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Towards a constructive dialogue between Christianity and atheism, with reference tothe work of Eeberhard Jüngel, David Bentley Hart, and Henri de Lubac

Williams, Andrew

Awarding institution:King's College London

Download date: 17. Jul. 2022

TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTIVE

DIALOGUE BETWEEN

CHRISTIANITY AND ATHEISM,

WITH REFERENCE TO THE WORK

OF EBERHARD JÜNGEL,

DAVID BENTLEY HART,

AND HENRI DE LUBAC

ANDREW WILLIAMS

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES

FACULTY OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES

KING’S COLLEGE LONDON

1st April 2021

i

ABSTRACT

In this thesis I examine the nature of atheism and its appearance within Western thought

and culture and argue that atheist-Christian dialogue is not only possible but also that it is

desirable and important. I highlight the groundwork and parameters that enable a

constructive dialogue between atheism and Christianity to be developed and set out the

reasons why such a dialogue is necessary within society today. This is done by identifying

those aspects of both atheism and Christianity in respect of which unbelievers and believers

can learn from each other, highlighting the resources within atheism and Christianity that

may offer starting points for dialogue, and pointing to the arenas within which atheists and

Christians can come into conversation and partnership. I focus entirely on Western

atheism, the phases in its development, the connections that have existed, and continue to

do so, between theism and atheism, and the variety of different types of atheistic thought

that exist within Western culture today. I explore some of the reasons for atheism and

unbelief and address the range of different expressions of atheism by presenting a four-

fold typology of atheism. As a means to explore the different categories of atheism and as

a starting point for developing a dialogue between atheism and Christianity, I draw on three

Christian theologians who have given atheism serious attention and woven its study into

their projects. These are Eberhard Jüngel (Lutheran), David Bentley Hart (Orthodox), and

Henri de Lubac (Roman Catholic). I examine the critiques that they have offered of a range

of atheist positions and provide an analysis of their views, particularly as they relate to

atheism. I show how they each, in different ways, highlight how a conversation between

the Church and atheism can be advanced in a constructive, productive, and meaningful

way.

Drawing on the work of these theologians, I argue that a meaningful and positive

relationship between Christianity and atheism can be developed, which enables those who

both possess and deny the reality of faith in God to engage with and learn from each other.

This enables me to demonstrate how the relationship between Christianity and atheism

need not always be a polarised and hostile one, marked by confrontation, rancour, and

dispute. By examining the resources offered by Jüngel, Hart, and de Lubac, I identify a

series of approaches that enable a constructive dialogue between atheism and Christianity

to be advanced. I also argue that there is much learning that Christianity can derive from

ii

atheistic positions, that atheists can offer a prophetic function for the health of the Church,

and that there are theological perspectives that enable Christians to understand atheism and

atheists in positive ways, as well as for atheists to better appreciate the position of

Christians. Based on this premise, I seek to elucidate the elements that comprise a

productive conversation between Christianity and atheism, and explore what the mission

of the Church in increasingly secular Western societies might involve.

iii

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family, in gratitude for the enormous support and patience

they have demonstrated to me throughout the course of this project. They include my

parents John and Margaret, together with my wife Sarah, and my children Rosaleen and

Joseph.

iv

DECLARATION

I, Andrew Williams, hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, that

this thesis is a result of my own research, and that no part of this thesis has been

submitted to any other university for a degree or qualification.

1st April 2021

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am enormously grateful to my principal supervisor, Doctor Susannah Ticciati, who has

steered me through the process of writing and revising this thesis. Her insights, advice and

constructive feedback have been immensely helpful throughout the project. In addition, I

am very thankful for the support and assistance of my second supervisor, Professor Vernon

White, who offered many invaluable suggestions relating to the content and form of the

thesis during its composition. I would also like to record my gratitude to the King’s College

Theological Trust, which provide financial assistance during the early years of the project.

vi

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... i

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii

DECLARATION ............................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ v

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1

1. Requiem aeternam Deo ................................................................................................ 1

2. Atheist-Christian dialogue ............................................................................................ 4

2.1 The importance of dialogue ............................................................................... 4

2.2 Dialogue in a historical context ........................................................................... 5

2.3 Advancing dialogue between atheists and Christians ....................................... 8

2.3.1 The parasitic relationship between atheism and Christianity ........................... 9

2.3.2 Believing without belonging .......................................................................... 10

2.3.3 Atheism within Christianity ........................................................................... 11

2.3.4 Conceptions of God ........................................................................................ 12

2.3.5 The nature of religion ..................................................................................... 14

2.3.6 Atheism’s prophetic function ......................................................................... 16

3. The interlocutors examined in this thesis .................................................................. 18

Chapter 1: Christianity and the age of atheism ................................................................. 22

1.1 What is atheism? ........................................................................................................ 22

1.2 The emergence of modern atheism ............................................................................ 25

1.3 The challenge to the Church ...................................................................................... 31

1.4 Reasons for atheism and unbelief .............................................................................. 34

vii

1.5 Classifying atheist positions ...................................................................................... 37

1.6 Type I atheism ........................................................................................................... 41

1.6.1 The intellectual roots of Type I atheism ..................................................... 42

1.6.2 The Enlightenment and its aftermath .......................................................... 46

1.6.3 The affirmation of reason in recent forms of atheism................................. 50

1.7 Type II atheism .......................................................................................................... 58

1.7.1 The origin and nature of Type II atheism ................................................... 59

1.7.2 The ‘masters of suspicion’ .......................................................................... 64

1.8 Type III atheism ......................................................................................................... 71

1.8.1 A contested religious inheritance ................................................................ 73

1.8.2 A secular age? ............................................................................................. 74

1.9 Type IV atheism......................................................................................................... 80

1.9.1 Radical atheism in contemporary philosophy ............................................. 85

1.10 Concluding remarks .................................................................................................. 92

Chapter 2: Perspectives on atheism in the theology of Eberhard Jüngel .......................... 96

2.1 Restoring the ‘thinkability’ of God ............................................................................ 96

2.1.1 Jüngel’s theology of the cross ..................................................................... 98

2.1.2 The God who comes into the world .......................................................... 100

2.2 Metaphysical theism as the harbinger of atheism .................................................... 102

2.2.1 The inaccessible perfection of God........................................................... 102

2.2.2 Cartesian epistemology and the erosion of God’s necessity ..................... 103

2.3 The emergence of the idea that God is dead ............................................................ 108

2.3.1 Kant’s conception of the unknown God ................................................... 109

2.3.2 The impossibility of conceiving God in Fichte’s thought ........................ 110

viii

2.3.3 Feuerbach and the anthropological essence of faith ................................. 112

2.3.4 Nietzsche and the death of God ................................................................ 114

2.4 Thinking through the death of God.......................................................................... 116

2.4.1 The meaning of the statement ................................................................... 117

2.4.2 Luther’s notion of the crucified God ........................................................ 118

2.4.3 Hegel’s contribution to the debate ............................................................ 120

2.4.4 ‘We live without God:’ Bonhoeffer and the loss of faith ......................... 123

2.4.5 Jüngel’s theology of atheism .................................................................... 125

2.5 Jüngel’s endeavour to renew Christian theology ..................................................... 126

2.5.1 Jüngel’s interaction with atheism.............................................................. 127

2.5.2 Jüngel’s doctrine of God ........................................................................... 131

2.5.3 The suffering of God and persons ............................................................. 132

2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 135

Chapter 3: David Bentley Hart’s engagement with atheism ........................................... 137

3.1 Theology in dialogue with unbelief ......................................................................... 137

3.1.1 Hart’s project ............................................................................................ 138

3.2 Hart’s doctrine of God ............................................................................................. 139

3.2.1 The beauty and infinity of God ................................................................. 139

3.2.2 The analogical interval and human participation in God .......................... 142

3.2.3 Divine impassibility .................................................................................. 145

3.2.4 Hart’s eschatology .................................................................................... 150

3.3 Postmodern philosophy and theology ...................................................................... 152

3.3.1 Engagements with Nietzsche .................................................................... 154

3.3.2 The rhetoric of violence ............................................................................ 157

ix

3.4 Encounters with atheism .......................................................................................... 159

3.4.1 Hart’s critique of contemporary Western culture ..................................... 161

3.5 An assessment of Hart’s work ................................................................................. 168

3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 174

Chapter 4: Henri de Lubac’s response to atheism and unbelief...................................... 176

4.1 The Christian vision in the context of unbelief........................................................ 176

4.2 The relationship between nature and grace.............................................................. 179

4.2.1 Opposition to neoscholasticism ................................................................ 179

4.2.2 The desire for God and the supernatural finality of humanity .................. 185

4.3 Engagements with atheism and unbelief ................................................................. 187

4.3.1 The roots of atheism and secularism ......................................................... 187

4.3.2 The consequences of atheist humanism .................................................... 192

4.3.3 Mysticism and human reason in the context of faith ................................ 200

4.4 De Lubac’s soteriology ............................................................................................ 204

4.4.1 The dignity of the person and the unity of humanity ................................ 206

4.4.2 The Church as the means for salvation ..................................................... 208

4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 212

Chapter 5: Christianity and atheism in dialogue ............................................................. 215

5.1 Towards a constructive dialogue between atheism and Christianity ....................... 217

5.2 Resources for dialogue in the theology of Jüngel, Hart and de Lubac .................... 218

5.2.1 Eberhard Jüngel’s perspectives on atheism .................................................. 219

5.2.2 David Bentley Hart’s contribution to Christian-atheist dialogue ................. 224

5.2.3 Henri de Lubac: A Catholic response to atheist humanism ......................... 229

5.3 Engaging with different categories of atheism ......................................................... 235

x

5.3.1 Type I atheism........................................................................................... 236

5.3.2 Type II atheism ......................................................................................... 237

5.3.3 Type III atheism ........................................................................................ 238

5.3.4 Type IV atheism ........................................................................................ 238

5.4 Approaches to dialogue ........................................................................................... 239

5.4.1 The relationship between faith and reason ................................................... 242

5.4.2 The question of transcendence ..................................................................... 244

5.4.3 Christian ministry in an age of unbelief .................................................... 246

5.4.4 Patient listening ......................................................................................... 247

5.4.5 Partnership and collaboration ................................................................... 248

5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 250

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 255

1

Introduction

1. Requiem aeternam Deo

I know the rather sinister figure of the ‘atheist’ very well, not only from books, but also

because it lurks somewhere inside me too.1

The true believers know that they run the risk, they have to run the risk, of being radical

atheists.2

Christianity contains a germ of tranquil atheism…3

Here are priests: but although they are mine enemies, pass them quietly and with sleeping

swords… my blood is related to theirs; and I want withal to see my blood honoured in

theirs.4

The genuine, single and deepest theme of all world history and human history, to which all

the rest are subordinate, remains the conflict of unbelief and belief.5

The human relationship with faith and unbelief, the intricate connection between them, and

the insights that each can offer to the other constitute central strands in the human religious

quest, in Western philosophy and in the cultural history of our society. These are highly

complex and subtly interwoven dimensions of our identity, which have undergone a

1 Karl Barth, "Atheism, For and Against," in Fragments Grave and Gay, ed. Martin Rumscheidt (London:

Collins, 1971), 45-46. 2 Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart, Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments (London: Routledge, 2005),

46. This is part of a response by Jacques Derrida to a question posed by John Caputo. 3 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum,

2003), 125. 4 F.W. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. T. Common (Ware:

Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 88. 5 Quotation attributed to Goethe. Cited in Laurence Lampert, "Nietzsche's Challenge to Philosophy in the

Thought of Leo Strauss," The Review of Metaphysics 58, no. 3 (2005): 591.

2

profound transformation over the course of human history. Of particular significance are

the changes in religious alignment and affiliation that have taken place over the last half a

millennium. During the 500 years or so leading up to the present day the populations of

the Western world have shifted from near ubiquitous belief in God and a connection with

the Church to a widespread distancing from, and sometimes opposition to, Christianity. A

momentous transformation has taken place in modern history that has seen post-religious

societies appear in the once-Christian West.6 During the last few centuries, particularly in

recent decades, the hold on thought and public life by religion has gradually eroded, and

some observers have suggested that we have reached a point where we now inhabit a

‘secular age.’7 The term should not be taken to imply that unbelief is ubiquitous within

contemporary society. Recent surveys in the United Kingdom indicate that the most

commonly used form of self-identification for individuals is ‘no religion’ rather than

atheist.8 The absence of a religious commitment does not necessarily imply unbelief.

Given the diminished role that the Christian faith has within the lives of many people

in the West, it is timely to reflect on the significance of various forms of unbelief for the

Church, and to consider how it might best engage with the phenomena of atheism and

unbelief. This is a matter that in my personal and ministerial experiences, as a former

university chaplain, as a self-supporting priest within the Church of England, as a trainer

of teachers in Religious Education, and as a member of a Standing Advisory Council for

Religious Education, I am acutely aware of and consider to be an important matter both

personally and professionally in the context of the mission of the contemporary Church.

The relationship between Christianity and atheism, together with the imperative to

develop a constructive dialogue between them, represent pressing concerns both for those

who affirm and those who reject the possibility of faith in God, and it is an issue that

requires in-depth analysis and reflection. Such an investigation must attend to the deep

6 Alec Ryrie, Unbelievers: An Emotional History of Doubt (London: William Collins, 2019), 1. 7 See, for example, Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1-16. 8 A NatCen survey in September 2017 indicated that some 53% of the population of the United Kingdom

now identify themselves has having ‘no religion.’ See The Guardian, 4th September 2017:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/half-uk-population-has-no-religion-british-social-

attitudes-survey [accessed: 9th November 2017].

3

connections that exist between Christian belief and its denial as it is encountered in

multiple ways in society today. This is because no analysis of faith’s rejection can take

place without a consideration of the engagement between Christian thought and the many

expressions of unbelief that exist today. Indeed, given the parasitic relationship between

belief and unbelief, the dialectic between faith and its rejection exposes a profound

interlinking between Christian theology and atheism. The task for Christian theology is,

then, to understand the nature and development of the different species of unbelief, to

unravel the interlaced categories of faith and unbelief and to consider how the Church can

speak into the spaces vacated by its retreat within society. This will involve developing the

groundwork and setting out the parameters for a constructive dialogue with atheism and

atheists in order to create a space in which Christians can listen carefully to the perspectives

of those who reject the existence of God and vice versa. I also believe that Christians need

to better understand the reasons why atheists have come to the position that they hold, learn

from the criticism levelled at them and the Church by atheists, and identify areas where

conversation, mutual engagement, partnership, and cooperation can be enabled.

Such a dialogue will not always be easy to facilitate and there will continue to be both

atheists and Christians who are unwilling to engage with each other. It is, however, a

desirable objective if atheists and Christians are to better understand perspectives and

beliefs that differ, often radically, from their own. Furthermore, in contemporary Western

societies, where religious identity is so contested and complicated, moving beyond the

acrimony, stereotypes, and prejudices that sometimes characterise both the views atheists

hold about Christians, and the opinions some Christians may have concerning atheists, will

be an important outcome of constructive dialogue and provide a contribution to the

building of a more united culture where people across a wide spectrum of belief positions

are able to live together harmoniously.

4

2. Atheist-Christian dialogue

2.1 The importance of dialogue

By focusing on Christianity’s engagement with atheism, specifically within the West, I aim

in this thesis to highlight the importance of and the opportunities for a constructive

dialogue between Christianity and atheism. Indeed, constructive dialogue between atheists

and Christians is enormously important in diverse Western societies today for a number of

reasons.

Firstly, earnest, patient, and respectful conversations between unbelievers and believers

can serve as a means for each group to learn from the other. It is undoubtedly important

that religious believers, specifically Christians, and atheists develop an improved

understanding of each other. In part, this process will involve the identification of areas of

common ground between the two groups, including the residual expressions of faith and

the religious currents that may remain within atheism, and the moments of doubt and

uncertainty that sometimes coexist with the faith of those who profess to be Christians.9 At

the heart of this process I believe that there needs to be charitable engagement between

atheists and Christians that involves each group respecting the position of the other.10

Secondly, dialogue can highlight how, within the history of Christianity, the seeds of

unbelief have been sown by intellectual and theological developments within Christianity

itself. This is a theme that each of the interlocutors who will be examined in this thesis are

acutely aware of. Thirdly, and closely related to the first point, in exposing the intimate

relationship between unbelief and belief, the binary distinction between atheism and

Christianity may be brought into question. Finally, constructive dialogue between atheists

and Christians can contribute to the development of a more cohesive society in which the

opportunities for partnership, cooperation, and collaboration between those who do and do

9 For a fascinating discussion of this matter, see Chapter 1 (The ‘atheism’ of Christianity) in Stephen

Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2013), 1-23. 10 Trent Horn, Answering Atheism: How to Make the Case for God with Logic and Charity (San Diego,

CA: Catholic Answers Press, 2013), 7.

5

not hold a belief in God can be identified in order to advance social justice and human

well-being.11

2.2 Dialogue in a historical context

Interestingly, as Stephen Bullivant acknowledges, dialogue with unbelievers is less often

practised or reported than ecumenical or interreligious dialogue.12 However, given that

atheists make up the fourth most numerous grouping across the world in relation to

religious identity (behind Christians, Muslims and Hindus),13 there remains an important

impetus for Christians to engage in dialogue with atheists in order to open up fruitful,

constructive and respectful channels of conversation from which each party can learn from

the other. This, of course, is not a straightforward task given the many different kinds of

atheist (for example, humanists, Marxists, existentialists, atheist scientists, those who hold

no interest in religion or faith, philosophical atheists, and so on) and also because there are

many atheists (as well as Christians) who are disinclined to enter into dialogue with those

who have sharply different perspectives on the question of God’s existence.

Despite the challenges in developing a constructive engagement between atheists and

Christians, there is a long history of atheist-Christian dialogue, recorded both in works of

fiction and through actual encounters. The emergence of such conversations is documented

in some detail by Stephen Bullivant in his work Faith and Unbelief.14 This account begins

with reference to the lengthy free exchange of ideas between Ivan and his novice monk

brother Alyosha in Chapter 2 of Dostoevsky’s 1880 novel The Brothers Karamazov as well

as to other examples in literature, including Georg Büchner’s play of 1835, Danton’s

Death, and in Ivan Turgenev’s 1862 novel, Fathers and Sons. With the growth of unbelief

11 In additional to the points made in this section, Stephen Bullivant provides an extended rationale and

account of how dialogue between atheists and Christians has and may continue to be developed in

Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 95-118. 12 Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 96. 13 See Phil Zuckerman, "Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns," in The Cambridge Companion to

Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 47-65. 14 See Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 100-06.

6

in the twentieth century, particularly in its Marxist, humanist and existentialist forms,

grassroots dialogue between Christians and atheists became increasingly common. This

was particularly the case in France as Christians and Marxists engaged in exchanges of

views and in the ‘priest-worker’ initiative that saw Catholic (mainly Jesuit and Dominican)

priests working alongside miners, dockers and factory workers. There was also an

important encounter in 1948 when the Dominicans of Latour-Maubourg invited the atheist

philosopher Albert Camus to share his views on Christianity. This event highlighted the

necessity of honest disagreement but demonstrated that it could take place within the

context of constructive and patient engagement.

Further developments within the Roman Catholic Church took place in the aftermath of

the Second Vatican Council through the establishment by Pope Paul VI of the Secretariat

for Non-believers. This was set up in order to promote understanding and dialogue with

atheists and as an initiative it was warmly welcomed by the Director of the American

Humanist Association, who expressed his support for the Secretariat in a letter to its

President, Cardinal König. The development precipitated a number of high-profile,

international events, notably a series of international conferences that focused on Christian-

Marxist dialogue.15 Alas, after much fruitful dialogue between Christians and atheists, the

momentum in these exchanges rather dissipated and in 1993 the Secretariat was

amalgamated by Pope John Paul II into the Pontifical Council for Culture.16 With the rise

of the New Atheist movement in the first decade of the twentieth century, which reflected

a deepening sense of unbelief within the West, other opportunities for dialogue and

encounter arose. An example of this were the public conversations that the former

Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, had with prominent atheists such as Richard

Dawkins and Philip Pullman, as well as many examples of grassroots and low-key

dialogues between Christians and atheists in settings such as meeting halls, church halls

and university chaplaincies.17 In a key study, it became apparent that non-atheist students

who engaged with atheists in university settings were more likely to appreciate atheists

15 Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 103-04. 16 Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 105. 17 Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 105-06.

7

than those believers who did not have meaningful interactions with atheists, an insight that

once more highlights the value of conversation, listening, and dialogue.18

Although both public and lower key encounters between Christians and atheists will

often highlight areas of contention and disagreement between the two parties, it is also the

case that such initiatives may also yield many benefits and are undoubtedly worth pursuing.

There are a number of reasons why a dialogue between Christianity and atheism needs to

be developed. Firstly, honest, respectful, and meaningful conversations between Christians

and atheists can help to correct misplaced stereotypes, prejudices, and caricatures that each

group may have of the other and, in so doing, promote a more positive assessment of those

whose views about God and God’s existence are very different from those held by each

side. Secondly, fruitful dialogue can shed light on aspects of belief that are present within

the atheist (or humanist) worldview and on the beliefs, particularly those that are critiqued

by atheists, that may be rejected by those who identify as Christians. This aspect of atheist-

Christian dialogue may therefore highlight the common ground between those with and

without a belief in God. Thirdly, atheist-Christian dialogue can play a valuable role in

informing Christians’ and atheists’ views of themselves and thus underline how each group

is seen by the other. Richard Dawkins’ and Sam Harris’ understanding of the crucifixion

as a repellent doctrine serves as an example.19 Atheist-Christian dialogue in this sense can

offer an opportunity for the Church to carefully examine its own beliefs, consider how

these are communicated within contemporary society and encourage a form of self-

criticism that may enable it to engage more productively with the wider population within

which it is situated. Although dialogue between atheists and Christians will not be an easy

or straightforward task and will inevitably generate areas of disagreement and dissent, it is

certainly an exercise that is worth the effort involved, and can yield rich and rewarding

insights for both atheists and Christians.

18 Nicholas A. Bowman et al., "College Students' Appreciative Attitudes Toward Atheists," Research in

Higher Education 58, no. 1 (2017): 98-118. 19 See the citations in Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 113.

8

2.3 Advancing dialogue between atheists and Christians

Drawing on the work of the interlocutors who will be examined in the central chapters of

this thesis, the central objective of this thesis is to highlight how a meaningful and creative

dialogue with some manifestations of unbelief can be advanced. One of my foci is the close

relationship between belief and unbelief in the history of Western thought and how the

deconstruction of the binary distinction between atheism and Christianity can be an

important step in paving the way for a fruitful dialogue between atheists and Christians.

As the document Humanae Personae Dignitatem, issued by the Vatican’s Secretariat for

Unbelievers in August 1968, notes, ‘dialogue with unbelievers can lead believers… to a

better understanding of religious matters.’20 This might be by challenging certain views

of God, which may be untenable, idolatrous or distorting; by tempering tendencies to use

theological language in a way that is over-confident or excessively ‘clear;’ in reminding

believers that affirmations about divinity are always simultaneously accompanied by forms

of denial; and by demonstrating that transcendence can be conceived of in multiple ways,

which include phenomena and experiences that are encountered in the midst of this world.

Within this thesis I offer a number of reflections that seek to open up lines of enquiry

which may encourage honest engagement with the deep currents of unbelief in our society,

which retain a perspective that is rooted within a resolutely Christian framework, and

which offer to the Church elements of an agenda for interaction, dialogue and mutual

learning with those who have deep-seated misgivings about the Christian faith. Most

importantly, I will seek to examine the question of what the Church might learn from

atheism and how, in response, it might productively and generously enter into dialogue

with different forms of unbelief. This will involve several different dimensions of learning,

each of which may be of considerable value for Christian theology and which may

contribute to the establishment of what Paul Ricœur has called ‘a postreligious faith or a

faith for a postreligious age.’21 In the following sub-sections, I highlight a number of

20 Austin Flannery, Vatican, Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents (Collegeville,

Indiana: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 1002. 21 Paul Ricœur, "Religion, Atheism, and Faith," in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics,

ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 440.

9

themes that may serve as valuable starting points for atheist-Christian dialogue, all of

which point both to the close entanglement between belief and unbelief and to the learning

that atheists and Christians can derive from each other’s position.

2.3.1 The parasitic relationship between atheism and Christianity

The first area of learning for both Christians and atheists in relation to contemporary

unbelief concerns the recognition of the close entanglement of Christianity and atheism. In

other words, there appear to be religious currents running through some forms of atheism.

Merleau-Ponty argues that atheism ‘contains within itself the theology which it combats.’22

This is an issue that has been explored at some length by both John Gray and Terry

Eagleton. Gray argues that atheists have looked for surrogates for the God they have cast

aside, that the progress of humanity has replaced belief in divine providence, and that the

notion that humanity realises common goals throughout history is merely a secular avatar

of the religious idea of redemption. Furthermore, the modern liberalism that is embraced

by many atheists is, in fact, a late flower of Judaism and Christianity.23 Thus, for Gray,

atheism rejects the idea of a creator-god but this is not the same thing as the rejection of

religion, as religion is an attempt to find meaning in the world, not a theory to explain the

universe.24 Although an atheist himself, Gray finds little to commend in New Atheism and

reserves his most interesting comments for other expressions of atheism. Secular

humanists, for example, are characterised, despite having rejected monotheistic beliefs, as

being wedded to monotheistic ways of thinking. The idea of human progress (meliorism),

which is so central to post-Enlightenment humanism is, Gray believes, merely a reworking

of the Christian idea of salvation history and even Marxism is a distorted form of

Platonism. Similarly, despite his implacable opposition to Christianity, Gray sees even in

Nietzsche an incurably Christian thinker who was never fully able to shake off Christian

values.25 This insight echoes the analysis of Nietzsche with which de Lubac concludes his

22 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy (Evanston, Illinois: University Press, 1963), 43. 23 John Gray, Seven Types of Atheism (London: Penguin Books, 2019), 1. 24 Gray, Seven Types of Atheism, 2-3. 25 Gray, Seven Types of Atheism, 24-52.

10

work The Drama of Atheism, where he presents Nietzsche as a mystic and seeks to establish

a connection between two of Nietzsche’s key notions: the Eternal Return and the

Overman.26 Further to these observations, Gray identifies in some forms of atheism,

particularly in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer, Benedict Spinoza and Leve Shestov, a

mystical quality that he describes as the atheism of silence.27 In reviewing Gray’s work,

Eagleton agrees with Gray’s analysis, particularly of humanists, who have, despite their

atheism, merely substituted humanity for God and remain in thrall to the very religious

faith that they claim they reject.28

2.3.2 Believing without belonging

It should also be noted that there are many people in contemporary Western societies with

a highly ambiguous relationship to religion and who may exhibit what Grace Davie refers

to as ‘believing without belonging’ or practise some form of ‘vicarious religion’ where,

despite not holding a faith, they are able to support the role of those who do to offer prayer

and worship on their behalf.29 Furthermore, a sizeable proportion of the population, whilst

distancing themselves from institutional religious movements, may identify as ‘spiritual

but not religious.’ Indeed, the contemporary interest in spirituality and ritual in Western

societies is a notable feature of culture today.30 An openness to the spiritual, or a sense of

the sacred, may provide an arena where religious and non-religious outlooks might find

26 Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley, Anne Englund Nash, and Mark

Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 469-509. 27 Gray, Seven Types of Atheism, 142-56. 28 Terry Eagleton, "Seven Types of Atheism by John Gray review – is every atheist an inverted believer?,"

The Guardian (11th April 2018). 29 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Wiley-Blackwell, 1994). 30 For a thoughtful discussion of this aspect of contemporary society, see Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality: A

Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Barry Stephenson, Ritual: A Very Short

Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

11

some common ground,31 whilst a case has even been made for a form of ‘atheist

spirituality.’32

2.3.3 Atheism within Christianity

As well as discerning the religious provenance of atheistic thought, its ongoing openness

to the transcendent and the religious dynamics with which it is sometimes imbued, it should

also be acknowledged that there are atheistic currents within Christianity.33 This may, as

Rowan Williams has pointed out, involve the rejection of certain concepts about God that

are at odds with orthodox Christian thought, the far from uncommon phenomenon of

‘belonging without believing’ in some church congregations, and even the tensions in the

Bible that promote atheism34 as a counter to the authoritarian metaphysical theism imposed

by clerical exegesis.35 Furthermore, as Stephen Bullivant points out, there are forms of

atheism that are present within mainstream, orthodox Christian spirituality and mystical

theology: the intellectual ‘atheism’ of the via negativa, and the experiential ‘atheism’ of

the mystic’s feeling of God’s absence and/or abandonment.36 Additionally, many

Christians will acknowledge the role of doubt in shaping their beliefs and will not

necessarily be uncomfortable with its presence in their life of faith.37

31 John Cottingham, "The spiritual and the sacred: Prospects for convergence between religious and non-

religious outlooks," in Religion and Atheism: Beyond the Divide, ed. Anthony Carroll and Richard Norman

(New York: Routledge, 2016), 130-39; see also Paul Avis, A Church Drawing Near: Spirituality and

Mission in a Post-Christian Culture (London: T & T Clark International, 2003), 103-08. 32 Kerry S. Walters, Atheism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2010), 157-77. 33 For an extended discussion of this notion, see Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the

Exodus and the Kingdom, New ed. ed. (London: Verso, 2009). 34 For a discussion of atheism in the Bible, see Marshall Davis, Thank God for Atheists: What Christians

can learn from the New Atheists (New Hampshire: Independently published, 2017), 29-39. 35 See Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom. 36 Stephen Bullivant, "Christian Spirituality and Atheism," in The Bloomsbury Guide to Christian

Spirituality, ed. Richard Woods and Peter Tyler (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 375-76. 37 For a discussion of the place of doubt within the lives of Christians, see Lesslie Newbigin, Proper

Confidence: Faith, Doubt, and Certainty in Christian Discipleship (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub.

Co, 1995); Anthony C. Thiselton, Doubt, Faith, and Certainty (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.

Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2017).

12

2.3.4 Conceptions of God

Another field within which atheism can provoke fresh thinking in Christian theology is in

connection with the doctrine of God. With the exception of the New Atheists, whose

thought will be discussed in Chapter 1, most atheists generally reject the concept of God

as a being and this position should not, according to Rudolf Bultmann, be indicted. In this

sense, atheism will act as a vital corrective to misconceptions about God that may be

harboured by Christians. As Gleason notes:

Curiously enough, the atheist is often a great help to the believer, unintentionally

cooperating in the necessary purification of faith by providing the salt that prevents the

believer’s idea of God from becoming corrupt.38

Rudolf Bultmann argues that a good deal of Christian discourse is overburdened by

mythological narratives, such as the idea that God is a being, that need to be pruned away

in order to allow the true message of Christ to be heard in our contemporary world.39 This

insight echoes Blondel’s assessment, referred to in Chapter 4, that the atheistic rejection of

false conceptions of God, in fact, unwittingly gives honour to God. Atheism can therefore,

as Jacques Maritain asserts, be a source of ‘hellish purification’ for Christians.40 The

characterisation of God as a being by Christians may have its roots in a static and a-

historical notion of God that was imported into Christianity in the ancient world but which

still lingers on in the faith of some Christians, and which may on occasions also distort

Trinitarian belief into a kind of crypto-tritheism.41 And, as will be discussed in Chapter 4,

neoscholasticism, which preserved this very view of God, was accused by de Lubac of

acting as progenitor of modern atheism.

The orthodox God of Christian belief is, as David Bentley Hart robustly argues, not a

being but being itself, or the source of all being. Christian belief is, in essence, about the

38 Robert W. Gleason, The Search for God (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), 14. 39 Rudolf Bultmann, "Protestant Theology and Atheism," The Journal of Religion 52, no. 4 (1972): 332. 40 Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason (London: G. Bles, 1953), 100. 41 Brian Wicker, "The Future of Belief," New Blackfriars (1967): 373.

13

reality of God’s presence and not about words or concepts, none of which will ever be

adequate as tools to capture in any definitive sense the reality of God’s mystery. As

Eberhard Jüngel also makes clear, the atheist is right to reject a metaphysically-conceived

God as standing outside the world. The transcendent reality of God is, rather, to be

encountered sacramentally in this world as both Rudolf Bultmann and Dietrich Bonhoeffer

affirm. Bonhoeffer writes that ‘God is beyond in the midst of life,’42 whilst Rudolf

Bultmann notes that ‘the transcendent is to be sought and can be found not above or beyond

the world, but in the midst of this world.’ This represents ‘the presence of eternity in

time.’43 In a shared notion of enchantment within the world, the atheist and the Christian

may therefore be closer to each other than either would normally allow, which, again,

confirms their close relationship. As Rudolf Bultmann argues, the non-nihilistic conscious

atheist is capable of sharing with the genuine Christian an acknowledgement of a

transcendent reality, and of seeking its presence in the world as opposed to outside it. This

may even make the term ‘atheist’ inappropriate for such thinkers.44

In relation to the doctrine of God, a further area of learning from atheism for Christians

as they contemplate God’s reality concerns the question of the existence of God. Atheists

will generally reject the existence of God and this commitment may, on first sight, seem to

be entirely at odds with Christian faith. However, Christians may have to pause before

denouncing the atheist’s stance on this matter. For a number of thinkers, including Meister

Eckhart, Simone Weil, and Paul Tillich, have argued that speaking about God as ‘existing’

can be misleading.45 Put another way, ‘it is impossible to have full knowledge when

speaking of God because having full knowledge or control would eliminate God’s

transcendence.’46 As Simone Weil puts it, ‘God does not in fact exist in the same way as

42 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, Enlarged edition. ed. (London: SCM Press, 1971),

282. 43 Rudolf Bultmann, "The Idea of God and Modern Man," in Translating Theology into the Modern Age,

ed. Gerhard Ebeling and Robert W. Funk (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965), 90, 95. 44 Bultmann, "Protestant Theology and Atheism," 333. 45 Mikel Burley, "Atheisms and the purification of faith," International Journal of Philosophy and

Theology 75, no. 4 (2014): 325. 46 Christina M. Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics?: Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy

(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 225.

14

created things which form the only object of experience of our natural faculties.’47 The

atheistic notion of God’s non-existence can, Weil believes, be the source of purification

for it can help the believer to be on their guard in order to avoid the idolatry of supposing

that they are capable of conceiving of God.48 ‘Our knowledge of God suffers from

qualitative and not merely quantitative limitations and that we do not know God as God

knows God, as God most truly is, as unmediated presence to the intellect.’49

2.3.5 The nature of religion

A third area in which the Church can learn from the atheistic critique concerns the nature

of religion and role that this plays in the lives of believers as well as the chequered impact

that it has had during the history of Western culture. Given the patchy record of the Church

throughout history, Christians themselves should show due humility.50 For, as Martin

Buber knew, ‘religion can hide from us as nothing else can the face of God.’51 With respect

to the contested relationship between the Church and society, atheistic criticism is, quite

understandably, directed against religiously-motivated wars, centuries of Christian anti-

Semitism (an issue that de Lubac was especially conscious of), sexual abuse scandals and

a moral position on many issues that is at odds with the attitudes that prevail in much of

society, particularly amongst younger people. As Verhey notes:

[Secular moral] theories may challenge and judge certain claims made on the basis of

Scripture. Scripture has, after all, been used to justify racial and sexual discrimination; it

has been used to justify ‘holy wars,’ crusades, and inquisitions; it has been used to justify

47 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Gustave Thibon (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 20. 48 Weil's thought on this matter is discussed in Rowan Williams, "The necessary non-existence of God," in

Simone Weil's Philosophy of Culture : Readings Toward a Divine Humanity, ed. Richard H. Bell

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 52-76. 49 Merold Westphal, "Overcoming Onto-theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith," (New York:

Fordham University Press, 2001), 8. 50 Rupert Shortt, God is No Thing: Coherent Christianity (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), 20. 51 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 18.

