When personal identities confirm versus conflict with group identities: Evidence from an intergroup...
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European Journal of Social Psychology
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.747
*L
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Special issue article
When personal identities confirm versus conflict with group identities:Evidence from an intergroup paradigm
Correspondence to: Meagan M. Patterson, Deawrence, KS 66045, USA. E-mail: mmpatter@
opyright # 2010 John Wiley & Son
MEAGAN M. PATTERSON1*, REBECCA S. BIGLER2
AND WILLIAM B. SWANN JR.2
1University of Kansas, Lawrence, USA2University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA
Abstract
This study provides an experimental investigation of the consequences of conflict between children’s personal identities
and experimentally manipulated group identities. Elementary-school-aged children (N¼ 82, ages 5–11) attending a
summer school program rated their own academic and athletic abilities and were then randomly assigned to one of two
novel groups. Children’s views of the academic and athletic skills of the novel groups were assessed both before and after
information about the groups’ academic and athletic skills was manipulated via posters placed in their classrooms.
Following the manipulation, children’s self-views, ingroup identification, and intergroup attitudes were assessed. Results
indicated that (a) in the absence of information about the novel groups, children projected their personal identities onto
their ingroup identities, (b) children maintained their ingroup identities in the face of new information that should have
altered their ingroup identities, and (c) more positive personal identities predicted ingroup bias, which in turn predicted
happiness with one’s ingroup membership. The latter finding suggests that a tendency for children to generalize from their
idiosyncratic positive self-views, rather than an indiscriminate desire for self-enhancement or positivity, may be
responsible for ingroup bias. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Just as people have perceptions of themselves as individuals (i.e., personal identities), they also have perceptions of the
groups of which they are members (i.e., group identities). Often personal identities agree with group identities: males often
perceive both themselves and their group as strong and skilled at math, so too females often perceive themselves and their
group as kind and skilled at reading. At times, however, individuals’ personal identities differ from their ingroup identities.
The outcome of clashes between children’s personal identities and their experimentally manipulated group identities are
the focus of this report. We were specifically interested in the impact of membership in groups that either confirmed or
conflicted with their personal identities on children’s subsequent views of themselves and their ingroup.
The process of integrating group and personal identity is unlikely to be uniform across types of groups. So, for example,
some group memberships are fixed at birth (e.g., gender), whereas others are voluntarily selected (e.g., political party). An
individual whose personal identity is discrepant from that of a voluntarily selected group might choose to leave the group,
an impossible or impractical option for a fixed group membership such as gender. In addition, some group memberships
are associated with well-known cultural stereotypes (e.g., race), whereas others carry few associations (e.g., handedness).
The integration process may well be more complex when group identities carry stereotypic associations than when they
are closer to blank slates. In this study, we sought to examine the process of integration of personal and group identities
when group membership is both (a) involuntary and fixed and (b) associated with specific traits.
partment of Psychology and Research in Education, University of Kansas, 1122 West Campus Rd.,ku.edu
s, Ltd.
Received 9 October 2009
Accepted 20 January 2010
Personal and group identities 653
The challenge of identity integration is likely to be particularly daunting for young children. Relating group and self
identities, for example, requires a multi-step inference process. First, children must understand the relevant social category and
their status as category members. Next, children must acquire knowledge of the traits associated with that particular group in
their culture, which involves the abstraction of general rules (e.g., women are kind) from exposure to individual exemplars.
They must also acquire stable views of their own traits, skills, and values. Finally, children would need to intergrate these two
sets of knowledge. Evidence suggests, however, that elementary-school-aged children are capable of such processes.
By the age of three or four, children are aware of their membership in social groups (e.g., gender and racial groups), and
across early childhood (4–7 years), they become increasingly knowledgeable about cultural stereotypes associated with
such groups (e.g., Aboud, 1988; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006). At the same time, childhood is marked by greatly
expanding knowledge of the self. Across the elementary school years, children increasingly come to see themselves as
possessing a unique set of traits, skills, and preferences (Harter, 2006). Importantly, there is also some evidence that children
integrate these two domains of knowledge; recent research using a cognitive confusion paradigm indicates that, by the age of 5 years,
children treat the ingroup as an aspect of the self, indicating that a process of integration has occurred (Sani & Bennett, 2009).
In the current study, we sought to examine the effects of children’s membership in groups that either confirmed or
conflicted with children’s personal identities on their self and group views. Some children undoubtedly acquire views of
themselves and their ingroup that are concordant. For example, a boy may believe himself and other males to be good at
math. Other children, in contrast, may acquire preferences, talents, or behaviors that conflict with their own or others’ views of
their group. So, for example, a girl may think of herself as highly skilled at math and then learn the cultural stereotype that
females are not especially skilled at math. How will this new knowledge affect her views of herself and her group?
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONAL AND GROUP IDENTITIES
Little direct empirical evidence concerning the process by which children integrate self and group identities exists;
however, several extant theories offer descriptions of the processes by which children might integrate their self and group
views. In addition, there is a broad base of empirical work that bears, albeit indirectly, on the question of how personal
identities and group stereotypes interact to shape developmental outcomes. This body of theoretical and empirical work
can be classified into two broad approaches. The first broad class includes what we call ‘‘group-identity-shapes-personal-
identity’’ approaches. Although they differ in details, these approaches are all based on the implicit or explicit assumption
that membership in social groups plays a powerful causal role in shaping individuals’ self-perceptions. The second class of
work includes what we refer to as ‘‘personal-identity-shapes-group-identity’’ approaches. These approaches are all based
on the implicit or explicit assumption that the self is an important causal agent in shaping individuals’ views of groups.
Although an exhaustive review of work falling into these categories is beyond the scope of this paper, we provide several
illustrative examples of such approaches.
GROUP-IDENTITY-SHAPES-PERSONAL-IDENTITY APPROACHES
Perhaps the most important exemplar of this approach is social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979,
1986). Tajfel coined the term ‘‘social identity’’ to describe the outcome of a system by which social categorization creates
and defines an individual’s personal place in society. Tajfel and Turner proposed that social identities help people to
maintain a positive and distinctive sense of self. Later work by these theorists and others posited a range of additional
motivations that drive individuals to align themselves with groups, including the enhancement of personal identities
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988), need to make sense of the world (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000; Turner, 2000), and
reduction of uncertainty (Hogg, 2000, 2007).
Self-categorization theory (SCT; e.g., Hogg & Haines, 1996; Turner, 1975) also falls within the category of group-
identity-shapes-personal-identity models, arguing that membership in social groups leads individuals to perceive
themselves and behave in ways that are consistent with the group. That is, self-categorization theories view group identities
as exerting a dominant influence in shaping personal identities and behavior. Self-categorization theories predict, for example,
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
654 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
that a girl who learns the stereotype that her ingroup is not skilled at math will come to view herself as consistent with the
stereotype and thus fail to develop an interest in math, or begin to doubt her own math skills if such an interest is already
present. Both SIT and SCT posit that identification with the ingroup is a prerequisite for the development of ingroup bias, and
that demonstrated levels of ingroup bias will vary with the strength of ingroup identification. (See Barrett & Davis, 2008, for a
discussion of SIT- and SCT-based developmental research on racial and national group identities.)
