This is a pre-refereed version of an article that was revised and published in the Journal of Human Resource Management, Special Issue on Human Resource Management and Employment Relations in Australian public sector and not-for-profit organisations (2006).
Bringing the Community In:
Possibilities for public sector union success
through
community unionism
Amanda Tattersall
Officer Unions NSW
Work and Organisational Studies, University of Sydney
Abstract:
Public sector employment relations are increasingly difficult for public sector unions. It
has been suggested that alliances between public sector employees and public service
consumers may provide a strategy for enhancing union success in bargaining and
achieving reforms in the public service. This paper uses the concept of community
1
unionism to explore how and when relationships between unions and community
organisations may provide a means for enhancing union success for public sector
unions. The paper uses a case study of the NSW Teachers Federation and their four year
campaign for public education between 2001 and 2004. This case study shows the
success of long term deep alliances between parents and teachers in achieving reform of
the public service, while highlighting some limitations for community unionism strategy
in salary negotiations. The paper concludes that community unionism is a viable
strategy for public sector unions, and suggests that organisational relationships,
common interest and mutli-scaled forms of activity are important ingredients of
successful community unionism in the public sector.
While there is a marked decline in union density across liberal
market economies, public sector union density has shown greater
resilience. Public sector union density in Australia and the UK
is twice that of overall density, and in New Zealand and the USA
public sector density is three times that of overall density.i
Yet, public sector unions remain constrained in their negotiations
with Governments who are fiscally conservative and criticise the
narrow vested interests of unions. They are also increasingly
subject to restrictions on the use of traditional forms of
industrial action, like the strike.
2
Indeed, public sector union success has been muted by the ‘crises’
of union power apparent in many industrialised countries. Public
sector unions in Australia, which in the past enjoyed
accommodating, consent-based relationships with Government now
experience relationships with far more conflict. In the State of
NSW, Transport and Nursing unions who have a history of non-
militancy and strong relationships with the Australian Labor Party
(ALP), now find themselves in protracted struggles to prevent
concession bargaining and achieve wage increases (Markey 1994;
Tattersall 2004). The WorkChoice legislation has recently
restricted the types of industrial action that are able to be
taken by front-line public sector workers.
In this context the NSW Teachers Federation has experimented with
a practice I term community unionism, to try to advance the
concerns of public education and worker voice in a space of
deteriorating employment relations. This paper first develops a
framework for understanding this concept of community unionism and
then explores the various strategies of the NSW Teachers
Federation over a three year period to assess their relative
success and the potential of those strategies for enhancing the
strength of public sector unions.
3
Community Unionism: an introduction
Public sector employment relations are directly connected to
public services, with many Non-Government Organisations and local
communities sharing a direct interest in the quality of the
services produced. The term ‘community’ has come into vogue as a
possible frame for advancing the interests of unions in an
environment of declining service quality and hostile employment
relations (Johnston 1994; Carpenter 2000; Terry 2000).
‘Community,’ in the form of community unionism or (labour) union-
community coalitions is said to provide a mechanism for increasing
power and enhancing union success (Brecher and Costello 1990;
Tuffs 1998; Reynolds 1999; Nissen 2000; Clawson 2003).
Community is one of those troublesome ‘keywords’ of sociology. It
is almost always invoked positively – an adjective antidote – that
conjures up ideas of generalised public support (Williams 1976;
Tattersall forthcoming). For unions, community is often perceived
as an instrumental, external, silver bullet that will multiply the
power of unions through joint union and community action. Yet,
like the measure of union density, the mere presence of community
partners does not translate into enhanced power or union success.
4
Success is a more subtle outcome of the complex types of
interactions between union and ‘community’, and how those
interactions create and respond to external political
opportunities.
Approaches to community unionism and labour-community coalitions,
while confusing, elucidate some consistent themes. Most commonly,
the term community is used to substitute for the phrase community
organisation. This slippage is so common it is built into the
term labour-community coalition, which refers to coalitions
between unions and community organisations (Brecher and Costello
1990; Tuffs 1998; Reynolds 2004). Secondly, community is also
used to describe a group of people who have a set of common
concerns, interests or identities, such as a community of women or
environmentalists (Waterman 1991; Taksa 2000; Clawson 2003;
Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005). Thirdly, community is also
used to mean place, as in a geographic area, in particular a local
neighbourhood (Patmore 1994; Jonas 1998; Savage 1998; Walsh 2000;
Ellem 2003). These three definitions of community are not
mutually exclusive. They can be seen as complementary and
supplementary: the greater the interaction between organisation,
5
common interest/identity and place, the stronger the ‘community’
foundations.