15

the abuse of power and the violation of the rights and integrity of others in order to pursue

what has been taken to be God’s cause.52

Criticism of religion is, of course, present in the Bible where both immorality and idolatry

are repeatedly denounced. Theologians have also been critical of the Church. Barth, for

example, reacted against the cultural Protestantism of his youth and against the conflation

of church and culture,53 Kierkegaard offered a penetrating indictment of the shallow and

self-righteous Christianity that he observed in Danish society, and Bonhoeffer sought to

advance the concept of ‘religionless Christianity.’54 However, in the history of Western

atheism, the criticism of religion is most closely associated with Nietzsche, Marx and

Freud, the so-called ‘masters of suspicion.’ Their critique is most sharply directed at the

Church and cultural manifestations of religion rather than against Christian theology. Their

indictments of religion are distinct and it would be misleading to conflate their views. In

the case of Nietzsche, religion is primarily sociological weakness seeking revenge. For

Marx it is sociological power that seeks legitimation, whilst for Freud religion is

condemned as ontological weakness seeking consolation. In examining the work of these

thinkers, Westphal believes that their atheism ‘should be taken seriously as a stimulus to

self-examination rather than refuted as an error.’55 He argues that Christians should listen

carefully and humbly to the critiques of three of the Church’s most formidable foes,

particularly in their observations about the nature of sin (hamartiology).

The purificatory function of the criticism levelled against Christianity by Nietzsche and

Freud is interpreted by Ricœur as having the potential to mediate between the stale religion

of accusation and consolation and a revived and purified tragic faith. According to Ricœur,

just as Nietzsche rejects the ‘god of morality’ who is ‘conceived as the origin and

foundation of an ethics of prohibition,’ so should the person of faith reject such a god.

Similarly, just as Freud rejects the image of God as a fatherly protector, so, Ricœur argues,

52 Allen Verhey, The Great Revival: Ethics and the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 193. 53 Kimlyn J Bender, "Karl Barth and the Question of Atheism," Theology Today 70, no. 3 (2013): 277. 54 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 280-82. 55 Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism (Fordham University

Press, 1999), x, 16.

16

should this picture of God be rejected by the person of faith.’56 In summary, each of the

three ‘masters of suspicion’ offer a chastening voice of criticism to the Church and the

religious belief and practice of Christians. Whilst their critiques may be difficult to hear,

they are insightful and provocative opponents of a distorted and self-indulgent form of

Christianity than can be more damaging than helpful, either to individual believers or to

those to whom they relate. In response to this critique, Christians can, however, respond to

such assaults by asserting that ‘the unconditional claim made by Christianity is not related

to the Christian Church, but to the event on which the Church is based.’57

2.3.6 Atheism’s prophetic function

The prophetic quality of the New Atheist authors, whose thought will be discussed in the

next chapter, has also been explored in some depth by Marshal Davis.58 Davis, a Baptism

minister himself, argues that the New Atheists have much to teach Christians. This is an

unusual but commendable position for a committed Christian to adopt. For Marshall, the

New Atheists highlight the value of scepticism and doubt in the journey of faith and

encourage believers to consider carefully what their faith may look like from the outside

for someone to whom it is difficult to comprehend. This may be a helpful exercise in

identifying the faults within the Christian faith. Furthermore, the New Atheists challenge

believers to take a long hard look at the object of their faith, particularly forms of idolatry,

including false images of God (such as the Freudian notion of God as an accusing father-

figure that must be appeased), to test its reality and help to underline the atheistic

dimensions of Christian faith with respect to other gods. Davis claims that even theology

can become idolatrous when it becomes overly systematised and petrified into creeds,

confessions of faith, and propositional truths. Similarly, religious experiences can be the

object of idolatry, particularly in Evangelical-charismatic and Pentecostal churches, which

56 Ricœur, "Religion, Atheism, and Faith," 446, 47, 60, 67. 57 Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 41. 58 Davis, Thank God for Atheists: What Christians can learn from the New Atheists.

17

can, on occasions, place undue emphasis on signs, wonders and manifestations of the

presence of the Holy Spirit in believers’ lives.59

It may be that, in response to the New Atheists’ critique, Christians have good cause to

question the notion of a supernatural, interventionist, ruler-deity of traditional theism and

embark on the long path or reimagining God in other ways – as an experiential reality, or

as consciousness, as Truth, immanent beauty, love, or intimate presence, for example. As

Davis concludes:

We are entering an era of post-theistic spirituality. Revelation will be seen as a

combination of scientific discovery interpreted by spiritual experience… Theism must die

for God to live. Otherwise, the church will be nothing more than an empty tomb and a

whitewashed sepulchre. Theism is dead! Long live God!60

Christians may have much to learn from the New Atheists in their prophetic and

challenging role for the Church. The God that they reject will be the one that Christians

may also dismiss. An abstract God, a cosmic ‘watchmaker,’ a wish-fulfilment, a

judgemental father-figure is not the God proclaimed by Jesus Christ. The task for theology

is to rethink God in a way that counters these images and presents a picture of God as

intimate to us in our world and in our plight.61 This is the radical message of Christianity

that the Church must hold fast to and is a theme that is at the heart of Jüngel’s thought. It

is the love made manifest in Jesus, a vulnerable, defenceless love, the same love that

Christians are called to confess as the ultimate environment, ground and destiny of all

being.62 In other words, Christianity – at its centre, the story of love’s mending of wounded

hearts – forms a potent resource for making sense of our existence and the Christian vision

is that Christ is the revelation in a human life of what God is like.63 This is not the God that

corresponds to Dawkins’ ‘monster’ but the incarnate God who, as Jüngel affirms, is made

59 Davis, Thank God for Atheists: What Christians can learn from the New Atheists, 44-73. 60 Davis, Thank God for Atheists: What Christians can learn from the New Atheists, 316. 61 For a discussion of the role of New Atheism as a stimulus for theological reflection and renewal see Gary

Keogh, "Theology After New Atheism," New Blackfriars 96, no. 1066 (2015). 62 John F. Haught, God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens

(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 92. 63 Shortt, God is No Thing: Coherent Christianity, 1, 24.

18

manifest in weakness, suffering, perishability and death in the man Jesus, a vulnerable God

who is not, in any sense, detached from the chaos of natural and historical processes. The

Church does not affirm the God of Deism, an Absolute that remains eternally above the

world’s struggles in splendid isolation from the hopes, tragedies, sorrows, and struggles of

weak human beings and the larger story of cosmic and biological evolution. Such a God

would only be an accurate reflection of the New Atheists’ idea of God. However, it is

emphatically not the God of the Christian faith or the God of the Bible. In countering the

New Atheists’ reduction of the Bible to morality and demonstrating that, instead, it is about

meaning, it is this God of love for, and engagement with, humanity that the Church needs

to affirm as it enters into dialogue with contemporary atheists.

3. The interlocutors examined in this thesis

The following chapter explore aspects of the Christian theological response to unbelief by

setting out the complexity and differentiated nature of the atheist critique in the form of a

four-fold typology of unbelief. This will prepare the ground for more extended discussion

of the projects of three theologians from different ecclesial traditions who have sought to

engage with different kinds of atheistic critique and who have each offered

counterproposals in defense of the Christian gospel. These are the German Lutheran

theologian Eberhard Jüngel, the American Orthodox thinker David Bentley Hart, and the

French Jesuit writer Henri de Lubac. Although there are other thinkers in each Christian

denomination that engage with atheistic thought,64 I chose to focus on these theologians

because of the centrality of atheism and unbelief to their projects, the serious attention that

each gives to these phenomena, and the important resources that they each offer to the

Church as it seeks to engage in a constructive dialogue with atheism. I will examine the

distinctive contributions of each theologian, with the aim of drawing out lessons for the

64 These include: Rudolf Bultmann, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karl Barth, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Paul Tillich,

Jacques Maritain, Yves Congar, Karl Rahner, Hans Küng, Thomas J.J. Altizer, Joseph Ratzinger, Herbert

McCabe, Michael Buckley, Elizabeth Johnson, Merold Westphal, Michael Gillespie, Gavin Hyman, Alister

McGrath, Charles Taylor, John Caputo, Stuart Murray, Tina Beattie, and Stephen Bullivant.

19

Church today about how it can enter into a meaningful and fruitful conversation with

contemporary unbelief.

It will be apparent that each thinker engages with atheism in different ways and offers

critiques that are distinctive to their theological, historical and cultural contexts. Eberhard

Jüngel’s focus is on the modern scepticism about the reality of God, which he believes is

rooted in metaphysical developments within the Christian tradition, as well as with the

profound misunderstanding of the invisibility of God within the world. He engages with

the role of reason and logic in the philosophical tradition but also enters into an important

dialogue with the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche in connection with Nietzsche’s

announcement of the ‘death of God.’ With respect to the typology discussed in Chapter 1,

Jüngel engages principally with Type I and Type II categories of atheism. For Jüngel, the

fundamental way of understanding the presence of God within the world is the cross of

Christ, upon which God, who is the mystery of the world, enters the perishability of the

human condition. The Christian faith, for Jüngel, is the response in thought and speech to

Jesus, who is the Crucified One, the one who makes God knowable and speakable as the

living form of God, who is identified as love. At the heart of Jüngel’s project, particularly

in his work God as the Mystery of the World, is an attempt to respond to the notion within

atheism that the God affirmed by Christianity is too detached and distant from the world

and may be seen as an abstract concept derived from philosophical reasoning instead of

from lived experience. This theme in Jüngel’s work was a key reason for selecting him as

the first interlocutor to be examined in the thesis.

David Bentley Hart, writing in very different circumstances, is also preoccupied with

the thought of Nietzsche. Furthermore, he engages with the broad current of Continental

philosophy in the wake of Nietzsche as he examines the thought of European philosophers

such as Jean-François Lyotard, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze,

Michel Foucault and Hans-Georg Gadamer, within which he identifies a nihilistic strand

that runs counter to the gospel. Hart also enters into dialogue with representatives of the

New Atheist movement (particularly Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins) as he

highlights the deeply flawed notions of God and the Christian faith that are to be found in

20

the works of these authors. In a recent work,65 Hart extends his critique of notions that are

antithetical to authentic Christian belief by dismantling the belief in hell and eternal

damnation. Hart’s sensitivity to the atheistic objection to ‘selective salvation’ was a

significant factor in identifying him as the second theologian to engage with in the thesis.

In relation to the typology that is presented in the next Chapter, I consider Hart to examine

each of the four categories of atheism within it.

Henri de Lubac’s interactions with atheism and unbelief are distinguished by his

concerns over the theological origins of the secular worldview, which he traces through

the neoscholastic principle of nature and grace being separated from each other. Thus, like

Jüngel, de Lubac is sensitive to the role of the Church in laying the foundations for unbelief.

Additionally, however, and in common with both Jüngel and Hart, de Lubac is also

attentive to the work of Nietzsche as he critiques the atheistic humanism that Nietzsche’s

work inaugurated within Western culture. De Lubac’s attentiveness to the role of the

Church in providing a foundation for atheism and the secularisation of contemporary

society, together with his efforts to recast the Christian message in ways that focus on a

social, rather than individual, understanding of salvation, were reasons for including him

as the final theologian to be discussed in this thesis. De Lubac’s focus is principally on

Type II atheism, particularly as this finds expression in the thought of Feuerbach and

Nietzsche.

It should also be noted that, although all three theologians are critical of atheistic

positions, they each also offer important resources to assist the Church in its dialogue

with atheism. These will be highlighted in the chapters dedicated to each thinker although

they will also be discussed in the final chapter of the thesis.

Having set out the rationale for developing a constructive dialogue between atheists

and Christians, examined some of the many areas of learning that Christians may be able

to derive from the atheistic critique, and highlighted the role of the three theologians who

65 David Bentley Hart, That All shall be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2019).

21

will be examined in the thesis, I turn in the next chapter to discuss in more detail the

nature and types of atheism, its emergence within Western culture, the challenge that it

presents to the Church, some of the stumbling blocks to belief that may precipitate atheist

arguments, and then go on to set out and discuss a four-fold typology of different forms

of atheism.

22

Chapter 1:

Christianity and the age of

atheism

In this chapter I examine the question of what is meant by atheism, acknowledge the

complex nature of the term, highlight the associations that exist between belief and

unbelief, trace the emergence of atheism in Western thought, and underline the challenge

that it presents to the contemporary Church. Having outlined some of the reasons that

provoke an atheistic worldview, I offer a fourfold typology of atheism. I then discuss each

of the types of atheism, reflecting on both their connections and internal variations. The

chapter lays the foundations for a more comprehensive analysis of the thought of my three

primary dialogue partners, Eberhard Jüngel, David Bentley Hart, and Henri de Lubac, in

the following three chapters.

1.1 What is atheism?

Given the variety of ways in which it has been used, the term atheism requires some

attention, for it is a word charged with a variety of meanings and connotations.66 It

originated in the Ancient Greek word ἄθεος (átheos), which means meaning ‘godless’ or,

broadly, ‘without deities.’ The prefix a- implies the lack of, rather than, necessarily,

66 There is evidence even in the Bible that the denial of God’s existence was present amongst the Hebrew

people. Psalms 14 and 53 both indicate this, with their opening words ‘Fools say in their hearts, “There is

no God.”’

23

opposition toward, belief. Atheism is today most commonly defined as a lack of belief in

God or gods, and an atheist is usually defined as someone who does not believe in Gods

or gods. Atheists will therefore normally deny the existence of God. They will assert that

God did not create human beings but that human beings created God and that, for this

reason, God is a myth.67 This simple definition may not, however, be entirely satisfactory

since atheist belief may fall along a spectrum from a strong conviction that God or gods

do not exist to a weaker position concerning the existence of God or gods, rather than being

a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response to the question of belief in God or god.68 Conceptually,

Bullivant defines atheism today as the absence of belief in the existence of a God or gods.69

This is a capacious designation. By incorporating a range of positions where faith is absent,

it moves beyond notions of atheism that reduce it to the explicit rejection of belief. This

allows the term to be used as a description of both positive atheists,70 who have arrived at

their position after informed and principled thought (sometimes referred to as hard or

strong atheism) and so-called negative atheists,71 who may not have consciously evaluated

the matter but who are, nonetheless, marked by the absence of belief in a transcendent

reality (a position often described as agnosticism but also as soft or unconscious atheism).72

And by widening the object of unbelief to God or gods, an acknowledgement is made that

67 Ron Rhodes, Answering the Objections of Atheists, Agnostics, and Skeptics (Eugene, OR: Harvest House

Publishers, 2006), 22. 68 Bowman et al., "College Students' Appreciative Attitudes Toward Atheists," 99. 69 Stephen Bullivant, "Defining 'Atheism'," in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, ed. Stephen Bullivant and

Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 70 Positive atheists (also sometimes termed explicit atheists), who can be considered to include Feuerbach,

Marx, Schopenhaur, Nietzsche, Freud, and Sartre, from the nineteenth century, and more recently figure

such as Ernest Nagel, Richard Dawkins, Michael Martin, and Daniel Dennett, each provide, in their own

distinctive way, a repudiation of God and all theistic claims. See Michael Palmer, "The Meaning of

Atheism," in Atheism for Beginners (The Lutterworth Press, 2013), 16-17. 71 See Antony Flew, "The Presumption of Atheism," in The Presumption of Atheism and Other

Philosophical Essays on God, Freedom and Immortality (London: Pemberton, 1976), 14. 72 A distinction is sometimes made between soft, or weak, agnositicism, which says we do not know if God

exists, and hard, or strong, agnosticism, which says that cannot know if God exists. See Rhodes, Answering

the Objections of Atheists, Agnostics, and Skeptics, 24.

24

atheists will disavow all forms of theism and their associated conceptions of supernatural

being, whether this is in terms of the singular God or plural gods.73

It must also be acknowledged that belief and unbelief remain closely entangled and

complexly interwoven categories of human identity within contemporary Western society.

Thus, there are significant numbers of people who would classify themselves as, in some

sense, religious but who do not believe in God. These include secular Jews and Christian

atheists.74 Similarly, there are, perhaps surprisingly, those who identify as atheist but who

maintain some forms of spiritual belief, despite their rejection of any form of religious

allegiance.75 It has also become increasingly common for people today to identify as

spiritual but not religious.76

Another matter concerns the issue of whether atheism might be regarded as a positive

worldview in its own right. Atheism is generally thought of as negation, a denial of the

believing, belonging and behaving that accompany religious faith. On this definition it is

a position that rejects both a transcendent reality and a sacred dimension to material

existence. For this reason, many (although not all) atheists are motivated by naturalism,

the belief that the world and the properties of human nature are fundamentally natural and

not anchored in some invisible and supra-sensible realm that lies beyond the physical

domain.77 Such a stance is articulated by Bertrand Russell in his assessment of who we

essentially are. ‘Man,’ for Russell, is not to be thought of as the creation of divinity. Rather,

‘…his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, and his beliefs, are but the outcome of

73 This definition is shared broadly by Martin in his own understanding of the meaning of atheism. See

Michael Martin, "General Introduction," in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism:, ed. Michael Martin

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-2; see also Palmer, "The Meaning of Atheism," 13-18. 74 This paradoxical, but not uncommon, phenomenon is explored by Brian Mountford. Christian Atheist:

Belonging without Believing (Winchester: O Books, 2011). 75 Research undertaken by Theos, for example, uncovered the prevalence of belief in notions such as life

after death, heaven, hell, the soul and angels amongst those who identified as non-religious. See Nick

Spencer and Holly Weldin, "Post-religious Britain? The Faith of the Faithless," (London: Theos, 2012), 24-

31. 76 See, for example, Charles Lippy, "Review article: Spiritual but Not Religious: Understanding

Unchurched America by Robert C.Fuller," The Journal of Religion 84, no. 4 (2004). Conversely, there are

others who identify as ‘religious but not spiritual.’ The philosopher Julian Baggini and the artist Grayson

Perry are examples. 77 Julian Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5-7.

25

accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and

feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave…’78 However, atheism may also

be understood in terms of what it affirms rather than what it rejects. As several atheist

authors have been keen to point out, a more affirmative position seeks to articulate a vision

of atheism that highlights its positive, meaningful, and moral qualities, such as social

welfare, community justice and individual liberty.79

Although the focus of this thesis is on the opportunities and possibilities for a

constructive dialogue to be developed between Christianity and atheism, another argument

in the thesis is that theism and atheism are very closely related and that a straightforward

binary understanding of the relationship between belief and unbelief, or between

Christianity and atheism, is inaccurate. This point is evident in the history of atheism within

the West, which will be briefly outlined in the next section.

1.2 The emergence of modern atheism

This section will address some of the key landmarks in the history of atheism, particularly

within the West, and highlight the close connection that has existed, and continues to be

present, between theism and atheism. It will highlight the complex relationship that has

existed, and persists to this day, between belief and unbelief, and provide a starting point

for the fuller exploration of this principle in subsequent chapters within the thesis. The

section draws on the work of a number of authors who have examined the history of

atheism, including Michael Buckley and Gavin Hyman.

78 Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic: And Other Essays, [2nd ed]. ed. (London: Allen and Unwin,

1917), 46. 79 Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction, 7-10.

26

It should be noted at the outset that first Christians were once described as atheists.80

Those, who like the martyr Polycarp (d. 156), refused to take part in the civic cult of the

empire and so subordinate their faith to political loyalty, were condemned to death as

atheists.81 The early use of the term demonstrates how atheism is always to be understood

in relation to a particular form of religious commitment, which it denies. In the succeeding

centuries, and throughout the Middle Ages, atheism remained a rare phenomenon. It was

not until the Renaissance that the term ‘atheist’ began to be used in a way that approaches

some of the current understandings of its meaning. Its first appearance in English has been

traced by Buckley to a text written by John Cheke in 1540 within a translation of Plutarch’s

On Superstition.82 Prior to this, theism was not, fundamentally, an intellectual position but

a practical orientation, an inspiration that governed the relationship between multifarious

forms of human life and the divine presence that enchanted – and was signalled within –

the natural world.83 For many, religion was the organising principle of society. The

emergence of a variety of atheistic viewpoints, which was set in motion by a complex suite

of intellectual, cultural and theological moves made during the Renaissance era, was a long

and drawn-out process. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the meaning of the

word atheism evolved to correspond to something similar to its current usage. In the late

1600s and into the 1700s, expressions of sceptical and so-called ‘free’ thought,

underpinned by growing interest in early scientific endeavours, emerged across Europe.84

80 Joseph J Walsh, "On Christian Atheism," Vigiliae Christianae (1991): 261; see also David Bentley Hart,

Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and its Fashionable Enemies (London: Yale University Press,

2009), 126. 81 Rowan Williams, "Analysing Atheism: Unbelief and the World of Faiths," Bearing the Word (2004): 1.

See also the chapter 'Atheism Before Modernity' in Simon Perry, Atheism after Christendom: Disbelief in

an Age of Encounter (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2015), esp. 5-17; Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 1-2,

143. 82 Plutarch’s adoption of the term suggests that he was using it to describe the denial of divine providence,

rather than the reality of God. However, it is significant that the word was first used just as European

society was on the cusp of its long transition toward modernity. Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of

Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 9-10. 83 As Shagan notes, ‘Historians interested in the emergence of atheism have described at considerable

length the variety of meanings attached to the term in the sixteenth century, arguing that it did not generally

signify the absence of belief in God.’ Ethan H. Shagan, The Birth of Modern Belief: Faith and Judgment

from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (Princeton University Press, 2018), 101. 84 James M. Byrne, Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment (London: SCM Press,

1996), 124-33.

27

The emergence of atheism during the Enlightenment was a highly complicated process

although it appears that its inception was closely related to birth of modernity and the desire

for an objective grasp of reality through rational enquiry and the application of scientific

methods.85 Such speculative enquiry, which pointed to the nonsensical nature of orthodox

Christian belief, seen in figures such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Voltaire and Hume, served to

loosen the grip of the Church amongst the intellectual classes.86 Even in the Enlightenment,

however, many thinkers remained wedded to a Christian worldview and faith in God, often

in the form of Deism, persisted within European intellectual culture. It was in eighteenth-

century France that the word atheist finally came to be used as a term of self-identification.

Following his somewhat tortuous journey through theism, Deism and pantheism, it was the

famous encyclopaedia creator Diderot who was to become the first explicitly and self-

confessedly atheist philosopher.87 Further propelled by the forceful thought of Diderot’s

contemporary d’Holbach, atheism quickly became a respectable position that one could

freely apply to oneself. By the middle of the century, naturalistic interpretations of the

universe, which made no recourse to theological explanations, were widely held amongst

the philosophes, who advanced the so-called ‘Cult of Reason.’ However, even when God

was denied, theistic structures were retained through the substitution of another notion,

such as Reason, Truth, or Nature, for God.

In Britain, the situation was more complex and until the end of the century, atheism was

championed, in the main, by solitary figures,88 and was not, as in France and Germany,

associated with revolutionary politics. There was, actually, resistance to atheism in Britain,

with the terms, secularist or agnostic89 (the latter coined by Thomas Huxley90), being used

85 Gavin Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael

Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 27-28. 86 Alan Charles Kors, "The Age of Enlightenment," in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, ed. Stephen

Bullivant and Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 195-6. 87 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 199. 88 D. Carroll, George Eliot: The Critical Heritage (Taylor & Francis, 2013), 38, 249. Other well-known

English atheists included Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) and Lord Byron (1788-1824). 89 People who identify as agnostic may neither believe or disbelieve in the existence of God. They may not

subscribe to the anti-theistic beliefs of positive atheism and may instead by regarded as a form of negative

atheist for whom the question of God simply does not arise. Palmer, "The Meaning of Atheism," 17. 90 See Thomas Henry Huxley, Agnosticism and Christianity (Editions Le Mono, 2016).

28

as alternative and more culturally acceptable labels. Beyond the learned elites, within the

working classes religious identity was frequently marked by apathy, indifference and

clerical hostility rather than intellectually-grounded unbelief.91 Sensitive observers within

the Church of English, including John Henry Newman, could read the shifts taking place

in European civilisation and they predicted that religious dissent would move from private

to public arena of corporate life.92 For a number of authors, such as Thomas Hardy and

Matthew Arnold, the loss of faith in Victorian England provoked a sense of poignant

sadness rather than triumphant optimism, as they grappled with their own complex

relationship between belief and unbelief.93 Once again, the entanglement between faith and

unbelief is evident as the erosion of belief in God was accompanied, for some at least, with

lament and wistfulness.

This sense of mourning is captured in words from Matthew Arnold’s poem Dover

Beach:

The Sea of Faith

Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore

Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.

But now I only hear

Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,

Retreating, to the breath

Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear

And naked shingles of the world.

During the twentieth century atheism became much more widespread within Western

culture and this trend has continued into the twenty-first century. Atheism underwent a

91 Walter Arnstein et al., "Recent Studies in Victorian Religion," Victorian Studies 33, no. 1 (1989): 151;

Brian Harrison, "Religion and Recreation in Nineteenth-Century England," Past & Present, no. 38 (1967):

99. 92 Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," 32. 93 For highly insightful discussions of the religious views of these two figures, see Norman Arkans,

"Hardy's 'Religious Twilight'," Texas Studies in Literature and Language 21, no. 3 (1979); Anthony

Kenny, "Newman and Victorian Doubt," New Blackfriars 92, no. 1038 (2011). See also R. Albert Mohler,

Jr., Atheism Remix: A Christian Confronts the New Atheists (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2008), 23-26.

29

transition from an intellectual position to a cultural phenomenon.94 Over recent decades,

disengagement from the Church and disinterest in Christian faith has moved out of private

consciousness into the Zeitgeist of European cultural life. It was in the 1960s that atheism

first gained a firm grip within all levels of society.95 By this decade Western society had

entered what Ebeling terms the ‘age of atheism.’96 Disengagement from the Church and a

loss of Christian faith became widespread within the 1970s, especially within youth culture

and there are few signs that this is a trend that will be reversed. Despite this development,

it is still the case that more people describe themselves as ‘non-religious’ rather than

‘atheist.’97 It is also the case that a loose belief in a ‘higher power’ or ‘something out there’

persists within Western populations even amongst those people who do not have any form

of religious identity. Furthermore, there appears to be considerable interest in forms of

spirituality that have been unshackled from institutional religious structures, there has been

a resurgence of interest in religion within Continental philosophy (particularly, although

not exclusively, in French phenomenology), and prominent coverage is given to issues

related to faith and belief within the media.98 Empirical research highlights a ‘fuzzy

fidelity,’ that is a the subtle interweaving of faith, doubt and denial amongst European

people, who may exhibit non-binary religious identities.99 To demonstrate this, many

people belong exhibit what might be termed ‘believing without belonging,’ which renders

them somewhat hospitable to religious concerns even if levels of attendance and allegiance

are low.100 Given the coexistence of religious and secular phenomena in contemporary

94 It should be noted that atheism is predominantly a feature of countries that have historically been

characterised as Christian, that Western atheism is by and large a home-grown phenomenon and, for this

reason, tends to be most pointed in European nations. See Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 47-48. 95 Hugh McLeod, "The Religious Crisis of the 1960s," Journal of Modern European History 3, no. 2

(2005): 205. 96 Gerhard Ebeling, "The Message of God to the Age of Atheism," Oberlin College Bulletin January 1964:

3-14. 97 A NatCen survey in September 2017 indicated that some 53% of the population of the United Kingdom

now identify themselves has having ‘no religion.’ See The Guardian, 4th September 2017:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/half-uk-population-has-no-religion-british-social-

attitudes-survey [accessed 9th November 2017]. 98 See Matthew Engelke, "Religion and the media turn: A review essay," American Ethnologist 37, no. 2

(2010). 99 David Voas, "The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe," European Sociological Review 25, no. 2

(2009): 161. 100 Gavin Hyman, A Short History of Atheism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 17.

30

society, it would arguably be more accurate to describe the world we inhabit as ‘religio-

secular.’101 It would appear that the boundary between faith and unbelief is a permeable

one and that, as Ronald Dworkin observes, ‘the familiar stark divide between people of

religion and without religion is too crude.’102 The complicated intersection of theistic and

atheistic themes is explored in the context of several artistic projects, including the Netflix

series Stranger Things, the sculptures of Damien Hirst, and the music of David Bowie,

Nick Cave, and Leonard Cohen, in an absorbing study that develops the argument that

Christianity both needs atheism and that atheism offers profound and necessary theological

insights into Christianity itself.103 Intriguingly, it might also be argued that the interest in

various atheistic standpoints, in particular the attention given to the arguments propounded

by the so-called ‘New Atheists’ in recent years, points to the persistence of a religious

dynamic within Western nations. This suggests that a binary distinction between theism

and atheism is unsustainable and that that the dynamic flux between belief and unbelief

within the West demonstrates the interwoven nature of these perspectives, both within the

lives of individual and within the wider population.

It is also the case that religion in contemporary Western society has been far from

extinguished. The surge in Christian and Muslim populations within the Global South has

had enormous consequences for international religion and has impacted on some Western

cities with sizeable immigrant populations, particularly through the spread of

Pentecostalism.104 As a result of this, as well as the increasing popularity of Evangelical-

charismatic churches, religious affiliation and church attendance is actually growing in

some major cities, such as London.105 This trend further illustrates the complex relationship

101 Martin E. Marty, "Our Religio-Secular World," Daedalus 132, no. 3 (2003): 42. 102 Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 2. 103 Kutter Callaway and Barry Taylor, The Aesthetics of Atheism: Theology and Imagination in

Contemporary Culture (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2019). 104 Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Politics," Foreign

Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010): 94. 105 John Wolffe and Bob Jackson, "Anglican Resurgence: The Church of England in London," in Church

Growth in Britain: 1980 to the Present, ed. David Goodhew (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 23-40.

31

that exists between belief and unbelief within the West and highlights how deeply

connected these two positions are in society today.

1.3 The challenge to the Church

There is little doubt that unbelief in its manifold expressions constitutes a matter of

considerable importance to the ministry and mission of contemporary churches. Whilst he

may have rather simplified and exaggerated the phenomenon, perhaps because his words

were issued when the demarcation line between theism and atheism was a little more

clearly drawn than it is today, it is significant that in 1986 Pope John Paul II identified

atheism as ‘the striking phenomenon of our time.’106 God, for many, has become

superfluous, a fading memory from our culture’s history. Having abrogated the properties

traditionally attributed to divinity and transferred them to ourselves, it has been suggested

that humanity has usurped God.107 The Israeli author, Yuval Noah Harari, in his recent

best-seller Homo Deus, captures the tenor of this new conception: ‘In seeking blessing and

immortality humans are in fact trying to upgrade themselves into gods.’108 Recalling

Feuerbach’s famous critique, which I shall examine in due course, he even suggests that

the act of faith in God is no more than confirmation that the only genuine basis for truth is

the human conscience: ‘…the real source of authority is my own feelings. So even while

saying that I believe in God, the truth is I have a much stronger belief in my own inner

voice.’109

One of the major themes running through this thesis, signalled by the quotations at the

start of the Introduction to the thesis, is the complex entanglement between Christian faith

and atheism. The relationship is a multifaceted one. Firstly, as many thinkers have

106 This was a statement within the the fifth encyclical written by Pope John Paul II. "Dominum et

Vivificantem," Section 55 (1986). 107 See C.A.J. Coady, "Playing God," in Human Enhancement, ed. Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom

(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-80. 108 Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Harvill Secker, 2016), 43. 109 Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, 265.

32

acknowledged, atheism in Europe was generated dialectically. In other words, the

apologetic strategies adopted by Christian thinkers were to prove, it turns out, to be the

very ground for key developments in the growth of atheism within Western culture. Thus,

as Buckley, in particular, has argued, the very efforts designed to counter atheism by the

Church were the source of its intellectual power and cultural growth.110 Reflecting his

reading of Nietzsche, Valadier is more forthright: ‘it was the Christian tradition that

produced atheism as its fruit; it led to the murder of God in the consciences of men because

it presented them with an unbelievable God.’111 Secondly, both atheism and Christianity

have, at times, imagined the nature and being of God in ways that are now regarded as

unhelpful and unfaithful to the biblical witness. Thus, the different manifestations of

atheism today may be mapped to specific expressions of theism, which have arisen

throughout the history of the Church and which have each generated a particular mode of

unbelief. As Rahner remarks, ‘atheism essentially lives on the misconceived ideas of God

from which theism, in its actual historical forms, inevitably suffers.’112 Eberhard Jüngel

makes a similar point in a different way as he notes that both atheism and theology ‘stand

equally overshadowed by the dark clouds of the unthinkability of God.’113 It follows then

that certain categories and ideas about God need to be carefully unpicked for a constructive

dialogue to be opened up between theists and atheists. This may be one of the ways in

which atheist perspectives might make a contribution to the life of the Church.

If that conversation can be held, atheism might, on occasions, have an important role to

play within Christian theology. Indeed, ‘[c]ertain types of atheism… may prove both

therapeutic on behalf of theism and even positive in their ethical thrust.’114 Engagement

with atheism need not, therefore, be a combative exercise. A number of Christian thinkers

110 Michael J. Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God: The Ambiguous Progress of Modern Atheism (New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), xi. 111 Paul Valadier, Nietzsche: l'athee de rigueur (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1975), 485. 112 Karl Rahner, Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (A&C Black, 1975), 50-51. 113 GMW, vii, 17. 114 Joseph C. McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier

University Press, 1988), 5.

33

acknowledge the potential value of such dialogue. The philosopher Paul Ricœur, for

example, observes that:

… atheism is not limited in meaning to the mere negation and destruction of religion but…

rather opens up the horizon for something else, for a type of faith that might be called… a

postreligious faith or a faith for a postreligious age.115

Ricœur is an important voice in Christianity’s response to atheism, particularly as it was

expressed by Nietzsche and Freud, seeing it a valuable resource that can mediate between

‘stale religion’ and a purified faith.116

A similar acknowledgement of the value of atheism for Christian faith has been put

forward by other authors. Barth’s endorsement of Feuerbach’s rejection of religion (for all

his reservations about the earlier author’s final conclusions), which is consonant with

Barth’s own criticism of the prevailing Protestant theology of his day, derived as it was

from Schleiermacher, is a good example of this.117 Burley holds that ‘atheism can be

positively beneficial, and perhaps even essential, in promoting a deeper mode of faith or at

least in preventing one from slipping into shallow or idolatrous modes.’118 The notion of

purification is also at the heart of Simone Weil’s heartfelt explorations of the boundary

between faith and unbelief: ‘There are two atheisms of which one is a purification of the

notion of God.’119 And within his thoroughgoing examination of atheism as an

indispensable aid for religious belief, Merold Westphal even asserts that Freud, Marx and

Nietzsche are ‘God-given instruments of our own cleansing and renewal as individual

Christians’ who offer a critique of religion that echoes that voiced by the Old Testament

prophets, Jesus’ denunciation of the Pharisees, Paul’s critique of works righteousness and

115 Paul Ricœur, "Religion, atheism, and faith," in The Conflict of Interpretations : Essays in Hermeneutics

(Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 440. 116 Ricœur, "Religion, atheism, and faith," 460. 117 Barth provided an introductory essay in Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George

Eliot (New York: Harper, 1957), x-xxxii. For a helpful discussion of this relationship, see Bender, "Karl

Barth and the Question of Atheism," 272. 118 Burley, "Atheisms and the purification of faith," 320. 119 Weil, Gravity and Grace, 114.

34

James’ critique of cheap grace.120 The opportunities for fruitful interaction between

Christians and atheists will be revisited in the final chapter of this study.

1.4 Reasons for atheism and unbelief

There is little doubt that the grounds for atheism are complex and varied, and that people

will reject the reality of God’s existence for many different reasons. In this section I will

outline some of the objections to belief in God that are cited by atheists, which may also

present stumbling blocks to the participation of atheists in dialogue with Christians.121

Although the reasons for atheism I highlight are all important ones, I recognise that this

may not be an exhaustive list and that some atheists will cite other factors that have

provoked their rejection of the existence of God. Nonetheless, what follows will provide a

foundation for a typology of atheism that will be presented in the next section of this

chapter.

For some unbelievers, the basis of their atheism is grounded in their perception that God

is too distant and detached from the world, that God is solely an object of faith, and that

there is insufficient evidence to believe in God within human experience.122 This basis for

atheism is a feature of Type I atheism in the typology outlined in the next section. Such a

conception is one that Eberhard Jüngel seeks to respond to in his work God as the Mystery

of the World. It is a position may be associated with a purely materialistic or naturalistic

conception of the world and may also be wedded to a belief that scientific enquiry provides

120 Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism, 10-11. 121 Stephen Bullivant also offers a discussion of the range of reasons for disbelief in Chapter 2 of his work

Faith and Unbelief, 24-46. 122 Such a position was adopted by the poet Shelley, who in 1811 was expelled from University College,

Oxford, for having published an essay entitled “The Necessity of Atheism.” Shelley argues that, since there

is no compelling evidence for the ecistence of God, there is no intellectual obligation to believe in God. See

Alister E. McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism : The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World

(London: Rider, 2005), 122-27.

