JOURNAL OF INDIANPHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Volume 15 October 2010

Society forIndian Philosophy and Religion .

Vasubandhu on Truth andSubjectivityl

Eviatar Shulman

A defining feature of a substantial portion of Indianphifosophical thought ls the importance attributed tosubjectivity, or the mind, or the Self, in understandingthe nature of reality. A basic metaphysical stance ofIndian thought could thus be defined as: "subjectivity isessential to reafity", or maybe better "Reafity mustrelate to consctousness.r" This understanding - and I amconcerned here mainly with its metaphysical orontological aspects - has important consequences forwhat could be understood as a healthy human attitudeto life, that is, both to one's own life and to the Jives ofothers.

What I wish to achieve in this short paper is apresentation of what I believe to be one of the primaryarguments in support of this position. This argument isdeveloped in the Vif!1satikä (V), "The Twenty," wrtttenby the Buddhist sage Vasubandhu, probably in the late4th or early 5th century A.D. Although the V has receivedmuch scholarly attention, and some of its arguments arevery well-known, I believe that the point underdiscussion has yet to be appreciated.

It should be noted that although the idea of truthbeing ingrained in selfhood has very deep roots in Indianphilosophv, it took rnanv years before tradition feit theneed to provide arguments for what was first acceptedeither intuitively or due to the authority of the primordial

".»

)-,'(

EVIATAR SHULMAN 45

"seers" (the ('$is). The moment I believe such argumentswere beginning to become important was during the firstfew centuries of the Common Era, when BuddhistMahäyäna thinkers were redefining their tradition'sontological vision. These early Mahäyänists werebuilding on the fundamental Buddhist insight ofimpermanence and change, which, as they saw it,characterizes any form of human experience, as welf asany object of experience. These creative Buddhistphilosophers were now wondering what degree of realityit is reasonable to attribute to things which aretransient, ephemeral, inconsistent, and in Buddhistterms "like a ball of foam," or "fike a bubble in thestrearn.'? The tendency was now to view suchinsubstantial experiences or objects as being similar toillusions or drearns."

It may be true that these early Mahäyäna insightswere originally motivated by a sense of awe regardingthe striking force of meditation. Meditation gives theardent practitioner the ability to transform both himselfand reality. Putting aside the magical abilities attributedto powerful yogis (reports which may possibly be moreserious than our metaphysical inclinations allow us tobelleve"), Buddhist meditators were now quite convincedthat by the power of the mind, more specifically by thepower of the imagination, one can become a Buddha."This means that what the human organism, which theBuddhist normafly views as a painful, limited and quitedisgusting mass of f1esh (the body), accompanled by aconfused, obscured and over-excited mental apparatus(the mind), can, by the power of certain types of mentalconcentration, become a bright, shining, and blissfulperfection. Indeed, they betleved, one mav become aBuddha. -,

The insights developed by these Mahäyänameditators or thinkers were now beginning to beattributed to the Buddha himself, most importantly in"The Discourses on the Perfection of Wisdom" (the genreof the prajiiä-päramitä-sutras). These texts taught thatreafity was ernptv, that it lacks any true, objective,

46 JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND RI;UGION

substantial state of existence. They revealed that theworld is like a phantom, devoid of any definable andreliable nature. Following the authority of these texts,the great philosopher Nagarjuna supplied a structuredlogical explication of their teaching. Nägärjuna's talentlies in his ability to turn the visions of these earlyMahayana texts into a coherent phllosophlcal system.

N3garjuna Is not our subject here, but it is imperativeto understand his main point in order to make sense ofVasubandhu. The acme of Nägarjuna's work ts oftenunderstood to be verse 24.18 of his Müla-madhyamaka-kärikä.7 Although I do not believe this is the verse bestsuited to represent Nägärjuna's thought,s it will providethe ability to achieve a short summary of his thlnking:

It Is dependent-orlglnatlonWeproclalmto be emptlness.She (emptlness)Is adependent act of knowh~dgeAnd that Itself Is the mlddleway.

ya~ pratitya-samutp5da~ sünyat5f!1 t5f!1precsksmehe /55 prajflaptlr up5d5ya pratJpat salva madhyam511

Nagarjuna wishes to portray amiddie way betweenexistence and ncn-exlstence.? Complete non-existencecannot be the truth," but neither can extstence." Thefact that everything that is exists in dependence, that itis caused and conditioned by numerous, posslbly endlessother phenomena (pratltya-samutpäda), means that it isempty (sünyatä), that it has no true nature of its own.Possessing no true nature it ls unreal, like a phantom oran iIIusion.12 Thus, nothing dependent - and everythingis dependent - can be. understood to be real.13 It is,indeed, empty. This emptiness too is only the fact thatwe still actively know things (prajfiaptir upädaya), eventhough they _are not there in any substantial sense.Thus, things are not "out there" of their own, and theirso called existence depends on an act of knowledge. Thetruth, if the concept of truth can be retalned at all, is not

EVIATAR SHULMAN 47

)

only mental, but it is not objective either. This, forNagarjuna, is the middle way. . _ . ,

summary in order to come to terms wtth Nagal1una svision of emptiness, and there are, of course, ma~yquestion left unanswered regarding his ideas. ~ISthought, as weil as the historical development whl~hlead to lt, has only been introduced here so that we Willbetter understand how in the opening verse of theViI?1satikäVasubandhu can quite casually say that

Thls ("reality'') ls only-a-mental-constructlon,becauseof the appearanceof unreal things. It IsIIke the seelng of nets of halr by peoplesufferlngtrom eye-Impairments.

