Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essay

What role does the United Nations play in facilitating

‘successful’ Climate Change negotiations, especially with regard

to pre negotiations?

This essay seeks to analyse the role of the United Nations

(UN) as a facilitator in climate change negotiations in order to

demonstrate that their ‘success’1 is facilitated by the behind-the-

scenes-work undertaken within the UN framework during the pre

negotiations, and to a certain extent, by the logistics behind

them.

The first part of the essay will be theoretical and will

explain in what ways pre negotiations play a crucial role vis-à-vis

the success or the failure of international multilateral

conferences. The second section will provide a background to the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),

and in particular it will focus on some of the tasks that its

Secretariat undertakes, to show how it is involved in the process

of facilitating the ‘success’ of the Climate Change Conferences of

the Parties (COPs). The rest of the essay will compare and

1 A definition of ‘successful’ climate change negotiations will not be provided until later on in the essay, once the conceptual framework of pre negotiations and the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have first been introduced. In particular, a definition of ‘successful’ COP will be presented on page 6

1

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaycontrast the Copenhagen’s and the Durban’s pre negotiations to

demonstrate that, when climate change pre negotiations are

conducted openly and under the auspices of the UN, they will

contribute to the ‘success’ of the actual COPs. In particular, it

will show that the Copenhagen’s pre negotiations were not

successful because, a latere of the meetings which were organized and

managed by the UNFCCC Secretariat, “secret” meetings – which often

saw the participation of a small number of developed countries, at

the expense of developing countries - took place outside the UN

framework. This created a climate of mistrust that emerged at

Copenhagen, which undermined “momentum”, as the conference was

transformed into a ‘political’ meeting, especially with the early

arrival of numerous heads of state, leaving little room for

diplomats in the negotiations. Copenhagen will be contrasted with

the Durban Conference, which was instead successful.2 In

particular, the essay will show how the UNFCCC Secretariat was

able to successfully lead the Durban’s pre negotiations, by

focusing on some of the meetings preceding the Durban Conference –

specifically the Transitional Committee meetings - which proved to

be necessary for the adoption of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) at

2 The Copenhagen’s pre negotiations will be examined first because of chronological reasons. COP 15 Copenhagen took place in 2009, whereas COP 17 Durban happened in 2011

2

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final EssayDurban. The GCF, however, could be implemented to a large extent

thanks to Connie Hedegaard, the European Union’s diplomat. This

will confirm once again the argument that pre negotiations, led

and conducted under the auspices of the UN – in this case the

UNFCCC Secretariat - are fundamental for the outcome of the actual

COPs. In addition, it will also suggest that the role of diplomats

is still crucial in climate change negotiations. Finally, the last

section will address the importance of logistics for the ‘success’

of the COPs and will point out how the UNFCCC Secretariat acted as

a facilitator both in the case of Copenhagen and Durban, by

providing information ranging from visa issues to hotel

accommodation.

First of all, it is important to remark that, despite their

misleading name, pre negotiations are the first stage of

negotiations.3 In fact, as William Zartman and Maureen Berman

state, negotiations can be divided into three stages: pre

negotiations, formula and details; the last two representing the

official phases in which the Parties officially adopt the agenda

discussed during the pre negotiations and agree to the details.4

3 Pre negotiations represent the sine qua non condition for the successfulness of negotiations. See G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy, Theory and Practice, Fourth Edition, New York,Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 274 I.W. Zartman, and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator, Yale University Press, New Havem London, 1982, chs. 4-6

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final EssaySimilar to Zartman and Berman, Brigid Starkley et al. divide

negotiations into three stages: pre negotiations, negotiations,

and implementation. What is important to realize is that, as the

authors stress, the third phase depends largely on the second,

which in its turn depends heavily on the first, thus making the

pre negotiations not only the sufficient, but also the necessary

condition for the success of the other two phases.5 Pre

negotiations are, for this reason, said to be the most important

phase in the negotiating process because, without them, there

would be no negotiating process. In particular, the pre

negotiations that will lead to successful negotiations are

oftentimes those where most of the work has been properly done. In

fact, as Gretchen Sidhu states, the negotiation phase is nothing

but a phase in which “all the participating governments finally

reach agreement on the exact wording of all portions of the text.”6

The goal of pre negotiations, as Geoff Berridge states, is to

establish “that substantive, around-the-table negotiations are

worthwhile, and then to agree the agenda and the necessary

procedures for tackling it.”7 It must be acknowledged that pre5 Brigid Starkley et al., International Negotiation in a Complex World, 2nd edition, Plymouth, The Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010, ch.16 Gretchen Sidhu, Intergovernmental Negotiations and Decision Making at the United Nations: A Guide. Second Updated Edition, New York and Geneva, UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), 2007, p. 217 Berridge, Diplomacy, Theory and Practice, 2010, p. 27