Community unionism can be seen as a broad concept that describes
the intersection between unions and these three forms of
community. Thus the strategy of community unionism includes
unions working to build power at the scale of a place, a union
working with community organisations and unions working on issues
of community identity (such as with immigrants, women) or on
broader community issues (such as public education or peace).
Within this, union-community coalitions refer one kind of
community unionism – that is coalitions between community
organisations and labour unions.
This categorisation of community unionism provides a three part
framework for analysing how and when this form of union strategy
can be successful. Community unionism has a relational dimension,
made more successful when there are interdependent, trusting
coalitional relationships between community organisations and
unions (Tuffs 1998; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Obach 2004).
Community unionism also has a political frame, made more
successful when the common concern between the organisations is in
6
the mutual interests of those organisations, deeply connected to
the experiences of union members and framed as a social concern
rather than a vested interest (Flanders 1970; Brecher and Costello
1990; Moody 1997). Thirdly, community unionism has a spatial
dimension, made more successful when it is able to act at multiple
scales, such as the local, city, state and the national (Ellem
2005; Walsh 2000, Castree et al 2004, Pastor 2001). In addition,
these three types of relationships are also dependent on the
available political opportunities (Reynolds 1999; McAdam, Tarrow
et al. 2001; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Turner forthcoming).
The usefulness of this analytical framework is that it overcomes
the empirically intensive literature that tends to equate
successful outcomes with successful union-community relationships.
While obviously successful political victories are important, the
‘means’ of political action are as important as the ‘ends.’ The
ability for community unionism to develop powerful reciprocal
relationships with community organisations, and build the capacity
i In Australia total density is 23%, public sector density is 46%; in UK total density is 26% and public sector density is 60%; in Canada total density is 30% and public sector density is 70%; in the USA total density is 13% and public sector density is 36%; in New Zealand total density is 21% and public sector density is 66%: sources Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005; Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 2005; UK Dept of Trade and Industry 2005; US Dept of Labor 2005; Statistics New Zealand, QES March 2005.
7
and politicisation of union members are important goals for
building successful and sustainable and long term union power.
In particular, the strategy of community unionism may be
particularly useful for advancing union and community interests in
the public sector, given the nature of public service and the
crisis in public sector employment relations. A union’s
industrial location may make successful engagement in community
unionism more likely. Labour geographers suggest that reaching
out to the community is most likely in service-based industries,
particularly ones where the consumer market and labour market are
fixed in the same geographic spaces {Walsh, 2000 #53; Savage, 1998
#39; Pastor, 2001 #279}. Johnston suggests that community
unionism is a promising strategy for public sector unions, because
these workers provide services of public benefit, creating a ready
constituency of consumers with an interest in improving the
quality of public services (Johnston 1994). It is widely
speculated that the economic conditions of international
competition and privatisation create a ready environment for
community unionism (Brecher and Costello 1990; Robinson 2000). In
addition, it is suggested that community unionism is more likely
to be chosen as a strategy in periods of union crisis, that union
8
leaders play a critical role in its development and that embarking
on community unionism requires a process of internal union change,
or union renewal (Voss and Sherman 2000; Tattersall forthcoming;
Turner forthcoming).
I will examine this framework using a case study of the public
education campaign run by the NSW Teachers Federation from 2001 to
2004. I will examine how variations in the relationship between
the union and community organisations, the types of interests
campaigned on and the scale of the campaign affected the success
of the union’s campaign. I conclude by considering the
possibilities and limitations of this strategy for public sector
unions more generally.
NSW Public Education Campaign: Community Unionism and the NSW
Teachers Federation
The NSW Public Education campaign was a four year campaign lead by
the NSW Teachers Federation in a comprehensive attempt to ‘do
things differently’ by structuring their fight for improved
conditions in schools as a broad-based campaign for public
education. The stimulus for this campaign arose from a brutal and
damaging salaries campaign in the late 1990s, prompting dramatic
9
internal structural and strategic changes. The four year campaign
involved creating state-based and locally organised alliances
between ‘parents, principles and teachers.’
The NSW Teachers Federation is the largest public sector union in
NSW. It was formed in 1918, and represents public school teachers
and teachers in the NSW-based ‘Technical and Further Education
(TAFE) system (O'Brien 1987). The union has very strong density,
with well over 90% of full-time teachers in the union (White
2004). Over 70% of its members are women. It has a long history
of radicalism for public education and on social issues as broad
as peace and feminism (O'Brien 1987). Its radicalism has meant it
often had a tense relationship with the Australian Labor Party
(ALP). The union has a strong commitment to member involvement,
with a 300 rank and file person council that meets eight times per
year and over 2000 union delegates and 2 000 women’s contacts, one
each in each school across the state (Federation 2005). The union
has a regional structure, with over 150 regionally-based teacher
associations that meet monthly.