Another exemplar of the group-identity-shapes-personal-identity approach can be found in conceptualizations of
gender role development. Several extant theoretical models posit that children’s gender role attitudes drive their gender
role behavior, a view that is consistent with SCT’s emphasis on the ways in which individuals strive to be ideal group
members (Hogg & Haines, 1996). For example, Martin and Halverson (1981) predicted that, when presented with a truck
as a possible play object, girls think, ‘‘I am a girl and this is a truck; trucks are for boys, therefore trucks are not for me.’’
The powerful influence of the group was also posited by Bussey and Bandura (1992, 1999), who argued that children’s
knowledge of gender stereotypes shapes their own preferences by means of anticipatory self-approval for stereotype-
consistent behavior and self-sanctions for stereotype-inconsistent behavior. These authors argue that children create a set
of personal behavior standards based on their observations of ingroup models and that, over time, children increasingly use
these standards to regulate their own behavior. Consistent with their claims, Bussey and Bandura (1992) reported that
preschool children gave more positive self-evaluations for engaging in sex-typed play than for engaging in cross-sex-typed
play, and furthermore, that these self-evaluations predicted children’s subsequent behaviors.
PERSONAL-IDENTITY-SHAPES-GROUP-IDENTITY APPROACHES
Like all expectancies, personal identities can have a profound impact on information processing (e.g., Shrauger &
Schoeneman, 1979; Swann, in press). One such effect has been dubbed ‘‘self-anchoring’’ (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). This
effect occurs when people rely on their personal identities to make guesses about the value or characteristics of the groups
to which they belong (e.g., Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Robbins &
Krueger, 2005; Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001). Meta-analytic research on self-anchoring indicates that this effect
is particularly strong for minimal or laboratory groups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Otten and Epstude (2006) used a
minimal group paradigm to explore self-anchoring and self-stereotyping processes and found that, when dealing with
ambiguous characteristics, individuals are likely to generalize from the self to the group, but less likely to generalize from
the group to the self. In such instances, rather than changing their personal identities to match group stereotypes,
individuals will construct views of ingroups that match their personal identities. Thus, according to this view, a girl who
views herself as mathematically talented will deny, distort, or forget gender-stereotypic information about girls and math
(rather than begin to doubt her own math skills).
Although we are unaware of research on self-anchoring among youth, there is some evidence that young children’s
personal identities do influence their activities during childhood and adolescence (Bandura, 1990; Cassidy, Aikins, &
Chernoff, 2003; Cassidy, Ziv, Mehta, & Feeney, 2003; Rosen, 2006). Cassidy et al. (2003), for example, reported that
children preferred to interact with partners who confirmed their personal identities, and Bandura (1990) reported that
children ignored feedback that could improve their performance on a task when they believed themselves to have low
ability in that domain. Evidence consistent with a role for personal identities in shaping social stereotypes also comes from
gender development research. Dinella and Martin (2003), for example, found that self-described tomboys were more
likely to endorse counterstereotypic views of gender than their more traditional peers.
BI-DIRECTIONAL AND IDENTITY NEGOTIATION MODELS
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that group-identity-to-personal-identity and personal-identity-to-group-identity
pathways operate in tandem. Swann and colleagues have argued that a process of ‘‘identity negotiation’’ between the
personal identities of targets and others’ perceptions of targets often occurs (Swann, 1987; Swann & Bosson, 2008; Swann,
Milton, & Polzer, 2000). Swann and colleagues’ research indicates that targets’ self-views prevail in most instances,
although perceivers’ beliefs prevail when they are highly certain of their judgments of targets and targets are uncertain of
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DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
Personal and group identities 655
their self-views. Similarly, field studies of college roommates (McNulty & Swann, 1994) and small groups of MBA
students (Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004) reveal that just as perceivers’ initial appraisals influence targets’ subsequent
personal identities, so too do targets’ self-views influence perceivers’ later appraisals.
The notion of bi-directional influences of self and group views has also been incorporated into recent models of gender
role development. In contrast to unidirectional causal models, Liben and Bigler (2002) proposed a bi-directional model of
gender differentiation. Liben and Bigler argued that gender role development is propelled by a personal pathway, in which
views of the self drive views of the group and, simultaneously, an attitudinal pathway, in which gender attitudes drive views
of, and decisions for, the self. Although Liben and Bigler argue that both of these processes occur, they do not specify the
factors that might lead one pathway to predominate within a given context.
An additional perspective on integration of self and group views is Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory.
Brewer posited that the formation of social identities is motivated by two opposing human desires: a desire for similarity to
others and a desire for uniqueness. Brewer argued that one way in which individuals maintain feelings of optimal
distinctiveness is through identification with social groups. The desire for feelings of similarity (assimilation with others)
is satisfied within the social group, whereas the desire for uniqueness (differentiation of the self) is satisfied through
intergroup comparisons (Brewer, 1991). Brewer predicts that group members who feel overly distinctive or dissimilar
from the ingroup will strive to increase their ingroup identification in an attempt to feel more similar to ingroup members
and maintain an optimal level of distinctiveness. That is, the coordination of self and group identities is an ongoing process
that serves individuals’ needs for belonging and uniqueness.
Support for Brewer’s theory comes from empirical studies that manipulate individuals’ sense of typicality. Markus and
Kunda (1986), for example, found that individuals who had been led to feel highly unique subsequently perceived
themselves as more similar to ingroups – and more dissimilar to outgroups – than participants who had been led to feel
similar to others. Similarly, Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman (2002) reported that participants who were told that they were
different from ingroup members (a threat to ingroup assimilation) stated that they possessed typical ingroup characteristics
more often than participants who were told that they were similar to ingroup members. The authors interpreted the findings
as indicating that threats to assimilation (such as indications that one holds different attitudes than most ingroup members)
produce increased ingroup identification.
A recent study of racial typicality also relates to optimal distinctiveness theory’s predictions regarding ingroup
identification. Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee, and Celious (2006) found that African American and Latino adolescent boys
whose facial appearance (or self-perceived appearance) was atypical of their race showed higher rates of academic failure
than their peers with more typical racial features. The authors interpret their findings as indicating that being atypical of
one’s social group in one respect may lead individuals to strive to be typical of their ingroup in other respects, even when
this means confirming negative stereotypes.
One final theory that is relevant to the integration of self and other views concerns the development of subjective group
dynamics (DSGD). Abrams and colleagues (Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Rutland,
Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007) have studied children’s perceptions of social groups and group norms, with a particular emphasis on
the importance of differentiation processes (i.e., intergroup bias, differential evaluation, and differential inclusion). Studies
from the DSGD perspective indicate that, with age, children become increasingly aware of the norms governing intergroup
relations and more sensitive to factors such as ingroup loyalty (Abrams et al., 2003, 2007). With age, children also
show increasing evidence of identity-based motivation (e.g., children who identified with their ingroup more strongly
showed greater preference for normative group members than did children who identified less strongly; Abrams et al.,
2003). Recent research (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008) indicates that these processes apply in minimal
and culturally important social groups. Thus, in the present study, we tested the hypothesis that group-identity-shapes-
personal-identity pathways may operate more strongly among older than younger children, whereas personal-identity-shapes-
group-identity pathways may operate more strongly among younger than older children.