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaynegotiations constitute a very delicate and time-consuming

process. They often represent, as Harold Saunders correctly puts

it, a “complicated and delicate matter”, but if they are well

managed and conducted, they will prove to be vital for the outcome

of negotiations, as they will make it easier to reach an agreement

once negotiations have begun.8 Pre negotiations are crucial because

it is during this phase that countries form coalitions and actors

“harness the power of allies to enhance a negotiating position.”9

Two further aspects which are to be considered when evaluating

the outcomes of multilateral diplomatic conferences involve venue

and participation. These two elements are vital components of pre

negotiations and are crucial to making talks work. For instance,

picking the right venue is important because not all cities “have

the communication systems, hotel space, and pools of qualified

interpreters to cope with the huge size of many of these

conferences.”10 In addition, picking a particular location might be

of symbolic importance, because it shows that the party which

suggested hosting a Conference is relevant and willing to take the

lead in negotiations.11 However, as Barston argues, states may

8 Harold Saunders, ‘We need a larger theory of negotiation: the importance of prenegotiation phases’, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 1, 1985, p. 2499 Starkley et al., International Negotiation in a Complex World, 2010, p. 4410 Berridge, Diplomacy, Theory and Practice, 2010, p. 14811 Saunders, ‘We need a larger theory of negotiation’, 1985, p. 250

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaydevelop stakes as a result of initiating or hosting a diplomatic

multilateral conference, and by doing so, they may fail to develop

a negotiating text which is seen to be “neutral” or distinctive

from any texts sponsored by a group or delegation, thus creating

substantial conflict and deadlock among Parties, resulting in a

loss of “momentum.”12

Parallel to the question of venue, participation is an

important component of pre negotiations. As Berridge suggests,

one needs to take into account the question of who should be

invited, because it acknowledges that the invitee is crucial to

the outcome of the conference.13 In order to be successful,

international environmental pre negotiations, as Barston

emphasizes, need to be conducted at a bureaucratic and technical

level, and not at a political level.14 Similar to Berridge, Sir

Ivor Roberts stresses that pre negotiations, ranging from picking

a certain venue to deciding whom to invite, are all vital elements

in that they “often enhance the likelihood of agreement being

reached.”15 To give an example, picking Botswana as the location

for the 1983 meeting which led to the signature of the Convention

12 R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2006, pp. 160-16113 Berridge, Diplomacy, Theory and Practice, 2010, pp. 148-14914 Barston, Modern Diplomacy, 2006, p. 15415 Ivor Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, Sixth Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 523

6

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayon Endangered Species was crucial in facilitating the agreement,

in that the venue assisted the publicity of the conference.16

Having discussed the literature on the importance of pre

negotiations, the goal of this section is to analyse the scope and

the functions of the UNFCCC Secretariat, because it helps us

understand the role that the UN plays as a facilitator in climate

change conferences, especially with regard to pre negotiations.

However, in order to appreciate how the Secretariat operates, it

is necessary to provide a brief historical excursus. The UNFCCC

Secretariat was set up in 1996 “to support action under the

Convention” – the UNFCCC.17 The UNFCCC is an international treaty

which countries joined in 1992 at the Rio Summit to consider what

they could do to limit global temperature increases and,

ultimately, climate change.18 As Parties to the Convention had

realized that the Convention, by itself, was not enough to tackle

climate change, they launched a process of negotiations in order

16 See, for instance, Klaus Aurisch, ‘The Art of Preparing a Multilateral Conference,’ Negotiation Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1989, p. 28317 UNFCCC, ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change’, available at<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php> (March 24, 2012) 18 Michael Grubb et al., The Kyoto Protocol: A guide and Assessment, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999, p. 36

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayto strengthen and coordinate the global response to climate

change.19

The background to the UNFCCC having been introduced, it is

important to focus on how its Secretariat facilitates climate

change negotiations. The Secretariat makes, for instance,

practical arrangements for the organization of sessions of the

Convention and it supports negotiations, by coordinating all

institutions involved in Climate Change negotiations, such as the

Conference of the Parties (COP), the subsidiary bodies (whose goal

is to advise the COP), and the COP Bureau, which basically deals

with organizational and procedural issues. In addition to this, it

also prepares and manages official documents and drafts upon which

Parties will draw during official negotiations.20

Now that the Conferences of the Parties have been introduced,

it is necessary to briefly explain what they are. It is

fundamental to do so for two reasons. Understanding what the COPs

are is essential to have a better comprehension of the context and

the ways in which the Secretariat facilitates ‘successful’ climate

change negotiations. An introduction to them is also important as19 UNFCCC, ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change’, available at<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php> (March 24, 2012)20 UNFCCC , ‘History of the Secretariat’, available at <http://unfccc.int/secretariat/history_of_the_secretariat/items/1218.php> (March9, 2012)

