Yugoslav Myths [IESIR Bratislava Working Papers 2007]

Institute ofEuropean Studies andInternational Relations www.es . f se s .un iba . sk

‘Yugoslav Myths’ Vassilis Petsinis

W O R K I N G

P A P E R S

I n s t i t u t e o f E u r o p e a n S t u d i e s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n sF a c u l t y o f S o c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c S c i e n c e s

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Institute of European Studies and International Relations Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences Comenius University Bratislava 2007 WORKING PAPERS Managing editor: Jozef Bátora Editorial Board: Andrej Findor Nikola Hynek Dagmar Kusá Silvia Miháliková Graphic Design: Tomáš Grečko FOR ACADEMIC USE ISSN 1337‐5466 Copyright notice: © Vassilis Petsinis, February 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication or parts thereof may be made without written consent of the author(s).

2 IESIR Working Papers 02/2008

‘Yugoslav Myths’

Abstract

In this article, I will touch upon three historical events that have given rise to a series of myths in the lands of the former Yugoslavia. These are, namely, the following: a. the Battle at Kosovo Polje (1389); b. the Communist Partisan movement and the anti‐Fascist resistance struggle (1941‐1945); c. the Croatian independent statehood under the Ustaše (1941‐1945). First, I will outline the historical background behind each of these events. Then I will focus on the ‘instrumental’ dimension of the myths that have emanated from them. In other words, I will demonstrate why and how, in the Western Balkans, the past is often appropriated for the legitimization of present political purposes.

IESIR Working Papers 02/2008 3

‘Yugoslav Myths’

Vassilis Petsinis

Introduction

National myths form an essential component of national identity. This is the case in the course of the identity‐formation process, as well as after its completion. At both stages, the function of national myths is of crucial importance to political elites. In short, national myths can be utilized for two purposes: a. mass mobilization through references to common symbols, shared historical heritages and common future aspirations; b. legitimization of those elites’ status and political authority. National myths are usually standardized through the selective appropriation and interpretation of certain historical events. The dynamic of national myths within the political sphere is particularly significant in these parts of Europe where the nation‐building process was materialized at some later stage, in comparison to Western Europe. This is the case, for instance, with the states of Southeast Europe.

In this article, I will touch upon three historical events that have given rise to a series of myths in the lands of the former Yugoslavia. These are, namely, the following: a. the Battle at Kosovo Polje (1389); b. the Communist Partisan movement and the resistance struggle (1941‐1945); c. the Croatian independent statehood under the Ustaše (1941‐1945). First, I will outline the historical background behind each of these events. Then I will focus on the ‘instrumental’ dimension of the myths that have emanated from them. Particular attention will be paid to the ways in which the employment of these myths has often interceded with each other. In other words, I will demonstrate why and how, in the Western Balkans, the past is often appropriated for the legitimization of present political purposes. Before embarking to the empirical discussion, it is essential to place the subject of this article within a theoretical framework.


Theoretical framework

Theoretical approaches to national myths

An ongoing debate among theorists of nationalism is that between the primordialists and the modernists. The representatives of these two schools have formulated contrasting approaches to the subject of national myths. In this article, I will briefly sketch out some basic standpoints of the two schools, with regard to national myths. Then, I will demonstrate why and how a modernist, and at the same time instrumentalist, theoretical approach would serve the objectives of this article more efficiently.

Primordialists such as John Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith attach a high importance to the persistence of ethnic heritages and traditions through the ages, thus including national myths1. For primordialists, the commonest and most persistent national myths are those that rest on the cultural affinity with a group’s presumed ancestors. In this case, we have to do with a spiritual type of kinship, one that seeks to trace a historical link between the present ideals and aspirations of the group and those of its presumed ancestors. Cultural myths stress the persistence of certain types of collective virtue (e.g. the ‘heroic spirit’) or other distinctive qualities such as language, religion and customs through the ages. They also seek to draw a parallel between these old qualities and the present virtues and cultural qualities of the group in question. By locating the present in the context of the past of the group, cultural myths interpret social changes and collective aspirations in a way that satisfies the drive for meaning. Most important, cultural myths endow the ‘nation’ with a near universality through the employment of images and phrases (e.g. ‘homeland’, ‘fatherland’, ‘motherland’), which aim at forging a subconscious bond of integrity among its members2. These myths acquire a more profound meaning when associated with ancestral territories. Hence the importance attached to ‘sacred territories’ in all types of nationalist imagery. Sacred territories encompass a poetic dimension: these are the territories where the group flourished during its golden age and which have to be defended by all means and at any cost. As will be demonstrated in greater

1 As far as John Armstrong is concerned, see Armstrong 1982, Introduction. 2 For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Connor 1993, p206.


depth, a typical example is the importance of the ‘Saga of Kosovo’ in Serbian nationalism. To sum up, in Anthony D. Smith’s words, cultural myths serve the following purposes:

1. They link past to present (or future) and act as models; 2. They possess external references of comparison, even implicitly; 3. They designate a space and time for action, a territorial program; 4. They contain impulses for collective action, mobilizing people; 5. They are developmental, assuming the possibility of change; 6. They are partly voluntaristic, in that successive generations may add to the

heritage and even regenerate themselves3.

The modernist and instrumentalist outlooks on national myths are distinctively different. Eric Hobsbwm (Hobsbwm 1983; 1990), Ernest Gellner (Gellner 1983) and other modernists acknowledge the locus of national myths and other symbolic material within contemporary national identities. Nevertheless the major qualitative difference between modernists, such as Hobsbwm, and primordialists lies in the following: For modernists, national myths are essentially constructed and generated by political elites in order to serve their interests and aims. In his contribution to the work The Invention of Tradition and in his study Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Hobsbwm focuses extensively on the locus of cultural myths inside the late 19th and early 20th century nation‐building processes. The author deconstructs these myths and disputes the assertion that they persist in a non‐malleable form through the ages and from one generation to another. What Hobsbwm demonstrates in both his works is that national myths have been largely adapted, transformed (even created) and, ultimately, standardized in more recent eras with the aim to serve certain political objectives. In other words, much of the subjective content of national myths is the outcome of sophisticated social engineering. The underlying motivation of this ‘invention of tradition’ lies precisely in serving the political and economic interests of ruling elites. In an even more instrumentalist light, Rogers Brubaker (Brubaker 2000) views national cohesion not as an essential state but as a continuous process that in some cases may be brought to completion but in others fail. This process is

3 On this issue see Smith 2000, pp 82‐3.


orchestrated by a variety of social and political entrepreneurs, such as politicians and political organizations, intellectuals and journalists. As part of this combined endeavour, these actors make good use of the historical background, as well as an array of cultural and socio‐psychological catalysts, in order to cement national cohesion. In the event, that this process is successful, ‘Serbs’ ‘Croats’ and other ethnic definitions transform from simple categories into homogeneous and externally bounded groups. The utilization of national myths, as part of this process, is of primary significance.