+

vijflapti-mätram evedam asad-arthävabhäsanät 1yed-vet taimJrikasyäsat-kesoIJ9ukädi-darSanaf!11114

f:

When Emptiness is the accepted truth, one can treatappearances as unreal. Vasubandhu translate~ th~Sunderstanding into the statement that everythmg IS"only-a-mental-construction," "mere eplsodes ofknowledge," or "but a perceptual presentation" (vijfiap.ti-mätra).lS When experience of an unreal, tnsubstanttatand empty world still takes place, Vasubandhu con.du~esthat all that appears ls a form of subiectlvepresentation. This statement resonates with the openingverse of the Madhyänta-vibhaga (MAV, "Thedifferentiation between the middle and the extremes")":

ThereIs unreal-ImaginationIn it there Is no dualltyBut emptlnessis thereAnd In It (emptlness), too, it (unreal-Imagination)ls found

abhüta-parJkalpo 'sti äveyem tetre na vidyate /sünyat5 vtäyete tv atra tasyäm apl sa vidyate 1

Ii

"..

This weil known verse constitutes a formatlonal impulsein the Buddhist conception of non-duality. In his

48 JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSO!1HY AND REUGION

com~~ntary to the verse, Vasubandhu explains that theduah~lc form .of experience, in which the stream ofconsaousness IS differentiated (vikalpa) into perceiver(g'"!haka) and. perceived (gr5hya), or subject ando~)ect, IS. a. rnlstaken form of cognition. Duality lsmlsta.ken, tt IS empty, but it nonetheless appears. Thusempt~ness ~nd unreal-imagination exist in each othe/Emptmess IS no mo:e than the truth regarding whatnatu~ally appears. Mistaken cognition and the truth ofemptmess naturally abide together and pervade eachotherY

Wha~is crucial a~out MAV 1.1 is that it allows for notru~ exlstence of elther subjectivity or objectivity. Thesubject and the object are dependent on each other to a~egr~e ~hat they cancel each other out. There is no"su?Je~ that can perceive an "object," and there is noobiect to be perceived apart from a "subject" since

both forms demand each other. All that is exists 'in factIn .some v."eryfi~e sphere between the subject 'and th~object. Thls too I~ only a metaphorical space, since thereare no true subject and object in the first place. Thusforms of expenence are "nelther empty nor non-empty "as the ~~ verse. will daim." Setter said, all is VijiiaPti-mstre, mer; eplsod~s ~f knowing" or "only-a-mental-co.nstructlon. The polnt 15 not that all is mind, but thatrnlnd and reality necessarily collapse Into each other.

For the MAV, there is no true subject, in precisely thesame ~easure that there 15 no object. Thereis no axism,,!n~1In ~he spheres of either subjectivity or objectivity.Thls idea 15expressed vividly in verse 6:

Dependlng on perceptlonNon-perceptlon 15genetatedDependlng on non-perceptionNon-perception 15generated

upalabdhirn samäsritya nopalabdhil} prajäyate /nopelebdbtm samäSritya nopalabdhil} prajäyate //

EVIATAR SHULMAN49

Vasubandhu explains:Dependlng on the perception of v~fiap.ti-matra,non-perception of things (artha) 9 15 born.Dependlng on the non-perception of things.' non-perception of vljfiaptJ-matra ls born. Thls 15 ~o~one comes to understand the unreal characten5tlcof subject and object.2o

Different aspects of this passage can be debated, butone point must remain certain: there is no level ?funderstanding that this system accepts as true. There 15no more truth in subjectivity than in objectivity,21 andthus the characterization of experience as vijiiapti-matrats only a way to say that truth is situated somewherebetween the subject and the object. Truth is notobjective, and cannot be divorced trorn s~bj~ivity.

When everything ls empty, and there IS no truesubject in exactly the sarne manner as there is noobject, we must ask why is it that vastub~nd~ says th~teverything is "only-a mental-constructIOn. "w.~J I~subjectivity privileged, and the system called vljnaptl-mätratä," the fact that everything is vijfiapti-mätra?Emptiness, we may argue, must relate equally to themind as weil 5 to reality.

Vasubandhu'S response to such a question would bemainly pragmatic: The. first-person perspective 15 agiven. It is true that for Vasubandhu there is no Self, notrue "I " no stmen and that any real subject is denied.At the' same time, the fact Is that experience takesplace, and that the suspension of duality does ~ot leaveus in a complete void: an acnve form of expenence, orof kncwledge, in which there are no true subjects orobjects. still remains. This is precisely the point ~adewhen It was said that unreal imagination and empttnessco-exist. Without attributing any ultimate trutn tosubjectivity, it remains the inevitable reality of our lives.In a sense subjeetivity ts truth, albeit in a differentsense than' our normal usage of these terms utilizes.Terms such as "subjectivity," "truth," "knowledge,"and"the mind" may need to be defined anew in relation to

EVIATAR SHULMAN 51

50 JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND REUGIONfrom the system. Without objectivity, we are then lettwith vijifapti-mätra. Again, in the V tne claim is ofontological purport.

