UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM

SCHOOL OF LAW

(FORMERLY FACULTY OF LAW)

LW 400: LL.B. DISSERTATION

TOPIC: RESOURCE BASED CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN

TANZANIA: THE CASE OF SONJO/ BATEMI AND MAASAI OF

NGORONGORO.

NAME: PAUL ONESMO

REG: NO. 53890/T.2005

SUPERVISOR: DR. KHOTI CHILOMBA KAMANGA

Y EAR . 2008/2009

FOURTH YEAR COMPULSORY RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITED IN

PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE BACHELOR OF

LAWS DEGREE OF THE UNIVERSITY O DAR ES SALAAM.

1

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for examination

by the University of Dar es salaam the dissertation titled “Resource based conflicts

in northern Tanzania the case of Sonjo and Masaai of Ngorongoro” in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of Bachelor of laws (LL.B)

Of the University of Dar es salaam.

. .………………………………………………

Dr. Khoti Chilomba Kamanga

(Supervisor)

Date…………………………

2

DECLARATION

I, PAUL ONESMO, declare that this dissertation is my own work and it has not

been presented and it will not be presented to any other university for similar or any

other degree award.

Signature……………………….

Paul, Onesmo

( Candidate )

COPYRIGHT

This dissertation is copyright protected material under the Berne Convention, the

Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999 and other international and national

enactments on intellectual property law. Production by any means, in full or in part,

without the prior written permission of the Directorate of Undergraduate Studies, on

behalf of the author and the University of Dar es salaam, is strictly prohibited,

except for short extracts in fair dealing for research or private study, critical

scholarly review, or discourse with an acknowledgement

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Despite the great effort I sold to this peace of work, there are few people invariably

were ready to see the success of my work. The author is most grateful to the people

who have contributed in one way or the other to the conception, preparation and

eventually production of this work.

Before all, my special thanks should go to my beloved wife Joyce Japhet Humbe for

her moral and material support during my fieldwork, she made my trip to conflicts

vicinity possible and she was tolerant of my frequent absence at home.

I should as well cast my thanks to my beloved supervisor Dr Khoti Kamanga for his

constructive criticism and friendly supervision that made me to enjoy my work.

Not easy to mention all but the following, also had great role to make my work of

high quality. Suzan Rhorer from USA for her moral and financial support, lecturer

of law Makumira university Mr Elifurah Laltaika , Program Officer OXFAM

Tanzania Mr William Olenasha, Melau Alais , Legal Officer Ngorongoro District

Mr Tluwah Otai, Chairman Ngorongoro District Council Hon S. Soinda ,

Ngorongoro Police Commissioner Mr. Mponjoli , Coordinator PINGO’S FORUM

Mr Edward Parokwa, DC.Ngorongoro Honourable Jowika Kasunga.

4

Ultimately, I have special thanks to almighty God for his love and care, for without

his care and guidance nothing would have been achieved.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my lovely parents Paul Kasale Olengurumwa and

Priscilla Ngurumwa for love and parental care they showed me before their Passing

on .May their souls rest in peace.

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

Declaration………………………………………………………………………….i

Certification and copyright…………………………………………………………ii

Acknowledgement ………………………………………………………………..iii

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………iv

Acronyms and abbreviations…………………………………………………...vii

List of Legal instruments…… …………………………………………………. .. ix

List of International Legal instruments………………………………………… …x

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND INFRORMATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

OF THE RESOURCE BASED CONFLICTS IN NOTHERN TANZANIA

1.0.Introduction…………………………………………………………………….1

1.1.Objectives/justifications……………………………………………………..….5

1.2.Statement of the problem……………………………………………………......6

1.3.Background of the problem……………………………………………………..9

1.4.Literature review…………………………………………………………….....11

1.5.Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………..…14

1.6.Methodology………………………………………………………...................15

6

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW ON THE LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING TO

RESOURCE BASED CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN TANZANIA

2.0 Introduction……………………………………………………………………16

2.1 Land and Village Land Acts 1999…………………………………………….17

2.2 Tanzania Wild Life Law and Environmental Law……………………………20

2.3 .The Immigration Law…………………………………………………………21

2.4 .Tanzania Investment Law and Policy.…………………………..…................22

2.5. Firearms and Ammunition Law………………………………………………23

CHAPTER 3

PRESENTATION, DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

3.0. The Issue of International Border and Illegal Immigrations…. ………………25

3.1. Lack of Land Use Planning and Resource Management……..……………….30

3.2. Natural Resource Curse……………………………………………………….34

3.3. Privatization, Acquisition and Investment Policy…………..…........................39

3.4. Dispute Settlement Mechanism…………………………….………………....43

3.5. Villagization……………………………………………………...…..………..44

3.6 Overlapping Of Laws…………………………………………….. …………. 46

CHAPTER 4

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

4.01 Recommendations…………………………………………………………….49

4.02 Conclusions ………………………………………………………… …….. . 50

7

5.0. BIBLIOGRAPY

6.0. APPENDIXES

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATION

ADDO Arusha Diocesan Development Organization

CRT Community Resource Team

DC District Commissioner

GCA Game Controlled Area

IUCN World Conservation Union

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

KIPOC Korongoro Integrated People’s Orientation to Conservation

LGCA Loliondo Game Controlled Area

LARRRI Land Rights Research and Resources Institute

MP Member of Parliament

NCA Ngorongoro Conservation Area

NGO’s Non-Governmental Organization

NAFCO National Agriculture and Food Corporation

NCAA Ngorongoro Conservation Authority

NLUPC National Land Use Planning Commission

OBC Ortello Business Corporation

PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Survey.

PINGO’s Pastoralists Indigenous NGO’s

SRCS Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy

SENAPA Serengeti National Park

8

SRCS Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy

SMG Sub Machine GUN

SAR Sub Automatic Rifle.

TANAPA Tanzanian National Parks

TBL Tanzania Breweries Limited.

UAE United Arab Emirates

URT United Republic of Tanzania

UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization

WMA Wildlife Management Area

9

LIST OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

Forest Act, 2002 Cap 323 [R.E 2002]

Land Dispute Court Act 2002

Ngorongoro Conservation Area Ordinance of 1959 [CAP284 R.E 2002]

National Land Act No 4 of 1999[CAP 113 R.E 2002]

The Immigration Act [CAP 54 R.E 2002]

The Firearms and Ammunition Act of 1991[R.E 2002]

Tanzania Investment Act of 1997 (Act No: 26)

The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 (as amended)

Village Land Act no 4 of 1999 [CAP 114 R.E 2002]

Ward Tribunal Act no 18 of 1995

Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 [CAP283 R.E 2002]

NATIONAL POLICIES

National Land Policy of 1995

National Wildlife Policy of 1998

National Investment Policy of 1996

National Environmental Policy of 1997

National Forest Policy of 1998

10

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS

1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage

Commonly UNESCO Convention.

1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment

(Stockholm Declaration)

1971 Ramsa Site Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially

as Waterfowl Habitat.

2000 Nairobi protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and

Light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa

2001 SADC Protocol of on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other

Related Materials.

1966 International Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

1992 Rio De Janeiro declaration on Environment and Development.

1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision

decision making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters Aarhus

Convention, Aarhus.

11

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE

RESOURCE BASED CONFLICTS IN NGORONGORO

1.0 Introduction

Tanzania is increasingly facing resource based conflicts, mainly involving herders1

on one hand, and farmers on the other hand. Such conflicts sometimes involve

herders themselves (Intra-group), farmers or herders and investors. Morogoro,

Mbeya, Arusha and Mara regions are notorious for such conflicts. Sonjo and

Maasai live and lead conflicting livelihoods. This research focuses on Ngorongoro

District in Arusha Region where the sedentary Sonjo/Batemi and Maasai have

historically been in confrontations.

Ngorongoro District is famous both in Tanzania and worldwide due to variety of

wildlife species. It is also in this District where the Ngorongoro crater, has been

categorized as the world heritage site2. The District divides into three Divisions,

which are Loliondo, Ngorongoro, and Sale. The District has a population of

129,000 people, according to the 2002 census, 59% of the District's landmass falls

within the famous Ngorongoro Conservation Area, which was established in 1959

1 The word herders here has been used to mean pastoralists who move with their herds of cattle, sheep and goat in search of pastures, water and sometimes to run from animal diseases. 2 Convention Concerning The Protection Of Cultural and Natural Heritage Commonly UNESCO Convention

12

to deal with matters related to the conservation of wildlife resources, promotion of

tourism and the development of indigenous Maasai pastoralists living in the area.3

Loliondo Division, which is divided into a number of wards and villages, is

inhabited Mostly by Maasai who are traditionally pastoralist but who now practice

farming as well. The Batemi (commonly known as Sonjo) and other groups also

live in the area, and they are mostly farmers even though they also keep domestic

animals. The Division is made up of the villages of Loliondo, Sakala,

Ngwarrwa/Enguserosambu, Oloirien/Magaiduru, Soitsambu, Ololosokwan, Oloipir,

Arrash and Maaloni.

As for Sale Division, most of its residents are agro-pastoralist. The Division is

made up of the villages of Tinaga, Mgongo, Kisangiro, Samunge, Yasimdito,

Digodigo, Malambo, Piyaya, Pinyinyi and Engaresero. The three Divisions are

characterized by differences in natural resources endowments, modes of production,

the history and cultures of their inhabitants. There are very complex and hostile

socio-economic and political relations between Maasai and the Batemi of the Sale

and Loliondo Divisions.

