Vicarious Liability in Roman locatio conductio?1

Tritremmel, Vicarious liability in Roman locatio conductio?

128 University of Vienna Law Review, Vol. 4 No 2 (2020), pp. 128-167, https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-

128.

Vicarious Liability in Roman locatio conductio?1

David Tritremmel

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................... 129

Locatio conductio .......................................................................................... 132

2.1 The character of locatio conductio ......................................................... 132

2.2 General liability standards in locatio conductio ..................................... 134

2.2.1 Dolus, culpa (imperitia, infirmitas) ..................................................... 134

2.2.2 Custodia ............................................................................................... 135

The principle of personal responsibility ....................................................... 139

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 139

3.2 The principle of personal responsibility in locatio conductio ............... 142

Liability for damages caused by others in locatio conductio ....................... 144

4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 144

4.2 Contractual noxal liability ....................................................................... 145

4.3 Liability for violation of a certain contract clause................................... 149

4.4 Liability for culpa in eligendo ................................................................. 150

4.5 Liability for culpa in habendo vel inducendo ........................................ 152

4.6 D. 19.2.25.7 – indication of a strict vicarious liability? .......................... 154

Conclusions ................................................................................................... 159

Bibliography .................................................................................................. 161

6.1 Ancient sources ....................................................................................... 161

6.2 Literature ................................................................................................. 161

1

This paper is based on my dissertation ‘Die Haftung für das Verhalten anderer Personen bei der

locatio conductio (2020)’.

Dr. David Tritremmel has been working as a University Assistant at the Department of Roman Law

of the University of Vienna for four years and then as an External Lecturer at the same department.

Currently, he works as an associate at Doralt Seist Csoklich Attorneys; [email protected].

I warmly thank Univ. Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Benke, LL.M., Mag. Dr. Caterina Maria Grasl, the editorial

team of the VLR, my external peer and the members of the ARS IURIS VIENNA – DOCTORAL

SCHOOL for their thorough review of my paper and their valuable comments.

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

mailto:[email protected]



128.

Introduction

Locatio conductio is a Roman synallagmatic consensual contract with a wide scope

and a particular economic significance. The terminology – locatio conductio – refers

to the mutual rights and obligations of the contracting parties: “locare” and

“conducere”. The general meaning of locare is “to place/put/arrange” and of

conducere “to bring together/collect/assemble”.2

In a legal sense locare stands for “to

rent/let” while conducere stands for “to hire/accept something on hire”.3

Regarding terminology and actions, locatio conductio can be seen as a contractual

unity.4

However, as there are different contractual constellations that Roman jurists

classify as locatio conductio, a trichotomous (or less common a dichotomous5

)

structure as proposed by the majority of modern scholars, seems justified.6

Accordingly, letting and hiring of things refers to locatio conductio rei (contract of

lease), the fulfilment of a specific task refers to locatio conductio operis (contract for

work) and the rendering of services refers to locatio conductio operarum (contract of

employment).7

2 Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring in Roman Legal Thought: 27 BCE – 284 CE’ (Leiden –

Boston: Brill, 2012) p. 9.

3 See Adolf Berger, ‘Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law’ (Philadelphia: American Philosophical

Society, reprint 1991) p. 567.

4

Most recently Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring’, pp. 13 seq.; Roberto Fiori, ‘La definizione della

‚locatio conductio’: Giurisprudenza romana e tradizione romanistica’ (Napoli: Jovene, 1999)

pp. 361 seqq. 5

See Philipp R. Springer, ‘Die Wurzeln der werkvertraglichen Gefahrtragung im römischen

Bauvertragsrecht’ (Dissertation: University of Vienna, 2017) pp. 51 seqq.

6

Most recently Armando J. Torrent Ruiz, ‘La Polemica sobre la tricotomia ‚res’, ‚operae’, ‚opus’ y los

origines de la Locatio-Conductio’ (2011) 4 TSDP 1-51, pp. 49 seq.; Pokécz Kovács, ’Quelques

observations sur la division de la locatio-conductio’, in Hamza et al. (eds.), Iura antiqua – iura

moderna: Festschrift für Ferenc Benedek zum 75. Geburtstag (Pécs: Dialog Campus Kiadó, 2001)

217-230, pp. 217 seq.; see also A.D.E. Lewis, ‘The trichotomy in locatio conductio’ (1973) 8 Irish

Jurist 164-177, pp. 176 seqq.

7 Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition’,

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990: reprint 1996) pp. 339 seq.; Max Kaser, ‘Das römische

Privatrecht I: Das altrömische, das vorklassische und klassische Recht’, 2nd edn. (München: C.H.

Beck, 1971) p. 564; Theo Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio conductio: eine Untersuchung zum klassischen

römischen Recht’, (Wien – München: Herold, 1956) pp. 18 seqq. Regarding the special type “locatio

conductio irregularis” see Nikolaus Benke, ‘Zum Eigentumserwerb des Unternehmers bei der "locatio

conductio irregularis"’ (1987) 104 SZ 156-237.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

The contracting parties of a locatio conductio are called locator and conductor.8

Locator is the person who leases out his property to the conductor (locatio conductio

rei), who entrusts the conductor with a certain task (locatio conductio operis) or who

provides his labour for the conductor (locatio conductio operarum).9

If a contracting

party suffers loss due to a violation of contract by the other party, the locator is

provided with the actio locati while the conductor is provided with the actio conducti

to claim for compensation.10

When someone11

who is not bound by the vinculum iuris12

of a certain locatio

conductio causes harm to a contractual item entrusted to the locator or to the

conductor by the other party (e.g. a leased asset or working material to be processed)

the question rises whether the harmed party can assert a claim for damages against

his contracting partner. In order to provide a clear answer to this question, an in-

depth analysis is required. This is because there are barely any general rules regarding

contractual liability for loss caused by others in classical13

Roman law, in contrast to

modern civil law codifications.14

8

See Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.11.4; Inst. 3.24; Kaser, ‘Römisches Privastrecht I2

’, p. 563. 9

See Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, p. 339.

10

Inst. 3.24: [...] competit locatori quidem locati actio, conductori vero conducti. Translation: The

locator is entitled to actio locati, the conductor certainly to actio conducti. For the formulae of the

actions see Dario Mantovani, ‘Le formule del processo privato romano’, 2nd edn. (Padova: Cedam,

1999) p. 54; Otto Lenel, ‘Das Edictum Perpetuum: Ein Versuch zu seiner Wiederherstellung’, 3rd

edn. (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1927) pp. 299 seqq.

11

This includes everyone except for the contracting parties, such as slaves and children of the

contracting parties but also (free) external parties. For all those people the general term “third party”

will be used in the following.

12

The vinculum iuris is a non-material bond, which exclusively ties the contracting parties together

and provides them with contractual rights and duties; see Axel Hägerström, ‘Über den Grund der

bindenden Kraft des Konsensualkontraktes nach römischer Rechtsanschauung’ (1945) 63 SZ 268-

300, pp. 278 seqq.

13 The classical period of Roman law is a legal historical era starting with the Principate (27 BC) until

roughly the end of the Severan period (235 AD). Within the classical period the Roman jurisprudence

reached a particularly high level as regards legal concepts and casuistic reasoning, what the

continuation of Roman law for centuries is based on; Ulrich Manthe, ‘Geschichte des römischen

Rechts’, 4th edn. (München: C.H. Beck, 2011) pp. 87 seqq.; Kaser, ‘Römisches Privatrecht I2

’,

pp. 2 seqq.; Franz Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Recht: zehn Versuche’, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Koehler,

1961) pp. 161 seqq.; Fritz Schulz, ‘Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft’ (Weimar: Böhlau,

1961) pp. 117 seqq.

14

See Hermann Seiler, ‘Die deliktische Gehilfenhaftung in historischer Sicht’ (1967) 22 JZ 525-529,

p. 526.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Therefore, Roman jurists had to respond to the following questions on a case-by-case

basis15

: Should a contracting party of a locatio conductio who suffered loss caused by

a third party have legal claims against the contracting partner, who is probably more

accessible and solvent than the actual tortfeasor? Or should the harmed party only

have (delictual) claims against the actual tortfeasor and bear the risk of the tortfeasor’s

insolvency?

The analysis of various classical legal texts16

shows that for Roman jurists liability

generally remained strictly personal. Nevertheless, there are Roman jurists who

supported an unlimited contractual liability for damage caused by third parties in

certain classical cases, especially in the field of locatio conductio. The legal basis for

this kind of contractual liability of conductores and locatores is hardly ever explicitly

mentioned in the fragments or is discussed in rather contrasting ways. Modern

scholars likewise have different opinions thereto.17

After an analysis of the structure of locatio conductio and its general liability

framework, this paper examines the principle of personal responsibility in classical

Roman and modern Austrian civil law. Thereafter, the legal basis for cases of

contractual liability for loss caused by others in locatio conductio is examined on the

basis of certain leading cases. Eventually, this paper addresses the question to what

extent those liability cases are in conformity with the principle of personal

responsibility in classical Roman law.

15

See fn 69.

16 See fn 85.

17 The most relevant papers thereto are Philipp Klausberger, ‘Objektive und subjektive

Zurechnungsgrunde im klassischen ro mischen Haftungsrecht’ (Habilitationsschrift: Universität Wien,

2019); Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring’; Hartmut Wicke, ‘Respondeat Superior: Haftung für

Verrichtungsgehilfen im römischen, römisch-holländischen, englischen und südafrikanischen Recht’

(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2000); Rolf Knütel, ‘Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen im römischen

Recht’ (1983) 100 SZ 340-443; Imre Molnár, ‘Verantwortung und Gefahrtragung bei der locatio

conductio zur Zeit des Prinzipats’, in Hildegard Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der

römischen Welt II: Principat, vol. XIV (Berlin: New York, 1982) 583-681; Bruce W. Frier, ‘Tenant’s

liability for damage to landlord’s property in classical Roman law’ (1978) 95 SZ 232-269; Mayer-Maly,

‘Locatio Conductio’.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Locatio conductio

2.1 The character of locatio conductio

The contract of locatio conductio came into existence not before the second century

BC.18

A locatio conductio can be concluded by mere consensus on the essential terms

(essentialia negotii) without any formal requirements.19

This contract is always entered

into by a locator and a conductor. The locator is the person who gives something to

the conductor: a rental property20

, a certain task to fulfil21

, or his labour22

. In exchange,

the conductor rents property, fulfils a certain task, or exploits the locator’s labour.23

In return for the primary obligation its recipient has to pay a certain fee (merces).24

18 See Cic. (de off.) 3.70; see also Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring’, pp. 9 seqq.; Fiori, ‘Locatio

Conductio’, pp. 11 seqq.; Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, pp. 15 seqq, 82; Horst Kaufmann, ‘Die

altrömische Miete: ihre Zusammenhänge mit Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und staatlicher

Vermögensverwaltung Altrömische Miete’ (Köln – Graz: Böhlau, 1964) pp. 22 seqq.

19

See Ulp. (71 ad ed.) D. 19.2.14: Qui ad certum tempus conducit, finito quoque tempore colonus

est: intellegitur enim dominus, cum patitur colonum in fundo esse, ex integro locare, et huiusmodi

contractus neque verba neque scripturam utique desiderant, sed nudo consensu convalescunt.

Translation: A man who leases for a fixed term is a tenant farmer also after the term’s end; the owner

is considered to lease anew when he allows the tenant to remain on the farm. Contracts of this kind

require neither formal words nor writing; they take fore by mere agreement; and so if the owner, in

the meantime, went mad or died, Marcellus says that it is impossible for the lease to be renewed, a

view that is correct; Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. II (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 104.

20

E.g. a real estate, see Pomp. (9 ad Sab.) D. 19.2.3; an animal, see Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.9.4; or a

slave, see Lab. (5 post. A Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.7.

21 E.g. a gemstone to be set or cut, see Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.13.5.

22

E.g. the labour of a shoemaker’s apprentice, see Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.13.4.

23 Nadi Günal, ‘An example of consensual contracts: Locatio Conductio Rei’, (2004) 1:2 Ankara Law

Review 201-211, p. 204.

24

Gai. (2 rer. cott.) D. 19.2.2 pr.: [...] nam ut emptio et venditio ita contrahitur, si de pretio convenerit,

sic et locatio et conductio contrahi intellegitur, si de mercede convenerit. Translation: [...] Sale and

purchase is contracted if the price is agreed upon; similarly, lease and hire is considered to be

contracted once the rent is agreed upon; Watson, ‘Digest II’, 101.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Locatio conductio is a bonae fidei negotium25

, entitling the contracting parties to

conclude contract clauses in good faith.26

So-called leges locationis/conductionis may

extend the general rights and duties of one or both contracting parties.27

To enforce

contractual claims, a locator has an actio locati and a conductor an actio conducti.28

Both actions are bonae fidei iudicia, which means that the judge (iudex) has a wide

margin of judicial discretion to evaluate all relevant circumstances of a given legal

dispute, such as common usages, contract clauses, local customs etc.29

25

Inst. 4.6.28: Actionum autem quaedam bonae fidei sint, quaedam stricti iuris. Bonae fidei sunt haec:

ex empto vendito, locato conducto […]. Translation: Certain actions, moreover, are of good faith and

others of strict law. Those of good faith are such as arising from purchase and sale, leasing and hiring

[…]; translated by the author. Gai. Inst. 4.62: Sunt autem bonae fidei iudicia haec: ex empto vendito,

locato conducto […]. Translation: Actions of good faith are such as the following: purchase and sale,

leasing and hiring; translated by the author. C. 4.65.19: Circa locationes atque conductiones maxime

fides contractus servanda est […]. Translation: Regarding contracts of leasing and hiring, the

contractual terms shall, by all means, be observed; translated by the author.

26

See Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘The Roman Concept of lex contractus’ (2006) 3 RLT 79-94, pp. 79 seqq.;

Carsten H. Müller, ‘Gefahrtragung bei der locatio conductio: Miete, Pacht, Dienst- und Werkvertrag

im Kommentar römischer Juristen’ (Paderborn – München: Schöningh, 2002) p. 103; Bruce W.

