Writing and Reading the Self with a Thousand Eyes

Mark Wenger – final project.ENGL 794 Modern Rhetorical TheoryDr. John MuckelbauerDecember 13, 2013

The problematization of Foucault’s unfinished project on the “Care of the Self” by Derrida’s“inaugural event” and Kofman’s “reading with a thousand eyes.”

Abstract: In his exploration of bold or frank speech as significant to “the care of the self,” Foucault made plain his disquiet with psychoanalysis – a disquiet shared by manyPost-structuralist theorists; these same theorist, however, also doubt Foucault’sclaim that care of the self is possible – which is problematic to anyone wishing tofurther Foucault’s incomplete project. By taking Derrida’s “A CertainImpossible Possibility of Saying the Event” as a single text for attentive readingalongside “Fearless Speech” this short paper seeks to investigate how care of theself can take place within an awareness and function of post-structuralistdeconstruction of language – particularly the written word. It is the conclusion ofthis author that Sarah Kofman’s “Nietzsche and Metaphor” demonstrates thatcritically informed frank (or confessional) parrhesiastic writing nurtures “theever dancing self” by what might be called “writing and reading the self with athousand eyes.”

A student of mine in the prison Associates of Arts program in which I teach wrote this

introductory disclaimer in his final project in ENG 2130 The Writing of Memoir: “The

following is a recollection of memories from a mind that has been terribly abused by alcohol and

drugs since the age of eight, thus it is unable to evaluate accurate facts and order. It is the best

recollection of distorted memories told in the most honest way.” Though this second-year

college student was not aware of it, his wrestling with the question of memory and accounting for

the self touches deeply upon some of the most significant matters of concern from Classical

philosophy to Critical theory. As a graduate student of such matters, and the teacher of such a

student, the question of how to connect the writing of those whom I instruct with the concerns of

those who have wrestled with the most practical of matters of “saying the event” drives my

current studies, particularly as they related to the speeches and writings of three particular

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theorist – Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Sarah Kofman.

Beginning with The History of Sexuality (1976), Michel Foucault began to develop what

would become his final project, which he termed “the care of the self” in his third, incomplete

volume in the series. “He envisioned his new project, however, as ‘separate from the sex series.’

‘I must confess,’ he reflected, ‘that I am much more interested in problems about techniques of

the self’...[that]...permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a

certain number of operations...so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of

happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”1

In a manner which seems to have perplexed many at the time, but which appeals to

rhetoricians, Foucault anchored his genealogy in the “Greco-Roman philosophy in the first two

centuries A.D...[and in] Christian spirituality and the monastic principles developed in the fourth

and fifth centuries of the late Roman Empire” The conclusion of the examination was that, as a2

result of the evolution of care of self “[w]e find it difficult to base rigorous morality and austere

principles on the precept that we should give ourselves more care than anything else in the

world....We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the

condition for salvation. To know oneself was paradoxically the way to self-renunciation” Care3

of the self became hatred of self!

The alternative to such self-hatred – a condition which Nietzsche attributed to “modern

man”– Foucault explains through metaphors of physician and patient intentionally similar to

Foucault, Technologies of the Self, 4.1

Ibid, 19.2

Ibid, 22.3

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those Classical authors, which Foucault traced back as early as Epicurus during his lectures in

France earlier in 1982 on “The Hermeneutics of the Subject” of the 10 of February. Foucaultth

describe the alternative to self-hatred as “a way of living” in which first, “One must become the

doctor of oneself” – care of self as healthful living; second (and remarkably prescient) “the

objective is...to get prepared for a certain complete achievement of life...complete at the moment

just prior to death” – care of self as a life project. Finally, drawing from various Classical4

authors (Plutarch, Philo of Alexandria, etc.) Foucault outlines over the next few pages (32 - 34)

several practices as being vital to such healthful, lifelong care of self: First, listening as an art

practiced in community with a master or teacher; second, dialogue as an art, with oneself (after

listening) and with others in community with a master or teacher. Third, confession as an art

(after listening and dialogue). This confession is significantly and fundamentally different from

that of the Christian tradition, which is a renunciation of self. “From the eighteenth century to

the present, the techniques of verbalization have been reinserted in a different context by the so-

called human sciences in order to use them without renunciation of the self but to constitute,

positively a new self. To use these techniques without renouncing oneself constitutes a decisive

break.” For Foucault, “the care of the self” is much more than a linguistic act, particularly an act5

of writing, although, “for Foucault, the ‘Care of the self’ is a practice that is not merely verbal or

linguistic, though it might employ these as partial methods. It is, as it were, a practice of freedom

that can only be experienced in its active application by a subject.” This unproblematized6

Ibid, 31.4

Ibid, 49.5

O’Sullivan, “Lacan’s Ethics and Foucault’s Care of the Self”, 67.6

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distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic acts seems indicative of the incomplete nature of

Foucault’s project.