The ethnic relationship between Maasai and Sonjo has historically based on

competitions. The problem grew bigger at the time of making boundaries and

formalization of village land in the Loliondo Division. However, at the same time

3 NCA Act, s 4

13

we have to bear in mind that this problem was on track one century ago4. It is

therefore misleading to brand name findings of various scholars in 1990’s 5as being

the root causes of the problem; rather they are simply factors that facilitate the

development of the problem.

An assessment of the magnitude of the problem reveals more political and legal

struggles with ecological reference. The conflicts as stated earlier are resource

based, for instance two years ago there was a conflict between Maasai clans Loita

and Purko(intra-group) in Soit Sambu Ward, mainly due the fact that great part of

their land have been grabbed by government, and granted to outsiders like United

Arabs kings from Dubai; Brigadier Mohammad and other companies like Cattle

Products Ltd from Kenya and the Tanzania Breweries limited Company (TBL).

Various community meetings were conducted to settle the dispute, but no

sustainable solution was found. Before a brief of time, an order from Ngorongoro

District Authority to nullify the certificates of occupancy, offered to Loliondo

villages in 1990’s, and declared those villages to be resurveyed. Then again

worsened the dispute between Sonjo and Maasai.

The rivals of ethnic animosity, tried to end their cattle and land disputes when 25

leaders from each faction signed a peace accord brokered by the Arusha Regional

Commissioner, Mohamed Babu in Collaboration with Ngorongoro District

Commissioner, Mr. Assey Msangi, District Executive Director (DED)

4 Personal Interview with Ngorongoro District Council Chairman. 5 See for example Sanna Ojalammi in Contested Land Disputes in Semi Arid Parts of Northern Tanzania introductory pages.

14

Mr.Nicholaus Kileka, tradional leaders and experts from the Irish Embassy6 .

However, with all those efforts still the problem continued and expanded to great

magnitude.

1.1 Objectives/Justifications

This research aimed to find out the role of Laws and National Policies in the said

conflicts. It also aims at studying why the problem has acquired a persistent nature,

and why the Government has left the problem unattended for all those years. This

research found out, where these fighting groups get small firearms used during the

conflicts. The research also addressed the case of illegal immigrants, as it has been

associated with the conflict.7

The legal implications of the findings will help the policy and law enforcement

organs, to have the knowledge and insight of the problem. Such findings will as

well create awareness to people as to what is taking place in Ngorongoro. In the

end, the community will understand sources of conflicts, so that, possible conflict

resolution strategies in areas of heterogeneous communities with plural and land

tenure systems will be suggested.

6 Eamon, B. (2005). “Draft Report on Effort to resolve the conflict Between the Sonjo and Maasai of Loita section”., p. 2. 7. 24th /03/2008: Nipashe. Ngorongoro watakiwa kuwadhibiti wahamiaji haramu.

15

1.2 Statement of the Problem.

The main problem in Ngorongoro is ethnic and resource based between herders and

farmers and the situation takes another shape as most of the time even pastoralist

themselves have been in hostility. The disputes have been associated with land

matters by many writers.

Sanna Ojalammi of Helsinki University8 in his work on semi arid parts of Northern

Tanzania has shown that the dispute in Maasai and Sonjo land has relation to land

dispute. Being a geographer, he tried to address the problem basing on properties in

the changing geopolitical and economic system on varying geographical and

historical scales.

The main problem that this research dealt with is the recurrent nature, [Endemism]

and ever growing of these disputes in Ngorongoro. The conflict breaks almost every

year, and its magnitude became bigger when the Somali and Loita (Maasai from

Kenya)9 immigrants took part10. To add salt on the wound, types of arms used are

not expected to be used in a local conflict of this nature. Some of the said firearms

include SMG, AK 47, RPG, LMG, and Rifle. These conflicts result into death of

8 Ojalammi, S. (2005). Contested Land Disputes in Semi Arid Parts of Northern Tanzania, p. 108. 9 Loita is the Masaai clan commonly found in Tanzania and Kenya 10 Daily News 3Rrd /11/1998. Somali raid and killed 9.

16

many people, destruction of their homes and properties like burning of crops and

many people women and children ran away from their homes.

The then Ngorongoro District Commissioner Aseri Msangi11 and the former

Ngorongoro MP, Mathew Taki ole Timan admitted that the conflict had eventually

reached the great intensity of conflicts by considering the type of weapons being

used. One of the victims of war also admits the same.12 It therefore appears that the

problem receives many new players every year and make it grow bigger and bigger.

The District is rich of natural resources, but surprisingly the people on the land still

live in extreme poverties. This is what Ragna Tarvick and others baptized it as

“resource curse”.13They found that resource curse represents enormous

impediments to development, yet it is important to understand that natural resources

is not a problem, rather it is lack of good governance and democracy.

Despite several attempt to end the animosity still the problem breaks out often.

Therefore the endemic nature of this problem with no doubt matured into legal

problem to be researched. Only recently it was reported by Kulikoni News Paper of

11 DC Aseri Msangi was quoted saying: “In the army, as far as war planning is concerned, there is something called D-Day and H-Hour. These are important moments in time when signals for attack can be issued,” says Msangi. “In the recent clash between these two groups, there is evidence to show that D-Day and H-Hour techniques were employed by one group,” he adds. Explaining, Msangi says that on September 5 this year, Sonjo tribesmen attacked Masai villages from four fronts and the attacks have all signs of collaboration as they occurred simultaneously. “Since clashes between these two groups started almost a century ago, we had never experienced something of that nature in this conflict,” he explains. Daily News 23rd March 2004. 12 “We are not in conflict with all Maasai clans. We are clashing with the Loita clan in Kenya. They have been crossing the border to our side in search for pastures. 13 Tarvick, et al. (2005). “Institutions and Resource Curse’. In Economic Journal.

17

22/04/2008 that one person named Lesingo Nanyoi (34) was brutally shot by Police

Officers in resource based conflict with a foreigner investing on their land at

Soitsambu Ward.14.

Therefore the problem manifested that there are legal issues to be dealt with, as the

combination of causes fueling the problem. The situation then manifests that there

are laws or policies that tend to overlap, hence leave people into conflicts. For

instance the Loliondo Division villages are recognized by Land laws and Local

Government laws but Wild life laws and Policies recognize them as (LGCA)

The following questions were guidelines during research activities.

How do the law and National Policies respectively contribute to

these endemic conflicts in Ngorongoro?

How do the issues of borders make the problem persistent?

14Kulikoni 22nd /4/ 2008 .Apigwa risassi vurugu za mwekezaji na wafugaji

18

1.4 Background of the Problem

Parties to the conflict believe that, the problem could have been contained if

Government was serious and firm in addressing the problem. The two groups have

a long history of hostile relations and tensions.15

The history behind the existing conflict goes back to 1975 when the most intense

fight was first recorded. Many lives were claimed in a fight that was triggered by

cattle theft. The conflicting situation was temporarily arrested in the late 1970’s

when the late Premier Edward Sokoine mediated the same by using traditional

means of conflict resolution. 16

The conflict between the two sides gathered new momentum after 1990, when a

highly disputed demarcation and issuance of title deeds to some villages, was done

by Arusha Development Diocesan Organization (ADDO)), Korongoro Integrated

Peoples Oriented to Conservation (KIPOC), International Union for Conservation

of Nature (IUCN) and Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS).17 It

however blew in 1995 in an occasion where a Maasai young man stole a shoe of a

Sonjo trader in a local market, an incidence that quite surprisingly exploded in

bloodshed of a magnitude not seen to date.

While the problem was not yet solved , the village land at Olososokwan with a

long term licensed permit was granted to private non Tanzania in 1993 from

15 Story narrated by old Sonjo men at mgongo village during field work. 16 Report on mediation on the Batemi –Loita Conflict –Held at Olmotonyi Forest Training Cenntre August 31st –September 4/2004, p.1. 17 Ibid.

19

United Arabs Emirates (UAE). 18 Then, citizens living in Loliondo Game

Controlled Area (LGCA) created an open conflict due to the indigenous land

dispossessions. Several debates were made questioning the property right of the

Indigenous. This was followed by complains that the Government has not given the

conflict its due weight to end it.

The co – existence of the two groups of people have always reflected certain

ambiguity ranging from hostility to administration surrounding forest of Loita

hills. Ole Nangoro in his article19 said that, the land dispute prevalent in Loliondo

and Sale Division occurred in the borderland area or in wildlife conservation area,

such as Loliondo game controlled area, the most heavy violent disputes took place

from 1980`s, involving heavy raiding, theft, by armed bandits destruction of homes,

property and death of many.20

18  Mwananchi 17th /20 /2001. Mwarabu apewa ruksa loliondo na JWTZ yapewa magari ya ghuba 19 Ole Nangoro, B. (1998).’Branding the land Maasai Response to Resource and Tenure Security and Social change,” pp. 15-80. 20 See also the daily News 23rd 11 1998, Daily New 12th and 15th /1 /2002. And Sunday News 20th/ 1 /1 /2000

20

1.5 Literature Review

Sanna Ojalammi 21 deals with specific land disputes, which took place in 1990 in

the Loliondo and Sale Divisions of Ngorongoro. The author being the geographer

shows that territoriality, boundary, property and relations of power in geographical

space as being the main reasons for the problems. He further opines that the reason

behind the problem is the lack of communal land rights, since the existing one is

based on the English property law systems. However, as stated earlier on, these

cannot be the root causes of the problem since the problem started many years

before those transformations. On his part, Shivji22 propounds that from 1990’S

lands disputes have become common in Tanzania due to poor management of land

matters.

Territoriality is an important part of social relations, and implies the existence of

equal social relations on deferent geography scales; propounded by Holloway23.