My main objective in this article is to concentrate on the instrumental dimension of certain myths in the lands of the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, I tend to be more positively inclined towards the modernist and instrumentalist sides of the debate. This is not to underestimate the moving impact which, as primordialists promptly point out, national (especially cultural) myths can exert upon people. Neither is my intention to assert that political elites construct national myths ‘out of the blue’. Most of these myths, in their original versions, are products of popular imagery. Nevertheless, when entering the political sphere, the socio‐psychological impact of these myths is subject to successful political engineering. In other words, it is up to certain political elites to publicly propagate these myths using a wide array of means at their disposal (most commonly the media and the educational system). As part of the entire process, these elites may overemphasize certain aspects of these myths, overlook others, or even radically reinterpret the content of these myths as such. The driving force behind this process is the motivation of these elites to maximize their mobilizing potential. Therefore, in practice, it is often political engineering that shapes (or reshapes) myths and not vice‐versa. In addition to these, there exists one more reason why an instrumentalist approach would be more applicable for the purposes of this article: Apart from cultural myths, the modern era has witnessed the emergence of collective myths with a trans‐national dimension; myths that aimed to transgress ethnic and cultural boundaries. Although myths of this variant acknowledge the diachronic significance of ethnic heritages and traditions, still they lay higher importance to symbols and images of a more universal appeal. The imagery of such ‘ideological’ myths has often consisted in allusions to the common struggle of various ethnic groups, within a given territory, for ‘social equality and progress’ or against ‘dark political forces and their agents’. By emphasizing the universal and minimizing the cultural


aspect, ideological myths have sought to provide a common ground for diverse groups and forge a sense of trans‐national unity, which has much more of a political than an ethno‐cultural character. Two good examples of this kind are the concepts of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ in the Soviet and Yugoslav cases respectively.

Myths of all kinds, their official interpretation and mass appeal tend to be not a static but a fluctuating field. Under certain political circumstances, the validity of fundamental myths may be regarded as unquestionable and the assessment (or reassessment) of given historical events as a ‘taboo topic’. However, when political circumstances change, erstwhile dominant myths may be strongly criticized (or fully discredited) and taboo topics touched upon. As empirical reality has demonstrated, ideological myths tend to be more malleable to the impact of socio‐political changes. Within the former Yugoslav context, this was the case with: a. the reassessment of the Partisan myth and the Titoist heritage, as a whole, since the early 1990s; b. the elaboration of diverse accounts on the Ustaše experience by Serbian and Croatian historians alike. The relatively recent elaboration of ideological myths in combination with their higher degree of malleability provide two additional factors that render a modernist and instrumentalist approach more suitable for the purposes of this article.

The Battle at Kosovo Polje (1389)

The Battle of Kosovo took place on St Vitus’ Day, 15 (now celebrated on 28) June 1389. The location of the battle was the Kosovo Field (or Kosovo Polje) in the proximity of Prizren (Map 1). The two combatants were the Ottoman army, under the leadership of Sultan Murad I, and a coalition of Balkan forces led by the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović. Murad’s army might have numbered 27,000 to 40,000, whereas Lazar’s might have 12,000 to 30,000 soldiers. The problem, however, is that reliable historical accounts of the battle are scarce4. In the beginning, the Balkan coalition took their rivals by surprise and inflicted heavy damage on the Ottoman flank. Nevertheless, an Ottoman counter‐attack pushed Lazar’s forces back. The Ottomans would strengthen

4 For some (often conflicting) estimations regarding the numerical strength of the two combatants, see the following sources: Sedlar 1994, p244; Cox 2002, p30; Cowley 1996, p249.


their position later in the day, but the result of the battle yet remains unclear5. This has to do with the fact that, due to the death of Sultan Murad during or before the battle, the military commander Bayezid had to go to Istanbul to be crowned the new Sultan. Therefore, the Ottoman forces retreated and the event as such cannot be classified as a clear victory or defeat. However, the Ottomans were now in an advantageous position since: a. the toll on the Serbian side was particularly heavy; b. much of the Serbian nobility, including Prince Lazar, was executed.

During the centuries of the Ottoman conquest, the Battle of Kosovo inspired successive generations of minstrels (or ’guslari’) in Serbia and Montenegro. The guslari commemorated the battle in a series of non‐standardized epic poems and legends. Most of these texts depict the outcome of the battle as a ’glorious defeat’ and result of divine intervention. In one of this legends, an angel appears to Prince Lazar before the battle and asks him to choose between a Heavenly kingdom and an earthly one; the latter meaning victory in the battlefield. Lazar opts for a Heavenly kingdom, so the Serbian army perishes. Some other legends of the ’Kosovo circle’ alleviate the biterness of defeat through allusions to scapegoats and traitors. A certain military commander, Vuk Branković, is represented as the Serbian Judas who led his forces over to the enemy at the crucial moment6. The first endeavour to rationalize and appropriate the symbolism of the ’Kosovo circle’ for political purposes was carried out by the Serbian intelligentsia and political elites in the 19th and early 20th century. These actors sought to interlink the old cult of the Kosovo Battle with the reverence for the 19th century Serbian uprisings and the commemoration of the First World War. The first marked the defeat of the medieval Serbian empire, the second announced the dawn and the third the consolidation of the modern Serbian state. As part of this endeavour to establish continuity among these events, in 1882, King Milan Obrenović was awarded the symbolic title of ‘The First Serbian King who is crowned after the Battle of Kosovo’. Moreover, Kosovo’s incorporation into the Kingdom of

5 For an account of the Battle of Kosovo, its course and outcome, see: Thomas A. Emmert, ‘The Battle of Kosovo: Early Reports of Victory and Defeat’, in Vucinich and Emmert (eds.) 1991, pp 1‐16. 6 For a brief example of the Kosovo Battle’s conceptualization in Serbian nationalist imagery see: Sima Cirković, ‘The Kosovo Field‐June 15, 1389’, pp 1‐6, at: http://www.kosovo.net/kosbitka2.html.


Yugoslavia (1919) was interpreted as clear indication that the ‘glorious defeat’ of 1389 had been avenged at last. As a matter of fact, the task to ‘avenge Kosovo’ possessed a focal position in the poems and legends of the Kosovo epic circle.