35

the only basis for both investigating and drawing conclusions about the nature of reality.123

The notion that science and atheism are intrinsically linked is widespread within some

expressions of atheism, particularly that articulated by thinkers within the New Atheist

movement, for whom religious and scientific positions are fundamentally incompatible.124

The Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection is frequently cited by atheists as

evidence that the Christian conception of creatio ex nihilo is incomprehensible and

unbelievable, although it should also be noted that there are many Christians who are not

especially troubled by Darwin’s ideas about the evolution of species for which the fossil

record provides ample evidence.125 This first reason for the denial of existence of God is

essentially connected with intellectual argumentation, logic, reason, and evidence, which

are certainly characteristics of Type I atheism in the typology presented later in this

chapter.

There are other reasons for rejecting the existence of God that are founded upon

emotional or instinctive revulsion from the Christian message rather than on an intellectual

dismissal of faith. One of the arguments that sometimes emerges in atheistic rhetoric is the

notion of selective salvation and eternal damnation, which, quite understandably, can be

very off-putting to unbelievers. Both David Bentley Hart and Henri de Lubac seek to

respond to this objection in their projects. The Christian idea of hell, whilst not necessarily

part of the faith of many Christians, can be traced to several passages in the New Testament

(for example, Matthew 25.41), and has run as a thread through the Christian history. It has

presented a major stumbling block to belief for several contemporary atheists including

several members of the New Atheist movement.126 The issue of hell and eternal perdition

is certainly a contested issue in Christian theology and the objections to this notion that are

123 Naturalistic objections to the existence of God are discussed in some detail by Richard Dawkins in the

chapter ‘Why there is almost certainly no God’ in his work The God Delusion. Richard Dawkins, The God

Delusion (London: Black Swan, 2007), 137-89. 124 See, for example, D. C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (London:

Penguin Books, 2007), 29-53. 125 See Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 39-45. 126 See, for example, Casper Rigsby, The Passion of the Atheist: Exploring the Emotional Aspects of

Atheism (Scotts Valley, California: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 16-18; Dawkins,

The God Delusion, 359-62; Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation (London: Bantam, 2007), 4.

36

raised, quite understandably, by atheists may provoke Christians to reflect carefully on

their views about hell.

A further and very powerful reason for rejecting the existence of God, which is in part

both intellectual and emotional, stems from a protest expressed by many atheists against

arbitrary suffering within the world. It is a theme that exercises all three of the interlocutors

examined in this thesis, although Hart gives the matter the most extended treatment,

particularly in his work The Doors of the Sea, which discusses the issues raised by the

Indian Ocean tsunami of 26th December 2004. Described by Hans Küng as the ‘rock of

atheism,’127 the existence and extent of suffering certainly presents an enormous obstacle

to faith in God for those who encounter trials, pain, sorrow, and suffering, either in their

own lives or in those of people they love. It is entirely understandable that this issue should

act as a stumbling block faith and, for many, it may be an insurmountable issue that cannot

be reconciled with the existence of God. The problem of evil has provoked responses from

Christian theologians who have sought to provide a justification for God in the face of

suffering through various forms of theodicy. These arguments, however, tend to have little

persuasive power among atheists, and suffering remains a very significant factor in the

unbelief of a large proportion of atheists.128 With respect to the typology that will be

presented in the next section, the issues of suffering and hell tend to be factors that provoke

Type II atheism.

In addition to the reasons for unbelief referred to above, atheism may also be rooted in

objections to the moral failings of the Church, both in its history and within contemporary

society, in a perception that religion and violence are interwoven, and in an objection to

the perceived privileges accorded to the Church within some Western nations, particularly

(as in the United Kingdom) where the Church is formally established and where it plays a

key role in the apparatus of the state. The strong secular currents sweeping through many

European nations in the early decades of the twentieth century may have been the cause of

127 Hans Küng, On Being a Christian (London: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, 2008), 432. 128 For a discussion of this issue, see Bullivant, Faith and Unbelief, 32-39; see also William L Rowe, "The

Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," in The Philosophy of Religion Reader, ed. Chad Meister

(London: Routledge, 2008).

37

faith’s erosion in the lives of many people within their populations.129 There are also many

people who once attended churches but who have drifted away and cut ties with

Christianity. This process is most commonly found amongst teenagers and young adults.

Despite disassociating themselves from churches, however, studies of church leavers do

suggest that they frequently continue to pursue journeys of faith, even if these do not

involve church attendance.130 The loss of faith that is sometimes, although not always, a

feature of church leavers, and the objections to the place of the role of the Church within

an increasingly secular society, tend to be features of Type III atheism in the typology

outlined in the next section.

Finally, there are expressions of atheism within some forms of Continental philosophy

which stress the radically immanent nature of all human experience and which seek to

erase the transcendent dimension from human life. Associated with the workers of thinkers

such as Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, Quentin Meillassoux, and Gilles Deleuze, this

philosophically-grounded form of naturalism is mainly associated with Type IV atheism

in the typology that follows.

1.5 Classifying atheist positions

As the previous sections sought to make clear, an examination of both the development of

unbelief and its contemporary expression demonstrates that atheism takes a variety of

forms and that different principles have governed its argumentative force. Atheism over

history has been derived from multiple religious, intellectual, social and cultural

influences, which accounts for the constellation of atheistic standpoints and identities

within society today. The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to delineating and

discussing a proposed heuristic typology of atheistic perspectives. The classification

129 Gregory Starrett, "The Varieties of Secular Experience," Comparative Studies in Society and History 52,

no. 3 (2010). 130 Alan Jamieson, A Churchless Faith: Faith journeys beyond the churches (London: SPCK, 2002); Alan

Jamieson, Jenny McIntosh, and Adrienne Thompson, Church Leavers: Faith journeys five years on

(London: SPCK, 2006).

38

offered here seeks to identify four dominant strands within atheism based on the key

principle or driver that informs each type.131 The four categories, which might be best

thought of tendencies of thought or argumentation, rather than clearly delineated positions,

along with the motivating factor with which they are associated, are as follows:

Type I atheism: unbelief stemming from the application of reason.

Type II atheism: atheism associated with the rebellion against God.

Type III atheism: disengagement from belief based on indifference to religion or the

question of God’s existence, and an orientation of personal and cultural priorities that

makes no or little reference to faith.

Type IV atheism: a radicalisation of atheism resulting from a profoundly immanentist

philosophy.

Each of these species of atheism are present in some form or other within contemporary

society. In the sections that follow their current mode of expression within Western culture

will be outlined before tracing some of the key strands within their intellectual genealogies.

In doing so, it will become evident that the categories are not neatly-packed fields of

thought. There is considerable cross contamination of influences and priorities amongst

the different modes of unbelief. Thus, reason, whilst it is especially important to the first

category of atheism, will still have some role in the other expressions of unbelief. Similarly,

the repudiation of God, perhaps on ethical grounds or in the cause of human autonomy,

which is key characteristic of a rebellious Type II atheism, may also surface within the

other types. Furthermore, within each field there are significant internal variations, which

prevent any of these orientations from being treated as homogenous positions. There are,

131 It should be noted that other typologies of atheism have been developed by a range of authors. See Gray,

Seven Types of Atheism; Thomas Steven Molnar, "Theists and Atheists: A Typology of Non-belief,"

(1980); Christopher F. Silver et al., "The six types of nonbelief: a qualitative and quantitative study of type

and narrative," Mental Health, Religion & Culture 17, no. 10 (2014); Barbara Keller et al., "Profiling

atheist world views in different cultural contexts: Developmental trajectories and accounts," Psychology of

Religion and Spirituality 10, no. 3 (2018); Stephen LeDrew, "Discovering Atheism: Heterogeneity in

Trajectories to Atheist Identity and Activism," Sociology of Religion 74, no. 4 (2013).

39

nonetheless, important distinctions that need to be traced and it will become apparent that

particular forms of argumentation tend to surface more prominently than others in each of

the four spheres of atheism. It should also be noted that the tendencies associated with each

type of atheism will be differently weighted in different atheist thinkers and that few

individuals will exhibit patterns of thought that are confined to a single category of

unbelief.

Type I reason-based atheism will be examined first. Its dynamism comes from the

application of rational and empirical strategies to demonstrate the non-existence of God

and thus to promote the logic of unbelief. It is, primarily, an atheism of the head. Emerging

during the birth of modernity and intensifying within the European Enlightenment, this

variety of atheism is especially closely associated with the thought of David Hume and,

although he was not an atheist himself, Immanuel Kant. It continued through nineteenth-

century German Idealism and philosophical positivism before being taken up by certain

twentieth-century philosophers, notably Bertrand Russell.132 It then gained expression in

the state-sponsored ‘scientific atheism’ of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century and

within the shrill rhetoric of the so-called New Atheists, who came to prominence in Britain

and North America in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Type II atheism is less concerned with proving the non-existence of God than in

highlighting the social, political and psychological damage that arises when humans centre

their world on faith in God. For Type II atheists, theistic belief alienates us from our true

selves and so needs to be rejected. It is, quite distinctively, an atheism of the heart.133 The

organising principle here is more moral repulsion than intellectual argument; protest is

more significant than proposition. This Promethean form of atheism, which we shall

132 Russell’s unbelief is expressed in his lecture ‘Why I am not a Christian’ although this piece focuses

more on debunking what he sees as the dehumanising myths of Christendom rather than attacking the heart

of Christian belief. Bertrand Russell, Why I am not a Christian: and Other Essays on Religion and Related

Subjects (London: Routledge, 2004). 133 This characteristic of the varieties of atheism we are dealing with here was identified by Jacques

Maritain: On the Church of Christ: The Person of the Church and Her Personnel, trans. Joseph W. Evans

(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 261, n.22.

40

explore below, gained force in the nineteenth century following the critique marshalled by

the great masters of suspicion: Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud.

Type III atheism, whereby God and church-going lose their place at the centre of society

and in individual lives, is closely linked to the cultural process of secularisation (although

this is not necessarily an atheistic development) and to the increasing currency given to the

term humanism as a philosophical position and humanist as a form of cultural identity. It

is a category that is characterised by a weaker form of atheism than that associated with

the other three types, and an orientation that might be better described as agnosticism.134

Marked by indifference toward Christianity, alternative and generally non-faith notions of

transcendence and the decoupling of personal spiritual identity from institutional religious

frameworks, this form of unbelief became commonplace during the twentieth century and

is arguably the most common expression of atheism found today in Western societies.

Although it is certainly less forthright than the other forms of atheism considered here, it

could be thought of as an instinctive or intuitive atheism of the gut, orientated around a

lifestyle that is generally not driven by intellectual or moral argumentation, but which is

characterised, nonetheless, by disinterest in and lack of connection with religious beliefs

and values.

Finally, attention will be given to a variety of unbelief that has emerged in recent

decades that has sought to advance a radical form of atheism. Drawing on developments

in both contemporary Continental (particularly, French) and analytical philosophy, Type

IV atheism seeks to answer Nietzsche’s call for a ‘second atheism,’ one that frees itself

from theistic structures as well as its belief content and which offers a thoroughgoing

redefinition of what it must mean to disown any notion of God’s reality. The stress placed

on a radically materialistic conception of reality suggests that this deeply-rooted and far-

reaching outlook might be considered an atheism of the body. It is an atheism that

questions, and is often highly critical of, earlier expressions of imitative ‘humanistic

atheism,’ and is sometimes associated with ethical and political activism. In its more

134 Palmer, "The Meaning of Atheism," 2.

41

radical forms, it is an outlook that will deny not just the reality of divinity, salvation and

eternity but also the very desirability of belief in these things.

1.6 Type I atheism

In this section I will outline the perspectives of a number of rational expressions of atheism.

I will also consider the intriguing phenomenon termed ‘New Atheism.’ As we shall see,

the application of reason runs as a thread through these different types of atheism. Indeed,

following the Enlightenment, reason came to be regarded as the organising principle and

supreme virtue of culture, the Leitmotif of self-confident human identity. This conception

emerged only gradually as the modern age unfolded and has deep roots in periods of

intellectual history stretching back into the mediaeval period and beyond. Once

established, however, reason became crowned as the arbiter of what is true and the defining

trait modernity, the episode in intellectual culture, which Gavin Hyman defines as a ‘desire

for an all-encompassing mastery of reality by rational and/or scientific means.’135 The

authority of reason and its capacity to deliver access to universal truth has, of course, not

been unchallenged. The attack on modern rationalism launched by Rousseau, heralding the

so-called eighteenth-century ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ in France and the Sturm und Drang

(storm and stress) movement led by Hamann in Germany, and advanced by Schelling

during the following century, gave impetus to a critique of reason that reverberated in the

work of many later thinkers.136 These include Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Lévinas,

Foucault, Vattimo, members of the Frankfurt School, and a host of other postmodern

authors, all of whom have, in different ways, sought to question the positivism,

instrumentalism, materialism and determinism associated with Enlightenment thought by

highlighting the role of the body, history, language and culture as mediating components

135 Hyman, A Short History of Atheism, 11. 136 Arthur M Melzer, "The origin of the counter-enlightenment: Rousseau and the new religion of

sincerity," American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (1996): 344; Damon Linker, "From Kant to

Schelling: Counter-Enlightenment in the name of reason," The Review of Metaphysics (2000): 338.

42

in the human quest for truth. The important relationship between some of these thinkers

and atheism will be explored in later sections.

Notwithstanding this criticism of its basic premises, modernity prizes reason as the lens

through which reality should be viewed. It has been argued that modernity’s controlling

assumption is that the individual can escape the clutches of their temporal apparatus and

‘view’ the world from a detached position of clarity and independence.137 From this

putative perspective, the methods of rational enquiry are marshalled in order to deliver

definitive judgements about what is true. This development has huge implications for the

subject of this study for it led to a form of unbelief that is most preoccupied by the issues

of evidence and logic in its denial of God, a mode of unbelief that is sometimes referred to

as speculative atheism. This position seeks to highlight the fallacious nature of religious

belief, to demonstrate that the concept of the divine is based on an unprovable hypothesis,

and attempts to point to the intellectual mistakes that underpin religious traditions.138 Yet,

the atheism that appears to be associated with the growth of modernity cannot be examined

in isolation from the belief systems that it reacts against. In other words, it can only be

understood against the backdrop of a distinctively modern theism, whose development is

interwoven with a number of epistemological moves made during the transition towards

modernity, principal amongst them being the marshalling of the resources of reason in

order to demonstrate the existence of God.

1.6.1 The intellectual roots of Type I atheism

The roots of cognitive dissent from assertion of God’s reality have been traced back, by a

number of authorities, to intellectual developments in the ancient world. However, the

received argument is that the emergence of modernity, with its turn to the subject, the

adoption of the scientific method and the attendant pursuit of objective knowledge about

the world, created the intellectual circumstances that enabled atheism to appear within

137 David H Nikkel, "The Postmodern Spirit and the Status of God," Sophia 33, no. 3 (1994): 46. 138 Bowman L Clarke, "The Modern Atheistic Tradition," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

5, no. 4 (1974): 209.

43

Western culture. As we shall see, it may be possible to excavate certain grounds for

contemporary reason-centred atheism from the history of theology. Thus, several authors

have suggested that certain moves which were made by thinkers from the medieval period

into the Enlightenment era can be construed as significant in creating the grounds for

rational rejection of faith in God.139 In the sections that follow, I will outline the genealogy

of Type I atheism as it unfolded through the modern era and into the present age. My focus

will be on identifying those theological and philosophical developments that might be

construed as having encouraged reason-centred unbelief.

A case has been made to locate the roots of modern atheism in the scholastic thought of

Thomas Aquinas who, it is suggested, opened a gulf between faith and reason.140 This

argument is most closely associated with Paul Tillich, who believes that atheism is the

inevitable outcome of Thomas’ supposed adoption of a rational way to demonstrate God’s

existence in his quinque viae.141 Such an assessment is, however, debatable and it will not

be discussed here. This is because the developments in philosophical theology, which took

place within the Church in the generations after Aquinas, are almost certainly of greater

significance for the emergence of Type I atheism. Of particular note is the major shift that

took place in the way in which God was conceived of in late mediaeval thought, which, it

has been argued, was to lay the ground for the emergence of a distinctly modern version

of theism by René Descartes (1596-1650) and his successors, and in so doing created the

conception of divinity that modern atheism was to reject.142 A number of thinkers suggest

that the key transition here was from a conception of God as spirit to the notion of God as

139 This narrative is worked out in texts such as the following: Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism;

Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth

Century (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986); Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological

Origins of Modernity (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Hyman, "Atheism in Modern

History." 140 Glenn B Siniscalchi, "Contemporary Trends in Atheist Criticism of Thomistic Natural Theology," The

Heythrop Journal (2012): 14; for a discussion of the relationship between Thomism and atheism, see also

James V Schall, "Thomism and Atheism," New Blackfriars 92, no. 1041 (2011). 141 ‘It is obvious that [Thomas’ five proofs] bring God’s existence down to that of a stone or a star, and it

makes atheism not only possible, but unavoidable as later development has proved.’ Tillich, Theology of

Culture, 18. 142 As Simon Perry notes, Descartes inaugurated a profoun shift in the nature of belief. God was no longer a

foundation for belief, but an object of belief. Perry, Atheism after Christendom: Disbelief in an Age of

Encounter, 25.

44

a thing (sometimes equated with a ‘Supreme Being’). The importance of this development,

so it is asserted, lies in the crucial shift that took place in the understanding of divine

transcendence. Instead of transcendence being ontologically related to creaturely reality in

qualitative terms, it came to be seen, rather, as quantitatively different from us and thus

‘merely’ beyond our epistemological horizon. In other words, God became not so much

fundamentally and essentially different from the physical realm of human existence, but

infinitely greater, in quantitative terms, from the existence we partake in.143 In short, God

became ‘domesticated.’ For Gavin Hyman, following this theological move at the outset

of modernity, ‘atheism becomes almost irresistible.’144

The profound developments in Western epistemology and ontology advanced in the late

Middle Ages were to be taken forward decisively by the one figure generally thought to

represent the inauguration of theological and philosophical modernity, René Descartes.

Within a context of political upheaval and intellectual and religious turbulence, Descartes

sought to grant certainty in an era of doubt.145 His intention was to articulate a

philosophically-grounded confirmation of divine reality that would gain universal assent.

This was undertaken by a committed Christian whose key work, the Meditations on First

Philosophy, was dedicated to the faculty of theology at the Sorbonne. However, numerous

interpreters have identified the Cartesian revolution as an essentially a-theological

development, which set up an ineluctable trajectory toward modern intellectual atheism.

Indeed, one of the major interlocutors in this study, Eberhard Jüngel, centres much of his

own assessment of atheism’s roots on the cognitive strategies adopted by Descartes. It is

now widely believed, therefore, that contemporary atheism developed as a gradual

realisation of a philosophical revolution instantiated at the outset of modernity by the

methodological break enacted by Descartes.146

143 Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," 38-39. 144 Hyman, A Short History of Atheism, 79. 145 In particular, he was responding to the widespread scepticism, which had accompanied the renewed

interest in Pyrrho and other ancient philosophers by Renaissance thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne.

See McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 61. 146 Hyman, A Short History of Atheism, 19.

45

Descartes is such an important figure in the development of Type I atheism because of

the status that he grants to human reason. Underscoring the priority he gives to rational

thought over appeals to the witness of scripture, Christology or pneumatology in defence

of the Christian faith, he opens his Meditations with this remark: ‘I have always considered

that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be

demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument.’147 Reason is

characterised by Descartes as the process whereby knowledge of empirical reality could

be derived from a priori eternal truths, truths that were held in common by both the divine

and human mind. We are like God because of our use of reason. Thus, a priori speculation

can produce incontestable certainties because reason yields truths that are grounded in the

mind of God.148

The thinking self, the cogito, is, for Descartes, the foundation and first principle of

indubitable certitude in the face of radical doubt about what it is that can actually be known.

This is because Descartes calls into question the reality of the external world and believes

that, as our senses can deceive us, knowledge can only be secured through a strategy

involving the ‘painting’ of the objects in the world by the mind or consciousness (cogitatio)

of the human person.149 Descartes instead strives to demonstrate the superiority of the clear

and distinct rational thought that is associated with immediate selfhood in providing

indubitable certainty about God.150 What is crucial here is that Descartes seeks as a

Christian to employ rational philosophical logic, rather than religious experience, ecclesial

tradition or Scripture, within his quest to offer surety about God. He prohibited appeal to

unfounded divine revelation within his project.151 However, in an effort to eradicate further

doubt about the cogito itself, Descartes invokes the existence of God as the indispensable

147 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. John Cottingham and Bernard Williams, [1641]

ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Sect 1.1. 148 Byrne, Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment, 99. 149 Meditation I, Descartes, Meditations, Sect 1.6. 150 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 61. 151 Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," 34.

46

ground of certain truth. God, then, is at the outset of modernity, essentially an idea that

stems from, rather than provides the frame for, the human ego.152

Many thinkers, both Christian and non-Christian, argue that, by positioning the cogito

at the centre of knowledge, Descartes’ break with the Christian theological tradition fuels

the development of contemporary intellectual unbelief. They claim that, in making God

the highest object of human knowledge, Descartes inadvertently ushers in an atheistic

framework. Although he invokes God, God is an alien theological concept within a de facto

secular rationalist construction.153 In Descartes’ epistemology, the thinking self, rather than

God, is the fundamental basis of certitude. The question of God becomes, for the first time,

a matter more appropriate to philosophy than theology.154 In short, rational principles

trump faith in addressing the matter of divine reality.

1.6.2 The Enlightenment and its aftermath

In the eighteenth century, France became Europe’s battleground between the established

power of the Church and the emerging secular spirit.155 The climate of the time brought

focus to the allegedly corrupt effects of ecclesial authority, with these being contrasted

unfavourably with the liberating effects of autonomous reason. The atheism of the French

Enlightenment is closely associated with thinkers such as Voltaire, Diderot,156 Baron

152 Patrick Masterson, Atheism and Alienation: A Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary

Atheism (Dublin: Gill and Macmillann, 1971), 8-10. 153 Hyman, A Short History of Atheism, 27. 154 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 75. 155 Byrne, Glory, Jest and Riddle: Religious Thought in the Enlightenment, 134. 156 Like a number of other Enlightenment figures, Denis Diderot (1713-84) is mischaracterised if he is cast

as enemy of God and an icon of atheism. Rather, his revulsion was with the Church and with any notion of

received truth. Perry, Atheism after Christendom: Disbelief in an Age of Encounter, 29; Peter France,

Diderot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 37.

47

d’Holbach,157 and, ironically, the Roman Catholic priest Jean Meslier.158 They each sought

to drive a wedge between ‘blind’ faith and ‘clear’ reason. Religious belief was often cast

as something obediently unthinking, wilfully dishonest or positively stupid. Revelation

was rejected and replaced by an ‘inexorable materialism’ coupled with a focus on human

experience as the best guide to nature and life. Because Christianity could not be the true

religion, the Christian faith was, in fact, the enemy of true religion.159 This was to have a

lasting impact on European society. As Michael Buckley suggests, these figures introduced

the denial of God into the intellectual culture of the West with such strength that its

presence was permanently secured.160

The energy and force of reason within the Enlightenment are based upon a conception

of the ego as central to human identity and around which the phenomena of the world

appear as a spectacle. Some commentators have even described this position as a cult of

reason.161 Reason discloses reality, enabling the ‘science of man to take precedence over

the despotism of theology.’162 The outcome of unbelief resulted in the label ‘atheist’

becoming for the first time, in eighteenth-century France, a term that individuals were

happy to apply to themselves. The key question from the point of view of this study,

however, is whether the Church and Christian theology was attacked from the outside by

these self-confident expressions of unbelief or whether, through its own intellectual

strategies, it contributed to the atheistic critique itself. As noted, a case has been made that

the latter scenario was a key factor in the emergence of atheism. The assaults by the atheist

157 The Swiss aristocrat D’Holbach (1723-89) is widely thought to be the first unambiguously self-

professed atheist in the modern West. He ran a salon in Paris that attracted leading Enlightenment thinkers,

including Diderot, Rousseau, Adam Smith, David Hume, Edward Gibbon, and Benjamin Franklin. He

rejected the idea that nature was dependent on the God of Christianity and argues that matter is self-

sustaining. His fanatical deprecation of God is expressed in his most famous work, The System of Nature

(1770), within which he attacks the religion of his day with venom, intelligence and eloquence as he

displays a rather obsessive vehemence against God. Ira O. Wade, The Structure and Form of the French

Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 310. 158 Meslier’s personal atheism was revealed in writing discovered only after he had died. 159 See Charles A Gliozzo, "The Philosophes and Religion: Intellectual Origins of the Dechristianization

Movement in the French Revolution," Church History 40, no. 3 (1971): esp. 274, 80. 160 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 322. 161 Gliozzo, "The Philosophes and Religion: Intellectual Origins of the Dechristianization Movement in the

French Revolution," 273. 162 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 96.

48

philosophes, such Voltaire, d’Alembert, and d’Holbach, were made possible because the

theologians during the Enlightenment had largely abandoned the religious figure of Jesus

as the primary expression on earth of God’s reality and had instead sought to address the

question of God using the same terms and language as their detractors had done. By failing

to proclaim the ‘witness and reality of Christ and the religious experience of the Judeo-

Christian heritage, Christianity itself prepared the ground for the Enlightenment rejection

of God.’163

The epitome of Enlightenment thought might be regarded as that developed by

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant’s insight is that for speculative reason to analyse

questions such as the existence of God, the possibility and limits of human freedom, the

grounds of knowledge and the basis of morality, it has to turn on itself and provide an

analysis of its own power. In pursuing this project and in his efforts to connect Christian

faith with the surrounding culture, Kant developed a corpus of writing that has exerted

huge influence on Christian theology since 1800 such that he has, for some, taken on the

status as the ‘philosopher of Protestantism.’164 However, at the same time, he has also been

regarded as a harbinger of atheism. He proposes that, while we can know, via sensory

experience, particular facts about the world (which he termed phenomena), we cannot

know things in themselves (Dinge an sich) as they exist prior to any experience (which he

called noumena). The sharp distinction in Kant between the human mind and the objective

world places the onus within the process of knowing on the a priori forms of our

understanding. The conditions for the possibility of knowledge and the basis of universal

science and mathematical statements are thus to be located not in the empirical realm of

objects but in the categories of thought (such as causality and spatial relations) with which

the human mind encounters this world. In this way, the raw material of knowledge, that is

the given sensory data received from the world, is transformed into intelligible reality by

the activity of the thinking subject. This insight has profound implications for religious

belief.

163 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 41. 164 Gordon E. Michalson, Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 1.

49

In elevating human sensibility and understanding within the field of epistemology, Kant

intensifies the turn to the subject inaugurated by Descartes. The thinking subject becomes

the locus of knowledge generation through the mind’s operational principles and

structures. Thus, the world as it appears to us is the product of the interaction between our

categories and the world in itself. However, for Kant, we do not have access to the world

as it exists in itself beyond the mind. For Kant, the noumenal world remains inaccessible

to us and for this reason the jurisdiction of metaphysics is severely truncated. Kant

demands empirical limitations on all theoretical knowledge and insists that no physics or

natural philosophy, no theoretical knowledge of any stamp, can form the basis for any

natural theology.165 What is left is a ‘metaphysics of finitude’ and a philosophical position

that has had an enormous impact on intellectual enquiry about God in the generations since

Kant.166 For Kant, metaphysical demonstrations of God’s existence are invalid. They serve

only to mystify and distract us from our task of establishing ourselves as agents within the

finite empirical world. Whilst he goes on to develop a moral argument for faith, based on

practical reason, it is a rather attenuated ground for religious belief. God serves the purpose

of a ‘necessary practical postulate’ who is required in order to make sense of the human

experience of morality.167 Kant's practical theory of religion is, then, that morality is not

based on religion, but rather religion follows as a practical consequence of the absolute

demands made on us by moral law.

On balance, it seems that, despite his intentions, Kant corrodes, rather than upholds, the

Christian inheritance. For this reason, he would appear to have a stronger continuity with

the nineteenth century atheism that we shall explore later in this chapter than with the

liberal theological tradition that has at times appealed to him. For these reasons, he has left

a legacy that is highly significant for atheism. Firstly, Kant’s critical philosophy heralded

the end of metaphysical theism and its God of necessary reason: 'classical theism reaches

165 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 327. 166 Masterson, Atheism and Alienation: A Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary Atheism, 14. 167 Hyman, "Atheism in Modern History," 35; see also Allen W. Wood, "Rational theology, moral faith,

and religion," in The Cambridge companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2006), 402-3.

50

its denouement at the hand of its own child.'168 Secondly, because for Kant practical belief

may coexist with theoretical unbelief, both the autonomy of morals and the establishment

of a secular society become possible. His critique of reason yields, then, an unstable

solution to the problem of God that would soon come under attack in the work of his

successors.

1.6.3 The affirmation of reason in recent forms of atheism

In Western societies today, amongst the panoply of positions held by those who do not

identify as religious, the absence of compelling evidence for the existence of God, or,

alternatively, the presence of those conditions (such as gratuitous evil and suffering),

which, it is claimed, cannot be reconciled with the existence of God, are sometimes cited

as grounds for atheism.169 These arguments demonstrate that reason plays an important

role in persuading atheists and other sceptics that religious faith is misplaced. As we shall

see, the logic of unbelief has a long and complex history. It can be traced back into the

ancient world, although in Western civilisation its place within intellectual enquiry into the

question of God came to the fore with particular prominence at the beginning of the modern

era. In particular, current manifestations of atheism appear to hark back to the arguments

made by Voltaire, Diderot and Lessing in their desire to oppose faith and reason during the

European Enlightenment.170

Reason-based atheism in some Western nations remains an important element in

contemporary forms of unbelief. It is most closely associated with a highly visible and

much-discussed brand of atheism that surfaced in the first decade of the twentieth century.

168 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 102. 169 Although the new atheist movements tends to be regarded as a British and American phenomenon, the

French philosopher Michel Onfray and leaders of the ‘neuer Atheismus’ movement in Germany, such as

Michael Schmidt-Salomon, Philipp Möller and Andreas Müller, demonstrate how the cause of militant

atheism has been extended into continental Europe. See, for example, Jim Stone, "Evidential Atheism,"

Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 114, no. 3 (2003). 170 Another manifestation of Type I atheism is the Sovient scientific atheism that was adopted in Russia and

other states within the Soviet bloc during much of the twentieth century. See Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, A

History of Soviet Atheism in Theory and Practice, and the Believer (London: Macmillan, 1987).

51

Often referred to as ‘New Atheism,’ this phenomenon re-packages the atheism that

emerged during the Enlightenment. Associated with writers such as Richard Dawkins, Sam

Harris, Daniel Dennett, Garry Wolf (who is believed to have coined the term), Victor

Stenger, Anthony Grayling, Martin Amis, Ian McEwan, Phillip Pullman, and Polly

Toynbee, New Atheism has taken a particularly strong hold in British and American

culture. These are very different writers who come from a range of academic disciples.

They use disparate genres of literature, are marked by distinctive approaches, and are

exercised by diverse issues in their engagement with religion and faith. It is therefore of

some interest that the label New Atheist has been applied within contemporary culture as

if to imply that these authors represent a unitary phenomenon.171 Their differences aside,

however, New Atheist writers do, in general, share the objective of articulating a somewhat

strident resistance to religion and belief. Dawkins’ denunciation of a particular image of

God illustrates their combative tone:

The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction:

jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty

ethnic cleanser; a misogynist, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal,

pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.172

Furthermore, some New Atheist authors seek to highlight the supposedly delusional nature

of faith in a non-natural dimension of reality and invoke a polemic that often caricatures

religious belief and believers as either hopelessly insouciant or dangerously deceptive.173

David Bentley Hart, who will be the focus of Chapter 3, is, for example, described by

171 Thomas Zenk, "New Atheism," in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, ed. Stephen Bullivant and Michael

Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 254-55. 172 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 51. 173 Richard Dawkins’ most recent book elaborates on his his earlier criticism of Christianity. In this work,

he dismisses the historicity of the events described in the Bible (particularly miracles) and rejects the

notion that Christianity provides a viable moral framework for human beings to live by. Richard Dawkins,

Outgrowing God: A Beginner's Guide (London: Bantam Press, 2019). Rupert Shortt offers a perceptive

critique of Dawkins' muddled thinking, philosophical illiteracy and the crude caricature that he has of the

Chrsitian tradition. See Rupert Shortt, Outgrowing Dawkins: God for Grown-Ups (London: SPCK, 2019).

52

Dawkins as a ‘yammering fumblewit,’ and as someone who has the ‘abysmal lack of

anything approaching wit or intelligence.’174

It is generally thought that the energetic and outspoken form of atheism found in the

works of New Atheist thinkers is a response to the Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks in the

United States on 11th September 2001 and the London bombings on 7th July 2005.175

Religion, according to the New Atheist polemic, leads to violence. Such an assertion

complicates the location of New Atheists within the Type I atheism group. For this position

is arguably more a form of anti-religious renunciation than it is a logical dismissal of faith

in God, suggesting that New Atheism may show traits of Type II, as well as Type I,

atheism. Indeed, the criticism of religion as a social phenomenon – as much as of religious

faith – is an important strand within New Atheist rhetoric. This is particularly the case

when those with conservative religious views are critiqued, because of what is judged to

be an irreconcilable chasm between fundamentalism and the logic of science:

I am hostile to fundamentalist religion because it debauches the scientific enterprise. It

teaches us not to change our minds, and not to want to know exciting things that are

available to be known. It subverts science and saps the intellect.176

Although they may recognise the diverse range of positions within any one faith tradition,

most of the New Atheist authors not only attack religious fundamentalists.177 New Atheist

writing is generally centred on a robust condemnation of what are perceived to be acts of

religiously-motivated violence. However, other contributing factors, particularly in

Britain, can also be identified. These are connected with the perceived privileges and

political influence of the established Church of England, along with the public funding

174 These comments were posted in a blog by Richard Dawkins. They are cited in Nick Spencer, Atheists:

The Origin of the Species (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 252. 175 Sam Harris began writing the first of the best-selling atheist books, The End of Faith, the day after

‘9/11.’ Stuart McAnulla, "Radical atheism and religious power: new atheist politics," Approaching

Religion, no. 1 (2012): 91. 176 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 321. 177 Even religious believers with tolerant, moderate and liberal attitudes are condemned because, it is

asserted, they provided a shield for militant religious fanatics. See Adam C. Scarfe, "On Religious

Violence and Social Darwinism in the New Atheism: Toward a Critical Panselectionism," American

Journal of Theology & Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2010): 55.

53

being directed towards Church and other faith schools. Whatever the causes, the recent

resurgence of atheism within the public square certainly demonstrates that religion

continues to be a matter of interest and attention in Western societies. Although writing

before the emergence of New Atheism, Bruce highlights this phenomenon: ‘self-conscious

atheism and agnosticism are features of religious cultures… they are postures adopted in

a world where people are keenly interested in religion.’178

The most significant feature of New Atheism, however, is the emphasis that authors in

this movement place on rational analysis and logic in marshalling their case against belief

in God. Indeed, the appeal to reason runs through much New Atheist literature. Religion is

correspondingly portrayed as intellectually naïve or even wicked and dangerous, and so

New Atheist campaigners regard religion as an attack on Enlightenment values.179

Contemporary celebrity atheists, particularly Dawkins, Harris, Dennett, Amis, Grayling,

and Hitchens, champion rational thought, science and the capability of the human mind to

supposedly demonstrate the falsehood of religious belief in a way that echoes the

marshalling of reason to denounce the Christian worldview in eighteenth-century France.