The problem of language as a means to the Classical understanding of parrhesiastic

action (bold truth-telling) would seem to be clear – attributable to post-structuralists’

demonstrations of the failure of language. For the purposes of this paper, Derrida’s A Certain

Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event provides a single text by which to consider the

problematization of language in parrhesiastic care of the self, particularly the unmistakable

linguistic act of writing – which Sarah Kofman devoted much of her life to exploring. Her

Nietzsche and Metaphor will serve as the space in which to explore a “impossible possibility of”

a Derridian iteration of Foucauldian parrhesia.

As a teacher of writing within the explicitly Foucauldian contexts of prison and academy,

it is my hope that such a critical orientation upon parrhesiatic writing may help keep an

important (and easily under-emphasized) rhetorical tradition in composition studies that is

nevertheless more critically oriented for “the care of the self” – but not in the Socratic tradition of

the examined life that allows one to “know thyself”, but rather in the tradition of Nietzsche’s call

to “be a cow, and under no circumstances a modern man! – rumination!” 7

First, Foucault’s concise summary of the Classical understanding of the parrhesia, which

he gave early in his lectures at Berkeley: “parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker

expresses his personal relationship to truth and...uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead

of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security,

Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Genealogy of Morals, 77

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criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.” Foucault8

goes on to map the evolution of the parrhesiastic game, from truth-telling to the rhetorical figure

for absence of rhetoric. It is devoid of efforts to persuade, and thus Quintillian (most notably)9

identified parrhesia essentially as similar to the role which zero plays in mathematics –

indicating lack of artifice, lack of effort to affect audience – which Foucault called “nonrhetorical

rhetoric” in his earliest 3 March 1982 lecture on the subject.10

Furthermore, parrhesia is not only the absence of rhetoric, it is also not a pedagogic

activity; in the 12 of January 1983 lecture at the College de France, on “The Government of Selfth

and Others” Foucault flatly stated “[n]or is parresia (sic) a way of teaching; it is not a form of

pedagogy.” (54) The emphasis is clearly that parrhesia is not a techne; it is not something that11

one can choose to attempt or choose not to attempt. Parrhesia is the very action of a non-ironic

self – a concept fundamental to the linking of Foucault’s parrhesia and Derrida’s “inaugural

event”, but this will be developed later. First, however, a demonstration that even for Foucault,

parrhesia as it relates to the care of the self, is not without problematization – albeit, left

undeveloped in his incomplete project.

In his lectures on parrhesia at the University of California at Berkeley, fall of 1983.

Foucault’s lifelong ambivalence to interiority and exteriority in the construction of the self, is

explored by Joel Whitebook in his chapter, “Against Interiority: Foucault’s Struggle with

Foucault, Fearless Speech, 19-20.8

Ibid, 21.9

Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 368.10

Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 54.11

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Psychoanalysis” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Whitebook claims that beside

seeing himself (accurately) as an intellectual peer to Freud, “another, perhaps more profound,

source for Foucalut’s difficulties with psychoanalysis [was] its very essence. Though it doesn’t

deny the importance of social reality, analysis confronts us with the formidable and often

frightening task of turning inward and undertaking a prolonged exploration of our inner

reality.” A similar line of thought is offered in Simon O’Sullivan’s analysis “Lacan’s Ethics and12

Foucault’s ‘Care of the Self’” who notes that “for Foucault...the deployment of knowledge about

the subject which is precisely what the epimeleia heautou does not do. Indeed,

knowledge—however this is thought—is not enough for Foucault. The ‘Care of the Self ‘ has to

be a practice that results in a transformation.” 13

Both Whitebook and O’Sullivan demonstrate Foucault’s early, confident dismissal of

more psychoanalytic concerns with interiority and the constitution of the self and his later

explorations of just such interiority in his ‘Care of the Self’. Foucault, himself, seems to

acknowledged this ambivalence, in his lectures at the College of France in 1982 and ‘83 as

summarized in the publisher’s abstract, including a quotation attributed to Foucault but not

found, exactly as quoted, within the work:

Modern philosophy is a practice which tests its reality in its relationship topolitics. It is a practice which finds its function of truth in the criticism of illusion,deception, trickery, and flattery. Finally, it is a practice which finds the object ofits exercise in the transformation of the subject by himself and of the subject bythe other. Philosophy as exteriority with regard to a politics which constitutes itstest of reality, philosophy as critique of a domain of illusion which challenges it toconstitute itself as true discourse, and philosophy as ascesis, that is to say, as

Whitebook, Against Interiority, 31.12

O’Sullivan, “Lacan’s Ethics and Foucault’s Care of the Self”, 58.13

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constitution of the subject by himself, are what constitute the modern mode ofbeing of philosophy.14

The rhetorical game, or the political game, as well as the philosophical game can each be

played within a variety of orientations, whether more ethically (and therefore more exteriorly)

from Socratic, Epicurean, or rhetorical traditions, or in situations of greater interiority and moral

concern for persons inside these traditions (or completely outside or beyond them) as they face

questions of self-definition, self-nurture in the modern context. Foucault’s final comments

compiled in the recorded lectures on Fearless Speech at Berkeley in fall 1983 seem to indicate

this fact:

...this problematization has two sides, two major aspects. One side is concernedwith ensuring that the process of reasoning is correct in determining whether astatement is true (or concerns itself with our ability to gain access to the truth). And the other side is concerned with the question: What is the importance for theindividual and for the society of telling the truth, of knowing the truth, of havingpeople who tell the truth, as well as knowing how to recognize them? 15

The dynamic of whether the questions are “for the individual” or “for the society”

indicate that although Foucault’s project was left incomplete, due to his untimely death, he was

clearly drawing from all traditions (rhetorical, political, and philosophical) to articulate both an

ethical and a moral parrhesia for the individual’s care of the self.

It was others, therefore, who were left to develop a post-structural response to the

problem of language and self-inquiry. This seems to have been an element of concern for

Jacques Derrida, but space does not allow the tracing of the myriad of places in which the

problematization of language and the consequence upon self-investigation or inquiry into the

sub-conscious can be demonstrated. The publication “The Certain Impossible Possibility of

Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, Publisher’s Abstract. 14

Foucault, Fearless Speech, 170.15

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Saying the Event”, however, may serve as a fairly concise and current summary, published late in

Derrida’s life. In this less than twenty-page article, Derrida examines the aporetic nature of

linguistic activities (specifically in reference to media portrayals of events in the Gulf War) “An

interpretation does what it says. It may pretend simply to state, show, and inform, but it actually

produces.” 16

Does this mean that parrhesia (bold, frank speech that has the potential to speak truth to

power) “pretend[s] to state, show, and inform, but it actually produces”? Is parrhesia a different

kind of speech act? And if not, then how can it be a means of “care for the self”?

Derrida examines five examples of events in his 1997 speech at the Canadian Centre of

Architecture in Montreal, speaking between Gad Soussana and Alexis Nouss concerning “the

event” (which in his 1998 essay “Typewriter Ribbon” he defined as “what is happening” ). Two17

of the examples are more clearly speech acts (confession and forgiving), while two (the gift and

invention) are less clearly linked to language (although whether or not any cognitive experience

is devoid of language seems to be a significant aspect of Derrida’s many considerations of “the

event”, but this extends beyond the scope of this present study). The fifth example (hospitality)

is clearly an action that is also a saying of welcome, and therefore disquiets any Foucauldian-like

tendency towards distinguishing between linguistic and non-linguistic events. Of the five

examples Derrida examines, “confession” and “forgiveness” are most closely similar to

Foucault’s considerations of parrhesia. Both confession and forgiveness (although Derrida does

not explicate this fact for forgiveness, leaving it implied) along with parrhesiastic speech are not