In the days of Tito’s Yugoslavia, the public veneration of the Kosovo Battle, as a Serbian cultural myth, weakened to a remarkable extent. Yugoslavia’s Communist establishment preferred to lay much higher emphasis on ideological myths of a trans‐national content and appeal. This was mainly the case with the Partisan movement during the Second World War, as well as the ideological predecessors of Socialist Yugoslavism (e.g. the ‘Illyrian Movement’ and similar 19th century initiatives). The higher importance attached to ideological myths and the simultaneous marginalization of the ‘particularistic’ ethno‐cultural ones was dictated by two political specificities of primary significance: a. Yugoslavia’s federal structure; b. the high degree of ethnic diversity within the federation. In other words, Yugoslav policy‐makers were convinced that the employment of trans‐national ideological myths could help provide a common symbolic capital for Yugoslavia’s diverse nations. On the contrary, the emphasis on ‘particularistic’ (e.g. Serbian, Croatian, etc.) ethno‐cultural myths of any kind was regarded as a potentially divisive option.

In the specific case of the Kosovo Battle, this myth was associated with the Serbian imperial past as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church7. This provided the Communist establishment with two additional reasons to marginalize the public dimension of the Kosovo Battle: On the one hand, all pre‐modern empires (including the Serbian one) were viewed by the Party instructors as oppressive and obsolete structures of the feudal era. On the other hand, the Serbian Orthodox Church, although not publicly denounced, still it was regarded by many Yugoslav Communists as a ‘reactionary’ institution. This is not to say that the Kosovo Battle myth was dormant among the Serbian population during the Communist era. However, the Kosovo Battle was celebrated in the privacy of the local community or family circle and did not enjoy any institutional endorsement. Meanwhile, the Kosovo epic circle and

7 It should also be born in mind that Kosovo is home to mediaeval religious monuments of primary significance to Serbs. Some examples are the Patriarchy of Peć and the monasteries of Gračanica and Dečan.


its various interpretations (or reinterpretations) became a favourite subject among academic specialists based in the, often anti‐Communist, Serbian Diaspora. This clearly contrasts with what was the case in certain unitary Communist states where the ruling elites often promoted ethno‐cultural myths, at the expense of proletarian internationalism, with the aim to legitimize their rule and mobilize the masses behind their banner. Two good examples were the institutional endorsement and propagation of the Daco‐Roman and Illyrian continuity myths in Ceausescu’s Romania and Enver Hoxha’s Albania respectively8.

The Kosovo myth would reappear to the fore in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By that time, Yugoslavia’s dissolution process had accelerated and the economic situation seriously deteriorated. Throughout the 1980s, the Serbian Communists under Ivan Stambolić would avidly protest against the way in which the system of autonomies for Kosovo and Vojvodina had practically resulted in Serbia’s ‘dismemberment’. According to Article 301 of the Yugoslav Constitution (1974), the Socialist Republic of Serbia could not pass legislation throughout its entire territory without the previous assent of the Kosovan and Vojvodinian assemblies. On the contrary, Kosovo and Vojvodina (i.e. the two autonomous provinces within the Socialist Republic of Serbia) could enact their legislation without the necessary ratification from the Serbian republican assembly. Moreover, according to the 1971 constitutional amendments, Kosovo and Vojvodina could introduce amendments to their provincial constitutions without previous consultation with the Serbian assembly9. This was an arrangement that seriously irritated Serbian officials, especially after the ethnic troubles in Kosovo (1981) and the emigration of Serbs out of the province.

Meanwhile, the political climate in Serbia during the 1980s had become rather liberal. Consequently, Serbian constitutional theorists, such as Kosta Cavoški and Vojislav Koštunica would constantly protest against the way in which the system of autonomies had rendered Serbia’s administrative system dysfunctional10. Soon, the Serbian intellectuals’ opposition to the political

8For a more detailed discussion of the employment of ethno‐cultural myths in Ceausescu’s Romania see Verdery 1995. 9For more on this issue see Mujajić 1981, pp 95‐99. 10 For more on this issue see Koštunica and Cavoški 1985, pp 212‐21.


status quo would acquire more nationalistic undertones: Certain circles within the Serbian intelligentsia would elaborate highly romantic interpretations of the history of the Serbian nation. This process ran parallel to the Serbian elites’ objective to curb the system of autonomy that Kosovo enjoyed, as an autonomous province, at that time. These interpretations largely consisted in martyr‐images emanating from the medieval battle at Kosovo Polje. A very potent image was that of the ‘Serbian Golgotha’11 under the Ottoman occupation and the way that the symbolism of the Kosovo Battle inspired the Serbs to rebel and ultimately end Ottoman rule. The ‘pact’ between the new wave of Serbian nationalist intellectuals and the emerging Serbian elites was concretized, as soon as Slobodan Milošević became leader of the Serbian Party Committee (1988) and, later, the Socialist Party of Serbia‐SPS (1990).

Under these circumstances, Kosovo and its mythology did not simply replace the Partisan symbolism and become part of the new institutionally‐endorsed myths. They could also, either implicitly or explicitly, be employed as a mobilization means with the aim to stimulate a sense of unity among Serbs for the challenges that awaited them within the crumbling federation. Therefore, the possibility that newly‐institutionalized cultural myths could interweave with the political objectives of the new Serbian elites was imminent. This was a groundbreaking development. Until then, Serbian Communists would criticize the situation in Kosovo from a purely ideological and structural perspective. They contended that the system of extended autonomy, which the Kosovan Albanian elites enjoyed since the 1970s, hindered the implementation of state policies within Serbia and jeopardized the function of the Yugoslav federation as a whole. This in itself, however, was not enough to mobilize the Serbian masses, especially at a time when nationalism was gaining ground and the Communist elites were discredited. Slobodan Milošević, on the contrary, was quick on his feet to make tactical use of the new wave of nationalism among the Serbian intelligentsia. To this aim he was assisted by a countrywide media network that his Socialist Party had inherited intact from the previous regime.

The significance of this novel approach consists in the following: It touched a sensitive cord in the Serbian collective subconscious. From that

11 ‘Serbian Golgotha’ is a term used in Serbian nationalist imagery in order to denote the plight of the Serbs under Ottoman occupation.


point onwards, Kosovo would not be seen as just a territory that had to be reincorporated into Serbia, so that the administrative balance of power within the Serbian republic would be restored. Most important of all, Kosovo would be seen as a territory where a landmark event that inspired Serbdom through the ages had taken place. Therefore, to the eyes of many Serbs, Kosovo’s administrative reincorporation into Serbia would simultaneously correspond to the restoration of the sentimental ties between Serbia and its immaculate ‘national soul’. The mobilizing potential of this new strategy was facilitated by: a. the eroding appeal of Socialist Yugoslavism among the Serbian population, as result of the administrative malfunction and the economic crisis; b. the shared conviction among the Milošević loyalists, as well as the emerging anti‐ Communist opposition, that the system of territorial autonomies had to be revised. Consequently, in March 1989, Kosovo’s autonomy was terminated and the province’s administration passed under Belgrade’s direct control.