THE PRESENT STUDY
We sought to examine the causal pathways through which relations between group and personal identities are integrated by
creating a situation in which children’s self-conceptions would be consistent – or conflict – with their group identities.
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
656 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
Because we were interested in fixed, involuntary group identities that are associated with stereotypes (such as race and
gender), children were randomly assigned to novel social groups (‘‘red’’ and ‘‘blue’’ groups denoted by colored t-shirts) in
their classrooms and provided information about the associations between these color groups and specific competencies
(academic and athletic skills) via posters in their classrooms. The use of posters to convey information about the
characteristics of novel groups has been used in previous work (Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Bigler, Jones, &
Lobliner, 1997; Brown & Bigler, 2002), and combines the advantages of experimental manipulation with those of field
methods (e.g., ecological validity). Specifically, in previous studies (Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002), the
presence of classroom posters presenting status information about novel groups affected children’s intergroup attitudes.
That is, the presence of posters depicting one color group as winning athletic and academic contests led to more positive
views of ingroup members among high status (i.e., winning) than low status (i.e., losing) group members. In the present
study, we focused on two primary sets of outcomes: personal identity (i.e., views of self) and group identity (i.e., views of
novel groups).
With respect to personal identity, we assessed children’s perceived self-competence in the same two domains
targeted for experimental manipulation: academics and athletics. Self-competencies were assessed prior to and after the
exposure to the experimental messages about the novel groups. As noted above, three outcomes are possible. The
first possible outcome is that children whose personal identities are discrepant from their ingroup within these domains
(i.e., children whose personal identities are not confirmed by their group membership) will alter their self-perceptions to
bring them into line with their views of the ingroup. The second possible outcome is that children whose personal identities
are discrepant from their group identities will not alter their personal identities but instead will alter their perceptions of
their ingroup to bring them into line with their personal identity. The third possible outcome is that children whose
personal identities are discrepant from their ingroup identity will alter neither their personal identities nor their perceptions
of their ingroup; children will maintain a stereotypical view of the group while perceiving themselves as atypical group
members.
With respect to group identities, we assessed children’s (a) affective reactions to the intra- and intergroup context, (b)
ingroup identification, and (c) intergroup bias. Again, there are theoretical grounds to support two conflicting hypotheses
with respect to these variables. The first possible outcome is that children whose personal identities are discrepant from
their group views (i.e., children whose personal identities are not confirmed by their group membership) might value their
group membership more strongly than their peers and, as a consequence, seek to strengthen their psychological sense of
belongingness, similarity, and ingroup bias. This view is consistent with social identity and self-categorization theories
(Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991). Because atypical
children may have a less secure sense of attachment to the group (and consequently a threatened sense of pride and self-
esteem) they may have to work especially hard to maintain their connection to the group. Indeed, threat has been found to
increase ingroup bias (Cameron, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2005). Thus, those children who are atypical of their ingroup
would be expected to show stronger ingroup identification and higher levels of ingroup bias than those children who are
typical of their ingroup.
The second possible outcome is that children who are atypical of their group might value their group
membership less strongly than children who are typical of their group and, as a consequence, show a weakened
psychological sense of belongingness, lower perceptions of similarity to the group, and reduced ingroup bias. In other
words, because atypical children are likely to view themselves as differing from their ingroup to a greater degree than
typical children, they may be less likely to extend their personal identities to other ingroup members and thus show
reduced ingroup bias.
The research questions were addressed using a sample of children who ranged in age from 5 to 11. This range allowed
us to examine whether age was associated with differing reactions to the experimental manipulation. We had two reasons
for expecting that older children may provide stronger evidence for the group-identity-shapes-personal-identity model
than younger children. As noted earlier, older children have been shown to be more knowledgeable than younger children
about the norms governing social groups, including the norms of ingroup loyalty and conformity (e.g., Abrams et al.,
2008). Older children may, therefore, show more concern with conforming their personal identity to the ingroup identity.
In addition, older children are better able to reason about internal (nonobservable) person characteristics than younger
children (e.g., Alvarez, Ruble, & Bolger, 2001). Because our manipulation concerned internal rather than perceptually
salient characteristics (i.e., academic and athletic aptitude), we expected older children to show more pronounced
responses to the manipulation of group identity (see Abrams et al., 2003; Patterson & Bigler, 2007).
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DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
Personal and group identities 657
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 82 children (43 boys, 39 girls) attending a summer school program in the Midwest. Four additional
students were enrolled in the summer school program but were not included in data collection because parental permission
to participate in testing sessions was not obtained. The sample was predominantly white and middle class. Participants
ranged in age from 5 to 11 years (M¼ 8.14, SD¼ 1.79). Prior to the start of the study, children were grouped according to
age and assigned to one of eight classrooms. Classes ranged in size from 8 to 14 pupils.
Overview of Procedure
On the first day of school, prior to the introduction of the novel social groups, children were given a self-esteem measure
that included assessments of children’s perceived competence in the academic and athletic domains. Next, children in each
classroom were randomly assigned to novel social groups (‘‘red’’ or ‘‘blue’’), denoted by colored t-shirts (as in a number of
studies conducted by Bigler and colleagues, e.g., Bigler, 1995; Bigler et al., 1997; Brown & Bigler, 2002; Patterson &
Bigler, 2006). All children who attended the school wore colored t-shirts. Within each classroom, half of the children were
assigned to the blue group and half were assigned to the red group.
To test the idea that children would project their own personal identities onto their ingroup, children were asked to rate
the characteristics of their ingroup and outgroup within 24 hours of their group assignment. Children rated the groups
using the same competence scales on which they had rated themselves. Over the following 6 weeks of summer school,
teachers made frequent use of the novel groups to organize and label children (e.g., ‘‘The red group can line up for
recess’’). Teachers were instructed to treat the two groups equally and to prevent group competition because
competitiveness has been found to promote negative intergroup relations. In addition, six large color posters were placed
within each classroom. These posters were nearly identical in size (55 cm� 71 cm), shape, and content to the posters used
to affect children’s judgments about novel group qualities in previous studies (e.g., Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler,
2002).
Three posters depicted the winners of contests in academic domains and three posters depicted the winners of contests
in athletic domains. Ethical and ecological validity considerations prevented the depiction of novel groups as incompetent
in academic and athletic domains (i.e., depicting the losers of athletic and academic competitions). Within each classroom,
children of one color group (e.g., red) were depicted as winning all of the athletic events, whereas children of the other
color group were depicted as winning all of the academic events (the color of the high-performing group in the each
domain was counter-balanced across classrooms). Thus, each classroom included some children whose self-perceptions
were consistent with the poster messages (e.g., I am good at school; other members of my group are good at school) and
some children’s whose self-perceptions were inconsistent with the poster messages (e.g., I am good at school; other
members of my group are good at sports).