Frier, ‘Landlords and tenants in imperial Rome’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)

pp. 61 seqq.; Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, pp. 355 seqq.; Pieter W. Neeve, ‘Colonus: private

farm-tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the early Principate’ (Amsterdam: Gieben,

1984) pp. 5 seqq.; Frier, ‘Tenant’s liability’, pp. 243 seqq., Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’,

pp. 106 seqq.

27

Tobias Tröger, ‘Arbeitsteilung und Vertrag: Verantwortlichkeit für das Fehlverhalten Dritter in

Vertragsbeziehungen’ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) pp. 83 seqq.; Du Plessis, ‘Lex contractus’,

pp. 81 seqq.; Müller, ‘Gefahrtragung’, p. 103; Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, pp. 355 seqq.;

Frier, ‘Landlords and tenants’, pp. 61 seqq, 142; Neeve, ‘Colonus’, pp. 5 seqq.; Antonino Metro,

‘L’obbligazione di custodire nel diritto romano’ (Milano: Giuffrè, 1966), pp. 174 seqq.; Mayer-Maly,

‘Locatio Conductio’, pp. 106 seq.

28

See fn 10.

29

Martin J. Schermaier, ‘Bona fides im römischen Vertragsrecht’, in Luigi Garofalo et al. (eds.), Il

ruolo della buona fede oggettiva nell' esperienza giuridica storica e contemporanea: Atti del Convegno

internazionale di studi in onore di Alberto Burdese, vol. III (Padova: CEDAM, 2003) 387-416; Susan

D. Martin, ‘The Roman Jurists and the Organization of Private Building in the Late Republic and

Early Empire’ (Bruxelles: Latomus: Revue D'Études Latines, 1989), p. 30; Klaus-Peter Johne/Jens

Köhn/Volker Weber, ‘Die Kolonen in Italien und den westlichen Provinzen des Römischen Reiches:

Eine Untersuchung der literarischen, juristischen und epigraphischen Quellen vom 2. Jahrhundert

v.u.Z. bis zu den Severern’ (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1983), p. 188; Kaser, ‘Römisches Privatrecht I2

’,

pp. 485 seqq.; Alexander Beck, ‘Zu den Grundprinzipien der bona fides im römischen Vertragsrecht’,

in Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel (ed.), Aequitas und bona fides: Festgabe zum 70.

Geburtstag von August Simonius (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1955) 9-27.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

2.2 General liability standards in locatio conductio

2.2.1 Dolus, culpa (imperitia, infirmitas)

During the classical period, dolus and culpa became established as general liability

standards under the contract of locatio conductio, as the following fragments show:

Ulp. (28 ad ed.) D. 13.6.5.2

[...] Sed ubi utriusque utilitas vertitur, ut in empto, ut in locato, ut in dote, ut in

pignore, ut in societate, et dolus et culpa praestatur.30

Ulp. (30 ad ed.) D. 16.3.1.10

In conducto et locato […] et dolum et culpam praestabunt […].31

Ulp. (29 ad Sab.) D. 50.17.23

[...] Dolum et culpam mandatum, commodatum, venditum, pignori acceptum,

locatum [...].32

The majority of fragments which name dolus as a general liability standard in locatio

conductio are quite vague regarding the actual meaning of the term dolus. Whereas

dolus remains a relatively flexible term within the classical period, a technical

meaning of the liability standard dolus develops with regard to bonae fidei iudicia.

According to the fragment D. 19.2.24 pr. and following MacCormack33

, Meissel34

and

Du Plessis35

dolus can be defined as a deliberate breach of the principle of good faith.

The liability standard culpa is quite multifaceted and includes all kinds of careless

behaviour.36

During the classical period, the term culpa became increasingly

systematized and distinctive; however, it still lacked full abstractness even in the late

30

Translation: [...] On the other hand, where, as in sale, hire, dowry, pignus, and partnership, the

interest of each party is advanced, liability is for both willful conduct and fault; Alan Watson, ‘The

Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. I (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 402.

31

Translation: In hire [...] they [...] will be liable for both fraud and fault; Watson, ‘Digest II’, p. 12.

32

Translation: [...] Mandate, loan for use, sale, acceptance in pledge, hire [...] involve [the liability

criteria] bad faith and culpability; see Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. IV

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 472.

33

Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Dolus, Culpa, Custodia, Diligentia’ (1994) 22 Index 189-209, p. 206.

34

Franz-Stefan Meissel, ‘Dolus’, in Hubert Cancik/Helmuth Schneider (eds.), Der Neue Pauly

(Stuttgart – Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 1997), vol. III, pp. 736 seq.

35

Du Plessis, ’Letting and Hiring’, pp. 29 seqq.

36

Frier, ‘Tenant’s liability’, pp. 242 seq.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

classical period.37

Therefore, the presence of culpa in a certain context had to be

legally assessed according to the specific circumstances and the contractual basis of

each case.38

Two subcategories of culpa which are most relevant for locatio conductio operis are

imperitia and infirmitas.39

The successful completion of a specific task may require

certain skills and physical strengths. Regardless of his personal ability, by entering a

locatio conductio operis a conductor has to commit himself to fulfil a certain task

with the professional skill of an expert (artifex) and with the required physical

strength.40

Consequently, in the event of damage the conductor is also liable for his

physical weakness (infirmitas) and his lack of professional skill (imperitia).41

2.2.2 Custodia

Besides dolus and culpa, modern scholars discuss custodia as a further general

liability standard in the field of locatio conductio. In common usage custodia means

“safe custody/special security”.42

In legal contexts custodia is understood as a form of

responsibility of a custodian, who is obligated to safeguard a certain thing that is

entrusted to him by the other contracting party; in the event of loss, the custodian has

to bear the negative consequences – custodiam praestare.43

37

Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring’, pp. 26 seq, 36; Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘Liability and locatio conductio’,

in Roberto Fiori (ed.), Modelli teorici e metodologici nella storia del diritto private, vol. IV (Napoli:

Jovene, 2011) 63-95, p. 66; MacCormack, ‘Dolus, Culpa, Custodia, Diligentia’, pp. 196 seq.; Frier,

‘Tenant’s liability’, p. 242.

38

See Klausberger, ‘Zurechnungsgründe’, p. 60.

39

Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, p. 612.

40

Susan D. Martin, ‘Imperitia: The Responsibility of Skilled Workers in Classical Roman Law’ (2001)

122 AJP 107-129, pp. 109, 115; Michael J. Rainer, ‘Zur locatio conductio: Der Bauvertrag’ (1992) 108

SZ 505-525, p. 507; Carlo A. Cannata, ‘Sul Problema della Responsabilità nel Diritto Privato Romano

(Catania: Libr. Ed. Torre, 1996) pp. 56 seqq.; see also § 1299 ABGB.

41

Gai. (7 ad ed. prov.) D. 9.2.8.1; Klausberger, ‘Zurechnungsgründe’, p. 427; Rainer, ‘Bauvertrag’,

p. 506; Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, p. 611; Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, (1972) 89 SZ

149-219, pp. 194 seq.

42

See Hermann G. Heumann/Emil Seckel, ‘Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts’,

11th edn. (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verl.-Anst., 1971) p. 116; Berger, ‘Encyclopedic dictionary’,

p. 422; see also Franz-Stefan Meissel, ‘Zur Haftung fur Furtum beim ro mischen Leihevertrag:

Diebstahlsverfolgung und Drittschadensproblem’ (1993) 94/4 JAP 212-218, p. 213; G.C.J.J. Van den

Bergh, ‘Custodiam Praestare: Custodia-Liability or Liability for Failing Custodia?’ (1975) 43 TR 59-72,

p. 63; MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, p. 155; Carlo A. Cannata, ‘Richerche sulla responsabilità

contrattuale nel diritto romano’ (Milano: Giuffrè, 1966) pp. 49 seqq.

43

Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘Between Theory and Practice: New Perspectives on the Roman law of Letting

and Hiring’ (2006) 65 CLJ 423-437, p. 426; Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, p. 194; Meissel,

‘Furtum’, p. 213; MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, pp. 155 seqq.; Cannata, ‘Responsabilità


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

When a person, who is not bound by the vinculum iuris of a contract, commits theft

(furtum) of an item entrusted to another person under a contract, this incident is

generally classified as a fortuitous event (casus minor); thus, it generally does not

entail a liability of the contracting party who has had the object in his keeping.44

However, if a person has the contractual obligation of custodia, classical fragments

state a responsibility for (at least certain cases of) theft.45

Common examples involve

contracts with storage managers (horrearii)46

, launderers (fullones) and tailors

(sarcinatores)47

, as well as shippers (nautae), innkeepers (caupones) and stablers

(stabularii)48

.

Whether there existed a general custodia liability in locatio conductio within the

classical period remains highly controversial amongst modern scholars. This is

because we have only one fragment that appears to indicate custodia to be a general

liability standard in the field of locatio conductio besides dolus and culpa, namely

rescript C. 4.65.28:49

Diocl. et Maxim. C. 4.65.28 (a. 294)

In iudicio tam locati quam conducti dolum et custodiam, non etiam casum, cui resisti

non potest, venire constat.50

According to the rescript of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian, contracting

parties of a locatio conductio are liable for dolus and custodia but not for force

majeure – casum, cui resisti non potest.

contrattuale’, pp. 24 seqq.; Joachim Rosenthal, ‘Custodia und Aktivlegitimation zur Actio furti’ (1951)

68 SZ 217-265, p. 222.

44

See Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 356; Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, pp. 597, 629.

45

See Van den Bergh, ‘Custodiam praestare’, p. 67; Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 357.

46

See Lab. (5 post. a Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.9; Lab. (5 post. a Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.6; Paul. (2 sent.)

D. 19.2.55 pr.; Paul. (5 resp.) Coll. 10.9.1; C. 4.65.1; C. 4.65.4 pr.-2.

47

See Gai. (5 ad ed. prov.) D. 4.9.5 pr.; Gai. Inst. 3.205-206; Ulp. (29 ad Sab.) D. 47.2.14.12;

Iavol. (9 post. Lab.) D. 47.2.91 pr.; Lab. (5 post. a Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.2; Ulp. (43 ad Sab.)

D. 12.7.2; Paul. (22 ad ed.) D. 9.1.2 pr.; Gai. (10 ad ed. prov.) D. 19.2.25.8; Ulp. (42 ad Sab.)

D. 47.2.48.4; Ulp. (29 ad Sab.) D. 47.2.12 pr.; Ulp. (29 ad Sab.) D. 47.2.10.

48

See Papin. (8 quaest.) D. 19.5.1.1; Gai. (5 ad ed. prov.) D. 4.9.5 pr.; Gai. (5 ad ed. prov.) D. 4.9.5.1;

Ulp. (38 ad ed.) D. 47.5.1.4; Ulp. (14 ad ed.) D. 4.9.1 pr.; Ulp. (14 ad ed.) D. 4.9.3.1; Ulp. (14 ad ed.)

D. 4.9.1.1; Ulp. (14 ad ed.) D. 4.9.3.1.

49

See René Robaye, ‘L’obligation de garde: essai sur la responsabilite contractuelle en droit Romain’

(Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1987) p. 193.

50

Translation: In the contracts of letting and hiring it is established that the lessor can bring suit on the

ground of fraud or lack of safeguarding, but not for unavoidable accident; translated by the author.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

The context to which the rescript refers is not clear. In any case, it is conspicuous that

the rescript does not mention culpa as a liability standard at all. Due to the uncertainty

regarding the context of the rescript, different views were held by modern scholars.

According to the findings of Haymann51

in 1919, the text is subject to far-reaching

cuts making a reconstruction of the original version of the rescript impossible.

Krückmann52

, in 1944, examines the text with procedural considerations. According

to him, the plaintiff of the case in question might just have based his claim on dolus

or custodia while the defendant might have based his defence on the occurrence of

vis maior.

In 1951, Rosenthal53

builds on the arguments of Haymann. In his reconstruction of

the (supposedly) interpolated54

fragment, Rosenthal replaces, inter alia, “custodiam”

by “culpam”, but admits that the fragment is rather useless due to the alleged severe

interpolations. Mayer-Maly55

, in 1956, argues along similar lines as Krückmann: he

assumes that the rescript refers to a particular case where only the liability/risk

standards dolus, custodia and vis maior had to be discussed. At the same time Mayer-

Maly relativises this view by following Haymann and Rosenthal with the argument

that Justinian’s compilers undoubtedly made several cuts in the original version of

the rescript, which would make an accurate reconstruction of the case impossible.

51

Franz Haymann, ‘Textkritische Studien zum römischen Obligationenrecht’ (1919) 40 SZ 167-350,

p. 235. 52

Paul Krückmann, ‘Custodia’ (1944) 64 SZ 1-56, p. 35. 53

Rosenthal, ‘Custodia und Actio furti’, p. 240.

54

The term “interpolation” refers to alterations of classical fragments, which distort their original

content. Interpolations mainly resulted from the codification process of Justinian’s compilers who

were commissioned to collect, shorten and edit the multitude of existing legal texts to make them

concise and clear. Besides, there also happened some defects during the process of transcription

within the past centuries; Wolfgang Kaiser, ‘Justinian’, in David Johnston (ed.), The Cambridge

Companion to Roman Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 119-149, pp. 128 seqq.;

Franz Wieacker, ‘Zur Technik der Kompilatoren: Prämissen und Hypothesen’ (1972) 89 SZ 293-

323, pp. 293 seqq. Especially from the late 19th

century until the middle of the 20th

century the method

of “interpolation criticism” was pursued by several scholars to deconstruct and remodel (classical)

fragments in order to remove passages which contradict their own theses; Max Kaser, ‘Ein Jahrhundert

Interpolationenforschung an den römischen Rechtsquellen’, in Max Kaser (ed.), Römische

Rechtsquellen und angewandte Juristenmethode (Wien – Graz: Böhlau, 1986) 112-154, pp. 112 seqq.

Today, scholars generally assume the classicity of fragments, which date back from the classical period,

unless there are significant facts indicating post-classical alterations; Kaser, ‘Interpolationenforschung’,

pp. 112 seqq.; Paul Kretschmar, ‘Kritik der Interpolationenkritik’ (1939) 59 SZ 102-218, p. 102 seqq.