The entire process culminated with a massive celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle (28 June 1989). On that occasion, Milošević delivered a powerful speech at Gazimestan, the actual site of the battle in Kosovo Polje. That event, which one might rightly term ‘a lesson in mass mobilization’, was attended by over 1 million Serbs from Yugoslavia and abroad. Slobodan Milošević had introduced to the Serbian and Yugoslav political scene something that it was lacking until then: A highly emotional use of political oratory that would deliver some short, simple but largely influential messages to the audience. Milošević’s speech consisted exactly in an amalgamation of national myth and legend with Socialist‐style slogans about social prosperity. His employment of the Kosovo myth as a potent vehicle for mass mobilization and indirect warning to rival leaderships in the other Yugoslav republics was summarized in the following lines: ‘The Battle of Kosovo contains within itself one great symbol. That is the symbol of heroism…Six centuries later we are again involved in battles and facing battles. They are not battles with arms, but these battles cannot be excluded’12. Meanwhile, the paraphernalia of the audience was a peculiar combination of the modern and the pre‐modern. Socialist‐style portraits of Slobodan Milošević coexisted with portraits of Prince Lazar and theatrical

12 See this quotation in Thomas 2000, p50.


representations of the battle. This was a primary indication that the Serbian leader’s project was successful.

The Communist Partisan movement and the resistance struggle (1941‐1945)

Royal Yugoslavia capitulated to the Axis on 17 April 1941. Resistance to the occupation forces was coordinated by two political and military organizations: the Chetniks (Serbian: Četnici) and the Communist Partisans. The Chetnik leader, Dragoljub‐Draža Mihailović, and his associates envisaged a postwar Yugoslavia under the pre‐war royal government, within which Serbia would occupy a focal position13. The Chetnik leadership was convinced that the Axis was bound to lose the war. So, their main aim during the war would be to perfect their organization and concentrate on operations against their internal competitors, the Communist Partisans. A general uprising against the Axis would take place when the country would be at the point of liberation and the Western Allies there to help. The other resistance movement was the Communist Partisans, under Josip Broz ‘Tito’. The ‘Anti‐Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia’ (AVNOJ) was the main administrative body within the Partisan structures. The first AVNOJ meeting took place at Bihać, in the northwest of Bosnia (26 November 1942). The Bihać manifesto proclaimed support for: a. democracy; b. the equality of all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia; c. the right of all ethnic groups to economic autonomy14.

Between 1941 and 1943 the Partisans resisted a series of, often combined, operations by Wehrmacht, the SS, Italian, Chetnik, Ustaše and Bulgarian forces. The Partisan success in the battlefield relied upon a major factor: The movement was founded on ideology rather than ethnicity. The slogan ’Brotherhood and Unity’ (’Bratstvo i Jedinstvo’) provided a common ground for individuals coming from various ethnic backgrounds. Therefore Partisans could expect at least some degree of support in almost every corner of the country, unlike other paramilitary formations limited to territories with a Serb or Croat majority. This allowed Partisan units to be more mobile and fill their ranks with a larger pool of potential recruits. To this should be added the fact

13 For some information about the Chetnik plans for postwar Yugoslavia see Tomašević 1975, pp 166‐178. 14 For some information about the Bihać manifesto and its resolutions see Plenča and Đonagić 1967, p107.


that, on certain occasions, Chetnik units would proceed into mass reprisals against Croatian and Bosnian Muslim civilians15. This was one more factor that progressively alienated the Chetnik movement to the eyes of the non‐Serbian masses.

In November 1943, the invigorated Partisans convened the second AVNOJ congress in the Bosnian town of Jajce. The resolutions of the second congress included amongst others the establishment of a federal Yugoslavia, based on the right of self‐determination, where the 5 recognised South Slav peoples (i.e. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins) would live in federated republics with equal rights. In addition to this, the Jajce congress recognised the AVNOJ as the supreme legislative and executive institution in Yugoslavia, a provisional government16. Between the second AVNOJ congress and autumn 1944, the Partisans controlled most of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and the Dalmatian coast. In October 1944, a Soviet‐Partisan offensive liberated Belgrade and forced the Chetnik units of Serbia proper to capitulate. This was the ultimate act that paved the way to Tito’s victory and the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the years of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Partisan movement constituted one of the fundamental ideological myths. The concept of ’Brotherhood and Unity’ was propagated through a variety of channels, the educational system in particular. History textbooks portayed the Communist Partisans as the defenders of all Yugoslav peoples and the Yugoslav working class against the foreign aggressors and their domestic collaborators. The Chetniks, as well as the Ustaše, were lumped together as ’reactionary and Fascist‐inspired groups’ who practised white terror against the peoples of Yugoslavia. Perhaps most important, the Communist Partisan movement was set in context as the culmination of an age‐old historical project for the unification of South Slavs. This was a project that had commenced in the 19th century, under the coordination of the ’Illyrian Movement’ and other similar

15 For some information on this issue, see the following testimonies in the Yugoslav state archives: Zbornik Dokumenata i Podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom Ratu Naroda Jugoslavije, Tom XIV, Knjiga 1, Dokumenti Četničkog Pokreta Draže Mihailovića 1941‐1942, Vojnoistorijski Institut, 1972, COBISS. SR‐ID: 32586252. 16 For more information on the Jajce resolutions see ‘Državnopravno Konstituisanje Nove Jugoslavije’, in Petranović and Štrbac 1977, pp 23‐26.


initiatives17. Consequently, the propagation of the Partisan myth through the educational system ran parallel to the emphasis on the shared traditions and cultural affinities among the Yugoslav peoples.

The emphasis on the Partisan movement had two dimensions, internal and external. With regard to the former, the Partisan resistance struggle was the only occasion in recent history that people from all South Slav groups systematically cooperated against a foreign occupation force. This, in itself, could provide the Yugoslav Communists with a potent symbol for legitimization of their authority. The Communist Party could appear to the fore as the sole political force with the ability to safeguard the unity of South Slavs at a time of peace and, if necessary, war. This was of vital significance to the Yugoslav Communist elites, especially during the consolidation phase of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1946‐1949). At that time, the Yugoslav Communist elites would be at the position to denounce their adversaries not solely on ideological grounds but, also, as ’traitors of the Yugoslav nation(s)’. As a matter of fact, Tito and his associates made good use of this medium while trying to liquidate ’Soviet sympathisers’ among the Party ranks18.