The 2001 Public Education campaign grew out of a crisis in public
education, and a crisis in the ability for the union to change it.
10
The State and Federal Governments are responsible for education
funding, with the State Government primarily responsible for
running the public school system. The 1990s saw significant budge
reductions to public education from both Governments. At a
Federal level, there was a shift in funding from public schools to
private schools. At a state level, the policy of fiscal
tightening was directed at school restructures and reducing
recurrent expenditure – the greatest item being teacher wages.
Union members and leaders were drawn into the union’s battle
against fiscally conservative Government policy as salary battles
became increasingly difficult during the 1990s. Salaries
campaigns became ‘increasingly bitter,’ with condition stripping
becoming the basis for award negotiation (Author interview, Maree
O’Halloran, NSWTF President 20 Dec 2004). The hostility reached
fever pitch in 1999 with The Daily Telegraph, the largest circulation
paper in the country running a front page campaign attacking the
credibility of the Teachers Federation and their wage claims.
This culminated in a tabloid front-page article on the day of a
strike that featured a cartoon of the Teachers Federation
President who was drawn wearing a dunce’s cap with the slogan ‘if
the cap fits!’ (Telegraph 1999).
11
The media campaign was unusually brutal; prompting the union to
embark on new thinking about types of campaigning that could be
used to reinstate their credibility and capability to advance the
conditions of public education. During 1998 and 2000, the union
undertook three structural innovations. A group of teachers and
organisers, mainly based in the South-Western and Outer Western
suburbs of Sydney, an area of socio-economic disadvantage, began
planning a program for new union strategies (Author interviews,
NSWTF organisers Feb and March 2005). The first initiative was to
establish a membership levy to assist the Teachers Federation to
campaign proactively on public education through the commercial
media and in the community. The second innovation was the
development of Public Education Lobbies. These locally based
lobby groups, the same size as Federal Electorate Districts, and
would function as advocacy group for public education, run by a
local parent, local teacher and local principle (Zadkovich 1999).
Thirdly, the union at a leadership level decided to restructure
its relationship with principals, committing to a stronger
relationship between Teachers and Principals Associations as a key
ally in public education.
12
These three structural shifts allowed the union to embark on a
broad strategy of community unionism involving three key elements.
Firstly, the union formed closer relationships, and eventually a
formal coalition with the Principal Associations (Secondary
Principals Association, Primary Principals Association and Public
Schools Principals Forum) and Parent Groups (the Federation of
Parents & Citizens (P&C) and the Federation of Community
Organisations (FOSCO). Secondly the union shifted to frame all
its campaigns as campaigns for public education. Thirdly, the
union established capacity at a local as well as a state level in
order to build member participation, political influence and
public awareness about publication education.
During 2001 to 2004 there were a series of different campaign
periods, with different types of relationships between the parties
which had varying successes. These periods will be briefly
examined and the success and weaknesses of the changing contours
of community unionism will be evaluated.
Period One: Federal Election, Jan -Nov 2001
13
The public education campaign began with the aim of influencing
the outcome of the 2001 Federal Election, and to do so developed a
simple coalition with parents and principals.
The Election campaign consisted of a series of ad hoc events. It
began with an advertising campaign focused on the merits of public
education, then extended locally as the new public education
lobbies undertook local events. Through the lobbies local
parents, principles and teachers met with politicians. The major
activity of the campaign was a Public Education Convention on
September 8. Planning was coordinated by the Teachers Federation,
with the other partners consulted in drafting a joint statement,
and then encouraged to bring people to event (Anonymous author
interview, Principal Representatives, Feb 2005). The Convention
was attended by over 10 000 people, in a space that fits 30 000,
with the audience addressed by politicians from all the major
parties. Teachers Federation organisers described the event
positively, one even called it ‘groundbreaking’ (Anonymous author
Interview, Teachers Organiser March 2005). Yet, many of the
principal and parent representatives who were less involved had
quite modest reflections (Author interview, Principal
Representative Feb 2005). Education as an issue was overshadowed
14
during that election. September 11 and the issue of refugees and
border control dominated the election, and saw the conservative
Government re-elected.
The community union strategy during this period was moderately
successful. The union relationships with community organisations
shifted from an ad hoc coalition to a more formal coalition
structured around planning a joint event (Tattersall forthcoming).