8

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaythe next sections will focus on COP 15 (Copenhagen), which will be

contrasted with COP 17 (Durban).21 The Conferences of the Parties

are the primary decision-making body within the UNFCCC. The COPs

usually meet once a year “to review Convention implementation and

to take decisions on how to improve the implementation process.”22

What this means is that Parties to the UNFCCC meet every year in

order to discuss and negotiate agreements whose ultimate goal is

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and consequently climate

change.23 Having introduced the COPs and the goal of the

Convention, this essay defines as successful any COP which

formally adopts any decisions contributing to the implementation

of the Convention.24

However, since climate change is a very complicated technical

issue, and the interests at stake are always conflicting,25 the21 COP 17 Durban represents the most recent COP, the first COP having taken placein Berlin in 199522 United Nations Environment Programme, Guide for Negotiators of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 2007, p. 14, available at <http://www.unep.org/DEC/docs/Guide%20for%20Negotiators%20of%20MEAs.pdf> (March 17, 2012) 23 The goal of the UNFCCC is clearly laid out in Article 2 of the Convention: “The ultimate objective of this Convention...is to achieve...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”24 Conversely, negotiations will be considered a ‘failure’ if the Parties’ decisions are not formally adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP), whichis, as previously seen, the primary decision-making body within the UNFCCC25 Climate change negotiations require a pool of experts, an “epistemic community”, as Peter Haas calls it, due to the technical nature of the problem

9

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final EssayUNFCCC has set up, in addition to the annual COPs, further

meetings, which are to be viewed as the pre negotiations, in order

to adequately prepare for the COPs, which constitute the formal

climate change negotiations. These meetings usually take the form

of Ad Hoc Working Groups, and their role is vital because they

often produce draft decision texts which are then discussed and

evaluated during the COPs.26 This concept needs to be stressed

because it is essential to realize that negotiations do not come

out of nowhere. Most of the work, in fact, has already been done

when the Parties meet at the COPs.

This section focuses on some of the general trends

characterizing the Copenhagen’s pre negotiations to demonstrate

that, when pre negotiations are not conducted openly and under the

auspices of the UN, the actual negotiations are likely to fail.

In particular, it will show how some of the meetings which were

conducted outside the UN framework were able to block the work

undertaken under the auspices of the UN, and were not only

and its specificity. What complicates the issue is the fact that developed and developing countries realize that climate change needs to be tackled, but they accuse each other of being responsible for it, thus making cooperation difficult. For the challenges of climate change for international cooperation see, for instance, World Development Report, The State in a Changing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 13826 See for instance International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘UNFCCC Parties agree on Additional Meeting Sessions before COP 16’, 12 April 2010, available at <http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/unfccc-parties-agree-on-additional-meeting-sessions-before-cop-16> (March 9, 2012)

10

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayresponsible for the loss of “momentum” during the Copenhagen’s pre

negotiations, but also during the actual negotiations themselves.27

The first round of Copenhagen’s pre negotiations started on 29

March and ended on 8 April 2009, and was divided into two Ad Hoc

Working Groups.28 The first one focused on how to adapt to climate

change impacts, by taking into consideration aspects such as the

governance of finances, whereas the other discussed issues of

technology cooperation between developed and developing countries,

as well as such problems as deforestation in several developing

countries. The then Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Yvo de

Boer, was particularly pleased with the status of the pre

negotiations, stating that “this is important progress given the

very limited time negotiators have to get to an agreed outcome in

Copenhagen in December this year.” 29

This climate of optimism continued during the second round of

meetings in Bonn from 1 to 12 June 2009 which, in addition to the

AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP, also saw the presence of the Subsidiary27 It will be pointed out how some of the meetings, which were conducted outside the UN framework and in a climate of “secrecy”, created mistrust among UN Parties, reflecting itself in the failure of the official negotiations.28 The first is the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). The second group is the Ad Hoc Working Group for Further Commitments for Annex 1 Countries Under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).29 UNFCCC, ‘Progress at Bonn Climate Change Talks signals start of serious negotiation,’ 8 April 2009, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/20090804_closing_pr_bonn.pdf> (March 24, 2012)