Perhaps more significant was the external dimension of the Partisan myth. This became more evident after June 1948, when Stalin expelled Yugoslav Communists from the Cominform. By that time, Stalin had become worried with Tito’s independent foreign policy in the Balkans and his vision for the establishment of a Balkan Socialist federation, contrary to Moscow’s wishes. Since then and until Tito’s death (1980), Soviet‐Yugoslav relations would enter successive phases of tension and attempts at a compromise. Nevertheless, the fear of a Soviet intervention was always present in the minds of the Yugoslav elites. This fear intensified, following the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Under these circumstances, the symbolism of the Partisan struggle could be re‐utilized in order to keep the Yugoslav peoples united, in the event that relations with the Soviets seriously deteriorated. It should also be born in mind that both the internal and external

17 The ‘Illyrian Movement’ was a cultural and political organization that operated in Croatia during the second half of the 19th century. The promotion of the political and cultural links among South Slavs formed essential part of its platform. For some information about the ‘Illyrian Movement’ see Djilas 1991, pp 20‐21. 18 For some information on this issue see Banac 1988, pp 98‐111.


dimensions of the Partisan myth interweaved with the promotion of Tito’s personality cult. Tito was portrayed as: a. Yugoslavia’s liberator; b. the only East European leader who had managed to consolidate his status against the Soviets successfully; c. the strong‐arm leader who could maintain order within Yugoslavia and protect the country from any external aggressor19.

The reassessment of the Partisan myth, since the early ‘90s, serves as a good example of what can happen to ideological myths when the political status quo changes. Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, historians from all over the former Yugoslav republics have questioned the credibility of concepts that during the Communist era were deemed undisputable. These historians, each from their own angle, have tried to deconstruct the flawless image of the Partisans, as cultivated through the educational system and state propaganda during the Communist era. Particular attention was paid to the summary executions of numerous individuals regarded as ‘reactionaries’ or Axis‐collaborators (late 1944 and early 1945)20 as well as the tactical contacts between Partisans and the Axis forces (1942‐1943).

The criticism of the Partisan legacy has derived from two angles. On the one hand, a new generation of liberal historians, throughout the lands of the former Yugoslavia, have opted for a rational and non‐ideological assessment of the Partisan myth and other dimensions of the Titoist heritage. This group of academics and researchers regard their initiative as part of a broader process aimed at a decisive break from the former Yugoslavia’s totalitarian aspects21. In most cases, however, the endeavour to dethrone the Partisan myth from its seat of ideological pre‐eminence was undertaken from a more ‘nationally‐minded’ perspective. Especially in Serbia and Croatia, a number of historians have sought to interlink the deconstruction of the Partisan myth

19 For example, Article 333 of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution elected Tito ‘President of Yugoslavia for an unlimited term of office’. Moreover, on 15 May 1974, Tito was awarded the honorary title of the ‘Lifetime President of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’. 20 In early 1945, the Partisans executed en masse groups of fleeing Slovene and Croat soldiers and civilians, on the accusation of collaboration with the Axis (e.g. the Bleiburg massacre). Some information on war crimes committed by the Communist Partisans can be found in Macdonald 2003. 21 A good example of this kind is the following book: Zoran Janjetović, Between Hitler and Tito: The Disappearance of the Ethnic Germans from Vojvodina, Institut za Savremenu Istoriju: Belgrade (2000). For more information see Janjetović 2000, pp 213‐219.


with a broader endeavour aimed at demonstrating how the Communist experience as a whole ‘harmed’ the Serbian and/or Croatian nations22.

This trend has often been communicated from the academia to the political sphere. In Croatia, during the first half of the 1990s, the deconstruction of the Partisan myth formed integral component of Franjo Tuđman’s broader anti‐Communist oratory. In Serbia, during the same period, this was not the case at the ruling elite level. On the contrary, Slobodan Μilošević’s Socialists would make frequent allusions to the Communist Partisan movement as an essential pillar of the party’s ideological identity23. Nevertheless, the deconstruction of the Partisan myth has ranked highly in the agenda of Serbian political actors with an ardently anti‐Communist disposition (e.g. the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Serbian Radical Party). The reinterpretation of the Communist Partisan movement by these actors has been very one‐sided and often borders the sphere of pseudo‐history.

As a matter of fact, the re‐evaluation of the, not so distant, past remains an open question throughout the former Yugoslavia. This has affected not only the academia and the political elites but the field of public policy as well. For example, in late 2004, the National Assembly of Serbia passed a new law that equalized the rights of former Chetniks with those of former Partisans, including the right to war pensions. The rationale behind this measure was that both Chetniks and Partisans were anti‐Fascist movements. Still, this law has caused great controversy in Serbia. Some have greeted it as a step towards ‘national reconciliation’ and the healing of the last wounds from the Second World War. This was the case with most political parties in Serbia, as well as Prince Alexander Karađorđević (son of the last Yugoslav King). Others, however, have criticized the law as an artificial or ‘wishful thinking’ construct, which disregards a universally‐admitted fact: that the Communist Partisans did most of the fighting against the Axis. The accusations against the law have, by default, brought under the ‘same umbrella’ actors as diverse as the

22 A representative and relatively recent example of this kind is Dobrica Ćosić’s book with the title Kosovo (2004). For more on this issue see Ćosić 2004, p140. 23For more on this issue see Programske osnove Socijalističke Partije Srbije, Prvi Kongres (16 jula 1990. godine, Beograd), at: http://www.sps.org.yu .


Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights24.

The ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (1941‐1945)

Before embarking into the empirical discussion of the Ustaše experience, one thing should be made clear: In contrast to the Kosovo Battle and the Partisan myths, the Ustaše experience does not constitute a mobilizing ’myth’ per se. On the contrary, the ’Independent State of Croatia’ (or ’Nezavisna Država Hrvatske’‐NDH) is universally acclaimed as one of the most brutal statelets established by the Axis throughout occupied Europe. Nevertheless, the NDH experience and its various interpretations

are not entirely irrelevant to the issues that are discussed in this article. First of all, the official affirmation of the Ustaše genocide’s ethnic character, by the Serbian intelligentsia in the early ’90s, signified that the concept of ’Brotherhood and Unity’ had been fully discredited. As has been demonstrated, the concept of ’Brotherhood and Unity’ among the Yugoslav peoples formed an integral component of the Communist Partisan ideological myth(s). Moreover, the utilization of the Ustaše experience, by the Serbian elites, as a mobilization means over the same period often interceded with the employment of cultural myths such as the Battle of Kosovo. Finally, the necessity to rid their nation of the Ustaše collective guilt was a top priority among the Croatian intelligentsia and political elites, in the course of Croatia’s ’new’ identity‐formation process (early 1990s).