Vasubandhu has thus stated in V 1 that "this is only-a_mental-construction." In the next verse he introducesa counter-argument that wishes to retain the notion ofobjectivity. V 2 states that neither personalities andcommonalities of experience, nor the regularities ofspace and time, nor cause and effect, can be accountedfor by the theorv that knowledge does not rely on theperception of objective things.30 Reality as we know it,the opponent argues, must contain arthä.

Vasubandhu responds that believing objects to beexternal does not help us to come to terms with theseproblems, adducing the example of the dream. In adream there are still space and time, cause and effect,and regularities of personal experience. The aspects ofreality/experience polnted to by the opponent can beexplained also without the appeal to objects.

The analogy of the dream shows that there is nounbiased, impersonal objective truth that can prove thereality of waking perception. We can never surely knowreality exists objectivelY, since it always appears to asubject. This is an important point, and it prepares theground for Vasubandhu's stronger statement that if wenever know an objective reality, we are best to stopbelieving it exists (discussed below). sut the crux ofVasubandhu'S response to his opponent goes far beyondthe example of the dream.31 His vision is articulated withthe help of an analogy taken from the depths of theBuddhist imagination: Vasubandhu now says that allhell-beings see rivers of pus, excrement and blood,although they are not really there. How does he knowthey are not there? Because hell doesn't rnake sense.Why not? Because of the hell guardians-either they arehell-beings, or they are not. If they are not-why arethey there? If they are hell-belngs-why are theyguardians and not regular hell-beings?

Of course, we have an easyanswer to this question-it is because the hell-guardians have done different

Va~uband.hu'sthouqht. At the same time, on the level ofPhlloso~hlcal,discourse, the point can still be made thatthe object IS never divorced from the mental andtherefore that all is vijifapti-mätra. '

The ,:"ad~Yänta-vibhäga-bhä$Ya's position needn'tnecessanly mvolve ontology. It can dearly beunderstood a~ ~aking ontv an epistemological,22phenomenol.oglcal, or psychological polnt." But the~on.-ontologlcal reading of Vasubandhu cannot be upheldm light of th~ Vi!J7~atikä.2sHere we must accept thatva~ub~ndhu IS makmg an ontological point. What thispoint IS must be carefully defined, since the VimSat'k-~t02~Snot make the .idealistic claims so often attributed' t~I.

, Va~ubandhus's statement in V 1 is radical, and it istntensiüed by the daim he makes as he introduces theverse that he is explaining the farnoussaytnq attributedto ,the Buddha that ~\.thethree worlds ... are only mind"(citta-m~trafT! ~ho j1na-putra yad uta trai-dhätukam).But the idealisttc overtones of this statement should .betaken ~ery carefully. Some of the probrems revolvearound issues of translation, while others are clarified bya close reading of the rest of the text. Already at theend of the short introductory paragraph Vasubandhu~pla!nS ~hat what is meant by the world "only" in "onlyml~d (Cltta-mätra) is a negation of artha, "a thing,'t27w~JC~for Vasubandhu means something Iike "a trulyextstinq and objecti~e thing." Artha, like vastu, is a termused to de~ote a thing or an objeet, and it carries with ita connotancn o~ objeetivity. These terms are used torefer t~ somethlnq that is simply there, the objeet ofpe~c~ptlon. In 2~ realistic system, or the pre-refleetiveeXlsting. thl~g. It is against such a notion of a thing~hat ~Ists mdependently of the mind that VasubandhuISargumg.:9

The main objective of the Vi!J7satikäis to show thatthe conc.ept of. artha is superf1uous, even problematic,wh~n utlllzed In order to explain reality. Rather, the~otJon of, artha, of the objective thing, createstncoherencies that are solved only by fully discarding it

JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

deeds, because the quality of th . .potential, is distinct from that ~I~~ctlons, their karmicWhat's the problem, we ask? 0 e other hell-beings.

52

Vasubandhu responds:If It ls accepted that (appearancejblrth th ( thelr) exlstence /actlons th ere In hell) Is due to thelr

, en why ls a t &

consdousnessnot accept d ransformation ofe as weil?

yad/ tat-karmabhis tatra bh - -Isyate par/(1amas ca ktm 1{~fnalJ1 sembnsves tathä /

'I' v~, nasya ne~yate//

. If, .as we wish to argue it i . .glve nse to birth in hell ' I IS the d~stlnct actions thatset of actions generat~ wae~ust ad.mlt that each uniqueof the being born in hell ~nge In the consciousnessaccept that it is in fact a h erefore, why will we notis at stake, rather than th~ an~e of consciousness whichexternal reality? extstence of some objective,

Vasubandhu then drives his .The reslduesof POint home: .oneplace the ~I~IO?S are understoodto be Inwhat rea;on Is It n~~a~hea:on) In another.ForIn the very sameplaceacetPh that (the frult Is)s e reslduesare?