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final EssayBody for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the

Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), which all produced key

draft texts that would be discussed at Copenhagen. The meeting,

which saw the participation of over 4,600 participants – including

government delegates, representatives from business and industry,

research institutions and environmental organizations – was so

promising that an ambitious and effective agreement in Copenhagen

was in sight.30

However, very little progress was made during the third

meeting, because developed industrialized countries were not

willing to agree to meaningful emission reduction targets and were

not being clear about their willingness, or lack thereof, to help

developing countries adapt to climate change. “In the context of

the G8 and Major Economies Forum, I see a group of countries

considering actions that would allow them to profit from the boom

in clean technology,” said former UN climate chief Yvo de Boer.

“The question is how all nations can profit from this development.

Poorer countries risk being left by the wayside without access to

technology and finance.”31 30 UNFCCC, ‘Progress made in Negotiations for Ambitious and Effective Copenhagen Deal at Bonn UNFCCC meeting,’ 12 June 2009, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/091206_closing_pr_sb30.pdf> (March 24, 2012)31 UNFCCC, ‘Negotiators Get Down to Practicalities at Bonn UNFCCC Meeting, But Negotiations Have Yet to Pick Up Speed,’ available at

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essay

Clearly, the decline in the pre negotiations’ progress within

the UN framework needs to be analysed in the light of, and in

tandem with a parallel less transparent series of meetings between

developed countries or within fora regrouping and representing

developed countries, at the expense of developing countries.

Contrary to President of COP 15 (Copenhagen), Connie Hadegaard -

who preferred a UN framework within which to conduct the pre

negotiations - Danish Prime Minister Bo Lidegaard had very little

trust in the UNFCCC process,32 pushing instead for bilateral

negotiations between developed countries. Under this new logic,

Lidegaard was invited as COP President at the G8 Summit in Italy

in July 2009,33 which clearly explains why the UNFCCC process would

be slackened at Bonn the next month.

The fourth and the fifth round of pre negotiation meetings saw

some progress but were unable to solve important issues which

would prevent Copenhagen from being successful. In all this, the

role of the UNFCCC Secretariat was to facilitate the talks, for

<http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/20091408_closing_pr_august_2009.pdf> (March 24, 2012)32 Per Meilstrup, ‘The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference,’ in Nanna Hvidt and HansMouritzen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2010, pp. 123-12433 For an overview of the Summit, see ‘G8 From La Maddalena to L’Aquila Summit 2009,’ available at <http://www.g8italia2009.it/G8/G8-G8_Layout_locale-1199882089535_Home.htm > (March 25, 2012)

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayinstance by collaborating with the Inter-Governmental Panel on

Climate Change, often by acting as a “tractor” trying desperately

to push the pre-negotiations forward. During the fourth meeting in

Bangkok (28 September-October) countries made little progress on

the issue of mid-term emission reduction targets for

industrialized countries.34 The same issue, together with the lack

of agreement over how to help developing countries adapt to

climate change, paralyzed the Barcelona meetings (November 2009),

the last round of pre negotiations before Copenhagen. Referring to

these two problems, UNFCCC Executive Secretary warned, “Without

these two pieces of the puzzle in place, we will not have a deal

in Copenhagen.”35 This clearly explains that, a month away from the

start of COP 15, it did not look like Copenhagen would succeed.

Starting in the summer of 2009, these “secret” meetings taking

place outside the UN framework went on until the start of the

Copenhagen’s negotiations.36 Interestingly enough, a week prior to

the start of COP 15 and a latere of a secret meeting with 2534 UNFCCC, ‘UN Climate Change Negotiations Result in More Clarity on “bricks and mortar” of Copenhagen agreed outcome, but decision on finance and mid-term targets remain outstanding,’ 9 October 2009, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/closing__pr_bangkok_sept_2009.pdf> (March 25, 2012)35 UNFCCC, ‘UNFCCC Executive Secretary: Governments can and must deliver strong Copenhagen deal,’ 6 November 2009, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/closing_pr_barcelona.pdf> (March 25, 2012)36 Meilstrup, ‘The Runaway Summit,’ 2010, p. 127