55

Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, p. 214.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

MacCormack56

, in 1972, assumes, too, that there are substantial cuts within the

fragment and believes that the original version of the rescript also covered the liability

standard culpa. Nevertheless, he considers it to be possible that there was a general

custodia liability in locatio conductio during the classical period. Ten years later,

Molnár57

analyses the fragment by following the arguments of Krückmann and Mayer-

Maly. According to Molnár, the assessment of culpa in the particular case was either

not relevant or was taken into consideration as far as it is to be located between dolus

and custodia. He further believes that during the classical period, every

conductor/locator who was entrusted with an object by his contracting partner was

subject to custodia liability.

In 1987, Robaye58

draws a large-scale comparison between what is stated in the

rescript and in several other fragments dealing with liability standards in the field of

locatio conductio. According to his findings, a general custodia liability under the

contract of locatio conductio cannot be derived from C. 4.65.28. The opposite view

would be incompatible with several other classical fragments in which custodia is (at

least implicitly) denied to be a general liability standard under the contract of locatio

conductio.

There are several reasons to follow Robaye’s opinion. On the one hand, there are a

number of fragments59

which explicitly deal with general liability standards in the field

of locatio conductio but only mention dolus and culpa as such and not custodia. On

the other hand, the rescript is too fragmentary that a general assertion could be

derived from it. Finally, the rescript dates back as late as 294 AD, the post-classical

era, and therefore does not necessarily reflect classical law. For all these reasons, it

can be stated that custodia is most likely not a general liability standard under the

contract of locatio conductio within the classical period.60

In conclusion, only dolus

and culpa can be categorised as general liability standards in the field of locatio

conductio.

56

MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, p. 205.

57

Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, pp. 613 seq.; see also Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Custodia-Haftung des

Sachmieters untersucht an Alf./Paul. D. 19,2,30,2.’ (1969) 86 SZ 394-403, p. 396.

58

Robaye, ‘L’obligation de garde’, pp. 193 seqq.

59

See Du Plessis, ‘Letting and hiring’, pp. 26 seqq.

60

See Robaye, ‘L’obligation de garde’, pp. 193 seqq.; Du Plessis, ‘Between Theory and Practice’,

pp. 426 seq.; MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, p. 161; Rosenthal, ‘Custodia und Actio furti’,

pp. 238, 263.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

The principle of personal responsibility

3.1 Introduction

In modern legal theory, legal norms are separated into rules and principles.61

Rules

are specific legal norms which are characterised by strict applicability.62

Principles are

legal norms with a high degree of generality, demanding that their normative content

is realised to a large extent, even though they have to be balanced with opposing

principles.63

In Roman law, principles are to be considered as judicial guidelines.64

A certain

principle has to be applied if relevant for a given case and if there are no opposing

principles.65

In case there are opposing principles, they have to be balanced according

to the particularity of a certain case.66

Furthermore, if the application of a certain

principle leads to an inadequate result because of the particular circumstances of a

certain case, this principle has to be disregarded in favour of an appropriate

(individual) decision.67

Contrary to modern European civil law codifications, classical Roman law is not

based on a closed set of norms.68

As a result, its jurisprudence is predominantly

characterised by casuistry, i.e. legal assessment on a case-by-case basis.69

Resorting to

the casuistic case practice, Roman jurists developed certain principles inductively.70

61

Ronald M. Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 University of Chicago Law Review 14-46,

pp. 22 seqq.; Robert Alexy, ‘Rechtsregeln und Rechtsprinzipien’, in Robert Alexy et al. (eds.),

Elemente einer juristischen Begründungslehre (Baden: Nomos, 2003) 217-233, pp. 218 seqq.;

Michael Potacs, ‘Rechtstheorie’, 2nd edn. (Wien: facultas, 2019) pp. 105 seqq.

62

Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’, p. 25.

63

Alexy, ‘Rechtsregeln und Rechtsprinzipien’, p. 224.

64

See Laurens C. Winkel, ‘The Role of General Principles in Roman Law’ (1996) 2 Fundamina

103-120, pp. 112 seqq.

65

See Potacs, ’Rechtstheorie2

’, pp. 109 seq.

66

Ibid.

67

See Max Kaser, ‘Zur Methode der römischen Rechtsfindung’, 2nd edn. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck

& Ruprecht, 1969) pp. 60 seqq.

68

Kaser, ‘Methode2

’, pp. 50 seqq.; Richard Böhr, ‘Das Verbot der eigenmächtigen Besitzumwandlung

im römischen Privatrecht: Ein Beitrag zur rechtshistorischen Spruchregelforschung’ (München: Saur,

2002) p. 25.

69

Tomasz Giaro, ‘Über methodologische Werkmittel der Romanistik’ (1988) 105 SZ 180-262,

pp. 210 seqq.; Dieter Nörr, ‘Spruchregel und Generalisierung’ (1972) 89 SZ 18-93, p. 90.

70

See Franz Horak, Dogma und Dogmatik: Zur Genese und Entwicklung eines Begriffs in der

Wissenschaftsgeschichte (1984) 101 SZ 275-293, p. 279.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

These maxims are in part explicitly phrased as principles, in part their character as

principles can only be derived from the wording of several corresponding case

decisions.71

In modern Austrian civil law72

, § 1313 ABGB pronounces a principle of

personal liability73

: “Generally a person is not liable for illegal actions of someone else

in which he did not participate […]”74

. In classical Roman law, there is no such general-

abstract provision regarding personal responsibility.75

In the absence of an explicitly

phrased principle of personal responsibility, such a principle might still be formulated

in view of the wording of a variety of case decisions.76

The most relevant text in this

regard is D. 39.1.5.5:

Ulp. (52 ad ed.) D. 39.1.5.5

Si plurium res sit, in qua opus novum fiat et uni nuntietur, recte facta nuntiatio est

omnibusque dominis videtur denuntiatum: sed si unus aedificaverit post operis novi

nuntiationem, alii, qui non aedificaverint, non tenebuntur: neque enim debet nocere

factum alterius ei qui nihil fecit.77

71

See Bruno Schmidlin, ‘Die römischen Rechtsregeln: Versuch einer Typologie’ (Köln – Wien:

Böhlau, 1970) p. 7; Nörr, ‘Spruchregel’, pp. 37 seqq.

72

The legal comparison with modern Austrian law, as drawn in this paper, emphasises the continuing

close dependence of modern Austrian torts and contractual liability law on its Roman foundations;

see Gábor Hamza, ‘Die Entwicklung des Privatrechts und die römischrechtliche Tradition in den

österreichischen Erbländern /Erblanden/ und in Österreich’ (2009) 13 AFDUDC, 321-334, p. 325;

Herbert Hausmaninger, ‘Roman Tort Law in the Austrian Civil Code of 1811’, in Herbert

Hausmaninger et al. (eds.), Developments in Austrian and Israeli Private Law (Wien – New York:

Springer, 1999) 113-135, pp. 114 seqq. The comparison shows how far-sighted the decisions of

Roman jurists were almost 2000 years ago and how contemporary they still are today.

73

Rudolf Reischauer, ‘§ 1313 ABGB’, in Peter Rummel (ed.) Kommentar zum Allgemeinen

bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 3rd edn., (Stand 1.1.2004, rdb.at) para 1.; Eva Ondreasova, ‘Die

Gehilfenhaftung: eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zum österreichischen Recht mit

Vorschlägen zur Reform’ (Wien: Manz, 2013), p. 15. For the development of the legal framework

towards a regime of fault-based liability see Hausmaninger, ‘Roman Tort Law’, pp. 118 seqq.

74

§ 1313 ABGB: “Generally a person is not liable for illegal actions of someone else in which he did

not participate. Even in the event the opposite is provided by law, he can claim regress against the

culpable party”; Peter Eschig/Erika Pircher-Eschig, Das österreichische ABGB – The Austrian Civil

Code (Wien: LexisNexis-Verl. ARD Orac, 2013) p. 313.

75

That is not surprising, since Roman law is more flexible compared to modern private law

codifications; see Giaro, ‘Werkmittel’, pp. 216 seqq.

76

See Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 359 seqq.

77

Translation: If the property on which new work is being carried out belongs to several persons and

a notice is served on one of them, that notice has been correctly served and is regarded as having been

served on all the owners. However, if one of them carries out building-work after the serving of the

notice of new work, the rest, who have not done so, will not be liable, since the action of one person


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

A community of owners starts to construct a new building, whilst an objection against

the continuation of the construction (operis novi nuntiatio) is made. Contrary to the

objection, one of the co-owners continues the construction process. The legal

question is whether the other co-owners can also be held accountable for the unlawful

continuation of the construction process.

The operis novi nuntiatio is a legal tool to regulate new constructions on neighbouring

property.78

If there is a certain predictable impairment of interests, the owner of a

property or a person entitled by easement can object to a new construction on a

neighbouring property.79

If the construction is continued unlawfully80

– as obviously

in the case under review –, the claimant obtains an interdictum (demolitorium)81

which entitles him to demand the removal of the construction that was pursued after

the objection.82

If the constructor refuses to do so, he is condemned to pay

compensation.83

Especially in cases in which the defendant is insolvent the question

arises whether the co-owners can also be held liable.

In D. 39.1.5.5 Ulpian decides that only the person who unlawfully continued to

construct the new building is liable for loss resulting from the continued construction

process. In contrast, the co-owners – most likely – just have to tolerate the removal

of the unlawfully constructed building on their property in conformity with

D. 39.1.2284

, where heirs of a piece of land on which the decedent constructed a new

ought not harm another who has done nothing; Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn.,

vol. III (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) p. 376.

78

Michael J. Rainer, ‘Bau- und nachbarrechtliche Bestimmungen im klassischen römischen Recht’

(Graz: Leykam, 1987), p. 169.

79

Ulp. (52 ad ed.) D. 39.1.1.16: Nuntiatio fit aut iuris nostri conservandi causa aut damni depellendi

aut publici iuris tuendi gratia. Translation: Notice is given either in order to preserve our own rights

or to prevent the occurrence of injury or to protect public rights; Watson, ‘Digest III’, p. 375.

80

Regarding the constructor’s lawful possibilities for action to suspend the operis novi nuntiatio see

Rainer, ‘Bau- und nachbarrechtliche Bestimmungen’, p. 169; Thomas Finkenauer, ‘Vererblichkeit

und Drittwirkungen der Stipulation im klassischen römischen Recht’ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010)

p. 253.

81

The name of the interdictum dates back to the era of the glossators; Rainer, ‘Bau- und

nachbarrechtliche Bestimmungen’, p. 188; Finkenauer, ‘Stipulation’, p. 253.

82

Rainer, ‘Bau- und nachbarrechtliche Bestimmungen’, pp. 177 seq.; Finkenauer, ‘Stipulation’, p.

253.

83

Rainer, ‘Bau- und nachbarrechtliche Bestimmungen’, p. 193.

84

See Marcell. (15 dig.) D. 39.1.22: Cui opus novum nuntiatum est, ante remissam nuntiationem

opere facto decessit: debet heres eius patientiam destruendi operis adversario praestare: nam et in

restituendo huiusmodi opere eius, qui contra edictum fecit, poena versatur, porro autem in poenam

heres non succedit. Translation: A person on whom a notice of new work had been served died after

carrying out work before the relaxation of the notice. His heir must give his adversary permission to


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

building despite an expressed operis novi nuntiatio had to tolerate the removal of the

building, too. Beyond that the continued construction of their co-owner must not be

to their detriment, since the action of one person must not harm another person who

has done nothing – neque enim debet nocere factum alterius ei qui nihil fecit.

Besides D. 39.1.5.5 there are further legal texts which refer to a concept of personal

responsibility in similar wording and various legal circumstances.85

Taking all these

cases into consideration, there is a strong indication that a principle of personal

responsibility has been developed within the classical period, despite the absence of

an explicit general rule thereto. In fact, it is noteworthy that the phrase “neque enim

debet nocere factum alterius ei qui nihil fecit”, which describes the principle of

personal responsibility best of all classical fragments, is almost identical to the wording

of § 1313 ABGB.86

It does not seem unlikely that this Ulpian fragment has been taken

as a template in the codification process of this modern Austrian legal provision.87

3.2 The principle of personal responsibility in locatio conductio

The assumption that a principle of personal responsibility has been developed during

the classical period is confirmed by several fragments dealing with liability under the

contract of locatio conductio.88

A text that exemplifies the principle well is

D. 19.2.60.7:

demolish the construction, since in respect of restoration of a construction of this kind it is the person

who acted in the contravention of the praetor’s edict who is subject to a penalty. But the heir certainly

does not succeed to the penalty; Watson, ‘Digest III’, p. 380.

85

See Alf. (2 dig.) D. 18.6.12; Alf. (5 dig.) D. 28.5.45 (44); Nerat. (4 membran.) D. 44.4.11 pr.; Pomp.

(13 ad Sab.) D. 10.2.45.1.; Paul. (6 ad ed.) D. 2.10.2; Ulp. (52 ad ed.) D. 39.1.5.5; Ulp. (9 ad ed.)

D. 3.3.27 pr. For the discussion of these cases see David Tritremmel, ‘Die Haftung für das Verhalten

anderer Personen bei der locatio conductio’ (Dissertation: University of Vienna, 2020) pp. 65 seqq.;

Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 359 seqq.

86

In the opinion of Franz von Zeiller, one of the leading drafters of the Austrian Civil Code, the

principle of personal responsibility as stipulated in § 1313 ABGB is so obvious that it would not have

been even necessary to be enshrined in law; Franz von Zeiller, ‘Commentar über das allgemeine

bürgerliche Gesetzbuch’, vol. III/2 (Wien: Geistinger, 1813), p. 741: „Daß man für ganz fremde

beschädigende Handlungen, woran jemand weder unmittelbar, noch mittelbar (§.1301.) Theil

genommen hat, wo man also auf keine Art als Beschädiger betrachtet werden kann, nicht

verantwortlich sei, ist eine so einleuchtende Wahrheit, dass sie in dem Gesetzbuche keiner Erwähnung

bedürfte […].“

87

See Hausmaninger, ‘Roman Tort Law’, p. 133.

88

See Lab. (5 post. a Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.7; Paul. (22 ad ed.) D. 19.2.45 pr.; Ulp. (32 ad ed.)