Therefore, this defines human territoriality within this study as an attempt to

effect influence or control actions, interactions (of people, things and relationship)

by asserting and attempting to enforce control over specific geographical areas.

Therefore, what I noted is how this principle is applied or enforced; sometime

Government used it as the weapon to grab the land of the poor.

Blomley24 is of the opinion that law has a geographical aspect because it is

formalized, implemented and enforced within a specific context. Generally law

21 Ojalammi, Op. cit., p. 14. 22 Shivji, I., & Kapinga, W. (1998).The land and Maasai Rights in Ngorongoro,p. 114. 23 Ojalammi, loc. cit., p. 104. 24 Blomley, K. (1994).Law Space Geography of the Power, p. 328.

21

and property are both geographical and political. This is an assertion by Mustafa25

who says that, law and state apparatus are inextricably linked in the process of

production of social special patens of access to resources, and empowerment of

certain social agents in the process. Blomley 26 says that state has a legal monopoly

over the land territory through legal enactments. In principle, law should provide

tools for administrations and judicial procedure to protect the land rights.

The study shows the multiple legal situation in Tanzania, whereby land and

resource property has accommodated notions of private, common /collective or

granted law in land ownership in the beginning of the 1990’s. State law also

lagged decades behind states policy changes. Tenga, 27 went on saying that

changes in law and property have taken place with force and violence ever since

the colonial time example the land ordinance 1923 remodified and re- co -

structuring the local systems of customary land tenure from 1921 on wards.

Peter and Saudin28 say the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act has some glaring

weakness like liberation of economy hailed as policy that will open avenues

through which the local and foreign investors would walk together to prosperity but

this has not been achieved because the law is silent on the joint ventures and

obligation to investors.

25 Mustafa,D.(2005).Colonial Law ; Contemporary water issues in Pakistan, pp. 20, 817-37. 26 Blomley,K. (2004).Unsettling The City, Urban Land and the Politics on Property. 27 Tenga, R.(1991).“Tanzania Land Law, A Paper Presented in Proceedings of Arusha Workshop on land Policy” August 27-29 -1991. 28 Peter, M.& Mwakaje, S.(2004).Investment in Tanzania, pp. 27-28.

22

Lane’s study (1991)29 shows that the disruption of the Barbeig people’s land use,

and their pastoral economic was due to allocated lands grant to National Food

Cooperation (NAFCO) and Canada Tanzania wheat Programme.

Other writers like Potkanski30 argued that Sonjo and Maasai dispute was due to

competitions over water, he made a study and found the resource based conflict

between the two hostile group. Mbonile31 with the case of Pangani Basin says that

immigrations of people should be taken as the major cause of resource based

conflicts.

Some of the resource based conflicts, are due to forced migrations of pastoralist

from their local areas, this include eviction of the Maasai from Ihefu Valley to

Lindi from Ngorongoro to Oldonyosambu and the eviction of members of the

same ethnic group from Rufiji and Kilosa. Also ITV32 reported the conflict

between nomadic pastoralist and herders at kisarawe. Mustafa33 argues that law

can be contingent, political and contestable often perpetuating and legitimizi

exploitative and oppressive geographies of social power.

ng

29 Lane, C. (1991). Alienation of Barbeig Pasture Land: Policy implication on Development of Pastoralism in Tanzania, p.327. 30 Potkanski.et al,.(1998),Water Scarcity and Property Regims and irrigation Management in Sonjo, pp. 27, 84-116. 31 Mbonile, J. (2003).Migration and Intensification of Water Conflicts in Pangani Basin; Tanzania, pp. 1-28. 32 On 6th March, 2008. 33 Mustafa, op. cit., pp. 20, 817 -835.

23

Some people have translated to mean, that there was no need to respect boundaries

and it was great incentive to lawlessness. These local boundary problems seem to

be maximized by conflict between customary law and land law.

Babiker 34 says the existing policies and legal institutional framework were put in

place in 1950s, and the tensions between the state legislations in Sudan and

customary land regimes, continual grabbing of land and displacement of pastoralists

were leading for conflicts among pastoralists, commercial farmers, sedentary

farmers and state security forces.

34 Babiker, M. (2007). Fighting For Inclusions Conflicts among Pastoralists in Eastern Africa and the Horn, pp 103-104.

24

1.6 Hypotheses

The reasons behind the problem seem to be the state intervention by

grabbing the land, imposing hard and unknown laws, squarely with unfair

formulated policies to majority. Citizens from the grass root are not

involved in policy making.

The Overlapping and failure of the following laws around and within the

disputed areas, “the Local Government Laws, Forest Laws, Land Laws,

Conservation Law, Environmental Law, Wildlife Laws and Laws of

Immigrations” manifested to be key players to the problem.

The rights to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural resources have

been put in jeopardy. The parasitic stratum between Investors through

Government manifested how Natural resource curse play a role to endlessly

resource based conflicts in Tanzania and Africa in general.

25

1.6Methodologies

The case study area was the Sale Division and Loliondo Division in Ngorongoro

District. This study has been substantively selected due to the following reasons:

The area has been historically facing the dispute between Maasai and Sonjo/Batemi,

Pastoralists vs investors and sometime Maasai themselves. The following villages

are victims of conflicts. Loosoito, Malon, Eyasi/Mdito (Sonjo), Kisangoro (Sonjo),

Mughole (Sonjo) and Nga’rwa. The dispute most of the time breaks along the

border land areas of these villages and wildlife conservation area like LGCA.

Substantive field research was conducted to generate primary data. Participatory

methodologies were employed, such as interviews, questionnaire, and story telling

and group discussion. Participatory method of data collection was very important as

it provides additional knowledge to the researcher. The field work meant to meet

Government officials, communities and civil society operating in the area. These

methods have been selected because of the nature of the area and people. It

demands, sometime to meet elders and have group discussion with them and have

their testimonies as they have long experience of the conflicts, questionnaires were

directed to Police officers, leaders and district council officers. Library research was

used as another method of collecting data, libraries visited including University of

Dar es Salaam libraries.

26

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW ON THE LAWS AND NATIONAL POLICIES RELATING

RESOURCE BASED CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN TANZANIA

2.0 Introduction

Policies and laws are the tools that a society, through the institutions of

Government, use to regulate the use, management, and ownership of its resources.

It is important, however, to distinguish between the purposes and functions of a

policy, on the one hand, and a law, on the other. A policy describes the objectives

and aims for a given sector such as land, education, health care, etc. A policy

describes how the management of a sector will be organized, what roles different

stakeholders will play, and the principles that should govern decision-making.

Laws determine the rights possessed by different institutions and individuals. Laws

provide the penalties for violating their provisions and provide guidance for courts

to enforce them; laws also restrict any kind of illegal practice. Courts in terms of

interpreting laws, by contrast, can as well use policies.

At the same time laws and National policies in deferent places and time, can be

seen as the factor behind everlasting conflicts within our communities. This can be

manifested from initial point of policy formulation and implementation of the law.

To reveal this, the following laws and national policies in relation resource based

conflict in Tanzania were visited.

27

2.1 Land Law and National Land Policy

According to the National Land Policy of 1995, all land is public and the President

is the trustee on behalf of all citizens. The policy identifies several land categories

like general land, reserve land (Over 25 % of Tanzania’s land mass is devoted to

national parks, most of which are at present delineated from the general land) and

village land. General land,35 which includes unoccupied or unused, is currently the

one available to pastoralists for grazing their animals and smallholder farmers for

harvesting forage. However, the land can always be allocated to reserves, national

parks or villages to the pastoralist’s disadvantage.

The land has for several decades been shrinking through reallocation and

expansion of cultivation while livestock population has increased. There are very

few, if any, areas that have been set aside and protected by law for communal

grazing lands for pastoral communities, to add salt to the wound Tanzania

Investment Act provided all lands for investors. No effective land use planning and

village land gazettement have been undertaken and this has allowed processes of

encroachment to develop unabated.

Tanzanian Land law, prior to 1895, was under customary rule by respective tribes

or communities. In 1895, following the onset of German colonial rule, an Imperial

Decree was issued on Land. After 1920 the British administration began passing

several laws to govern, land including the Land Ordinance Cap 113 in 192336. This

35 National Land Policy 1995, Paragraph 4.1.1 36 Stolla, P. (2004). “A Comparative Analysis of the Land Acts of 1999 and the Land Ordinance 1923.”

28

law governed land in Tanganyika/Tanzania until May 1, 2001, when the Land

Act37 and the Village Land Act38 came into operation. This has provided a new

framework for Land tenure in Tanzania. 39

The Land Act and Village Land Act now govern all land in Tanzania. These laws

state that all land is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of the

citizens.40 Land is divided into three categories: reserved land, village land, and

general land, which are managed according to differing provisions.41

These legislations provide for different powers in different Government

institutions, including the President, the Commissioner, and the Minister for

Lands. District Councils and Village Councils also have powers for land

management, and the latter are the principle management institution for village

lands. Dispute settlement institutions are also provided for in terms of different

courts and a new village institution, the Village lands Council, as well as a

District Land and Housing Tribunal.42

A number of central aspects of land tenure also remain relatively unchanged as

compared to the situation under the Land Ordinance, including: The corpus of land

37 No. 4 of 1999[CAP 113 R.E 2002] 38 No. 5 of 1999 [CAP 114 R.E 2002] 39 Stolla, P. (2004). “A Comparative Analysis of the Land Acts of 1999 and the Land Ordinance 1923.” 40 Lamd Act 1999, s 3 (1) (a). 41 The land and Village Acts Part II. 42 Act no 18 of 1995

29

tenure regime developed during the colonial times continued to apply fully after

independence with only one change: ‘President’ replaced ‘Governor.’43

All land in Tanzania remains public land under the President, Village land

management remains under community authority. The President retains the

authority to revoke rights of occupancy in the public interest (subject to

compensation)44. Land tenure is still defined by either granted rights of occupancy

or customary rights of occupancy (now defined as equal under the law).