Tina Beattie asserts that the New Atheists represent the culmination of the Enlightenment

triumph of reason over faith, an end-point in the trumping of religious ignorance by

scientific rationalism.180 Dawkins is especially clear about the rational basis for his atheist

views, trumpeting the power of reason to defeat what he regards as the illusion of faith.181

Such an emphasis on the power of autonomous thought betrays, Beattie suggests, New

Atheism’s Protestant preoccupation with individual faith, textual analysis and moral

concerns, in contrast to the rather different modes of atheism found elsewhere in Europe,

178 Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1996), 58. 179 Christopher R Cotter, "Consciousness raising: The critique, agenda, and inherent precariousness of

contemporary anglophone atheism," International Journal for the Study of New Religions 2, no. 1 (2011):

88. 180 Tina Beattie, The New Atheists: The Twilight of Reason and the War on Religion (London: Darton

Longman & Todd, 2007), 114. 181 He even quarries the Christian tradition to justify his position by citing Martin Luther’s dismissal of

reason (‘Whoever wants to be a Christian should tear the eyes of reason.’) as evidence of the Church’s

contempt for rational thought. Dawkins, The God Delusion, 221.

54

which, reflecting their Jewish and Catholic provenance, tend to focus more on matters of

language, community and symbol.182

This focus on evidential logic in justifying their dismissal of God is generally expressed

through the lauding of science as the principal means by which humanity can know about

the world and gain access to truth. The empirical is seen as the normative domain for testing

what Dawkins refers to as the ‘God hypothesis.’183 Within the epistemological model

adopted by the New Atheists, science and religion occupy the same field and both speak

to the same reality.184 It is a move that is, conversely, associated with a degree of hostility

to the terrain upon which atheists have historically waged their battles with religion,

namely philosophy.185 References to the triumph of science are littered throughout best-

selling atheist literature and Dawkins has set up a foundation named after him, which aims

to ‘promote scientific literacy and a secular worldview.’186 Reason, within the canon of

New Atheist thought, amounts to the application of the scientific method to the task of

understanding the world and embracing human wellbeing. As the comedian Paul Provenza

put it, in addressing a rally in the United States, ‘we are here to celebrate our belief in

reason, science and the power of the human mind.’187 For the New Atheists, this logic

informs the demolition of claims made by religious believers because the presence or

otherwise of God is, they hold, reducible to a scientific hypothesis to be tested. Given the

lack of empirical evidence for God, they conclude that God cannot exist.

Although New Atheism’s intellectual provenance can be followed back into the modes

of atheism that emerged within the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly in

Europe, there are distinguishing features of the movement, despite a degree of internal

diversity, that give it a rather different character from earlier forms of anti-religious dissent

182 Beattie, The New Atheists, 15. 183 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 24. 184 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 50; see also William A. Stahl, "One-dimensional Rage: The Social

Epistemology of the New Atheism and Fundamentalism," in Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical

Appraisal, ed. Amarnath Amarasingam (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 99, 101. 185 Massimo Pigliucci, "New Atheism and the scientistic turn in the atheism movement," Midwest Studies

in Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2013): 151. 186 See https://www.richarddawkins.net/aboutus/ [accessed 03.01.18]. 187 See Stephen RL Clark, "Atheism Considered as a Christian Sect," Philosophy 90, no. 2 (2015): 287.

55

within the Type I category. Firstly, there is an uncompromising, pugnacious, and resolute

tenor to the New Atheists’ rhetoric, which is encapsulated by their best-known protagonist,

Richard Dawkins: ‘I am not attacking any particular version of God or gods. I am attacking

God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have

been or will be invented.’188 The assertive attitude to matters of faith and belief can, at

times, be belligerent.189 Using what many would hold to be a disturbing metaphor that

recalls dark episodes in European history, Dawkins describes faith as ‘one of the world’s

great evils, comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to eradicate.’190 Going beyond an

understandable critique of the failure of religious individuals and institutions on moral

grounds, the New Atheists insist that religion is almost always fundamentally damaging

and corrupt. Harris is particularly strident in this regard, ridiculing religion and describing

himself as being ‘at war with faith.’191 In no uncertain terms, the religious education of

children, for example, is singled out as wilfully harmful: ‘isn’t it always a form of child

abuse to label children as possessors of beliefs that they are too young to have thought

about?’192 New Atheist authors’ arguments tend to bypass the philosophical concepts and

approaches used in earlier debates about God and are expressed in a much less sober and

more brazen register. Instead of adopting academic conventions or engaging with

philosophical and theological arguments, the New Atheist style is about accessible and

popular language framed by a highly political agenda.

Secondly, taking advantage of social media, the Internet and other forms of mass

communication, the New Atheists are marked by a much higher degree of social and

political organisation than had been the case in previous expressions of atheism. There is

a collective identity to atheism today, which is centred on best-selling books, a strong

188 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 36. 189 Amarasingam has described the leading new atheists authors as ‘petulant and provocative, challenging

yet cranky, urgent but uninformed.’ "Introduction: What is the New Atheism?," in Religion and the New

Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Amarnath Amarasingam (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1; see also Lawrence

Wilde, "The antinomies of aggressive atheism," Contemporary Political Theory 9, no. 3 (2010). 190 Richard Dawkins, "Is science a religion?," The Humanist 57, no. 1 (1997): 26. 191 For his uncompromsing repudiation of Islam, for example, see Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion,

Terror, and the Future of Reason (London: Free Press, imprint of Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2006), 129. 192 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 315.

56

media presence, public audiences, marketing initiatives (such as the ‘There is probably no

God…’ message seen on the on the side of buses in London and Berlin), conventions,

activist organisations and political agitation.193

Finally, the New Atheist polemic is, ironically, coloured by a distinctly religious

character.194 It might even be claimed that much contemporary militant atheism mirrors

the traits of religious fundamentalism, the very target of its invective.195 Both seek to offer

a monopoly on truth, both exhibit a binary perspective on theological positions (by

demonising their opponents whilst regarding their own position as unambiguously correct),

both tend to be socially and politically conservative, and both have a tendency to rancour

in debates on the nature of truth.196 There are even church-like gatherings for atheists,

which operate in many cities across the world.197 These bodies hold events that have a

similar structure to Christian acts of worship and, in the case of the Sunday Assembly,

which was founded by a former member of an Evangelical church, borrow approaches

from traditional church services. The atheist meetings include songs, readings, an address,

time for sharing experiences and for socialising, which engenders a strong sense of

community and belonging.198

Even the appeal to science as the arbiter of truth has a religious ring to it. Science is

offered as the means through which purpose, value and truth can be discovered, and might

therefore be regarded as simply supplanting God with a similar structure of meaning.

193 See Jesse M Smith, "Creating a godless community: The collective identity work of contemporary

American atheists," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52, no. 1 (2013). 194 For a discussion of atheism's religious nature, see Chris Hedges, When Atheism Becomes Religion :

America's New Fundamentalists (New York: Free Press, 2009). 195 Mohler identifies the evangelistic intent and ambitious hope of the New Atheists as they seek to advance

their view that atheism is the only plausible worldview and persuade others to adopt this position. Mohler,

Atheism Remix: A Christian Confronts the New Atheists, 12. 196 Stahl, "One-dimensional Rage: The Social Epistemology of the New Atheism and Fundamentalism," 97. 197 These include the Sunday Assembly and Godless Revival networks. See:

https://www.sundayassembly.com/ and https://www.facebook.com/The-Godless-Revival-

532305740178434/ [accessed 5th September 2020]. 198 Huffington Post, "Atheist Church Split: Sunday Assembly and Godless Revival’s ‘Denominational

Chasm.’," (January, 2014); Jesse M Smith, "Can the Secular Be the Object of Belief and Belonging? The

Sunday Assembly," Qualitative Sociology 40, no. 1 (2017).

57

Indeed, in upholding the inspiration that can stem from scientific enquiry, Dawkins sounds

like an ardent religious believer:

The feeling of awed wonder that science can give us is one of the highest experiences of

which the human psyche if capable. It is a deep aesthetic passion to rank with the finest

that music or poetry can deliver. It is truly one of the things that makes life worth living.199

Science becomes an object of faith, a method to deliver intellectual certainty, which is

accompanied by a level of absolute confidence sometimes encountered in some

conservative religious communities. And in this way, the ‘scientism’ adopted by the New

Atheists appears to be rather similar to the literal interpretation of scripture that may be

practised in such traditions. It has the ideological character of a ‘legitimising myth,’ which

does not look so different to the strident claims of the religiously fundamentalist positions

that the New Atheists routinely attack.200 Borer detects this quasi-religious tendency in

much contemporary atheist rhetoric: ‘science is the New Atheists’ new god and Charles

Darwin is their patron saint.’201 The urgency with which science is upheld as the

appropriate field for thinking people to put their faith in suggests an evangelical zeal.202

Science, it is claimed, is not just another worldview amongst others. It is the sole

perspective that rational individuals should adopt if they are to break the spell of their

historically conditioned ‘need’ to believe in God.203 For this reason, Lash regards Dawkins

as a ‘fundamentalist in reverse.’204

199 Dawkins, The God Delusion, x. Interestingly, the opening chapter of Dawkins' work is entitled 'A

Deeply Religious Non-believer.' This book has sold over two million copies across the world. 200 Alister E McGrath, "Evidence, Theory, and Interpretation: The “New Atheism” and the Philosophy of

Science," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2013). 201 Michael Ian Borer, "The New Atheism and the Secularization Thesis," in Religion and the New

Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Amarnath Amarasingam (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 137. 202 In effect, the New Atheists serve as secular priests and prophets for the power structures that now have

largely displaced those of Christendom. Perry, Atheism after Christendom: Disbelief in an Age of

Encounter, 37. 203 Borer, "The New Atheism and the Secularization Thesis," 135. 204 Nicholas Lash, "Where Does The God Delusion Come from?," New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007):

508.

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1.7 Type II atheism

I have shown how the atheism that surfaced at the beginning of the modern era, flourished

as a strand within Enlightenment thought, and which re-emerged in recent decades, placed

great emphasis on the resources of human reason in order to assemble arguments against

the reality of God. The focus of this ‘atheism of the head’ is on the object of God and the

question of his existence. Another species of atheism, however, was to approach the

question of God from an altogether different angle, placing the focus not so much on the

matter of God’s existence or otherwise but on the struggle of humanity to be free of what

was sometimes seen to be an oppressive divine force. This crucial shift took place in the

nineteenth century. It changed the character of atheism from a critique of the evidence of

God’s existence to a rejection of the properties traditionally attributed to God.205 Such

atheism demonstrates the primacy of the human will over human reason in the rejection of

God.206

Type II atheism is ‘not so much a denial of God, then, as the substitution of humanity,

a change of subject rather than predicates: only a divinised humanity can secure the

confidence of wilful atheism.’207 It is a form of atheism that has found expression in

multiple species of unbelief, which range from hostility and antagonism toward

Christianity to much more subtle and complex critiques of the Christian faith. It might also

be added, however, that the thinkers who have embraced various forms of this feeling-

centred atheism, unlike many of the atheists who appeal to the resources of reason, such as

members of the New Atheist movement, have engaged very seriously with the faith of the

Church and offer arguments that have, in turn, been regarded by Christian thinkers as

worthy of careful reflection and thoughtful response. I must also acknowledge that

emotional factors remain very important today in provoking atheism and unbelief, whether

these are connected with indignation against the actions or moral stance of the Church, the

205 Patrick Masterson, "Contemporary Atheism," Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 54, no. 214/215

(1965): 132. 206 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 276. 207 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 291.

59

repulsion generated by unwelcome evangelism undertaken by some Christian groups in

public places, or with certain supposedly Christian doctrines, such as the existence of

hell.208 The work of some of the most important thinkers within this category of atheism

will be explored at a later stage in this section. In advance of that, however, I offer a number

of prefatory remarks may be made about the broad characteristics of Type II atheism.

1.7.1 The origin and nature of Type II atheism

As with reason-based atheism, Type II atheism has deep roots. It draws on the Promethean

impulse to transfer to humanity the attributes classically associated with God and thus

represents a form of ‘substitutionary humanism.’209 God is posited as Zeus, an

overpowering ruler whom humanity must challenge, usurp and even, in the term used by

Nietzsche’s madman, ‘murder.’ Counterpoising autonomy against divine heteronomy, this

heartfelt atheism centres on the quest for human liberation and independence. It is a moral

protest, a revolt against God that draws more on experience than logic as human freedom

and the autonomy of the will are pursued.

Kant’s postulatory proof of God’s existence is here turned into its opposite: not the

existence but the non-existence of God is postulated by human freedom. Even if God

existed, the fact could play no role in man’s life. Human autonomy contradicts every kind

of theonomy!210

As Jacques Maritain recognises, this form of atheism is not especially exercised by the

issue of evidence. It is, rather, often energetic in its opposition to the notion of God: ‘It is

in no way a mere absence of belief in God. It is rather a refusal of God, a fight against

God, a challenge to God.’211 Elsewhere, he characterises this style of unbelief as ‘an active

struggle against everything that reminds us of God – that is to say, antitheism,… a heroic

208 Two recent works have explored the emtional dimensions of contemporary doubt, unbelief and atheism.

See Rigsby, The Passion of the Atheist: Exploring the Emotional Aspects of Atheism; Ryrie, Unbelievers:

An Emotional History of Doubt. 209 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 3. 210 Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (London: SCM Press, 1984), 30. 211 Maritain, The Range of Reason, 98, 106. Emphases added.

60

effort to recast and reconstruct the whole human universe of thought and the whole human

scale of values according to that state of war against God.’212 Such polemical language

may, at times, overstate the antagonism inherent in the thought of Type II atheism. For, of

all the species of atheism considered in this study, it is the authors considered in this section

who have probably offered the most meaningful critiques of Christianity and who have

provoked the most stimulating and creative responses from academic theologians.

Philosophically, this orientation reflects a paradigm that is resistant to modernity’s

aspiration for a privileged, detached and timeless vantage point with which to gain access

to truth. Type II atheists have, in general, wanted to stress that epistemological neutrality

and absolute metaphysical insights are simply not possible. Rather, they highlight the fact

that that human enquiry into the nature of reality, including the question of God, is always

contaminated by the subject’s relationship with the object of knowledge, that our

participation in reality brings it into definition, and that absolute schemas, binary

oppositions and rigid categories need to be regarded with suspicion.213 Such an orientation

has brought focus to the human subject within its context of temporality, language, culture

and tradition. It has tended to resist both overarching metanarratives in connection with the

pursuit of truth and the controlling authority of institutional frameworks in association with

human affairs. Consequently, the Type II atheism that has been coloured by such

perspectives is marked by resistance to divinity, opposition to the Church, suspicion about

the place of God in the world and rejection, sometimes in venomous terms, of the universal

claims of religious believers. It has, at times, sought to highlight the deleterious nature of

faith, the delusional character of religion, and, correspondingly, the independence of

humanity that must be freed from the shackles of harmful supernatural belief. Why should

we believe in God, it is argued, when such a belief leads to human alienation and a naïve

and misplaced hope in a fantasy realm purportedly beyond the frame of this world? Our

role must, instead, be to make the most of this finite life, to seek personal fulfilment and to

212 Jacques Maritain, "On the meaning of contemporary atheism," The Review of Politics 11, no. 3 (1949):

268. 213 Nikkel, "The Postmodern Spirit and the Status of God," 46-47.

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exhibit ‘the courage to be, the courage to live – in the face of death, of nothingness, of

failure, of suffering.’214

Undoubtedly presenting a profound challenge to Christianity, the atheism associated

with the intellectual climate of nineteenth-century Europe was unfolded in a series of

critiques centred on the Nietzschean proclamation of God’s death. And such a vision

continued, albeit in a somewhat modified form, through the twentieth century to the present

day. This is an atheism marked by the primacy of the will. It is altogether more impulsive,

sometimes lyrical, frequently caustic, often eloquent, a form of unbelief within which God

is regarded as a source of alienation, accusation and prohibition.215 Religion is typically

regarded by Type II atheism as ‘an instrument of social control whose surface conceptual

structure is designed to obscure its real function and to divert thought, emotion and energy

from real to unreal objects.’216 As a set of positions driven by feeling and instinct as much

as, if not more than, by rational analysis of conceptual inadequacies, it might be described

as an ideological opposition to God.217 Religion takes on a gloomy hue, more to be

repudiated than argued against. This attitude may stem, for many, not just from what might

be seen as the social control of the Church and the suffocating climate of oppression

putatively associated with a religious ethic, but by the experience of suffering and evil,

which has been so eloquently spelt out by Dostoevsky’s fictional character Ivan

Karamazov. It is a perspective that Karl Rahner acknowledges in one of his many

engagements with atheism:

The real argument against Christianity is the experience of life, this experience of

darkness. And I have always found that behind the technical arguments levelled by the

learned against Christianity – as the ultimate force and a priori pre-judgement supporting

214 T. M. Steeman, "What is Wrong with God? Some thoughts about modern atheism," New Blackfriars 47,

no. 554 (1966): 512. 215 Ricœur, "Religion, atheism, and faith," 441. 216 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 266. 217 Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 78.

62

these scientific doubts – there are always these ultimate experiences of life causing the

spirit and the heart to be sombre, tired and despairing.218

This is the bleak and disconsolate experience of life discerned by Heidegger, who called

his age ‘an hour of night.’ The modern sense of loss and absence he detects leads him to

present a sombre portrait of humanity without God: ‘But alas! our generation walks in

night… dwells in Hades, without the divine.’219 Similarly, Michael Buckley equates this

same darkness with ‘an absence of religious faith or of any living theistic affirmation

together with an alienation, scepticism, or hostility towards religious doctrines and

institutions.’ Furthermore, he notes that it is a disposition that infused Western culture more

comprehensively than the arguments of reason-centred, Type I, atheism did: ‘for the first

time, this eclipse fell upon all ranks of society in Europe, from workers to bourgeois to

intellectuals, gathering strength to spread over into the twentieth century with an ideational

force unmatched since the Protestant Reformation.’220 As Shagan puts it: ‘Modern belief

would only emerge when the Reformation project of belief collapsed under its own

weight.’221

In summary, this second category of atheism concerns itself less with reason than with

feeling, suggesting that its symbolic origin is in the ‘heart’ rather than in the ‘head.’ As

Walters observes, Type II atheism is less about objective and evidential reasons than about

societal, biographical and psychological causes. Sometimes referred to as humanistic

atheism, such dissent is, perhaps, more focused on humanity than on God. For, it is not so

much a denial of God’s existence in itself as a statement of humanity’s inability to believe

that there is a God or to believe in a morally credible God. ‘God is dead because man is

not able any more to believe in God.’222 As Kasper notes, its point of departure ‘is not

218 Karl Rahner, "Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today," in Theological Investigations, Volume V

(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 6. 219 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 2010), 39. 220 Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God, 70. 221 Shagan, The Birth of Modern Belief: Faith and Judgment from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment,

128. 222 Steeman, "What is Wrong with God? Some thoughts about modern atheism," 509.

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nature and substance, but subject and freedom.’223 The key motivating principle is human

autonomy, a flourishing that is impeded at both an individual and collective level by

religious belief. From such a perspective, God becomes ‘not the enhancement of humanity

but its estrangement.’224

In what follows, the contours of this spirited and defiant strand within the atheistic

critique of Christianity will be traced. This will involve an outline of how the new

coordinates of human-centred negation of religion led to the explicit rejection of the

Christian faith. The focus will be the principal ‘masters of suspicion,’ Feuerbach,

Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud,225 who argue, in different ways, that God is essentially a

projection of our imagination, values and desires. God is, in other words, a human creation.

However, it should be noted that a number of twentieth-century thinkers who have been

influenced by and sought to respond both to the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and to the

phenomenology of Edmund Husserl also espoused a form of Type II atheism. These

thinkers include the French Existentialists, Sartre and Camus, as well as Heidegger,

Derrida and Lévinas. In different ways, they all question the power of reason to deliver

access to universal truth, including judgements (one way or the other) about the existence

of God, and in this way they lay the foundations for the proliferation of different faith

orientations that characterise the climate of postmodern religiosity, which, it should be

stressed, is generally much more measured and nuanced in its reflection on belief and

unbelief than the rebellious stance adopted by earlier expressions of Type II atheism. Some

of these later thinkers assert that the Christian faith is ultimately no more than a human

projection of a purely physical reality and, for this reason, their atheism represents a

‘negation of a negation,’226 and their work constitutes a formidable challenge to Christian

223 Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 26. 224 Buckley, Denying and disclosing God, xiv. 225 It should be noted that Freud’s atheism is not at all easy to classify. Although he repudiates the

consolation that some people find religion provides for them, is suspicious of faith and regards religion as

delusional, he is also beholden to positivism, scientism, and empirical verificationism. His focus on the

lack of evidence for the claims of religious believers therefore makes him as much a Type I as a Type II

atheist. See Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism, 38-42, esp. 40. 226 Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 33.

64

belief. Other thinkers have had a rather more complicated relationship with the Christian

faith and have offered, to both theists and atheists, ground for exploration and discovery.

1.7.2 The ‘masters of suspicion’

The thinkers that will be examined here advance a form of atheism that is more of an attack

on the Church and on religious life and practice than it is an argument for the non-existence

of God. This is not to say that the so-called masters of suspicion believed in God. In

general, they held no such faith and equated belief in God with self-deception.227 However,

the question of God’s reality was of less concern to them than the causes that rendered faith

in God unjustifiable. These included what were regarded as morally objectionable portraits

of God and the oppressive role that they saw the Church playing in contemporary

culture.228 The key issue is human freedom and the rejection of what Nietzsche refers to as

the ‘slave morality’ that he believed threatened humans from fulling their potential as

autonomous and creative individuals who are fully embroiled in the experiences and

limitations of this-worldly existence.

Marcel Neusch has identified four such factors which have generated this form of

opposition to the Christian faith.229

1. The problem of evil, which was acutely felt during the nineteenth century. Its existence

for some makes God morally impossible.

227 Peter A Huff, "Our Lady of Unbelievers: Mary and Modern Atheism," Marian Studies 64, no. 1 (2013):

138. 228 Huff, "Our Lady of Unbelievers: Mary and Modern Atheism," 138. 229 Marcel Neusch, The Sources of Modern Atheism: One Hundred Years of Debate over God (New York:

Paulist Press, 1982), 27-28.

65

2. The redundancy of God within a scientific worldview. Not all Type II atheists lionised

science (Nietzsche was suspicious of scientific ‘truth’230). However, a number of

thinkers retain this element of Type I atheism and argue that the scientific viewpoint

makes belief in God useless.

3. God undermines our freedom and represents an intolerable interference in the affairs

of human beings. God represents a ‘privileged spectator’ and is therefore to be rejected.

4. Drawing on the thought of Heidegger, there are no foundations for truth or of

metaphysical certainty. God, the ultimate symbol of the ‘tyranny of the logos,’ is

therefore to be rejected as metaphysically superfluous.

A different emphasis is placed on these various arguments by those rejecting belief in God

and the institution of the Church. However, they share a basic tendency, which is to be

suspicious of the place of God in human affairs, and wish to uphold, instead, the liberating

and life-affirming orientation that results when such faith is repudiated. I will now

summarise the principal contributions to Type II atheism of two key thinkers whose

influence on the development of modern unbelief has been enormous.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), frequently regarded as the ‘father of modern atheism,’

represents a highly significant figure in the history of unbelief within the West. In his

Essence of Christianity, published in 1841, he sets out a thesis that ‘religion is the dream

of the human mind’231 and that the content of ‘God’ is to be understood as no more than

the essence of humanity, which we misleadingly believe to be something separate from us.

God is, for Feuerbach, nothing more than the projection of human subjectivity. In other

words, Feuerbach argues that, through the reduction of theology to anthropology, the

attributes traditionally ascribed to God (such as infinity) are actually human qualities.232

230 Nietzsche's dismissal of objective truth is well known: 'What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,

metonyms, and anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,

transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and

obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that is what they are; metaphors

which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only

as metal, no longer as coins.' Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann

(London: Chatto and Windus, 1971). 231 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, xxxix. 232 Neusch, The Sources of Modern Atheism: One Hundred Years of Debate over God, 35, 37.

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‘God is the mirror of man… God is for man the commonplace book where he registers his

highest feelings and thoughts.’233 Through this work, Feuerbach attempts to develop an

anti-theological project centred on the idea that when religion is unmasked it can be seen

for what it really is: the worship not of God but of man.234 The critique of Christianity that

he mounted was unsparing and so important to the unfolding of contemporary atheism

because of the enormous influence that it has exerted on subsequent thinkers. These include

Nietzsche,235 Wagner,236 Marx237 and Freud238 in the German-speaking world, as well as

George Eliot239 and Thomas Hardy240 along with many others in England. Furthermore,

Feuerbach’s anthropological revolt spawned a tradition of atheist humanism. As de Lubac

observes, ‘[m]an is getting rid of God in order to regain possession of the human greatness

that, it seems to him, is being unwarrantably withheld by another. In God he is

overthrowing an obstacle in order to gain his freedom.’241

Whilst Feuerbach’s impact has been considerable, there is little doubt that it is Friedrich

Nietzsche (1844-1900) who represents the towering figure in the story of Western atheism.

… the greatest recent event, that God is dead, that belief in the Christian God had become

discredited, is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe.242

In his desire to overturn the Platonic philosophical framework, supposedly founded on an

otherworldly conception of reality, his complex, rhapsodic and often compelling work

233 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 63. 234 Masterson, Atheism and Alienation: A Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary Atheism, 63. 235 Paul Bishop, "Nietzsche's “new” morality: Gay science, materialist ethics," History of European ideas

32, no. 2 (2006): 3. 236 George G Windell, "Hegel, Feuerbach, and Wagner's Ring," Central European History 9, no. 1 (1976). 237 Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Hackett Publishing, 1997), 93, 400. 238 Cyril Levitt and Anouk Turgeon, "Sigmund Freud's Intensive Reading of Ludwig Feuerbach," Canadian

Journal of Psychoanalysis 17, no. 1 (2009). 239 Carroll, George Eliot: The Critical Heritage, 429. 240 Robert Schweik, "The influence of religion, science, and philosophy on Hardy’s writings," in The

Cambridge Companion to Thomas Hardy, ed. D. Kramer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),

66. 241 de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, 23. 242 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,

1974), 343.

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presents a relentless critique of Christianity and the morality associated with it, presages

the epistemological instability of postmodernity, and has had a monumental influence on

the discourse about religion in the century or so since his death. The bearing he has had on

philosophy has been enormous, and his writing was ingested and interpreted by figures that

include Heidegger, Camus, Sartre, Russell and Blanchot, as well as recent and

contemporary neo-Nietzschean philosophers such as Derrida, Foucault, Nancy and

Deleuze. However, within the Christian tradition, Nietzsche has also been the subject of a

vast body of literature. His thought has been engaged with by numerous theologians,

including Barth, Bonhoeffer, Jaspers, Altizer (and other members of the ‘death of God’

movement), Kaufman, and Ricœur.243 Furthermore, the principal theologians examined in

this thesis – Jüngel, Hart, and de Lubac – all engage extensively with Nietzsche within

their projects.

Why is Nietzsche just such an important figure in the history of Western atheism? A

number of thoughts might be offered in response to this question. Firstly, Nietzsche

bypasses, to a large extent, questions concerning the existence or otherwise of God and he

jettisons rational examination of the claims of Christianity. His atheism is based more on

refutation than unbelief; it is a gesture of defiance of the divine, a raging and indignant

repudiation of Christianity that is essentially instinctive rather than intellectual.244

I regard Christianity as the most fatal seductive lie that has yet existed, as the great unholy

lie… I reject every compromise position with respect to it – I force a war against it.245

Whilst many in society today who consider themselves not to have a faith might be

reluctant to identify themselves fully with Nietzsche’s invective, the fact that it is his

sensibility rather than his reason which is offended by Christianity does, perhaps, resonate

with a contemporary spirit that rejects the message of the Church, expressing his unbelief

in a carefully articulated way. Secondly, because Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity is

243 For a helpful examination of Nietzsche’s reception within Christian theology, see Fraser, Redeeming

Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief (London: Routledge, 2002), 3-23. 244 Beattie, The New Atheists, 149. 245 Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power : in Science, Nature, Society and Art, trans. Gordon D. Kaufmann

(New York: Vintage books, 1967), no. 200, 117.

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grounded more in issues of morality than in evidence, he articulates a sentiment that those

who wish to free themselves from a sense of oppression by the Church may relate to.246

His genealogical account of what he sees as Christianity’s ‘slave mentality,’ along with the

resentment (ressentiment in his parlance) so generated, coupled with his insistence that

humanity must embrace the will to power in order to realise the potential of the overman

(Übermensch), of which his Zarathustra is the epitome, have been persuasive notions for

those convinced that the Christian faith suffocates the human spirit and defrauds what is

best in us.247 Thirdly, it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity

does shed light on some of the temptations that this faith tradition has succumbed to

throughout history, particularly through his unmasking of the deceptions that allow power

and ideology to masquerade as truth in God’s name,248 in exposing the presumption that

civilisation must be founded on Christianity, and also through his challenge to overly

determinate language about God that has, on occasions, been used by Christian thinkers.249

Finally, Nietzsche’s prophetic insight must be recognised as an extraordinary element

within his writing. As Neusch notes: His thought has proved to be astonishingly modern.

What he foresaw (the decline of Christianity) and what he predicted (post-Christian man)

have become realities before our eyes.250 Not only did he anticipate the diminishing place

of the Church and of Christian culture within Europe, he was able to recognise that the

removal of God from human consciousness would have lasting consequences for our

conception of morality, history, society and even of truth itself.

The best-known statement uttered by Nietzsche is to be found in his announcement that

‘God is dead,’ uttered by the madman in his work The Gay Science of 1882:

246 As Haar notes, Nietzsche’s beliefs are quite different to the ‘dogmatic and easy atheism of the kind

encountered in Diderot or in Sartre’ and he attaches far more importance to the end of morality than to the

end of metaphysics. Michel Haar, "Nietzsche and the Metamorphosis of the Divine," in Post-Secular

Philosophy : Between Philosophy and Theology, ed. Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998), 158-59. 247 McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism, 215-22. See also de Lubac, The Drama of

Atheist Humanism, 44. 248 Beattie, The new atheists, 149-50. 249 Joerge Salaquarda, "Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian tradition," in The Cambridge Companion to

Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 91. 250 Neusch, The Sources of Modern Atheism: One Hundred Years of Debate over God, 110.

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The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Whither is God?’ he

cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him – you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how

did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the

entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither

is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging

continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down?

Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty

space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need

to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers

who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too,

decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.’251

In this remarkable passage, the madman discerns the sheer enormity of the deed of deicide,

hinting at the guilt associated with the epochal act but also the challenge, perhaps an

impossible one, of finding a substitute infinity to take the place of God. The implications

of God’s death as articulated by Nietzsche are so far reaching for humanity, for culture and

for religion, and the significance of his attack on Christianity so profound that they still

demand consideration today. I will return to reflect on the responses offered to his critique

in subsequent chapters when I examine the engagements with Nietzsche advanced by

Jüngel, Hart and de Lubac. In these explorations I will illuminate the insight that, whatever

Nietzsche may have meant by the phrase ‘God is dead,’ these words did not put an end to

questions about God, and they shall help us interpret Heidegger’s statement that Nietzsche

was ‘the last German philosopher who was passionately in search of God.’252

In addition to the so-called ‘masters of suspicion,’ Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) also

warrants brief attention here due to the deep influence that religion and theology had on

his life and the important contribution that he made to what might be meant by unbelief in

connection with God. In the wake of Nietzsche, upon whose thought he drew extensively,

251 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 181-82. 252 Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University: Address, Delivered on the Solemn

Assumption of the Rectorate of the University Freiburg the Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," The

Review of Metaphysics 38, no. 3 (1985): 479. See also Haar, "Nietzsche and the Metamorphosis of the

Divine," 157.

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Heidegger’s particular significance lies in his repudiation of onto-theology, a neologism

he coined in order to characterise Western philosophy’s twin metaphysical preoccupations

since the age of the Greeks: ontology and theology. This enterprise, Heidegger argues, has

been logocentric in character in seeking to equate thinking with reason and explanation,

and it has pursued a generative ground (causa sui) for the wholeness of the whole as the

fundamental source of all being.253 Heidegger rejects the notion that reason can deliver

truth and holds that the metaphysical ‘God of philosophy’ is no more than an attempt to

incorporate the mystery of the divine within our own ontological categories. This

misleading and over-interpreted God compromises transcendence and gives rise to

atheism. Heidegger adopts Nietzsche’s proclamation that God is dead by speaking of the

death of the metaphysical God. ‘Before the causa sui man can neither fall to his knees in

awe nor can be play music and dance.’254 Despite this insistence, however, Heidegger,

particularly in his later work, leaves room for mystical apprehension of the divine and his

thought is not, in any sense, relentlessly atheistic or hostile to the idea of God’s reality:

The godless thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus

perhaps closer to the divine God. Here this means only: godless-thinking is more open to

Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.255

The death of the metaphysical God is not, then, for Heidegger, a loss. It is, rather, a prelude

to the possibility of a non-metaphysical relationship to God. Recalling Pascal’s exhortation

to lay aside the God of the philosophers in favour of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob,

Heidegger’s notion of the ‘divine God’ remains a source of an ‘other beginning,’ a new

age of the Holy, within which ‘God can indeed be God.’256 For this reason, the atheism

that Heidegger proposes does not close down the question of belief but offers a radical

253 John Peacocke, "Heidegger and the problem of onto-theology," in Post-Secular Philosophy : Between

Philosophy and Theology, ed. Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998), 178-84; John R. Williams,

"Heidegger and the Theologians," The Heythrop Journal 12, no. 3 (1971): 259. 254 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago

Press, 2002), 72. 255 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 72. 256 John D. Caputo, "Heidegger and theology," in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B.

Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 340-41.

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interpretation of unbelief as a purely ‘methodical atheism’ that offers the possibility of a

way into faith.257

1.8 Type III atheism

Although some contemporary expressions of atheism are rooted in either logical

argumentation or in an emotive rebellion against the strictures of religion and its creeds,

late modernity has also seen the emergence of another form of unbelief within Western

societies. A third type of atheism has arisen, which is driven less by rational analysis and

heart-felt dissent than by indifference and a casual sliding away from religious

commitment and faith in God. Closely associated with the development of supposedly

secular societies in the present era, it is perhaps more intuitive than it is intellectual, gaining

momentum amongst large swathes within the population, particularly in Europe, where

church attendance, Christian devotion and orthodox belief have simply ebbed away and

have ceased to represent central elements in lived experience. Since the second half of the

twentieth century, atheism in its multiplicity of manifestations has now become

demographically significant for the first time in human history, even in those countries

which until recently had high levels of religious adherence.258

Like the other categories of atheism that have been explored, this variety of unbelief is

heterogenous, multifaceted and internally differentiated. It has surfaced in a culture marked

by a spectrum of competing discourses, cultural diversity, increasing individual autonomy

and, it should be noted, a proliferation of different religious expressions. It might be

thought of as the unreflective cultural assimilation of the ‘death of God,’ heralded by

Nietzsche, although the extent to which the new majority of people in many Western

nations who now identify as possessing no religion would know or identify with

Nietzsche’s words is debatable. What appears to be the hallmark of Type III atheism is a

257 Laurence Paul Hemming, Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice (Notre Dame,

Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 19-21. 258 See, for example, Michael Paul Gallagher, "Atheism Irish Style," The Furrow 25, no. 4 (1974).

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distancing from religion rather than a renunciation of God. We seem, then, to be inhabiting

the era anticipated by Bonhoeffer in his late prison writings: ‘We are approaching a

completely religionless age; people as they are now simply cannot be religious

anymore.’259 It might be argued that the current religious outlook for many within diverse

and religiously plural societies is threaded with uncertainty, indifference or even

bewilderment. As John Caputo has expressed it, society today, with regard to belief in God,

might be seen as ‘a space of undecidability before things are definitely settled one way or

the other.’260 Although writing before the firm establishment of secularism261 within

European nations, Rudolf Bultmann chooses rather different words to describe this form

of atheism, focusing more on indifference than on indecision:

An unconscious, so to speak, naïve atheism is the real enemy of faith in God. It consists in

simply ignoring the question of a transcendent reality and as a habitual attitude is the

consistent outcome of the secularization of modern culture, which in disposing of the

world of beings with its planning and organizing, takes no account of God, but for which

God is ‘dead.’262

Although Bultmann goes on to characterise such unbelief as ‘relative or provisional,’263

his assessment may overstress the opposition between ‘naïve atheism’ and genuine faith.