D. 19.2.9.4; Ulp. (18 ad ed.) D. 9.2.27.11.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Lab. (5 post. a Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.7

Servum meum mulionem conduxisti: neglegentia eius mulus tuus perit. si ipse se

locasset ex peculio dumtaxat et in rem versum damnum tibi praestaturum dico: sin

autem ipse eum locassem, non ultra me tibi praestaturum, quam dolum malum et

culpam meam abesse […].89

A slave is hired as a muleteer. Due to his negligence, a mule belonging to the

conductor gets killed. The legal question is whether the locator who leased out the

slave is contractually liable for the loss that the conductor has suffered. Regarding the

conductor’s liability for the loss caused by his slave, two scenarios are distinguished

in the fragment:

If the slave entered the locatio conductio himself – scenario one –, his dominus is

subject only to a limited liability within the framework of the actiones adiectitiae

qualitatis90

. The actio de peculio, one of the granted actiones adiectitiae qualitatis, is

limited to the value of an existing peculium91

that was previously given to the slave by

his dominus/pater familias. The actio de in rem verso, which is also granted by the

jurists, is limited to the amount of the dominus’ enrichment (versio) resulting from

the contract. It refers to the amount of the paid rental fee (merces).

In case that the dominus leased out his slave as a muleteer – scenario two –,

Iavolenus/Labeo raise the question of his unlimited contractual liability. According

to the jurists, there is no contractual liability, if there is no dolus malus or culpa that

89

Translation: You hired my slave as a muleteer; due to his carelessness your mule died. If he leased

himelf out, I [Labeo] decide that I will be held responsible to you for the loss up to the value of his

peculium or the amount of benefit I [the lessor] took; but if I leased him out, I will be held responsible

to you for no more than the absence of my bad faith and fault; Watson, ‘Digest II’, p. 115.

90

If the slave had a peculium, the hirer would have the actio conducti as actio de peculio. The scope

of this action is limited with the amount of the peculium. Otherwise, if the dominus of the slave

received the rental fee, the hirer has the actio conducti as actio de in rem verso in the amount of the

enrichment (versio) of the dominus […]; translated by the author. Regarding actiones adiectitiae

qualitatis see Andreas Wacke, ‘Die adjektizischen Klagen im Uberblick. Erster Teil: Von der Reeder-

und der Betriebsleiterklage zur direkten Stellvertretung’ (1994) 111 SZ 280-362, pp. 280 seqq.

91

A peculium is a personal property that is held by a person under one’s power and was entrusted by

the person’s dominus/pater familias. For further information and references see Richard Gamauf, De

nihilo crevit – Freigelassenenmentalität und Pekuliarrecht: Einige Überlegungen zur Entstehung von

Sklavenpekulien; in Ulrike Babusiaux/Peter Nobel/Johannes Platschek (eds.), Der Bürge einst und

jetzt: Festschrift für Alfons Bürge (Zürich – Basel – Genf: Schulthess, 2017) 225-253 pp. 225 ff;

Richard Gamauf, ‘Slaves Doing Business: The Role of Roman Law in the Economy of a Roman

Household’ (2009) 16:3 European Review of History 331-346, pp. 331 seqq.; Andreas Wacke,

‘Peculium non ademptum videtur tacite donatum: Zum Schicksal des Sonderguts nach der

Gewaltentlassung’ (1991) 42 Iura 43-95, pp. 51 seqq.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

the locator could be blamed for – non ultra me tibi praestaturum, quam dolum

malum et culpam meam abesse.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this fragment: first, there is (in general) no

unlimited contractual liability in the field of locatio conductio without personal

misconduct (dolus, culpa). Second, the mere fact that a slave who was leased out as a

muleteer negligently caused loss to the conductor during his work does not

necessarily have to be linked to a misconduct of the locator.

Liability for damages caused by others in locatio conductio

4.1 Introduction

In modern Austrian civil law, there are certain provisions stipulating a contractual

liability for losses caused by third parties, despite the general principle of personal

liability as laid down in § 1313 ABGB. Most prominently, there is § 1313a ABGB,

introduced by the Third Partial Amendment (1916) to the Austrian Civil Code of

181192

, providing a strict vicarious liability.93

Furthermore, there is – for instance –

§ 1314 ABGB94

stipulating the liability of whoever employs or accommodates

unreliable persons who cause harm to the (rented) property of a landlord. Both

provisions were of particular relevance for contractual relationships classified as

contracts of locatio conductio in classical Roman law.

In comparison with modern Austrian law, classical Roman law barely consists of

general liability provisions of this kind. With regard to the fragments mentioned in

chapter 3, rather the idea of a personal responsibility seems to have prevailed.

Nevertheless, there are certain fragments which affirm a contractual liability for losses

caused by third parties in the field of locatio conductio.95

Consequently, the question

arises on what legal basis the liability decisions are founded and to what extent these

cases are in conformity with the postulated principle of personal responsibility. In

92

See Herbert Hausmaninger, ’The Third Partial Amendment and Austrian Tort Law’, in Herbert

Hausmaninger et al. (eds.), Developments in Austrian and Israeli Private Law (Wien – New York:

Springer, 1999) 137-157, pp. 139 seqq.

93

§ 1313a ABGB: Whoever is obliged to perform [a service] to someone else is liable to him for fault

of his legal representative as well as of persons who he employs to deliver the performance [of the

service] as for his own; Eschig/Pircher-Eschig, ‘The Austrian Civil Code’, p. 313.

94

§ 1314 ABGB: Whoever employs an employee without a reference or knowingly keeps or provides

housing to a person who is dangerous due to his physical or mental state is liable to the landlord and

the cohabitants for compensation for the damage caused by the dangerous nature of this person;

Eschig/Pircher-Eschig, ‘The Austrian Civil Code’, p. 313.

95

For a comprehensive overview of several cases see Tritremmel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 87 seqq.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

order to approach this question in the following subsections, several leading cases will

be examined and structured into different liability models.

4.2 Contractual noxal liability

Noxal liability is a liability regime sui generis dating back to the Twelve Tables (about

450 BC).96

It refers to the strict liability of a dominus for torts committed by persons

in his power (patria/dominica potestas), who themselves cannot be successfully sued.97

Noxal liability is not only strict but also limited insofar as a dominus insciens – who

is unware regarding the commitment of a tort by a person in his power – can

surrender the actual tortfeasor to the harmed person by the so-called noxae deditio98

to escape his own full liability.99

In the archaic period100

, the “value” of a surrendered

tortfeasor lied in the possibility of enacting vengeance.101

During the classical period,

96

See Table 12.2a: Ex maleficio filiorum familias servorumque, veluti si furtum fecerint aut iniuriam

commiserint, noxales actiones proditae sunt, uti liceret patri dominove aut litis aestimationem sufferre

aut noxae dedere. Translation: From delinquency of children of the household and of slaves actions

for damages shall be appointed in a way that the father or the master may be permitted either to

undergo assessment of the claim or to deliver the delinquent for punishment; translated by the author.

See also Gai. Inst. 4.75; Dieter Flach, ‘Das Zwölftafelgesetz – Leges XII tabularum’ (Darmstadt: Wiss.

Buchges., 2004) pp. 159 seqq.

97

Martin Pennitz, ‘§ 107. Die Noxalhaftung’, in Ulrike Babusiaux et. al. (eds.), Handbuch des

Römischen Privatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming) p. 4; Martin Pennitz, ‘Obligatio

domini und Obligatio servi’, in Jan D. Harke (ed.), Drittbeteiligung am Schuldverhältnis: Studien Zur

Geschichte und Dogmatik des Privatrechts (Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, 2010) 71-95, pp. 71 seqq.;

Hans-Peter Benöhr, ‘Zur Haftung für Sklavendelikte’ (1980) 97 SZ 273-287, p. 276.

98

See Ulp. (23 ad ed.) D. 9.4.21: Quotiens dominus ex noxali causa convenitur, si nolit suspicere

iudicium, in ea causa res est, ut debeat noxae dedere eum, cuius nomine iudicium non suscipitur […].

Translation: Whenever an owner is sued on noxal grounds, if he does not wish to defend the action,

the position is that he must noxally surrender the slave on whose account he makes no defense […];

Watson, ‘Digest I’, p. 300.

99

If the dominus insciens wants to keep the noxious person in his power, he has to pay the same

amount of compensation that a person sui iuris must pay, if he had committed the tort himself; Paul

F. von Wyss, ‘Haftung für fremde culpa’ (Zürich: Schultheß, 1867) p. 36.

100

The archaic period of ancient Rome lasts approximately until the 3rd

century BC; Helmuth

Schneider, ‘Rom von den Anfängen bis zum Ende der Republik (6. Jh. bis 30 v. Chr.)’, in Hans-

Joachim Gehrke/Helmuth Schneider (eds.) Geschichte der Antike: Ein Studienbuch, 5th edn.

(Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2013) 277-352, p. 277.

101

Peter Gröschler, ‘Considerazioni sulla funzione della responsabilità nossale in diritto romano’, in

Carmela R. Ruggeri (ed.), Studi in onore di Antonino Metro, vol. 3 (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 2010)

195-222, pp. 198 seqq.; Schmidlin, ‘Rechtsregeln’, pp. 94 seqq.; Otto Lenel, ‘Die Formeln der

actiones noxales’ (1927) 47 SZ 1-28, p. 19.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

a more economic approach was pursued, namely to exploit the manpower of the

surrendered person.102

The historical starting point for the development of regimes of contractual liability

for losses caused by others was most likely a controversy between the Sabinian School

and the Proculeian School concerning contractual noxal liability, as stated in

Coll. 12.7.9:103

Ulp. (18 ad ed.) Coll. 12.7.9

Sed et si qui servi inquilini insulam exusserint, libro X Urseius refert Sabinum

respondisse lege Aquilia servorum nomine dominum noxali iudicio conveniendum:

ex locato autem dominum teneri negat. Proculus autem respondit, cum coloni servi

villam exusserint, colonum vel ex locato vel lege Aquilia teneri, ita ut colonus servos

posset noxae dedere et si uno iudicio res esset iudicata, altero amplius non

agendum.104

A locator leases a tenement house (insula) to a conductor. Slaves of the conductor

subsequently cause a fire, which burns down the house. The legal question is whether

the conductor is (contractually) liable for the damage caused by his slaves. Urseius

reports a responsum by Sabinus stating that the locator can bring actio legis Aquiliae

noxalis against the conductor. Urseius adds that the contractual actio locati is not

applicable.

In contrast, Proculus provides the locator, in a comparable case where slaves of the

conductor burn down the rented house (villa) not only with the delictual action but

also with the contractual actio locati as an alternative. Nonetheless, the actio locati is

limited by the option of noxae deditio, too, according to Proculus.

In both cases the conductor was obviously not at fault, as the noxal limitations

indicate. What is remarkable about this fragment is the quite uncommon105

regime of

102

Wicke, ‘Haftung’, p. 46; Benöhr, ‘Sklavendelikte’, p. 274.

103

Du Plessis, ‘Letting and hiring’, p. 36; Wicke, ‘Haftung’, pp. 42 seqq.; Knütel, ‘Haftung’,

pp. 392 seqq.

104

Translation: But if some slaves of an urban tenant burn down an apartment house, according to

Urseius in Book 10 Sabinus responded that the owner may be sued, on the account if his slaves, by a

noxal trial under the Aquilian law; but he (Urseius) denies that the owner is liable on the lease. But

Proculus responds that when a tenant farmer’s slaves burn down a farmhouse, the tenant is liable

either on the lease or from the Aquilian law, with the conditions that the tenant can surrender the

slaves noxally, and that if the matter is adjudged in one trial there should be no further suit by the

other; Frier, ‘Landlords and Tennants’, p. 233.

105

But see Paul. (32 ad ed.) D. 17.1.26.7 regarding actio mandati and Ulp. (19 ad ed.) D. 10.2.16.6

regarding actio familae erciscundae.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

contractual liability with noxal limitation as proposed by Proculus, which has led to a

controversy106

between the Sabinian School and the Proculeian School.

In the

fragment under review there is no indication concerning the rationale behind

Proculus’ decision. However, there are certain hypotheses amongst modern scholars

regarding the legal basis of contractual liability with noxal limitation.

Schipani107

and Knütel108

trace the limited contractual liability to the principle of good

faith which underlies the contract of locatio conductio. Von Lübtow109

believes that

the conductor is contractually liable for the misconduct of his slaves because of his

abstract ability to exercise control over the leasehold. While Frier110

questions the

purpose of the limited contractual liability and thus its classicity, there are several

practical explanations for the alternative contractual action: the delictual actio legis

Aquiliae noxalis and the contractual actio locati have different prerequisites for claims

that a certain case does not necessarily cumulatively fulfil. If the prerequisites for both

claims are fulfilled, the option to choose between the two actions might still have a

positive effect with regard to provability111

, as a plaintiff generally bears the burden of

106

For the law schools and their controversies in the classical period see Okko Behrends, ‘Wie haben

wir uns die römischen Juristen vorzustellen?’ (2011) 128 SZ 83-129, pp. 83 seqq.; Johannes Platschek,

‘Nochmals zum "Paradigmenwechsel" in der römischen Jurisprudenz’ (2010) 38 Index 401-406,

pp. 401 seqq.; Detlef Liebs, ‘Hofjuristen der römischen Kaiser bis Justinian’ (München: Verl. d.

Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., 2010) pp. 5 seqq.; Tessa G. Leesen, ‘Gaius meets Cicero: law and rhetoric in

the school controversies’ (Leiden – Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) pp. 7 seqq.; Dieter

Nörr, ‘Exempla nihil per se valent’ (2009) 126 SZ 1-54, pp. 44 seq.; Franz Horak, ‘Wer waren die

Veteres? Zur Terminologie der klassischen römischen Juristen’, in Georg Klingenberg/Michael

J. Rainer/Herweig Stiegler (eds.), Vestigia iuris Romani: Festschrift für Gunter Wesener zum

60. Geburtstag am 3. Juni 1992 (Graz: Leykam, 1992) 201-236, pp. 201 seqq.; Heinrich Vogt, ‘Die

sogenannten Rechtsschulen der Proculianer und der Sabinianer’, in Dieter Nörr/Dieter Simon (eds.),

Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Kunkel (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984) 515-521,

pp. 515 seqq.; Okko Behrends, ‘Institutionelles und prinzipielles Denken im römischen Privatrecht’

(1978) 95 SZ 187-231, pp. 192 seqq.; Wolfgang Kunkel, ‘Römische Rechtsgeschichte’, 2nd edn. (Graz

– Wien – Köln: Böhlau, 1967) pp. 107 seqq.