Derrida, A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event, 447.16

Lawlor, “Jacques Derrida”, 5.17

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constituted upon the moment of speaking or writing – they each come to be what they are when

there is a “transformation in my relationship to the other” . For Foucault, in his explication of18

the characteristics of parrhesia the key “relationship to the other” is the parrhesiastes’

relationship to himself – “ he prefers himself as a truth-teller rather than as a living being who is

false to himself.” An parrhesiastic event, therefore, would be one in which “there is a saying of19

the event, of what happened, that produces a transformation...something that’s not merely

ignorance, but that no longer pertains to the realm of knowledge...not lack, not sheer

obscurantism, ignorance, or non-science, but simply something that is not of the same nature as

knowing.” This transformation is primarily one of relationship between the one20

speaking/writing the confession/forgiveness and the one before whom it is being spoken, which,

for Foucault, clearly includes oneself, but which Derrida also implies in his explication of the

gift: “No one can ever say, with any satisfying criterion of knowledge, ‘a giving has taken place,’

or else ‘I’ve given’ or ‘I’ve received.’” 21

Derrida, in his examination of the example of forgiveness offers another similarity

between “the event” and parrhesia. He explains that forgiveness can only exist in the space in

which it is not possible – it is not forgiveness to forgive what is “the slight misdeed, the

measured and measurable, the determined and limited wrongdoing.... Forgiveness requires

“doing the impossible.” This is quite similar to what Foucault explains regarding the22




Ibid, 449.21

Ibid, 449.22

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truthfulness of a parrhesiastic action, for “the parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows

that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it is really true.” This circular argument was23

not a problem for the Classical parrhesiastes, according to Foucault, because “truth-having is

guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities.” However, with the rise of democracy,24

this self-evident nature of a parrhesiastes was called into question (a question that may have

already been present), and therefore, there is always a level of “impossible possibility” in truth-

telling – it exists only when it accomplishes the impossible task of speaking that which is true.

Derrida explicated this in the question and answer session of his speech in Montreal when he

detailed “Pervertibility has to be at the heart of that which is good, of the good promise, for the

promise to be what it is. It must have the capability of not being a promise, of being broken, for

it to be possible, to have the chance of being possible. This threat is not a bad thing; it’s its

chance.”25

The threat implicit within every promise is quite similar to the risk implicit to every event

of parrhesia: “Someone is said to use parrhesia and merits consideration as a parrhesiastes only

if there is a risk or danger for him in telling....not always a risk of life... Parrhesia...is linked to

courage in the face of danger.” It was Derrida who explicated and partially illustrated by his26

five examples the multi-fold process by which the “saying” of “the inaugural event” was a

courageous risk – in total giving at least eleven characteristics/effects which an inaugural event


Ibid, 15.24


Foucault, Fearless Speech, 15 & 16.26

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both performs and is constituted by. Ten of this constitutive effects he gives in his talk and an27

eleventh – secrecy – is given during the question and answer session. An inaugural event is

constituted by (1) iterability, (2) unpredictability, (3) irreducibility, (4) uniqueness, and an

element of (5) secretness or “that which is untold”. These five performative characteristics have

six constative effects upon the one upon whom the inaugural event falls; an inaugural event is:

(6) disarming through it’s uniqueness, but that uniqueness is (7) neutralized through (8)

substitution through erasure of difference by (9) the return of the same, which produces a (10)

haunting (revenance) by the impossibility of a uniqueness that can only befall by the return of the

same. This produces a (11) bereavement for the one upon whom the event falls, for there is

already a trace of the past and the future in the moment of the event.1

These characteristics, I contend are constitutive of parrhesia, as well, or especially, as

applying Derrida’s own words to Foucault’s employment of classical parrhesia; an inaugural

parrhesiastic event is: spoken (interability) truth, but not in a theoretical, abstract sense –

parrhesia is always a unique speech act by a parrhesiastes, disarming in it’s uniqueness before

the other, but neutralized by the utterance – which substituted through language/cognition and

erased the difference. The erasure through substitution means that the event of parrhesia is a

unique event that is met with both joy and mourning – joy at the arrival of the unique moment of

truth, and sorrow at the erasure of the distinctiveness of that truth through substitution that comes

through cognition and language. The result is that every parrhesiastic utterance/performance is

haunted with both the possibility and impossibility of itself. Such “impossible possibility” is