Many people are not aware of the existence or content of the new legislation. A

number of the new institutions do not exist and their formation will be time-

consuming. Certain new institutions, such as the District Land and Housing

Tribunal, are not provided for in terms of composition by the laws and not found

down to people.

Prior to the new land legislations, Tanzania had already adopted a National Land

Policy of 1995, which the country had not previously had in the years since

independence. A number of land management problems spurred the adoption of the

Land Policy, including population growth, increasing demand for agricultural land,

expansion of urban areas, need for investment, increasing disputes over land, the

need for a land market, and uncertainty in land tenure in rural areas.

43 Tenga, Op.cit. 44 Village Land Act 1999, s 4

30

The National Land Policy is concerned primarily with four key issues: land

allocation, land ownership, land use, and land dispute settlement. However, it also

touches on fundamental issues such as land management and administration, rights

of women to use and own land, land use and conservation, land transfers or sales,

land acquisition, revocation of rights of occupancy and compensation, land dispute

settlements, documentation of land rights, and surveying and mapping.

2.3 Forest Law, Wild Life Law and Policy

The documentation and legislation supports forestry activities in Tanzania,

including Forest legislation from 1957, the Tanzania Forest Action Plans from the

1980’s and 1990’s, the National Environment Action Plan of 1994, and the National

Environmental Policy of 1997. In 1998 the National Forest Policy was released,

and in 2001 the Ministry published Community-based Forest Management

Guidelines.

The management of Tanzania’s wildlife resources has for the past quarter century

been based on the legal content of the Wildlife Conservation Act of 197445. The

Wildlife Conservation Act represents the ‘fences and fines’ approach to wildlife

management.

45 Act of 1974 [CAP283 R.E 2002]

31

The two core elements of the Act are: Provisions for establishing and managing

protected areas such as Game Reserves and Game Controlled Areas. Provisions for

regulating the use and consumption of wildlife and wildlife products.

GCA are described in the Wildlife Conservation Act as areas where hunting is

regulated by the Director of Wildlife. No restrictions are placed on the land uses of

people living in GCA- only their rights to use and consume wildlife resources. By

contrast, in Game Reserves restrictions are placed on entry, cutting of vegetation,

and grazing of livestock.46

The Wildlife Conservation Act provides the legal framework for regulating the

main form of wildlife utilization in Tanzania, which is tourist hunting. Tourist

hunting is carried out in much of the nation in areas such as Game Reserves, Game

Controlled Areas, and Open Areas. The basis of tourist hunting management is that

the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism leases a

block- a designated hunting area in reserved or village land- to a commercial tourist

hunting company.

The Policy describes the problems facing the wildlife sector as including:

1. The failure of wildlife conservation as a form of land use to compete

adequately with other forms of land use, especially for rural

communities. 46 Wild Life Act.,ss 9, 12 ,14 and 84

32

2. The loss of wildlife habitats to settlement, agriculture, grazing, mining

and logging due to human population increase.

3. Escalating illegal wildlife off-take and trade.

4. The existing land tenure system and the wildlife resource ownership by

the State hinder investment in and development of wildlife-related

industry by the private sector.

5. Inadequate wildlife user rights granted to rural communities.

These legal opportunities have existed for years. Local communities have not used

them due to the dominance of the state-centered conservation paradigm, which

restricted Community participation in wildlife and natural resource management.

The current policy also does not adequately recognize the transhumant, or nomadic,

nature of many communities living within or near wildlife areas and Tanzania's

protected estate. Pastoralism in semi-arid environments requires regular movement

and flexibility, in order to utilize the different climate-driven resource niches this as

been proclaimed even by Potkanski.47

2.4 Investment Law and Policy.

A number of developing countries recently have been busy enacting laws, and

amending the existing one in order to provide incentives to investors and giving

them a red carpet treatment. 48

47 Potkanski, T. (1997). Property Concepts, Herding Patterns and Management of Natural Resources among the Ngorongoro and Sale Maasai of Tanzania. Pastoral Land Tenure Series No. 6. 48 Peter & Mwakaje.Op. cit., p. 1.

33

The main objective of Tanzania investment policy in tourism industry is to expand

a diversify tourism industry, encourage foreign and local investors, On the other

hand this is not what is in the practice, local investors are ignored and indigenous

do not benefit from their resources, only foreign investors investing on their land.

The only song by government leaders is that pastoralist are enemies of environment,

which is quite wrong as it’s all known pastoralism and wild life coexist.49

No promotion and equitable growth throughout the country. Peter and Mwakaje50

said the Tanzania investment Act51 was aimed to attract foreigners to invest in our

country and few local people got in by accident. Less than 1997 Act everything is

up for grabs without any inhibition, the investment promotion Act52 which was

repealed by 1997 Act, was some how fair to our land as it indicated reserved areas

for public activities.

2.05 Firearms Laws and Policies.

The problem of the proliferation, misuse and illicit trafficking in small arms and

light weapons in Tanzania has had a tangled history due to the country’s unique

geographic location and its role in African liberation wars. During the 1970s and

1980s, Tanzania was the centre of liberation movements, for Southern African

countries, that were under colonial rule. Tanzania offered military training to

freedom fighters belonging to these movements. However, these liberation

49 Olengurumwa, O. (2007).”The Fate of Pastoralist in Tanzania” .Paper Presentenced During OSOTWA Workshop on the Future of Pastoralist in Tanzania. 50 Peter and Mwakaje.op. cit., p. 19 51 No 26 of 1997 52 No 10 of 1990

34

movements also had their own command and organizational structures, and were

solely responsible for the distribution of small arms, light weapons and ammunition

to their troops without interference by the host country. Other reasons behind, is

Tanzania being surrounded by war torn countries.

Tanzania doesn’t have an effective legislation to eradicate the illicit trade of

firearm. The Arms and Ammunition Act of 1991 regulates the acquisition of

firearms in Tanzania. A license or permit is required for all types of firearms, and

there are mandatory waiting periods, training certifications and background checks.

Tanzania is also signatory of the Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the

proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and

the Horn of Africa.53

Grace, M. a Tanzania delegates to United Nation General Assembly 54 said that,

following the adoption of the 2001 Programme of Action, her country had formed

its own national strategy and joined other regional initiatives including the SADC

Firearms protocol.55 In 2003, the Government reviewed its national firearms

legislation to ensure that it was in line with the Programme and the SADC initiative.

It had also committed resources to addressing the development-related aspects of

53 General Assembly DC/3032 Review Conference on Illicit Small Arms Trade June 2006 54 Ibid

55 2001.SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials

35

the illegal small arms trade, which fuelled conflict and hindered socio-economic

development and, in war-torn areas, hindered humanitarian access.

The United Republic of Tanzania believed that efforts to track the spread of the

weapons would be greatly improved, with the adoption of an internationally binding

agreement. And, while some instruments of a political nature and character had

been somewhat helpful, it was clear that more needed to be done.56

56 General Assembly DC/3032 Review Conference on Illicit Small Arms Trade JUNE 2006

36

CHAPTER THREE

PRESENTATION, DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE

FINDINGS

3.0 The Issue of International Border and Illegal Immigrations

Loliondo and Sale Divisions of Ngorongoro District closely border Narok County

Council in neighboring Kenya. The nature of people living across this international

boundary is almost the same. People found in Kenya Masaai region are almost the

same people found in Loliondo divisions. The three Maasai clans who are Loita,

Purko and Laitayok commonly found on the land of both countries. The territory of

Loita Maasai of Tanzania is a part of the greater Loita territory, which extends

deeply into Kenya. Artificial borders57 created by colonial masters have

theoretically remained. The Loita continue to move across borders as if they did not

exist in the first place.

This situation has been further complicated by the factor of illegal arms, attributed

to illegal trade with Somali bandits who flocked the district in the late 1980s and

early 1990s.58 Guns have been used in recent conflicts, raising the stakes for both

the protagonists and local administration officials59.

57 Before colonialism we had no boundaries which separate Maasai from Kenya and Tanzania the Whole Region was called Maasai Province. Story by Old Maasai Leaders. (Laigwanak) and Sonjo elders ( Wenamiji). 58 Interview with Wenamiji (sonjo elders) August 2008. 59 Ibid.

37

It is also observed that the Batemi are more militaristic than the Maasai, with a

number of Batemi having been members of the armed forces.60

There are claims that during skirmishes between the two sides, Kenyan Loita

Maasai are ferried across the border to fight the Batemi. A further complication

comes from the proximity of this area to the border with Kenya, and the fact that the

Loita Maasai traverses this border to Loliondo on the Tanzania side.

Moreover61, the Batemi claim that additional pressure on land and natural resources

comes from the large number of Kenyan Loita Maasai who have migrated into

Loliondo Division. Furthermore, the informal and unregulated cross-border trade

that constitutes a major component of the local economy on both sides of the border

is controlled largely by the Loita, as a result of which the agricultural produce of the

Batemi has often failed to find market as they would have to cross over ‘enemy’

territory on both sides of the border62.

We can therefore say, with nature of people living in Loliondo and sales divisions

the laws of Immigrations have failed to accommodate the nature of this problem

around this international boundary.