When Yugoslavia was partitioned by the Axis, the Ustaše (English: ’Insurgents’) were allowed to proclaim their ‘Nezavisna Država Hrvatske’ extending over 40 percent of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia; ranging from inner Croatia, across Bosnia‐Herzegovina, to the gates of Belgrade (Map 2). This decision was an obvious attempt, on the Axis’ behalf, at capitalizing on Croat grievances with the pre‐war Yugoslav state. The ‘Independent State of Croatia’ was proclaimed on 10 April 1941, in Zagreb. Ante Pavelić was

24The Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights interpreted this measure as the institutionalization of the ‘unholy alliance’ that was informally forged between former Communists and re‐born nationalists, during the 1990s. For more on this issue see Branka Magaš, ‘Persistence of the Old Regime in Serbia’, 31 May 2006, at: http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2205.


awarded the title of the NDH poglavnik (i.e. the equivalent of Duce or Fuehrer). The overriding aim of the Ustaše was to create an ethnically pure Croatian state, from which Serbs, Jews and Roma would be permanently cleansed. Especially as far as Serbs were concerned, one third of Serbs were to be deported to Serbia, another third to be converted to Roman Catholicism and the remaining third to be executed25.

When in early 1942 the German authorities in Serbia imposed restrictions on the number of deported Serbs, only two options remained for the Ustaše: conversion or killing. Consequently, notorious death camps were set up in Jasenovac, Gospić and Stara Gradiška. At the same time, mass executions of Serbs were carried out in Knin, Glina, Pakrać and Bijeljina (i.e. Western Slavonia and inner Dalmatia). The number of Serbs who were executed by the Ustaše remains a largely disputed and highly controversial figure. History textbooks in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia spoke of 700,000 Serbs, Jews and Roma who died at Jasenovac alone. According to the Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust: ’The Ustaše killed 500,000 Serbs, expelled 250,000 and forced 250,000 to convert to Roman Catholicism...An additional number of 32,000 Jews and 40,000 Roma died in the territory of the ‘Independent State of Croatia’”26. Whatever the case, it is certain that over 300,000 Serbs (men, women and children included) died at Ustaše hands27.

During the Communist era, public debates on the ’Independent State of Croatia’ and the Ustaše terror became a taboo topic. The Ustaše genocide was officially interpreted through the matrix of class conflict and its ethnic dimension understated, if not ignored. The Ustaše were ’...oppressors and counter‐revolutionaries’ who commited crimes against the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav working class in general. At the same time, history textbooks and propaganda documents presented Serbs and Croats as

25 This cynical statement, regarding the ‘final solution’ of the Serbian question in Croatia, was made by Mile Budak (Pavelić’s education minister) on 22 June 1941, in Gospić. See this statement as cited in Jelić‐Butić 1977, pp 158‐67. Also, see Jelinek 1980, pp193‐201. 26 For some information on this issue see Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, Macmillan Library Reference Books: (1995), vol. 2, ‘Independent State of Croatia’ entry. 27 In accordance with the following sources, the total number of Serbs who were executed by the Ustaše ranges between 300,000 and 500,000: Jelić‐Butić 1977, pp 170‐75; Tomašević 1975, pp 101‐08; Djilas 1991, pp 125‐27.


having an equal contribution to the resistance movement28. Especially in the first years of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this historical interpretation was necessary for Yugoslav Communists in order to gain the support of the Croatian masses. In the long term, the Communist elites obviously feared that the emphasis on the Ustaše genocide’s ethnic dimension might result in the collective vilification of the entire Croatian nation. This, in turn, might generate potential tensions and result in a serious deviation from the proclaimed principles of Socialist Yugoslavism, ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ in particular. In other words, it was exactly at that point where any hint at the Ustaše genocide’s ethnic dimension would clash with the state’s employment of the Partisan myth. Consequently, the collective memories from the Ustaše genocide would be restricted to the private spheres of the local community and, most commonly, the family circle.

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia’s dissolution process would see the reassessment of this historical event as well. At an early stage, in Serbia, this campaign was orchestrated

by academics and other extra‐parliamentary actors. The ’Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (1986) spoke overtly of the Ustaše genocide’s ethnic dimension. Most important of all, the Memorandum’s authors were the first who tried to interlink the NDH experience with contemporary cases of alleged discrimination against Serbs in Croatia. In the Memorandum’s own words, ’…with the exception of the Independent State of Croatia, between 1941 and 1945, Serbs in Croatia have never been as persecuted in the past as they are now’29. Although prepared by a group of academics, the text of the Memorandum largely resembled a platform or pamphlet for political action. Meanwhile, historical novels would re‐elaborate the topic of the Serbian plight in wartime Croatia. Two good examples were the novels ‘Nož’ (‘Knife’) and ‘Molitva’ (‘Prayer’) by Vuk Drašković, a dissident journalist back then. The further the Yugoslav federation disintegrated, the greater the public debate on the Ustaše genocide and the

28 For some information on the Ustaše genocide’s portrayal in Yugoslav history textbooks, see Djilas 1991, pp 105‐07. 29 For a full‐text version of the SANU Memorandum (1986) see: http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/memorandumSANU.htm .


parallel erosion of: a. the Partisan myth; and b. the ’Brotherhood and Unity’ principle.

In the early 1990s, the reassessment of the Ustaše experience and the renewed emphasis on its ethnic dimension would suit the political objectives of the new Serbian elites. Between 1990 and 1991, the tension between Croatia’s Serb community and Franjo Tuđman’s government had started to escalate. Croatian Serbs would continuously protest against existing or perceived cases of ethnic discrimination against them30. By April 1991, the Croatian Serbs would proclaim the so‐called ‘Serbian Republic of Krajina’, comprising Western Slavonia and parts of the old Habsburg ‘Military Frontier’ (i.e. Lika, Kordun and inner Dalmatia). Under these circumstances, the new political elites in Belgrade and the Serbian media proved quite keen on comparisons between the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ and contemporary instances of discrimination against ethnic Serbs31. In this way, the new Serbian elites aimed at mobilizing Croatia’s Serbs behind their banner. As part of this strategy, the employment of the Ustaše genocide often interceded with the employment of the Kosovo Battle and other Serbian cultural myths.

The reminder of the NDH experience would function as a warning to Croatian Serbs for contemporary perils and the ‘dangers yet to come’. This touched a sensitive chord in the collective subconscious of the Serbs living within the bounds of the ‘Serbian Republic of Krajina’, a region where the most horrendous Ustaše atrocities had taken place. Under the new circumstances, the memories from the Ustaše genocide had gained a much higher appeal among Croatian Serbs. From that point onwards, these memories were no longer communicated secretly and in a non‐standardized form, as part of family history. On the contrary, the public discourse on the memories from the Ustaše experience had been fully decriminated. Most important, these memories had effectively entered the public domain in a standardized version with the aim to serve certain political purposes. At the

30 For more information on this issue see Cohen 1993, p97. 31A frequently quoted sentence from Franjo Tuđman’s book Wastelands of Historical Reality (Croatian: Bespuća Povijesne Zbiljnosti) was the following: ‘…the establishment of Hitler’s new order in Europe might be justified by the need to remove the Jews’. Many Serbian journalists would interpret this sentence as an exhibition of the author’s own opinion rather than his description of the Hitlerite propaganda’s hidden agenda. For this quotation see Tuđman 1989, p149.


same time, the imagery of cultural myths such as the Kosovo Battle would provide the symbolic material required in order to keep the Croatian Serbs united under these adverse circumstances. In other words, Serbian politicians, academics and journalists would portray the new political situation as a repetition of history, as a modern‐day ‘Serbian Golgotha’ that had to be overcome.