karmano väsanänyatr. h ltatra/va nesyate yatra<1p_ a a~kanyatra kalpyate /. vasana /fJ7 nu kara(1afJ7//

We, Vasubandhu now adactions, of subjective ente v~nces against us, speak ofto . take different rebirths~i~n~~, as what bring belngsbemgs or as hell guardians B t ~~ case as regular hello~~he actions to exist in s~m u . en we want the result .~Ivlded from the individu I ; obiectlve sphere which isI~elegant theorv. A much ':n'o or Va:uba~dhu, this is anview the actions and th rf parsrrnoruous view wouldthe same place. e resu ts taking place in one and

~eachnically, Vasubandh' .resldues, or the imprints o~ '~' wondenng where thea Ion are placed, Clearly

EVIATAR SHULMAN53

they exist in the mental, in some form of consciousnessrather than in the physical world. Therefore, he savs, itmakes best sense that the result of the action, the phala("fruit"), will be situated in consciousness as weil, or atleast that it not be seen as an objective form ofexistence divorced from the mind. If me cause issubjective, it cannot be turned into an objective effect,since there is no way to bridge the gap between thesetwo inherently differentiated spheres of being.

32

Vasubandhu'S analogy of the hell-guardians is deeplycouched in the Buddhist metaphysics of karma. lt wouldbe helpful to disentangle his position frorn the Buddhistimagination in which it has taken form. Experience,Vasubandhu ls now saying in the 21

stcentury, ls always

involved with subjectiVity. There is never anything thatdoesn't appear to amind, which is detached from theway it is apprehended. Therefore, it is objectivity whichdemands proof and which must be explained. ForVasubandhu, following in the footsteps of Nägärjuna, itmakes more sense to say that reality is necessarily,ontologically connected to subjectivity. When it issubjective empirically, then ontologicalty it should not beviewed as objective. There is no empirical worldindependent of the mind, and therefore there is noreason to assume a "reality" or existence which is

independent of the mind.Let us take an example closer to horne: following a

game of football, two children head toward tbe localklosk. One of the two has enough change to ouv achocolate bar, while his penniless friend is left with envyalone. Why the difference between the two children?What leads them to such distinct experiences in front ofthe same kiosk? lf we wish to say that the difference liesin an objective sphere, in the children's parents' bankaccounts for instance, we must again ask where thisdifference comeS from. Such a form of analysis, asidefrom being endlesS, ls inevitably unfruitful, according toVasubandhu. His intuition is that so long as thedifference between the two children exists in the realms

54 JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND REUGIONEVIATAR SHULMAN

o substantive, independent andarevv». no substane:, n b dhu's thoughts on. . form of eXlstenee. Vasu an .

~~~e~~V:er are clarified in his eommentary to verse 14.

Why the extra worry, if the defining characte':t,stllcf forms an so forth ls not refuted? What ls le r

~efinlng characteristic? Belng.an.ObJde~~ngbet~~and so on This ls mamtalne .

~~~: or yellow object of the eye, etc. is accep~~!B t does lt have a substantive base (dravya) w I fiS

uone or multiple? What the~; rne fallacy 0multiplicity has been dlscussed...

The next verse eompletes the diseussion, adbdredsshin?sH as weil vasu an u

the fallacies of ~ne~e~~ar ~~~t the pr~blem ts related

~~md~a~:,rye:~ai~n~ ~e ~~~~;~~ f~~I~n~h~~~t~~~o~~the object of the eve IS . .' ..42substanee (dravya) devoid of multiplIcIty. V bandhu's

h erv clearly that asuatt:~~ i:~~t~~a~ns~Wt~eV e~istenee of fhingsR:~~oire~~er~nor against the fact that ~hmgs ta:e p acethe idea thatarguing against the netten of ratvya, reliable andthings wh ich appear have a rue.

. b e 43substantive as . , t' V 11-15 lsThe fact that Vasubandhu s argu~en 10 t of