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perhaps best expressed through the Nietzschean metaphor (which is the performance/

constativeness of all language) of Dionysian dithyramb. 2

Sarah Kofman is the one who makes the link between Dionysian dithyramb and

Nietzsche’s metaphorical style of writing, which is much of her project in Nietzsche and

Metaphor. In the first paragraphs of her first chapter she states: “...being faithful to Nietzsche

does not mean doing as he does, writing as he does....an impossible task...imply[ing] the

existence of an absolute norm of ‘good taste’.... Just as he multiplies perspectives, so Nietzsche

intentionally diversifies his styles in order to save the reader from misunderstanding a single style

as a ‘style in itself.’” However, as Nietzsche explained, his predilection for aphoristic writing is28

so that his “every single word” might “wound” and “exercise....enchantment” an outcome only29

possible through “be[ing] a cow, and under no circumstances a modern man! - rumination.”

What does it mean to “be...a modern man” with writing (of any type)? The endless effort

to “understand”, to turn the act of speech or writing into a subject of examination and

interpretation. So as to avoid this deadly impulse found in the “neediness” of man, Nietzsche

wrote in aphorisms, for, as he explained “[a]n aphorism properly coined and cast into its final

mould is far from being "deciphered" as soon as it has been read; on the contrary, it is then that it

first requires to be expounded - of course for that purpose an art of exposition is necessary.” It is

towards this “art of exposition” that Kofman wrote her book, it seems, for she ends upon a call

for “reading with a thousand eyes”. But before she can do that she first explains how Nietzsche’s

aphoristic writing makes possible entrance into Dionysian dithyrambic dance:

Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, 2.28

Nietzsche, On Genealogy of Morals, Preface, 8.29

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In its brevity and density, the aphorism is an invitation to dance: it is the actualwriting of the will to power, affirmative, light, and innocent. It is writing whichdeletes the opposition between play and seriousness, surface and depth, form andcontent, spontaneous and considered, amusement and work. If one reads anaphorism and takes note of only one of the two ‘contraries’ in each group ofoppositions, one is doomed to incomprehension. One must be able to stay nimbleas one reflects, and stay on the ‘surface’ whilst reading between the lines...Everyreading gives birth to a different text...we can discover in a text only what weourselves are but were unaware of.30

In this phrase, Kofman not only echoes the subtitle of Ecce Homo, “Wie man wird, was

man ist” , but she (and all who write in a similar style) also evidences how faithfully she has3

taken on the rhetorical task which Nietzsche set for himself in the book. As Duncan Large

explains in his introduction to his translation (which he dedicated to Sarah Kofman) “...the text’s

whimsicality is a deliberate strategy.” 31

Nietzsche’s laughter rings out again, and those who read him well laugh, also. Ecce

Homo, thought not unique among Nietzsche’s works for its whimsical or autobiographical

nature, is far more deliberately “laugh-writing” which the chapter titles demonstrate: “Why I Am

So Wise”; “Why I Am So Clever”; “A Book for All and None”; “Why I Am a Destiny” – few

can read these without laughing; few refrain from asking “Is he serious?” which demonstrates

just how seriously he did take the effort he was making. It was just such serious effort which

Sarah Kofman took her work, which Derrida noted in his eulogy:

Art and laughter were also for her, no doubt, readings of art and of laughter, butthese readings were also operations, experiences or experiments, journeys. Thesereadings [lectures] were lessons in the magisterial sense of an exemplary lecturingor teaching...she unveils in the act, through experimentation and performance,giving the example of what she says through what she does, giving of her

Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, 115 - 116.30

Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, xiii.31

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person...[and] [o]ne of these lessons of the lesson given by Sarah is, for example,that this tormented being laughed a lot. 32

Kofman, herself stated, “every reading gives birth to a different text [in which] we can

discover...only what we ourselves are” For both author and reader, the strategy of literacy is the33

reading-of-life – perhaps best pronounced “laugh”? Life/Laugh-reading, then. Yet this can so

easily be misunderstood as behavior that stems from neediness and negation, rather than fullness

and affirmation. What, then, does such life-writing look like? What is this “laughing style” of

life?