For, in most Western nations, this form of atheism has not generated a particularly strong

anti-religious sentiment. So, although on the face of it, at least for some commentators,

there are currents in contemporary thought that are radically atheistic,264 our examination

of this category of atheism must acknowledge its complexity, its cultural (rather than

intellectual or emotional) ground, and the somewhat porous boundary that distinguishes it

from orthodox faith. As Poupard observes:

259 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 362. 260 John D. Caputo, "Atheism, A/theology, and the Postmodern Condition," in The Cambridge Companion

to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 269. 261 The word ‘secularism’ was first coined by the editor and lecturer, George Holyoake (1817-1906). See

Palmer, "The Meaning of Atheism," 2. 262 Bultmann, "Protestant Theology and Atheism," 331. 263 Bultmann, "Protestant Theology and Atheism," 332. 264 Brian Wicker, "Atheism and The Avant‐Garde," New Blackfriars 51, no. 606 (1970): 527.

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The church today is confronted more by indifference and practical unbelief than with

atheism… It is no longer a question of a public affirmation of atheism, with the exception

of a few countries, but a diffuse presence, almost omnipresent, in the culture.265

The tone of unbelief in Western societies today is, therefore, characterised more by lack of

concern with religion than it is by contempt or hostility toward the positions or institutions

associated with religious belief: ‘you have to care too much about religion to be

irreligious.’266 In our own country, as Stephen Bullivant observes, Britons… ‘do not

appear to inhabit a world where people are keenly interested in religion.’267 In his own

classification of atheistic positions, Glendinning refers to the form of unbelief we are

considering here as a-theism, situating it in the space between outright atheism and

religious commitment. It is an orientation that is marked by ‘mindless sheepishness: the

complete absence of any interest in religious commitment whatsoever, positive or

negative.’ He goes on to assert that it comprises people who, ‘while not full-blown atheists

(if asked)… do not live a life that cleaves to religious creeds [or] believe in a God able to

hear our prayers.’268

1.8.1 A contested religious inheritance

Type III atheists may wish to affirm some societal structures and norms that have grown

out of the West’s Judaeo-Christian heritage, such as universal human rights and the

existence of an ethical canopy which directs our actions. However, such endorsement may,

to a greater or lesser degree, be driven by what are thought to be non-religious conceptions

or morality and they may only be loosely held in a culture marked by such profound

diversity and the fragmentation of belief systems of any kind. The surfeit of religious

voices in contemporary society may have deafened a large proportion of the population, so

265 Paul Poupard, Where Is Your God?: Responding to the Challenge of Unbelief And Religious

Indifference Today (Chicago: Liturgy Training Publications, 2004), 12. 266 Steve Bruce, God is Dead : Secularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 42. 267 Stephen Bullivant, "The New Atheism and Sociology: Why Here? Why Now? What Next?," in Religion

and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Amarnath Amarasingam (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 114. 268 Simon Glendinning, "Three cultures of atheism: on serious doubts about the existence of God,"

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2013): 39-40.

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that notions of universality, rationality and truth in connection with faith and belief are

replaced by highly variegated positions distinguished by particularity, relativism and

contextuality.269 It has been argued that such a cultural environment actually represents a

‘new kind of space for religiosity,’ a notion that, in fact, follows from the work of several

late twentieth century French philosophers, some of whom were referred to in the previous

section.

It may be the case in countries such as Britain that, even amongst unbelievers, historic

places of worship, the cultural inheritance of Christianity and the structural connection

between the Church, the state and the monarchy are sources of some comfort. For others,

however, a degree of resistance to the perceived privileges conferred on religious

institutions provokes rather more vocal opposition to religion, which can find expression

in campaigns to create a more secular society. For still others, however, selected religious

beliefs and even practices, such as prayer, persist, although they may be decoupled from

either religious identity or belonging. And then there are those who may self-identify as

humanists, amongst whom a clearly articulated social ethic may be embraced and who may

be actively involved in dialogue with religious adherents in, for example, local interfaith

forums and Standing Advisory Councils for Religious Education. In what follows some of

the most important facets of Type III scepticism and unbelief will be outlined.

1.8.2 A secular age?

The drift away from orthodox religious belief and participation within worshipping

communities, along with the progressive weakening of the role of religious institutions

within public affairs, are frequently described as features of that most complex of

269 See Beattie, The New Atheists, 133.

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processes, secularisation.270 There are multifarious understandings of secularism, for the

term is used in a variety of ways. On occasions, secularism represents a programmatic

attempt to restrict the voice and influence of religious groups within corporate life such as

in politics, the media, education, healthcare chaplaincy and social care.271 In other

instances, the word is used to denote a neutral stance that seeks to open up a space within

which a variety of views – both religious and non-religious – can be expressed and lived

out in a mutually respectful manner.272 In this sense of the word, secularism is formally

agnostic, instead of atheistic. It shows that secularism need not always involve a rejection

of religious belief, identity, and practice, nor the lack of respect for the place of religious

communities within society.273 It should be noted, however, that such a standpoint does

not necessarily constitute a positive disposition towards religious expression in society.

Religious beliefs and institutions may be more tolerated than welcomed, and faith

commitment must be exercised in accordance with the strictures of a neo-liberal ideology,

which can be deeply resistant to religious authority or dogmatism.

The roots of secular culture may be traced back to the Judaeo-Christian emphasis on the

fundamental ontological distinction between Creator and creation. This set the stage for

‘the eventual rationalisation and disenchantment of the world,’ a process that was

encouraged by other significant transformations within Western history, such as the

Reformation, the emergence of Renaissance humanism, the European wars of religion and

270 For Pope Benedict XVI, secularism impoverishes spiritual horizons and diminishes opportunities for

self-transcendence, creating a void that is filled the adulation of celebrities or the pseudo-liturgies of youth

culture. It leads, he argues, to a contemporary reworking of the error of Pelagius, which involves society

placing trust in institutions and in education without any reference to God or the inerior dynamics of the

human soul. Tracey Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T & T Clark, 2010), 79,

82. 271 Fenella Cannell, "The Anthropology of Secularism," Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 86. 272 This is the position adopted by Andrew Copson in a very fair-minded discussion of a form of secularism

that allows for a range of religious and non-religious positions within society. Andrew Copson, Secularism:

A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); See also Frank L. Pasquale and Barry

A. Kosmin, "Atheism and the Secularization Thesis," in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, ed. Stephen

Bullivant and Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 458. 273 The positive interpretation of secularism, which makes space for, although does not privilege any

particular religious group, is discussed in Mark Cladis, "Religion, Secularism, and Democratic Culture,"

The Good Society 19, no. 2 (2010): 23-25.

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the Enlightenment.274 The notion that Western societies were inescapably pursuing a

trajectory that would take them from a condition where the values and organisational

structures associated with religion to one where national institutions and the wider

behaviour of the population comes to be set within non-religious frameworks is known as

the ‘secularisation thesis.’ This has its roots in the critiques of religion and its role in both

corporate and individual decision making that were advanced by Comte, Marx and Freud.

However, a more thoroughgoing articulation of the thesis was developed by the

sociologists Max Weber (1864-1920) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917). Weber famously

refers to the ‘disenchantment of the world,’ which he saw as lying at the heart of the

secularisation process.275 These and other theorists hold that there is an ineluctable

transition ‘from a society dominated by magic, myth, superstition and religion, into one

with a cognitively superior outlook in which these categories are disclosed as delusions

that we shed in the name of reason, criticism and science.’276 Throughout much of the

twentieth century, the process of secularisation seemed to be following the predictions of

those who had forecast its outcome. This was especially true during the 1960s, often

described as the ‘decade of secularisation’ in the West. During the so-called ‘long Sixties,’

from 1958 to 1974, there were dramatic drops in church attendance, an erosion of Christian

identity and awareness, a multiplication of world-views, the rise of liberal or even

heterodox theological views (most keenly seen in Bishop John Robinson’s 1963

publication Honest to God) and legal changes in connection with divorce, abortion and

contraception.277

There is little doubt that the ‘sacred canopy’ that had once provided an orientation for

human experience and our understanding of the world has been progressively undermined

by some of the cultural shifts that have taken place in modern history and that, increasingly,

274 Alan D. Gilbert, The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of Modern

Society (London: Longman, 1980), 18-39. 275 George Levine, "Introduction," in The Joy of Secularism: 11 essays for how we live now, ed. George

Levine (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 2. 276 Simon Glendinning, "Religiosity and secularity in Europe," in Religion and Atheism: Beyond the

Divide, ed. Anthony Carroll and Richard Norman (New York: Routledge, 2016), 200. 277 McLeod, "The Religious Crisis of the 1960s," 205-8.

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personal and institutional decisions are now made on an instrumental or rational basis.278

Such a process has been accompanied by the lack of, or loss of, or disinterest in, faith and

belief. Secularisation is, then, in some sense connected with atheism, the focus of this

study. However, it needs to be stressed that the story is far more complex than the narratives

outlined by the early social scientists, who predicted that religious frameworks and

personal faith would be slowly extinguished from society. Although secularism and Type

III atheism are clearly related, they are certainly not identical. The resurgence of religious

life in the global South, and in some faith groups, such as large black-majority

congregations that are located in many Western cities, within recent years; the discovery

that large numbers of people, even if they do not identify with any particular religion,

continue to hold quasi-religious beliefs; the increasing recognition that is being given by

the state to the role played by religious communities in social welfare; and the renewed

interest in religion and, more broadly, themes connected to transcendence, in Continental

philosophy, have all conspired to undermine the confident predictions that individual belief

and organised religious life will come to an end.279

Furthermore, it should be recognised that some Christian commentators are not troubled

by the notion of secularism and, indeed, see it as the necessary condition for a democratic

society to thrive and also as the basis for a positive plurality of beliefs and worldviews to

coexist. Of those who have affirmed elements of contemporary secularity and have seen

within them the ground for human flourishing, arguably the most prominent within the

Christian tradition is the Canadian political and social philosopher, Charles Taylor. His

monumental work A Secular Age traces the unfolding nature of secularity within the West

in the modern era. Taylor rejects the thesis that modernity led to the ‘death of God’ and

suggests that a focus on religion has not, in fact, been lost in our age. Rather, he argues

278 Pasquale and Kosmin, "Atheism and the Secularization Thesis," 453. 279 The influential sociologist, Peter Berger, for example, who had been one of those to anticipate the

demise of religion within the West, revised his views at the end of the last century, describing the world

today ‘as furiously religious as ever.’ Peter L. Berger, "The desecularization of the world: a global

overview," in The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. Peter L.

Berger (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999), 2.

78

that secularism fosters a vast range of faiths and beliefs within civilisations marked by

‘overlapping consensuses.’280

This perspective stems from Taylor’s dismissal of ‘subtraction’ theories of

secularisation, which hold that God has been rendered unnecessary and has thus been

eradicated from human experience such that we now live in a ‘disenchanted’ world.281

Eschewing exclusive humanism, Taylor asserts that as the modern era has progressed,

since around 1500, the sources of what he terms ‘fulness’ have shifted from an inescapable

orientation toward God to a host of different resources. These may, in fact, involve the

denial of God, but they, nonetheless, enable people to discern something that is beyond or

transcendent to their lives even within the ‘immanent frame.’282 In acknowledging the

manifold forms of lived experience that are open to mystery, he is able to develop a broad

and generous definition of religious life, which he detects traces of wherever a ‘vertical

axis’ in our experience is present.283 Taylor is not entirely uncritical of the transition that

society has witnessed as a sense of enchantment has ebbed away. Thus he rues the move

from what he calls the ‘porous’ self, which was conscious of its fragility, its connection

with the natural world and of a dependence on divine providence, to the ‘buffered’ self,

which seeks autonomy, separation from, and rational control of, nature (and the other).284

Nonetheless, his elastic interpretation of religion certainly challenges narrow conceptions

of secularism, which focus on the removal of religion from society and it may offer a

framework within which a potentially fruitful dialogue between those with and without a

religious commitment can be made possible.285

280 Taylor, A Secular Age, 532, 693. 281 Taylor, A Secular Age, 26. 282 Taylor, A Secular Age, 16. An example of this is provided by Barbara Ehrenreich, who, despite her

atheism, charts a spiritual odyssey that was provoked by a profoundly mystical experience in her

adolescent years that enabled her to encounter transcendence in the everyday world. Barbara Ehrenreich,

Living with a Wild God: A Non-believer's Search for the Truth about Everything (London: Granta Books,

2015). 283 Taylor, A Secular Age, 57. 284 Taylor, A Secular Age, 37-42, 134. 285 See Ruth Abbey, "Siblings under the skin: Charles Taylor on religious believers and non-believers in A

Secular Age," in Religion and Atheism: Beyond the Divide, ed. Anthony Carroll and Richard Norman (New

York: Routledge, 2016), esp. 222, 28-30.

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A number of commentators, conscious of the persistent place of religion and belief

within contemporary society, even in those nations where levels of religious adherence are

dropping, are now referring to our age as ‘post-secular.’ One of the more influential voices

in this regard has been that of the critical theorist and philosophical pragmatist Jürgen

Habermas. Habermas argues that, despite the cleavage between secular reason and faith

(which generates dissonance between the modes of discourse associated with liberal

democratic rhetoric and the language of faith), religion must ‘open itself up to the

normatively grounded expectation that it should recognize, for reasons of its own, the

neutrality of the state towards worldviews.’286 However, there is also a burden on the

secular state. For Habermas, it must:

…face the question of whether it is imposing asymmetrical obligations on its religious

citizens. For the liberal state guarantees the equal freedom to exercise religion not only as a

means of upholding law and order, but also for the normative reason of protecting the

freedom of belief and conscience of everyone. [The state] may not demand anything of its

religious citizens which cannot be reconciled with a life that is led authentically ‘from

faith.’287

Within the field of Continental philosophy there has also been extensive reflection on the

notion of post-secularity. Interestingly, this development has been traced to the thought of

Nietzsche, who would not, on the face of it, be an obvious authority to appeal to in

connection with the ‘return’ of religion in present times, given his forceful denunciation of

the distinction between transcendence and immanence. However, as John Caputo

identifies, the ‘death of God’ announced by Nietzsche not only signalled the end of

metaphysical theism, it also spelt ‘the death of any kind of monism or reductionism,

including secularism.’288 Developing the work of the philosophers situated within the

French phenomenological tradition, a number of contemporary thinkers have turned to

religious themes, including ethics, justice, alterity, the eschaton and universalism and have

286 Jürgen Habermas, "An awareness of what is missing," in An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and

Reason in a Post-secular Age, ed. Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 20. 287 Habermas, "An awareness of what is missing," 21. 288 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2002), 133. Emphasis added.

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sought to undermine a secular logic that seeks to offer assured and totalising depictions of

the world based on purely immanent conceptions of reality.289 Additionally, as I shall

explore more fully in examining the final category in my typology of atheism, religious

themes represent areas of serious interest for several philosophers who themselves identify

as atheist. These include Gilles Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou. Disparate

though the work of these thinkers is, it shares a distrust of Enlightenment rationalism and

is suspicious of thought that purports to offer a ‘fixed centre’ or foundational schema.

Although orthodox Christian faith is not embraced by these writers, their incredulity

toward overarching meta-narratives undermines any clear case for scientific atheism as

much as it questions modes of metaphysical thought.290 In her survey of some themes

within the turn to religion in French intellectual thought, Barker holds that the key element

of the post-secular culture we may be moving through is the priority of the other, a concern

shared by philosophy and theology and which provides the basis for and an invitation to

dialogue.291 It is a reflection that, once more, highlights how questionable the predicate

‘secular’ is for the Western world.

1.9 Type IV atheism

The final forms of atheism that I will examine represent an attempt to eradicate faith in

God by emphasising the radically immanent frame of human experience. Grounded in a

thoroughgoing embrace of materiality, these critiques repudiate what is sometimes seen as

the primordial status given by theism to immortality and to the immaterial. Connected with

a number of contemporary philosophers, mainly operating within the Continental tradition,

the ‘radical’ atheism that will be discussed here asserts the irreversibility of the death of

289 These include, in addition to Caputo himself, the Italian postmodern philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, the

French feminist, linguist and philosopher Luce Irigaray and the French philosopher and intellectual

historian Michel Foucault, all of whom reject the binary opposition of faith and reason and who allow for

traces of transcendence in the human experience of encounter, engagement and justice 290 Caputo, "Atheism, A/theology, and the Postmodern Condition," 267-68. 291 Victoria Barker, "After the Death of God: Postsecularity?," Journal of Religious History 33, no. 1

(2009): 94-95.

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God, the impossibility of God’s existence, and is opposed to moves that seek to retrieve

theological modes of thought, such as those encountered in the philosophical turn to

religion or in the notion of post-secularism, both of which were briefly discussed above.

For Gilles Deleuze, one such thinker whose atheism belongs to this category, being is laid

out in a ‘plane of immanence,’ or ‘plane of Nature.’292 This amounts to a ‘flat ontology’ in

which everything is included on one common plane, not immanent to something else, to

some ‘supplementary dimension’ such as a transcendent realm.293 Such a resolute

expression of atheism may draw on philosophical materialism and, for this reason, might

be thought of as an atheism of the body.294

On the face of it, radical – or absolute – atheism entails ‘an active struggle against

everything that reminds us of God… and at the same time a desperate… effort to recast

and reconstruct the whole human universe of thought.’295 Such atheological frameworks,

marked by a complete denial of divinity or of transcendence, are, however, difficult to

realise and, even in the work of putatively ardent atheist thinkers, suggestions of religious

themes, consciously held or otherwise, may persist. As Christopher Watkin expertly

highlights, ‘thinking without God’ in the atheistic projects of contemporary philosophy is

actually almost impossible. His study of the atheistic formulations of Alain Badiou, Jean-

Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux, unearths a latent parasitism within their work, within

which theological motifs are concealed, betraying echoes and traces of the divine.296 Some

remarks about the provenance and characteristics of this broad category of thought will

now be set out.

292 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press,

1995), 145. 293 Christopher Ben Simpson, Deleuze and Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 17. 294 Deleuze is especially concerned with the body as the 'field of desire.' He holds that the plane of

composition that frames our existence is 'a continuum immanent to the body.' Gilles Deleuze and Felix

Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: The

Athlone Press, 1988), 154. 295 Maritain, "On the meaning of contemporary atheism," 104. 296 Christopher Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and

Quentin Meillassoux (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), See esp. Ch. 3, pp. 95-131.

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Firstly, the heritage of Type IV atheism must be located within the thought of Friedrich

Nietzsche, the principal voice of early forms of Type II atheism, which I discussed above.

Nietzsche was contemptuous of the prevailing atheism of his age for its inability to grasp

the full reality of God’s death. He saw that for the full implications of this event to be

realised metaphysics has to be utterly overturned and a systematic transformation of

European culture and the values upon which it is built needs to take place.297 Nietzsche

was conscious of the enduring shadow of faith, which insinuates itself in the scientific

method and even in the structures of language. Indeed, he held that as long as we continue

to believe in grammar and in the metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions

concealed within language we will continue to believe in God.298 The project of Type IV

atheist thinkers might, in their various directions of travel, may be thought of as an attempt

to work out the meaning of such a fundamental rethinking of what atheism can mean in

human experience. However, for all their dependence on Nietzsche, they are not always

uncritical conversation partners with him, detecting the traces of a lingering orientation

toward God not only in the culture that Nietzsche critiqued but also concealed within his

own principles and rhetoric. Alain Badiou, a leading exponent of contemporary radical

atheism, interprets within Nietzsche’s claim that God is dead a theistic schema that points

to an ongoing enthrallment with a worldview that still incorporates the infinite and the

immutable.299

Secondly, a number of thinkers in the broad field of Type IV atheism must be considered

as anti-humanist. Far from affirming humanism’s critique of religion, whether in its

Renaissance, liberal nineteenth century or politicised twentieth-century forms, humanism

is often condemned for its adulation of humanity and its intoxication with the myth of

297 Joseph M. Spencer, "The Religious Significance of the Atheist Conception of Life," Radical Orthodoxy:

Theology, Philosophy, Politics 2, no. 2 (June 2014): 272-73. 298 Alan D. Schrift, "Nietzsche and the critique of oppositional thinking," History of European Ideas 11

(1989): 786. 299 Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin

Meillassoux, 22.

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human progress.300 The atrocities of the twentieth century were hugely influential here,

undermining such visions of humanity’s stature and eroding the notion that we possesses

a fundamental nature that is essentially good: ‘Faced with philosophical opposition and

political catastrophe, the status of humanism eroded dramatically, taking with it the

imagination of modern humanity based on innate qualities, characters or rights.’301 Thus,

during the on the philosophy of the previous century, particularly, although not exclusively,

in French intellectual culture, a horizon of thought opened which situated atheism within

an anti-utopian, anti-foundational and anti-humanist framework. This mode of thought is

associated with philosophers such as Georges Bataille, Alexandre Kojève, Maurice

Blanchot, Emmanuel Lévinas (who formulated this turn as ‘an atheism that is not

humanist’),302 all of whom draw on Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism.’ Later in the

century, it gained expression in the work of thinkers such as Michel Foucault,303 Maurice

Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Luc Nancy as well as the critiques of the Enlightenment mounted

by members of the Frankfurt School. Their negative anthropologies and anti-systematic

philosophies recoil against ‘anthropotheistic’ conceptions of humanity such as those

developed by Denis Diderot in his article on L’Homme in the Encyclopédie, Ludwig

Feuerbach in his Essence of Christianity and Auguste Comte’s ‘religion of humanity.’

They argue that such theocentric humanism, along with the philosophical anthropologies

that undergird it, are thoroughly discredited by the atrocities of human callousness and

violence, and that the wreckage of a century of conflict has discredited the whole Western

notion of human perfectibility.304

Thirdly, it should be noted that many of the thinkers to be considered in this section, in

continuity with Nietzsche, espouse a form of atheism that is not only radically anti-

300 The anti-humanist orientation in twentieth-century literature and philosophy may be traced back to

Nietzsche's project. See Elizabeth Kuhn, "Toward an Anti-Humanism of Life: The Modernism of

Nietzsche, Hulme and Yeats," Journal of Modern Literature 34, no. 4 (2011). 301 Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought (Stanford, Calif:

Stanford University Press, 2010), 1. 302 Emmanuel Levinas, Proper Names (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 127. 303 Foucault famously stated 'Man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.' Michel

Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 1989), 386-87;

see also Roger Paden, "Foucault's Anti-Humanism," Human Studies 10, no. 1 (1987): 123. 304 Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist, 23.

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religious but also fiercely critical of many other kinds of atheism. This is highly significant,

since it once again highlights the tremendous range of, and tensions between, the positions

that constitute contemporary atheism. Martin Hägglund, for example, undoubtedly one of

the most prominent of the radical philosophical atheists, rejects the kind of ‘vulgar atheism’

of the New Atheist movement, which, he holds, is formally theistic despite the fact that it

camouflages itself as materially atheistic. His principal objection is that ‘it affirms the

desirability – and thus primordiality – of [the] immortality’ that it purports to reject. For

Hägglund , life is irreparably mortal to its core.305 Such traditional atheistic critiques are

dismissed by Hägglund as melancholic, pragmatic or therapeutic. They outwardly dismiss

the reality of God and eternity but betray a wish that such things, were they to exist, would

be desirable.

The common denominator for all these models of atheism is the assumption that the

religious desire for absolute immunity is operative. When we desire the good, we desire an

absolute good that is immune from evil, and when we desire life, we desire an absolute life

that is immune from death. The fundamental drama of human existence is thus seen as the

conflict between the mortal being that is our fate and the immortal being that we desire.306

Similarly, Vardoulakis shuns both secularism and most contemporary atheism, reading

them as Christian-derived phenomena, which continue to belong to their Christian

‘signifying horizon.’

My position cannot be further away from currently fashionable rationalist-naturalist

atheism (espoused by the likes of Richard Dawkins or Sam Harris)… Christian-derived

atheism may be said to be distilled in the declaration ‘I don’t believe in God’ or ‘I don’t

believe there is a God.’ This statement amounts to self-delusion insofar as it refuses to

acknowledge that the negation it claims participates in the terminological framework of

305 Spencer, "The Religious Significance of the Atheist Conception of Life," 275, 77. 306 Martin Hägglund, "The challenge of radical atheism: a response," The New Centennial Review 9, no. 1

(2009): 229.

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belief, a discourse that, from the standpoint of religious conviction, belong to the

epistemology of God.307

Traditional atheism is typically denounced either as parasitic on religion, for it seeks to

reject God in ways that require or assume God, or as ascetic, for, along with God, it is

forced to renounce, albeit reluctantly, the notions of truth, beauty and goodness that are

tied up with the image of God in human thought. The alternative position, which is pursued

by Type IV atheists, consists of a thoroughgoing materialism that supposedly jettisons all

pretension of belief in God and his very desirability. For Badiou, for example, God as the

metaphysical ‘One’ is strictly impossible, not just absent, peripheral or irrelevant.308 And

Nancy is equally dismissive of any system that substitutes for God another governing

principle or authority:

There is not even ‘atheism’; ‘atheist’ is not enough! What we need to hollow out is the

positing of a principle. It is not enough to say that God absents himself, withdraws or again

is incommensurable. Much less is it a case of placing another great principle on his throne

– Man, Reason, Society. It is a case of grasping this with both hands: the world rests on

nothing – and that is its most vivid sense.309

In what follows, the lineaments of some philosophical positions will be outlined as these

are encountered in selected atheistic thinkers.

1.9.1 Radical atheism in contemporary philosophy

Jean-Luc Nancy (b. 1940) is typical of the group of radical thinkers considered here in

seeking to move beyond the parasitic atheism prevalent within contemporary culture. He

is equivocal about applying the label ‘atheist’ to himself, believing that it needs to be

307 Dimitris Vardoulakis, "Why I Am Not a Post-secularist," in Lessons in Secular Criticism, ed. Stathis

Gourgouris (Fordham University, 2013), 68-69. 308 Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin

Meillassoux, 29. 309 Jean-Luc Nancy, Adoration: The Deconstruction of Christianity II, trans. John McKeane (New York:

Fordham University Press, 2013), 48.

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deconstructed in the same way that theism does.310 In his two-volume work,

Déconstruction du christianisme, he engages with Christian themes, working out his

principal assertion that it is impossible that there is any ‘pre-existing single, substantial

essence of Being.’311 Although his work is modulated by Christianity, he argues that

monotheism is, in truth, atheism and that atheism is Christianity realised because, for him,

‘[t]he unicity of God… signifies the withdrawal of God from presence and thus also from

the power thereby understood.’312 Nancy’s own account of the death of God is that this

event is irreversible and that both God and religion are ‘finished.’ This leads him to reject

the so-called ‘turn to religion’ in Continental philosophy; ‘[t]here is no return of the

religious: there are the contortions and the turgescence of its exhaustion.’313

Gilles Deleuze (1925-95) also situates his philosophical project in the wake of

Nietzsche’s death of God, developing an anti-theistic system of thought based on the

affirmation of ‘multiplicity as the most fundamental unity.’314 His preoccupation with

difference, which he roots in Nietzsche’s affirmation of life, leads Deleuze to reject any

metaphysical framework that would ‘judge and depreciate life in the name of a supra-

sensible world.’315 This is the basis of his dismissal of transcendent hierarchical structures

and of his vision of the world as one of pure immanence.316 Such an orientation generates

the atheistic horizon in Deleuze’s work, a position that has been described as anti-

theological given his view that God is a dam that needs to be burst. God, for Deleuze, must

310 Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin

Meillassoux, 33. Nancy's ambiguity about his relationship with faith is evident in the following statement:

'If it is simple and necessary to be an atheist, it is neither so simple nor so necessary to be "without God."'

See Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-enclosure : the deconstruction of Christianity, trans. Bettina Bergo, Gabriel

Malenfant, and Michael B. Smith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 115. 311 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2000), 29; see also Marie-Eve Morin, "Towards a Divine Atheism: Jean-Luc

Nancy’s Deconstruction of Monotheism and the Passage of the Last God" (paper presented at the

Symposium, 2011). 312 Jean-Luc Nancy, "Deconstruction of monotheism," Postcolonial Studies 6, no. 1 (2003): 42. 313 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Gravity of Thought, trans. Francois Raffoul and Gregory Recco (Amherst, N.Y:

Humanity Books, 1997), 136. 314 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and philosophy (London: Continuum, 2006), xi-xii. 315 Deleuze, Nietzsche and philosophy, 147. See also Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 7. 316 Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 17.

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be forgotten in order for philosophy to begin.317 The God of Kant’s disjunctive syllogism,

the negative exclusionary force which gives identity and immortality to the self through

divine mastery, is rejected by Deleuze. Instead, he upholds the ‘order of the Antichrist,’

within which ‘difference, divergence and decentering [affirm disjunction] as such an

affirmative and affirmed power.’318

[The anti-divine order] is characterised by the death of God, the destruction of the world,

the dissolution of the person, the disintegration of bodies, and the shifting function of

language which now expresses only intensities.319

Here Deleuze re-presents the Nietzschean line of atheistic thought, arguably going further

by celebrating the death of God as the guarantor of human identity and seeing in such an

event the dissolution of human selfhood.320 In this way, any possibility of analogy between

humanity and divinity is dismissed; ‘all claims to the possibility of an identity established

within the “order of God” must be surrendered.’321 In place of a transcendent authoring of

a worldly and creaturely simulacra, Deleuze insists that human existence is characterised

by a constant flux of truly infinite becoming and a ‘strange unity’ that applies the

multiple.322

An important motif within Deleuze’s thought is that of the body. As Poxon highlights,

this is neither the physical or spiritual body of Christian theology, which is held to be

created by God as an organism and which is both subject to divine judgement and is a

carrier of eschatological hope. Deleuze rejects the possibility of an analogical thread

connecting us and God. Rather, in replacing identity with difference, Deleuze proposes a

317 Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 49. 318 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (London: Athlone, 2001), 296-97. 319 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 294. 320 Judith Poxon, "Embodied Anti-theology: The Body without Organs and the Judgement of God," in

Deleuze and religion, ed. Mary Bryden (London: Routledge, 2001), 49. 321 Poxon, "Embodied Anti-theology: The Body without Organs and the Judgement of God," 44-45. 322 Poxon, "Embodied Anti-theology: The Body without Organs and the Judgement of God," 44, 46.

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‘theological body,’ a ‘body without organs’ as a challenge to divine order and an

expression of pure affirmation.323

In contrast to the body-as-organism, the theological body… is ‘an affective, intensive,

anarchist body that consists solely of poles, zones, thresholds and gradients. It is traversed

by a powerful, nonorganic vitality’ and is defined not in its wholeness, its identity, but

rather ‘in its becoming, it is intensity, as the power to affect or to be effected.’324

Deleuze is clear that the body without organs is in no sense to be regarded as having been

made in the image of God. It supports, rather, a demonic image, or, in his words, ‘an image

without likeness…, stripped of resemblance.’325 Within Deleuze’s order of the Antichrist,

pre-individual and impersonal singularities lead to the loss of identity of the self, which

promotes the ‘intense multiplicity and power of metamorphosis, where relations of force

play with one another.’326

As with Nancy, Deleuze is not always entirely able, nor does he necessarily intend, to

resist theological themes, as is evident in the presence of an anti-Christ motif in his work,

and it might be thought that his mutation of theology has the potential to generate a new

conception of God that offers a different way of understanding our being in the world.327

As Bryden notes, there are pulses of religion within Deleuze’s writing, mystical

affirmations of life, and even references to spiritual ‘practices,’ such as Taoism and

sorcery, which suggest that his philosophy is, perhaps, more open to theological

interpretation than might at first appear to be the case.328 Some authors have detected in

Deleuze’s interest in human creativity, and in the generative processes that operate within

thought, theological echoes. Thus, Davies reads in the Deleuzian idea that intellectual

323 Poxon, "Embodied Anti-theology: The Body without Organs and the Judgement of God," 42. 324 Poxon, "Embodied Anti-theology: The Body without Organs and the Judgement of God," 45; the

quotation is from Gilles Deleuze, Essays critical and clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A.

Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 131. 325 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum Publishing Group, 2004), 127. 326 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 297. 327 Anthony Smith, "The Judgment of God and the Immeasurable: Political Theology and Organizations of

Power," Political Theology 12, no. 1 (2011): 79. 328 Mary Bryden, "Introduction," in Deleuze and Religion, ed. Mary Bryden (London: Routledge, 2001), 2.

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creation stems from difference as absence or negation a form of creatio ex nihilo, which

aligns Deleuze with the transcendental notion of the One in Plotinus and Eckhart.329

Drawing further on work in this area, Burrell suggests that Deleuze’s work can serve to

incorporate within a Christian theology of creation a robust affirmation of the world, which

may prevent God’s creative act from being overshadowed by an overly redemption-centred

focus.330 Even Deleuze’s insistence that difference is the essential mark of being can, for

Hart, be accommodated within a trinitarian theological framework that speaks of the one

God in terms of originary difference through patterns of divine ‘supplementation,

repetition, variation’ and of God’s plenitude, which gratuitously bestows in the difference

of creation an analogically-related pattern that refers back to its divine source.331

Furthermore, even if his depictions of God are taken at face value, several Christian

commentators have argued that the God and Christianity rejected by Deleuze are actually

‘pale shades, caricatures [and] counterfeit doubles that are worthy of rejection.’332 So,

despite claiming to oppose, point for point, the divine order with the system of the

Antichrist,333 Deleuze’s atheism need not be regarded as completely refractory to Christian

readings as its author may intend it to be. As Simpson notes, God or the divine does not

disappear entirely in Deleuze’s work. His Spinozist insistence on the priority of immanence

may, in fact, support an authentically Christian reading of the human encounter with God

in this world, such as the worldliness set out by Bonhoeffer in his prison writings.334 It is

for this reason that Simpson argues that Deleuze’s work, understood in Christian terms,

329 Oliver Davies, "Thinking difference: A comparative study of Gilles Deleuze, Plotinus and Meister

Eckhart," in Deleuze and religion, ed. Mary Bryden (London: Routledge, 2001), 82. 330 David B. Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre

Dame Press, 1993), 3; see also Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 82. 331 David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Cambridge:

Eerdmans, 2003), 180-81. It should be added that Hart is critical of Deleuze in other respects, particularly

in relation to Deleuze's notion that difference is an ontic violence or rupture. 332 Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 54; as Bryden puts it: 'The old God is dead for Deleuze. The spiritual,

however, remains...' "Introduction," 4. 333 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 294. 334 In his letters to Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer frequently refers to a 'world come of age' in which our

encounter with divine revelation is 'this-wordly.' Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison.

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can offer an opportunity to think positively and creatively about the world and our place

within it.335

Alain Badiou (b. 1937), one of contemporary philosophy’s most creative thinkers,

presents a thoroughgoing critique of Christianity, which is summarised in his conviction

that ‘God is finished. And religion is finished too.’336 As with most other representatives

of Type IV atheism, Badiou’s thought is rooted within a Nietzschean framework, which

has led to the development of a philosophical orientation that has political, as well as

intellectual, import.337 In his anti-theological philosophy of immanence, he seeks to

demolish all notions of God, whether these are grounded in the ‘somebody’s God’ of lived

experience; in the ‘God-Principle’ of metaphysics, which locate all being in the One; or in

the superstitious mysticism of poetry.338 This orientation stems, for Badiou, from his

synthesis of philosophy and mathematics, particularly his use of Georg Cantor’s axiomatic

set theory, out of which he develops an ontology that explicitly denies the existence of

God.339 The priority that Badiou gives to numbers within his philosophical system, the

decision he gives to the multiplicity of being and the affirmation of the actual infinite are

applied to his analysis of the issue of the relationship of the many to the one, bequeathed

to the Western tradition by Parmenides. Badiou asserts that although the one exists, as in

the ‘count-as-one,’ all presentation and thus being qua being is ‘nothing but infinite

335 Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 95. 336 Religion, for Badiou, is the 'tethering of being to the One.' See Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans.

Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2006), 23. This work contains Badiou's most explicit atheistic

pronouncements. 337See, for example, Ishay Landa, "True Requirements or the Requirements of Truth? The Nietzschean

Communism of Alain Badiou," International Critical Thought 3, no. 4 (2013); Bruno Bosteels, "Nietzsche,

Badiou, and Grand Politics: An Antiphilosophical Reading," in Nietzsche and Political Thought, ed. Keith

Ansell-Pearson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). 338 Alain Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, trans. Norman

Madarasz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 22-26. 339 Central to Badiou’s mathematical ontology are the axioms of an actual (intead of a potential) infinity

and of the null or empty set that has no elements, which he refers to as the ‘no-thing’ of the void.