107

Sandro Schipani, ‘Responsabilità "ex lege Aquilia". Criteri di imputazione e problema della "culpa"’

(Torino: Giappichelli, 1969) p. 428.

108

Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 396.

109

Ulrich von Lübtow, ‘Untersuchungen zur lex Aquilia de damno iniuria dato’ (Berlin: Duncker &

Humblot, 1971) p. 71.

110

Frier, ’Tenant’s liability’, p. 263.

111

On the relevance regarding questions of evidence in the Roman jurisprudence see Richard Gamauf,

‘Vindicatio Nummorum: Eine Untersuchung zur Reichweite und praktischen Durchführung des

Eigentumsschutzes an Geld im Klassischen Römischen Recht’ (Habilitationsschrift: Universität Wien,

2001) pp. 88 seqq.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

proof regarding the facts on which the claim is based.112

Finally, the calculation of

damages can differ between the delictual and the contractual action, provided that

the tenant waives his right to surrender the noxious person(s) in his power.113

Besides these arguments there is another reason to treat Coll. 12.7.9 as classical,

namely the Ulpian fragment D. 9.2.27.11:

Ulp. (18 ad ed.) D. 9.2.27.11

Proculus ait, cum coloni servi villam exussissent, colonum vel ex locato vel lege

Aquilia teneri, ita ut colonus possit servos noxae dedere, et si uno iudicio res esset

iudicata, altero amplius non agendum. Sed haec ita, si culpa colonus careret […].114

Slaves of a conductor cause a fire that burns down the villa located on the leasehold.

The legal question is whether the conductor is (contractually) liable for this damage.

Proculus decides that the conductor is liable not only delictually but also

contractually. However, according to Proculus, the conductor’s contractual liability is

limited insofar as he can surrender the noxious slaves in order to escape personal

liability, if there was no personal misconduct on the conductor’s part – si culpa

colonus careret.

Three important conclusions can be drawn from this text: first, the contractual

liability with noxal limitation is classical; second, it seems that the Proculeian opinion

on contractual noxal liability prevailed against the Sabinian opinion by the end of the

classical period, as the late-classical jurist Ulpian just refers to the opinion of Proculus

but not of Sabinus; third, D. 9.2.27.11 relativises and simultaneously confirms the

principle of personal responsibility by awarding contractual noxal liability for losses

caused by persons under one’s control while denying unlimited contractual liability if

there was no personal culpa.

112

See Andreas Wacke, ‘Zur Beweislast im klassischen Zivilprozeß: Giovanni Pugliese versus Ernst

Levy’ (1992) 109 SZ 411-449, pp. 419 seqq.

113


114

Translation: Proculus says that when the slaves of a tenant farmer have burned down the country

house, the tenant is liable either on the contract of tenancy or under the lex Aquiliae, but with the

privilege that the tenant is able to hand over the slaves for punishment. And if the case is decided in

one of these actions, the other cannot be brought in addition. But the position is thus only if the tenant

farmer was free of fault; Watson, ‘Digest I’, p. 284.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

4.3 Liability for violation of a certain contract clause

When entering into a locatio conductio the parties frequently add certain contract

clauses (pacta adiecta).115

Due to the principle of good faith, which is applicable in

locatio conductio,116

contract clauses can be enforced regardless of any formal

requirements.117

Quite regularly, pacta adiecta are agreed to impose special duties on

the person who under the contract receives a certain item (e.g. a leased property or

working material to fulfil a certain task) from the other contracting partner.118

The

non-fulfilment of such a special duty can lead to an unlimited contractual liability

even in cases in which harm is directly caused by a person that is not bound by the

contract,119

as D. 19.2.11.4 and D. 19.2.12 show:

Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.11.4

Inter conductorem et locatorem convenerat, ne in villa urbana faenum

componeretur: composuit: deinde servus igne illato succendit. Ait Labeo teneri

conductorem ex locato, quia ipse causam praebuit inferendo contra conductionem.120

Hermog. (2 iur. epit.) D. 19.2.12

Sed etsi quilibet extraneus ignem iniecerit <in villam urbanam, ubi conductor

adversus conventionem faenum composuerat>,121

damni locati iudicio habebitur

ratio.122

115

Du Plessis, ‘Lex contractus’, pp. 79 seqq.; Müller,’ Gefahrtragung’, p. 103; Zimmermann, ‘Law of

Obligations’, pp. 355 seqq.; Neeve, ‘Colonus’, pp. 5 seqq.; Frier, ‘Tenant’s liability’, pp. 243 seqq.,

Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, pp. 106 seq.

116

See fn 25 seqq.

117

Klausberger, ‘Zurechnungsgründe’, p. 353; see also Finkenauer, ‘Stipulation’, pp. 3 seqq.

118

Frier, ‘Landlords and Tennants’, p. 63.

119

Tröger, ‘Arbeitsteilung’, pp. 83 seq.; Wicke, ‘Haftung’, p. 63; Frier, ‘Landlords and tenants’, p.

142; Metro, ‘L’obbligazione di custodire’, pp. 174 seqq.

120

Translation: Lessee and lessor agreed that hay not be stacked in a city villa. He [the lessee] stacked

hay, and his slave then set a fire and ignited it. Labeo says that the lessee is liable on the lease because

he himself furnished the cause by bringing in [hay] against the contract of hire; Watson, ‘Digest II’,

p. 102.

121

<Amendment> of the source according to Otto Lenel, ‘Palingenesia iuris civilis: iuris consultorum

reliquiae quae Iustiniani digestis continentur, ceteraque iuris prudentiae civilis fragmenta minora

secundum auctores et libros’, vol. 1 (Lipsiae: Tauchnitz, 1889) p. 270.

122

Translation: But if some outsider sets the fire <in the city villa in which hay was stacked against the

contract>, an assessment of the loss will also be made in the action on lease; see Watson, ‘Digest II’,

p. 103.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Under a lease contract locator and conductor agreed that hay must not be stacked in

the town house (villa urbana) of the leasehold. Contrary to the contract clause, hay

was stacked in the mansion and so it happened that a slave, as in D. 19.2.11.4, or a

stranger (extraneus), as in D. 19.2.12, set fire and ignited the villa. The legal question

is whether the conductor is (contractually) liable for the damage. Labeo and

Hermogenian hold the tenant liable ex contractu. As Labeo states, the tenant

contributed to the damage by stacking hay in the town house contrary to the

contractual agreement.

Without the lex contractus the tenant would only be delictually liable for the damage

directly caused by his slave or possibly contractually, but in the absence of personal

fault with the option of noxae deditio. Regarding damages caused by an extraneus,

the conductor would not even face noxal liability, provided that he was not at fault

himself.

In the case under review, however, the conductor breached the contract clause, not

to stack hay in the town house of the leasehold. By doing so, he violated the principle

of good faith. As the damage is connected to the breach of the contract clause – quia

ipse causam praebuit inferendo contra conductionem –, which was obviously

stipulated for the very purpose of protecting the mansion against fire, Labeo and

Hermogenian hold the conductor fully liable ex contractu, although the damage was

directly caused by another person.123

4.4 Liability for culpa in eligendo

With regard to the concept of culpa in eligendo124

– contractual liability for negligent

selection of a person to fulfil a certain task – the Ulpian fragment D. 9.2.27.9 is most

relevant:125

Ulp. (18 ad ed.) D. 9.2.27.9

Si fornicarius servus coloni ad fornacem obdormisset et villa fuerit exusta, Neratius

scribit ex locato conventum praestare debere, si neglegens in eligendis ministeriis fuit:

123

See Riccardo Cardilli, ‘L'obbligazione di "praestare" e la responsabilità contrattuale in diritto

romano’ (Milano: Giuffrè, 1995) p. 369; Dieter Nörr, ‘Causa mortis: Auf den Spuren einer

Redewendung’ (München: Beck, 1986) p. 16, 22; Reinhard Willvonseder, ‘Die Verwendung der

Denkfigur der „condicio sine qua non“ bei den Römischen Juristen’ (Wien – Graz: Böhlau, 1984)

p. 19; J.A.C. Thomas, ‘Actiones Ex Locato/Conducto and Aquilian Liability’ (1978) 20 Acta Juridica

127-134, p. 128.

124

For details see David Tritremmel, ‘Culpa in eligendo et culpa in habendo bei der locatio conductio

rei’, in Esther Ayasch/Jaqueline Bemmer/David Tritremmel (eds.), Wiener Schriften: Neue

Perspektiven aus der jungen Romanistik (Wien: Manz, 2018) 191-214, pp. 192 seqq.

125

See also Lab. (5 post. a Iavol. epit.) D. 19.2.60.7; Ulp. (18 ad ed.) D. 9.2.27.34.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

ceterum si alius ignem subicerit fornaci, alius neglegenter custodierit, an tenebitur qui

subiecerit? Nam qui custodit, nihil fecit, qui recte ignem subiecit, non peccavit: quid

ergo est? puto utilem competere actionem tam in eum qui ad fornacem obdormivit

quam in eum qui neglegenter custodit, nec quisquam dixerit in eo qui obdormivit,

rem eum humanam et naturalem passum, cum deberet vel ignem extinguere vel ita

munire, ne evagetur.126

In this fragment Ulpian discusses two separate scenarios, only one of which deals with

culpa in eligendo.127

The other part of the fragment covers a similar but independent

case of delictual liability. The caesura is marked by the end of the phrase “si neglegens

in eligendis ministeriis fuit”.

The first scenario deals with a case in which a fire is lit in a furnace on the leasehold,

then spreads and burns down the leasehold. The spreading of the fire is possible

because the slave who was selected by the conductor to guard the fire fell asleep. The

legal question is whether the conductor is (contractually) liable for the damage.

Neratius decides that the conductor is fully liable ex contractu, if he was negligent in

selecting this particular slave for guarding the furnace – si neglegens in eligendis

ministeriis fuit.

If the conductor guarded the furnace himself, every violation of care leading to the

leasehold being damaged would result in his personal (culpa-)liability. As the damage

was not caused by the conductor himself but by his careless slave and as there was no

special contract clause breached, there is no obvious argument for an unlimited

contractual liability of the conductor. However, as Neratius points out, an unlimited

contractual liability is applicable, if the tenant was negligent in selecting this particular

slave for guarding the fire.

With regard to Coll. 12.7.9 and D. 9.2.27.11 – the Ulpian fragments that have been

discussed in subsection 4.2. – it seems questionable, according to what criteria the

126

Translation: If a tenant farmer’s stoker-slave drops asleep at the furnace and the house is burned

down, Neratius says that the tenant must nevertheless make good the damage in accordance with

agreement in the contract of letting, if he was negligent in choosing his workers. But if one man lighted

the furnace but another watched it carelessly, will the one who lighted it be liable? For he who watched

it did nothing, while the one who lightened it be liable? For he who watched it carelessly, will the one

who lighted it be liable? For he who watched did nothing, while the one who is lighted it properly was

not at fault. What is the answer? I think that an actio utilis lies just as much against the man who fell

asleep at the furnace as against him who watched it negligently, nor can anyone say that he who fell

asleep was only afflicted by a normal human failing; for it was his duty either to put out the fire or take

such care that it did not escape; Watson, ‘Digest I’, p. 284.

127

Frier does not adequately distinguish the independent scenarios; Frier, ‘Tenant’s liability’, p. 257.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

selection (of a certain person) is to be qualified as being negligent (culpa in eligendo)128

and thus leading to an unlimited contractual liability. Unfortunately, Neratius does

not further discuss this question in the fragment under review. What seems most

relevant in tackling this question is that according to D. 19.2.11.2, a conductor faces

a general legal obligation to maintain the leasehold in good condition.129

Keeping fire

in the furnace of a leased villa always poses a certain threat to the leasehold, which is

why a high level of diligence is demanded of the persons involved.130

Eventually, by

selecting an unsuitable person to guard the fire the tenant himself acted in a way that

endangered the safety of the leasehold. This behaviour can (at least) be qualified as

culpa, thus leading to the conductor’s unlimited contractual liability.

4.5 Liability for culpa in habendo vel inducendo

Building on Neratius’ concept of culpa in eligendo, Ulpian describes a different but

similar form of culpa-liability for loss directly caused by others. In accordance with

some modern scholars, this concept is referred to as culpa in habendo vel

inducendo.131

A particularly relevant source132

in this regard is D. 19.2.11 pr.:

Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.11 pr.

Videamus, an et servorum culpam et quoscumque induxerit praestare conductor

debeat? Et quatenus praestat, utrum ut servos noxae dedat an vero suo nomine

teneatur? Et adversus eos quos induxerit utrum praestabit tantum actiones, an quasi

ob propriam culpam tenebitur? Mihi ita placet, ut culpam etiam eorum quos induxit

praestet suo nomine, etsi nihil convenit, si tamen culpam in inducendis admittit, quod

tales habuerit vel suos vel hospites: et ita Pomponius libro sexagesimo tertio ad

edictum probat.133

128

As neglegentia is a form of culpa, it is appropriate to use the modern term of culpa in eligendo; see

Frier, ‘Landlords and Tenants’, p. 136; Kaser, ‘Römisches Privastrecht I2

’, p. 512.

129

Ulp. (32 ad ed.) D. 19.2.11.2: Item prospicere debet conductor, ne aliquo vel ius rei vel corpus

deterius faciat vel fieri patiatur. Translation: Likewise, the lessee should take care in no way to lower

in value the thing's legal or physical condition, nor to allow it to become lower; Watson, ‘Digest II’, p.

102. See also Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, p. 177; Emilio Costa, ‘La locazione di cose nel diritto

romano’ (Torino: Bocca, 1915) p. 27; Johne/Köhn/Weber, ‘Kolonen’, pp. 216 seq.

130

See Frier, ‘Tenant’s liability’, p. 258.

131

For details see Tritremmel, ‘Culpa in eligendo’, pp. 205 seqq.

132

See also Ulp. (18 ad ed.) D. 9.2.27.11.