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaydeveloped countries, Ledegaard discussed and negotiated a text37

which he hoped would be adopted at Copenhagen. Yet, the text,

which was leaked on the second day of the negotiations to the

British newspaper The Guardian, infuriated developing countries, who

felt betrayed by such an “unfair” text. In fact, not only had they

been excluded by the negotiating process, but the text would also

work to the advantage of developed industrialized countries and

put to an end the role of the UN in climate change negotiations.38

The UNFCCC Executive Secretary was very worried about

Lidegaard’s management of the negotiations. In particular, he

feared that the “Danish text” would have a terrible impact on the

negotiations, in addition to destroying the pre negotiations

conducted within the UN framework: “the Danish text destroyed two

years of effort in one fell swoop. All our attempts to prevent the

paper happening failed. The meeting at which it was presented was

unannounced and the paper unbalanced.”39 As Martin Khor stresses,37 The “Danish Text” is available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-change> (March 25, 2012)38 See John Vidal, ‘Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after “Danish text” leak,’ 8 December 2009, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-disarray-danish-text> (March 25, 2012); see also John Vidal, and Dan Milmo, ‘Copenhagen: Leaked draft deal widens rift between rich and poor nations,’ 9 December 2009, available at < http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/09/copenhagen-summit-danish- text-leak> (March 25, 2012) 39 John Vidal, ‘Copenhagen climate failure blamed on “Danish text”’, 31 May 2010,available at

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaythe meeting was not mandated by the UNFCCCC and, therefore,

developing countries warned the Danish Prime Minister not to come

up with another similar text in the later stage of the

negotiations. However, what the developing countries feared became

a reality: another “secret” text was released during the last days

of the negotiations. Once again, this text had been negotiated by

an exclusive group of countries, which undermined the UNFCCCC

multilateral and democratic process.40 Unsurprisingly, the

‘Copenhagen Accord’ was not adopted by consensus by the Parties,

causing the total ‘failure’ of COP 15.41

In addition to secrecy, it is important to acknowledge that

another contributory factor in Copenhagen’s failure was the

‘political’ aspect of Copenhagen’s negotiations. Copenhagen was

the first time - in the history of UN climate change negotiations

- that so many heads of state took the lead in the talks. As De

Boer stressed in a confidential letter, the early arrival of heads

of states “did not have the catalytic effect that was hoped for.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/31/climate-change-copenhagen-danish-text> (March 25, 2012)40 Martin Khor, ‘Blame Denmark, not China, for Copenhagen failure,’ 28 December 2009, available at<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/dec/28/copenhagen-denmark-china> (March 25, 2012)41 The failure of Copenhagen has been assessed on the basis of the goals of the COPs and of the definition of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ provided in this essay. See page 6, in particular footnote no. 24

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final EssayThe process became paralyzed. Rumor and intrigue took over.”42 In

particular, the heads of state contributed to a loss of

“momentum” as they took over the negotiations, which became a

‘political arena’ where heads of state rather than diplomats and

ministers were leading the negotiations, and they lacked crucial

expertise in the field.43 Copenhagen, whose failure can be in part

attributed to the fact that diplomats were not given the chance to

take an active role in the negotiations, thus suggests the need

for a continued use of diplomats in climate change negotiations.

This section emphasizes the opposite case, i.e. an example of

successful pre negotiations undertaken under the auspices of the

UN. In particular, it will focus on the role of the UNFCCC

Secretariat in facilitating the Durban’s pre negotiations.

However, since it is not possible, for obvious reasons, to cover

all of the meetings from COP 16, which was held in Cancun, to COP

17 (the Durban Conference),44 this section will focus on the

Transitional Committee meetings whose goal was to work on the

Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF was established at the sixteenth

42 Vidal, ‘Copenhagen climate failure blamed on “Danish text”’, 2010, available at<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/31/climate-change-copenhagen-danish-text > (March 25, 2012)43 Notes based on a conversation with anonymous official. London, 28 March 2012. 44 Over 105 meetings were led over this time period. See UNFCCC, ‘Calendar’, available at <http://unfccc.int/meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php?year=2011> (March 9, 2012)

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaysession of the Conference of the Parties in Cancun, which decided

that it should be designed by a Transitional Committee (TC)

comprising 40 members, with 15 members from developed countries

and 25 from developing countries.45 The Secretariat would play a

crucial role in this, as its task was to make arrangements with

United Nations agencies to second staff to support the Committee.

The TC needed, in particular, to recommend to the Durban’s COP

documents which would enable Durban to make the Fund operational.