During the final (sixth) week of school, children were again given the academic and athletic subscales of the perceived
competence scale and asked a series of questions about the novel groups to assess ingroup identification and intergroup
bias. Finally, children participated in a 30-minute debriefing session led by the second author and a classroom teacher.
Together, they explained the purpose of the experimental procedures and discussed the negative consequences of social
stereotypes.
Pretest Measures
Academic and Athletic Self-Competence
Participants were asked questions from the Perceived Competence Scale for Children (Harter, 1982) assessing self-
perceived competences in two domains: academics (e.g. ‘‘Some kids do well in school, is that true for you?’’) and athletics
(e.g. ‘‘Some kids do well at new sports, is that true for you?’’). Response options ranged from ‘‘really true’’ (4) to ‘‘really
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
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658 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
not true’’ (1). Children were also asked to complete a single-item measure asking whether they believed themselves to be
better at school or sports.
Perceived Group-Competence
Participants were asked to rate the novel groups using the same perceived competence scales on which they had rated
themselves (i.e., Harter’s Perceived Competence Scale for Children, 1982). Specifically, children were asked to indicate
how many children in each color group within the school were characterized by each of the Harter items using the response
options, ‘‘only red kids,’’ ‘‘mostly red kids, some blue kids,’’ ‘‘some blue and some red kids,’’ ‘‘mostly blue kids, some red
kids,’’ and ‘‘only blue kids.’’
Treatment Conditions
Overview
The experimental manipulation of information about the novel groups was done via the placement of posters in the
children’s classrooms (as in Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002). Each classroom contained six posters. Teachers
informed the students in their classrooms that the posters portrayed children and events from the previous year’s summer
school. That is, we maximized the likelihood that children would generalize the characteristics of the children on the
posters to their own groups by creating the impression that the children in the posters (a) lived in the same general location
(e.g., city and state) as the participants, (b) had attended the same summer school as the participants, and (c) were the same
ages, races, and genders as the participants. None of the teachers had taught in the program previously and thus they were
able to answer questions about the posters honestly by stating that they knew nothing else about the children or events
depicted in the posters. Three of the posters depicted children who were successful in academic domains (spelling,
reading, and math contests) and three of the posters depicted children who were successful in athletic domains (swimming
contests, field day, and sports team captains). The depicted winners in academic domains were all members of one color
group, whereas the depicted winners in athletic domains were all members of the other color group. The domain of the winning
group was counterbalanced across classrooms: athletic winners were depicted as red and academic winners as blue in half of
the classrooms, whereas the reverse was true (i.e., academic winners were depicted as red and athletic winners as blue) in the
other half of the classrooms. Thus, half the children in the each classroom were assigned to each of the two treatment
conditions (academic and athletic). A summary of participant characteristics within conditions appears in Table 1.
Academic Ingroup Condition
Children in this condition saw posters that depicted their ingroup as better at academics than athletics. That is, the six
posters in the child’s classroom depicted the child’s ingroup (red in some classrooms; blue in other classrooms) as winning
Table 1. Summary of participant characteristics across condition
Condition
Academic Athletic
GenderBoys 23 19Girls 16 22
Age groupYounger (5–8) 22 25Older (9–11) 17 16
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DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
Personal and group identities 659
a series of academic competitions (summer reading contest, math quizzes, spelling bees) and the child’s outgroup as
winning a series of athletic competitions.
Athletic Ingroup Condition
Children in this condition saw posters that depicted their ingroup as better at athletics than academics. That is, the six
posters in the child’s classroom depicted the child’s ingroup (red in some classrooms; blue in other classrooms) as winning
a series of athletic competitions (swimming events, field day events, ball games) and the child’s outgroup as winning a
series of academic competitions.
Posttest Measures
Overview
After several weeks of exposure to the posters, children’s views of their own competence were assessed using both the
perceived competence scale and specific questions about academic and athletic skills. We also assessed children’s ingroup
identification and intergroup bias.
Academic and Athletic Self-Competence
Participants again reported their perceived competence on the academic and athletic subscales of the Perceived
Competence Scale for Children (Harter, 1982).
Ingroup Identification
Participants’ satisfaction with their group membership was assessed with three questions: (1) ‘‘How important is being a
blue/red group member to you?’’ with response options ranging from ‘‘not important’’ (1) to ‘‘very important’’ (4); (2)
‘‘How happy are you to be in the blue/red group?’’ with response options ranging from ‘‘not happy’’ (1) to ‘‘very happy’’
(4); and (3) ‘‘If you could choose your group membership, would you choose to be in the blue group or the red group?’’
Ingroup Bias – Traits
Participants rated how many members of each color group (all, most, some, or none) possessed seven positive traits (i.e.,
friendly, helpful, nice, pretty/handsome, smart, good, hard working), as in previous research (Bigler, 1995; Bigler et al.,
1997; Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002).
Group Evaluations – Academic and Athletic Skills
Participants rated each color group’s perceived skills in several academic (spelling, math, reading) and athletic (running,
swimming, sports) domains using a 4-point scale from ‘‘excellent’’ (3) to ‘‘not very good’’ (0).
Group Evaluations – Competency Ratings
Participants were asked which color group would win contests that were similar to those depicted on the posters (e.g.,
spelling bee, kickball game). Response options were ‘‘red,’’ ‘‘blue,’’ and ‘‘tie’’. Responses favoring the ingroup were
scored as þ1, responses favoring the outgroup were scored as �1, and neutral (‘‘tie’’) responses were scored as 0.
Composite scores were created to reflect children’s overall judgments of academic and athletic contests. Possible scores
for each subscale (academic and athletic) ranged from �3 to þ3.
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660 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
RESULTS
Overview of Data Analyses
The first set of analyses examined children’s pretest self-competence rating within academic and athletic domains (i.e.,
measures taken prior to the experimental manipulation of messages about the competencies of the novel groups). To test
for effects of personal identity on group identity, we examined whether children’s self-perceptions at pretest affected their
initial perceptions of novel groups.
The second set of analyses examined children’s responding on the posttest measures for evidence of ingroup bias (i.e.,
measures taken after the experimental manipulation of messages about the competencies of the novel groups).
The third set of analyses examined the effects of treatment condition (i.e., academic vs. athletic) on children’s personal
identities. That is, we tested the possible role of group identity in shaping personal identity by examining whether the
information presented in classroom posters about the social groups produced changes in children’s group views (i.e., a test
of the effectives of our manipulation) and personal identities. For this set of analyses, we used analysis of variance in order
to maximize the likelihood of detecting age by condition interactions.
The fourth and final set of analyses examined the effect of self-confirming versus disconfirming information on
children’s views of social groups. That is, we tested the possible role of personal identity in shaping group identity by
examining whether information that one was concordant with versus discordant from one’s ingroup produced differing
reactions to group membership (e.g., ratings of group importance, ingroup bias). Because we predicted that children’s level
of cognitive development might influence the effect of membership in discordant groups, for this set of analyses, we used
linear regression to increase our sensitivity to age effects.