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multiplicity;’340 in his words, ‘the One is not.’341 Although he sees in Continental

philosophy’s Kantian obsession with finitude an ongoing, if unacknowledged, desire for

an inexpressible – and hence religious – transcendence beyond the finite realm, infinity, in

Badiou’s system, is liberated from theological associations and becomes ‘secularised.’342

Mathematics, Badiou claims, invites us to think of infinity separately from its collusion

with the One and instead to consider it in a banal way in strictly numerical terms:

That the infinite is a number is what a set-theoretic ontology of the manifold finally made

possible after centuries of denial and enclosure of the infinite within theology’s vocation.

This is why the ontology of number is an important item in the secularization of the

infinite. Indeed, it is the only way to be freed from both religion and the Romantic notion

of finitude.343

Crucially for Badiou, based on his understanding of the void set, nothing and being are to

be thought together. The void is a ‘no-thing’ and so, he believes, ‘there is a being of

nothing.’344 This insight drives his rejection of the possibility of God as an absolute infinite

being beyond the actual infinite multiplicity of being qua being.345

I should note that Badiou’s radically atheistic thought has not evaded the interest of

Christian theologians, and some thinkers argue that there is, after all, the possibility of

retrieving from his project a hidden affirmation of a God who is beyond the conditions of

ontological predication and the association with a supreme being, such that God might be

considered as hidden in, or even equivalent to, the void of the empty set.346 Such an idea

340 Alain Badiou, Theoretical writings, trans. Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum,

2004), 39. 341 Badiou, Being and Event, 145. For helpful introductions to Badiou's adoption of set theory in the

context of his philosophical assault on religion, see Kenneth A Reynhout, "Alain Badiou: Hidden

Theologian of the Void?," The Heythrop Journal 52, no. 2 (2011): 223-27; Fabi Gironi, Naturalising

Badiou: Mathematical Ontology and Structural Realism (Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 2013), 9-33;

Frederiek Depoortere, Badiou and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2009), 11-21. 342 Alain Badiou, Number and Numbers, trans. Robin Mackay (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 45. 343 Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, 124. 344 Badiou, Being and Event, 54. 345 Hallward believes that no one has taken the death of God as seriously as Badiou. See Peter Hallward,

Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 7. 346 For a fascinating exploration of this theme, see Reynhout, "Alain Badiou: Hidden Theologian of the

Void?," 229-31.

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finds an echo in the intriguing and highly unconventional philosophy of Badiou’s student,

Quentin Meillassoux. Echoing Simone Weil’s suggestion of an identity between God’s

absence in the world and a divine form of presence, Meillassoux develops a whole

philosophy of what he calls ‘divine inexistence,’ using the notion of Contingency to signal

the un-grounding of being where Weil had spoken of the mystery of God’s darkness.347

Meillassoux's counter-intuitive speculations about God and religion, which find expression

in his notion of God’s inexistence, offer some of the most provocative and thought-

provoking ideas within contemporary Continental philosophy of religion.348 Meillassoux's

intriguing thought, along with the concealed religious dynamics that have been detected in

the work of even the most resolute of atheist thinkers, demonstrate that contemporary

radical philosophical atheism need not be beyond some forms of theological appropriation

and that such work may yield religious significance.349

1.10 Concluding remarks

Before moving into the central sections of this thesis, within which the dogmatic and

apologetic discourse associated with three selected interlocutors will be explored, it may

be helpful to summarise the characteristics of atheism as it has been analysed in the

foregoing discussion. These remarks will need to be borne in mind as the thought of Jüngel,

Hart and de Lubac is examined in some detail, particularly in connection with the atheistic

critiques that they engage with.

347 Stephanie Strickland, "Joined at the Hip: Simone Weil, Quentin Meillasoux," Religion & Literature 45,

no. 3 (2013): 227-29. For a much more critical assessment of Meillassoux's work, see Martin Hägglund,

"Radical Aatheist Materialism: A Critique of Meillassoux," (2011). 348 Clayton Crockett, "Review of ‘After finitude: An essay on the necessity of contingency’ by Quentin

Meillassoux," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 3 (2012): 251. 349 On the theological promise of some of the atheist writers considered here, see, for example: Spencer,

"The Religious Significance of the Atheist Conception of Life," 286-90; Depoortere, Badiou and Theology,

95-127; Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 59-62; Davies, "Thinking difference: A comparative study of

Gilles Deleuze, Plotinus and Meister Eckhart," 76-86; Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-theological Thinking

in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux, 95-123.

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Firstly, it will have been evident that atheism is highly complex and heterogeneous

phenomenon that defies straightforward characterisation, and which has arisen in different

forms as a consequence of a variety of impulses during its long period of development. As

noted in the Abstract, my focus in this study is on Western expressions of atheism, which,

by and large, have emerged in opposition to the Christian faith. Within this stratum of

unbelief, the pluriform nature of atheism still needs to be recognised given the array of

factors that have led people either to reject or to distance themselves from Christianity:

lack of evidence for faith, the perceived nature of God, the experience of suffering, the

actions of the Church, social and cultural changes, alternative understandings of being and

so on. Even within the different categories of atheism outlined in this chapter, where

unbelief is rooted respectively in the head, the heart, the gut and the body, it must be

acknowledged that there is considerable internal diversity and none of these broad

groupings are reducible to a single position.

Recognising this variety is important in advance of the discussion that will follow in the

next three chapters in connection with the thought of my three dialogue partners, because

each of them engages with different streams of unbelief within the history of atheism. Thus,

although, in common with the other authors to be examined, Eberhard Jüngel devotes a

significant section of his major work God as the Mystery of the World to Nietzsche and the

notion of the death of God, his major concern is a dogmatic one, exercising tools of reason

to undermine the arguments traditionally associated with certain forms of Type I atheism,

notably in the thought of Descartes and Kant, particularly as it developed in response to

elements of Christian thought. He does this by critiquing the so-called God of metaphysical

theism (from which atheism is, he believes, an inevitable consequence), and also by

developing a new model of theological analogy that displaces the understandings of

analogy put forward by Aquinas, Kant and others. David Bentley Hart’s concerns are rather

different. His preoccupation in The Beauty of the Infinite is in unfolding the beauty,

goodness, joy, peace and infinity of the Triune God as a counter-narrative to the ontic

violence that he detects within the themes of immanence, difference and repetition that run

as strands through much Type IV postmodern philosophy in the wake of Nietzsche. In

Atheist Delusions he opens up a broader canvas, seeking to reassess the broad sweep of

Christian history and its relationship to Western civilisation in a positive way that attempts

to undermine the assumptions and prejudices which he encounters in the post-Christian

thought that suffuses Type III atheism. Henri de Lubac’s target is different again. For, in

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his key text The Drama of Atheist Humanism, his principal concern is with Type II atheism

as expressed by Feuerbach, Nietzsche and Marx.350 De Lubac does, however, share

important common ground with Jüngel in that both thinkers are attentive to the Christian

roots of atheism. Their focus is rather different, with Jüngel targeting the abstract God of

metaphysical theism, which has been postulated as a necessity for the world and for

humanity, whilst de Lubac’s major concern is with the rupture between nature and grace

in neoscholastic thought, which, he argues, led to theological extrinsicism and which paved

the way for the emergence of secularism, a ‘thinned-out’ or nominal religious faith, and

unbelief in a multitude of expressions.

A second theme that will have emerged in the discussion throughout much of this

opening chapter concerns way in which many atheist thinkers have struggled to genuinely

disentangle themselves from theological influences and Christian doctrines. A concealed

vein of theistic reasoning can be discerned in the rhetoric of unbelief, whether this in the

appeal to ultimate truth, in hierarchical structures of thought, or in reference to notions

such as creativity, goodness or awe, which betrays the Christian origins of Western atheism

and which highlights the parasitic relationship between unbelief and belief. Of course, as I

have noted, several authors have sought to demonstrate that some forms of Christian

thought or action are actually responsible for generating an atheistic response, so the

genealogical roots of atheism may, arguably, be traced, in some cases, back to the position

of the Church at different points in its history. In other instances, however, the shadow of

Christian thought may be buried rather more deeply, and theological motifs will, as a

consequence, be more subtly integrated within the case for unbelief.

Finally, at various points in this chapter, the resources that the plurality of atheistic

positions might present to Christian theology have been referred to. It is a contention of

mine in this thesis that the relationship between Christian theism and atheism need not

always be one of antagonism or confrontation. In denouncing particular understandings of

350 It should be noted that this characterisation is complicated by the attention that de Lubac also gives to

the thought of Comte and logical positivism, which might be thought of as an expressions of Type I,

reason-centred, atheism.

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God, or other doctrinal positions, through its critique of some modes of theological speech,

by justly criticising certain behaviours of the Church or by highlighting the need to think

again about certain topoi (such as being, creation, worldliness, art, and language) with a

new theological apparatus, I suggest that the atheist voice may be able to offer to the

Church a great service. Indeed, given its importance within contemporary culture, the need

for the Church to find a way to enter into conversation with unbelief is a pressing one. In

the final chapter of the thesis I will pick up this theme in seeking to identify several points

of contact around which a thoughtful and generous reception of some atheist viewpoints

might be developed. Whatever the merits of such an engagement, it is clear that atheism in

all its variety needs to be taken seriously by Christian thinkers and that the ministry and

mission of contemporary churches cannot flourish unless the arguments for unbelief are

attentively listened to, carefully considered, and that a spirit of constructive dialogue is

pursued.

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Chapter 2:

Perspectives on atheism in

the theology of Eberhard

Jüngel

2.1 Restoring the ‘thinkability’ of God

The work of Lutheran theologian, Eberhard Jüngel (b. 1934), offers a rich and important

resource for the exploration of, and the development of a constructive dialogue with,

atheism in the modern world. Jüngel examines the phenomenon of atheism in the context

of reflections upon the connection between the Christological and cultural understandings

of the death of God. Jüngel was fascinated with atheism, regarded it as an invaluable

starting point to provoke theological reflection and renewal, and gives the phenomenon

serious and extended attention in his key work God as the Mystery of the World, which has

received much critical acclaim. For Jüngel, God’s passage through death is the key event

that discloses God’s identity, provides the starting point for language and thought about

God, and acts as the locus of the correspondence between divinity and humanity. Jüngel’s

focus on the participation of God in the human experience of suffering and death provides

a key strand in his project and serves as an important theme for the Church to draw upon

as it seeks to engage with atheists.

Jüngel has no interest in notions of God as a ‘cosmic watchmaker’ who is detached from

and transcendent to the world. Rather, Jüngel’s attention, throughout his project, is focused

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on the God who interrupts the world and who profoundly upsets its actualities.351

Stemming from this conviction, it is the ‘word of the cross’ that provokes in Jüngel a

protracted engagement with theology’s foundational question concerning what we are

doing when we speak about God.352 This study leads him to enquire into the manner in

which the concept of ‘the death of God’ has been used in history, taking the idea as the

point of departure both for his engagement with atheism and for his critique of certain

Christian understandings of the doctrine of God.353

Following his exposure to the state-sponsored atheism of the East Germany he grew up

within, his close attention to the disinclination toward faith amongst large swathes of

Western society and his awareness of the growing reality of religious pluralism, Jüngel is

highly sensitive to the challenge that those who lack belief pose to Christian theology.354

Jüngel also encountered unbelief within his own family as his elder brother, Rainer, was

an avowed Marxist and atheist. Thus, he recognises, with Martin Buber, that the word

‘God’ has, for many, been denuded of meaning: ‘What word of human speech is so

misused, so defiled, so desecrated as this!’355 Within both the history of Christian theology

and in the dependent phenomenon of modern atheism, Jüngel detects a core principle of

thought, which states that God is inaccessible to human thought. God is either an

351 R. David Nelson, Jüngel: A Guide for the Perplexed, First edition. ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T

Clark, 2019), 2. 352 Jüngel's concentrated focus on the relationship between God and death in much of his writing has led

Alan Lewis to describe him as the theologian of the grave of Jesus Christ. Alan E. Lewis, Between Cross

and Resurrection: A Theology of Holy Saturday (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2001), 255; Mueller

believes that Jüngel has provided the best critical analysis of the history of the concept of the death of God

in modern philosophy and theology. David L. Mueller, "God As Revealed Mystery," Perspectives in

Religious Studies 2 (1981): 156. 353 In each context, Jüngel invites his readers to revisit notions of God that have become ossified in

religious language and cultural discourse and thus to effect a re-visioning of what he refers to as the

‘thinkability’ (Denkbarkeit) of God. 354 For Jüngel's autobiographical sketch of the theological and cultural influences that shaped his thought,

see Eberhard Jüngel, "Toward the Heart of the Matter," The Christian Century 108, no. 7 (1991). 355 Eberhard Jüngel, "What Does it Mean to Say, 'God is Love'?," in Christ In Our Place : The Humanity of

God in Christ for the Reconciliation of the World: Essays Presented to James Torrance, ed. Trevor A.

Hart, James Bruce Torrance, and Daniel P. Thimell (Exeter: Paternoster, 1989). Jüngel is here citing Martin

Buber, Eclipse of God : Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy, ed. Roger Paden (New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 15-18.

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inconceivable and thus inexpressible object of faith or is thought of merely as a relic of a

now-vanished religious disposition and so is rejected as unreal.

I should note that Jüngel is unwilling to hastily denounce atheism. He takes very

seriously the current of disbelief in the modern world, seeing it as both an indictment of a

misplaced Christian theism and as the opportunity for the renewal of theology. In probing

the question at stake in the dispute between theism and atheism, he seeks to ‘understand

atheism better than it understands itself’ and to unfold the ‘moment of truth within

atheism.’356 And so in his theological project, Jüngel attempts to question the intellectual

unattainability of God by highlighting the intimate connection between God and humanity

in the form of God’s identification with the crucified man, Jesus. Jüngel uses the term

Entsphrechung (correspondence) for this mediation between the mystery of God and the

realm of humanity. Indeed, divine-human correspondence lies at the heart of Jüngel’s

efforts to develop a linguistic account of God.357 Jüngel’s particular interests are with the

varieties of atheism that emerge from the application of reason and logic, particularly

within the history of Christian metaphysical thought, and atheism that is driven by rebellion

against God, especially as this is encountered in the thought of Feuerbach, Fichte and

Nietzsche. With respect to the typology I outlined in Chapter 1, Jüngel’s engagements with

unbelief are associated with Type I and Type II categories of atheism. He has little to say

about Type III and Type IV atheism.

2.1.1 Jüngel’s theology of the cross

The rethinking of divinity within the world that Jüngel places at the heart of his theology

stems from his conviction that God is to be seen in the crucified Christ who freely enters

the transience and perishability of the world in order to bring life to humanity. Jüngel’s

project is thus a contemporary theologia crucis, which focuses on the death of God as the

material centre of dogmatic theology. For Jüngel it is an axiom that God defines himself

356 Jüngel, "Toward the Heart of the Matter," 230. 357 See Archie J. Spencer, The Analogy of Faith: The Quest for God's Speakability (Downers Grove, IL:

InterVarsity, 2015), 242-43.

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when he identifies with the dead man Jesus. This is a central element in Jüngel’s theology

and, because it counters the notion of a God who is remote and inaccessible, it provides

the Church with an important starting point as it seeks to develop a dialogue with atheists.

Jüngel’s most sustained treatment of God’s identification with the crucified Jesus and

thus with temporality, perishing, and death, is to be found in his major work God as the

Mystery of the World, published in 1983.358 Atheism, particularly as it emerged in response

to the idea of God as an abstract metaphysical proposition within the history of Christian

theology, is a central theme of this work and receives considerable attention from Jüngel.

It is a complex and dense text within which Jüngel oscillates between critical and

constructive material. He draws on a large array of concepts from previous philosophical

and theological literature, weaving these sources together with a number of strands of his

own thought, but granting his readers neither a clear outline map nor a systematic summary

of his conclusions. Nonetheless, the work is an important and original contribution to the

crowded field of writing on subjects such as God’s passibility, the place of Christian faith

in the modern world and the nature of theological language. As DeHart has noted, the focus

achieved in the work concerns the conversation between the ‘modern “death of God,” with

its own origins in Christian faith’ and the ‘theological “death of God,” represented by the

Christ event.’359 In the work Jüngel opens up the question of responsible human speech

and thought about God on the basis of the humanity of God. By selecting a number of

significant figures in the history of Western thought, he seeks to trace the emergence of

God’s inconceivability for many people today, linking this closely to the arguments that

have been assembled to demonstrate the necessity of God. In reaction against this

intellectual trajectory, Jüngel demonstrates God’s knowability on the basis of the facticity

358 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified

One in the Dispute Between Theism and Atheism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

Originally published in German as Gott als Geheimnis der Welt : zur Begründung der Theologie des

Gekreuzigten im Streit zwischen Theismus und Atheismus (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1977).

Hereafter, the work is referred to as GMW. 359 Paul J. DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God: Trinitarian Faith and Philosophy in the Thought of

Eberhard Jüngel (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), 9.

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of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.360 Jüngel’s focus on God’s presence in the historical

figure of Jesus as ‘the Crucified One’ is at the heart of his response to atheism.

2.1.2 The God who comes into the world

Jüngel’s doctrine of God centres on God’s advent in the world. The revelation of God is

the self-communication of God’s being, a being that is love and which embraces in freedom

that which is human. Indeed, reflecting the debt he acknowledges to Barth, Jüngel rejects

the premises of natural theology, which, in his view, seek to speak about God apart from

the event of his revelation. So, although Jüngel engages with the philosophical tradition,

he consistently holds that metaphysical injunctions that posit the necessity of God based

on a priori predicates of divinity have, in fact, led to the denial, rather than the affirmation,

of God’s presence in the world. On the basis of the biblical testimony, Jüngel sees God as

fully present in the revelatory word of address and is therefore accessible as an object of

thought to humanity. God’s historical revelation makes God known as the God of event.361

God’s being is, then, for Jüngel, in his becoming, in motion from eternity, through a

dynamism that stems from the primal decision to effect reconciliation with humanity. This

address to humanity is through the Son of God who journeys into the ‘far country’ of this

world’s suffering and into the dark world of death.362 Such a perspective provides a

valuable theme in Jüngel’s project that the Church can draw upon as it seeks into dialogue

with atheism.

In his project, particularly in God as the Mystery of the World, Jüngel focuses on the

presentation of a hermeneutical counterproposal to the unspeakability of God. Although

Jüngel accepts the biblical precedent of God’s hiddenness,363 he seeks to contradict the

360 GMW, 328. 361 See Roland Daniel Zimany, Vehicle for God: The Metaphorical Theology of Eberhard Jüngel (Macon,

GA: Mercer University Press, 1994), 81-3. 362 Jüngel provides a lucid 'paraphrase' of Barth's theology in his examination of God's dynamic presence in

the world as an expression of God's trinitarian being. Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's

Being is in Becoming, trans. Horton Harris (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976), 1-3. Hereafter,

this work is referred to as DT. 363 For example, ‘No one has ever seen God.’ (John 1.18a)

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traditional understanding of words as signs and proceeds toward a new way of thinking

about God based on the principle, which has an equally strong biblical warrant, that God

himself has made himself accessible.364 As such, he works out a theological counter-

movement against the Latin tradition that seeks to think of God and of thought itself in a

new way, which will query again the linguistic meaning and function of the word ‘God.’

The word ‘God,’ Jüngel asserts, must signify something beyond language because there is

some existing thing which exists only or chiefly in the word event. Thus, for Jüngel, words

can allow something to happen and in the case of the word ‘God’ it is ‘a note of the

presence of a thing.’ God himself is understood as the Word and so language, in Jüngel’s

project, has functions other than signification. One of its essential functions is that of

address, which is a form of signification.365 This, then, provides the foundation for Jüngel’s

argument in God as the Mystery of the World as he seeks to counter both abstract notions

of God that are associated with God’s incomprehensibility within the classical

metaphysical tradition and the dismissal of God as unthinkable by atheism.366 It is a

programme that must deal head on with the problem of contemporary atheism because ‘the

question of the thinkability of God can be dealt with seriously today only from that

perspective.’ In other words, in confronting atheism, Jüngel believes that the problem of

the speakability of God, and of the humanity of God, can be discussed only in constant

reference to the possibility of an understanding of God which proves itself in the death of

Jesus.367

364 ‘It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, who has made him known.’ (John 1.18b) 365 GMW, 11. 366 The feminist theologian Elizabeth Johnson is in agreement with Jüngel about the role that classical

theism and metaphysically-grounded notions of God, which are modeled on the pattern of an earthly

monarch and which view God as a Supreme Being, have played in encouraging much nineteenth- and

twentieth-century forms of atheism. For the God so conceived is repudiated as an alienating projection of

human consciousness. Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological

Discourse (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002), 19-20. 367 GMW, 14.

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2.2 Metaphysical theism as the harbinger of

atheism

Jüngel gives a great deal of attention to the emergence of atheism as an outcome of the

history of Western Christian thought. He holds that modern atheism has its roots in the

twin principles of God’s necessity and inconceivability, which gain expression in the

medieval principles of theological analogy and divine simplicity. These philosophical

conceptions generated a notion of God’s necessity that turned out to be highly precarious.

And as such they laid the platform for the disintegration of metaphysical theism which was

inaugurated by Descartes and unfolded in the thought of Kant, Fichte and Feuerbach before

the pronouncement of the ‘death of God’ by Nietzsche. An examination of this trajectory

of thinking will provide the platform for a discussion of Jüngel’s countermove, which,

following Hegel and Bonhoeffer, is to take the concept of the ‘death of God’ as a means to

express God’s identification as the Crucified One. This becomes the central idea in his

theology of revelation and his conception of the humanity of the God who is the mystery

of the world.

2.2.1 The inaccessible perfection of God

Jüngel’s engagement with the classical understanding of God’s nature is a crucial aspect

of his attempt to foster a rethinking of who God is and how we receive him in thought and

speech. This is because Jüngel seeks to unearth the roots of contemporary disbelief within,

rather than outside of, the Christian tradition. His concern is that the postulates of absolute

superiority and perfect simplicity in the divine being, which the Western Christian tradition

inherited from pre-Christian philosophy, prohibited the very qualities that he reads as

central to the biblical revelation of God’s nature: becoming, proximity (to humanity),

transience and love. God, instead, has been conceived traditionally in terms of static

properties of substance (or essence) such as infinite superiority, self-dependence,

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immutability and the absolute identity of being and thought.368 ‘The perfection of God

required by the law of metaphysics forbade imagining God as suffering or even thinking

of him together with one who was dead. [This is] the basic aporia into which European

theology has blundered.’369 Jüngel holds that the long-standing metaphysical principle, that

‘the finite cannot comprehend the infinite,’ which, as we shall see, was to form the basis

of Fichte’s rejection of the knowability of God, can, more generally, be applied to the

aporia of theological epistemology which classical notions of divine perfection bequeathed

to modernity. For Jüngel, the principle of divine independent absoluteness, which he

regards as axiomatic for a philosophically-founded theology, is thus the contradictory

breeding ground for unbelief in God. Thus, modern ‘talk about the death of God is a

meaningful but inauthentic expression of the impossibility of continuing to think God,

postulated metaphysically… the expression “God is dead” is the paradoxical code word

for the beginning of the end of metaphysics.’370 This is an important point for the Church

to draw out from Jüngel’s thought in its task of developing a dialogue with atheists.

2.2.2 Cartesian epistemology and the erosion of God’s necessity

To follow the trajectory in Jüngel’s thought between classically-framed notions of God’s

necessity, yet unknowability, it is necessary to consider his engagement with the thought

of René Descartes, the seventeenth-century philosopher and scientist who so profoundly

unsettled Western conceptions of theological epistemology. For Jüngel, it is Descartes who

sets in motion the ineluctable disintegration of the medieval ideas of God’s being and who

inadvertently authors the death of God in modern thought and in doing so prepares the way

for the emergence of modern atheism. For Jüngel, Descartes makes audacious claims

concerning the reality of God that ground his essence in the thinking ego and fatally erode

authentic Christian conceptions of God based on the biblical testimony of revelation. As

368 GMW, 52. 369 GMW, 39. 370 GMW, 203.

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MacIntyre has remarked, ‘the God in whom the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came

to disbelieve had been invented only in the seventeenth century.’371

The auspicious step that Descartes took in the direction of contemporary atheism

involved the crowning of the human ego as the self-securing foundation of knowledge.

This move followed his drive to determine a solid foundation for truth about the world.

The pursuit of an unshakable basis for the human thinking self (the cogito) was itself driven

by Descartes’ adoption of methodological doubt in order to discard means for knowledge

of reality that could not be proven to be secure. The human ego itself, in the act of thinking,

became, for Descartes, the unshakable foundation for truth: cogito ergo sum. In the act of

thinking the self recognises itself (‘I think myself thinking’) and so the essence and the

existence of the self become equated. As Jüngel notes, this discovery parallels the classical

model of divine simplicity. The ‘Archimedean point of certainty’ has been reached

whereby the ‘existence and essence of the human person as being [are], in fact, one and

the same.’372 The problem that arises, however, is the perdurance of human subjectivity.

For the equation of existence with thought is necessarily true only in the moment of

thinking. The ego is thus constantly thrown back to the ‘zero point’ of thinking his being

anew. The certainty of one’s own existence does not guarantee continuity of this certainty.

And so, in order to secure the continuity of the ego, Descartes invokes God, the perfect

being from whom everything comes, as the guarantor of truth.373

In this way, God becomes a methodological necessity, logically guaranteeing the

continuity of the cogito. Consequently, the argument for God’s existence becomes

dependent on the human being and its capacity to think.374 Although in classical Christian

thought God is the condition of the possibility of human thought, for Descartes God is

contingent upon the intellectual activity of the ego and so human subjectivity, both

ontologically and epistemologically, becomes primary to, rather than dependent on, that

371 Alasdair C. MacIntyre and Paul Ricœur, The Religious Significance of Atheism (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1969), 14. 372 GMW, 115; see also DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 51. 373 GMW, 115-17. 374 Spencer, The Analogy of Faith: The Quest for God's Speakability, 250.

105

which is beyond it. As Jüngel puts it: ‘Part and parcel of the stringency of the Cartesian

approach is the idea that God is necessary for the human “thinking thing.” Therefore, we

can understand that Descartes understands God as a necessary essence, as a ‘necessary

being’ (ens necessarium),’375 although it could be argued that this makes human thought

dependent on God and not vice versa. Such a God must also be utterly superior to the ego

as the most perfect essence. For only the perfect divine being is able to eradicate the doubt

that is the signature of human thought. Jüngel interprets Descartes’ thought here to suggest

that the notion of God’s perfection stems from the perception of imperfection within the

thought apparatus of the human ego. The idea of God that is intrinsic to human thought is

that perfection which fulfils the lack of perfection discerned by the cognitive processes of

the cogito. The recourse to the absolutely perfect God, inherited from classical

metaphysical theism, makes necessity the fundamental category of divinity upon which

Cartesian logic stands.376

It is this methodological necessity, with its positioning of an absolutely superior God as

an epistemological guarantor for the ego, that Jüngel sees as paving the way for the crucial

blow to the proper conception of Christian faith. Jüngel’s precise focus is on the

disintegration of the essence and existence of God in the Cartesian metaphysical

framework. This is because the cogito ergo sum requires a fundamental distinction between

the existence of God, who is proven to exist beyond doubt as ‘present with me’ (the

guarantor of the continuity of the ego) and the perfect essence of God, who, ‘as the infinite

substance, independent, omniscient, omnipotent, [is] absolutely superior to me.’377 In

Descartes’ system of thought, existence is equated with being ‘present to mind.’ And so,

because of the strategic necessity of God in securing the coherence of the ego’s self-

reflection, the thinking ego, which has become the measure of all things, becomes the place

of God’s presence. In this way, God is made dependent on human thought and human

subjectivity has, consequently, made God’s existence a necessity. However, the God upon

which the human subject is dependent is defined in terms of lack of defect and ultimate

375 GMW, 119. 376 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 51. 377 GMW, 124-25.

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perfection. The essence of God required by the ego has the attributes of transcendence,

perfection and absolute power. For this reason, Cartesian thought forces the concepts of

the divine essence and the divine existence to move in opposite directions.378 This is

carefully expressed by Jüngel in this way:

(a) In that the essence of God is represented by me, the existence of God is secured, the

existence of God is secured through me.

(b) With regard to his essence, God is almighty Creator, who is necessary through himself

and through whom I am…

(c) In terms of his existence, however, God is through me, in that his existence can be

understood as representedness through and for the subject, which ‘I’ am.379

In this way, the notion of divine simplicity, which Descartes inherited from scholastic

metaphysics, becomes eroded and with it the necessity of God is fundamentally

undermined. Hence, for Jüngel, ‘this proof of the necessity of God is the midwife of

modern atheism.’380 God is above man but can only exist through man.381 The human ego

has therefore been positioned between the existence and essence of God. Thus, Descartes

exploits the rational distinction that had been postulated in scholastic thought between the

existence and the essence of God. And so, the intellectually conceived God that, in

Descartes’ conception, can only exist because of human thought, is banished as God.382

For Jüngel, the transcendent God is, in effect, replaced by an immanent one, who is

‘appropriate only to humanity. For, in Cartesian thought, the disintegration of the being of

God is ruptured into a ‘highest essence over me and into its existence through me and with

me.’383 Paradoxically this leads to the loss of God’s necessity, which is the very opposite

of Descartes’ intention. For once God had been established in this contradictory way at the

378 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 53. 379 The quotation appears in the way that Jüngel has organised it. GMW, 125. The translation used here is

that of Paul DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 53-54. 380 GMW, 19. 381 Joseph Palakeel, The Use of Analogy in Theological Discourse: An Investigation in Ecumenical

Perspective (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1995), 168. 382 Spencer, The Analogy of Faith: The Quest for God's Speakability, 250. 383 GMW, 126.

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outset of modernity, and as humanity found itself able, in matter of fact, to conceive of

itself without God, the removal of God was inevitably to follow. ‘Descartes secured the

existence of God in such a way that it necessarily had to lead to the destruction of the

concept of God and of the metaphysically grounded certainty of God.’384 This

epistemological development at the start of the modern era sets in train the progressive

dismantling of Christian faith and the corresponding emergence of contemporary atheism.

In summary, Jüngel’s reflections on the necessity of God are of crucial importance for

his understanding of both theism and atheism. Jüngel traces the notion of God’s apparent

necessity back to René Descartes’ belief in God as a ‘necessary being’ (ens

necessarium).’385 The Cartesian approach makes God necessary for the human thinking

thing (res cogitans). God, for Descartes, is necessary as the essence which is more perfect

than man, and proceeds in his attempt to provide proofs for God, all of which are connected

to an idea, not of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ within the domain of history, but in

human consciousness. The proof that Descartes believes he has demonstrated in his

ontological argument has insured the continuity of human existence.386 Jüngel is

unconvinced by Descartes’ logic, which founds faith on the necessity of God, and argues

that ‘the Cartesian securing of God for the purpose of providing assurance for the human

ego had to lead to the disintegration of certainty about God.’387 As a consequence, Jüngel

poses the question about whether Descartes’ understanding of God as the highest power is

totally defective.

384 GMW, 111. 385 GMW, 119. 386 GMW, 120. 387 GMW, 122.

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2.3 The emergence of the idea that God is

dead

The Cartesian demonstration of God’s necessity, in order to secure the continuity of the

thinking subject, led to a contradiction in thought. For in proving that the God which the

cogito knows to exist is over me as an absolutely superior essence, the “thinking I” has

ruptured the simplicity of God and disintegrated the divine being. Jüngel saw that this

contradiction had inevitably to lead to the removal of God as God in Western thought:

‘[T]o the extent that God, as an absolutely superior highest essence, cannot be limited to

presence within the dimension of my present existence, he is already disappearing.'388

Jüngel seeks to trace the fate of God’s fragile place in European consciousness and the

surfacing of atheism as a legitimate, even necessary, response to the inheritance

bequeathed to modernity by classical metaphysical theism. He plots the course from

agnosticism about what or who God is like, through the gate of intellectual doubt and onto

outright denial of God’s existence. He does this in a highly selective way by focussing his

attention on key figures in nineteenth century German intellectual thought: Kant, Fichte,

Feuerbach and Nietzsche. In these thinkers, humanity has become detached from divinity,

no longer finding itself to be understood on the basis of God and therefore finding God to

be strictly unnecessary. They each share the idea of a philosophically conceived God as

‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived.’389 They adopt different strategies but

they each conceive of divinity in terms of the modern self-grounding of God in the cogito,

the thinking self, and each thinker, ultimately, destroys the concept of God understood as

the unity of essence and existence. In God’s place, humanity takes on the qualities of

divinity through the defiance of thought and will. This trend represents what Jüngel

describes as ‘hue of inwardness,’ which for him characterises European philosophy after

Descartes.390

388 GMW, 126. 389 This is the famous statement of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). It formed the basis of his so-called

ontological argument and was adapted by Descartes in his own demonstration of God’s existence. 390 GMW, 71.

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2.3.1 Kant’s conception of the unknown God

In mapping the impact of the metaphysics of subjectivity on Christian faith, Jüngel

identifies Immanuel Kant as pivotal to the process of ushering in the ‘death of God’ in

modern intellectual consciousness.391 In this section I will therefore examine Jüngel’s

reading of Kant’s dense thought as this pertains to the question of human knowledge of

God. The thinking subject’s engagement with objective reality was examined by Kant in

his Critique of Pure Reason of 1781. Jüngel asserts that Kant presupposes the Cartesian

self-grounding of thought in the proposition ‘I think’ and that this is expressed in his

fundamental proposition of the synthetic unity of apperception.392 This notion involves the

reception of sensory data pertaining to objects external to the mind by a mental apparatus

of a priori categories (such as time, space and causality) that is internal to the mind. The

mind therefore has a rational organisational structure that orders and processes empirical

sensory information on the basis of universally held concepts. In order for objects to be

known, sensible perception corresponding to the phenomena (or appearances) of those

objects must occur.393 All knowledge has its origin in experience of real objects although

the active mind has a critical transcendental function in processing inbound data and

securing this knowledge. Non-empirical concepts, such as the abstract ideas of justice,

freedom, eternity and God can be thought by the intellect. So, despite Kant’s prohibition

against direct knowledge (or ‘cognizability’) of non-objective concepts, he does not contest

God’s thinkability and regards God as a legitimate object of thought.394 However, because

these concepts are not connected with experience, they are empty and do not constitute

knowledge. For this reason, Kant concludes that God is not knowable through sensible

intuition.395

391 There are two interconnected facets of Kant’s work which Jüngel regards as particularly important in

corroding authentic Christian faith and thus in the establishment of an impasse in the human conception of

God. These are, firstly, the epistemological revolution, which disassociates thinking and knowing, and,

secondly, his linguistic-hermeneutical model, which becomes evident in Kant’s understanding of analogy. 392 GMW, 129. 393 In this way the Kantian model of knowledge represents a continuation of the Cartesian grounding of

thought in the thinking subject or cogito. DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 57. 394 GMW, 130. 395 GMW, 131.

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Kant reaches the conclusion that God may be thought by turning to the empirical

consciousness of the ego’s existence. He asserts that, although sensory data can yield

knowledge of external objects, the intuition of the thinking self itself (the ‘I’ in ‘I think’)

is not possible.396 Kant secures the certainty of the self, which is not available through

intellectual intuition, to the ego’s relation to external things. Jüngel recognises that this is

a move that inverts Descartes’ grounding of the certainty of knowledge in human

subjectivity in response to the methodological doubt concerning external objects. With

Kant, the realisation of the ego’s identity is bound to the integration of sensory perceptions

by the cogito. For Kant, the synthesising of sensory data within the organisational

apparatus of the ego is possible because of the three a priori ideas of pure reason which

govern the ego’s function. In addition to sense itself, these ideas include the orderly cosmos

and God. Kant’s concept of God is therefore developed in a struggle with theoretically

indispensable doubt regarding the thinking self. 397 Kant makes a postulate of the God that

he cannot know.398 He further developed his notion of God’s necessity as an intellectual

postulate in the second part of his triumvirate, A Critique of Practical Reason, where God

serves as a point of orientation for the moral function of humanity.