60 Ngorongoro police officer (OCD) 61 PINGO’S.(2004).Report on the Conflicts Between Loita and Batemi, p.10 62 Ibid.

38

Source: Sanna Ojalammi

39

3.1 Proliferation of Firearms

The same border is freely used by both Sonjo and Maasai, to import illegal firearms

as to be used during the conflicts.63 The OCD during interview said that, up to July

2008 Loliondo Police station managed to receive surrendered fire arms 18 in total

and these are SMG.SAR, AK 47 and G3 from Arash, Oldosambu, Kisangiro,

Oloirien, Yasimdito, Oloipiri, Enguserosambu and Maaloni.The table below shows

the number of illegally possessed weapons collected from rival groups in

Ngorongoro.64

Table 1: A List of Illegally Possessed Weaponry/Shells Collected On April –

August 2008

NO DATE TYPE OF FIRE

ARM

QUANTITY PLACE FOUND

1 5/4/2008 SMG NO.3321 2 Enguserosambu

village

2 07/04/2008 SMG NO.56-

13009895

6 Maaloni village

3 08/04/2008 SAR NO.

25032510

2 Enguserosambu

4 30/06/2008 -------------- 15 Eyasi Mdito

5 30/06/2008 SMG

NO.6049924

15 Piyaya

Compiled From Data Provided by Ngorongoro OCD Mr. Mponjoli

63 Interview with Ngorongoro police officer (OCD), July-August 2008. 64 Ibid

40

The proliferation of firearms is associated with Kenya Fire arms policy during

1980’s where the policy in Kenya by then allowed every Kenyan to possess

firearms purposely to fight common enemies who were the Somali bandits. There

are many people who posses firearms illegally from neighboring country.

The use of firearms has risen to alarmingly high levels in Kenya during the past

decade, a trend blamed on the easy availability of small arms, mostly pistols and

assault rifles65. Armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia, some

parts of Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region, have been cited as one way through

which illegal guns have fallen into the hands of gangsters and livestock thieves.

Eregae66 said most of the weapons used in urban crime, cattle rustling and

poaching were smuggled into Kenya from neighboring countries that have

experienced civil strife. According to a source within the Kenyan law enforcement,

an illegal pistol would sell in some Nairobi suburbs for about 10,000 shillings

(US$140). Larger weapons, such as AK-47s, which are not readily available from

smugglers in the city, would cost three times more.

Conflicts have been also caused by cultural differences and influx of immigrants

that have resulted into competition over resources. Also the same border allowed

the Somali bandits to cross the border in 1980’s and later became a source of

weapons to the fighting groups in Ngorongoro. Mbonile (supra) examines how

65 IRIN (2008) In-Depth: Guns Out of Control: the continuing threat of small arms.

66 Ibid

41

immigration and other processes have exacerbated the water use problems in the

Pangani Basin and have led to a resource-based conflict. Mbonile found that the

major processes that have intensified the water conflicts in the Pangani Basin were

the high and rapid increases in both human and livestock populations.

Babikeri67 said the disorder, poor policies and insecurity has encouraged pastoralist

Gadaref in Sudan to posses arms for deffence.Francis, K68 says the deadly pastoral

conflicts in Kenya are further compounded by massive armament and the

corresponding rise in civil militarism among pastoralist communities.

3.2 Lack of Land Use Planning and Proper Resource Management

Proper land use planning at both the District and village levels is the major

Contributing factor to such conflicts.69 Certainly one would even suspect the lack of

land use planning capacity at district level. The little land use planning that is being

done is actually a simple demarcation of boundaries between villages.

Disorder in land tenure and regime70’, is responsible for many conflicts in land in

the country. The situation in Ngorongoro and especially in Loliondo and Sale

Divisions is a living example of the subject chaotic and disorderly arrangement in

land management and administration Sale and Loliondo Divisions have no clear

boundaries to the extent that administrators do not even know the geographical

limits of their jurisdictions.

67 Babiker.Op. cit., p. 109 68 Ibid, p. 39 69 Kennedy, G. (2007).The Impact of Tanzania New Land Laws on Customary Lands Rights of

Pastoralists, p. 160 70 The report of the presidential Commission of Inquiry into land Matters(1992), Vol 1, p xii

42

There has never been a systematic demarcation of the two Divisions. The

boundaries of villages in the two Divisions are consequently contested and are a

major cause of the escalating violence. Babiker 71 says the existing policies and

legal institutional framework were put in place in 1950s and the tensions between

the state legislations in Sudan and customary land regimes and continual grabbing

of land and displacement of pastoralists was leading for conflicts among

pastoralists, commercial farmers, sedentary farmers and state security forces.

Current legal system does not define the boundaries between the two conflicting

sides. The land regime in our Republic knows nothing about tribal land boundaries

but village land boundaries. The situation in the two Divisions is such that people

do not talk of village boundaries but those of Loita Maasai and the Batemi. The

interest of the two groups is to protect and expand their traditional territories, much

against the interest of the other.

In Kilosa some of the areas that constitute the District are surveyed or have at least

been declared as planning areas. However a large portion of District is unsurveyed

,and as results we now see daily bloodshed in Kilosa.A study by Misana and

others72 in three village in Kilosa District namely Ilongea, Msalalani and Msingisi

revealed that all the 3 villages lacked certificates of titles land is governed by virtue

of the district and the village councils.

71 Babiker.Op. cit .,103-104 72 Mtwale, T. (2002).Conflicts Between Farmers and Pastoralists Over Land Use,pp. 20-29

43

The situation found in Kilosa is similar to what found in Ngorongoro. Villagers

have only derivative rights only to use land not to own land,this is the great source

of conflicts. In Ngorongoro only two villages out of 35 villages possess the

certificate of land ownership these are Ololosokwan and Engaresero.The rest of the

area are not surveyed or planned for multiples uses.

The range land act of 1973 and village and Ujamaa village act of 1975 both aimed

at eliminating customary rights through process of law. The latter category of

conflicts is caused almost entirely by disputes about village boundaries.

As villages seek to plan the use of their land, they reserve specific areas for

different purposes such as dry season grazing areas. Conflicts arise when

pastoralists from neighboring villages seek to have access to such reserved areas in

contravention of village land use plans, or without the authority of respective

village councils. Such village land use plans often change the traditional pattern of

access to land, and in the absence of wide consultations across villages, they

become a basis for conflict with those who still ascribe to traditional mechanisms of

land use.

In practice however, disputes about village boundaries often interface with

traditional rivalries between different sections, as appears to be the case between

Arash and Piyaya or Soitsambu and Oloipiri.73 Where such traditional rivalries do

not exist, neighboring villages are able to reach agreements on the use of land with

relative ease. However, such conflicts are routinely dealt with through traditional

73 Olenasha, W. (2008). Conservation versus pastoralism,Natural resource and conservation-related investments versus pastoralism,Farming versus pastoralism, and Pastoralism versus pastoralism

44

dispute resolution and conflict management mechanisms involving elders,

traditional institutions, systems and practices.

Apart from conflicts that can be traced to historical rivalries, there are new forms of

conflict arising within pastoral society as a result of modern influences and

practices. With break down of traditional practices and penetration of global

economics forces to the local level, such conflicts in many societies as for spatial

differences are concerned. During research work the following were noted relating

to the resource based conflicts

1. Human population increases.

2. Increasing demand for agricultural land and increasing conflicts between

farmers and pastoralists.

3. Uncertainty and confusion in land tenure in many rural areas.

4. Increasing pressure to make land available for investment purposes

following liberalization of the economy.

5. The need to regulate land transactions through a market in soil.

6. Increasing disputes over land tenure and ownership.

7. Poor land dispute settlement mechanisms.

45

Maasai Pastoralists grazing livestocks in Loliondo Division. This reveals main activities of people living in Loliondo and the way they coexist with environment.

SOURCE: Sannaa Ojalammi

46

3.3 Natural Resource Curse

Ngorongoro District is the richest District in Tanzania in terms of natural

resources, but surprisingly the district is leading in resource based conflicts and

poverty. In 1987 NLUPC from Dar es Salaam prepared land use plan for Loliondo

Division but was not gazetted. The land was to be divided into land allocation for

cultivation, pastoralism and conservation.

As stated earlier, the majority of Tanzanians live far below the “poverty line”

earning less than US $ 1 per day; Remember the average income per capital is

obtained by an arithmetically equal distribution of wealth, which no Utopia is

expected to achieve.

This is a parasitic stratum. It strengthened tour and travel companies in the same

way in which local communities are weakened. It is polarisation of wealth and

poverty at two opposite extremes. It is all sheer robbery, criminal plunder of the

weak by the strong. To borrow the late Dr. Rodney’s (1970) phrase, “capitalism is

parading in without even a loin cloth to cover its nakedness.”

Condemnation of pastoralists and cultivators as simply trouble-mongers who must

be dealt with, has never ceased since 1992 when the Rio Conference 74came up

with the CBC philosophy, Principle 21 emphasizes that in sustainable development

everyone is a user and provider of information. For example, Dr. Jafar Kideghesho

of Wildlife Management at Sokoine University of Agriculture has written a number

74 1992 Rio declaration.

47

of papers clamouring for CBC. Yet he writes, “Habitat degradation attributable to

severe overgrazing by livestock was the major cause for the decline.

The eviction of Maasai pastoralists from the reserve [Mkomazi] in 1988 reversed

the situation by lessening the degradation and thus restoring the conducive

environment for wildlife species” (Kideghesho, 2001).75 He does not seem to have

even a clue that eviction of people from their land, under any cover, is a “gross

violation of human rights.” Praising such crimes should not come from someone

who is trumpeting for CBC, this is what Stoclohm Declaration76 and Arthur

Convention77 provide against.