133

Translation: Should a lessee be held responsible for fault on the part of his slaves and of those

whom he admits? And to what extent responsible: to surrender his slaves noxally or rather to be liable

in his own right? And will he just present the actions against those he admits, or will he be liable as if

the fault were his own? My view Is that that he is responsible in his own right for the fault of those he


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Persons under the conductor’s control or (free) guests of him cause damage to the

leasehold. The legal question is whether and to what extent the conductor is

(contractually) liable. In his assessment of the case Ulpian raises three legal questions:

First, he considers whether the tenant is liable at all for the culpa of his slaves and of

those who he admitted to the leasehold. Second, Ulpian examines the scope of

liability regarding the torts of his slaves, i.e. whether the tenant is liable without

limitation or with the possibility of noxae deditio. Third, he discusses whether the

tenant can only be forced to cede his actions against the actual tortfeasor or whether

he is fully liable (in case of personal fault).

Unfortunately, only the answer to the last question is preserved. Ulpian states that –

despite the absence of a certain contract clause – the conductor is contractually liable

if he was at fault in admitting those persons who caused damage to the leasehold.

Due to the incompleteness of the fragment, considerable cuts must be assumed.134

However, as there are not any convincing arguments within the existing text-critical

analyses, it should not be assumed that the given part of the fragment is unclassical.135

By the phrase “etsi nihil convenit” Ulpian en passant refers to the well-established

concept of liability for violation of a contract clause.136

In the case under review such

a clause, however, does not exist. Still, Ulpian and Pomponius support the

conductor’s contractual liability without limitation. As Ulpian states, contractual

liability in this case is based on the conductor’s fault in admitting untrustworthy

persons to the leasehold – si tamen culpam in inducendis admittit, quod tales

habuerit vel suos vel hospites.

In the absence of further information in the Ulpian fragment regarding the specific

fault of the conductor, the following legal aspects have to be considered: as described

above, a conductor has a general obligation to maintain the leasehold in good

condition.137

Thus, he must avoid putting the leasehold in danger. In contrast to

D. 9.2.27.9, previously analysed in subsection 4.4, the conductor did not select a

certain person to perform a responsible task that the person was unsuitable for.

admitted even if the parties did not agree to this, provided that he is guilty of fault in admitting them

because he has such people as members of his household or as guests. Pomponius supports this view

in the sixty-third book of his Edict; Watson, ‘Digest II’, p. 102.

134

See Wicke, ’Haftung’, p. 59; Pasquale Voci, ‘Diligentia, custodia, culpa: I dati fondamentali’ (1990)

56 SDHI 29-143, pp. 110 seq.; Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 403, Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, p. 630; Geoffrey

MacCormack, ‘Culpa in eligendo’ (1971) 18 RIDA 525-551, p. 541; Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio

Conductio’, p. 201.

135

Wicke, ‘Haftung’, p. 59; Voci, ‘Diligentia’, pp. 110 seq.; Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 403.

136

See subsection 4.3.

137

See fn 129.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Another difference is that D. 19.2.11 pr. does not only concern the contractual

liability for damages caused by a slave but also by (free) guests. Whereas a conductor

might be able to control his slaves comprehensively due to his far-reaching dominica

potestas138

, his influence over guests who have been introduced to the leasehold is

quite limited.139

For these reasons, it must in all likelihood have been discernible to the conductor

that the persons whom he admitted to the leasehold were (especially) untrustworthy

– quod tales habuerit.140

Under this presumption, person were recklessly admitted to

the leasehold who then caused damage to the locator, which was foreseeable based

on their supposedly untrustworthy character. As soon as these people were admitted

to the leasehold the conductor might not even have been able to prevent the damage,

but to admit them to the leasehold in the first place is most likely what Ulpian and

Pomponius blame the conductor for and classify as culpa in habendo vel inducendo.

4.6 D. 19.2.25.7 – indication of a strict vicarious liability?

The liability concepts that have been discussed so far concern cases in which – except

for cases of noxal liability – a person who is not bound by the vinculum iuris of a

certain locatio conductio causes damage to a contractual item of one contracting party

while the other party is held liable ex contractu on the basis of a previous form of

culpa (or dolus). This last subsection 4.6., in contrast, discusses whether there is a

form of strict vicarious liability in the field of locatio conductio in classical Roman law

that does not require any personal fault on the part of the liable contracting party.

The basis for this debate is the famous Gaius fragment D. 19.2.25.7:

Gaius (10 ed. prov.) D. 19.2.25.7

Qui columnam transportandam conduxit, si ea, dum tollitur aut portatur aut

reponitur, fracta sit, ita id periculum praestat, si qua ipsius eorumque, quorum opera

uteretur, culpa acciderit: culpa autem abest, si omnia facta sunt, quae diligentissimus

quisque observaturus fuisset. idem scilicet intellegemus et si dolia vel tignum

transportandum aliquis conduxerit: idemque etiam ad ceteras res transferri potest.141

138

Richard P. Saller, ‘Patria potestas and the stereotype of the Roman family’ (1986) 1 Continuity and

Change 7-22, pp. 7 seqq.

139


140

MacCormack, ‘Culpa in eligendo’, p. 544.

141

Translation: A man undertook [as a task] to transport a column. If it broke while being raised or

carried or repositioned, he is held responsible for the damage if this happens due to his own fault or

that of those whose labour he employs; but there is no fault if all precautions were taken which a very

careful person would have observed. I would obviously construe the same result if someone


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

A carrier (conductor) commits himself to transport a column belonging to his client

(locator). This column breaks during the dismantling, transportation, or repositioning

process. The legal question is whether the conductor is contractually liable only for

his own fault or also for the fault of his assistants. According to Gaius, the carrier is

contractually liable, “si qua ipsius eorumque, quorum opera uteretur, culpa

acciderit”.

The conductor and locator entered into a locatio conductio operis concerning the

transportation of a certain column. Accordingly, the conductor was obliged to

successfully fulfil his task (dismantling, transportation, and repositioning of the

column) whereas the locator owes the fee agreed by the parties.

To fulfil his contractual obligation, the conductor (most likely) hired the service of

assistants – eorumque, quorum opera uteretur.142

In the case under review the

conductor did not successfully fulfil his task. On the contrary, the column broke

during transportation.

In general, the transportation of columns in ancient Rome was quite challenging and

required the help of several people besides the use of certain technical devices.143

By

using assistants to fulfil his task, the conductor did not per se violate the contract.

Quite controversial, however, is the legal question whether the conductor is just liable

for his own culpa – as is customary in the classical period (in the field of locatio

conductio) – or also for the culpa of his assistants.

The reason for this debate is the ambiguous phrase “id periculum praestat, si qua

ipsius eorumque, quorum opera uteretur, culpa acciderit”. The parcticle “que” in

eorumque may stand for “and” or for “or”. If Gaius understood the particle

copulatively, the liability of the conductor required his own fault and the fault of his

assistants, who – most likely – caused the damage to the column. If the particle was

understood disjunctively, either his own fault or his assistants’ fault was sufficient to

make the conductor contractually liable without the limitation of noxae deditio.

Especially before 1950, the majority of scholars argued that substantial parts of the

Gaius fragment were either interpolated or they at least rejected the possibility of the

disjunctive interpretation of “que”.144

Several of those opinions are discussed in detail

undertakes [as a task] to transport storage jars or wood; and the same rule can be applied also to other

things; Watson, ‘Digest II’, p. 108.

142

See Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 420 seq.

143

See Vitr. (de arch.) 10.2.11.

144

Haymann, ‘Textkritische Studien’, pp. 193 seq.; Fritz Schulz, ‘Die Haftung für das Verschulden

der Angestellten’ (1911) 38 GrünhutsZ 9-54, pp. 26 seq.; Bernhard Windscheid, ‘Lehrbuch des


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

by Mayer-Maly and Knütel. Mayer-Maly145

shares the opinion that the fragment

contains extensive interpolations but he considers the fragment to be classical in its

core and supports the disjunctive translation of „que“. Knütel146

is more cautious

regarding suspicions of interpolation. He classifies the fragment as substantially

classical and – like Mayer-Maly – he supports the disjunctive translation of „que“.

Regarding the controversy about the specific meaning of the particle “que” the

following arguments stand in opposition. In support of a disjunctive interpretation of

“que” one can point to another Gaius fragment147

that contains the particle „que”, too,

but where there is no doubt that the particle has to be understood disjunctively.

Furthermore, the latter part of the Gaius fragment under review starting with

“idemque etiam ad ceteras res transferri potest” suggests the disjunctive translation of

„que“. What holds against the disjunctive translation is that this would be unique as

a case to indicate an unlimited contractual liability for the mere fault of another

person in the field of locatio conductio within the classical period.148

This argument

may be rebutted insofar, as the copulative translation of “que” would require personal

fault of the conductor as well as fault of (at least) one of his assistants to establish the

liability of the conductor. Thus he could be exempt from liability if only he was at

fault but not his assistants.149

To put it differently and more pointedly, if “que” was

understood copulatively, the conductor could hold himself exempt from liability by

using assistants who are incapable of tort.150

For those reasons and in accordance with the prevailing opinion amongst modern

scholars151

the disjunctive translation of “que” seems reasonable. Thus, the conductor

Pandektenrechts’, 6th edn., vol. II (Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening, 1887) p. 541; more recently

see Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, p. 603.

145

Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, pp. 28 seq.

146

Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 419 seq.

147

Siehe Gai. (15 ed. prov.) D. 26.8.11: Si ad pupillum aut furiosum bonorum possessio pertineat,

expediendarum rerum gratia et in agnoscenda et in repudianda bonorum possessione voluntatem

tutoris curatorisque spectari debere placuit: qui scilicet si quid eorum contra commodum pupilli

furiosive fecerint, tutelae curationisve iudicio tenebuntur. Translation: If a pupillus or a lunatic is

affected by bonorum possessio, in order to settle the matter, it seems right to consider the wishes of

the tutor or curator both in claiming and in repudiating bonorum possessio. Certainly, if they do

anything contrary to the interests of the pupillus or the lunatic, they will be liable in an action on

tutelage or curatorship; Watson, ‘Digest II’, p. 317.

148

Kaser, ‘Römisches Privastrecht I2

’, p. 513.

149

Wicke, ‘Haftung’, p. 70.

150


151

Klausberger, ‘Zurechnungsgründe’, p. 361; Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring’, p. 93; José L. Alonso,

‘Fault, strict liability and risk in the law of the papyry’, in Jakub Urbanik (ed.), Culpa: Facets of Liability


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

is allowed to make use of assistants to fulfil his task of transporting the column

belonging to the locator, but he is liable – periculum praestat152

–, regardless of

whether the column was damaged due to his own fault or the fault of his assistants.

The liability of the conductor ends where everything was done with the utmost care

– culpa autem abest, si omnia facta sunt, quae diligentissimus quisque observaturus

fuisset. The negative wording „culpa autem abest“ indicates a reversal of the burden

of proof.153

Accordingly, in the case of damage the conductor is only exempt from

liability if he is able to prove that everyone contributing to the transportation was

acting with the utmost care – diligentissimus quisque.154

According to Gaius, the same liability regime is applicable if someone undertakes the

transportation of barrels or beams – idem scilicet intellegemus et si dolia vel tignum

transportandum aliquis conduxerit. This opinion seems plausible insofar as the

in Ancient Legal Theory and Practice (Warsaw: The Raphael Taubenschlag Foundation, 2012) 19-81,

p. 73; Tröger, ‘Arbeitsteilung’, p. 89; Wicke, ‘Haftung’, p. 70; Heinrich Honsell, ‘Die Haftung für

Hilfspersonen’, in Andrea Büchler/Markus Müller-Chen (eds.), Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer

zum 60. Geburtstag (Bern: Stämpfli, 2011) 779-789, p. 781; Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’,

pp. 399 seq.; Voci, ‘Diligentia’, p. 107; Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 422; Apollonia J. M. Meyer-Termeer,

‘Die Haftung der Schiffer im griechischen und römischen Recht’ (Zutphen: Terra Publ., 1978) p. 182;

Frier, ‘Landlords and tenants’, p. 148; MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’, p. 202 Fn 149;

MacCormack, ‘Culpa in eligendo’, p. 541; Kaser, ‘Römisches Privastrecht I2

’, p. 513; Mayer-Maly,

‘Locatio Conductio’, pp. 28 seq.

152

Some scholars refer the phrase „periculum praestat“ to a risk regime because it can be translated as

„he bears the risk“ and because damages which are caused by others are generally considered risks

(casus minor); Alonso, ‘Fault’, p. 73; Honsell, ‘Haftung’, p. 781; Wolfgang Ernst, ‘Das Nutzungsrisiko

bei der Pacht’ (1988) 105 SZ 541-591, p. 547; Molnár, ‘Verantwortung’, pp. 603 seq. Others

understand the phrase „periculum praestat“ as a liability regime and translate it as „bear the damage“;

Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 419; MacCormack, ‘Culpa in eligendo’, p. 541. Du Plessis is uncertain regarding

the phrase, as he speaks of „risk regime“ on the one hand, and of „vicarious liabilty“ on the other; Du

Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring’, p. 93. As Gaius demands the conductor’s culpa or the culpa of at least

one of his assistants for the conductor to be liable, the phrase does most likely not refer to a risk

regime but rather to a (vicarious) liability regime; Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, p. 399.

153

See Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 422 seq.

154

Especially scholars of the 20th

century classify the term „diligentissimus quisque“ as a post-classical

interpolation; Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, p. 29; Haymann, ‘Textkritische Studien’, pp.

193 seq. The quite unspecified interpolation criticism can be rebutted, since this standard of care

appears in other (Gaius) fragments too; see Gai. (9 ad ed. prov.) D. 13.6.18 pr.; see also

Ulp. (11 ad ed.) D. 4.4.11.5. Due to the lack of convincing arguments indicating a post-classical

interpolation, the classicity of the term „diligentissimus quisque“ has to be assumed; Knütel, ‘Haftung’,

pp. 421 seq.; Herbert Hausmaninger, Diligentia quam in suis: in Dieter Medicus/Hans H. Seiler

(eds.), Festschrift für Max Kaser zum 70. Geburtstag (München: C.H. Beck, 1976) 265-284, pp.