best understood as an assault ~~~~~t i:h~f ~O~~~giCald:-aV(a emphasl~es ~~s t~~a~rgvasubandhu is arguingslgOificance. Thl.s so. cti ity without saying thatagainst the netten of core I~, t' what the. . . d More tmportan ISeverythmg IS. mm.. the context of the text: Followingargum~nt ahchtlevesrty,"is best understood as relating tothe dann t a re.aI discussion of thesubjectivity, achieved t~rough the I ft with the

~~~~~~ng O~h~tel~bj~~~~i~~i~~h;~~~~2~ ;~~~e:at~~The argument agalOst tne ru s that objectivity isargument one steb~fU~h~ro~~ i~a~bjectivity in conflictwholly unreasona e. ? .' ... herent.with the empirics of sub]~ctlVlty, it ISmco

55

of experience - the joy of having the ehoeolate bar, thepain of being without one - the most adequateexplanation must situate the cause for the differentexperienees in the realms of experience as weil. 50 longas experienee is subjective, its causes are bestunderstood as being subjectlve as weil.

The ontological point is further emphasized in verses11-15 of the V, which introduces tne famous argumentagainst the reality of atorns." A c1ear definition of thepurport of this passage is a must, since it has lead tomany misunderstandings. Two points must beemphasized: first that the refutation of atoms need notlead us to full-fledged idealism.· 5econdly, that theargument must relate to ontology.

Vasubandhu enters the dlscussions of the unreality ofatoms in order to show that the objects (vi$aya) ofmental constructions (vijfiaptl) ere not independeat(pratyekam).34 He has also just stated that it is untruethat objects do not exist at all/s and now he wishes toshow that they have no substantial existence (dravya)or independenee. Thus he addresses what appear to bethe two possibilities for the existence of an objectiveworld: that the world is a complete oneness, or that it isconstituted by a plurality of atoms.

The main thrust of the argument is directed againstthe possibility of atoms. Vasubandhu argues that it isconceptually impossible that reality is built bv atoms:the atom cannot be an oneness or a multiplicity, andmost importantly, atoms cannot loin each other in orderto form larqer conglomerations. 6 If atoms are to joineach other, they must have sides, or parts." If theyhave parts, there must be significance to the differentparts. In order for an atom to join another atom it muststop being an atom." The atom is necessarily furtherdissectible. Also, realltv cannot be oneness, since thisconceptlon is betrayed by the diversity of ourexperi ence.39

What this means, for Vasubandhu, ls not, again, thatall is mind. It also does not mean that there is nothingwhatsoever. What it does mean is that there is no

56 JOURNALOF INDIAN PHILOSOPHYAND REUGION

We my now summarize the argument regarding theinherent relation between truth and subjectivity, andregarding the notion that reality must relate toconsciousness. Since reality is always connected toexperience, objectivity is in need of justification. A morestraightforward account of reality would view it asstructured according to experience. Moreover, objectivereality is fundamentally incoherent, since there is noway in which it can be conceived. Reality can be neitheroneness, nor a multiplicity, and therefore it must bevijfiapti-mätra. It must be emphasized that contrary tothe major bulk of the scholarship that has advanced thenon-idealistic reading of Vasubandhu/" with whom Iside, the reading I offer of is ontological. Vasubandhu isat the same time not an idealist, and a thinker who isinterested in what exists and what is real. He discoversreality to be non-objective in any way, and inherentlyrelated to subjectivity.

As a Buddhist, for Vasubandhu notions of objectivitynecessarily involve pain. He believes that the intuitionthat reality is independent of the mind demandsunnecessary emotional conflict, and involves a deeprooted cognitive dissonance. This cognitive dlssonance isa way to say that objectivity is philosophicallyincoherent, and thus that the notion that the worldexists in any way of itself and in itself is ultimatelyuntenable. This of course sounds like Idealism to manyreaders (many of whom are slck of Idealism). In someweak sense of course it is, but that probably was notVasubandhu's point. Rather then asking if reality ismind, Vasubandhu is wonderingabout what makesreality move, about what makes it tick. Occurrencesdon't just happen out there, he says. They happen inrelation to consciousness. To some extent, they areforms of subjectivity. Perception is a form of projection.

I will condude with a practical, maybe even a politicalextension of Vasubandhu's philosophical vision. Wenormally view our lives as consisting of objectiveoccurrences happening "out there." This is, possibly, thebasic rationale of conflict. "He hit me," as If the "me"

57EVIATARSHULMAN