2.3.2 The impossibility of conceiving God in Fichte’s thought

Kant’s ambivalence in seeking to disassociate thought from sensible intuition was to be

exploited by Fichte.399 Fichte had become embroiled in the ‘Atheism Dispute’ of 1798,

which was triggered by the publication of his book On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine

World-Governance. In this work, Fichte had dispensed with the convoluted intellectual

396 Only through the coordination of the multiplicity of sensible inputs through the unifying synthetic

apperception of the ego is the thinking subject able to intuit itself. 397 GMW, 131. 398 This he expresses in the famous statement from the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure

Reason: ‘I therefore had to annul knowledge in order to make room for faith.’ Immanuel Kant, Critique of

Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, ed. Unified Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1996), 31. 399 The German philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 – 1814), was a founding figure of German

Idealism, which developed from the philosophical an ethical thought of Immanuel Kant. Fichte made

particularly important contributions to the notion of self-consciousness or self-awareness, and to the triad

of ideas, thesis, antithesis, synthesis, which are used to explain the dialectical method of Hegel.

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pattern of Kant’s epistemology and asserted that God could simply not be grasped. And

because he conceived of substance as a category defined by presence in time and space, he

had proposed the logical impossibility of conceiving God as a substance possessing ‘being.’

He also denied the possibility of thinking of God as ‘outside the world’ (or, in Kant’s terms,

in the ‘noumenal’ realm) for such a location undermines the infinity of God.400

Fichte was not an atheist and he did not dispute the actuality of God.401 However, he

did contest the possibility of any possible conception of God. He did not accept Kant’s

adoption of analogy as a means to speak of God because all forms of thought and language,

including his own understanding of thought as a schematising act, represent a form of

limiting and grasping.402 Jüngel suggests that Fichte’s rejection of thought about God is

derived from the contradictions in Kant’s thought whereby the differentiation of

knowledge and thought dissolves: ‘The paradox that the supersensuous schema always

falls short of the truth which it grasps is related to the fact that we basically apprehend

everything comprehended in the first supersensuous schema only through our sensory

capacity to represent things (our power of imagination).’403 Fichte clarifies the ambiguity

of Kant’s epistemology and so draws from it the only logical conclusion, that God is

fundamentally inaccessible to thought.404 Fichte sought to preserve and protect the deity of

God by rejecting the possibility of speaking of the existence of God. In so doing he is

actually advancing an anti-idolatrous position that is in line with much classical theism. As

Jüngel recognises, this position had been expressed in Augustine’s well-known statement,

si comprehendis non est Deus.405 And so Jüngel sees Fichte’s engagement with the

Atheism Controversy of 1799 as leading to a philosophical translation of Augustine’s

position. For this reason, Fichte is a thinker that Jüngel is able to support. Thus, Fichte’s

400 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 59. 401 He was, however, dismissed from his post as Professor of Philosopher at the University of Jena in 1799

following a charge of atheism. 402 Thus, as Jüngel notes, ‘[t]he either-or has proved to be a neither-nor. Nothing leads to God… God

cannot be thought at all.’ GMW, 137. 403 GMW, 138. 404 GMW, 139. See also DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 60-61. 405 ‘if you comprehend, it is not God.’ Sermon 52. Jean Grondin, "Augustine’s ‘Si comprehendis, non est

Deus’ – To What Extent is God Incomprehensible?," Analecta Hermeneutica 9 (2018).

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understanding that God is not thinkable is, Jüngel believes, not a statement against God

but for God.406

2.3.3 Feuerbach and the anthropological essence of faith

If the self-grounding of thought asserted by Descartes, Kant and Fichte was to have a

crippling impact on Christian faith, Feuerbach was to deliver the critical blow. Building on

the notion of emancipated subjectivity, Feuerbach attacks the thinkability of God by

claiming that all thought of divinity is, in effect, no more than the fantasy of humanity.

Inverting Anselm’s so-called ontological proof of God (‘that than which nothing greater

can be thought’) as a statement about the limit of human thought, Feuerbach seeks to turn

theology into anthropology.407 Jüngel regards him as taking the decisive step in separating

talk of the death of God from its original Christological significance and using it in the

sense of an atheism which undermines the Christian faith.408 He holds that Feuerbach,

along with Nietzsche, develops a form of atheism that trades on an inauthentic identity

between Christian theology and philosophical theism.409 The position Jüngel holds here

must be distinguished from that expressed by Barth, who accepts the validity of

Feuerbach’s critique of ‘religion,’ although he claims that Christianity, grounded in divine

self-revelation, is improperly identified as a human religious project and is, as a result,

largely immune from Feuerbach’s critique.410 As Bender notes, Barth is not especially

threatened by atheism for he sees it not as a new and unique threat to Christianity in the

modern era, but as a recent variation of a very old problem, that of idolatry. For this reason,

Barth addresses atheism not on its own terms, but places it in a subcategory of religion,

406 GMW, 139. 407 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 61-62. 408 GMW, 100. 409 Its presupposition is that God’s essence is regarded as a counter-concept to the essence of humankind. J.

B. Webster, Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to his Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1986), 81. 410 Barth outlined this position in his section on religion in the first volume of the Church Dogmatics

entitled ‘‘The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. I, Part

2, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1963), 280-361; Barth's discussion of Feuerbach's

critique of religion is contained in the introduction he wrote for Feuerbach's key work. Karl Barth, "An

Introductory Essay," in The Essence of Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1854).

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which he regards as a form of self-righteous idolatry, and which is, in fact, a form of

unbelief.411

By contrast, Jüngel’s engagement with Feuerbach centres on Feuerbach’s assertion,

‘[o]nly when thy thought is God does thou truly think,’ which appears in the work The

Essence of Christianity.412 In this phrase Feuerbach holds that everything implied by the

word ‘God’ should, instead, be asserted of man. In this way religion can be returned to its

anthropological essence. In his philosophy of reason-will-heart, which is developed in this

text, he treats God as the ‘essence of understanding, as moral essence (or law) and the

essence of the heart.’ Each of these three human capacities reflect the human thought of

divinity through the process by which thought intensifies and magnifies itself. Reason is

unable to escape from itself and obtain a purchase on the supposedly transcendent being

of God. Rather, the idea of God is the limit point of human thought, the highest state of

rational value.413 Whilst Feuerbach seems to be taking the opposite stance to that of Fichte,

Jüngel argues that, in fact, both thinkers arrive at a denial of the divine existence whilst

preserving the idea of the divine essence. Divine existence, for Feuerbach, is an illusion of

reason at its limit point. However, the concept of God as the highest and infinite being,

combining all perfections, had to be preserved by Feuerbach to realise his intention of

‘elevating the mortality of human existence.’414 For Feuerbach, God is non-existent. Yet,

simultaneously, the concept of God is the self-fulfilment of thought. The mystery of

theology has become mere anthropology.415

411 Bender, "Karl Barth and the Question of Atheism," 272-73. 412 GMW, 141. The quotation is from The Essence of Christianity, 36. 413 ‘God’ is the highest idea; that than which no greater idea can be conceived. Divinity is the pièce de

résistance of thought and is, therefore, a reflection of human reason alone.413 Instead of conceiving of God

as a separate being, Feuerbach argues that God is merely a category of our intellect. He therefore abrogates

the opposition between divinity and humanity. GMW, 143. 414 GMW, 151. 415 Again, then, the self-grounded human cogito inserts itself between the existence and essence and so

destroys the concept of the unity of God. This, for Jüngel, ultimately heralds the widespread disbelief in

God.

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2.3.4 Nietzsche and the death of God

A key theme within God as the Mystery of the World is the notion of the death of God,

both as a theological motif in relation to the death of Jesus Christ, and as a phrase that gives

expression to atheism and unbelief in the wake of Nietzsche as well as those who both

proceeded and followed him. In Jüngel’s analysis of the emergence of atheism in the

mindset of Western culture, Nietzsche is identified as a pivotal figure. Jüngel has a

thorough grasp of Nietzsche’s thought and recognises the profound influence of his work

in Western philosophy of religion. In part this reflects the close intellectual connection

between Jüngel and Heidegger, for whom Nietzsche was also a source of great fascination.

Jüngel, of course, follows a very different course in his understanding of God than either

Nietzsche or Heidegger. However, there are important areas of correspondence in the two

thinkers’ concepts of time, religious freedom and moral psychology.416 These fields will

not be considered here. Instead, this section will highlight the area of Nietzsche’s work that

is most closely related to Jüngel’s theme, namely the idea of God’s death.

It is in Nietzsche’s writing that the phrase ‘the death of God’ first appears as a metonym

for the loss of Christian faith.417 The notion of God’s death has a multivalent quality in

Nietzsche, encompassing meanings that include murder, suicide, abandonment and

sacrifice. The target, however, in each case is the metaphysical God of Christian theism as

supposedly ‘proved’ by variations of the ontological argument propounded by Anselm and

Descartes. This is the God of infinite superiority to humanity whose existence is pinned to

the activity of the ego’s ‘I think.’ And it is therefore significant that in an early reference

to the death of God Nietzsche notes that it is we who have killed him:

416 See G.O. Mazur, "On Jüngel's Four-fold Appropriation of Friedrich Nietzsche," in The Possibilities of

Theology : Studies in the Theology of Eberhard Jüngel, ed. John Webster (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,

1994), 60-69. 417 Although he was the son of a Lutheran minister, Nietzsche developed an intense hostility towards his

native religious upbringing and in his mature writings set out to demolish the basis of Christian faith. These

texts are subtle and complex, combining philosophical argumentation, invective, and rhetoric to provoke

both intellectual disbelief and moral revulsion with the Christian notion of God. See Benjamin D Crowe,

"Nietzsche, the Cross, and the Nature of God," The Heythrop Journal 48, no. 2 (2007): 244.

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The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Where is God?’ he

cried: ‘I tell you. We have killed him – you and I. All of us are his murders. But how did

we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the

horizon? What are we doing when we unchained this earth from the sun?418

Crucially, for Jüngel, the category through which Nietzsche’s madman declares God to be

non-existent is God’s location. For the question about where God is surfaces as an

inevitable source of doubt in the intellectual climate that followed the Cartesian insinuation

of the cogito between the existence and essence of God. Thus, for Jüngel, the ‘we’

implicated in the madman’s statement includes all those in the Western metaphysical

tradition who have sought to demonstrate the presence of God as a superior and

inaccessible being through the application of rational thought. Specifically, the Cartesian

security of God leads inevitably to the question ‘where has God gone?’ And this is a

development that results eventually in the cultural death of God: ‘Within the dimensions

of [Descartes’] “I think,” the metaphysical concept of God which has also defined

theology… has become progressively less conceivable and finally unthinkable.’419

Jüngel’s particular attention is directed to Nietzsche’s question ‘could you conceive a

God?’ where Nietzsche questions God’s very thinkability.420 The basis for Nietzsche’s

dismissal of God centres on the notion that God is the conjecture of infinity, conceived of

in classical thought as that realm surrounding human finitude. Nietzsche rejects the concept

of infinity set in opposition to finitude. The idea of God is fatally tied up with the

intolerable superiority of an unreachable and incomprehensible infinity. He seeks to

replace such a ‘bad’ notion of infinity with a ‘good’ revision of the concept based on the

limitless thrust of the human creative will.421 Envisioned through Nietzsche’s figurative

Superman, the human will is capable of a self-intensification and the rehabilitation of the

infinite. And in its emancipated role as master of the universe, humanity is able to ‘wipe

418 See Lucy Huskinson, The SPCK Introduction to Nietzsche: His Religious Thought (London: SPCK,

2009), 32-35. The passage quoted is from The Gay Science, 125. 419 GMW, 126. 420 GMW, 127. The quotation is taken from Thus Spake Zarathustra, from the section "In the Happy Isles,"

XXIV. 421 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 64-65.

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away the horizon’ of the infinite God and itself assume the position at the limit of thought.

The death of God, then, is the ‘setting aside of a fixed oppositeness between finitude and

infinity.’422 For Nietzsche, God is understood as absolutely infinite and can therefore not

be conceived by finite reality; God’s otherness abrogates thought.423 In the post-Christian

world that Nietzsche heralds, God, as an alien height superior to human thought, is

dethroned and replaced by the finitude of restricted human thought, which, in turn,

magnifies human essence into an insatiable source of generative power. When humanity

comes to itself in this way, all connection to God is severed and divinity, for Nietzsche,

must die. Atheism, then, is the ironic consequence that Nietzsche reached as he followed

through to its conclusion the pattern of thought founded on the apparent proof of a

necessary yet absolutely unreachable God.

2.4 Thinking through the death of God

The formula ‘the death of God’ highlights, for Jüngel, the aporetic juncture reached by

modern thought in its engagement with the content of theology. The phrase has become a

metaphor for the extinguishing of Christian faith within large sections of Western society

and, in turn, for the phenomenon of atheism. Instead of a reference to the passage of God

through death in Christ, the words have been adopted as an anti-Christian slogan. In this

section, the way in which the statement has been used in Christian theology and philosophy

will be examined and consideration given to how Jüngel regards the Christological notion

of God’s death as a starting point for engaging with the challenge presented to Christian

faith by contemporary atheism.

422 GMW, 147. 423 Christopher Holmes, "Revisiting the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes: In Dialogue with Karl Barth,

Eberhard Jüngel and Wolf Krötke," (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 102.

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2.4.1 The meaning of the statement

The demonstration of God’s necessity as an unknowable essence through the operation of

Cartesian subjectivity is implicated by Jüngel in the emergence of modern atheism.424 This

arose through the self-grounding of the ego and the conception of the divine essence as

absolutely superior to humanity. And because the God so conceived is ultimately

unknowable, the God whom Descartes requires as a guarantor of the doubting cogito’s

continuity becomes the God who, in the end, is not needed. In Jüngel’s mind, the

dissolution in faith unwittingly triggered by Descartes and then Kant reached its

denouement in the German philosophical tradition. Feuerbach took the decisive step in

separating talk about the death of God from its Christian roots and propelled the formation

of an atheistic orientation.425 Nietzsche subsequently delivered a vicious indictment of the

Christian faith and ushered in the words ‘God is dead’ as a mantra for the postmodern loss

of belief.

Jüngel seeks to engage seriously with these critiques of Christianity, reading in them a

pointed attack on the classical theism that he too seeks to undermine. For this reason, he

implores faith to work through the particula veri (grains of truth) of atheism in order to

confront the aporia associated with the concept of God which, in fact, finds its origin inside

the Christian tradition.426 Theism and its twin, atheism, have fundamentally misconceived

the nature of the divine essence by ignoring the encounter of God with death as

ontologically decisive. Thus, for Jüngel, the touchstone for both a re-envisioning of

Christian theology and for Christian engagement with atheism is the crucifixion. This event

in the life of God permits Christian talk about death and divinity being found together.

Consequently, the ‘death of God’ is a central theme in Jüngel’s theological framework.

Repeatedly characterising the phrase as a dark statement, Jüngel understands that it points

both to the sharp critique of metaphysical theism that has emerged from a culture for whom

God is no longer thinkable, and to the reality of God’s participation in the event of a

424 This is because, by questioning the identity of the essence and existence of God, Descartes

problematises the essence of God. 425 GMW, 100. 426 GMW, 102.

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historical death on the cross which is central to authentic Christian faith. The philosophical

critique provides a resource for Jüngel in working out a genuinely Christian vision of God’s

presence in finitude, powerlessness, suffering and death. In the face of the bastions of

unbelief, ‘theological consideration of… the death of God must have both an historical and

dogmatic orientation.’427 Jüngel discerns a lineage in Nietzsche’s thought between the

crucifixion and emergence of modern atheism. And in this vein, he suggests that Nietzsche

recognised what many theologians failed to see, that the proclamation of the crucified God

ushered in the negation of deity.428

2.4.2 Luther’s notion of the crucified God

The influence of Luther on Jüngel’s thought is significant, for he sees in Luther’s

Christology the basis for a revision of the classical notion of the divine being.429 Luther’s

theologia crucis, with its emphasis on God’s revelation in hiddenness on the cross of

Calvary, is central to Jüngel’s conception of God’s penetration of the human predicament.

In the metaphysical tradition’s a priori dismissal of change and perishing as predicates of

God, Luther discerns a tendency to confuse the nature of God for all that is not God and to

call non-divine that which really is God.430 For Luther, human reason is unable to assail

the mystery of God as the absconditus Deus. Indeed, even in Christ, God is revealed as

hidden, concealed within suffering and humiliation and so found in all that is regarded as

least godlike.431 God is present on the cross but in a way that defies human conceptions of

the divine presence. So, even in the crucifixion, God is concealed in his revelation, making

himself known only through suffering, both of the sinner and in Christ,432 to those who are

427 GMW, 45. 428 Jüngel, "Toward the Heart of the Matter," 230. 429 GMW, 41-42. 430 Eberhard Jüngel, The Freedom of a Christian: Luther's Significance for Contemporary Theology

(Augsburg Fortress Publishing, 1988). 431 ‘He wants to be found in Christ, but must “hide”… in order to fly below our radar which is set for what

we take to be “spiritual” things above.’ Steven D Paulson, "Luther on the Hidden God," Word and World

19 (1999): 369. 432 Alister E. McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 150-52.

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confronted by the abject poverty of their personal soteriological capacity.433 The theologia

crucis is, then, a programmatic and Christologically focused theology of revelation that

finds its centre in death.434 God is, thus, present only as the absent One, grasped only by

faith, for his essence is interwoven with nothingness as articulated in the crucifixion.435

Luther’s imprint on Jüngel is seen in the positioning of the cross at the centre his

theological project.436 And, like Luther, Jüngel is adamant that the Christian faith cannot

be understood or held to be plausible without offering to the world a picture of God’s union

with the wretchedness of death.437 Within his theologia crucifixi Jüngel draws on Luther’s

Alexandrian Christology with its robust doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum (the

exchange of attributes) between the human and divine natures of Christ.438 This allows

Jüngel to speak of Christ’s death as integral to the being of God. The resurrection is seen

by Jüngel as the confirmation of God’s identification with humanity in the abandonment,

isolation and death of Jesus on the cross. And in the raising of Jesus from the grave God is

revealed as being present in the event of Christ’s death.439 He uses the logic of the

communicatio, which is so central in Luther’s theology, to assert that the suffering and

death undergone by Jesus truly belong to God.440 On the cross God enacts his being and is

thus, in Jüngel’s thought, identified with the Crucified One. For Jüngel, ‘God’s life does

not exclude death but includes it’ and, as such, God vanquishes death ‘in that he took death

with himself into that life which he, God, is himself.’441 On occasions, Jüngel goes further

and has stated that not only does God identify with the crucified Jesus, he is to be

433 Thus, for Luther, ‘true theology and knowledge of God are found in Christ crucified.’ Martin Luther,

"Luther's Werke im WWW (Weimarer Ausgabe)," (2000): 1.30.30-31. 434 Thus, a true understanding of God is possibly only through the execution of Christ. See Jaroslav Pelikan

(ed.), 55 vols., Luther's Works (L.W.), (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1957), 31.52. 435 Jüngel, The Freedom of a Christian: Luther's Significance for Contemporary Theology, 31, 33. 436 He concurs with Luther in asserting that it is not possible to speak about God aside from the ‘incarnate

God’ and the ‘human God.’ GMW, 37. 437 Eberhard Jüngel, Death, the Riddle and the Mystery, trans. Iain Nicol (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press,

1975), 113. 438 Johann Anselm Steiger, "The Communicatio Idiomatum as the Axle and Motor of Luther's Theology,"

Lutheran Quarterly 14 (2000). 439 GMW, 363. 440 Ivor J Davidson, "The Crucified One," in Indicative of Grace - Imperative of Freedom: Essays in

Honour of Eberhard Jüngel in his 80th Year, ed. R. David Nelson (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 38. 441 GMW, 220, n.65.

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considered completely unified with him. ‘The living God and the dead man are

identical.’442

2.4.3 Hegel’s contribution to the debate

Within Continental philosophy, Hegel remains the outstanding thinker of the death of God

and he has been a major influence on much German theology both within the Protestant

and the Catholic Church.443 Jüngel identifies the enormous significance of Hegel in

providing a ‘philosophically conceived theology of the Crucified One as the doctrine of

the triune God.’444 Furthermore, in tracing the demise of faith in God and by establishing

the Christ event as the ‘death of the divine,’ Hegel has, for Jüngel, provided an important

resource for theology in connecting the originally Christological theme of God’s death

with the epistemological problem of contemporary atheism. Thus, Jüngel credits Hegel

with initiating the philosophical treatment of the relationship between God and death

within the context of theology’s engagement with atheism. ‘The systematic connection of

the Christological source of the idea of the death of God with the epistemological-

metaphysical problematic of modern atheism could be Hegel’s most significant

achievement for theology.’445

The death of God is an enduring theme in Hegel’s writings. However, his most

frequently-cited reference to the concept is expressed at the end of his long essay on

Enlightenment thought, Faith and Knowledge.446 In this work Hegel argues for the unity

of God with radical otherness and introduces his concepts of the ‘Calvary of the Absolute

442 Jüngel, Death, 108. See Davidson, "The Crucified One," 38. 443 Barth had wondered why Hegel had not been accorded the status in Protestant theology similar to the

position occupied by Thomas Aquinas within the Roman Catholic tradition. Karl Barth, Protestant

Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background and History (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1973), 370. 444 GMW, 94. 445 GMW, 97. 446 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany:

State University of New York Press, 1977). The work was originally published in 1902.

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Spirit’ and the ‘speculative Good Friday.’447 Jüngel plays close attention to this text,

highlighting the critique Hegel is offering of philosophical rationalism in relation to the

question of God, the participation of God’s being in the historical movement of thought,

and the meaning that the ‘absolute Passion’ holds for understanding the divine nature.

Hegel disputes the finality of the alternative between the human ‘I think’ and a God

whose essence is absolutely superior to this thought. However, as God is considered to be

the identity of thought and being, Hegel holds that God’s essence is present in the

negativity of thought itself. For this reason, as Jüngel points out: ‘This negativity of thought

would then, if it were not thought to belong to God himself, mean that God is nothing for

thought.’448 And so, in Hegel’s ‘true philosophy of the Absolute,’ the inconceivability of

God is shown to be just a moment of the supreme Idea.449 For Jüngel, Hegel’s

understanding that God is dead is an event in the self-negation of God.450 God does not

wish to abandon the world in finitude and so sacrifices himself, giving himself up to

destruction. The sacrifice is the outcome of the Incarnation, which leads inevitably to the

cross. Yet, in Hegel’s true philosophy of the Absolute, it is not the man who dies but the

divine. He thus wants to understand the death of Jesus as expressing the death of the divine.

In the Incarnation it is God that became man and so it is God as God who is involved in

the total turning towards death. ‘God has submitted himself to death to that which was

most alien to him and now he bears the mark of mortality in himself.’451 This is the

Absolute Passion or Speculative Good Friday which reproduces the atheistic feelings of

the modern age within the course of the life of God. Jüngel sees this as the decisive point

447 ‘But the concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness is which all being is engulfed, must signify the

infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a moment of the supreme Idea… Formerly, the infinite grief only

existed historically in the formative process of culture. It existed as the feeling that ‘God Himself is dead,’

upon which the religion of more recent times rests... By marking this feeling as a moment of the supreme

Idea, the pure concept must give philosophical existence to what used to be either the moral precept that we

must sacrifice of formal abstraction. Thereby it must re-establish for philosophy the Idea of absolute

freedom and along with the absolute Passion, the speculative Good Friday in place of the historical Good

Friday.’ Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 190-91. 448 GMW, 70. 449 GMW, 70. 450 GMW, 74. 451 GMW, 78.

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when the engagement of God with finitude enters philosophical thought.452 And so, for

humanity, the ‘infinite grief’ and ‘unhappy consciousness’ that characterise the ‘feeling

that God is dead’ become conduits for the in-breaking of truth. These feelings are like the

dark night of the soul through which emerges in the Calvary of the absolute Spirit a purified

conception of God.453

In Hegel Jüngel encounters a philosophical perspective on his own conviction that God

is God as he is involved in the total turning of himself to the temporality of history. And

in this turning to history – and so to the plight of humanity – God becomes a reality that is

subject to perishing. The ‘unending’ bears in itself the harshness of the fate of mortality.454

Only in this way can the fault line between finitude and infinity be crossed. This is the

speculative Good Friday that Hegel speaks of, the self-humiliation of divine being, which

empties itself of itself so that the separation between God and humanity can be ended. The

conception of the death of God is thus reconciled with Christianity. Luther’s dogmatic

insight is made fruitful so that the crucifixion of Jesus becomes decisive not just within the

context of his life but also as a criterion for understanding the divine being: ‘God has died,

God is dead – this is the most fruitful of all thoughts, that all that is eternal, all that is true

is not, that negation is found in God; the deepest sorrow, the feeling of something

completely irretrievable, the renunciation of everything of a higher kind are connected with

this.’455 In identifying himself with all that is foreign to his nature, negation is negated by

God, the death of death is accomplished and the ‘infinite grief’ assumed by God himself.

Hegel spells this out as the death of God. As Jüngel notes, Hegel repeatedly refers to the

‘feeling’ that God is dead. Hegel seeks to show that this feeling can be transformed into

the most profound of all thoughts. The cross is the very event through which God realises

himself and thus death is sublated into the infinity of divine life.456

452 GMW, 75. 453 Gary D Badcock, "Hegel, Lutheranism And Contemporary Theology," Animus 5 (2000): 148. 454 GMW, 78. 455 GMW, 88-92. The quotation is from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel: Lectures on the

Philosophy of Religion: One-Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827 (Oxford University Press, 2006), 91. 456 William Franke, "The Deaths of God in Hegel and Nietzsche and the Crisis of Values in Secular

Modernity and Post-secular Postmodernity," Religion and the Arts 11, no. 2 (2007): 217.

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2.4.4 ‘We live without God:’ Bonhoeffer and the loss of faith

Within modern thought, Jüngel identifies Bonhoeffer as a notable successor to Hegel by

virtue of his efforts to integrate death into Christian theology. In Bonhoeffer Jüngel

encountered the theological re-assimilation of the notion of God’s engagement with

perishing that Luther had so forcefully expressed but which had subsequently been adopted

within philosophical discourse in an anti-Christian way. Furthermore, Bonhoeffer was to

contemplate the place of God in the crucifixion in the context of a high degree of sensitivity

to the erosion of Christian faith and religiosity in European culture. This was a trend that

Bonhoeffer was able to view through the lens provided by his extensive reading of the

work of Friedrich Nietzsche.457

Bonhoeffer was also attentive to the very same aporia in the conception of God that

Jüngel ascribes to post-Cartesian thought, the audacious attempt of the cogito to grasp after

God in order to be secure about its own existence. Thus, a recurring theme in Bonhoeffer’s

early writing is his identification of the tendency in human thought to assert the reality of

that which is beyond the mind’s jurisdiction. In his second doctoral thesis, Act and Being,

Bonhoeffer was to argue that thinking ‘lays claim to a meaning which it cannot give to

itself’.458 The ‘I’ cannot move beyond itself; it remains forever imprisoned in itself and is

unable to place itself into truth.459 With respect to theological enquiry, which concerns

itself with the reality of God, this epistemological condition creates a problem if the

premise of human thinking is ignored. The ‘main fault with theology,’ Bonhoeffer was to

state, is that it ignores its ‘particular province and limits.’460 It therefore seeks to move to,

rather than starting from, the reality of God. This notion correlates with Jüngel’s own

457 Frits de Lange, "Aristocratic Christendom: on Bonhoeffer and Nietzsche," in Bonhoeffer and

Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy, ed. Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmermann (Bloomington, IN:

Indiana University Press, 2009), 73-83. 458 Bonhoeffer, D., ‘Act and Being’, in Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (ed. Whitson Floyd, W. Jr.,

Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996) Vol. 2 (hereafter DBW 2), p. 27. 459 DBW Vol.2, 39, 75. 460 DBW Vol.10, 424.

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understanding of revelation as interruption within the word-event, which brings God to

language.

Jüngel applauds Bonhoeffer for taking this situation of modern atheism as the

opportunity to develop anew a Christian conception of God which draws on a similar point

of orientation to Hegel. So, for Bonhoeffer, the engagement with atheism and the

development of an authentically Christian understanding of God are interrelated tasks. For

God cannot be thought of as God without attention to the world in its particular historical

situation.461 As Jüngel observes, Bonhoeffer finds it impossible to reverse the development

of the world to its maturity, and so our coming of age leads to a true recognition of our

situation before God. Bonhoeffer, then, saw in ‘religionlessness’ the dismantling of

something ultimately unhelpful and, indeed, that it marked a recovery of the truly biblical

God and thus a more faithful recognition of our situation before him. The religion that was

being lost was connected, in Bonhoeffer’s view, with metaphysical models of divine

presence, inwardness, subjectivity and individualism.462 And as these categories deny the

biblical view of God they are ultimately idolatrous.463 Bonhoeffer dared even to suggest

that it was God’s plan to encourage this aspect of growing human maturity:464 ‘God would

have us know that we must live as men who manage our lives without him.’465 For this

reason, Bonhoeffer is a key thinker for Jüngel and presents a vision of the Church that can

make a genuine and meaningful contribution to atheist-Christian dialogue. As Childs puts

it:

A church for others living out its vocation of service and solidarity in the theology of the

cross, sustained by faith and hope is equipped for participation in our pluralistic post-

Christian/post-secular world. It is free in faith to engage the complex ethical dialogue and

debate of our diverse societies with compassionate concern for life, freedom, peace, and

461 GMW, 57. 462 Godsey, J. D., The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 249. 463 Plant, S., Bonhoeffer (London: Continuum, 2004) p. 130. 464 Clements, J., The SPCK Introduction to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 46. 465 Bonhoeffer, D., DBW 8, p. 360, emphasis added. See also GMW, 59.

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justice; free to let discipleship be its most eloquent statement. It is called to be a beacon of

hope.466

2.4.5 Jüngel’s theology of atheism

In Jüngel’s deliberations on the death of God, a number of key lines of argument are

apparent. Firstly, Jüngel wants to suggest that the cultural appropriation of the phrase ‘the

death of God,’ in the wake of Nietzsche, and the associated phenomenon of atheism, have

an important role to play for Christian theology in assisting it to differentiate itself from

inauthentic conceptions of God. In this sense, Jüngel sees atheism as a key resource for

Christian theology as it seeks to contribute to the development of a dialogue with Western

atheism. Indeed, Jüngel regards atheism as possessing grains of truth and he engages in a

serious exploration of the thought of a number of important atheist thinkers. He certainly

agrees with the atheist conclusion that God is not to be deemed necessary for the function

of the world. Jüngel ‘attempts to show that “atheism” offers an invaluable critique of the

sub-Christian aspects of “theism,” and that in this way it points to a genuinely Christian

concept of God “beyond the theism and atheism.”’467 Secondly, the purposes of Jüngel’s

interactions with atheistic thought is primarily dogmatic rather than apologetic.468 He

writes for a Christian, rather than an atheistic, readership.

Thirdly, Jüngel places the slogan ‘the death of God’ within a clearly defined

philosophical dispute. He characterises atheism, and the theism upon from which he

believes it has been derived, as wedded to a particular conception of God that can be traced

back to Greek metaphysical thought. In particular, he is exercised by the question of God’s

essence and the way in which this is conceived in traditional lines of thought, both inside

and outside of the Church. His concern is with the a priori assumptions of the nature of the

466 James M. Childs, "Lutheran Theology and Dialogical Engagement in Post-Christian Society," in

Justification in a Post-Christian Society, ed. Carl-Henric Grenholm and Göran Gunner (The Lutterworth

Press, 2014). 467 Webster, Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to his Theology, 79. 468 For this reason, Jüngel engages with atheism in the context of his discussion on the nature, rather than

existence, of God, and he expends little energy seeking to demonstrate the ‘truth’ of the Christian

proclamation as a counter story to the atheistic narrative.

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divine being that inhabit both theistic and atheistic conceptions and which have been

decisively set by the Cartesian epistemological revolution in a way that is at odds with the

biblical testimony of God’s being. Fourthly, Jüngel’s discussion of God, particularly in

partnership with the thinkers that have been examined, Luther, Hegel and Bonhoeffer, is

used to frame his own constructive and systematic proposals for the re-thinking of God.

These, as will have been evident, centre on the self-disclosure of God in the perishability

of the human domain and, in particular, in God’s identification with the Crucified One.

And central to Jüngel’s vision of God is his non-necessity, a conclusion he shares with the

atheist critique. Atheism therefore forms a backdrop to a prescriptive theological project

that places God’s humanity at its heart.

2.5 Jüngel’s endeavour to renew Christian

theology

As I have noted, Jüngel seeks to advance a fundamental revisioning of Christian theology

on the basis of God’s self-communication made manifest in the death and resurrection of

Jesus Christ. I suggest that this is his principal contribution to the Church’s task of

developing a dialogue with atheism. He works out a comprehensive theology of the cross,

responding to Luther, Barth, the New Hermeneutic movement associated with Bultmann

and other German theologians,469 and in conversation with a number of key philosophers,

notable amongst them Hegel and Heidegger. He also offers a sustained critique of those

theological and philosophical enterprises that attempt to demonstrate the existence, or

determine the attributes, of God on the basis of intellectual enquiry apart from the biblical

narrative.

Jüngel’s quest is to locate thought about God solely in the wake of God’s revelation.

This is a complex theopaschite theology as Jüngel invites his readers to think of God and

469 The theologians associated with the New Hermeneutic movement were especially attentive to the

theological challenged posed by modern atheism. Nelson, Jüngel: A Guide for the Perplexed, 46.

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perishability together and so to associate the categories of nothingness and annihilation

with God in order that possibility can assume ontological priority over actuality. In the

remainder of this chapter I will provide an assessment of aspects of Jüngel’s theological

project, particularly as they relate to the central concern of this study, the Christian

response to the ‘death of God’ in modern culture. In God as the Mystery of the World,

Jüngel engages with the challenge presented to theology by contemporary atheism and the

associated linguistic displacement of God. Many of the remarks in this section will

therefore relate to this important work, although some reference will also be made to other

texts by Jüngel where they connect with the main themes within this work. The section

will underline the important contribution Jüngel has made to Christian thought as he seeks

to present a coherent argument about God within a deeply secular culture.

2.5.1 Jüngel’s interaction with atheism

Jüngel stands as a leading figure in the Protestant tradition in offering a serious-minded

engagement with atheism. As I have emphasised, he situates his longest work to date, God

as the Mystery of the World, in the dispute between atheism and theism, and he seeks both

to uncover the particula veri in the atheist critique of classical metaphysical theism and to

present a counter-move of his own based on the reconstrual of the death of God on

Christological grounds. In this section I will examine the interpretative lens Jüngel views

atheism through and make some remarks on the benefits and limitations of his approach

that stand in addition to comments on the subject elsewhere in this chapter.

Jüngel holds that modern atheism has its roots in the marriage between theology and

metaphysics which resulted in Christian thought separating God’s existence and his

essence and so consigning God to an unreachable realm that is totally separate from us.

The aporia of God’s unthinkability and unspeakability is traced back to the logical

distinction between essence and existence in scholastic thought, which was exploited by

Descartes in his efforts to ground knowledge of the human cogito. The consequent

silencing of God found expression in the apophatic tradition which was, for Jüngel, merely

a theological harbinger of contemporary atheism and the cultural notion of the ‘death of

God.’ It is Jüngel’s view that the metaphysical God of signification needs to be rejected.

He believes that this understanding of God is conceptually undermined in the thought of

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Fichte, Feuerbach and Nietzsche.470 Jüngel’s response is to reassess the modern world’s

rejection of God and argue that the notion of the death of God presents an authentic doctrine

of the divine being. He therefore seeks to reverse theology’s refusal to countenance the

truth of God’s engagement with death, which he contends led to the modern notion of the

death of God (as an expression of atheism) in the first place. Influenced strongly by both

Luther and Hegel, Jüngel seeks to reclaim the death of God as a historical event in the cross

of Christ.471

I believe that Jüngel’s analysis of the arrival of atheism in contemporary culture

deserves to be taken seriously. He offers one of the most detailed critiques of the

relationship between Christian theology and modern unbelief in recent Christian thought,

and his engagement with Descartes, in particular, is most interesting and provocative.