In reference to the Ramsar Site Convention78 the Lake Natron area was declared to

be Ramsar site without peoples concern and hence became a threat to presence of

pastoralist living around the lake on their jurisdiction and sovereignty over natural

resources.

The director of wildlife has more power to grant concession for exclusive hunting

rights without involving villagers. Practically this has taken place in Loliondo

where the whole LGCA was granted to OBC and left indigenous as squatters on

their land. OBC hunting activities have long struggled to get accommodated within

traditional grazing patterns of pastoralists in the area, which struggle has at times

precipitated into sore relationships and open conflicts with villagers. The land

leased to OBC and the other sold to Thomson Safari in Loliondo are seasonal

75 Mtwale.Op.cit., pp. 29-40. 76 1972 Stockholm Declaration. 77 1998 Aarhus Convention. 78 1971 Ramsa Site Convention

48

migrated corridors. The same situation was found taking place in Sudan whereby

most of the pastoralist seasonal migrated corridors were granted to investors from

U.A.E, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.79

The Ngorongoro Conservation Authority (NCA) occupies more than a half of the

District land (59%). All people within the conservation area have no right of

ownership and even villages are not recognized. Mount Lengai and Lake Natron

Game controlled have been hunted by NCA and hash Project companies.The

erosion of pastoralist land to the hand of outsiders did not cease, currently Thomson

Safaris an American company possess 12000 acres of pastoralists grazing land.

Box 1: the uses proposed for farm No. 373 in Soitsambu80

(i) 2250 acres shall be used for campsites in several areas

(ii) 1500 acres will be used for building Tourism Hotel and Lodge

(iii) 500 acres will be used for building cultural Bomas to the residence

(iv) 250 acres shall be used for curio shops

(v) 7500 acres are for game driving and walking

(vi) 200 acres for staff village

OBC has not only impinged on Maasai grazing rights, the company has attempted

to restrict freedom of human movement regardless of the presence of cattle. In

79 Babiker.Op. cit., pp.94-95. 80 Olenasha, William. (2008). Resource Based Conflicts in Ngorongoro District: A Draft Report.

49

1998, OBC erected a gate on the only road to the northern part of LGCA. They

controlled access to the road. Those living north of Loliondo town needed special

permission to go through the gate; otherwise, they would have to take a route that

was twice as long. The road was finally opened in 1999, after the matter being taken

to the parliamentary debates.

This reality has prompted a number of studies and investigations over conflict in

Ngorongoro in recent years, mostly by development partners, students and civil

society or organizations active in the district or concerned with pastoralism,

development and conflict management.

Resource-based conflicts should constitute one of the major development

challenges in Ngorongoro. Indeed, this is consistent with the reality all over the dry

lands of Africa where conflict has become endemic. In a global review of

pastoralism and conflict, have shown how areas occupied by pastoralists are

characterised by conflicts emanating from competition for natural resources81. In a

sense the survey does no more than update and confirm what previous studies,

including those by Kratli and Swift,82 already concluded and asserted: that

competition for access to range resources leads to conflict among pastoralists and

between them and other livelihoods and land use systems that seek the use of the

same resources.

81 Michele, et al. (undated). Herding on the Brink: Towards a Global Survey of Pastoral Communities and Conflict. (An Occasional Working Paper from the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy) 82 Kratli, et al. (1999). Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review.

50

Major challenges to the security of pastoral land tenure include expansion of

agriculture, oil and mineral extraction, tourism-driven conservation policies, and

Western notions of private property and resource ownership, which promote

individualization and privatization of pastoral commons.

In response to pressures for privatization and individualization, Governments,

including that of the United Republic of Tanzania, have often implemented

sweeping changes in land tenure with the support of international donors,

particularly the World Bank.

The situation in Ngorongoro District is defined by competition for access to land

and natural resources underpinned by competing land uses and livelihoods. The

land use competition, which often translates into conflict, can be classified into four

major categories83 although of a much smaller scale, there are also conflicts in

Ngorongoro which pit pastoralists against pastoralists. Such conflicts occur either

between different sections of the Maasai community, for example between the

Purko and the Loita or between Laitayok and Purko.

The former category of conflicts is explained largely by historical rivalries which

create latent animosity capable of flaring up into violence at the slightest excuse. It

is difficult with such latent rivalries to distinguish between instances where

83 Conservation versus Pastoralism, Natural Resource and Conservation-related

Investments versus Pastoralism, Farming versus Pastoralism, and Pastoralism versus Pastoralism.

51

individual differences are “communalized” by either side to feed their historical

differences and instances of real inter-sectional disputes or conflicts. There is a

clear tendency in such cases for individual differences, especially where they result

in any form of violence to be enlarged into communal conflicts as both parties

mobilize the support of their families and relatives.

3.4 Privatation, Acquisition and Investment Policy

Potkanski 84 says From the 1990s onwards, land disputes between settled

agricultural and mobile pastoral people have become more common in Tanzania.

These land disputes have been due to land alienation and multiple allocations of

land/resource rights on village lands.

From the end of the 1980s this has been the case especially in Tanzania, in the

Districts of Monduli, Kiteto and Siman-jiro, Kilosa, Tarime and Usangu. Conflicts

occurred in places where large-scale agriculture and/or mining rights have been

granted to private investors by the State. In Arusha Region underlying causes to

conflict include both territorial issues and property claims where the access and

control to critical resources has been very important. Conflicts on village lands have

developed when State authorities have favored land allocations to cultivators at the

expense of the pastoralists or offered to investors at the expense of pastoralists.85

In land disputes, villagers use territorial strategies to guard their village land and

property rights against encroachment by “outsiders” The village Land Act makes it

84 Potknaski, T. (1994).Livestock as Collective Conflicting with Individual Property, P.64. 85 Nipashe 9th /7/2009. Nyumba za Wafugaji zachomwa moto, p. 8.

52

legally for village lands to be alienated to non village private investor it has a

potential for further approbation of common land and privatization.86

Chachage concedes that liberalization has prompted high marginalization of the

rural poor as a lot of pieces of land are being alienated from peasants and

pastoralists87. Thus causing conflicts over natural resources. This was possible

because when they move elsewhere in order to secure for forming and grazing ,

they cause conflict with people they meet, we have at hand live examples at Rufiji,

Ihefu, Kilosa and lindi.

Shivji and Kapinga88 states that a number of controversial alienation have justified

over past few years in forms of promoting investment and attracting foreign

investment and attracting foreign investor land has been alienated to hoteliers for

purpose of tourism in and around National parks as will as on prime beach later.

We currently have great conflicts with hoteliers at Ngorongoro who wants to build

hotels almost every where at conservation area while the laws prohibits indigenous

to build modern buildings. Also exclusive hunting right granted to outsider like

(OBC) in Loliondo all these is evident from discussions with villagers and other

stakeholders in the District, that a major cause of conflict between conservation

related investors and local communities in the district is the information gap that

surrounds the grant of licenses to the investors, the terms under which the licenses

86 Village Land Act, Part III 87 Mtwale.Op. cit., p. 25 88 Shivji &Kapinga. (1998). The Land Maasai Rights in Ngorongoro Tanzania, p. 24

53

are granted, and the benefits that communities are supposed to get from the

operations.

A key cause of this situation is the lack of clarity about the legal status of the land

and the relative powers and responsibilities of the central government and the

village authorities regarding the management of access to the land for purposes of

conservation related investments.

A key example is OBC in 1992 was granted the land without people’s consultation

and District council signed on behalf of villages. The above act of District councils

amounts to violation of constitutional rights. 89 The situation is further complicated

by the multiplicity of policy, legal and institutional mandates surrounding the

Loliondo Game Controlled Area.

The allocation of hunting blocks is done by the Director of Wildlife in exercise of

powers that are not clearly regulated under the Wildlife Conservation Act. In fact,

complaints have been raised to the effect that “in practice, the allocation of hunting

blocks has reflected the Director's personal whim rather than the consistent

application of” guidelines.90

While such complaints come from professional hunters and hunting companies,

which feel that there is inadequate clarity about the criteria for the granting of

hunting licenses and the allocation of hunting blocks, they in part reflect the

information gap referred to above. The entire process takes place in Dar es Salaam 89 Article 18 &24 of the Constitution of Republic of Tanzania. 90 Rugemeleza Nshala, ‘Granting Hunting Blocks: the need for reform’, (Sept 1999), posted in the website of Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), www.leat.or.tz/publications/hunting.blocks/index, accessed 11th October 2008

54

without any reference to the local communities. In particular, village councils

complain that they are never consulted even though the operations of the hunting

blocks ultimately touch on lands that fall under their mandates within the meaning

of the Village Land Act.

Loss of Land though Government acquisition and creation of conservation areas

and game reserves have deprived people’s Land. Such measurers have created Land

less mobile pastoralists and farmers. Shivji (1998)91 says Government leaders serve

only government interests and policies and put aside majority interest.

At another level, the competition for tourist business is feeding on old animosities

and creating more conflict. Moreover, there are now claims that some tour

operators are using villagers to fight their competitors92. During the Soitsambu

village assembly on August 2008 I managed to attend the meeting and noted some

grievances as follows: one old man named Oletoroge complained “we are not

ready to live with Investors, like OBC and Thomson but our fellow Laitayok have

been corrupted to sale the land” In fact, the ongoing dispute between Thomson

Safaris and the village of Soitsambu is explained in some quarters by reference to

competition between tours operators, as those with existing businesses seek to

protect their turfs.

