Word Llywleynthe Greatand King John

Llywelyn the Great and King John 1

*Delete the heading on this page and the number

Llywleyn the Great and King John: A Foreign Policy Perspective

Rebecca Quinones

Dr. Connie Evans, Advisor

Honors Thesis

April 11, 2011


Since the sixteenth century, Wales has been an integral comp

onent of the United Kingdom; in the middle ages, it was an indepe

ndent country divided into multiple principalities. Various ruler

s attempted to unite the Welsh beneath one administration via mil

itary conquest and/or political alliance; however, Welsh cultural

beliefs hindered a sense of common national purpose amongst the p

opulace and aristocracy. Thus, consolidation of these political t

erritories required substantial work and negotiation by a lord to

gain control over any significant portion of land. Only one leade

r was able to earn the sobriquet of “Great” in Wales: Llywelyn ap

Iorwerth, who fought his way to prominence in Gwynedd and led Wal

es from 1194 to 1240.1 Of particular interest in his administrati

on of Wales and his construction of a virtually unified state is

the foreign policy he maintained against King John and the regenc

y government of Henry III of England. At the beginning of Llywely

n ap Iorwerth’s rule, his connection to England focused on the No

1 R. R. Davies. The Age of Conquest: Wales 1063-1415 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 239-240.


rman monarchy and on maintaining a peaceful relationship with the

king of England, allowing him to consolidate his control of volat

ile Wales; however, after the invasion of 1211, Llywelyn formed a

n alliance with the English barons to undermine John’s hold over

Wales and proceeded to cultivate relations with the marcher lords

and English barons in opposition to the monarchy for the remainde

r of his reign.

The Wales in which Llywelyn ap Iorwerth assumed control was

not a unified state, such as England, but, rather, the historical

divisions of territory of the middle ages remained in effect. Pri

or princes, such as Owain Gwynedd, had attempted to unify the fra

ctured state, resulting in the redistribution of his land into su

b-units upon his death. Owain Gwynedd ap Gruffudd is particularly

distinguished in historical literature due to the praise of Welsh

contemporary poets; his reign was noted as the first extension of

Gwynedd’s control over the entirety of northern Wales under one o

f its princes in over a century.2 However, the alienation of Henr

y II of England led to the forced restoration of Owain’s brother

Cadwaladr to joint rule of Gwynedd’s territory; thus, upon his de

2 Davies, Age of Conquest, 49.


ath, Owain had multiple heirs, causing his kingdom to be re-divid

ed into administrative units.3 Yet, by the time period of Llywely

n ap Iorwerth, Welsh kingdoms were nominally fixed and the rivalr

ies between members of princely dynasties did not destabilize the

se established regions. Connections of lineage and reward were es

tablished with local nobility, resulting in regular and systemati

c extraction of wealth and resources by the princes which ultimat

ely consolidated the territorial foundation for authority and enh

anced the quality of the governance structure so that the geograp

hical identity of the greater, as well as smaller, kingdoms becam

e more affirmed.4

According to R. R. Davies, the lesser dynasties in Wales con

trolled the smaller territories while other native dynasties, exe

mplified by those of Arwystli and Tegeingl, diminshed in status t

o the level of local noble families whose lands and titles were a

rrogated by the princely lines of the greater over-kingdoms. In c

ontrast, regional dynasties in the middle March (Elfael, Cedewai

n, and Mealienydd), upper Glamorgan and upper Caerleon were consi

dered independent of the major dynasties; however, they were prog

3 Ibid., 51-53.4 Ibid., 216.


ressively coming under the influence of the larger kingdoms.5 The

focus of the primary documents from this time period uphold the p

erception that the emphasis shifted to Gwynedd, Powys and Deheuba

rth, whose courts were at Aberffro, Mathrafal, and Dinefwr.6

Geographically, Gwynedd was the farthest of these three over

-kingdoms from the English border where tensions and the possibil

ity of conquest ran high, yet it was also the easiest to defend,

due to tidal estuaries and three different mountain ranges/highla

nd regions, all of which acted as geographical barriers to invade

rs from the East.7 It was naturally divided by the River Conwy in

to Gwynedd Uwch Conwy, the western portion, and Gwynedd Is Conwy,

or the eastern portion; Uwch Conwy contained Anglesey, the grain-

production heartland of Wales.8 Is Conwy was subjected to the maj

ority of invasion attempts due to its geographically vulnerable p

osition, as shown by the intent of Robert fitz Hugh who, in 1078,

constructed a military base at Degannwy, alongside the River Conw

y and in Perfeddwlad or Gwynedd Is Conwy.9 This particular geogra

5 Ibid., 217. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 236. 8 Roger Turvey, The Welsh Princes: The Native Rulers of Wales 1063-1283 (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 21. 9 Turvey, Welsh Princes, 21; Davies, Age of Conquest, 31.


phic context is relevant to Llywelyn’s foreign policy towards Kin

g John as the 1211 English invasion is marked as distinct from it

s predecessors due to the devastation imposed by John’s troops af

ter they crossed the River Conwy and into Uwch Conwy; thus, it wa

s a common policy for the Anglo-Norman neighbors to attack Is Con

wy and, indeed, this portion of Gwynedd was claimed by England in

the subsequent peace contract.10

Another geographic characteristic of medieval Wales was that

it contained substantial forests which prevented incursion by out

siders attempting to penetrate the nation from the north-east or

south-east; the Domesday Book estimated the forest of Ewloe in th

e north, or region of Gwynedd, as ten leagues by three leagues in

measurement.11 Davies highlights the inclusion of this factor alo

ngside the treacherous characteristics of water travel and the pr

evalence of narrow, wooded and steep-sided gorges which required

troops to march through in single file and which provided plenty

of possible ambush locations.12 These characteristics amplified W

10 Roger Turvey. Llywelyn the Great: Prince of Gwynedd (Ceredigion: Gomer Press, 2007), 55-56.11 Davies, Age of Conquest, 141. 12 Davies, Age of Conquest, 143.


elsh capabilities to defend their territory and are therefore rel

evant to the power relations between England and Gwynedd.

Demographically and economically, Gwynedd had less people an

d was less integrated into the medieval economic structure than t

he competing principal kingdoms in Wales, Powys and Deheubarth; h

owever, Gwynedd was self-sufficient and able to withstand aggress

ion due to these characteristics.13 Utilizing the maps provided b

y Davies for Deheubarth, Powys and Gwynedd which delineate the lo

cation of Welsh castles, Anglo-Norman castles and religious cente

rs of monasteries, an interesting conclusion can be drawn which d

emonstrates the relative population paucity in Gwynedd compared t

o its neighbors. The number of castles within Gwynedd and Powys w

ere equal; however, out of the six, one in Powys was Anglo-Norman

and, immediately outside of the Powys’ boundaries, another eleven

Anglo-Norman castles can be included in the demographics for Powy

s. This inclusion is possible due to the tendency of Welshmen to

travel temporarily to England or the Marches for seasonal labor p

ositions, as well as to act as foot soldiers for Anglo-Norman lor

ds; additionally, alien settlers had profoundly altered many part

13 Ibid., 237-238.


s of Wales by the thirteenth century as they constructed their co

mmunities alongside the Norman castles, restricting the native We

lsh population to the foothills and uplands.14 Thus, the substant

ial number of Anglo-Norman castles on the border of Powys, inside

the Welsh Marches, influenced the population demographic in Powy

s, increasing its connections to England.