Kofman, in her fourth chapter, turns to the examining of various metaphorical

“conceptual constructs” used by Nietzsche to describe “the hierarchized system of concepts to be

found in ordinary language and in science.” Specifically, she examines the Beehive (the symbol34

for the “needy” construction of “a systematic ordering of concepts” found in science; the Tower35

(the defensive structure of modern science, at war against “lying, myth, and art;” The Pyramid36

and the Roman Columbarium (the “sepulchre of the intuitions” of science, made into a god and

the tomb of that god); the spider’s web (the “feeding off of life” that is the nihilist’s knowledge);

and finally the castle-made-of-spider’s-web, which she calls “the Saturnalia” (drawing from

Truth and Lies) – the only “good” metaphorical architecture, for it demonstrates:

[t]hat immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy manclings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding

Derrida, The Work of Mourning, 174.32


Ibid, 60.34

Ibid, 62.35

Ibid, 64.36

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and plaything for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when itsmashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it backtogether in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating theclosest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of needinessand that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. 37

The parrhesiastic effort, therefore is “to have a thousand eyes,” a phrase which Kofman38

amalgamates from a variety of places in The Genealogy of Morals, and which Kofman explains

as:

[k]nowledge and mastery are one and the same thing: one cannot aim at‘objectivity’ by cutting oneself off from every ‘point of view’ but, on the contrary,one needs to multiply perspectives in order to see ‘the world’ with the greatestnumber of ‘eyes’, constructing and deconstructing worlds as an artist.” 39

Derrida’s eulogy for Kofman, therefore, inaugurates just such a writing and reading the

self with a thousand eyes: in its iterability, unpredictable, irreducible, unique, disarming way it

does “the work of mourning” by allowing much of Sarah to remain untold even as it enacts

bereavement – casting upon the moment of eulogy a haunting of the trace of the past and the

shadow of what is to come – all who hear/read the words are disarmed in the moment of memory

by the neutralization of the uniqueness of Sarah and each unique memory of Sarah by the

inevitable (but necessary) substitution of the event of her life, even the event of Derrida’s eulogy,

forcing the return of the same through the written word. Derrida transformed himself and the

listen/reader is transformed through the gift of this richly forgiving, inventing, welcoming,

confessing gift of bold speech.

Nietzsche, Truth and Lies, 90 as quoted in Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, 90.37


Ibid, 102.39

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1. The following chart demonstrates the ways in which Derrida explicates the five examplesof inaugural events:

2. Derrida closes his answer to the next-to-the last question of the seminar in Montreal withthis tantalizing statement: “A pure event, worthy of the name, defeats the performative asmuch as the constative. One day we’ll have to come to terms with what this means.”

3. Duncan Large, in his 2007 translation translates the subtitle “How to Become What YouAre”, diverging from the more common “How One Becomes What One Is”, which is howRoger Hollingdale (1979) and Kaufmann (1967), and even the more recent translation byThomas Wayne (2004) translate the phrase. The more universal “one” seems somehowless faithful to Nietzsche’s resistance of generalizations than the second person “you”,even if the indefiniteness more literally matches the German (which I cannot adequatelyaddress).

End Notes

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Bibliography

Derrida, Jacques. “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event.” Critical Inquiry. 33:2(2010) 441 - 461.

Derrida, Jacques. The Work of Mourning. Edited by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2003 (paperback).

Foucault, Michel. Fearless Speech. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2001.

Foucault, Michel. The Government of Self and Others. Edited by Frederic Gros. Translated byGraham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Foucault, Michel. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Edited by Frederic Gros. Translated byGraham Burchell. New York: Picador. 2005.

Foucault, Michel. Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Edited by Luther H.Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton. Boston: Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Kofman, Sarah. Nietasche and Metaphor. Duncan Large (trans.), Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress. 1993.

Lawlor, Leonard, "Jacques Derrida", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/derrida/>

O’Sullivan, Simon. “Lacan’s Ethics and Foucault’s ‘Care of the Self’: Two Diagrams of theProduction of Subjectivity (and of the Subject’s Relation to Truth).” Parrhesia. 10 (2010): 51 - 73.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Ecce Homo, Duncan Large (trans.), New York: Oxford Press. 2007.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Genealogy of Morals, Horace B. Samuel (trans.), New York: DoverPublications, Ltd., 2003.

Whitebook, Joel. “Against Interiority: Foucault’s Struggle with Psychoanalysis” In TheCambridge Companion to Foucault, edited by Gary Gutting. 312-47. New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/derrida/>

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