These relationships allowed for joint participation, and
established bonds of trust that later deepened into stronger
coalitions. However, the Teachers Federation’s organisational
dominance over the event constrained others ownership. On the
question of common interest, the campaign was consistently framed
as public education. Local lobbying events harnessed rank and
file participation and created a platform for lobbying and local
awareness for the union in addition to the national Convention.
Period Two: Vinson Inquiry, March 2001-August 2002
The public education campaign’s most successful activity was the
Vinson Inquiry, an independent Public Inquiry into Public
Education organised by a deep coalition between the NSW Teachers
Federation and the Federation of Parents & Citizens. It created a
15
teacher/parent agenda for public education, and engaged a large
number of rank and file teachers in the Inquiry process.
The Vinson Inquiry was a political opportunity, created by the
Teachers Federation and the P&C in response to repeated
restructuring proposals from the NSW State Government. The State
Government’s controversial Building the Future proposal, released in
March 2001, recommended the closure of 13 schools, and was
immediately opposed by inner city communities through wildcat
strikes and public meetings (O'Halloran 2001). The union
initially called for the Government to review its proposals
through a Government Inquiry, then, during its April Executive
meeting one rank and file representative exclaimed ‘why don’t we
just do a review ourselves’ (Author interview, Simpson, former
NSWTF President, 12 April 2005). With the Public Education Levy,
which had accumulated over $1 million for public education, an
independent review, while expensive was possible.
The Vinson Inquiry was run by a tight formal partnership between
the Federation of Parents & Citizens and the Teachers Federation
through a separate independent structure. A partnership across
the ‘education community’ gave the Inquiry legitimacy to comment
16
on the future of public education. A joint decision making
structure was formed, with a dedicated representatives from the
Teachers and the P&C directly responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the Inquiry. The Teachers found an Inquiry head,
Tony Vinson, an Emeritus Professor of Education at the University
of Sydney who also had previous experience in reviewing Government
Services. He established a separate structure for the Inquiry
process, acting as an autonomous head of a distinct organisation.
He set up an office in separate premises, hired as research team
and was given control over discretionary funds provided mainly by
the Teachers Public Education Fund, but also by the P&C.
The Inquiry’s independent status gave it authority within
Government and amongst the partner groups. Vinson independently
sought out a constructive relationship with the ALP Government and
the Department of Education, requesting their support as a
condition for the inquiry proceeding (Author interview, Tony
Vinson, 3 March 2005). Although it was created by the parents
and teachers, the inquiry sat above them, allowing it to focus on
the common concerns for education issues and not tensions or
conflicts of interest. The Inquiry looked like a formal
Government Inquiry while acting as a tool for agenda setting and
17
generating mass union participation. The Vinson Inquiry had
submissions, hearings and public meetings. But it was also
consciously structured to increase awareness about public
education for the 2003 State Election and to maximise teacher and
parent participation. The union constantly used mass-based
activities for every stage of the Inquiry. Submissions were
advertised in the major daily newspapers, the Inquiry was launched
through a Sky Channel meeting (which is a live television
broadcast that plays live in over 40 locations around the state,
followed by meetings of teachers and parents in those locations),
772 Submissions were received and the Inquiry held 28 public
meetings and school visits across the state (Vinson 2002).
Simultaneously, this community oriented practice reflected a
conscious commitment by the Teachers Federation to broaden how it
expressed its public messages and how it engaged its members.
Maree O’Halloran, the President of the Federation recalls ‘I made
an effort … of saying parents, principals and teachers say’ not
just speaking as the union, but as the education community (Author
interview O’Halloran, President NSWTF, 20 Dec 2004). The members
were engaged in ongoing activities that sought their input, and
asked them to reflect on public education. Sue Simpson, the former
18
NSW President noted that ‘it is a more engaging collective process
to write a submission, compared to a strike which can be organised
in an individualised way … this was deeply collective and
participatory (Author interview, Sue Simpson, former NSWTF
President, 12 April 2005). The activities of the Inquiry
constantly engaged the union membership in new ways and on issues
not simply about wages but about the status of the education
system.