During the early 1990s, a simultaneous endeavour at reassessing the Ustaše experience, though through a different lense, took place in Croatia as well. As in Serbia, this process, at its early stages, was carried out by extra‐parliamentary actors, most commonly historians and other academics. The main objective of this endeavour was to rid the Croatian nation of the collective guilt that was allegedly instilled on it after decades of Communist and Serbian nationalist manipulation. Soon, this academic project would interweave with the political aims of the emerging anti‐Communist elites in Croatia. The chief objective of the combined academic‐political project was to demonstrate how and to what extent Croatia’s experience within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had resulted in the violation of the ’national rights’ of the Croatian nation32. Whereas in Serbia the main focus was cast on the system of autonomies for Kosovo and Vojvodina, the main areas of concern in Croatia were: a. Croatia’s alleged economic exploitation within the old Yugoslavia; b. the state of positive discrimination that Croatia’s Serbian community allegedly enjoyed back then. Nevertheless, in order for the entire project to gain legitimacy, a complementary task had to be fulfilled first: the dissociation of the Croatian nation from the Ustaše past’s collective guilt. This post‐Communist generation of Croatian historians did not deny the Fascist‐inspired and genocidal character of the Ustaše regime. Nevertheless, they expressed serious doubts over: a. the genuine popular support that the Ustaše enjoyed and, b. the extent of the tragedy, especially with regard to the number of the Serbian victims. The best example of this kind, perhaps, is Franjo Tuđman’s book with the title Bespuća Povijesne Zbiljnosti (or ‘Wastelands of Historical Reality’, 1989). In this piece of work, Tuđman is particularly

32 For example, Franjo Tuđman would frequently lament the alleged ‘persecution of Croatism throughout the 45 years of the Yugoslav federation’ and call for ‘…the restoration of Croatian legitimacy which would lead to the restoration of Croatian sovereignty’. For this quotation see Cohen 1993, p97.


occupied with challenging the official figure of the Jasenovac concentration camp victims, as estimated by Yugoslav historians.

According to the author, in the third chapter of a Yugoslav Commission for the Investigation for War Crimes report (26 December 1945) it is stated that the atrocities committed at Jasenovac were of lower significance than those that had taken place at the concentration camps of Banjica and Sajmiste in Serbia33. Tuđman estimates that the precise figure of the Serbian victims at Jasenovac does not surpass 60,000. He further maintains that the number of the 700,000 dead at Jasenovac is the product of a long manipulation process orchestrated by mostly Serbian historians during the Communist era. What Tuđman actually claims is that, in the course of the interrogation process, many former Ustaše officers at Jasenovac were forced by their interrogators to constantly increase the figures of the inmates executed in the concentration camp34. Whenever this would not be enough, the author adds, ‘…the text of the interrogation would be altered by hand with ink and statements such as “a few hundred thousand people died in Jasenovac” would be put into the interrogated officer’s mouth’35. As result of the entire process, an extraordinary, according to Tuđman, figure of 500,000 to 700,000 Serbian dead in Jasenovac was produced. This figure would later become standardized and popularized through the educational system and state propaganda. As a matter of fact, Bespuća Povijesne Zbiljnosti caused an upheaval and was regarded by many as a pamphlet in historical revisionism. Particularly irate were the reactions of the Serbian government and academic specialists in the Holocaust worldwide. Nevertheless, always bearing in mind that its author soon became the first President of independent Croatia, this book has had a definitive impact upon shaping popular perceptions of the Ustaše experience in modern‐day Croatia.

Finally, it would be useful to add that, as in Serbia, the re‐evaluation of Croatia’s recent past has affected the sphere of public policy as well. In post‐Communist Croatia, the public status of a number of individuals with a dubious record in the years of the Ustaše regime has been reinstated. The most prominent case, perhaps, is that of Alojzije Stepinac, a Roman Catholic Prelate

33 On this issue see Tuđman 1989, p91. 34 Ibid, p324. 35 Ibid, pp 324‐25.


and Zagreb’s Archbishop between 1941 and 1945. In the years of Communist rule, the ruling establishment officially portrayed Stepinac as an Ustaše collaborator and an encourager of forced conversions into Roman Catholicism. However, the viewpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and worlwide was radically different: Alojzije Stepinac was ’unjustly vilified’ simply because of his fierce opposition to the Yugoslav Communists after the end of the war. The public rehabilitation of Alojzije Stepinac as a ’martyr of Communism’ and a ’hero of the Croatian nation’ took place on 14 February 1992. On that date, the National Croatian Assembly symbolically condemned the 1946 court decision that had sentenced Stepinac to imprisonment. An even greater step took place on 3 October 1998, when the late Pope John Paul II beatified Alojzije Stepinac in Zagreb. Parties from all over the Croatian political spectrum greeted the late Pope’s decision with satisfaction. The Serbian Orthodox Church, on the contrary, protested avidly against Stepinac’s beatification. Meanwhile, the Simon Wiesentahl Centre objected to the beatification on the grounds that Alojzije Stepinac’s wartime conduct had not been fully investigated by that time. Whatever the case, though, one thing remains clear: Together with the deconstruction of the Partisan myth and the rehabilitation of the Chetnik movement (Serbia), the public rehabilitation of Alojzije Stepinac signified that the predominant symbols, as well as the official historical interpretation of nearly half a century, were no longer valid in the lands of the former Yugoslavia.