Pretest Measures
Preliminary Analyses
We first examined children’s pretest ratings of their academic and athletic abilities using participant gender as a between
subjects variable. Results indicated a significant main effect of gender, with boys generally showing higher levels of
athletic self-competence than girls. We controlled for variations associated with gender by using gender as a covariate in
all subsequent analyses. We also examined correlations between age and children’s pretest ratings of their academic and
athletic abilities. Age was not significantly related to children’s ratings of their academic or athletic abilities (ps> .30).
Thus, we did not include age in analyses relating to children’s personal or group identities. We did, however, include age as
a predictor variable in analyses regarding the integration of personal and group identities, due to the potential influence of
children’s level of cognitive development on integration processes.
Personal Identities
Academic and Athletic Self-Competence
Children’s mean pretest scores on the academic and athletic subscales of the Harter Perceived Competence Scale were
typical of those found among elementary-school-aged children (Academic: M¼ 21.9, SD¼ 3.5; Athletic: M¼ 21.1,
SD¼ 4.0; see Harter, 1982). As expected given random assignment to conditions, a 2 (treatment condition: academic vs.
athletic) by 2 (domain: academic vs. athletic) ANCOVA using gender as a covariate indicated no significant differences
across treatment condition. The gender covariate was nonsignificant for the academic subscale but was significant for the
athletic subscale (F(1, 67)¼ 12.80, p< .01). Boys demonstrated significantly higher self-competence than girls on the
athletic subscale (girls’M¼ 19.5, boys’ M¼ 22.5). Children’s perceptions of their academic and athletic competence were
moderately correlated (r(70)¼ .29, p< .05).
Children were also asked to report whether they were better at sports or school. Two children refused to choose one
domain. The remaining children were evenly split; 50% of the children claimed that they were better at school and 50%
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Personal and group identities 661
claimed that they were better at sports. Chi-square analyses indicated that boys were significantly more likely than girls
(70% vs. 27%) to say that they were better at sports than school, x2(1, N¼ 56)¼ 10.3, p< .01.
To create a single score indicating children’s self-perceived abilities, we subtracted children’s total scores on the Harter
athletic subscale from their total scores on the Harter academic subscale. Thus, positive scores indicate a perception that
one is better at school than sports; negative scores indicate a perception that one is better at sports than school. Children’s
scores ranged from þ9 to �11, with a mean of 0.85. Children’s scores on this measure were consistent with their responses
on the forced-choice measure; children who stated that they were better at school on the forced-choice measure had a mean
self-perception score of 2.96 (SD¼ 3.89), whereas children who stated that they were better at sports on the forced-choice
measure had a mean self-perception score of �1.78 (SD¼ 3.48). An independent-samples t-test indicated that the two
groups were significantly different in perceived competence, t(54)¼ 4.72, p< .001.
Group Identities
Perceived Group Competence
To assess whether children showed immediate biases (i.e., appearing within 24 hours of group assignment) in their
perceptions of the novel groups, we tallied the number of (a) ingroup biased (i.e., ‘‘only’’ and ‘‘mostly’’ members of the
child’s ingroup), (b) outgroup biased (i.e., ‘‘only’’ and ‘‘mostly’’ members of the child’s outgroup), and (c) neutral
responses (i.e., ‘‘both’’ members of the child’s ingroup and outgroup) to the items from the academic and athletic subscales
of the Harter measure. To obtain a single index of bias for each subscale, we subtracted the total number of outgroup biased
responses from the total number of ingroup biased responses. A one-sample t-test indicated that bias on the academic
subscale were significantly above chance, M¼ 0.71, t(72)¼ 3.39, p< .05. Bias on the athletic subscale, although in the
predicted direction, was not significantly different from chance, M¼ 0.15. Thus, at the group level, children showed some
bias favoring the ingroup within one day of being assigned to novel groups. As expected given random assignment, a 2
(treatment condition: academic vs. athletic) by 2 (domain: academic vs. athletic) repeated measures ANCOVA using
gender as a covariate indicated no significant differences in ingroup bias across treatment condition or gender for either
subscale.
Tests for Personal-Identity-Shapes-Group-Identity Effects
The self-anchoring hypothesis predicts that children will project their personal identities (whether positive or negative)
onto their ingroup. To test this notion, we examined whether individual differences in children’s perceived self-
competence were related to their perceptions of the competence of their ingroup. Specifically, correlations were calculated
between children’s self-competence and group competence ratings in the academic and athletic domains. As predicted by
self-anchoring theory, children’s academic personal identities were significantly correlated, r(69)¼ .25, p< .05, with
ingroup bias in the academic domain. As children’s rating of their own academic prowess increased, they were more likely
to claim that their ingroup was more skilled in the domain of academics (but not athletics, r(69)¼ .09, p> .10) than their
outgroup. Similarly, children’s athletic self-views were significantly correlated, r(68)¼ .26, p< .05, with ingroup bias in
the athletic domain. As children’s rating of their own athletic prowess increased, they were more likely to claim that their
ingroup was more skilled in the domain of athletics (but not academics, r(68)¼ .16, p> .10) than their outgroup. In other
words, children projected their views of their own athletic and academic abilities (or lack thereof) onto their ingroup in a
domain-specific manner.
Posttest Measures: Tests for Ingroup BIASES
Overview
The second set of analyses examined children’s responding on the posttest measures of intergroup attitudes (trait ratings
and group evaluations). A summary of these measures, including means and standard deviations, appears in Table 2. One-
sample t-tests were used to examine whether – at the group level – children’s ratings of the ingroup differed from neutral
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
Table 2. Measures of intergroup attitudes
Possible Range Mean SD
Ingroup bias - perceived group-competenceAcademic �7 to þ7 0.71 2.54Athletic �7 to þ7 0.15 2.76
Ingroup bias – trait ratings �21 to þ21 0.14 4.19Group evaluations – skills ratings
Academic �15 to þ15 �0.01 2.06Athletic �15 to þ15 0.29 2.07
Group evaluations – competency ratingsAcademic þ3 to �3 0.82 1.68Athletic þ3 to �3 0.49 1.66
Group happiness 1 to 4 3.24 0.89Group importance 1 to 4 2.68 1.01
662 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
(i.e., chance). We did not expect to find ingroup biases for two reasons. First, all children were exposed (via the classroom
posters) to negative messages about their ingroups’ skill (i.e., information that the ingroup was unsuccessful within either
the academic and athletic domain). Second, the group-level data included those children who perceived themselves to
perform poorly in each domain.
Ingroup Bias – Trait Ratings
To create a single index of trait bias, outgroup ratings were subtracted from ingroup ratings, such that positive numbers
indicated an ingroup bias and negative numbers indicated an outgroup bias. As expected, children’s trait ratings were not
significantly different from chance, M¼ 0.14, t(71)¼ 0.28, p> .10.