In stark contrast to these numbers, Deheubarth registered ov

er twenty Anglo-Norman castles within its territory, as well as n

ine of Welsh construction. The final divergence to be seen in the

demographic makeup of these three regions is in the number of rel

igious communities. As will be later demonstrated, the organizati

on of the Church was highly influential on the Welsh populace an

d, while there are five religious centers marked in Gwynedd, both

Powys and Deheubarth only register two. While these figures may b

e incomplete, they provide a starting point for establishing the

general cultural divisions and differences between the three nati

ons and illustrate the relative isolation experienced by Gwynedd.

Economically, prior to the English conquest of Ireland in th

e 1170s, northern and western Wales had maintained a steady sea t

14 Ibid., 146, 158.


rade with the Celtic island; however, as Davies argues, these tie

s were strengthened in areas of Wales in which the Normans had be

come influential and as a common imperial experience bound the st

ates together. However, this author posits that this connection i

s more relevant to the period after Edward I’s conquest, and the

original ties with Ireland were what Llywelyn emphasized when neg

otiating and planning for relations with countries along the West

ern Sea.15

Another factor of economic significance is the location of t

he majority of Wales’ population; regions below eight hundred fee

t contained a significant portion of the populace which utilized

mixed agriculture as their livelihood.16 Davies provides a map wh

ich illustrates the quantity of land over six hundred feet in Wal

es and it distinctly demonstrates the predominance of highland re

gions in both Gwynedd and Powys.17 Thus, stock husbandry and roug

h grazing was predominant in most areas of Gwynedd, except for An

glesey, which included no land over six hundred feet and lent its

elf to being the breadbasket of Wales.18 Alongside these physical

15 Ibid., 144-145. 16 Ibid., 153. 17 Ibid., 5. 18 Ibid., 153.


qualities, Gwynedd traditionally pursued an aggressive expansioni

st policy, as was demonstrated under the rule of both Gruffudd ap

Llywelyn and Owain Gwynedd.19

Aside from these fundamental characteristics of Gwynedd, Lly

welyn also utilized the societal structure on which to base his c

laim for legitimate rule over all of Wales. Every individual was

defined by a status that was inherited from birth and which uphel

d the significance of lineage in Welsh society; status was comple

tely separate from wealth or land, which meant that nobles were n

ot reliant upon the goodwill of a monarch to maintain their socie

tal position since they owned their land outright.20 This indepen

dence instigated complications for Llywelyn and his predecessors,

as it removed motivation for strict loyalty to any one prince; th

us, a continual tension pervaded noble ties to and between Welsh

leaders. In addition, military service was a prerequisite for per

iods of six weeks according to law texts, and military prowess wa

s regarded as a value of foremost importance.21 Reputation and po

wer were intertwined with military escapades, resulting in a recu

19 Ibid., 238. 20 Ibid., 115, 118.21 Ibid., 118.


rrent emphasis on conquest and battle amongst Welsh leaders, illu

strated in Llywelyn’s rise to power and method of consolidation.

Initially, it was rare for a formal annexation or government amal

gamation to occur; rather, royal power was characterized by milit

ary occupation and economic exploitation in which a temporary ove

rarching administration of gwladoedd was established.22 Economic

exploitation was enhanced by continual and frequent progresses ar

ound their realms in which officers claimed food-renders and bill

eting rights.23 This oppression coalesced with the Welsh basic so

cial division of unfree/bond and free classes to establish mechan

isms for Llywelyn to utilize in his elevation from minor princeli

ng into the “Great.”24

In conjunction with these characteristics, Llywelyn allied w

ith the Welsh church. In contrast to the ecclesiastical structure

found in England, Welsh churches were founded by, devoted to or d

onated to a specific saint, such as Dewi, Teilo, or Beuno; while

the role of the bishop was to lead this ecclesiastical community

and to execute decisions regarding any and all church lands.25 Th

22 Ibid., 74.23 Ibid., 145.24 Ibid., 119. 25 Ibid., 173.


e church was extremely decentralized, similar to the political st

ructure.26 Religious patronage was an expected project of Welsh p

rinces by the thirteenth century, as through the construction of

churches, monasteries, palaces and castles, Welsh princes were ab

le to emphasize their physical and theoretical power in their spe

cific region, upholding and expanding their political prestige th

rough the quantity and quality of religious buildings of which th

ey were patrons.27 The majority of acts which have survived from

Llywelyn’s reign either focus on political letters to other monar

chs (such as King John and Henry III) or charters affirming land

grants to monastic orders and abbeys; of particular interest is t

he grant and confirmation of Aberconwy Abbey, which is the longes

t document of this form remaining from a twelfth- or thirteenth-c

entury Welsh leader.28 It is under academic scrutiny as certain s

cholars view this document as containing characteristics which su

ggest it is not authentic; however, alongside other primary sourc

es, this document illustrates the significant interrelations betw

een the Church and the prince’s government structure. Llywelyn co

26 Ibid., 174.27 Turvey, Welsh Princes, 174. 28 Huw Pryce, editor, ed. The Acts of Welsh Rulers 1120-1283. (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005), 357.


nfirmed land donations to the abbey and included lawful restricti

ons such as forbidding any lay person or church member from the a

bbey’s lands to utilize the iron brand for identifying their catt

le, and in case another person’s animals bear this mark then that

livestock was to be sent to the monks.29 Charters and grants prov

ided a mechanism for Llywelyn to enhance his reputation amongst t

he populace. Through his reaffirmation of monastic rights, Llywel

yn portrayed his position as a political leader capable of organi

zing legal doctrine and able to successfully implement his mandat

ed rules, ultimately establishing a positive relationship with th

e church leaders in Wales due to the mutual benefits of these cha

rters.

Politically, the societal and religious structures combined

into a form of organization unique to Wales. As previously shown,

Wales was geographically and politically divided into various kin

gdoms, three of which evolved into over-kingdoms. Each ruler was

required to conquer the smaller dynasties in order to expand, bu

t, upon death, the resulting kingdom was divided amongst all the

eligible heirs, a process which led to constant challenges and cl

29 Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 351.


aimants.30 Conflicts developed between different kingdoms and eve

n between members of the same dynasty; marriages were negotiated

for dynastic purposes while alliances were established between va

rious branches and princely lineages. In the majority of cases, t

reachery, ambush or open battle were utilized to resolve disputes

during which bands of youthful warriors were hired with the expec

tation of plunder alongside Irish, Viking and Anglo-Norman fighte

rs from the exterior.31

The locality or region was of greater importance than the ov

erall administration represented by groupings such as Gwynedd, Po

wys and Deheubarth. Each locality contained its own lordly or roy

al center where dues were paid and services were fulfilled for th

e community.32 Davies makes the argument that, due to the communi

ty-focus of Welsh society, it was largely regulated at this level

of government and supervised less by the princes in charge of mil

itary conquest; due to this concentration on the locality, a tren

d can be observed in Wales which is distinct to all societies whi

ch are politically splintered and delicate where a weak governmen

30 Davies, Age of Conquest, 92. 31 Davies, Age of Conquest, 73. 32 Ibid., 21.


t is sustained by a profound respect for the law.33 The law being

referred to is not that established by monarchs, but customary la

w that develops out of tradition; however, both versions begin to

be seen under the consolidation of Llywelyn.34 The aspects of law

frequently influenced by the Welsh princes at this time were in m

atters of crime, payment of fines for illegal acts, land titles w

hich were determined based on seignorial investiture or on a cour

t decision, and in the use of judicial inquiry.35 Increased parti

cipation in judicial matters lent to greater influence on other p

olitical considerations; however, a loose hierarchy of lordships,

instead of a structured hierarchy, is appropriate for describing

the government structure in Wales prior to the consolidation put

in place by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth.36

Llywelyn’s claim to the Welsh kingdom of Gwynedd came throug

h his father, Iorwerth Drwyndwn, who did not participate in the p

ower struggle following Owain Gwynedd’s death in 1170.37 Upon his

father’s passing, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and his mother, Marared of

33 Ibid., 133. 34 Ibid.35 Ibid., 135. 36 Ibid., 69. 37 Turvey. Llywelyn the Great, 18, 24.


Powys, are believed by scholars to have been protected by her bro

ther, Gruffudd Maelor, ruler of Powys Fadog; this assumption is s

upported by the fact that Fadog’s son, Madog, became one of the m

ost loyal supporters of Llywelyn.38 Other details pertaining to h

is childhood remain elusive, restricting further arguments regard

ing the possible influences of his young experiences on his futur

e ruling policy and tactics. However, it is distinguishable that

he was raised to be aware of his rights as one of many heirs thro

ugh his father to Owain Gwynedd’s territory due to the early age

he started agitating for fulfillment of these rights against his

uncles.