Some conclusions

The appropriation of the past for purposes of the present has been a common political practice in the Western Balkans. This endeavour has been accomplished through the utilization and, frequently, reinterpretation of cultural myths. A good example, as far as the ex‐Yugoslav space is concerned, is the re‐utilization of the ’Kosovo myth’ in Serbia during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In this case, the resurrection of Kosovo as an ’ancestral territory’, together with all its mythology, coincided with the Serbian elites’ objective to reincorporate Kosovo into the administrative system of the Serbian republic. On that occasion, the association of the ’Kosovo myth’ with Kosovo as a ’sacred territory’ did help forge a subconscious bond of integrity among Serbs. Nevertheless, this not to provide an essentialist interpretation:


In other words, this is not to say that the Kosovo Battle, or other cultural myths, were dormant during the Communist era and simply awoke in the course of Yugoslavia’s turbulent dissolution. These cultural myths were always there, preserved by extra‐establishment institutions (e.g. the Serbian Orthodox Church) as well as in the privacy of the local community and family circle. In line with Rogers Brubaker’s approach, the socio‐psychological impact of the ’Kosovo myth’ upon Serbia’s population was subject to a carefully‐orchestrated process with the ultimate aim to cement a sense of national cohesion. This process was orchestrated jointly by extra‐parliamentary (i.e. the new wave of Serbian nationalist intellectuals) and political actors. With regard to the latter, the major part was played by the Serbian Party Committee (later the Socialist Party of Serbia) under Slobodan Milošević and the emerging anti‐Communist opposition (i.e. parties such as the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Serbian Radical Party). These political actors found a common ground in that the system of autonomies within Serbia had to be revised, especially with regard to the Kosovan Albanian elites. Consequently, they publicly endorsed the symbolism of the Kosovo epic circle, adapted it to their direct objectives and emphasized these aspects that would facilitate their aim to generate national cohesion. Particular attention was paid at the ’heroic spirit’ which emanates from the symbolism of the Kosovo epic circle and the ways that this would: a. inspire Serbs to go through that turbulent phase of their history; b. issue an indirect warning to rival leaderships in the other former Yugoslav republics.

Apart from the cultural ones, ’ideological’ myths have also provided a potent instrument for mass mobilization and legitimization of authority. In the years of the Titoist Yugoslavia, the Partisan myth provided a powerful symbol which the Communist elites employed for domestic as well as foreign policy objectives. The Communist establishment would utilize the Partisan symbolism in order to: a. de‐legitimize the political objectives of domestic competitors of power; b. maintain a spirit of national unity in the light of Yugoslavia’s antagonism with potential ’external aggressors’ (namely, Soviet Union). This is not to contend that there is a sharp boundary between cultural and ideological myths. As is the case with cultural myths, ideological myths have also emanated from the representation of given historical events. Moreover, ideological myths have also provided the basis for the construction and propagation of their own folklore and popular imagery. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, for instance, the Partisan myth provided plenty of material


for a series of state‐sponsored film productions and popular songs. Nevertheless, ideological myths tend to be more malleable and subject to political and social changes. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Communist order saw the reinterpretation and radical deconstruction of the Partisan myth. As a matter of fact, there are two empirical explanations that could be given with regard to this phenomenon. On the one hand, the ideological myths’ higher propensity towards malleability could be explained on grounds of their relatively recent elaboration. In contrast, most cultural myths have a much longer history behind them and this has enabled successive generations to add their own contributions to these myths’: a. interpretations; b. employment in the political and public spheres. On the other hand, most ideological myths of the modern era tend to have a trans‐national content and appeal. This was the case with most state‐sponsored myths in the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. The trans‐national appeal of ideological myths sharply diminishes when the political bonds that bind certain nations (or ethnic groups) together considerably weaken. The simultaneous deterioration of the social and economic situation functions as a catalyst that accelarates this process. Under these circumstances, societies become more introverted as a means of self‐sustainance. Correspondingly, political elites take advantage of the cultural myths’ ’particularistic’ nature in order to legitimize their authority to the eyes of the masses: Hence the renewed importance of the Kosovo Battle and other cultural myths in the course of Yugoslavia’s break‐up.

Finally, it should be born in mind that, as part of political practice, the employment of cultural, as well as ideological myths, may often intercede with references to certain historical events. These historical events, on the other hand, can also be subject to various interpretations and malleable to political changes. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the emphasis on the Ustaše genocide’s ethnic dimension (early 1990s) ran parallel to the new Serbian elites’ objective to mobilize Croatian Serbs behind their banner. Meanwhile, the simultaneous emphasis on the Kosovo Battle myth and its symbolism would provide the symbolic material required in order to keep the Croatian Serbs united under these adverse circumstances. At the same time, the reassessment of the Ustaše experience in Croatia formed part of a combined academic‐political endeavour with the objectives to: a. rid the Croatian nation of the NDH past’s collective guilt and, ultimately, b.


legitimize a broader project aimed at demonstrating how Croatia’s experience within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had resulted in the violation of the ’national rights’ of the Croatian nation. In both Serbia and Croatia, the reinterpretation(s) of the Ustaše genocide ran parallel to the dethronement of the ’Brotherhood and Unity’ principle from its seat of ideological pre‐eminence. This, ultimately, signified that the predominant symbols, as well as the official historical interpretation of nearly half a century, were no longer valid in the lands of the former Yugoslavia.


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IESIR Worki

ing Papers 02/2008

311


IESIR WORKING PAPERS

02/2008

‘Yugoslav Myths’ Vassilis Petsinis

01/2008

Organizational Learning in European Foreign Policy: The Role of the EU Special Representatives Cornelius Adebahr

04/2007

Štát ako aktér v medzinárodnej politike a limity realizmu Jozef Bátora, Jana Dvoranová, Nikola Hynek

03/2007

EU Coordination in International Organisations. The Case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva

02/2007

Saving Identity from Postmodernism? Disciplining Constructivism and Governing the ‘International’ Andrea Teti, Nikola Hynek


01/2007

Russia’s Quest for Recognition as a Great Power, 1489—2007 Iver B. Neumann

I n s t i t u t e o f E u r o p e a n S t u d i e s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s F a c u l t y o f S o c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c S c i e n c e sC o m e n i u s U n i v e r s i t yO d b o j á r o v 1 0 / a , P. O . B o x 1 2 98 2 0 0 5 B r a t i s l a v a 2 5S l o v a k i at e l . : + 4 2 1 2 5 0 1 1 7 6 2 3f a x . : + 4 2 1 2 5 0 1 1 7 6 2 4e - m a i l : u e s m v @ f s e s . u n i b a . s kw e b : w w w . e s . f s e s . u n i b a . s k

The Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences was established in 2001. The professional community of the Institute of European Studies and International Relations (IESIR) at the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Comenius University in Bratislava has a multidisciplinary background mainly in political science, international relations, history, law, economics, sociology, organisation theory, diplomacy and philosophy. In 2005, IESIR was awarded the status as a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.

About the author :

Vassilis Petsinis (PhD, University of Birmingham) is currently Junior Fellow at Collegium Budapest. In 2006/2007 he was a SAIA research and teaching fellow at the Institute for European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University. He specializes in the politics of identity and ethnicity in Central and Southeastern Europe.

Institute ofEuropean Studies andInternational Relations

ISSN 1337-5466

Yugoslav Myths [IESIR Bratislava Working Papers 2007]

Documents

Transcript of Yugoslav Myths [IESIR Bratislava Working Papers 2007]