. . . . "his" objective action. 1t i~ adoes not partlc!pate In n mind can work otherwl~e,great question If tne huma en that an alternativeand it remains to be pr~ be certain though ts thatmetaphysiCSw~r~. What ~uSiCSoffered by Vasubandhuif the more hollstlc metap ~oment by moment, we. arets true, then day by dav, and more forms of pam. 1

. f ourselves more .creattng or 1'11b one of the heil-guardians ...hope, at least, e

Ben-Gunon Unlverslty of the Negev I Israel

NOTESf this paper for his

I wish to thank the anonymouS reviewer 0

1. helpful suggestions. t aditions especially the majorIt ls c1earthat a num~er ?f l~I~~ti~ns would disagree wlth ~hese

2. bulk of the Nyäya-VaISe~I~~ a do endorse such a postnon -statements. Even the tradltl~ns th~\he upanisadic traditions andAnd here I am thinklng mamly 0 V dänta of the Sarpkhya-Yogathelr development into tne AdV~~ ~ the ~oncept of karma in allmetaphyslCSof Puru~aa~d p~a 'i~ ~arl Buddhlsm, and of. manyIndian traditions, and pnmanly uld piobablY want to quahfy ~heforms of Mahäyäna Buddhlsmd-W\h their particular phllOSophlcalclaim so that it better accor s WI .

system. _ _ f the 5amyutta-nik5ya (Ill,See in the PhetJa-pi(/{jupama-sutta 0 .

3.140) .' eanin s of insubstantiality inFor a discussion of the dlstlnct _m_a ;ee my "Nägärjuna on

4. early Buddhism and early M~h~r:s~o~,It in David Shulman an~Impermanence, the BUd~~a~sages: Israeli 5cholarship on IndlaShalva Weil, eds., Ka~rT71c 008)(Delhl: Oxford Univers1tyPress,2 . M häyäna thought asMany authors understand the earlYplei~ Nagao (1991: 166):

. . h tology See for exam .•concerned Wlt on .. ahä äna and Nägärjuna.''True ontology began ~It~ M Ye in Yohanan Grinshpon, 5ilence

5. For a diSCussiohn/ofotthhles•.nls::sei;e"ätafljala-YOga(New York: SUNY,Unheard: üeet. y, .2002), chapter 3. _ _ meditation has been diScussedThis aspect of early Ma~ayana s eclally his Paul Harrison,

6. most fully by paul Harnson. sfieect\e:S on the Production of~Mediums and Messages: Re e d~h'stXXXV (2004) 1&2: 115-Mahäyäna Sütras," tne Eastern su I

SB JOURNALOF INDIAN PHILOSOPHYAND REUGION

151, as weil as Paul Harrison, "Buddhänusm(ti in thePratyutpanna-Buddha-Sarpmukhävasthita-Samädhl-Sutra, ..Joumal of Indian Philosophy 6 (1978): 35-57, and Paul Harrison,rne Samädhi of Direct Encounter with tne Buddhas of tne Present:An Annotated Translation of the Tibetan Version of thePratyutpanna-Buddha-Sarpmukhävasthita-Samädhi-Sutra (Tokyo:The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1990).

7. See, for instance, In Gadjin Nagao, Mädhyamika end Yogäcära(New Yone: SUNY, 1990), chapter 13, and Jay L Garfield, rneFundamental Wisdom of the Mlddle Way: Nägärjuna'sMülamadhyamakakärikä (New Yoneand Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995), 304.

8. For a greater elaboration regarding my reading of Nägärjuna, seemy forthcoming "Creative Ignorance: Nägärjuna on theOntological Function of Consdousness," Joumst of theInternational Assodation of Buddhist Studies 30.1-2 (2007[2009]).

9. See, for Instance, in MMK 15.10,11, as weil as Nägärjuna'sYukti~a$fikä-kärikä 1.

10. See, tor Instance, MMK 5.6 and 15.5, as weil as in Nägärjuna'sYukti~a$fikä-kärikä 2.

11. See MMK 5.8 for a poetic expression of the denlai of bothexlstence and non-existence.

12. MMK 7.33, Yukti-~a$fikä-kärikä25-27.13. Clearly, many modern exponents of Nägärjuna belleve that

emptlness equals dependence, and they Indeed base themselveson the verse just quoted, MMK 24.18. See, for example, inGarfield, rne Fundamental Wisdom, 305. But verses such as MMK10.8-12, 13.7, and Yuktl-~a~ikä-kärikä 43-45 prove thatNägärjuna belleved that dependent-origlnation emptles itself ofany reallty. Nothing can be dependent, since one would need tospecify some independent existent thing that could becharacterized as belng dependent. For a tuller exploration of theseIssues In my oeeuve Ignorance, section II.

14. For the text of the VifT/satika,as weil as the Trif!1sikä, I am usingthe edltlon's of Sylvlan U~vi, VijflaptJmatratasiddhl: Deux trstes deVasubandhu, VifT/satJkä et TrifT/s/ka, Blblioteque de l'Ecole desHautes Etudes (sclences historlques et phJlologlques) fasclcule 245(Paris: Ubralrle Anclenne Honcrä Champion, 1925), and StephanAnacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu (Delhl: MotllalBanarassldas, 1986).

15. For a fuller analysis of the term vljlfapti-mätra, see BruceCameron Hall, "11le Meanlng of Vijlfapti In Vasubandhu's Conceptof Mlnd," Journe! of the Intemational Assoclation of BuddhistStudles9.1: 7-23.

16. In the context of this dlscusslon I will bypass the question of theauthorshlp of the MAV, and relate to the text only through the\

\\

59EVIATARSHULMAN

attributed to Vasubandhu. I willlenses of lts bh5$Y:, ~oA~~;h~~ya and the V were written by thealso assume that t e 'same Vasubandhu. 'ng the edition supplied by

the text of me MAV-bhä~yaI am USIFor W rksAnacker, Seven 0 '" ce of this position, see in ~aga~,

discuSSionof the slgmfican 5 ("What remalns 1017. For a 'ka and Yogäcära, chapter