273 seq.; Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, p. 400.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

transportation of both goods, which are also fragile and quite valuable, requires the

cooperation of several people and their special knowledge.155

The last sentence of the fragment indicates a broad applicability of this liability regime

– idemque etiam ad ceteras res transferri potest. According to Gaius, the strict liability

for acts of others shall also be applicable regarding other things – ad ceteras res. This

statement by Gaius is, too, not without suspicion of being a post-classical

interpolation.156

In my opinion, an interpolation of this passage cannot be assumed

with certainty.157

However, if one argues that the last passage of the fragment is not

interpolated, I think that the generalisation has to be understood quite restrictively,

namely that the regime of strict vicarious liability in transportation contracts is not

applicable in every case but only regarding goods that are – due to their (replacement)

price, their fragility, their need of special diligence and assistance – similar to

columns, barrels, and beams.

Whereas the vicarious liability concept as mentioned in D. 19.2.25.7 seems

economically and socially plausible, there is a need for further considerations as to

the dogmatic explanation of Gaius’s decision, which constitutes a deviation from the

principle of personal responsibility. An explanation can possibly be found in the bona

fides-standard of the locatio conductio: when a conductor undertakes the

transportation of (valuable) goods, he commits himself to fulfil the task with

professional skill and an occurring damage that is based on his incapacity results in

the well-established imperitia-liability.158

In case that the conductor uses the help of

assistants because the transportation of a certain object – like a column – needs the

cooperation of several people, the conductor expands his range of operations.159

Simultaneously, there is an extended number of people who may potentially cause

damage to the object in performing the transport. Whereas the use of assistants is in

general not impermissible under a contract of transportation,160

the increased risk

ensuing from the involvement of several people to perform the contract can more

easily be calculated by the conductor than by the locator.161

Thus, it would not be

consistent with the principle of good faith to confine the locator to delictual claims

155

Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 420 seq.

156

Haymann, ‘Textkritische Studien’, p. 194.

157

See Knütel, ‘Haftung’, p. 421.

158

Rainer, ‘Bauvertrag’, p. 507.

159


160

Zimmermann, ‘Law of Obligations’, p. 397; Kaser, ‘Römisches Privatrecht I2

’, p. 571.

161



https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

against each carless assistant, considering that the locator probably does not have the

necessary insight into the transportation process. Actually, it would be quite

challenging to determine who of the assistants involved in a certain transportation

process was negligent.162

Eventually, the solvency of any assistant is questionable

especially with regard to the high (replacement) price of columns. A combination of

all these reasons was possibly the reason for Gaius to establish a strict form of

vicarious liability in the field of locatio conductio (operis).

Finally, it has to be re-examined whether the liability regime as stated in D. 19.2.25.7

could possibly be generalised to all forms of locatio conductio or even to other

Roman contracts, comparable with the general vicarious liability regime of § 1313a

ABGB stipulating that “[w]hoever is obliged to perform a [service] to someone else

is liable to him for fault of his legal representative a well as of persons who he employs

to deliver the performance [of the service] as for his own”163

.

In the late classical adage D. 50.17.149 the following is proclaimed: “Ex qua persona

quis lucrum capit, eius factum praestare debet“ – a person who profits from using

assistants shall be liable for their misconduct. This Ulpian fragment which –

according to Lenel164

– refers to the interdicta „Quorum bonorum“ and „Quod

legatorum“165

suggests the development of a strict vicarious liability in Roman contract

law. However, based on the preserved classical legal texts such a general concept of

strict vicarious liability most likely had not developed until the post-classical era of

Justinian in the sixth century AD.166

Conclusions

During the classical period, different concepts of contractual liability were established

with regard to the dynamic economic development in the field of locatio conductio.

Building on the concept of contractual noxal liability which was developed by the

162

Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio Conductio’, p. 29. 163

Eschig/Pircher-Eschig, ‘The Austrian Civil Code’, p. 313.

164

See Otto Lenel, ‘Palingenesia iuris civilis: iuris consultorum reliquiae quae Iustiniani digestis

continentur, ceteraque iuris prudentiae civilis fragmenta minora secundum auctores et libros’, vol. 2

(Lipsiae: Tauchnitz, 1889) p. 802 fn 7.

165

See Jörg Domisch, ‘Zur Frage eines Besitzübergangs auf den Erben im klassischen römischen

Recht’ (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015) p. 204; Philipp Lotmar, ‘Zur Geschichte des Interdictum

Quod legatorum’ (1910) 31 SZ 89-158, pp. 89 seqq.

166

See Knütel, ‘Haftung’, pp. 441 seqq.; Andreas Wacke, ‘Zur Aktiv- und Passivlegitimation des

gutgläubigen Sklavenbesitzers: Grenzen prozessualistischer Betrachtungsweise der römischen

Rechtsquellen’, in Heinz Hübner/Ernst Klingmüller/Andreas Wacke (eds.), Festschrift für Erwin

Seidl zum 70. Geburtstag (Köln: P. Hanstein, 1975) 179-219, p. 187.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Proculeian School, various regimes of unlimited contractual liability in locatio

conductio were introduced by Roman jurists.

For instance, the breach of a contract clause by a conductor/locator can lead to his

unlimited contractual liability, although a certain loss of his contracting party might

have been directly caused by a third party. Another established concept is culpa in

eligendo, the liability for negligent selection of a person to fulfil a certain (responsible)

task. A different but similar concept is referred to as culpa in habendo vel inducendo.

According to this liability model, a conductor is fully liable ex contractu for admitting

(especially) untrustworthy persons to the leasehold, who then cause damage to the

locator. Eventually, there is the concept of vicarious liability according to which a

conductor who committed himself to transport a column or certain other goods is

fully liable for damages caused by his assistants, regardless of his personal fault.

At first sight the examined liability cases in the field of locatio conductio indicate a

deviation from the described principle of personal responsibility. A closer look at

these various liability cases reveals quite a differentiated picture. On the one hand,

the fragments show that the demands on the (formerly strict) culpa-standard gradually

declined. On the other hand, the fragments by and large comply with the concept of

personal responsibility as – apart from cases of limited noxal liability and from the

singular case D. 19.2.25.7 – contractual liability still depends on personal fault,

although it might be a previous, strictly objectified, or implied form of culpa.


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Bibliography

6.1 Ancient sources

C. 4.65.1 D. 19.2.14 D. 19.2.60.7

C. 4.65.4 pr.-2 D. 12.7.2 D. 19.2.60.7

C. 4.65.19 D. 13.6.5.2 D. 19.2.60.9

C. 4.65.28 D. 13.6.18 pr. D. 19.2.9.4

Coll. 10.9.1 D. 16.3.1.10 D. 19.2.9.4

Coll. 12.7.9 D. 19.2.11 pr. D. 19.5.1.1

D. 4.4.11.5 D. 19.2.11.2 D. 39.1.1.16

D. 4.9.1 pr. D. 19.2.11.4 D. 39.1.5.5

D. 4.9.1.1 D. 19.2.12 D. 47.2.10

D. 4.9.3.1 D. 19.2.13.4 D. 47.2.12 pr.

D. 4.9.3.1 D. 19.2.13.5 D. 47.2.14.12

D. 4.9.5 pr. D. 19.2.2 pr. D. 47.2.48.4

D. 4.9.5 pr. D. 19.2.24 pr. D. 47.2.91 pr.

D. 4.9.5.1 D. 19.2.25.7 D. 47.5.1.4

D. 9.1.2 pr. D. 19.2.25.8 D. 50.17.23

D. 9.2.27.11 D. 19.2.3 D. 50.17.149

D. 9.2.27.11. D. 19.2.45 pr. Gai. Inst. 3.205‑206

D. 9.2.27.34 D. 19.2.55 pr. Gai. Inst. 4.62

D. 9.2.27.9 D. 19.2.60.2 Inst. 4.6.28

D. 9.4.21 D. 19.2.60.6 Vitr. (de arch.) 10.2.11

6.2 Literature

Robert Alexy, ‘Rechtsregeln und Rechtsprinzipien’, in Robert Alexy et al. (eds.),

Elemente einer juristischen Begründungslehre (Baden: Nomos, 2003) 217-233


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

José L. Alonso, ‘Fault, strict liability and risk in the law of the papyry’, in Jakub

Urbanik (ed.), Culpa: Facets of Liability in Ancient Legal Theory and Practice

(Warsaw: The Raphael Taubenschlag Foundation, 2012) 19-81

Alexander Beck, ‘Zu den Grundprinzipien der bona fides im römischen

Vertragsrecht’, in Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel (ed.), Aequitas und bona

fides: Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von August Simonius (Basel: Helbing &

Lichtenhahn, 1955)

Okko Behrends, ‘Institutionelles und prinzipielles Denken im römischen

Privatrecht’ (1978) 95 SZ 187-231

Okko Behrends, ‘Wie haben wir uns die römischen Juristen vorzustellen?’ (2011)

128 SZ 83-129

Nikolaus Benke, ‘Zum Eigentumserwerb des Unternehmers bei der "locatio

conductio irregularis"’ (1987) 104 SZ 156-237

Hans-Peter Benöhr, ‘Zur Haftung für Sklavendelikte’ (1980) 97 SZ 273-287

Adolf Berger, ‘Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law’ (Philadelphia: American

Philosophical Society, 1953: reprint 1991)

Richard Böhr, ‘Das Verbot der eigenmächtigen Besitzumwandlung im römischen

Privatrecht: Ein Beitrag zur rechtshistorischen Spruchregelforschung’ (München:

Saur, 2002)

Carlo A. Cannata, ‘Richerche sulla responsabilità contrattuale nel diritto romano’

(Milano: Giuffrè, 1966)

Carlo A. Cannata, ‘Sul Problema della Responsabilità nel Diritto Privato Romano’

(Catania: Libr. Ed. Torre, 1996)

Riccardo Cardilli, ‘L'obbligazione di "praestare" e la responsabilità contrattuale in

diritto romano’ (Milano: Giuffrè, 1995)

Emilio Costa, ‘La locazione di cose nel diritto romano’ (Torino: Bocca, 1915)

Jörg Domisch, ‘Zur Frage eines Besitzübergangs auf den Erben im klassischen

römischen Recht’ (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015)

Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘Between Theory and Practice: New Perspectives on the Roman

law of Letting and Hiring’ (2006) 65 CLJ 423-437

Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘Letting and Hiring in Roman Legal Thought: 27 BCE – 284 CE’

(Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2012)


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘Liability and locatio conductio’, in Roberto Fiori (ed.), Modelli

teorici e metodologici nella storia del diritto private, vol. IV (Napoli: Jovene, 2011)

Paul J. Du Plessis, ‘The Roman Concept of lex contractus’ (2006) 3 RLT 79-94

Ronald M. Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 University of Chicago Law

Review 14-46

Wolfgang Ernst, ‘Das Nutzungsrisiko bei der Pacht’ (1988) 105 SZ 541-591

Peter Eschig/Erika Pircher-Eschig, Das österreichische ABGB – The Austrian Civil

Code (Wien: LexisNexis-Verl. ARD Orac, 2013)

Thomas Finkenauer, ‘Vererblichkeit und Drittwirkungen der Stipulation im

klassischen römischen Recht’ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010)

Roberto Fiori, ‘La definizione della ‚locatio conductio’: Giurisprudenza romana e

tradizione romanistica’ (Napoli: Jovene, 1999)

Dieter Flach, ‘Das Zwölftafelgesetz – Leges XII tabularum’ (Darmstadt: Wiss.

Buchges., 2004)

Bruce W. Frier, ‘Landlords and tenants in imperial Rome’ (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1980)

Bruce W. Frier, ‘Tenant’s liability for damage to landlord’s property in classical

Roman law’ (1978) 95 SZ 232-269

Richard Gamauf, ‘De nihilo crevit – Freigelassenenmentalität und Pekuliarrecht:

Einige Überlegungen zur Entstehung von Sklavenpekulien’; in Ulrike

Babusiaux/Peter Nobel/Johannes Platschek (eds.), Der Bürge einst und jetzt:

Festschrift für Alfons Bürge (Zürich – Basel – Genf: Schulthess, 2017) 225-253)

Richard Gamauf, ‘Slaves Doing Business: The Role of Roman Law in the Economy

of a Roman Household’ (2009) 16:3 European Review of History 331-346

Richard Gamauf, ‘Vindicatio Nummorum: Eine Untersuchung zur Reichweite und

praktischen Durchführung des Eigentumsschutzes an Geld im Klassischen

Römischen Recht’ (Habilitationsschrift: Universität Wien, 2001)

Tomasz Giaro, ‘Über methodologische Werkmittel der Romanistik’ (1988) 105 SZ

180-262

Peter Gröschler, ‘Considerazioni sulla funzione della responsabilità nossale in diritto

romano’, in Carmela R. Ruggeri (ed.), Studi in onore di Antonino Metro, vol. 3

(Milano: A. Giuffrè, 2010) 195-222


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Nadi Günal, ‘An example of consensual contracts: Locatio Conductio Rei’ (2004) 1:2

Ankara Law Review 201-211

Axel Hägerström, ‘Über den Grund der bindenden Kraft des Konsensualkontraktes

nach römischer Rechtsanschauung’ (1945) 63 SZ 268-300

Gábor Hamza, ‘Die Entwicklung des Privatrechts und die römischrechtliche

Tradition in den österreichischen Erbländern /Erblanden/ und in Österreich’ (2009)

13 AFDUDC 321-334

Herbert Hausmaninger, ‘Diligentia quam in suis’, in Dieter Medicus/Hans H. Seiler

(eds.), Festschrift für Max Kaser zum 70. Geburtstag (München: C.H. Beck, 1976)

265-284

Herbert Hausmaninger, ‘Roman Tort Law in the Austrian Civil Code of 1811’, in

Herbert Hausmaninger et al. (eds.), Developments in Austrian and Israeli Private

Law (Wien – New York: Springer, 1999) 113-135

Herbert Hausmaninger, ’The Third Partial Amendment and Austrian Tort Law’, in

Herbert Hausmaninger et al. (eds.), Developments in Austrian and Israeli Private

Law (Wien – New York: Springer, 1999) 137-157

Franz Haymann, ‘Textkritische Studien zum römischen Obligationenrecht’ (1919)

40 SZ 167-350

Hermann G. Heumann/Emil Seckel, ‘Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen

Rechts’, 11th edn. (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verl.-Anst., 1971)

Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Custodia-Haftung des Sachmieters untersucht an

Alf./Paul. D. 19,2,30,2.’ (1969) 86 SZ 394-403

Heinrich Honsell, ‘Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen’, in Andrea Büchler/Markus

Müller-Chen (eds.), Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60. Geburtstag (Bern:

Stämpfli, 2011) 779-789

Franz Horak, ‘Dogma und Dogmatik: Zur Genese und Entwicklung eines Begriffs in

der Wissenschaftsgeschichte’ (1984) 101 SZ 275-293

Franz Horak, ‘Wer waren die Veteres? Zur Terminologie der klassischen römischen

Juristen’, in Georg Klingenberg/Michael J. Rainer/Herweig Stiegler (eds.), Vestigia

iuris Romani: Festschrift für Gunter Wesener zum 60. Geburtstag am 3. Juni 1992

(Graz: Leykam, 1992) 201-236

Klaus-Peter Johne/Jens Köhn/Volker Weber, ‘Die Kolonen in Italien und den

westlichen Provinzen des Römischen Reiches: Eine Untersuchung der literarischen,


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

juristischen und epigraphischen Quellen vom 2. Jahrhundert v.u.Z. bis zu den

Severern’ (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1983)

Wolfgang Kaiser, ‘Justinian’, in David Johnston (ed.), The Cambridge Companion

to Roman Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)

Max Kaser, ‘Das römische Privatrecht I: Das altrömische, das vorklassische und

klassische Recht’, 2nd edn. (München: C.H. Beck, 1971)

Max Kaser, ‘Ein Jahrhundert Interpolationenforschung an den römischen

Rechtsquellen’, in Max Kaser (ed.), Römische Rechtsquellen und angewandte

Juristenmethode (Wien – Graz: Böhlau, 1986) 112-154

Max Kaser, ‘Zur Methode der römischen Rechtsfindung’, 2nd edn. (Göttingen:

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969)

Horst Kaufmann, ‘Die altrömische Miete: ihre Zusammenhänge mit Gesellschaft,

Wirtschaft und staatlicher Vermögensverwaltung Altrömische Miete’ (Köln – Graz:

Böhlau, 1964)

Philipp Klausberger, ‘Objektive und subjektive Zurechnungsgrunde im klassischen

ro mischen Haftungsrecht’ (Habilitationsschrift: Universität Wien, 2019)

Rolf Knütel, ‘Die Haftung für Hilfspersonen im römischen Recht’ (1983) 100 SZ

340-443

Pokécz Kovács, ’Quelques observations sur la division de la locatio-conductio’, in

Gábor Hamza et al. (eds.), Iura antiqua – iura moderna: Festschrift für Ferenc

Benedek zum 75. Geburtstag (Pécs: Dialog Campus Kiadó, 2001)

Paul Kretschmar, ‘Kritik der Interpolationenkritik’ (1939) 59 SZ 102-218

Wolfgang Kunkel, ‘Römische Rechtsgeschichte’, 2nd edn. (Graz – Wien – Köln:

Böhlau, 1967)

Tessa G. Leesen, ‘Gaius meets Cicero: law and rhetoric in the school controversies’

(Leiden – Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010)

Otto Lenel, ‘Das Edictum Perpetuum: Ein Versuch zu seiner Wiederherstellung’,

3rd edn. (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1927)

Otto Lenel, ‘Die Formeln der actiones noxales’ (1927) 47 SZ 1-28

Otto Lenel, ‘Palingenesia iuris civilis: iuris consultorum reliquiae quae Iustiniani

digestis continentur, ceteraque iuris prudentiae civilis fragmenta minora secundum

auctores et libros’, vol. 1 (Lipsiae: Tauchnitz, 1889)


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Otto Lenel, ‘Palingenesia iuris civilis: iuris consultorum reliquiae quae Iustiniani

digestis continentur, ceteraque iuris prudentiae civilis fragmenta minora secundum

auctores et libros’, vol. 2 (Lipsiae: Tauchnitz, 1889)

A.D.E. Lewis, ‘The trichotomy in locatio conductio’ (1973) 8 Irish Jurist 164-177

Detlef Liebs, ‘Hofjuristen der römischen Kaiser bis Justinian’ (München: Verl. d.

Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., 2010)

Philipp Lotmar, ‘Zur Geschichte des Interdictum Quod legatorum’ (1910) 31 SZ 89-

158

Ulrich von Lübtow, ‘Untersuchungen zur lex Aquilia de damno iniuria dato’ (Berlin:

Duncker & Humblot, 1971)

Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Culpa in eligendo’ (1971) 18 RIDA 525-551

Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Custodia and Culpa’ (1972) 89 SZ 149-219

Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Dolus, Culpa, Custodia, Diligentia’ (1994) 22 Index

189-209

Dario Mantovani, ‘Le formule del processo privato romano’, 2nd edn. (Padova:

Cedam, 1999)

Theo Mayer-Maly, ‘Locatio conductio: eine Untersuchung zum klassischen

römischen Recht’ (Wien – München: Herold, 1956)

Ulrich Manthe, ‘Geschichte des römischen Rechts’, 4th edn. (München: C.H. Beck,

2011)

Susan D. Martin, ‘Imperitia: The Responsibility of Skilled Workers in Classical

Roman Law’ (2001) 122 AJP 107-129

Susan D. Martin, ‘The Roman Jurists and the Organization of Private Building in the

Late Republic and Early Empire’ (Bruxelles: Latomus: Revue D'Études Latines,

1989)

Franz-Stefan Meissel, ‘Dolus’, in Hubert Cancik/Helmuth Schneider (eds.), Der

Neue Pauly (Stuttgart – Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 1997)

Franz-Stefan Meissel, ‘Zur Haftung fur Furtum beim ro mischen Leihevertrag:

Diebstahlsverfolgung und Drittschadensproblem’ (1993) 94:4 JAP 212-218

Antonino Metro, ‘L’obbligazione di custodire nel diritto romano’ (Milano: Giuffrè,

1966)

Apollonia J. M. Meyer-Termeer, ‘Die Haftung der Schiffer’ (Zutphen: Terra Publ.,

1978)


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Imre Molnár, ‘Verantwortung und Gefahrtragung bei der locatio conductio zur Zeit

des Prinzipats’, in Hildegard Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der

römischen Welt II: Principat Principat, vol. XIV (Berlin: New York, 1982) 583-681

Carsten H. Müller, ‘Gefahrtragung bei der locatio conductio: Miete, Pacht, Dienst-

und Werkvertrag im Kommentar römischer Juristen’ (Paderborn – München:

Schöningh, 2002)

Pieter W. Neeve, ‘Colonus: private farm-tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic

and the early Principate’ (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1984)

Dieter Nörr, ‘Causa mortis: Auf den Spuren einer Redewendung’ (München: Beck,

1986)

Dieter Nörr, ‘Exempla nihil per se valent’ (2009) 126 SZ 1-54

Dieter Nörr, ‘Spruchregel und Generalisierung’ (1972) 89 SZ 18-93

Eva Ondreasova, ‘Die Gehilfenhaftung: eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zum

österreichischen Recht mit Vorschlägen zur Reform’ (Wien: Manz, 2013)

Johannes Platschek, ‘Nochmals zum "Paradigmenwechsel" in der römischen

Jurisprudenz’ (2010) 38 Index 401-406

Martin Pennitz, ‘§ 107. Die Noxalhaftung’, in Ulrike Babusiaux et. al. (eds.),

Handbuch des Römischen Privatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming)

Martin Pennitz, ‘Obligatio domini und Obligatio servi’, in Jan D. Harke (ed.),

Drittbeteiligung am Schuldverhältnis: Studien Zur Geschichte und Dogmatik des

Privatrechts (Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, 2010)

Michael Potacs, ‘Rechtstheorie’, 2nd edn. (Wien: facultas, 2019)

Michael J. Rainer, ‘Bau- und nachbarrechtliche Bestimmungen im klassischen

römischen Recht’ (Graz: Leykam, 1987)

Michael J. Rainer, ‘Zur locatio conductio: Der Bauvertrag’ (1992) 108 SZ 505-525

Rudolf Reischauer, ‘§ 1313 ABGB’, in Peter Rummel (ed.) Kommentar zum

Allgemeinen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 3rd edn., (by 1.1.2004, rdb.at)

René Robaye, ‘L’obligation de garde: essai sur la responsabilite contractuelle en droit

Romain’ (Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1987)

Joachim Rosenthal, ‘Custodia und Aktivlegitimation zur Actio furti’ (1951) 68 SZ

217-265

Richard P. Saller, ‘Patria potestas and the stereotype of the Roman family’ (1986)

1 Continuity and Change 7-22


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Martin J. Schermaier, ‘Bona fides im römischen Vertragsrecht’, in Luigi Garofalo et

al. (eds.), Il ruolo della buona fede oggettiva nell' esperienza giuridica storica e

contemporanea: Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi in onore di Alberto

Burdese, vol. III (Padova: CEDAM, 2003)

Sandro Schipani, ‘Responsabilità "ex lege Aquilia". Criteri di imputazione e problema

della "culpa"’ (Torino: Giappichelli, 1969)

Bruno Schmidlin, ‘Die römischen Rechtsregeln: Versuch einer Typologie’ (Köln –

Wien: Böhlau, 1970)

Helmuth Schneider, ‘Rom von den Anfängen bis zum Ende der Republik (6. Jh. bis

30 v. Chr.)’, in Hans-Joachim Gehrke/Helmuth Schneider (eds.) Geschichte der

Antike: Ein Studienbuch, edn. 5 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2013) 277-352

Fritz Schulz, ‘Die Haftung für das Verschulden der Angestellten’ (1911) 38

GrünhutsZ 9-54

Fritz Schulz, ‘Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft’ (Weimar: Böhlau,

1961)

Hermann Seiler, ‘Die deliktische Gehilfenhaftung in historischer Sicht’ (1967) 22 JZ

525-529

Philipp R. Springer, ‘Die Wurzeln der werkvertraglichen Gefahrtragung im

römischen Bauvertragsrecht’ (Dissertation: Universität Wien, 2017)

J.A.C. Thomas, ‘Actiones Ex Locato/Conducto and Aquilian Liability’ (1978) 20

Acta Juridica 127-134

Armando J. Torrent Ruiz, ‘La Polemica sobre la tricotomia ‚res’, ‚operae’, ‚opus’ y

los origines de la Locatio-Conductio’ (2011) 4 TSDP 1-51

David Tritremmel, ‘Culpa in eligendo et culpa in habendo bei der locatio conductio

rei’, in Esther Ayasch/Jaqueline Bemmer/David Tritremmel (eds.), Wiener

Schriften: Neue Perspektiven aus der jungen Romanistik (Wien: Manz, 2018) 191-

214

David Tritremmel, ‘Die Haftung für das Verhalten anderer Personen bei der locatio

conductio’ (Dissertation: Universität Wien, 2020)

Tobias Tröger, ‘Arbeitsteilung und Vertrag: Verantwortlichkeit für das Fehlverhalten

Dritter in Vertragsbeziehungen’ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012)

G.C.J.J. Van den Bergh, ‘Custodiam Praestare: Custodia-Liability or Liability for

Failing Custodia?’ (1975) 43 TR 59-72


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Pasquale Voci, ‘Diligentia, custodia, culpa: I dati fondamentali’ (1990) 56 SDHI 29-

143

Heinrich Vogt, ‘Die sogenannten Rechtsschulen der Proculianer und der

Sabinianer’, in Dieter Nörr/Dieter Simon (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang

Kunkel (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984) 515-521

Andreas Wacke, ‘Die adjektizischen Klagen im Uberblick. Erster Teil: Von der

Reeder- und der Betriebsleiterklage zur direkten Stellvertretung’ (1994) 111 SZ 280-

362

Andreas Wacke, ‘Peculium non ademptum videtur tacite donatum: Zum Schicksal

des Sonderguts nach der Gewaltentlassung’ (1991) 42 Iura 43-95

Andreas Wacke, ‘Zur Aktiv- und Passivlegitimation des gutgläubigen

Sklavenbesitzers: Grenzen prozessualistischer Betrachtungsweise der römischen

Rechtsquellen’, in Heinz Hübner/Ernst Klingmüller/Andreas Wacke (eds.),

Festschrift für Erwin Seidl zum 70. Geburtstag (Köln: P. Hanstein, 1975) 179-219

Andreas Wacke, ‘Zur Beweislast im klassischen Zivilprozeß: Giovanni Pugliese

versus Ernst Levy’ (1992) 109 SZ 411-449

Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. I (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2009)

Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. II (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2009)

Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. III (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 2009)

Alan Watson, ‘The Digest of Justinian’, 2nd edn., vol. IV (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 2009)

Hartmut Wicke, ‘Respondeat Superior: Haftung für Verrichtungsgehilfen im

römischen, römisch-holländischen, englischen und südafrikanischen Recht’ (Berlin:

Duncker und Humblot, 2000)

Franz Wieacker, ‘Vom römischen Recht: zehn Versuche’, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart:

Koehler, 1961)

Franz Wieacker, ‘Zur Technik der Kompilatoren: Prämissen und Hypothesen’

(1972) 89 SZ 293-323

Reinhard Willvonseder, ‘Die Verwendung der Denkfigur der „condicio sine qua

non“ bei den Römischen Juristen’ (Wien – Graz: Böhlau, 1984)


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124



128.

Bernhard Windscheid, ‘Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts’, 6th edn., vol. II (Frankfurt

am Main: Rütten & Loening, 1887)

Laurens C. Winkel, ‘The Role of General Principles in Roman Law’ (1996) 2

Fundamina 103-120

Paul F. von Wyss, ‘Haftung für fremde culpa’ (Zürich: Schultheß, 1867)

Franz von Zeiller, ‘Commentar über das allgemeine bürgerliche Gesetzbuch’, vol.

III/2 (Wien: Geistinger, 1813)

Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the

Civilian Tradition’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990: reprint 1996)


https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

https://doi.org/10.25365/vlr-2020-4-2-124

Vicarious Liability in Roman locatio conductio?1

Documents

Transcript of Vicarious Liability in Roman locatio conductio?1