As a result of this, the TC met four times between Cancun and

Durban. The first meeting was held on 28 and 29 April 2011 in

Mexico City; the second on 13 and 14 July 2011 in Tokyo; the third

one took place on 11-13 September 2011 in Geneva; whereas the

fourth was held on 16-18 October 2011 in Cape Town.46 These dates

need to be stressed because it is important to realize that, in

order to discuss one particular item which would be debated at

Durban, it took the Parties 7 months, which clearly shows that,

45 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, ‘The Cancun Agreements: outcome of the work of the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the convention,’ available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2> (March 17, 2012)46 FCCC/CP/2011/6, ‘Report of the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund. Note by the Co-Chairs of the Transitional Committee,’ available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/06.pdf> (March 17, 2012)

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaywithout all of this “backstage” work, the Green Climate Fund could

not have been made operational at Durban.47

The progress which was made from the first meeting to the last

meeting was enormous. The Parties gathered, in fact, during the

first meeting having an idea about the structure of the gathering,

but having no idea whatsoever about the content of it.48 Steps

forward could be seen already from the second meeting, where a

“draft instrument for the establishment of the Green Climate Fund”

was introduced.49 The third meeting, held in Geneva, was the most

productive. It was preceded by a workshop on the role of the Green

Climate Fund in fostering transformational change, engaging civil

society and leveraging the private sector, and it saw the

participation of delegates from UN member countries, UN

organizations and specialized agencies, intergovernmental

organizations, and non-governmental organizations.50

47 See UNFCCC, Durban, ‘Launching of the Green Climate Fund,’ available at <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_gcf.pdf> (March 9, 2012)48 TC-1/1, ‘Provisional agenda for the initial meeting of the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund’, 13 April 2011, available at<http://unfccc.int/files/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/application/pdf/tc1_2_annotations_provisional_agenda_.pdf> (March 18, 2012)49 TC-2/5/Rev.1, ‘Report of the Second Meeting of the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund’, 6 October 2011, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/application/pdf/tc2_5.pdf> (March 18, 2012)50 TC-3/4, ‘Third Meeting of the Transitional Committee for the Design of Green Climate Fund:1-13 September 2011’, 10 October 2011, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/application/pdf/lop_3rdtc_meeting_geneva_for_posting.pdf> (March 18, 2012)

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Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essay

Geneva was successful for several reasons. First, all major

countries were present and represented in a city which was seen as

impartial and not “political”. Second, the UNFCCC Secretariat

contributed to its success as it had sent out draft texts which

would be discussed at Geneva as early as July 2011, so that these

texts could be revised twice by the time the Parties had met in

Geneva. Finally, the fact Geneva was chosen as a venue was

fundamental in that it was “easy to move participants around” and

because the city, being located close to Bonn (Germany), could be

easily reached by a number of climate change experts directly from

the UNFCCC Secretariat located in Bonn. By being in Switzerland,

then, the venue was seen as an impartial city, caring more about

the environment than politics.51

The final meeting was dedicated to polishing the draft text

which would be presented at Durban and established a number of

items to make the Fund operational, such as a Board, a Secretariat

and a Trustee. It also laid out the Fund structure and contained

precise information about the eligibility of Countries to receive

sources from the Fund.52 Members of the Committee had worked so51 Notes based on a conversation with anonymous official. Interviewed by Marco Albonico. London, 28 March 201252 FCCC/CP/2011/6, ‘Report of the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund. Note by the Co-Chairs of the Transitional Committee’, 18 November 2011, available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/06.pdf> (March 17, 2012)

20

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayhard that the United Nation’s climate chief, Christiana Figueres,

was positive that “the UN Climate Change Conference [in Durban]

will both consider and approve the document as it now stands.”53

Durban turned out exactly as Figueres had foreseen, as the GCF

was made operational. However, the adoption of the GCF was not

immediate. In fact, it was not made operational until the last day

of the Conference, when Connie Hedegaard, the EU’s climate change

diplomat, was able to overcome the US’s and Israel’s opposition to

the Fund: “In doing so, Hedegaard saved the UN process of

negotiations, which without a deal at Durban would have fallen

apart.”54 Durban thus shows that, when official negotiations begin,

much of the work has already been done. As a consequence, it

supports Sidhu’s argument - mentioned earlier in the literature

review and stressing the importance of pre negotiations - as

official negotiations to him represent a formal gathering which

could not succeed without the “backstage” work behind it.55 Yet,

Durban also demonstrates that, when undertaken openly and under

53 UNFCCC, ‘Cape Town meeting provides governments with opportunity to make real progress on Green Climate Fund at COP17 in Durban’, 21 October 2011, available at <http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/press_release_20112110.pdf> (March 18, 2012)54 Fiona Harvey, ‘Durban talks: How Connie Hedegaard got countries to agree on climate deal’, The Guardian, 11 December 2011, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/11/connie-hedegaard-durban-climate-talks> (April 10, 2012)55 Sidhu, Intergovernmental Negotiations and Decision Making at the United Nations: A Guide, 2007, p. 21