Mädhya!,,' 60. . _Sunyata'1, esp. p. -J.- tasmäd sarvam vldhlYate.r yem napi ca:.unyaf'{l , f ns

18. MAV 1.2: na un 'f artha and me denial 0 1diScussion of the meanlng 0

19. For atruth, see below. , I äsrityärtänupa/abdh/r jäyate (

20 vijflapti-mätropalabdh!fl! ' nu. "-apti-mätrasyäpy anupalabdhlr. arthänupalabdhif'{l mrasntya '!l "!~;a-grahakayob pravisati //

'-yate / evam asal-lak$alJaf'{l raJa , ' made also in verse 1.3: ,

21. ihis same POintIS, as the appearances of things,MAV 1.3 consciousness I~ creat~~ tl). lts object does not exls~.belngs, self, and ~erceptlons (~;t:~ce 1t (consc\ousness) toc ISFrom its (the oblect's) non-ex ,

I if_- em nästiunrea . ,,_ ' t'bhäsam prajäyate / vifnsnartha_sattvätma-Vl)naptl-pra I sat //

-nfärthas tad-abhävät tad apy a k of ihomasca~T Vasubandhu In the wor

22 ihls ts me emphasis given to, Doctrine of Experience: A Ne~. A. KOch~muttom, A ::;~d~~stvasubandhu the Yogäcärin (Delhl:

Translation of tne w., 1999 {1982]).Motilal Banarasidass pubhshers b dhu in the work to Dan

23 ihls ts me emphasis glven to lvas~ ; "Philosophical Investigation. Lusthaus, Buddhist ~enom:n~h~gra,'eng We;-shih lun (Landon:

of yogäcära Buddhlsm anRoutledgeCurzon, 2002). _ •

h d by Trif'{lslka 26-28.24. ihis position is ec oe , not sltuated In only-a-mental-

(26) So long as consclousnes~ IS d dualistic perception willconstruction, the inclinatlon towar

not termlnate. - t~hati / g~ha-vävad vijflapti-mätratve vij~~naf'{lrt~a~,/aI .,, t - an na V/fllrva a.e I,dvayasyänusayas sv. I a mental-constructlon',

(27) Even If he perceives 'thls ts dO~y~o~t of him, he is not Inwhen ne make something stan

only-that. , a i hy upalabhatab /vijflapti-mätram ev'1t'::::it :a~.mfue nävati$fhate //sthäpayann agrattab ' basis it ls placed In

, ss Is not used as a, f the(28) When consCiOUsne and) tn the non-existenCe 0

only_coSclousness, ( rceptionpercelved, from its (own) non-pe .

60 JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND REUGION EVIATAR SHULMAN 61

yadälambanaf!1 vijHanaf!1 nalvopalabhate teas / stl7itaf!1vljif5na-m5tratve grähyabhave tad-agrahat //

A related posltlon regarding Yogtictira thought has been advocatedby Janlce Dean Willis, On Knowing Reality: TheTattvtirtha G1apterof Asanga~ Bodhisattvabhiiml (Delhi: Motllal Banarasidass, 1982),25-30. Willis' sees the claims made by Yogtidra phllosophers suChas Vasubandhu as pertalning to the realms of meditation, ratherthan to ontology. Her work Is based on Lambert Schmithausen,"On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practlce andPhilosophical Theory in Buddhism" In A. Wurfel and M. Duckwitzll

German Schofars on India vof. 2, (Bombay: NachiketaPublicatlons, 1976).

25. See also Malcolm David Eckei, "Review of BuddhistPhenomenology: A PhilOsophical Investigatlon of YogticäraBuddhlsm and the Ch'eng Wel-shih lun by Dan Lusthaus," TheJoumet of Asian StiJdies 63.4 (2004), 1087-1089.

26. A1though such works as W1ll1s,On Knowlng Reality, Kochumutton,A Buddhist Doctrlne of experience, Anacker, Seven Works, Hall,"The Meanlng of V1jifaptl," Rlchard King, "Early Yogäcära and ItsRelationship wlth the Madhyamaka School" Phllosophy East &West 44.4 (1994), and Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology, haveconvlnclngly made the case that Vasubandhu.ls not amethphyslcal Idealist, the understanding of hlm as one Is still alltao common. For recent examples see Ram Prasad, "Dreams andthe Coherence of Experlence: An Anti-Idealist Critlque fromClasslcal Indian Phllosophy," Amenasn Philosophical Quarterly32.3 (1995), and Joel Feldman, Vasubandhu's Illusion Argumentand the Parasltism of Illusion upon Veridical Experience,Philosophy East & West 55.4 (2005): 529-541. It Is also worthmentlonlng that In the last conference held by the Internationalassoctauen of Buddhist studies, In June 2008 at Emory universityIn Atlanta, I was qulte surprlsed to discover that a great majorityof the leadlng experts on Buddhist philosophy have no doubt thatYogticära ts a wholly Idealistlc system. Yoshlfuml ueda, "TwoStreams of Yogäcära Thought," Phllosophy East & West 17.1(1967), 155-65, has shown that the Interpretation of Vasubandhuas an exponent of a strang version of Idealism, althoughmlstaken, has deep roots in the Yogädira tradltlcrr Itself. Ueda'swork f1gures promlnently In the werk of WllIIs and King mentionedabove. Both these authors readlly adopt Ueda's point tnat theeariler strand of Yogäcära thought, which Vasubandhu was partof, was not Idealistlc.

27. matram-Ity arthä-prati$edhärthaf!1.28. See also the definition of vastu In WiIIis, On Knowing Reality, 190.29. As the ideallstic questions regardlng Vasubandhu already been

lcoked Into time and time agaln, I will confine myself to an outllneof the major points of Import regarding the V. the central passageto view these points In action ls the commentary to verse 10:

(1) The fact that artha are denied is not meant to affinn that themind is real. As with the arguments made by the MAVdiscussed above, V denlas the truth of subjectivlty Is thesame manner that it denies the truth of objectlvity.

(2) Vasubandhu clearly states that there must be dharmas(phenornena, appearances, things, objects) In order for thereto be vijifapti-matra. Vasubandhu is thus not denying thatthings appear, but only that this appearance should betreated as generated by same objective reallty.I will relate to further relevant points below.

30. Neither the regularity of space and time, nor the irregularity ofpersonal experienee, nor the results of action, are reasonable Ifmental eonstruction is devoid of objects,V 2. na desa-kala-niyama!l saf{7tänäniyamo na ca / na ca k(tya-kriya yukta vijifaptlr yadi nsrtn» //As the Vlf!1Satikähas been translated a number of times, I willconfine myself here to a summary of the discussion that leads tothe verses I wish to focus on. For a tull transtattcn and adiscusslon of the text, see in KoChumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrineof Experience, and Anacker, Seven Works.

31. In verse 18 Vasubandhu will exptain the difference between thedream and the waklng state (which ts IIke a drearn), as belng dueto the fact that in sleep the mind is overpowered by lethargy(tamas). Therefore a distinct quallty of experlence is generated.

32. Vasubandhu's potnt here agaln presupposes Nägtirjuna'sargument agalnst the true distinction between cause and effect,most forcefuliy arttculated In MMK 1.1. See also MMK 7.2, 12.1and Sünyata-saptati 4,5,22. The relevanee of thls point to theetassie body-mlnd problern In the west should be evident.

33. "Atoms," paramanu, here refer to the primary meanlng of theatom as the smallest conceivable unit.Again, since this point has been dlscussed time and agaln, I willsupply only a summary of what Is prlmary to our concems.

34. "And how should thls be known that the exlstence of the(objective) base of form and so forth was spoken of by thebhagavän wlth this special Intention (of leadlng to anunderstandlng of the non-substantlality of objects [dhrama-nairätmya]), and that those whlch exists as objects Independentof the eplsodes of knowtedge of form and so forth are not reallyso."

kathal]1 punar idal]1 pratyetavyam anenäbhiprayena bhagavatäropadyäyatanästitvam uktal]7 na puna!l santy eva tani yanlropadi-vljaptinäf!1 pratyekaf!1 v/~ayibhavantiti /

35. Now, If there Is no dharma (object, thing) whatsoever, then thereIs also no vljifaptl-matra. How will It be establlshed? It Is not that

62 JOURNALOF INDIAN PHILOSOPHYAND REUGION

there ts no änsrme whatsoever, and this is the entrance into theinsubstantiatity of dnermes:yadi tarhi sarvatha dharmo nästi tad api vljifapti-mätraf}1 nästitikstnem tsrtu vyavasthäpyate / na khetu sarvathä dharmo n5stityevem dharma-nalratmya-praveSo bhavati //

36. V 11. The object composed of atoms Is not an oneness or a. multiplIcity, and they (atorns) do not come together. Thereforethe atom ls not establlshed.na tad ekem ne canekaf/1 vi~yal) paramä(1usal) / na Ca tesaf/1hatä yamät paramäIJur na slddhyati / /

37. V 12ab. Because it slmaltaneousely connected on slx (sides), theatom consists of stx-parts,setken« yugapad yogät paramälJo/J ~aifaf!7satä /

38. Commentary to 12cd: "'Atoms surely do not come together, forthey have no parts" (na/va hi paramä(1ava/J saf/1yujyantenlravayavatväf). .

39. V 15. In oneness, there will be no (1) movement In stages, no (2)simultaneous perceptlon and non-percepnon, no (3) multiplediverse occurances,and no (4) lack of sight of very subtle things.ekatve na kramet)etir yugapan na grahagrahau / vicchlnnäneka-v(ttIS ca ~ük$f71änik$äca no bnevet //Regardlng these claims the commentary explains that If the worldwere one dravya (1) there would be no movement, since theentire earth would be traversed in one step, (2) There could notbe the perceptlon of the front side of something together wlth thenon-percepuen of the hind side, (3) There could not be bothhorses and elephants, and (4) there would be no dlfferencebetween coarse and subtle things, and thus one would see themlnlscule creatures whlch exlst In water.

40. tad eveäem saf/1pradh5ryate. "Thls Is malntatned," or poSsibly"'toward thlS (perception) ts directed.'"

41. kJm any5 dntayä / lak$a(1af/1tu rüpädi yadi na prati$ldhyate / kimpunas te~äf}1 lak1a(1af}1cak$ur-ädl- vl$ayatvalJ1 niläd/tvaf/1 ca / tadevedem saf!7pradhäryate / yat tac ca~ur-ädinäf/1 vl$8Yo nila-pitädikam Iwate ktm tad ekaf/1 dravyaf/1 ata vä teä anekaf/1 / tamc5ta/J / sneketve dO$8uktal) /

42. yadi yävad vkxnmnem nänekaf/1 caqU$O vj~ayas tad ekaf/1dravyaf/1 ketpyete ...

43. The concept of dravya Is argued agalnst also In the commentaryto verse 11 which Introduces the argument agalnst the atoms,quoted above In note 36.

44. See n. 26 above.

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