Group Evaluations – Academic and Athletic Skills
To create a single index of skills ratings bias, outgroup ratings were subtracted from ingroup ratings, such that positive
numbers indicated an ingroup bias and negative numbers indicated an outgroup bias. Consistent with expectation, children
did not show evidence of ingroup bias in their ratings of the color groups’ academic, M¼�0.01; t(71)¼�0.06, p> .10, or
athletic skills, M¼ 0.29; t(71)¼ 1.20, p> .10.
Group Evaluations – Competency Ratings
Children were asked which group would win a series of hypothetical contests (e.g., a spelling bee, a kickball game).
Responses favoring the ingroup were scored as þ1, responses favoring the outgroup were scored as �1, and neutral
(‘‘tie’’) responses were scored as 0. Despite the presence of posters, children expected their ingroup to win both academic
and athletic contests at levels significantly greater than chance (0), M¼ 0.82, t(70)¼ 4.08, p< .001 and M¼ 0.49,
t(70)¼ 2.51, p< .05.
Posttest Measures: Tests for Group-Identity-Shapes-Personal-Identity Effects
Overview
Group-identity-shapes-personal-identity models predict that children’s views of social groups play a causal role in shaping
their self-perceptions. To test this notion, we examined whether children in our two experimental conditions (i.e., those
children exposed to the message that their ingroup was good at academics but not athletics and those children exposed to
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Personal and group identities 663
the message that their ingroup was good at athletics but not academics) showed differential changes to their perceived self-
competence in academics and athletics. It was first necessary, however, to examine whether the posters used to convey
information about the social groups were effective at shaping children’s views of the color groups. If the manipulation was
effective, we would expect children in the two conditions (i.e., academic and athletic) to hold different views of the color groups.
Group Identities: A Manipulation Check
Group Evaluations – Academic and Athletic Skills
To examine whether children had internalized the posters’ messages about novel color groups’ skills, we examined
children’s ingroup and outgroup ratings in the two domains using a 2 (treatment condition: academic vs. athletic)� 2 (age
group: younger vs. older)� 2 (target: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANCOVA, with the latter variable as a repeated measure and
participant gender as a covariate. Contrary to the expectation that the poster messages would shift children’s views of the
groups, results indicated no significant interaction of treatment condition and target for either academic or athletic skill
ratings, F(1,66)¼ 0.20, p> .10, and F(1,66)¼ 0.22, p> .10, respectively.
Group Evaluations – Competency Ratings
As in the previous analysis, we examined the effects of posters on children’s predictions concerning the outcomes of a
series of hypothetical academic and athletic contests using a 2 (treatment condition: academic vs. athletic)� 2 (age group:
younger vs. older)� 2 (target: ingroup vs. outgroup) ANCOVA, with the latter variable as a repeated measure and gender
as a covariate. Contrary to the expectation that the poster messages would affect children’s views of the groups, results indicated
no significant interaction of treatment condition and target for either academic or athletic competency ratings, F(1,65)¼ 0.01,
p> .10, and F(1,65)¼ 0.17, p> .10, respectively. Means and standard deviations are presented in Appendix A.
Personal Identity
We did not find evidence that the posters affected children’s explicit views of the color groups. To test whether posters
affected self-views, we examined whether the information presented via the posters produced changes in children’s
perceived self-competence in academic and athletic domains. Specifically, we examined children’s ratings of their self-
competence in each domain using a 2 (treatment condition: academic vs. athletic)� 2 (age group: younger vs. older)� 2
(time: pre- vs. posttest) repeated-measures ANCOVA, with the last variable as a within-subjects factor and gender as a
covariate. For academic self-competence, results indicated a significant age group by time interaction, F(1, 55)¼ 4.09,
p< .05, with older children showing greater gains in academic self-competence over time than younger children. For
athletic self-competence, results indicated a significant main effect of gender, with boys showing higher athletic self-
competence than girls at both pre- and posttest, F(1, 58)¼ 14.72, p< .05. In sum, there was no evidence of effects of group
identities on personal identities. Children who were exposed to the message that their ingroup was good at academics did
not increase their own perceived competence in that domain; children who were exposed to the message that their ingroup
was good at athletics did not increase their own perceived competence in that domain.
Posttest Measures: Tests for Personal-Identity-Shapes-Group-Identity Effects
The analyses described above indicated that the posters used to convey information about the social groups were – at the
group level – ineffective at shaping children’s views of the color groups. Children in the two conditions (i.e., those children
who saw posters indicating that their ingroup excelled in academics and those children who saw posters indicating that
their ingroup excelled in athletics) did not hold significantly different views of competencies of the color groups. One
possible explanation for the failure to reject the null hypothesis is that children project their self-views onto their groups –
as they did at the start of the summer school – even in the face of new evidence to the contrary. That is, self-competence
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
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664 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
ratings in a given domain would be positively correlated with group competence ratings in that same domain. To test this
notion, correlations were calculated between children’s self-competence ratings in the academic and athletic domains at
posttest and their degree of ingroup bias within these two domains. Analyses indicated mixed support for the hypothesis. In
the academic domain, children’s self-competence ratings were correlated with ratings of ingroup academic skills,
r(70)¼ .39, p< .01, but were unrelated to belief that the ingroup would win academic contests, r(69)¼�.05, p> .10. In
the athletic domain, children’s self-competence ratings were correlated with predictions that the ingroup would win
athletic contests, r(69)¼ .32, p< .01, but were unrelated to ratings of ingroup athletic skills, r(70)¼ .21, p¼ .075.
Posttest Measures: Impact of Self-Confirmation Versus Self-Disconfirmation
Overview
The final set of analyses examined the effects of confirmation versus disconfirmation of children’s personal identities (i.e.,
whether the messages about the ingroup presented in the classroom posters were consistent or inconsistent with the child’s
self-views) on their views of their ingroups. Specifically, regression models were run in which participants’ differential
self-competence scores (i.e., difference scores on the Harter self-competence scale, with positive scores indicating higher
academic self-competence and negative scores indicating higher athletic self-competence), treatment condition (academic
vs. athletic; dummy coded), participant age in years, and each of the two- and three-way interaction terms (e.g., self-
competence by treatment condition) served as predictor variables and children’s group views served as the outcome
variables. On the basis of self-verification theory, we expected to find the interaction of differential self-competence scores
and treatment condition to be a significant predictor of children’s feelings about the groups. Those children who viewed
themselves as much more competent in academics than athletics – and who saw this situation depicted in their classrooms
posters – (or who viewed themselves as much more competent in athletics than academics and who saw this situation
depicted in their classrooms posters) were expected to show higher ingroup bias and greater ingroup satisfaction than their
‘‘disconfirmed’’ peers.
Group Identity
Ingroup Bias – Trait Ratings
The degree of bias in children’s ratings served as the outcome variable. Results indicated that the overall model was
nonsignificant. None of the predictor variables were significantly related to children’s ingroup bias in trait ratings and thus
there was no evidence that those children whose self-views were confirmed developed stronger ingroup biases than those
children whose self-views were disconfirmed.
Group Satisfaction
In the first regression model, children’s rating of their happiness with ingroup membership served as the outcome variable.