According to Gerald of Wales, Llywelyn began his campaign ag

ainst his uncles, Dafydd and Rhodri, in 1188, when he was around

fourteen or fifteen39; however, the Brut y Tywysogyon does not me

ntion this military activity until 1194, when Llywelyn united wit

h the sons of Cynan ab Owain as well as with his uncle Rhodri ab

Owain and fought against Dafydd ab Owain, forcing him from all bu

t three of his castles.40 This event was called the Battle of Abe

38 Ibid., 29. 39 Gerald of Wales. The Journey through Wales/The Description of Wales (England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), 193. 40 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 33.


rconwy by Llywarch ap Llywelyn in the Brut y Tywysogyon, but this

battle was partially remarkable due to the previous tensions betw

een his alliance partners Rhodri and the sons of Cynan.41 Llywarc

h ap Llywelyn describes in vague details the remainder of Llywely

n’s campaign, in which, after 1194, Rhodri became Llywelyn’s enem

y; however, Rhodri died in 1195 and it appears that his lands wer

e divided and given to his nephews Gruffudd and Maredudd.42 For a

few years, relative stability was established amongst these dueli

ng parties. In 1197, Dafydd tried to regain his lands from Llywel

yn using a mixed Welsh and English army; however, he was soundly

defeated and was imprisoned until 1198, when Hubert Walter, Richa

rd I’s chief justiciar, paid for his release.43 This victory made

Llywelyn the sole ruler of Gwynedd Is Conwy, but his cousin, Gruf

fudd ap Cynan, controlled Aberffraw, the royal seat of the kingdo

m, who thus was able to be called the primary prince of Gwyned

d.44

A year later, in 1199, Llywelyn instigated his plan to overt

hrow Gruffudd ap Cynan, yet no details have been recorded on the

41 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 34. 42 Ibid.43 Ibid., 36-37. 44 Ibid.


manner of this insurrection.45 Poets detail a battle near Mold in

January of 1199; however, the information is ambiguous and the re

sults are equally inconclusive, with some scholars defending the

position of a great Welsh victory by Llywelyn, while others argue

for a loss.46 Roger Turvey argues that a key turning point occurr

ed in this struggle on September 28, 1199, when the newly crowned

King John of England issued a charter, which confirmed Llywelyn’s

lands those previously held and those which he might yet conquer

as well as extend the English Crown’s protection to his cause.47

This document, in combination with the papal letter to Llywelyn i

n November 1199 in which he is referred to as the prince of North

Wales, suggests that Llywelyn was winning his rebellion against G

ruffudd at this point, or that he had at least become a prominent

threat to his cousin.48 John’s policy of divide-and-conquer, howe

ver, led to the issuance of subsequent charters to Gruffudd and G

wenwynwyn of Powys in December, with scholars assuming these to b

e attempts at boosting the failing rival’s luck.49 By 1200, Gruff

45 Ibid., 37-38. 46 Ibid., 38.47 Ibid., 39.48 Ibid., 39-40. 49 Ibid.


udd had passed away at the abbey of Aberconwy after having joined

a religious order.50 This death resulted in Llywelyn being left a

s the sole ruler of Gwynedd.

In 1202, Llywelyn began his expansionist policy through the

annexation of the border cantref Penllyn, although it was apparen

t from the first that his true goal was the eventual takeover of

Powys.51 Cantref, cwmwd, and swydd, when compared to units simila

r in size and character, those closest in both characteristics ar

e the lathe, soke or rape of Anglo-Saxon England or the early shi

res of northern England and southern Scotland.52 Thus, Llywelyn b

egan with the smaller administrative divisions before escalating

to the entire over-kingdom. In 1208, an opening appeared through

which Llywelyn happily stepped. Gwenwynwyn of Powys opposed King

John by attacking Blaen Llynfi, an area which had recently transi

tioned to the leadership of a new lord; the Powys prince was quic

kly captured and imprisoned at Shrewsbury.53 Following this arres

t, Llywelyn annexed southern Powys and Ceredigion at the same tim

e, rebuilt a castle at Aberystwyth, and installed client rulers i

50 Ibid., 40.51 Davies, Age of Conquest, 241. 52 Ibid., 20. 53 Turvey, Welsh Princes, 86.


n these territories.54 In a letter to Llywelyn from King John con

cerning these conquests, John states that he has pardoned Llywely

n for his conquest of Gwenwynyn’s castles and lands as well as in

regards to any other damages imposed on Gwenwynwyn while the king

had held him; however, this clemency was reliant upon Llywelyn fu

lfilling his promises as stated in a letter delivered on December

24th and that, thereafter, King John agreed to treat Llywelyn as

his son and work to protect his interests.This attitude evinced b

y John was characteristic of the foreign policy established betwe

en the two rulers after Llywelyn’s ascendancy in 1201.

Aside from John’s intervention in Llywelyn’s conflict with h

is cousin Gruffudd ap Cynan, after Llywelyn’s consolidation as so

le ruler of Gwynedd in 1201, King John extended the truce between

the two kingdoms and, in April of 1201, invited Llywelyn to his c

ourt to continue negotiations for a formal and lengthy peace agre

ement.55 Due to a war with France in May, John sent Geoffrey fitz

Peter, his chief justiciar, and Hubert Walter, the Archbishop of

Canterbury, to Wales to continue the negotiations, which were con

54 Davies, Age of Conquest, 241.55 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 44.


cluded in July of 1201.56 In effect, Llywelyn agreed to swear fea

lty and become united into a more solemn relationship with John t

o whom he gave an oath of homage, recognizing the king’s position

as overlord and feudal superior.57 Additionally, the English were

to recognize the lands held by Llywelyn as of July 11, 1201 and,

if a dispute arose at that time, when appropriate, it was to be c

oncluded under Welsh law.58 This form of relationship was not a n

ovel connection between Wales and England as, prior to the arriva

l of the Normans, an undefined overlord status had been conferred

on rulers of Wessex. A range of actions had been utilized to conv

ey this status: the taking of hostages, formal visits to the roya

l court, classification as under-kings on official charters, trib

ute payment, ceremonial oaths of fealty, and pledges of service w

ithout limitations. However, an institutional framework or denota

tion was missing or limited.59 This structure evolved as a result

Henry II’s decision to define the Welsh-English interaction in Ju

ly 1163 at Woodstock, when Rhys ap Gruffudd of Deheubarth was for

56 Ibid.57 Ibid., 45. 58 Davies, Age of Conquest, 239. 59 Ibid., 27.


ced to do homage after an English invasion.60 Significantly, Llyw

elyn’s grandfather, Owain, was also required to do homage one yea

r prior to this event.61 Llywelyn’s relations with John were more

stable than those experienced by Owain Gwynedd and, for the next

ten years, John and Llywelyn were at peace with one another.