Lack of community participation in land use planning and zoning for different use

is the main source of conflicts Shiviji (1998). The central focus of the large

91 Shivji & Kapinga .Op. cit. 92 Personal observation from Soit sambu village general assembly August 2008

55

majority of complaints received of concision on land was not considered

(hatushirikishwi) that was a constant cry. The result of that to people will take law

in their own hand to raid and killing one other.

Peter and Mwakaje93 says the 1997 Tanzania investment Act has some glaring

weakness like liberation of economy hailed as policy that will open avenues

through which the local and foreign investors would walk together to prosperity but

this has not been achieved because the law is silent on the joint ventures and

obligations to investors.

3.5 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

There is a lack of conflicts management in multiple resources user. This should be

resolved by mix institutions comprised both customary and formal system.LC

(1994) has indicated that there are many authorities dealing with land matters. This

has brought more problem than even before because there is no clear authority

dealing within land matter especially in areas with multiple land use and resources

like Ngorongoro.

Investigation comes out and revealed that people with land dispute don’t send their

cases anywhere for deliberation this is because of lack of clear authority to deal

with land matters. Courts do not resolve many land problems. Mwamfupe and

Mg’ong’o said94, the persistence of open clashes in many Villages of Kilosa

District, is an indication of the weaknesses in the reconciliatory bodies. In Kambala

village, for example, Maasai pastoralists complained of biased judgments that favor

93 Peter & Mwakaje.Op cit., pp. 27-28. 94 Mwamfupe & Mng’ong’o .Op.cit .,p. 32

56

crop cultivators. As one pastoralist put it “Only in one case out of 10 will a Maasai

win a dispute against crop cultivators”. On the other hand, crop cultivators argue

that pastoralists are, in most cases, the main offenders as echoed by one villager “It

is very rare that crop cultivators invade the Maasai’s grazing lands”.

Also some complainants cannot afford to report their complaints to courts. This is

because courts are not easily accessible to ordinary people. Also poor behavior of

leaders who lack accountability, people loose trust on the Government machinery

and it is bureaucrats at various levels. The gross negligence in settling lands use

conflicts has led to the persistent of conflicts for long time without any solution.

Kapinga says these include undermine of local tenure arrangement land

appropriation and misuse of leadership position to grab land.95

The experience and discussions with key informants in the study villages further

revealed that the machinery used to solve conflicts helped the growth of the

conflicts. For instance in 2004 the District high leadership and Police force was

condemned of arresting only one side of the fighting groups, the prisoners were the

Maasai leaders ;Tadei Olekoiye (ward councilor) and others.

- The traditional institution and methods used in Maasai and Barbeig shows

that the traditional conflicts resolution processes with society in Tanzania

have capacity to have conflicts solved.

- Peter96 says the major weakness of Tanzania investment Act is the lack

clear dispute mechanism for dealing with disputes arising out of investment

95 Mtwale .Op. cit., p.25. 96 Peter & Mwakaje.Op. cit., p. 48.

57

, it addresses only foreigners and local investors totally excluded .It also

silence on the conflicts that arise between the foreigners and indigenous.

- Police as enforcement organ is condemned for not being strategic in curing

the problem but we can’t blame the Police force because their role in solving

conflicts in Loliondo is basing on temporal measurers, only to cool the

dispute but not to end the animosity.

3.6 Villagization

Maganga, Shivji, Mvungi and Mwakyembe discussed problem of villagization at

different perspective97. Said to bring land struggle as well as conflict of various

magnitudes to coexist side by side with statutory ownership and incompatible

differences modes of economy were more mixed than ever before, exacerbation

resource use conflicts.

Maganga98 says, that happened because villagization was carried out without any

enabling legislation, therefore this alteration lead conflicts and endless disputes. In

other words one of the fundamental contradictions of villagization in Tanzania

appears to be that of aggravated lands use conflicts and pressure and weakening

institutional capacity in solving those conflicts.

Operation Vijiji was carried out without any enabling legislation under the premise

that since all the land could be allocated and re-allocated without legal

consequences.Shivji (1994) Says;

97 Mtwale.Op .cit., p. 29. 98 Ibid.

58

“Re-allocation and settlement was affected through the use of force. Allocation of

the villages was done by executive bodies such as DC, RC no one new what legal

refine will govern them.

The National Land Policy -1995 and Land Act -1999

Land Act was drafted and reaffirmed land continues to be vested in the President

and will be regulated on his behalf by the commissioner for lands. But there is no

difference with previous land refine. The only departure was to assert that “Land

has value” “become a market commodity”. The same thing to Village Land Act

provides for possibility of adjunctions and titling of village lands within village

lands but under supervision and ultimate power.

Tenga suggested that an important condition for resolving the apparent conflict

over land is to change land use and management policies land laws should allow

individual or groups to establish exclusive rights over land99 .

Sanna Ojalamm100 says in social native space, zoning policies have also caused

increased tenure insecurity and uncertainty of property due to land alienation, which

has led to varied land disputes in different places.

3.7. Overlapping of Laws

Existence of numerous pieces of land legislation.

Sanna Ojalammi101 says when thinking about law, it is also important to

remember that Africa has often had two parallel legal systems functioning at the

99 Ojalammi.Op. cit ., p. 80. 100 Ibid ., p 64

59

same level: state law and customary law. Also, overlap-ping land claims (modern

and customary) have existed side by side in social space. Customary law/tenure has

functioned at the level of peoples’ communities and statutory law has operated on

the national level.

Mr. Nelson of Sand County Foundation presented an apparent contradiction in the

legislation with respect to Game Controlled Areas and village lands. Game

Controlled Areas are created by the Wildlife Conservation Act102, and according to

the Land Act is therefore included under the definition of reserved lands.103 At the

same time, Game Controlled Areas in northern Tanzania overlap with demarcated

and registered village lands and are therefore included under the Village Land Act’s

definition of village lands.

Mr. Stolla stated that, the legislation did not intend land to be both reserved and

village lands, and that this was a contradiction and a flaw in the laws.104 Concern

was expressed as to the tenure security implications of this contradiction, and Mr.

Stolla advised that the only recourse would be harmonization of the laws by

Parliament.

Mtwale says one factor that brings about land conflict, is the existence of numerous

pieces of legislation controlling deferent land resources. Apart from contradicting

101 Ibid., pp. 90-100

102 The Wildlife Conservation Act 1974(R.E.2002) 103 Report on a Workshop on Land & Natural Resources Laws & Policies, Held in Arusha April 11 & 12, 2002 104 Peter, Stolla. (2005). “A Comparative Analysis of The Land Acts of 1999 and The Land Ordinance 1923

60

each other, often clash with indigenous property management system hence result

into insecurity to land tenure leading to unsustainable land use practices making

policies as well as legislation over resources ineffective and irrelevant to actual

situation.105

This study shows the multi-legal situation in Tanzania where land and resource

property has accommodated notions of private, common/collective or granted rights

in land ownership. The Wildlife Conservation Act does not define a game-

controlled area, and its provisions thereon are not very illuminating as regards the

status of persons who live within these areas.

The Act merely provides that the Minister may, by order in the Gazette declare any

area of Mainland Tanzania to be a game controlled area106; and then places certain

restrictions aimed at ensuring that animals are not trapped, wounded or killed.107

Such is the ambiguity about the import of these provisions that one hears claims

among certain groups in Loliondo that the local people have no rights to the land on

which they live. On the other hand, villagers in the area have applied for and

obtained certificates of village land under the Village Land Act.108.

Nevertheless, the multiple, policy, legal and institutional mandates of the Land Act,

the Village Land Act and the Wildlife Conservation Act combined with the

government’s aggressive pursuit of foreign investments in the wildlife sector add to

105 Mtwale. Op cit. 106 Section 6 107 Section 11 108 Act No. 5 of 1999

61

the sense of insecurity and uncertainty that surrounds land rights in Ngorongoro

district, and is one of the key factors engender resource-related conflicts in the area.

Recently Serengeti National Parks (SENAPA) in collaboration with land surveyors

from land ministry mercilessly grabbed the richest part of Ololosokwan Village

pretending that they are adjusting parks borders. While the village certificate of

ownership from the same ministry shows those areas belongs to the village109.

Mtwale110 discussed the work of Juma and Maganga on local resource management

at Mbarali District in irrigated areas noted that water utilization (control and

regulation) Act of 1979 and other piece of legislation that they have become source

of land use conflicts, it is therefore questionable whether or not system that ignore

customary laws over resource appeal to people and will be implementable. Because

those who were protected by customary law will not secure protection under new

legal system.

The National Land Policy does not 'recognize, clarify, and secure in law' customary

land Rights vs the wildlife conservation strategy predicated on the state's allocation

of customary lands. On the contrary, it enables further dispossession of rural

communities' lands. For example, the Land Policy recognizes overlapping and

sometimes conflicting land uses, including wildlife use, in many districts such as

Kiteto, Monduli and Ngorongoro. 'Some of the game controlled areas are critical

109 Pact Tanzania (2008). Ngorongoro PETS Committee Report. 110 Mtwale.Op.cit ,p. 19.

62

habitats for wildlife and also form wildlife migration routes .Those areas have

serious land use conflicts and dispute.

In Tanzania we have Environmental Managements Act of 1997 which works

simultaneously with Environmental sector Policy and Legislations like Forest law,

Mining, Wildlife, Agriculture and Land laws. Therefore to avoid overlapping of any

kind, all these laws must be properly implemented. This was recently manifested

where the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism under the coercive

force of International environmental law insisted that we have to see people around

Ngorongoro crater evicted to avoid threats from UNESCO.111

111 The Guardian 5th/ 5/ 2009.Ngorongoro crater issue tough – govt.’In a move to save the Ngorongoro conservation area (NCA) from being struck off Unesco`s list of world heritage sites, the government has banned farming inside the area, but admitted that the problem was a complex one.’