For happiness with group membership, the overall model was nonsignificant. Condition was a significant predictor,
b¼ 1.35, t¼ 2.12, p< .05; children in the academic condition were happier with their group membership than children in
the athletic condition. The age by condition interaction was a marginally significant predictor, b¼�1.30, t¼�1.93,
p¼ .059; age was a stronger predictor of happiness in the academic than the athletic condition, with younger children
expressing greater happiness with their group membership than older children.
In the second regression model, children’s ratings of the importance of group membership served as the outcome
variable. The overall model was significant, F(7, 51)¼ 2.59, p< .05. Self-competence (b¼ 2.38, t¼ 2.43, p< .05), age
(b¼ 0.63, t¼ 3.44, p< .05), condition (b¼ 1.56, t¼ 2.65, p< .05), the age by condition interaction (b¼�1.59,
t¼�2.59, p< .05), and the age by self-competence interaction (b¼�2.51, t¼�2.52, p< .05) were all significant
predictors of children’s ratings of the importance of group membership. Analyses of the age by condition interaction
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DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
Personal and group identities 665
indicated that age was a stronger predictor of importance in the athletic than the academic condition, with older children
expressing greater perceived group importance than younger children. Analyses of the age by self-competence interaction
indicated that, among older children, children who perceived themselves to be better at athletics than academics perceived
their group membership to be more important than other children; this relationship did not hold for younger children.
Subsumed by these interactions were main effects of age, condition, and self-competence. Children in the academic
condition, older children, and children who perceived themselves to be better at athletics than academics perceived their
group membership to be more important than other children. There was, however, no evidence that those children whose
self-views were confirmed were more satisfied with their group membership than those children whose self-views were
disconfirmed.
Group Evaluations – Academic and Athletic Skills
Children’s posttest ingroup bias in skill ratings served as the outcome variable. Separate models were run for posttest
academic and athletic ratings. For both academic and athletic skill ratings, the overall models were nonsignificant. None of
the variables were predictors of the degree of ingroup bias in children’s skill ratings.
Group Evaluations – Competency Ratings
Children’s posttest ingroup bias in competency ratings served as the outcome variable. Separate models were run for
posttest academic and athletic ratings. For academic competency ratings, the overall model was nonsignificant. The age by
self-competence interaction was a significant predictor, b¼ 2.13, t¼ 2.08, p< .05; among children who believed
themselves to be better at sports than school, older children predicted their ingroup would win fewer academic contests
than younger children. Subsumed by this interaction was a marginally significant effect of self-competence, b¼�2.02,
t¼�1.97, p¼ .054, with those children who viewed themselves as better at school showing slightly higher levels of
ingroup bias than those children who viewed themselves as better at sports. For athletic competency ratings, the overall
model was significant, F(7, 51)¼ 2.22, p< .05. Results indicated a significant effect of the condition by self-competence
interaction, b¼�1.89, t¼�2.08, p< .05; among students in the athletic (but not academic) condition, those who believed
themselves to be better at athletics than academics predicted that their ingroup would win more athletic contests. Results
also indicated a significant three-way interaction, b¼ 2.02, t¼ 2.20, p< .05. Regression models performed separately by
age (younger vs. older) indicated that pattern describe above (i.e., those children in the athletic condition who believed
themselves to be better at athletics than academics predicted that their ingroup would win more athletic contests) was
especially true of older children. Thus, results provided limited evidence for an effect of self-confirmation versus
disconfirmation on children’s group evaluations.
Alternative Analyses
The preceding results indicated that children who saw posters that strongly confirmed their self-views did not differ in their
group views from peers who saw posters that did not confirm their own views. Again, the failure to reject the null
hypothesis may have stemmed from the fact that children’s views of the groups derived from their own self-views rather
than from the posters. For example, children who saw themselves positively may also have viewed their ingroup positively
and, as a consequence, these children may have been happier and more satisfied with their group membership. To test this
hypothesis, we first conducted a regression model examining the effects of pretest self-esteem (combining academic and
athletic self-views) on happiness with group membership. Results indicated a positive relationship, b¼ .25, t(60)¼ 2.03,
p< .05. To test for mediating effects, a regression model was run including self-esteem and ingroup trait ratings as
predictors of happiness with group membership. Results indicated a significant effect of ingroup trait ratings, b¼ .33,
t(59)¼ 2.62, p< .05. When ingroup trait ratings were included in the model, the effect of self-esteem on happiness with
group membership became nonsignificant, b¼ .16, t(59)¼ 1.24, p> .10. A Sobel test for mediation effects indicated a
significant mediation effect, z¼ 2.08, p< .05. Thus, results indicate that children’s positive self-views led to ingroup bias,
which in turn led to greater satisfaction with group membership.
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
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666 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the process by which children integrate their personal identities
(views of their individual attributes) with their group identities (views of their ingroup’s attributes), especially when a
particular group identity is assigned and associated with cultural stereotypes (e.g., gender, race). To this end, we drew on
two broad classes of theories concerning the causal pathways whereby personal identities and group identities are
integrated. According to the ‘‘group-identity-shapes-personal-identity’’ family of theories, children are motivated to alter
their perceptions of the self to match their own views of their ingroup. This perspective predicts that children who are
exposed to information indicating that their ingroup is skilled in some domain will come to view themselves as especially
skilled in that same domain, whereas children exposed to information indicating that their ingroup is unskilled in some
domain will come to view themselves as unskilled in that domain.
Conversely, another group of theories, referred to here as ‘‘personal-identity-shapes-group-identity’’ models, view
children as motivated to maintain their self-views (e.g., Swann, in press). These models predict that when children find
themselves in a group, they will alter their perceptions of the group to bring them into line with their personal identities. In
addition, if they view themselves as having talents that are discrepant from their ingroup, they will feel less satisfied with
their group membership, and may show less ingroup bias than their peers who view themselves as having talents that are
concordant with their ingroup.
We began by examining children’s view of the novel groups prior to their exposure to information about the groups (i.e.,
posters). Noteworthy was the finding that children showed ingroup-biased perceptions of the color groups’ academic skills
within 24 hours of group assignment. Prior research (Bigler et al., 1997, 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002; Patterson & Bigler,
2006) has assessed intergroup attitudes after several weeks of experience as group members. These findings suggest that
lengthy experience within the intergroup context is not necessary for biases to develop and instead that ingroup biases
develop quite rapidly. It is not entirely clear why children did not also develop ingroup-biased beliefs about athletic skills.
The means were, however, in the expected direction and it is possible that school summer context made academic skills
especially salient to children.