The Inquiry’s backbone was its hearings, which allowed it to
operate simultaneously at the local scale and the scale of the
state. The hearings lasted over six months and were staged as
local events across the state, engaging rank and file
participation and major media attention. These hearings became a
space for direct union member engagement with the Inquiry, and by
asking teachers and parents to air their grievances and make
recommendations, it generated a deep level of rank and file
participation. As Maree O’Halloran commented ‘it touched the
middle teacher that doesn’t get involved in their union’ (Author
interview, Maree O’Halloran 20 Dec 2004). The hearings were also
a vehicle for media attention on public education across the
state, as a senior official noted ‘there was hardly a day (in 2002
19
and 2003) where there was not a story about public education’
(Author interview, Angelo Gavrielatos, then NSWTF Vice President,
1 Feb 2005).
Furthermore, the Inquiry developed a research agenda on the future
of public education, synthesising the concerns of teachers,
parents and principles into a vision for public education,
captured as 96 recommendations for reform (Vinson 2002). The
issue of public education was broad enough to mutually and
directly engage the organisational interests of the NSW Teachers
Federation and the P&C. And importantly, the Inquiry also
provided a framework that engaged rank and file teachers and
parents. Teachers and parents have an interest in public
education funding, and the Inquiry, by asking them to raise
specific grievances, engaged organisation members about their
specific issues of concern. The intermixing of a broad direct
interest and specific issues enabled the common concern at the
heart of the coalition to act as a mobilising, participatory force
that deeply engaged the rank and file.
The Vinson Inquiry represented a very successful form of community
unionism. The structure of the relationship between the parents
20
and teachers was deep and intimate. There was a formal decision
making structure, with dedicated organisational staff and the
formation of a separate independent coalition office. The common
concern at the heart of the relationship was the mutually-engaging
interest of public education. The program of the Inquiry allowed
rank and file parents and teachers to engage in this concern as
the issue of public education could be connected to the day to day
issues experienced on the job or as a parent. The social justice
frame of public education enabled the research agenda to gain
significant publicity in the media. Finally, the Inquiry was able
to act locally at a school level as well as at a state level,
sustaining public interest and escalating concern for public
education in the lead up to a State Election.
Period Three: The State Election, August 2002 to March 2003
The NSW Teachers Federation formed the Public Education Alliance
as the vehicle for the public education campaign between August
2002 and March 2003. That Alliance of ‘parents, principals and
teachers’ was a group of six public education partners that
created a mutual-interest coalition structured around winning
targeted reforms identified by the Vinson Inquiry.
21
The Public Education Alliance evolved out of the deep
relationships between the parents and teachers created through the
Inquiry, and the simple coalition initiated with the principals
during the Federal Election. The Public Education Alliance sought
create a ‘united front … of parents, teachers and principals
speaking with a united voice’ tied to agreed common priorities
that would be jointly promoted through a series of events in the
lead up to the state election (Author interview, Principal
Representative, 9 March 2005). The Alliance operated through
irregular but constant meetings held at the Teachers Federation.
These meetings were attended by the senior executive officers of
all of the participating organisations (Author interview,
Principal Representative, 11 March 2005). The participants put
aside differences within the Alliance space, as one representative
acknowledged:
‘I wouldn’t say we are close now as individuals, but when it
comes to a public face in terms of pursuing those ideas for
public education, well then we are buddies (Author
interview, Principal Representative, 26 Feb 2005).
22
The Alliance was a space for negotiation, evident in how it
formulated its six united demands for the Election campaign. The
Teachers Federation was an initiator of this process by preparing
the initial draft of demands, then ‘shopping them around’ for
discussion (Author interview, O’Halloran, NSWTF President 20 Dec
2004). Other groups then amended the documents, as a
representative from FOSCO describes, ‘we always had the power to
veto … anything that we didn’t approve of’ (Author interview,
Allen FOSCO, 17 Feb 2005). The formulation of united demands
sought to balance the specific issues that concerned individual
organisations within a broad interest frame of public education.
As one Principal noted ‘we were all encompassed by those
recommendations’ (Anonymous author interview, principal
representative, Feb 2005). The demands included the issues of
class sizes, school maintenance, quality teachers and professional
development. The negotiated balance of the demands allowed the
broad concept of public education to translate to the specific
concerns of each constituent organisation, binding them to the
campaign through their own self-interest.
Controversies surfaced over a few issues, the major one being how
the Alliance framed its concern for salaries. The Teachers
23
Federation knew ‘they couldn’t get away without having salaries
there’ as a part of the united demands (Author interview,
O’Halloran NSWTF 20 Dec 2004). After the election, the union
would move into bargaining its next wages claim, and mentioning
salaries would offset any disquiet in the union’s membership that
the Federation was forgetting its core responsibilities (Author
interview, Federation official, Dec 2004). However, the parent
groups, particularly FOSCO, were equally adamant that salaries
would not be mentioned, arguing it was ‘inappropriate,’ fearing
that this issue would come to dominate the Alliance, given the key
role the union was already playing (Author interview, Parent
representative, Feb 2005). Eventually the Federation compromised,
with the United Demands calling for ‘the development of strategies
to attract and retain teachers in an era of teacher shortage’
which was a way of expressing a need for salary justice to union
members without mentioning the word salaries.