This alliance was strengthened in 1205 by a marriage between

Llywelyn and Joan, King John’s illegitimate daughter.62 Originall

y, Llywelyn had pursued the traditional Welsh policy, in which ar

ound 1202 the western sea orbit was highlighted by Llywelyn’s pro

posal to marry one of the daughters of the king of Man; however,

the ultimate marriage with Joan illustrated the strength of Engla

nd’s place in Welsh foreign policy and the decline of the signifi

cance of the western sea orbit, which previously had been highly

important in northwest Wales.63 There is no exact proof, but scho

lars argue that John had agreed to the marriage of Joan and Llywe

lyn in October 1204, even though the pope had finally granted per

mission in April 1203 for Llywelyn to marry the daughter of Rognv

60 Ibid., 52. 61 Ibid., 51-52. 62 Ibid., 239. 63 Ibid., 10-11.


ald, the widow of Llywelyn’s uncle Rhodri.64 In addition, in orde

r for his English marriage to proceed, Llywelyn was required to c

ast aside Tangwystl, the Welsh mother of his two sons, Gruffudd a

nd Gwenllian.65 The subsequent agreement between Llywelyn and Joh

n included the transfer of the manor of Ellesmere on 16 April 120

5 as part of the marriage portion, even though it had been the ho

me of his dispossessed uncle, Dafydd ab Owain.66

The reasons behind John’s and Llywelyn’s agreement to this m

arriage are open to debate, since neither party recorded their mo

tivating factors. A few possible explanations present themselves

immediately upon consideration. Through marriage to the English k

ing’s illegitimate daughter, Llywelyn’s descendants established r

elations by blood to the leading families of Europe, as well as a

chieving a solid base for negotiation to its neighboring, powerfu

l state. John, in contrast, was focused on continental aspiration

s and concerns with his baronial subjects.67 By marrying his ille

gitimate daughter to Llywelyn, John may have concluded that he wa

s able to shift his focus to the region of greatest interest, the

64 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 47. 65 Ibid. 66 Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 375. 67 Davies, Age of Conquest, 241.


continent and his own state, as the prince in Gwynedd no longer p

resented an immediate threat to his new father-in-law. Thus, the

marriage of Llywelyn and Joan served political goals for both Wal

es and England.

Good foreign relations between Wales and England resulted in

the combined expedition in 1209 against William ‘the Lion’ of Sco

tland.68 The Scottish king had been forced to submit to Henry II

in 1174, but, while Richard had been king, William ‘the Lion’ had

intended to advance his claim of lordship over Northumberland, Cu

mberland, Westmoreland, and Lancashire in his role as a vassal.69

When John ascended the throne, William responded aggressively by

claiming Northumberland and Cumberland, thus rejecting the tradit

ion of paying homage for the English barony of Tindale, and by in

timating that he was willing to forcefully seize the territory du

e to him if his ultimatums were not fulfilled by John.70 In Novem

ber, 1200, William finally paid homage to John, yet the issue of

the northern counties was left indefinitely unresolved and, by 12

68 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 52. 69 W. L. Warren. King John: 1167-1216. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1996), 192-193. 70 Ibid., 193.


09, serious rebellion was brewing.71 Thus, King John, in alliance

with Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, arranged a military excursion to settl

e any treasonous plans afoot. Llywelyn was accompanied by the lor

d of Meirionnyd, Hywel ap Gruffudd, his seneschal Gwyn ab Ednywai

n, and his clerk Ystrwyth, all of whom were aware of the uniquene

ss of this occasion, as this expedition was the only time that a

ruling prince of Gwynedd united with a king of England for a mili

tary purpose.72 In August, William, who was against the possibili

ty of war with John, came to terms via the surrender of three cas

tles, the taking of his two daughters as hostages, and the agreem

ent of fifteen thousand marks to be paid within two years.73 This

form of agreement, characteristic of John’s foreign policy, was r

epeated within two years, as demonstrated through the conclusion

of his expedition against Llywelyn.

It is germane to investigate the possible motivations for th

e prince of Gwynedd to participate actively in the subjugation of

the Scottish king in conjunction with John, due to the equivalent

positions the two men held in comparison to England. Both Llywely

71 Ibid.72 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 52. 73 Warren, King John, 193.


n and William were considered vassals by the English monarch; thu

s, if John had requested Llywelyn’s presence, a refusal by the We

lsh prince may have not elicited a positive response, but, rathe

r, may have aroused suspicion. There is no evidence of the use of

this form of political or feudal pressure; however, another possi

bility related to this theory is the issue of relations between W

ales and England, which were in stark contrast to those between S

cotland and England. Llywelyn and John had a sustained nine-year

peace between their reigns, whereas William ‘the Lion’ had agitat

ed against the hesitancy of John to acknowledge previous Scottish

control over the northern counties. Therefore, the history of lon

g cooperation facilitated a mutual agreement in subduing another

lord of equal status to Llywelyn, as one who threatened the inter

ior realm of England. However, this convivial relationship broke

down shortly after this joint expedition.

There remains debate and speculation about the exact reason

or reasons for the split between Llywelyn and John in 1210, but i

t becomes apparent that such a division did occur due to the mili

tary expedition of the Earl of Chester to claim Perfeddwlad, as w


ell as to build castles at Holywell (Treffynnon) and Degannwy.74

In January, John had given some falcons as a gift to the Welsh pr

ince, suggestive of the fact that the two rulers were still on go

od terms.75 An argument can be made that Llywelyn may have been c

onvinced to aid William de Braose after King John turned against

the baron during the summer of 1210; while contemporary authors s

tate that certain Welsh lords did support Braose, no clarificatio

n about Llywelyn’s role has been found.76 However, that spring, t

he Earl of Chester did not invade Wales independently, but rathe

r, was accompanied by the Earl of Salisbury, the Bishop of Winche

ster, and Geoffrey fitzPeter, the justiciar; this number of impor

tant lords suggests to scholars that it was not a lone Marcher lo

rd attempting to secure greater land claims, but rather, a sancti

oned military endeavor.77 This expedition stopped at the Conwy wh

ere the Degannwy castle was re-built; however, in November of 121

0, John restored Gwenwynwyn to his lands in south Powys, a direct

challenge to Llywelyn’s control in that area.78

74 Davies, Age of Conquest, 241. 75 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 52. 76 Ibid., 53. 77 Ibid., 54. 78 Ibid.


The conflict escalated in 1211 when King John led two expedi

tions against the Welsh. John organized a massive army at Chester

in the spring alongside former Welsh supporters of Llywelyn who h

ad been convinced to switch sides; unfortunately, the only remain

ing supporters of Llywelyn were the grandsons of Lord Rhys, Rhys

Ieuanc and Owain, who were located in the south of Wales and were

experiencing their own difficulties which inhibited their ability

to aid the prince of Gwynedd.79 There are multiple arguments avai

lable for the change in allegiance of these Welsh lords, one of w

hich is that, in the thirteenth century, virtually all leaders of

Gwynedd and southern Powys had married English women of royal or

baronial status, including the four daughters of Llywelyn who wer

e married to English barons.80 Familial ties, as well as the over

lap of land ownership between these Anglo-Welsh families, are one

instigating factor for such nobles to support the overwhelming fo

rce controlled by King John. However, two of the Welsh lords alig

ned with John were Gwenwynwyn and Maelgwn of Ceredigion, whose go

als in backing John are crystal clear, since both gentlemen had l

79 Ibid., 55. 80 David Carpenter. The Struggle for Mastery: Britain 1066-1284. (England: Penguin Group, 2004), 428.


ost control of their territories to Llywelyn’s expansionist polic

ies from 1208-11.81

King John’s invasion was, in fact, two separate attempts; th

e first was inconsequential, as John did not successfully supply

his large army and was unable to maintain it due to Llywelyn’s sc

orched-earth policy.82 Some of his men were reduced to eating hor

se-flesh, in an era when a horse was an extremely valuable posses

sion, and even basic food items such as eggs were hard to find.83

Thus, John retreated for a short while. Oswestry, on Powys’ borde

r, acted as the mustering point for the second expedition by King

John in 1211.84 This developed in July, two months after the orig

inal force disintegrated, and this time John properly provisioned

his forces; they then proceeded to conquer the territory in betwe

en Powys and Bangor, on the coast.85 Yet the Normans did not enco

unter a stable political or governmental structure to modify for

their own purposes; thus, even a devastating victory militarily d

id not guarantee continued Norman authority in Wales.86 While thi

81 Ibid., 284. 82 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 55. 83 Warren, King John, 198. 84 Max Lieberman. The Medieval March of Wales: The Creation and Perception of a Frontier, 1066-1283 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 126. 85 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 55.86 Davies, Age of Conquest, 92.