21

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaythe auspices of the UN, pre negotiations are likely to contribute

to the success of the actual negotiations. Furthermore, the

Durban’s negotiations suggest that, even though the “backstage”

work is necessary, it is not sufficient for the ‘success’ of the

talks. The GCF could not have been implemented without Hedegaard,

which suggests the need for diplomats for the ‘success’ of the

negotiations. In this case, COP 17 has been considered successful

because the COP has been able to adopt and make the GCF

operational, thus contributing to the implementation of the

Convention itself.

This last section addresses the importance of logistics, which

is too often not taken into consideration when examining the

success or the failure of multilateral conferences. In more

detail, it briefly looks at how the logistics behind the

Copenhagen and Durban meetings were managed.

With respect to Copenhagen, the UNFCCC Secretariat played a

crucial role in facilitating the negotiations from a logistics

point of view. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to state that it

played even a bigger role than in Durban,56 as the Conference

hosted more than 40.000 people, representing governments, NGOs,

56 In Durban, ‘13389 picked up their badges.’ (Correspondence between the UNFCCC Press Office and the author. 16 February 2012)

22

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final EssayIGOs, faith-based organizations, media and UN agencies, which had

all applied to the UNFCCC Secretariat for accreditation.57 The

Secretariat also helped from a logistics point of view by

providing useful information about visa requirements,

accommodation and shuttle services, which all contributed to

facilitating the negotiations.58

Since the UNFCCC Secretariat was involved in the management of

the logistics, one could put the blame on it for the failure of

the Copenhagen’s negotiations. However, such a conjecture is not

only inaccurate, but it also does not reflect the reality of the

events for two reasons. The first reason does not involve

logistics. As demonstrated earlier, Copenhagen’s failure can be

largely attributed to the Danish Prime Minister/COP President, who

did not follow the “rules of procedure”59 – both during the pre

negotiations and the negotiations themselves – by introducing

57UNFCCC, ‘Copenhagen Climate Change Conference-December 2009’, available at < http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meeting/6295.php> (March 25, 2012)58 For a detailed list of how the UNFCCC Secretariat managed the Copenhagen’s logistics, thus facilitating the negotiations, check UNFCCC, ‘Copenhagen ClimateChange Conference-December 2009’, Logistics, available at<http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meeting/6295/php/view/logistics.php#logistics3> (March 25, 2012)59 See Interview with Denmark’s Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, ‘COP15: We will not just discuss procedure’, available at <http://www.theecologist.org/tv_and_radio/tv/383189/cop15_we_will_not_just_discuss_procedure.html> (March 25, 2012)

23

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayinstead secret “texts from the sky,”60 thus ignoring the

transparent UNFCCC rules,61 and by turning Copenhagen into a

‘political’ arena with little room for diplomats. In fact, UNFCCC

Executive Secretary had warned the COP’s President to follow

procedure and to act according to a transparent and democratic

process.62 The second reason regards the fact that the UNFCCC

Secretariat can only facilitate the logistics,63 but cannot

overcome structural logistical problems regarding the venue itself

– the city of Copenhagen – which, due to its small size, was not

able to “keep up with the high number of delegates,”64 thus

contributing to Copenhagen’s lack of success.65

As for Durban, the UNFCCC Secretariat played a crucial role in

the logistics’ management, as it decided, upon the submission of

an application, which Parties and Observer states, IGOs, civil60 Meilstrup, ‘The Runaway Summit’, 2010, p. 13061 Rasmussen, who did not seem to show great understanding of the rules of procedures, contributed, in this way, to creating a “chaos” in Copenhagen. See ‘Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?’, BBC News, 22 December 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8426835.stm> (March 25, 2012) 62 See the ‘Extracts from the confidential letter sent by UN climate chief Yvo deBoer to “colleagues and friends”’ in the UN in the days after the Copenhagen climate change summit ended”, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/31/climate-change-copenhagen-danish-text> (March 25, 2012)63 As seen earlier, the UNFCCC facilitated the logistics, for instance, by managing the accreditation process and by providing useful information regardingaccommodation, transportation, visas, etc.64 Notes based on a conversation with anonymous official. Interviewed by Marco Albonico. London, 28 March 201265 It is important to distinguish the subtle difference between ‘lack of success’and ‘failure’. The logistics, in the case of Copenhagen, contributed to a ‘lack of success’, not to its ‘failure’.