This controversy highlights a limitation in how coalitions frame
common concerns. While an alliance flourishes on issues of mutual
common interest, organisations also have autonomous internal needs
that must also be satisfied. For unions, salaries are inevitably
a concern as wage justice is a key purpose for why people join
24
unions. The art of coalition practice is balancing the
contradiction between autonomous organisational needs and common
unity – a dialectic between unity and autonomy (Hyman 1989). The
tension between salaries and the broader frame of public education
is a clear example of this.
Once the united demands were agreed upon, the Alliance planned a
series of joint events that led up to the State Election. The
events were staged at multiple scales, with greatest focus on the
scale of the State Government – where the key decision makers
were. The public education lobbies did undertake local activities
– displaying school signs that said ‘public education is the
issue,’ and continued with local lobbying. But the momentum from
the Alliance was drawn to State based events – including central
lobbying of key politicians and a State Public Education Forum.
The Alliance’s agenda setting power created political
opportunities. In November 2002, the Opposition leader in the
State Parliament endorsed the Alliance’s demands over class-sizes
five months before the election. This escalated pressure upon the
Government. The Alliance met with the Premier (Government Leader)
on January 22nd, an incredible achievement given the Teachers
25
Federation had not met with the Premier in years. The Alliance
also hosted a Public Education Forum on February 16th 2003.
Unlike the Convention in 2001 – this forum was meticulously
planned within the Alliance and was ‘packed to the rafters’ mainly
with teachers, but also with parents bussed in from around the
city. This escalation of public and private pressure created
political success with the Government announcing support for
reducing class sizes and increasing funding for professional
development two weeks out from the election.
In this period, the Public Education Alliance was extremely
successful in achieving outcomes for public education, while less
successfully at sustaining and developing union rank and file
ownership and participation. This example of community unionism
set a broad based agenda for public education, achieved reform on
class sizes and professional development, and put teacher salaries
on the agenda. It also involved rank and file union members in
several centrally organised events. However meaningful activity
was controlled by the State leaders of the Alliance. As Clawson
argues, a coalition can be successful without deeply engaging
organisation participants, and this mutual interest coalition
highlights this gap (Clawson 2003).
26
Period Four: The Salaries Campaign, March 2003 to May 2004
The final stage of the Public Education campaign saw a rapid
deterioration of the close relationships built over the last 2
years, with mutual interest relationships pulling back into ad hoc
relationships.
The public education agenda set up the teachers’ salary campaign.
As Angelo Gavrielatos noted, ‘we had created a platform from which
we were able to launch into salaries (Author interview,
Gavrielatos, then Vice-President, 1 Feb 2005). Indeed, the
momentum gave the union an early meeting with the Premier, and to
the Federation’s shock, an early pay offer. The offer of a 6%
wage increase over 2 years was significantly below union
expectations, but it was a dramatically better starting point than
the 1990s demand for concession bargaining. Indeed, the
Department of Education was keen to ‘avoid a war.’ The
Government’s strategy was to make an offer and push for
Arbitration using the NSW Industrial Relation’s Commission’s
powers to hear demands for pay claims and determine an independent
settlement (Author interview, Department Official, April 2005).
27
The Federation proceeded to prepare for Commission hearings during
a period of shifting ground. One problem was policy-based; the
union had not secured a commitment from the Government to fully
fund any pay recommendations. A fear was that if the Industrial
Relations Commission awarded a pay increase above 6%, then the
Government would pay for that increase out of the existing public
education budget – in effect cutting money from schools to pay for
teacher salaries. A second problem was organisational. During
2002 the Parents & Citizens Federation experienced an acrimonious
change in leadership. The new leaders of the P&C prioritised
building a stronger relationship with the Government, distancing
the Parents from the Teachers Federation (Author interviews,
parent representatives, February and May 2005). A third issue was
the Teachers Federation’s decision to campaign on salaries alone.
The commission hearings took the union into a courtroom separated
from the public agenda it had just created. While the union
brought their members into the courtroom and ran a very public
campaign around the hearings, they distanced themselves from their
education partners. For instance, the Teachers Federation
produced a pamphlet about their pay claim that they circulated in
the Sunday newspapers, which talked about ‘parents’ without
consulting the parents first (Author interview, teacher official,
28
Dec 2004). These entwined issues pulled previously close
relationships apart, reducing trust between parents and teachers.
The campaign events during this period were organised by the union
and were industrially not community focused. The rallies had only
union speakers, the first with speakers only from the Federation,
and the second adding the Secretary of Unions NSW (Central Labour
Council in NSW). The activities were industrial, mobilising union
support not the public education community. Similarly media
commentary focused on the percentage of wage increase that was
being offered, and advertisements run by the Federation also
narrowly focused on the issue of teacher pay, rather than the link
between pay and quality education (Federation 2003).