s characteristic as described by Davies pertained primarily to th

e conquest of the Marches of Wales, it is also relevant to the ma

nner in which John and his predecessors reacted after successfull

y defeating a Welsh prince. Instead of annexing the territory, te

rms of negotiation were set, because maintaining military control

over such regions for a prolonged length of time was virtually im

possible.

The resulting peace agreement was extremely harsh for Llywel

yn, even though he had sent his wife Joan to her father to beg fo

r better terms.87 The English translation of this document, as pr

ovided by Huw Pryce and Charles Insley, reads:

In order to receive the king’s grace and good will, Llywelyn has quitclaimed to King John for ever the castle of Degannwy with Rhos, Rhufoniog with Denbigh and Ystrad, and Dyffryn Clwyd with Ruthin [Gwynedd Is Conwy]. . . Llywleyn will grant the king the allegiances of whichever of hismen the king chooses, and deliver to the king his son Gruffudd; if he does not have an heir by the king’s daughter, Llywelyn grants to the king his heir all his lands, both those retained and those remitted, apart from those which it pleases the king to give to the same son and to Llywelyn’s men. Llywelyn will give the king for his expenses 10,000 cows, forty destriers and sixty hunters, so that the men of the lands he has remitted, both those who become the king’s tenants and those who remain with Llywelyn, shall reasonably give Llywelyn an aid for the aforesaid payment. Llywelyn will deliver to the king as many hostages as he wishes from his land for faithful service, and in order to ensure the agreement is kept Llywelyn has sworn on relics and had this charter made for the king.The bishop of Norwich, the earls William of Salisbury, William Marshal and William de Warenne and Peter fitz Herbert have undertaken that the king by this agreement has remitted all ill will and anger against Llywely

87 Carpenter, Struggle for Mastery, 284.


n. Sealed, at Llywelyn’s request, by the aforesaid bishop, earls and Peter, and by Llywelyn himself. -12 August 121188

Thus, not only was Llywelyn required to forsake the land he had r

ecently conquered, but he was also expected to pay for the resour

ces used by John in his military expedition against Llywelyn. Ano

ther aspect of significant importance is the declaration that if

Llywelyn and Joan did not have a son from their marriage, then th

e Welsh kingdom established by Llywelyn was to be ceded to John,

or his heir, Henry. In order to ensure compliance with these dema

nds, Gruffudd was taken hostage, in the common medieval negotiati

on technique established as relatively effective against Wales si

nce before the arrival of the Normans. It becomes apparent, howev

er, that Llywelyn was not content with these demands and, in 121

2, continued his struggle against King John.

Unity amongst the Welsh lords pervaded the political atmosph

ere immediately after the negotiation terms were dictated to Llyw

elyn.89 For ten months Llywelyn bided his time, attending Easter

services at the English royal court, but subsequently initiating

battle again in June of 1212.90 Alongside Llywelyn were the forme

88 Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 387. 89 Davies, Age of Conquest, 241. 90 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 56.


r Welsh allies which John had utilized in the 1211 invasion, yet,

actions by John alienated these lords. Gwenwynwyn and Maelgwn ap

Rhys were part of the growing alliance of Welsh leaders which con

tinuously expanded as information about John’s cruel treatment of

Welsh hostages became common knowledge91. For example, the sons o

f Maelgwn of whom two died after castration and the third of who

m, Rhys, was hung even though he was only seven years old.92 Addi

tionally, John refused to elevate his former allies’ status in Wa

les to replace the fallen Llywelyn, instigating his overlordship

and installing his trusted men in positions of authority near or

within his terroritories around Wales.93 Once the rebellion bega

n, Llywelyn and his allies laid seige to almost every royal castl

e, but John did not fail to respond. He mustered a huge, multinat

ional army composed of troops from various sections of his contin

ental holdings, which contained over eight thousand laborers whos

e specific job was to build castles; this force consisted of more

than double the quantity utilized by Edward I in his future conqu

est of Wales.94 Successful counteraction of this large force, whi

91 Ibid., 57.92 Ibid.93 Ibid.94 Ibid., 57-58.


ch was assembled at Nottingham, was not executed militarily by Ll

ywelyn, but through his foreign policy strategy and negotiation w

ith other European powers.

Pope Innocent III absolved Llywelyn and his allies of the fe

udal bonds that had been established between them and King Joh

n.95 This decision was not necessarily an act of allegiance to th

e Welsh cause, but rather a tool utilized by the Papal leader to

force John’s hand in the ongoing conflict between the two men. Th

e dispute arose over the replacement as Archbishop of Canterbury;

the Pope had intervened after an exact equal split in votes had o

ccurred between the monks in Canterbury, but King John disapprove

d of this imposition as well as of the actual elected official, S

tephen Langton.96 In 1208, Pope Innocent III declared England, an

d John, under interdict (the prohibition of church functions and

privileges), and only in 1212 did John willingly accept the Pope’

s terms for rejoining the church structure.97 Therefore, internat

ional circumstances provided the Papacy with an excuse to absolve

Llywelyn’s ties to John, while at the same time succeeding in his

95 Ibid., 58. 96 Warren, King John, 162. 97 Ibid., 166, 201.


legal dispute with the English monarch. In conjunction with this

church support, the French King Philip signed a treaty with Llywe

lyn, in which both countries agreed not to make peace with the En

glish and resulted in Prince Louis, Philip’s heir, organizing tro

ops for for an invasion.98 In a letter dated August 14, 1212, Lly

welyn wrote that he had called together the lead men of his counc

il; he also states that he received permission from every prince

in Wales, whom he states are bound to him in friendship, to use h

is seal on the Franco-Welsh treaty as a promise to be always fait

hful to Philip.99 Not only were the French on the point of invasi

on, but serious rumors had begun to circulate of rebellion amongs

t the English barons; all of these three arrangements resulted in

the termination of John’s planned expedition against the Welsh.

Thus, during 1213, Llywelyn utilized King John’s inattentive

ness to his advantage and began to reclaim lands which he had los

t in 1211. The Welsh took over the castles of Degannwy and Rhuddl

an at the same time as annexing the four cantrefi of Gwynedd Is C

onwy.100 John’s response was to support the opposition of Owain ap

98 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 58. 99 Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 392. 100 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 58.