24

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaysociety and media members could take part in the Conference.66 In

addition to that, it also worked in cooperation with the

government of South Africa to assist in locating and booking hotel

accommodation and transportation.67 Furthermore, the Secretariat

provided useful information about medical insurance and about the

participants requiring visas and those who were instead exempted.68

It is important to acknowledge that these elements were not the

ultimate reason causing Durban’s success. It would be too

simplistic, in fact, to argue so. However, one needs to take them

into account because they undoubtedly played a role in

facilitating the Durban’s negotiations.

As Ronald Peter Barston stresses, picking the right venue is

crucial for the success of an international conference.69 In

particular, picking Durban turned out to be a success as the

Conference was held at the International Convention Center (ICC),

which ranks among the world’s top 10 convention centers and which

was nominated the most environmentally-conscious Congress Centre

66 UNFCCC, ‘Parties and Observers’, available at <http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php> (March 9, 2012)67 COP17/CMP7 United Nations Climate Change Conference 2011 Durban South Africa, ‘Accommodation’, available at <http://www.cop17-cmp7durban.com/en/durban/accommodation.html> (March 9, 2012)68 UNFCCC, Durban Climate Change Conference-November/December 2011, ‘Logistics’, available at <http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/meeting/6245/php/view/logistics.php c > (March 9, 2012)69 R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 52

25

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essayby the European Inventive and Business Travel and Meetings

Exhibition.70 One can see how, in the case of Durban, picking the

right venue turned out to be crucial for the outcome of the

Conference. In addition to Durban’s flagship conference venues,

its “transport infrastructure and accommodation options have

positioned the city as the ideal host for COP17.”71 As it is by now

clear, the city’s infrastructure and its accommodation options did

not cause Durban to be successful per se, but it did, to a certain

extent, contribute to it.

This essay has sought to analyse the role of the United

Nations (UN) as a facilitator in ‘successful’ climate change

negotiations. The first part explained in what ways pre

negotiations play a crucial role vis-à-vis the success or the failure

of international multilateral conferences. The second section

provided a background to the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and in particular it focused on some

of the tasks that its Secretariat undertakes, to show how it is

involved in the process of facilitating the ‘success’ of the

Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (COPs). The essay then70 ICC Durban, ‘About the Durban ICC’, available at <http://www.icc.co.za/About/AboutTheICC.aspx> (March 9, 2012)71 COP17/CMP7 United Nations Climate Change Conference 2011 Durban South Africa, ‘Conference Venue’, available at <http://www.cop17-cmp7durban.com/en/logistics/conference-venue.html> (March 9, 2012)

26

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaycompared and contrasted the Copenhagen’s and the Durban’s pre

negotiations to demonstrate that, when climate change pre

negotiations are conducted openly and under the auspices of the

UN, they will contribute to the ‘success’ of the actual COPs. It

then showed that the Copenhagen’s pre negotiations were not

successful because “secret” meetings – often seeing the

participation of a small number of developed countries, at the

expense of developing countries – took place outside the UN

framework. This created a climate of mistrust that emerged at

Copenhagen, where it was not possible to maintain “momentum” in an

arena that has been defined as ‘political’ and which left little

room for diplomats.

The successful example of Durban followed. More specifically,

the essay showed how the UNFCCC Secretariat was able to

successfully lead the Durban’s pre negotiations, by focusing on

some of the meetings preceding the Durban Conference –

specifically the Transitional Committee meetings - which were

necessary to make the Green Climate Fund (GCF) operational at

Durban. However, it also addressed the fact that, without

Hedegaard, the GFC could not have been made adopted. This confirms

the argument that pre negotiations, led and conducted openly under

27

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essaythe auspices of the UN – in this case the UNFCCC Secretariat - are

fundamental for the outcome of the actual negotiations – the COPs.

Yet, it also suggests the continued need for diplomats in climate

change negotiations. Finally, the last section addressed the

importance of logistics for the ‘success’, or lack thereof, of the

COPs and paid attention to how the UNFCCC Secretariat acted as a

facilitator both in the case of Copenhagen and Durban, by

providing information ranging from visa issues to hotel

accommodation.

In short, it has been demonstrated that the ‘success’ of the

UN climate change negotiations is facilitated by the behind-the-

scenes-work undertaken within the open UN framework during the pre

negotiations, and to a certain extent, by the logistics behind

them. Furthermore, the examples of Copenhagen and Durban have also

suggested the need for diplomats in climate change negotiations.

28

Marco Albonico 000041018 Diplomacy’s Final Essay

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