Further pressure came from the Government who placed aggressive
pressure on the Commission in the lead up to it making its award.
The Premier ‘warned’ the Commission not to hand out ‘affordable
wage increases, and then opened the Salaries case to lodge
evidence about incapacity to pay wage increases (Dixon 2004).
The Government’s aggression inadvertently changed the outlook of
the campaign, shifting the issue from the quantum of pay to the
29
issue of fully-funding the pay rise. With this broader issue the
Federation began a process of reaching out to education partners
as well as to its members. It staged a strike, but also leafleted
parents at schools demonstrating that full funding was in the
interests of the public education community, as it protected the
public education budget (Zadkovich 2004).
The Commission handed down their award creating a 12.5% pay
increase, much lower than the Federation had hoped. But, by this
stage the union was focused on the issue of full funding and was
galvanising the public education community. Media messages began
to change, even the conservative Daily Telegraph noted – ‘this is not
the usual fight by teachers over money. This has become a fight
for the survival of a valued and quality public education system’
(Parker 2004). In this context, the Federation prepared for a
state-wide strike on 25 June over full funding.
The pressure of this reaching out strategy was magnified by a
historic vote at the P&C. For the first time since the 1980s, the
P&C voted to support the strike. It was a controversial vote too,
because the motion was not supported by the President of the P&C
(Author interview, parent representative, April 2005). That
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afternoon, news of the vote hit the press. It was this
controversial and unpredictable support that saw the Government
change its policy – and the day before the strike – it came out in
support of full funding.
This ad hoc support from the P&C was critical for the union to
finally achieve the full funding of its salary rise. In Maree
O’Halloran’s opinion ‘it kicked the balance in terms of full
funding and was why we got it in the end’ (Author interview,
O’Halloran President NSWTF, 20 Dec 2004). This support came even
while there was poor relationship between the leaders of the two
organisations. Beneath the leadership, officials in both parent
and teacher groups had continued to talk, and those relationships
had generated the support that cemented the teachers’ victory.
The salaries campaign represented a low point in the community
union strategy. The Teachers Federation became isolated through
Commission hearings, which were fought as an industrial not
community battle. Fundamentally, this campaign revealed a key
limitation and contradiction in community unionism. At one level,
the most important issue for unions are salaries, yet salaries
create the greatest level of tension and conflict with community
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partners. While the preceding community campaigns around public
education built a powerful platform for the salaries campaign,
creating the largest salaries offer that the union had received in
recent times, those relationships fell away as the union reverted
to its traditional industrial tactics and the leadership in the
parent organisation changed.
Yet, even with weak community relationships, it was resilient
relationships between union officials and the Parents & Citizens
that created the victory. These officials were bridge builders,
overcoming the tension between the two organisations and allowing
the groups to work together (Rose 2000). This campaign shows the
power of even weak ad hoc relationships between unions and
community organisations. It was this historic action by the P&C
that ‘tipped the balance’ away from the Government and created the
pressure that shifted the Government’s decision.
Reflections and Conclusion
Public sector unions have the capacity to use their role as public
service providers as a ‘sword of justice’ to enhance their power
in public sector employment relations (Flanders 1970). This case
study demonstrates key possibilities and limitations for community
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unionism as a public sector strategy. If community unionism
becomes more powerful through strong relationships, strong mutual
issues and strong multi-scaled action, then it requires a
supportive context to flourish. Community unionism relies on
strong non-Government organisation partners. Here the
relationships were built through a close knit group of parents and
principals, commonly interested in public education. However,
these partners had a significantly reduced capacity to mobilise
members, are highly influenced by their leadership and had
significantly smaller financial resources than the Teachers
Federation which placed constraints on the strategy. Community
unionism also relies on strong interests and issues. Here the
issue of public education was directly in the mutual interest of
all the partners, yet the issue of salaries – a core concern of
the union – was controversial. This case study makes clear that
salaries can be an issue of conflict, while also showing that it
does not have to be the case. This salaries campaign broke down
because of how it was run and because of a decline in consultation
between the parties; these are variables and not fixed limitations
on the possibilities of community unionism. Finally community
unionism also relies on multi-scalar action. The public education
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lobbies initiated this capacity, but they were difficult to
sustain.