Dafydd and Gruffudd ap Rhodri against their uncle, Llywelyn; howe

ver, no physical support or aid materialized from the English.101D

ue to the agreement between Pope Innocent III and King John of 12

13, the papal legate Pandulf organized a truce between the Welsh

and English; this agreement broke with the Franco-Welsh treaty an

d by 1214 John was attempting to woo the Welsh to his cause again

st King Philip.102 Llywelyn was not interested in aligning with th

e English monarch again even though hostages held by the Anglo-No

rmans were set at liberty, stipulations were made for the Welsh t

o return conquered castles and territories were rescinded; these

options were offered by William, the Bishop of Lichfield, who wen

t in person to the border to negotiate with Llywelyn over the pos

sible peace propositions.103

Indeed, Roger Turvey argues that, by 1215, the Welsh leader

had been convinced by the unhappy English barons to align his pur

poses with theirs against John.104 Reginald de Braose had been dis

patched to Wales with the plan of aiding Llywelyn and his allies

in their pursuit of reconquering the Braose lordships of Brecon,

101 Ibid., 59. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid.104 Ibid., 60.


Radnor, Builth, and Blaen Llyfni, where he eventually concluded a

n alliance with Llywelyn via a diplomatic marriage between their

families.105 In contrast, the majority of Marcher lords sided with

John in the baronial struggle[such as the earls of Chester, Derb

y, Salisbury and Pembroke] thus, it was a major event when Llywel

yn conquered Shrewsbury without a fight.106 There is no record of

the exact dates of occupation, but Llywelyn was subsequently invi

ted to participate alongside the rebellious barons so that he was

able to benefit from anticipated royal concessions.107 As the taki

ng of Shrewsbury occurred at the same time as the sacking of Lond

on, some scholars associate the two endeavors as a coordinated ca

mpaign; however, no exact proof has been forthcoming to legitimiz

e this idea.108

In 1215, King John was forced to sign the Magna Carta, even

though he struggled mightily to wiggle out of the barons’ demand

s. After the original declaration of baronial desire for a charte

r, John asked for additional time to consider his answer; in the

meantime he organized the addition of mercenaries to his troops,

105 Ibid.106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid.


which he eventually returned to their previous locations after Ar

chbishop Langton refused to act as negotiator between the crown a

nd the rebels.109 The barons continued to exert pressure on John t

o stop stalling. This pressure continued even after the Pope came

out in favor of King John, and they renounced their homage on May

3rd.110 John was willing to rectify pending grievances; however, h

e refused to constrain himself for future plans through an agreem

ent in generic terms.111 After the rebels gained control of Londo

n, a stalemate formed between both sides and Langton and the mode

rate faction restarted the negotiations; finally, on 10 June, Joh

n accepted a schedule for drafting the barons’ desired charter.112

From this date in June comes “The Articles of the Barons,” which

included the majority of points to be written in the Magna Carta

while others were only headings or notes.113 M.T. Clanchy points o

ut that the majority of the clauses were narrow in focus in regar

ds to specific laws and administration concerns, while others wer

e of only momentary consequence or of purely local interest.114

109 Warren, King John, 233. 110 Ibid., 234.111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., 236. 113 Ibid.114 M.T. Clanchy. England and its Rulers: 1066-1307 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 191.


On June 15, 1215, at Runnymede, when John signed Magna Cart

a, Llywelyn’s cause was represented by his ally and son-in-law, R

eginald de Braose, and Reginald’s brother Giles de Braose, who wa

s also the Bishop of Hereford.115 There were three clauses specifi

cally added which represented Welsh interests in the Magna Cart

a.116 These clauses basically led to the restoration of lands or r

ights of which Llywelyn and his allies had been unfairly dispose

d; the immediate liberation of all hostages, such as Gruffudd, Ll

ywelyn’s son; and the invalidation of any and all charters which

were obtained by threats against Welsh princes, especially the te

rms of 1211.117 In essence, the release of Gruffudd and the illega

lity of the 1211 treaty released Llywelyn from the imposition of

turning over his kingdom to the English throne in case Joan and L

lywelyn did not have a male child together. In the case that a di

spute arose, John proclaimed:

If we have disseised or deprived Welshmen of lands, liberties or other things without lawful judgment of their peers, in England or in Wales, they are to be returned to them at once; and if a dispute arises over this it shall be settled in the March by judgment of their peers; for tenements in England according to the law of England, for tenements in Wales according to thelaw of Wales, for tenements in the March according to the law of the March. The Welsh are to do the same to us and to ours.118

115 Turvey, Welsh Princes, 89. 116 Ibid. 117 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 61.118 Liebermann, March of Wales, 13-14.


There were no specific changes to the law regarding Welsh societa

l concerns because the Welsh legal system was separate from that

of the English and the goal of Llywelyn in relation to this Chart

er was to reverse conditions previously imposed on his people by

John.119 Due to Llywelyn’s absence on 15 June, a separate meeting

was required for the ratification of these positive terms.

Archbishop Langton of Canterbury appears to be in charge of

Welsh affairs in July when a council was called to make the Chart

er binding.120 This meeting was located in Oxford and Langton arra

nged for the safe passage of Llywelyn and his allies onto and thr

ough English soil; additionally, his mediation helped sweeten the

Welsh pot so that the king granted more concessions than he had o

riginally planned for Llywelyn to receive.121 Alongside the afore

mentioned terms, John bestowed the manors of Bidford and Suckley,

in Warwickshire and Worcestershire, respectively, on Llywelyn, in

what some scholars view as a benevolent act meant to cue a new, c

ontrite foreign policy approach towards Wales.122 Langton’s compli119 John Edward Lloyd. A History of Wales: from the Norman Invasion to the Edwardian Conquest (United States: Barnes & Noble Publishing, 2004), 197. 120 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 61. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid.


ance towards the Welsh did not stop here, but while still at Runn

ymede, he also helped to install two Welshmen in the bishoprics o

f Bangor and St. David’s, appointments which had been under debat

e for years due to stubborn opposition by John to the candidates

supported by Llywelyn and the Welsh church members.123

It became clear by September 1215 that King John did not pla

n to abide by the restrictions secured in Magna Carta and conflic

t between he and his barons resumed; however, Llywelyn did not ta

ke action until three months later, in December, when he led a mi

litary excursion south in a rare occasion outside of the normal c

ampaign seasons.124 The weather was mild, according to native chro

niclers, which lent to the hugely successful military expedition.

The list of castles subjugated by the Welsh appear like a travel

guide in which places such as Cydweli, Llanstephan, St Clears, La

ugharne, Narberth, Newport, Cardigan and Cilgerran make an appear

ance; however, the hardest trophy was won after a five-day siege

which unlocked the castle of Carmarthen, which had been the cente

r for English royal power in south-west Wales for almost a centur

123 Ibid., 62.124 Ibid., 63.


y.125 This campaign was not led by the prince of Gwnyedd alone, bu

t the majority of Welsh princes joined him in his first appearanc

e as a warrior-leader in the south of Wales.126 Militarily, Llywel

yn’s rise in strength after Magna Carta and his subsequent expedi

tions increased his credibility with his fellow lords and only Wi

lliam Marshall in Pembrokeshire maintained enough strength to sta

nd his ground between 1215 and 1217 against Llywelyn’s aggressio

n.127

The situation between England and Wales changed once again u

pon the death of John on October 19, 1216.128 The support for Prin

ce Louis of France waned among the English barons and the Magna C

arta was reissued under the name of John’s son and nine-year-old

successor, Henry III.129 Throughout 1216, Llywelyn had been consol

idating his dominance over the other Welsh princes before and aft

er John’s death. He called a ‘Council of Princes’ at Aberdyfi to

terminate the infighting amongst the lords in Deheubarth which ha

d continued for almost twenty years; the arrangement made by Llyw

125 Ibid.126 Ibid., 64.127 Ibid.128 Franklin McLynn. Richard & John: Kings at War (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007), 460.129 Ibid., 460.