63

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0. Conclusion

Conclusively the above study reveals the real situations taking place in Ngorongoro.

The District is notorious of the above categories of resource based conflicts, and the

escalation of violence in the district has been precipitated by Laws and National

Policies operating over the whole District. Laxity and overlapping of laws such as

wildlife and environmental related laws, manifested to be the reason for such

conflicts.

Proliferations of firearms and porous boundaries have been found to be among the

reasons for persistence nature of resource based conflicts in Ngorongoro.Porous

borders have been used by illegal immigrants as well as for importation of firearms.

Mashrooming of tourism related investment activities found to be key player to the

resource based conflict in Northermn Tanzania. Citizens from the grass root are not

involved in policy making. Natural resource curse, became new player due to the

fact that indigenous don’t benefit from natural resources around them.

64

4.2 Recommendations

On the basis of the foregoing analysis and findings, the following interventions are

recommended as a way of addressing the conflicts in Ngorongoro:

1. Establishment of a District-wide conflict management framework which

incorporates all the major stakeholders, especially central and local

government, traditional leadership and institutions, civil society, the private

sector and religious organizations, and ensures the effective participation of

men, women and youth, if the initiative could be enlarged beyond its present

focus on humanitarian crises, and to incorporate traditional mechanisms of

conflict management and dispute resolution.

2. A comprehensive education and awareness creation exercise should

constitute a core part of this strategy to confront and address different

aspects of conflict in Ngorongoro, including historical rivalries and

perceptions that derive from them, prejudice, especially as between the

Batemi and the Loita, enhancing awareness about land and natural resources

policy and law and land rights. Students in schools should be skilled to live

as one and united.

3. Systematic and comprehensive resolution of disputes regarding village

boundaries in the District in order to bring closure to this long-standing

issue. This need to be done by making sure all villages are surveyed and

posses certificate of ownership.

65

4. Participatory land use planning, at the Village and District levels with the

informed participation of all villagers, and the relevant institutions. In

particular, such land use planning should be informed by and take into

account historical access to common property resources across villages and

even districts.

5. Reconcile natural resource management and development policy,

institutional imperatives with pastoralism and reduce the perceived hostility

of key policy actors in the District to pastoralism, as a land use and

livelihood system. A key issue in this regard is the need for an improved

understanding of pastoralism among key policy actors in the District and

people should be seen benefiting from resources.

6. Find a lasting solution to the pending land claims whether through court

action, negotiated settlement (Alternative Dispute Resolution) or

government intervention. Leaving these claims pending for long periods

only serves to perpetuate feelings of hostility between the protagonists, and

encourages impunity in some quarters.

7. To cure the problem of porous border between Tanzania and Kenya

Government should enact laws which can accommodate the problems

arising from the border of Loliondo category where one clan extends to

neighboring country. Customs and immigration offices need to be

established at Loliondo.

8. The Government should improve the capacity of law enforcement organs to

confiscate firearms held illegally.

66

0. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Blomley, K. (1994).Law Space Geography of the Power, Guilford

Press, New York.

_________. (2004).Unsettling The City, Urban Land and the Politics

on Property. Routlage, London.

Babiker, et al. (Ed).(2007). Fighting for Inclusion

Conflicts among Pastoralists in Eastern Africa and

the Horn. Development Policy Management, Nairobi.

Kratli, S. & Swift, J. (1999). Understanding and Managing Pastoral

Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review. IDS University of Sussex.

Lavigne, P. (1998) .Rural land and Tenure, Renewable Resources

and Development in Africa, Paris.

Mustafa, D. (2001). Colonial Law; Contemporary water issues in

Pakistan. Political Geography,Dar es Salaam.

Mbonile, J. (2003).Migration and Intensification of Water

Conflicts in Pangani Basin, Tanzania.Habitat International.

Shivji, and Kapinga. (1988).The Land and Maasai Rights in

Ngorongoro Tanzania: Haki Ardlhi,Da es Salaam.

67

Peter, M & Mwakaje, S. (2004).Investment in Tanzania: Some Issues Some

Comments.Dar es Salaam: Friedrich Ebert Stifstung & University of

Dar es Salaam Department of International Law.

Articles and Journals.

Adams, W.et al. (1994). “Indigenous Farmers Managed irrigation in Sonjo

Tanzania” The Geographical Journal.

Ole Nangoro, B. (1998). “Brandy the land “Maasai Responses

to Resource Tenure Insecurity and Social Change,” . In

F Horn. (Ed) Economic Social and Cultural Rights of the Maasai,

University of Lap land: Rovaremi.

Torvick, R.et al.(2005).”Institutions and Resource Curse”. The

Economic Journal.

68

Reports and Unpulished Works/Dissertations

Brockington, D. (1998) Land Loss and Livestork.The Effect of Eviction

of Pastoralist Moved from Mkomazi Game Reserve,

Tanzania: PhD. Thesis, University College.

Brehony, E. Draft Report on Efforts to Resolve Conflicts between the

Sonjo and Loita Session of the Maasai: Embassy of Ireland

(2004/2005),Arusha.

FAO (1990) Community Forests Herders Decision Making in Natural

Resource Management in Semi arid Africa 126P FAO. Rome

Gastorn, K. (2007).The Impact of Tanzania New Land Laws on

Customary Lands Rights of Pastoralists. A Case Study of

Simanjiro and Bariadi: PhD.Thesis, Bayreuth University.

Mtwale, A. (2002).Conflicts Between Farmers and Pastoralists Over

Land Use. A Case Study of Kilosa District. University of Dar es salaam

Mung’ong’o, C. & Mwamfupe, D.(2003).Poverty and changing

Livelihoods of Migrants Masaai Pastoralists in Morogoro

Kilosa, Tanzania. Research Report on Poverty Alleviation,

REPOA. Mkuiki na Nyota Publishers, Dar es salaam.

NLUPC. (1987). Loliondo Land Use Plan, (draft), Dar Es Salaam:

National Land Use Planning Commission, Dar Es Salaam.

69

NGONET. (2008).A Report of a Consultancy Commissioned Jointly by ERETO

Ngorongoro Pastoralist Project (ERETO-NPP) and the Ngorongoro

District LocalGovernment and Managed by Ngorongoro NGO Network

(NGONET),Arusha.

PINGO’S. (2004). The conflict between Loita Maasai and the Batemi in

Loliondo and Sale Divisions: A Report of the Fact Finding Mission on

21st July to 1st August 2004, Arusha.

_________Report on a Workshop on Land & Natural Resources

Laws & Policies, Held in Arusha April 11 & 12, 2002.Arusha.

Olenasha, William. (2008) .Resource Based Conflicts in Ngorongoro District: A

Draft Report, Arusha.

Ojalammm, S. (1995).Contested land Dispute in Semi arid – Parts of

Northern Tanzania Case study of Loliondo and Sale

Division: PhD. Dissertation, University of Helsinki.

Potknaski, T. (1994). Livestock as Collective Conflicting with

Individual Properly: Property Rights Pastoral Economy and

Mutual Assistance among the Ngorongoro Salei and Maasai

of Tanzania, 200P. PhD. Dissertation, University of Warsaw, Warsaw.

______________ (1997) Property Concepts, Herding Patterns and

Management of Natural Resources among the Ngorongoro and

Sale Maasai of Tanzania. Pastoral Land Tenure Series No. 6

London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

70

Parkipuny, M. (1991) Eviction of Pastoralists from Mkomazi.

The report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters

(1995), Vol 1 pg xii’.

Papers

Stolla, P. (2005). “A Comparative Analysis of the Land Acts of 1999

and The Land Ordinance 1923.”

Michele, N.et al. (undated). Herding on the Brink: Towards a Global Survey of

Pastoral Communities and Conflict. (An Occasional Working Paper

from

the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy)

Tenga, R. (1991).”Tanzania Land Law”, A Paper Presented in

Proceedings of Arusha Workshop on land Policy August 27-29 -1991

Parkipunyi, M. (1991). Security of Land Tenure: Statement of the

Problem Report.

Henry, A’Fosbrook. (1988). “Emerging Conflicts in Land Use”. Paper

Presented at Mikumi Workshop on Conservation and Development.

Olengurumwa, O. (2007).”The Fate of Pastoralists in Tanzania” .Paper

Presented Land Mark Workshop on the Future of Pastoralist in Tanzania

March 2007, Dar es Salaam.

Pact Tanzania. (2008). A Report on Public Expenditure Tracking Survey

(PETS) by Ngorongoro PETS Committee, Dar es Salaam.

71

Newspapers

Daily News 23rd/11 (1998),

Daily News 3/11/1998.Somali raid and killed 9.

Daily New 12th and 15th, (2002 Daily news 16th /4/ 1994 .Wafugaji Mkuu wacha

tuwamalize hawa wavamizi wa Kenya

Kulikoni 22nd /4/ 2008. Apigwa risasi vurugu za Mwekwzaji na Wananchi.

Mwananchi 17th /2/2000. Mwarabu apewa ruksa Loliondo na JWTZ yapewa

magari ya ghuba

Nipashe 24th /03/2008. Ngorongoro watakiwa kuwadhibiti wahamiaji haramu.

Nipashe 9th/07/2009.Nyumba za Wafugaji zachomwa moto.

Sunday News 20/1 /(2000)

The Guardian 5th/ 5/ 2009.Ngorongoro crater issue tough – govt.The Citizen

The citizen 5 / 5/ 2008. th Villagers Up in Arms Over Sold Farm Sold to US

Investors.

72

73