More importantly, data collected within 24 hours of group assignment indicated that, in the absence of information
about their novel social groups, children projected their personal identities (i.e., self-views) onto their ingroups. This
finding is a novel one in the developmental literature, but consistent with social psychological research indicating that
adults are inclined to project self-views onto the social groups to which they belong, particularly novel groups (Cadinu &
Rothbart, 1996; Otten & Epstude, 2006; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). These data are important in suggesting that children’s
views of groups do not begin as blank slates, but instead are affected by self-views. This notion is consistent with Liben and
Bigler’s (2002) personal pathway model of gender development, which holds that gender atypical children are especially
likely to endorse egalitarian views of their own gender roles, and with Aboud’s view of the origins of racial attitudes among
young children. Aboud (1988, 2008) has argued that young children’s self-views, which are overwhelmingly positive,
form the basis of their views of the racial ingroup and thus most young children endorse biased (rather than neutral) racial
attitudes. Given that most individuals have positive self-views throughout adolescence and adulthood (Diener & Diener,
1995), this process leads to a general trend toward ingroup bias when encountering new social groups.
In the second phase of the study, we exposed children to messages indicating that their ingroup was successful in either
academic or athletic domains; then, after 5 weeks, we assessed children’s views of the groups. Previous research using this
same method of communicating information about novel groups (e.g., Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002) has
indicated that such messages affect children’s intergroup attitudes. Unlike earlier studies employing posters, however,
children in the current study received a mixture of positive and negative messages about the ingroup and outgroup. That is,
each color group was depicted as having a strength (e.g., academics) and a weakness (e.g., athletics), albeit the weakness
was implied by the absence of group members who excelled in a given domain. Given the mixed messages, we did not
expect children – at the level of condition – to be strongly ingroup biased. After 5 weeks of exposure, children did not show
significant ingroup biases in trait ratings or evaluations of groups’ academic and athletic skills. Children did, however,
demonstrate ingroup bias in both academic and athletic competency ratings. This finding demonstrates children’s tendency
to develop and maintain ingroup-biased attitudes even in the face of information (such as that depicted in the classroom
posters) that directly contradicts the notion of ingroup superiority.
In addition to failing to eliminate ingroup bias, the posters did not affect children’s views of the color groups’ skill within
academic and athletic domains. We expected that children in the academic condition would develop more positive evaluations
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
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Personal and group identities 667
of their ingroup’s academic skill than children in the athletic condition (and vice versa). They did not. There are several
possible explanations for the finding. It is possible that children did not attend to the posters, or that the poster manipulation
was not strong enough (e.g., not enough posters were presented) to elicit attitudinal change. These explanations seem
somewhat unlikely given that very similar posters have produced significant effects in very similar studies (e.g., the same
summer school program, nearly identical classroom sizes, similar experimental manipulations, and identical dependent
measures; Bigler et al., 2001; Brown & Bigler, 2002). It is possible that the mixed valence of the posters (noted above)
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the current manipulation, although relatively little is known about the relative influence of
content versus valence of messages about groups on children’s intergroup attitudes. Alternatively, it is possible that children’s
schemata for ingroup superiority (in evidence within 24 hours of group assignment and again at the end of 5 weeks, albeit
somewhat weakly) may have led children to disregard or view as irrelevant the messages concerning the failures of last year’s
ingroup members within a particular domain, especially given these failures were implied (rather then presented via posters
depicting poor performers). Previous research on constructive memory shows that children show systematic biases in their
attention to, encoding of, and retrieval of group-related information (e.g., Cherney, 2005; Levy, 2000; Signorella, Bigler, &
Liben, 1997). It will be important for future work to examine children’s encoding and retrieval of the content and valence of
information relevant to self and group identities.
Consistent with children’s failure to adjust their views of the color groups, children’s personal identities proved to be
resistant to change. Although children did not appear to change their self-views based on the treatment condition, it is
possible that they might have changed the value they imputed to particular domains. Research with members of negatively
stereotyped groups indicates that group members may disidentify with the negatively stereotyped domains to maintain
positive self-esteem (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). That is, children might have decreased their
valuing of a particular domain after receiving feedback indicating that their group was unskilled in that domain or if their
self-views were not verified. Future research should test this possibility.
Finally, the results of this study support the contention that personal identities shape views of social groups. Those
children who perceived themselves to be highly competent in both academics and athletics showed higher levels of
ingroup biased attitudes than those children who perceived themselves to be less competent. This finding is consistent with
other studies linking high self-esteem to intergroup bias (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Bigler et al., 1997; Rubin &
Hewstone, 1998). (Links between self-esteem and ingroup bias in children may be influenced by groups’ societal status,
however; see Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2007.) These data further indicate that ingroup-biased views mediate group
happiness. That is, it appears that children who perceived themselves to be highly competent within some domain may
project this view onto their ingroup (i.e., they become ingroup biased), which, in turn, leads to high levels of happiness
with their group. Children who perceived themselves to be incompetent within some domain also appear to project this
view onto their ingroup. This process, however, leads to nonbiased attitudes, which, in turn, leads to reduced happiness
with one’s group membership.
Caution, of course, must be exercised when interpreting the results of this work. The current study examined group
membership that was assigned, fixed, perceptually salient, and associated with specific attributes. The findings of this
research are, therefore, unlikely to generalize to other types of group identities. In addition, the sample size for this study is
relatively small and may have reduced our ability to detect effects, especially possible effects of age within conditions. It
will be important for future work to replicate these findings with larger samples and alternative outcome measures, such as
assessments which control for the inclusion of the self when rating the ingroup. Future work might also benefit from the
collection of data at multiple time points in order to examine the identity integration process more closely. In addition, it
should be noted that this research was conducted with a group of relatively homogenous children attending summer
school, who may differ from other children in systematic ways.
Finally, the experience of group membership in this study differs in important ways from the experience of membership
in most naturally occurring social groups (e.g., race, gender). Children’s experience was temporally constrained and,
although the use of the novel groups was extensive within the classroom setting, it did not extend to other environments. In
addition, children received messages about group characteristics from a single source (i.e., classroom posters), rather than
the variety of potential sources of information about gender or racial groups (e.g., peers, parents, media). Nonetheless,
novel group studies such as this one are valuable for establishing the existence of possible causal relations between
correlated variables (e.g., similarity of perceptions of self and group). Consistency of findings across naturalistic and
experimental studies will allow us to have greater confidence in our conclusions about the ways in which children’s
experiences with social groups affect their views and attitudes.
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652–670 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp
668 Meagan M. Patterson et al.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to thank the personnel, parents, and students associated with St. Cloud State University’s Summer
Reading and Mathematics Camp for their generous cooperation.
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APPENDIX A
Children’s posttest ratings of color groups
Target of rating
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & So
Condition
Academic
ns, Ltd.
Athletic
Ingroup
Outgroup IngroupEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 652
DOI:
Outgroup
Group evaluations – skills ratings
Academic 5.86 (1.83) 5.66 (2.48) 5.33 (2.03) 5.47 (2.38) Athletic 6.11 (1.71) 5.83 (2.35) 5.94 (2.18) 5.56 (2.20)Group evaluations – competency ratings
Academic 1.32 (1.04) 0.74 (0.67) 1.18 (1.06) 0.82 (0.97) Athletic 1.11 (1.01) 0.64 (0.76) 1.31 (0.98) 0.72 (0.88)Note: Skill ratings range from 0 to 9, with higher scores indicating greater competence. Competency ratings range from
�3 to þ3, with higher positive scores indicating higher competence.
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10.1002/ejsp