elyn was maintained for the rest of his life as the main Prince o

f Wales.130 Upon Henry III’s coronation, Llywelyn refused to parti

cipate in the election of the new British king and did not attend

the crowning event.131

The immediate response from the minority Regency was partial

ly to be expected due to the fragility of the new government stru

cture. In the 1217 Treaty of Lambeth which ended the British civi

l war, Wales was required to give back all the land it had conque

red since June of the same year in a conflict between Llywelyn th

e Great and Reginald de Braose.132 The regent and the justiciar we

re the lead officials in England, attempting to control a country

for a child-king after having to win it from an adult French chal

lenger. Therefore, the consolidation by Llywelyn of his control i

n Wales may have been both a welcome and worrisome event. A unite

d Wales behind Llywelyn had the possibility to increase its poten

tial military, political, and economic power. As a neighbor to th

e newly-weakened England, the regent felt compelled not to aliena

te Llywelyn by supporting other princes against the strong Gwyned

130 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 64-65. 131 Ibid., 67. 132 Ibid., 72.


d, but also saw a logical reason to include the clause in the 121

7 Treaty demanding the return of confiscated land. In this way, E

ngland presented itself as stronger than it was and in the same p

osition it had previously held as ‘overlord’ to the Welsh leader

s; yet, since it was not a direct agreement with Llywelyn, there

was no requirement for immediate military action if the Welsh did

not cooperate with this Welsh clause.

Llywelyn had begun a military campaign in June 1217 against

Reginald de Braose after his son-in-law betrayed their alliance t

hrough the Treaty of Kingston.133 In addition, he was concerned ab

out the disloyalty of previous allies from the Marches: Peter fit

zHerbert, Thomas Corbet of Caus, John Fitzalan, and Fulk fitzWari

n134. This worry resulted in swift action by Llywelyn to acquire a

firm hold over the Braose lands in southeast Wales.135 While secur

ing de Braose’s lands, Llywelyn also forced the citizens under Wi

lliam Marshall in Pembrokeshire to pay a hundred marks in silver

for him to leave their area unrazed as Llywelyn had devastated ot

133 Ibid.134 Ibid.135 Ibid.


her areas, although Marshall eventually got his castle at Caerleo

n back.136

The English Regency, led by the papal legate Guala, sued for

peace with Llywelyn in March 1218; a meeting was held at Worceste

r in which multiple concessions were given to the Welsh leader an

d recognition of his strong position in Wales became evident.137 H

e was granted custody of certain lands conquered in 1217, such as

southern Powys, but not all of the territory, as well as control

of the royal castles at Cardigan and Carmarthen while Henry III r

emained a minor.138 Southern Powys was given an additional restric

tion, however in that the territorial possession by Llywelyn was

to be reexamined once Gwenwynwyn’s heir came of age and was able

to take custody.139 For these agreements of his land ownership, Ll

ywelyn accepted the Crown’s overlordship and the duty to pay homa

ge.140 However, an important provision recognized Llywelyn’s autho

rity over the other Welsh lords, as it petitioned him to convince

all of the princes in Wales, by 1218, to do homage to the king of

136 Ibid., 72-73. 137 Ibid., 74. 138 Ibid.139 Ibid. 140 Ibid.


England.141 This characteristic combined with the fact that Llywel

yn was the only Welsh prince invited to particpate in the negotia

tions highlights his status as over-prince or lord of the other p

rinces of Wales.142 This document came to be known as the Treaty o

f Worcester.

Llywelyn’s power from this point on relied upon his ability

to contain the ambitions of various Marcher lords.143 His primary

policy was through marriage alliances in order to banish previous

harsh feelings between the Welsh and the Marcher lords. One of hi

s daughters was married to the Earl of Chester, while another mar

ried Reginald Braose (and later Ralph Mortimer upon Braose’s deat

h in 1227-8). The second daughter was wed to John Braose of Gower

and then to Walter Clifford of Bronllys and Clifford, and the thi

rd daughter was married to a member of the Lacy family, another p

rominent lordship in the March of Wales. The best match was saved

for his son, however, as after the war of 1228, Llywelyn elicited

a variety of compromises from William Braose, one of which was th

e marriage of William’s daughter, Isabel, to Llywelyn’s son, Dafy

141 Davies, Age of Conquest, 243. 142 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 75. 143 Davies, Age of Conquest, 247.


dd.144 These marriages did not all occur at the same period of tim

e, but pertained to an elongated policy plan followed by Llywelyn

whenever the opportunity presented the option of solving problems

or forming alliances through his children. Just as his marriage t

o Joan had formed an argument for legitimacy of his power amongst

Anglo-Norman society, these unions soldified Llywelyn’s children’

s status in the Anglo-Norman world as part of the aristocracy.

In 1218, the lords affected the worse were Braose, Mortimer

and Marshal, and these three gentlemen consumed the majority of L

lywelyn’s attention from 1218 onward.145 In 1219, William Marshal

passed away and his son, William Marshal the younger, began to ag

gressively push for the transition of his lands back to his contr

ol from Llywelyn’s; two meetings were held at Shrewsbury in July

1219 and May 1220, but Llywelyn failed to arrive at the third mee

ting in August, providing Marshal with a valid rationale for mili

tary activity.146 In retaliation, Llywelyn captured the castles of

Narberth and Wiston, and was never punished for these conquests d

ue to his refusal to meet with the Crown for more mediation on th

144 Ibid., 248. 145 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 74. 146 Ibid., 77.


is issue.147 At the same time, Llywelyn angered Hugh Mortimer when

the Gwynedd prince decided to uphold the rights of his allies, th

e sons of Maelgwn ap Cadwallon, instead of returning the land of

Maelienydd to Mortimer.148

When appeal to the English court failed to bring about any c

hange, Mortimer met with Llywelyn in August 1220 and a marital al

liance was decided as a method of reconciliation.149 According to

Max Liebermann, this marriage was between Ralph Mortimer and Gwla

dus Ddu, whose parentage is still under debate. She may have been

the daughter of either Joan or Tangwystl, Llywelyn’s Welsh love

r;150 however, Roger Turvey provides different names, those of Hel

en, Llywelyn’s daughter, and of Ranulf’s heir, John the Scot, who

married in 1222.151 Turvey is upheld in this regard through the pr

imary source letter translated by Pryce and Insley in which Ranul

f, the earl of Chester, agreed to the marriage of his nephew John

of Scotland to Helen, Llywelyn’s daughter, after which Llywelyn w

as to bestow on John of Scotland the manors of Bidford and Suckle

147 Ibid.148 Ibid.149 Ibid. 150 Liebermann, March of Wales, 85. 151 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 77.


y.152 This marriage appears to have successfully loosened tension

s; in 1223, Llywelyn attacked the castles of Kinnerley and Whitti

ngton and Ranulf attempted to mediate the subsequent negotiations

between de Burgh, who represented the crown, and Llywelyn.153

Events developed into a more dangerous situation, when the d

isgruntled Earl of Pembroke, Marshal, arrived with an army from I

reland and proceeded to dissolve Llywelyn’s alliances in the sout

h of Wales.154 Marshal’s forces were so powerful that defection be

came a common occurrence amongst local Welsh leaders, including t

he grandsons of Lord Rhys [Cynan ap Hywel Sais and Rhys Mechyll a

p Rhys Gryg].155 Subsequently, de Burgh quit pretending to be neut

ral and forcefully joined and reinforced Marshal’s forces, result

ing in a combined military expedition.156 The resulting campaign w

as particularly effective for the Anglo-Normans and, in October 1

223, Llywelyn sought terms, which were not as harsh as previously

imposed conditions had been.157 The resulting meeting slightly rea

rranged the power dynamics in Wales in which Llywelyn lost contro

152 Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 412. 153 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 79-80. 154 Ibid., 80. 155 Ibid., 81. 156 Ibid.157 Ibid.