This case study demonstrates that there are contextual
opportunities and choices that support the development of
community unionism. Confirming Johnston’s argument about public
sector social movement unionism and Walsh and Savage’s arguments
about service unionism, the Teachers Federation’s location in a
public, service-based industry, with local workplaces that
interact with a stable ‘customer’ base, provided a steady,
organised constituency of parents and principles, committed to
supporting public education (Savage 1998; Johnston 2000; Walsh
2000). Organisational leadership in the unions and community
organisations was critical for sustaining trusting relationships
and successful community unionism. For the union, size was
important. The Teachers Federation was a large, resource rich
union which enabled it to embark on an Independent Inquiry and
public community campaign. The demographics of union members may
also be important; the Teachers Federation was female dominated.
As Needleman and Pocock note, the boundaries between ‘work’ and
‘home’ are less distinct for women, who continue to be the primary
child carers, perhaps making the shift to ‘community issues’
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easier (Needleman 1998; Pocock 2003). The Teachers Federation’s
internal democracy and its large number of delegates, regional
organisers and regional Teacher Associations provided a mobilising
structure to undertake local hearings and the mass events during
the campaign. Finally, the union’s internal shift towards
community unionism affirmed Voss’s prediction, in that the public
education campaign was preceded by an environmental crisis that
triggered an internal union crisis and structural changes (Voss
and Sherman 2000).
From the experience of the public education campaign, we can
speculate about the applicability of this strategy across public
sector unions and public sector employment relations. The idea of
a constituency of service recipients that is organised in a local
area is a common feature in other public sector industries,
particularly for front-line public sector workers like public
transport, police and emergency services, health care and
childcare (Pastor 2001, 275). For some like health care workers,
this consumer base may be more transient than parents, but there
is clearly a constituency of people with a common concern capable
of being organised and connected to the issue of quality public
service, in addition to NGOs who are capable of forming
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coalitions. Similarly, public sector unions generally negotiate
wage claims in an environment of fiscal crisis that often includes
privatisation. These issues deeply affect union members by
threatening to reduce wages and conditions, while also affect the
capacity of a union to bargain. In such circumstances, a broad
based community campaign not only enhances the power of a union,
but provides a proactive frame for a campaign – a union becomes
‘for’ quality, public services, rather than reactively against
privatisation or wage cuts. In addition, public sector unions, by
having relatively strong union density and a larger pool of union
members may also have the internal financial and human resources
capable of mounting a community union strategy. Yet variables for
whether a public sector union will choose community unionism still
remain, and success will depend on the capacity of a public sector
union to mobilise its own membership base and the supportiveness
of union leadership. However, there is a broad coalescence of
political opportunities that make community unionism a viable
strategy for public sector unions.
This paper has explored the possibilities of community unionism by
examining the four year public education campaign of the Teachers
Federation. The Teachers Federation’s campaign achieved
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significant and unprecedented political victories for the union,
at a policy level and in bargaining. The public education
campaign created an agenda for positive policy reform, while also
transforming the hostile employment relationship of the 1990s to a
constructive non-concession bargaining environment in 2003. Since
this campaign, the union has had even greater success – in 2005
the Teachers Federation and the Government negotiated ‘an
unprecedented settlement’ outside of arbitration that did not
involve industrial action (NSWTF 2005).
Most importantly, this study demonstrates that community unionism
is not a simple recipe for union power or union success. Rather,
the practice of campaigning in coalition, on issues of mutual
community concern at multiple scales is a variable beast, which
changes overtime given the shifting relationships between the
organisations, the changing issues at the heart of the campaign
and the capacity to resource local as well as state and national
activity and organisation. Community unionism may deliver a
policy victory, but unless it also sustains and develops the
politicisation, engagement and participation of union members it
may provide only limited long term capacity benefits. Similarly,
coalition relationships do not necessarily improve over time.
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Rather, this case study demonstrates that coalition relations are
transient, a produce of sustained trust, mutual interest,
leadership and reciprocity. Community unionism has the potential
to enhance the success of public sector unions in achieving policy
reform, electoral influence and bargaining outcomes. However the
successfulness of these strategies is a product of the dynamic
political opportunities, relationships and interests that are
combined in particular campaigns.
Primary References
Author interviews conducted between December 2004 and May 2005.
In total 42 interviews undertaken with union and community
organisation representatives, one Minister for Education and
several Department of Education Officials. Most of the
interviewees are cited anonymously. Named interviewees include:
Maree O’Halloran, NSWTF President, Sue Simpson, former NSWTF
President, Angelo Gavrielatos, NSWTF Vice-President 1 Feb 2005,
Author interview, Tony Vinson, 3 March 2005, Author Interview Bev
Baker, former President of Federation of P&C.
References
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005) catalogue 6310.0 Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership. Canberra: ABS.
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