l of the southwest and the crown gained a foothold in the northea

st.158 The specific terms were as follows:

It was demanded of Llywelyn that he should restore his Shropshire conquests, Kinnerley and Whittington, to their rightful owners, give up all claims to the castles of Cardigan and Carmarthen, surrender Cilgerran to Marshal and return Montgomery to the Crown. For its part, the Crown agreed to restore the lands taken from Llywelyn’s southern allies provided they could substantiate their claim in law. . . As a result, between 1223 and 1225, Marshal returned southern Ceridigion to Maelgwn ap Rhys but Llywelyn’s other allies in Deheubarth were forced to cede control of the lordships of Cydweli(to de Londres), Cemais (to FitzMartin), St Clears, Llansteffan and Laugharne.159

Llywelyn was not cowed by these measures, but it was his pure for

tune that his main three Marcher enemies, Reginald Braose, Hugh M

ortimer and William Marshal, were either out of favor or dead by

1228. Braose passed away in 1227, while Mortimer passed in 1228,

by which time Marshal had fallen out of favor.160 This lack of fea

r is demonstrated by Llywelyn’s assumption of the title “Prince o

f Aberffraw and Lord of Snowdon;” although he did not style himse

lf Prince of Wales, as he wanted to be able to receive royal reco

gnition from Henry III.161

The last major event pertaining to Llywelyn’s relations with

the afore-mentioned earls occurred after the inconsequential 1228

158 Davies, Age of Conquest, 298. 159 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 81-82. 160 Ibid., 82. 161 Ibid., 88-89.


attempt by de Burgh and the English king to show off their milita

ry might to Llywelyn; during which, William de Braose was capture

d.162 Llywelyn had negotiated a ransom sum of £2,000, exactly the

same amount the English were requiring Llywelyn to pay, and in th

e spring of 1229, he was released.163 However, over Easter of 163

0, Braose returned to finalize the arrangements for his daughter

Isabel’s marriage to Llywelyn’s heir, Dafydd; during this time th

e elder Braose and Joan were caught in circumstances suggesting e

xtramarital relations and the two were promptly separated and imp

risoned.164 William was then tried before Llywelyn’s men and execu

ted on 2 May 1230; however, Llywelyn immediately began to write l

etters to those connected to the executed man, double checking on

the continued positive relationship he hoped to have with them; s

pecifically, he still wanted the marriage of his son and Braose’s

daughter to occur.165

As demonstrated by this evidence, Llywelyn’s foreign policy

after the death of King John revolved around his reaction and neg

otiations with various Marcher lords, who sometimes acted in conj

162 Ibid., 87. 163 Ibid., 89. 164 Ibid., 90.165 Ibid.


unction with the Crown and, at other times, of their own accord.

His legacy, however, has partially evolved out of how he managed

his affairs within Wales after 1218 until his death in 1240. Llyw

elyn did not attempt to unify all of Wales under one administrati

on and government; rather, he frequently intervened in the intere

sts and activities of his subordinates as a way of maintaining hi

s influential role.166 He was not afraid of sacrificing the well-b

eing of his supporters if it aided his overall policy, but any ma

jor military offensive required his approval [minor skirmishes no

t included].167

Davies argues that Llywelyn’s manner of rule was similar to

Lord Rhys of Deheubarth, in that both men utilized a patriarchal

instead of an institutional regime and that the goal of Llywelyn’

s rule was to establish a federation of the distinct principaliti

es instead of a cohesive union.168 For example, even though Llywel

yn had southern Powys firmly under his control from 1218 to 1240,

there were never any attempts to merge this territory into Gwyned

d, and, instead, increased formalities and bonds were used to amp

166 Davies, Age of Conquest, 244. 167 Ibid.168 Ibid., 245.


lify his strength in the region.169 The strongest remainder of his

administration is that Llywelyn declared his status as equal to t

hat of the king of Scotland; as a consequence, it was legal for h

im to welcome English outlaws into his lands. This assertion cont

radicted the idea inherent in his act of homage that his status w

as equivalent to a baron in England; thus, he stressed that he be

given the same level of respect due to any other ruler and that h

e not be forced to attend any meetings outside of his own territo

rial boundaries.170 Finally, Llywelyn tried to consolidate his las

ting territorial dominance by having his supporters swear loyalty

to only one of his sons, Dafydd, who was born in wedlock with Joa

n.171 The last twenty years of his reign focus heavily on this pol

icy, in which he constantly received support from the Pope, who e

ven went so far as to declare Joan as a legitimate sister of Joh

n, and from the English government under Henry III of Dafydd’s le

gitimacy.172 Unfortunately, by 1237, fighting had broken out betwe

en Gruffudd, Llywelyn’s illegitimate son, and Dafydd and this dis

pute only worsened after Llywelyn’s death in 1240.173

169 Ibid., 244-245. 170 Ibid., 246. 171 Ibid., 249.172 Ibid. 173 Ibid., 250.


Prince Llywelyn ap Iorwerth of Gwynedd successfully maneuver

ed his way through the quagmire that was medieval Wales to dredge

out a consolidated power base comprised of multiple feudal lords

underneath his control. However, no complete picture can be drawn

of his regime without including the interference of English polit

ics and its monarch. Since the beginning of Llywelyn’s rebellion

against his uncles up until his death, he had to take into consid

eration which side the English might aid, as well as think about

the possible independent movements of the Marcher lords. The ten

years of initial peace wore off between Llywelyn and King John fo

r reasons lost to time, but this change did not impede the ‘Grea

t’ Welsh leader. After suffering humiliating terms in 1211, Llywe

lyn returned stronger in 1215 to reverse his political fortunes w

ith King John via the inclusion of three Welsh clauses in the Mag

na Carta. The regency government structure established in England

after John’s death enabled Llywelyn to further consolidate his ho

ld over the more minor Welsh princes and to concentrate on his co

nflicts with various Marcher lords. These issues spilled over int

o later years when the English monarchy did take a peripheral int

erest in Wales, but never to the extent exhibited by John. Llywel


yn represented the hallmark of Welsh leadership; his power basis

was due to military prowess and although he did attempt to instal

l his son Dafydd as his sole heir, the majority of his administra

tion followed similar historical patterns as that of other prince

s. One of the largest differences was in his independent stance i

n foreign policy and his ability to manipulate international acto

rs, such as the pope and king of France, which were characteristi

cs lacking in previous Welsh lords who unified the country for a

time. For these reasons, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth came to be known as

Llywelyn the Great.


Works Cited

Carpenter, David. The Struggle for Mastery: Britain 1066-1284. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Clanchy, M. T. England and Its Rulers, 1066-1272. Malden, Oxford:Blackwell, 1998.

Davies, R. R. The Age of Conquest: Wales 1063-1415. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Gerald of Wales. The Journey through Wales/The Description of Wales. London, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978.

Liebermann, Max. The Medieval March of Wales: The Creation and Perception of a Frontier, 1066-1283. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Lloyd, John Edward. A History of Wales: from the Norman Invasion to the Edwardian Conquest. New York, New York: Barnes & Noble Publishing, 2004.

McLynn, Franklin. Richard & John: Kings at War. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007.


Pryce, Huw. Acts of the Welsh Rulers, 1120-1283. Malta: University of Wales Press, 2005.

Turvey, Robert. Llywelyn the Great: Prince of Gwynedd. Llandysul,Ceredigion: Gwasg Gomer, 2007.

Turvey, Robert. The Welsh Princes: The Native Rulers of Wales 1063-1283. London, Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2002.

Warren, W. L. King John, 1167-1216. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1996.

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