However, whilst his thought undoubtedly contains much of value to those exercised by the

matter of unbelief, it does not offer a complete prognosis of the predicament facing the

Church in contemporary culture, and the prescription he offers seems to fall short of a

compelling Christian vision that will persuade those who have left the Church. It may be

that questions of theodicy, the shortcomings of the Church and the demands of modern life

may be more significant than philosophical principles in accounting for contemporary loss

of faith.

It could also be that society is not as allergic to the idea of God conceived as absolute

and above us as Jüngel believes. Might it be that the emphasis he places on the identity

between God’s being and God’s becoming in history, nothingness and death, is more off-

putting than attractive to those for whom loss of faith in God stems from their own

encounter with suffering and death? Jüngel’s reading of Nietzsche in this regard is

particularly interesting. Jüngel believes that elements of Nietzsche’s thought can be

retrieved for Christian theology because, as an outworking of his thought about

Christianity’s philosophical inheritance, Nietzsche eschews the false God of classical

470 Philip A. Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities: How Words Refer to God (Atlanta, Ga: Scholars Press,

1993), 210. 471 See, for example, GMW, xxii, 43, 48, 55-57, 66, 74, 93-96, 361-63.

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theism. However, as Giles Fraser has pointed out, Jüngel misunderstands Nietzsche here.

Nietzsche’s fierce rejection of Christianity was, in fact, driven more by intuitive,

psychological and moral motives than by rational argumentation.472 He was not especially

interested in arguments around the existence or otherwise of God. His atheism stemmed

from the fact that he could simply not tolerate the association between deity and weakness

represented by the cross. In post-modern culture, unbelief may not, in fact, be anti-theist

but, rather, involve the rejection of a certain kind of God, that is a God who is

metaphysically defined as abstract, distant and removed from human affairs. And so, as

Bolt has suggested, society may not be anything like as allergic to notion of the absolute

God as Jüngel believes.473

In contrast to metaphysically-conceived notions of God, which he believes to be

responsible for modern unbelief, Jüngel’s response to atheism is centred on his insistence

that God can only be apprehended as the one who comes into the world in his humanity.

Thus, Jüngel’s theistic reconstruction can only be understood when the fundamental

connection between his trinitarian doctrine and the notion of God’s suffering and death is

grasped. Jüngel’s trinitarian interpretation of God is as a free subject of God’s own being

who comes to humanity in language and in history as the Crucified One and who, as a

result, cannot be sought through metaphysical or ontological philosophical frameworks,

which only serve to make God unthinkable. ‘The atheism born out of modern philosophy

is a child of resignation.’474 To think of God’s essence and existence as united in God’s

worldly presence requires, Jüngel argues, to confront God’s union with perishability.

Theology must be ‘prepared to destroy the understanding of God as superior to us (supra

nos) in order to think God in the way that he has revealed himself in his identity with the

man Jesus’ and to ‘think of the relationship of God’s being and existence as being without

contradiction, in such a way as God and man can be together.’475 Although, as I have noted,

Hart and other theologians dispute the notion that in the crucifixion God, in his essence,

472 Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche, 13-14. 473 John Bolt, "Review: God as the Mystery of the World," Calvin Theological Journal 21, no. 2 (1986):

254. 474 GMW, 185. 475 GMW, 187.

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suffers, for Jüngel, the Deus crucifixus destroys the notion of God’s impassibility. He goes

on to assert that in the ‘analogy of advent’ God has come to expression in the life, death

and resurrection of the man Jesus and, as such, history has been made a predicate of

revelation.476

The overall impression Jüngel’s staunchly cruciform theology provides is of thought

wedded to the Christian gospel and to the language of revelation, scripture, grace and faith.

However, despite his intention to engage with the concerns of an unbelieving culture, it is

not a project that particularly engages with voices, arguments and interests from beyond

the orbit of Christianity. Jüngel is concerned, primarily, with dogmatics rather than with

apologetics and this orientation perhaps accounts for the univocal tendency in his language

which lends a rather polemical tone to his writing.477 As has been the case with Barth, this

approach has led to the charge of fideism.478 Paul Janz picks up on this trait in Jüngel’s

writings, identifying him as a principal exponent of what he calls ‘tautotheology.’ This is

an intellectual stance to Christian thought and speech that is essentially self-guaranteeing,

self-enclosed in character and self-referential. Despite Jüngel’s strong rejection of the

suggestion that thought can precede faith, Janz accuses Jüngel of conceiving of the

theological enterprises as a noetic, mentally discursive, exercise in grammar and linguistics

that is, in fact, grounded in our cognitive faculty. This approach, Janz suggests, ignores the

appetitive category of desire and motivation that must characterise a theology that is

attentive to God in embodied life.479 In summary, Jüngel’s work has led to a sophisticated,

carefully constructed and imaginative set of writings but it is regrettable that these have

not, in the main, articulated a theology of the cross that has resonated with the non-

Christian world.

476 Geoffrey Wainwright, "Today's Word for Today III. Eberhard Jüngel," The Expository Times 92, no. 5

(1981): 133, 35. 477 Palakeel, The Use of Analogy in Theological Discourse: An Investigation in Ecumenical Perspective,

321; Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities: How Words Refer to God, 286. 478 Ivor J Davidson, "Crux probat omnia: Eberhard Jüngel and the Theology of the Crucified One," Scottish

Journal of Theology 50, no. 02 (1997): 177. 479 Paul D. Janz, The Command of Grace: Foundations for a Theology at the Centre of Life (London: T &

T Clark, 2008), 8, 9, 38-40.

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2.5.2 Jüngel’s doctrine of God

As has been noted, Jüngel’s understanding of God, and the manner in which he has made

himself known to humanity, is firmly grounded in Jesus Christ and, most particularly, in

Jesus’ death on the cross. Indeed, for Jüngel, there is no non-Christological doctrine of

God and he holds that all true knowledge of God is only to be located in Jesus Christ.

Reflecting his Lutheran Christology, Jüngel asserts that the cross reveals the true deity of

Christ and is the definitive ground of all Christian doctrine. This Christological

concentration in Jüngel’s thought marks a determined attempt to renew Christian theology

in the light of the gospel and thus to counter both conceptions of God grounded in generic

human rationality and the derivative trajectory of secularity, which has seen large sections

of contemporary society turning away from belief in God. Jüngel, for this reason, has

undoubtedly become one of the most creative voices in Protestant theology’s response to

atheism.

By rooting his conception of God in the Crucified One, Jüngel seeks to present, in Colin

Gunton’s phrase, an ‘ontology without metaphysics.’480 He offers a theistic vision that is

not rooted in a priori philosophical assumptions or generic anthropomorphic principles.

This involves the development of a doctrine of God that bypasses the so-called

metaphysical attributes of God (necessity, immutability, eternity, omnipotence etc.) and,

instead, seeks to ground our understanding of God’s nature on the biblical rendering of

God’s action in the world. God, so conceived, is a personal agent and is characterised as

merciful, righteousness and faithful. Additionally, a question needs to be raised about

whether Jüngel is, after all, able to jettison dependence on philosophical principles in

construing a doctrine of God. For the strong Christological focus in Jüngel’s doctrine of

God does introduce a number of problematic elements which appear to point to an

unacknowledged set of metaphysical assumptions that sit below his thought. These

presuppositions concern the relationship between God and the world and the manner in

which, in Jüngel’s Lutheran Christology, history, humanity and experience are related to

480 Colin E. Gunton, "The Being and Attributes of God: Eberhard Jüngel's Dispute with the Classical

Philosophical Tradition," in The Possibilities of Theology: Studies in the Theology of Eberhard Jüngel, ed.

John Webster (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 12, n.9.

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the being of God. John Farrelly, amongst other writers, has detected in Jüngel’s notion of

God being constituted by relationship and suffering, a concealed metaphysical principle at

work in Jüngel’s thought which is that a later act can affect an earlier reality.481 Such

foundational matters lay Jüngel open to the criticism that his drive to demonstrate that God

is a more than necessary mystery within our world does, in fact, end up compromising

divine freedom by making the world a necessary condition for God. This theme within his

thought will be explored in following sections.

2.5.3 The suffering of God and persons

Of particular significance within Jüngel’s doctrine of the divine attributes, because of its

relevance to his engagement with atheistic thought, is the vexed question of God’s

participation in human suffering and death. Jüngel has unquestionably been helpful in

contributing to modern theology’s attention on the relationship between God and suffering,

for this theme is at the forefront of the concern of many both within and outside the church

in relation to faith in God. However, he frequently slips from describing God as identifying

with the dead Jesus to language that implies that God is identical with the Crucified One.482

This is a view that does not have a scriptural warrant and it introduces a confusing and

unhelpful dimension to his work.483 It is funded, as I have shown, by the strong influence

of both Luther and Hegel on his thought and he develops the idea in order to counter the

atheistic standpoint in contemporary culture which has emptied the word ‘God’ of

meaning. Jüngel seeks to present a case for the speakability and thinkability of God and so

respond to the loss of faith in the world today by proposing that God genuinely was

481 Farrelly John Farrelly, "Book Review: God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the

Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism," Theological Studies 45, no. 3

(1984): 562-63. 482 For example: 'Christian proclamation speaks of the event of the unity of God with the executed Jesus of

Nazareth.' Jüngel, GMW, 190. See also 190, 329, 363-64, 373, 385 and 388. It should be added that the

notion that God is united to the Crucifed One, rather than identical to him, is not necessarily theologically

problematic. 483 Farrelly, "Book Review: God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the

Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism," 562; See also Davidson, "Crux probat omnia:

Eberhard Jüngel and the Theology of the Crucified One," 174; John Webster, "Jesus in the Theology of

Eberhard Jüngel," Calvin Theological Journal 32 (1997): 58.

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involved a human death at Calvary. Indeed, he wishes to restore the death of God as theme

in modern theology as the means to combat the aporia that has emerged in conceiving of

God, which he, in turn, traces to theology’s infatuation with metaphysical ideas of a God

who is supra nos.484 For Jüngel, the death of God must be understood Christologically as

the means by which God has taken up, and conquered, non-being into the divine life

itself.485 For the death of Jesus on the cross is the very basis of God’s advent: ‘The

incarnation of God is then immediately related to the death of Jesus Christ. It is not this

man who dies, but the divine…’486 Jüngel’s assessment of the relationship between the

cultural and theological readings of God’s death is one of the most interesting and

imaginative elements of his thought, particularly as it gains expression in God as the

Mystery of the World. It forms the basis of his riposte to both classical theism and modern

atheism and it forms the basis of his trinitarian vision of God as love.

For Hart and a number of other commentators, Jüngel’s efforts to tie God’s being to the

economy such that the very nature of divine reality is somehow constituted by Creature-

creation relations, most pointedly suffering and death, raises series ethical issues that may

undermine his efforts to assuage the doubts of non-believers. These critiques cast serious

doubt over the assumption in much contemporary theology that the response to an age for

whom the presence of evil has undercut belief in God – the so-called ‘rock of atheism’ –

is to emphasise the fellow-suffering of God through some form of soteriology of solidarity.

The outcome of such a conception of God is troubling. For the consequence of construing

God in the way that Jüngel advances is that evil becomes meaningful. Thus, if the

distinction between God’s immanent being and his presence in the world is collapsed, so

that God’s identity requires commerce with sin, pain, suffering, nothingness and death,

then, far from becoming our companion, God is merely a co-sufferer with us. Furthermore,

a God so-conceived would not only be a participant in but the author of suffering. ‘What a

monstrous irony it would be if, in our eagerness to find a way of believing in God’s love

in an age of Auschwitz, we should in fact succeed only in describing a God who is the

484 Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities: How Words Refer to God, 195. 485 GMW, xxii. 486 GMW, 77.

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metaphysical ground of Auschwitz.’487 Hart’s criticism might be a little excessive here and

it may be that a more conciliatory tone could have been adopted, which models the

constructive dialogue that needs to be developed between theists and atheists. A related

concern about Jüngel’s focus on the death of God has been voiced by O’Donovan, who is

exercised by the subordination of sovereignty in Jüngel’s conception of God. He highlights

the turn, throughout Jüngel’s theology, ‘from the all-powerful and immutable sovereign to

the suffering and truly dying servant.’488 By stressing God’s love as expressed in God’s

participation in perishing, God’s role in judgement and the upholding of justice is

minimised. For O’Donovan, Jüngel’s emphasis on God’s suffering undermines rather than

upholds the place of God in combatting the sufferings of God’s people.489

In addition to his reflections on the suffering of God, Jüngel also addresses the

problematic issue of human suffering, which for many is the basis for their rejection of

God. Unsurprisingly, Jüngel recognises that suffering is ‘the rock of atheism’490 and

acknowledges the incomprehensibility of suffering. ‘… it ought to be remarked with

clarity: Suffering is not understandable. Even the Christian faith cannot understand

suffering.’ Although the Christian faith leads to the hard fact that people on earth suffer

and although this very faith lives from a story of suffering, which is centred on Christ’s

pain, passion and death, the Christian faith does not by any means imply that suffering can

be understood.491 Jüngel grounds this observation in the thought of Luther, who argues that

original sin lies behind not only suffering but our inability to understand it. For Jüngel,

death is at work in suffering; it makes us helpless, as it did to Job, and must provoke from

us silence, a silence that grasps for, but can never quite obtain, words of protest, lament,

and comfort.492 Jüngel argues that theology cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the

487 David Bentley Hart, "No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility," Pro Ecclesia 11, no. 2 (2002):

192. 488 Leo J. O'Donovan, "The Mystery of God as a History of Love: Eberhard Jüngel's Doctrine of God,"

Theological Studies 42, no. 2 (1981): 270. 489 O'Donovan, "The Mystery of God as a History of Love: Eberhard Jüngel's Doctrine of God," 271. 490 Eberhard Jüngel, "The Christian Understanding of Suffering," Journal of Theology for Southern Africa

65 (1988): 8. 491 Jüngel, "The Christian Understanding of Suffering," 4. 492 Jüngel, "The Christian Understanding of Suffering," 5.

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question of why people suffer. Nonetheless, he does hold that God is passible and enters

into our suffering through Jesus: ‘The divine opposition against destruction and the

suffering that it brings activates the son of God and in the end leads him, the Son of God

himself, into the abyss of suffering.’493 This insight enables Jüngel to counter the path from

suffering to unbelief as he asserts that: ‘Faith in the God who infinitely suffers in Jesus

Christ and reveals himself in his suffering as love – this faith is capable of shaking the rock

of atheism.’494 It is unlikely that Jüngel’s thought on the issue of human suffering would

be convincing to those whose unbelief is grounded in the reality of evil and pain. However,

Jüngel does offer a Christocentric analysis of the problem that is theologically coherent

and, at least within the Christian tradition, meaningful.

2.6 Conclusion

In the foregoing discussion I have sought to demonstrate how carefully Jüngel has

examined the phenomenon of modern atheism, and I have highlighted the close connection

that he believes to exist between metaphysical theism, within which God is a superior being

who is removed from creaturely reality, and the rejection of God’s existence. The close

entanglement between atheism and theism is a matter that he is very sensitive to and he

makes a convincing argument for rejecting the simple binary opposition between these two

positions.

Tracing the emergence of Western atheism through the thought of Descartes, Kant,

Feuerbach, Hegel and Nietzsche, Jüngel perceptively points to the close relationship

between Christian thought and modern unbelief. This theme in his work is of crucial

importance to the Church as it seeks to better understand and engage with atheism. In

particular, Jüngel attends to the notion of the death of God, as discussed by Hegel and

announced by Nietzsche, and identifies in this proposal the basis of the atheism and

493 Jüngel, "The Christian Understanding of Suffering," 10. 494 Jüngel, "The Christian Understanding of Suffering," 11.

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unbelief that presently runs though Western culture. I believe that his analysis of atheism

is important, insightful, and illuminating and that it stands as a vitally important

contribution from one of Protestant theology’s leading thinkers to an issue that represents

a significant challenge to the contemporary Church. Jüngel’s counter-narrative, as I have

shown, is to revisit the death of God in Christological terms and to place great emphasis

on the engagement of God with the human predicament through God’s identification with

the life, suffering, passion and death of Jesus. Although hidden as the ‘mystery of the

world,’ Jüngel asserts that the revelation of God is to be encountered in the man Jesus and,

most particularly, in his embrace of perishability. It is in the death of Jesus, the Crucified

One, that Jüngel sees the revelation of God as the source of human salvation and the fount

of love for all people.

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Chapter 3:

David Bentley Hart’s

engagement with atheism

3.1 Theology in dialogue with unbelief

In this chapter I will examine the work of the American theologian David Bentley Hart (b.

1965) and consider the response that he offers to various expressions of unbelief as these

exist within contemporary culture and philosophical thought. Hart’s perspectives are

informed by his identity as a member of the Eastern Orthodox Church. He draws

extensively on patristic and medieval authors, particularly Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine,

Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas

and, amongst more recent work, von Balthasar and the thought of theologians belonging

to the Radical Orthodoxy movement, particularly Milbank. These influences lead Hart to

place significant emphasis on the transcendence of God, the notion of God as the source

of all being, the centrality of beauty and peace to the Christian vision, and on the

equivalence of divinity and infinity. In critiquing the arguments of New Atheists, the

rebellious atheism of Nietzsche and his disciples, the indifference towards religious belief

and practice that characterises contemporary secular culture, and the nihilism that he

believes is at the heart of much contemporary Continental philosophy, Hart engages with

the full range of atheistic categories that I discussed in Chapter 1 and provides for the

Church a number of important resources that can assist it as it seeks to develop a

constructive dialogue with the different forms of atheism and unbelief that are present

within contemporary society.

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3.1.1 Hart’s project

Hart’s most significant work is The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian

Truth.495 In this text, the atheistic currents running through the thought of Nietzsche,

Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida and other thinkers are carefully weighed and critiqued in

advance of a lengthy dogmatic section, which unfolds a Christian understanding of Trinity,

creation, salvation and the eschaton. In Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and

its Fashionable Enemies,496 Hart begins by summarising and then refuting the arguments

set out by several New Atheist authors. Most of the work, however, consists of a series of

essays on the history of Western civilisation, which attempt to expose the fallacious

narrative concerning the supposed trajectory from ‘blind faith’ toward the liberating

resources of reason and science. In his work The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness,

Bliss,497 Hart’s dialogue with atheism and his concern to offer an alternative Christian

vision are worked out in more depth. Through articles, interviews and a short book, Hart

has also addressed the question of God and the problem of unbelief as these came into

focus following the 1755 Lisbon earthquake and the Boxing Day tsunami in south-east

Asia in 2004.498 As I noted in the Introduction, Hart has also recently published a work

that explores themes in Christian eschatology, That All shall be Saved: Heaven, Hell and

Universal Salvation,499 within which he challenges, somewhat controversially, the notion

of eternal perdition and advances a position that embraces universal salvation in a way that

echoes an important theme in the theology of Henri de Lubac.

495 Hereafter, this work is referred to at TBI. 496 Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and its Fashionable Enemies. Hereafter, the work is

referred to as AD. 497 David Bentley Hart, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 2013). This work includes lengthy reflections on the human existence, awareness and happiness. 498 David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where was God in the Tsunami? (Cambridge: Eerdmans,

2005); "Where was God?: An Interview with David Bentley Hart," The Christian Century 123, no. 1

(2006); David Bentley Hart, "Tsunami and Theodicy," in In the Aftermath: Provocations and Laments, ed.

David Bentley Hart (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009). 499 Hart, That All shall be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation. Hereafter, this work is referred to

as TAS.

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3.2 Hart’s doctrine of God

Hart’s most systematic work of aesthetic theology, The Beauty of the Infinite, presents a

Christian doctrine of God centred on the act of creation. Hart’s central thesis is that the

plenitude of God’s love in the act of divine creation is apprehended through the human

experience of beauty. The central section of the work, which contains a lengthy dogmatica

minora, stresses the nature of God as being, the necessity of analogy in Christian

theological discourse, and the place of peace within a divine economy that is marked by a

plenitude of love. Throughout the book, Hart develops Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of God’s

infinity, which he holds to be the form of divine excess and not, as in much speculative

philosophy, qualitative dialectical negation. For Hart, divine infinity does not negate

human finitude but is the very fount of transcendent benevolence that embraces and

animates creaturely existence. Harts interest in and the emphasis that he places upon beauty

as an aspect of human experience, which points to the reality of God, is a central strand

within his project and represents one of the more significant resources that he offers to the

Church as it seeks to develop a dialogue with atheism.

3.2.1 The beauty and infinity of God

Hart’s rejoinder to the nihilistic and violent currents that pervade some strata within human

society centres on the impartation of the presence of Christ to human creatures by the Holy

Spirit. It is in this divine mission that the Church grounds its evangelical appeal to the

world and it is only in such a demonstration of love for humanity that salvation can be

understood. It is received by humanity, Hart argues, as a response not to disinterested

rationality but to desire. Indeed, the human desire for God, so powerfully articulated by

Augustine in his Confessions, is for Hart a signpost to the closeness of God to humanity.

For the gospel is founded on the assumption that the desire, which Christ evokes, is, at the

same time, a form of persuasion reborn as agape, expressed as peace, and summoning us

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through the intimation of beauty.500 Indeed, for Hart, the whole theological enterprise is

motivated and sustained by philokalia (the love of beauty) as we, as creatures, perceive

something of divine infinity in our encounters with beauty. In this sense, beauty must be

distinguished radically from the sublime, the narrative of which corresponds to the

dissolution of being and ‘the disintegration of radiant unity wherein the good, the true, and

the beautiful coincided as infinite simplicity and fecundity…’501

The forgetting of this notion of being in Western thought since the advent of modernity

has, Hart believes, led to the conception of being as a veil or an absence: ‘Being, no longer

resplendent with truth, appearing in and elevating all things, could be figured then only as

the sublime.’502 Unlike the beautiful, the sublime is unrepresentable and is intuited as

indeterminate and, indeed, as an abolition of beauty.503 Critiquing notions of the sublime

in Kant, Lyotard, and the contemporary French philosopher, Jacob Rogozinski, Hart reads

modern and postmodern notions of this concept as the postulation of an ‘untraversable

abyss,’ which seeks to eradicate the theological notions of transcendence and of infinite

eminence that see the creaturely order as participating in the divine fount of being.504 Hart

then identifies a number of narratives of the sublime. These include: the differential

sublime, or the sublimity of exteriority, which is asserted with the principle of difference,

the notion most closely associated in Continental thought with the work of Jacques Derrida

(and, in particular, with Derrida’s neologism, différance, which he uses as a signpost for

deferral of meaning that is at play within human language); the cosmological sublime,

within which, as argued by Deleuze, Foucault, and others in the Nietzschean tradition, the

unrepresentable beyond the immanent sphere is a form of ‘Chaos’ or disorder; the

ontological sublime of Heidegger and Nancy, which identifies being with the event of

appearance, and which holds that the apprehension of sublimity equates to the limit of

representation that is nothingness; and the ethical sublime, a conception of sublimity that

emerges from the experience of alterity in the face of the other, as set out in the work of

500 TBI, 2-3. 501 TBI, 44. 502 TBI, 44. 503 TBI, 44-8. 504 TBI, 45-52.

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Lévinas.505 In opposition to different narratives of the sublime in Continental philosophy,

which are unified by the sense in which the sublime is the intimation of the difference

between representation and the otherness beyond the limit of human experience and

thought, Hart posits a transcendent unity of being and the good, which lies at the heart of

human desire and our love of beauty. Beauty, rather than the sublime, is, for Hart, a key

attribute of God, who is the highest beauty. Indeed, experienced beauty is precisely the

way in which God utters himself.506

Beauty, for Hart, is both a source of goodness and enjoyment in its infinite variety for

humans in their contemplation of the divine. Beauty is associated with the particular and

concrete instead of the universal and abstract (the ‘sublime’); and it is something both prior

to and capable of evoking human response, as well as embodying difference and distance.

Divine beauty is closely associated in Hart’s thought with the infinity of God, where, again,

the Christian vision is presented in a way that undercuts postmodern conceptions of

unrepresentable sublimity: ‘The infinite God declares his freedom to appear, to act, to be

in the midst of that which his infinity comprises; he is the infinite who is not merely

boundlessly “sublime” but who – by virtue of being beautiful – goes where he will.’507

Infinity, for Hart, is not a negation of the world but its determination as divine gift in the

ongoing act of creation. Drawing on von Balthasar, Hart asserts that God holds all things

in his embrace and, despite being infinite is not without form. For, as Moses beheld the

form of the Lord (Numbers 12.8), creatures receive their being through their participation

in the infinity of God and, in so doing, share in the glory of the Trinity.

Hart’s understanding of the interconnection between divine infinity, beauty and creation

is grounded in his reading of Gregory of Nyssa. Following Gregory, Hart views creation

as an expression of the richness of God’s infinity, an outcome of divine plenitude that is

infused with the peace that flows from the utter simplicity of God; it is received before all

else as gift and as beauty.508 Being participates in the ‘infinite ontological plenitude’ of the

505 TBI, 52-90. 506 TBI, 178. 507 TBI, 212. 508 TBI, 249.

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divine life, for God can be both utterly transcendent and dwell within immanent reality,

the very presence that let his beauty pass before the eyes of Moses.509 In this context, Hart

refers to Augustine’s conviction, as expressed in The City of God (2.4.2).510 Augustine

states ‘the beauty in creation is a proclamation of divine beauty,’ developing this idea by

suggesting that that ‘the delightfulness of created things expresses the delightfulness of

God’s infinite distance.’511 Creation, for Hart, is the fullness of grace, the expression of

trinitarian love, which reveals the graciousness of God. It is, he is at pains to stress, without

necessity because creation adds nothing to God and ‘there might just as well have been no

creation.’512 In his sophisticated theological exploration of God’s attributes and gift in

creating the world, Hart seeks to offer an aesthetic vision of the Christian gospel that is

radically different from conceptions of God as abstract subjectivity or as an unexplicated

simplicity requiring an ‘exterior’ medium of determination.513

3.2.2 The analogical interval and human participation in God

Hart is concerned particularly with the relationship between the being of God and our being

as human creatures. Inevitably, this leads him to explore the question of the analogia entis,

which introduces an analogical interval into being itself, a relationship both of infinite

distance and immanent proximity between ourselves and the God who is ‘no being among

beings.’514 The analogy of being is a central concept in Christian metaphysics and for Hart

it is a luminous thread running through his project. Indeed, it is, for Hart, the only means

through which a metaphysics of participation can be unified with the doctrine of creation

within the context of trinitarian dogma.515 This is because it enables the utter difference

between human persons and God to be understood as an expression of divine

transcendence. According to this analogia entis, as Hart presents it, ‘being is said

509 TBI, 214. 510 Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871). 511 TBI, 252-53. 512 TBI, 256. 513 TBI, 256. 514 TBI, 232. 515 TBI, 241.

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ultimately and fully of God, but is also – analogically – said of individuals; individuals do

not exist in the same sense as God (this would be univocity), but neither is their existence

utterly separated from the existence of God (this would be equivocity).’516 Thus, for Hart,

the transcendence of God is of a kind that speaks, to, from, and within the world;517 it is

thus both distant and near.518

Hart derives his understanding of the analogia entis from work of the German-Polish

Jesuit priest and theologian, Erich Przywara, who he holds in high esteem.519 However,

challenges to the analogy of being have been presented through several centuries of

theological and philosophical reflection, from authors that range from John Duns Scotus,

William of Ockham, Thomas Cajetan, and Francisco Suárez to Martin Heidegger.520

Countering criticism of Przywara’s work, Hart notes that the principle does not place God

and creatures under the more general and prior category of being, but that it is the

analogization of being in the difference between God and creatures. Indeed, the analogia

entis is the very subversion of a general and univocal category of being, of naïve categories

of natural theology and any simple ‘essentialist’ notions of what might be meant by the

word analogy.521 The doctrine, rather, is the means by which revelation can be

comprehended. For, it is only because in some sense creaturely being is analogous to divine

being that we are able to apprehend God in his disclosure of himself to the world. Creatures,

516 Daniel Colucciello Barber, Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-secularism and the Future of

Immanence, Paperback edition. ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 78. 517 Barber, Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-secularism and the Future of Immanence, 78. 518 ‘Every putatively meaningful theological affirmation dangles upon a golden but fragile thread of

analogy. It must be possible to speak of God without mistaking him for a being among beings, an instance

of something greater than himself. Between God and creatures lies an epistemological chasm nothing less

than infinite, which no predicate can span univocally… the modal disproportion between the infinite and

the finite renders the analogy between God and creatures irreducibly disjunctive.’ David Bentley Hart,

"God, Creation, and Evil: The Moral Meaning of creatio ex nihilo," Radical Orthodoxy: Theology,

Philosophy, Politics 3, no. 1 (2015): 6. 519 As was noted in the previous chapter, this is in sharp contrast to the assessment of the doctrine held by

Barth and Jüngel. 520 John R Betz, "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part One)," Modern

Theology 21, no. 3 (2005): 367. 521 TBI, 241-2.

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for Hart, belong to God’s infinity.522 Analogy, in a theological context, for Hart, never

delivers an epistemic grasp of the divine or a framework within which God can be secured

through a taxonomy of concepts. Rather, analogy enable us to understand difference and

distance, within the created world, as categories through which the presence of God as ‘an

ever greater dissimilitude embracing every similitude’ can be apprehended.523

God, for Hart, is, of course, ‘not a being yet is; he does not belong to being, but is

being…’524 In contrast, finite beings are the analogical expression of God’s positive and

determinate infinite act of being, the act through which God pours forth his own being

kenotically into beings and in which God’s essence comes to be convertible with the

‘transcendentals’ (truth, beauty and goodness), which constitute points of participation by

finite beings in the infinite plenitude of God.525 God, then, is not limited in any way by the

ontological difference between infinity and finitude. Rather, as the actus of all beings. Hart,

again, refers to Gregory’s understanding of the infinite.526 Hart also draws on Gregory

Palamas, Augustine, and Nicholas of Cusa, who all emphasise the communicability of the

divine essence within the forma infabricata,527 which confers to creatures the beauty of the

Trinity such that it may be beheld through the light of God’s infinity that is interwoven

with the fabric of being.528 He also believes that Pseudo-Dionysius’ theological

enunciation of the ‘divine names’ constitutes a metaphysics of participation, ‘according to

522 The analogia entis is, for Hart, the pivotal Christian doctrine that allows the continuity between God

and creation to be understood and through which the divine glory can be discerned in the beauty and

goodness of the world. This is because God is the being of all things, who is the source of the ‘infinitude

plenitude of the transcendent act in which all determinacy participates.’ TBI, 242. 523 TBI, 314. Hart’s defense of the doctrine of the analogia entis has much in common with that of von

Balthasar, who integrates the analogy of being with the analogy of faith through an intrinsicist model of

nature and grace. According to von Balthasar, the order of creation (and thus the analogy of being) is

oriented toward the ontologically prior order of grace (and thus the analogy of faith). See Steffen Lösel,

"Love Divine, All Loves Excelling: Balthasar's Negative Theology of Revelation," The Journal of Religion

82, no. 4 (2002): 588-89. 524 TBI, 233. 525 TBI, 232-35. 526 ‘The God who is shows his glory not as the nimbus of otherness that dwells like a phantom glamor

about all finite things… but as quantity, kabod [abundance, honour, glory]. All that is finitely

apprehended… fills the distance as light, approach, proximity, and peace, because God gives his beauty as

an expression and weight that can be traversed.’ TBI, 236. 527 created forms 528 TBI, 237.

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which all things are embraced in being as in the supereminent source of all transcendent

perfections…’529

3.2.3 Divine impassibility

A central element of Hart’s doctrine of God is his conviction that God is impassible.530 In

line with other Orthodox theologians, notably Vladimir Lossky, Hart argues persuasively

that this ancient doctrine of divine apatheia is less to do with notions of a Hellenised and

abstract metaphysical deity or one that establishes a logical contradiction in Christian

theology between the divine essence and God’s revealed presence, than it is about the utter

fullness of God’s joy, the perfect boundlessness of his love and the very basis of our

salvation. For in God’s ‘everlasting immunity to every limitation, finite determination,

force of change, peril, sorrow or need,’ we encounter the trinitarian plenitude that is ‘the

Father’s manifestation and love of his goodness in the Son and Spirit.’531 Indeed, for Hart,

without an affirmation of the impassibility of the divine nature of the incarnate Word, no

theological sense can be made of the language of Christ’s sacrifice. To do justice to the

presence of God within history, in the Incarnation, passion and death of Jesus, does not, he

insists, imply that there is a change within the being of God or that suffering is endured by

God. Rather, as Cyril of Alexandria maintains, Christ ‘was in the crucified body

appropriating the sufferings of the flesh to himself impassibly.’532 The Incarnation in no

way involves God becoming alienated from himself. The notion, therefore, of impassible

suffering, which we encounter both in Cyril and Melito of Sardis, as well as in the

declaration of the Second Council of Constantinople (‘one of the Trinity suffered in the

flesh’), is not a conundrum or paradox but an explication of the biblical story of our

529 Assimilating mainstream patristic and medieval theology, he asserts that the Christian understanding of God is one that must hold fast to the notion of God as ‘…impervious to any force – any pathos or effect – external to his nature and is incapable of experiencing

shifting emotions within himself... [and that this is the] ground of Christian hope, central to the positive message of the evangel, not

simply an austere negation of thought, but a real promise of joy in God.’ David Bentley Hart, The Hidden and the Manifest : Essays in Theology and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2017), 8.

530 Hart, "No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility," 185. This paper takes as its starting point the

statement of divine impassibility in the Epistle of James (Jas 1.17). 531 TBI, 354. 532 TBI, 356. Here, Hart quotes from the Third Epistle to Nestorius.

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salvation in Christ. It enables us to hold together the immutability of God’s essence with

the human suffering of Jesus. As the Logos became flesh, God’s participation in the affairs

of humanity is an act of self-divesting love, which manifests divine kenosis, which does

not constitute change or alternation in God. Indeed, Hart is adamant that ‘the juxtaposition

of the language of divine apatheia with the story of crucified love is… what makes the

entire narrative of salvation in Christ intelligible.’533 Because love is integral to the essence

of God and is there before sin, the cross, he maintains, does not determine divine love;

rather, it manifests it. This is because, Hart argues, God’s love is an infinite peace, which

needs no violence to shape it and no death over which it must triumph. ‘If it did, it would

never be ontological peace but only metaphysical armistice.’534

Hart’s understanding of divine apatheia brings him into conflict with those theologians

who understand God as subject to change and who, further, suggest that in participating in

history, most notably the crucifixion, God experiences suffering.535 These thinkers attempt

to assimilate the trinitarianism of Hegel, that is they ‘collapse the distinction between

God’s eternal being as the triune God and the temporary history of God’s unfolding

presence with his creatures as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.’536 Such a position reintroduces

the ancient theopaschite heresy and turns it into a new orthodoxy.537 Hart’s particular issue

is with the developments in Lutheran trinitarian theology over the last few decades, most

notably as these find expression in the work of Jürgen Moltmann, Eberhard Jüngel,

533 TBI, 160. 534 TBI, 167. 535 Here, he is referring to a strand within recent and contemporary systematic theology which interprets

Rahner’s principle in a problematic way through an overemphasis on the identity between the economic

and immanent identity of God and, in so doing, supports the assertion that the revelation exhausts the

reality of God in himself. Gregory J. Liston, The Anointed Church : Toward a Third Article Ecclesiology

(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 192-93. Liston highlight's Hart's oppostion to this move and also

notes Hart's rejection of the notion of a contradiction between the trinitarian theologies in the Western

church (emphasising unity) and the Eastern church (stressing multiplicty). 536 TBI, 157. 537 See Ronald Goetz, "The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy," Christian Century 103, no. 16

(1986).

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Wolfhart Pannenberg and Robert Jenson.538 All these authors acknowledge the impact of

Hegel on their thought, with Jenson describing his own project as reclaiming ‘Hegel’s truth

for the gospel.’539 Jenson himself is both surprised by and rejects Hart’s dismissal of

Hegel’s project and his influence on trinitarian theology,540 and is unapologetic about the

Hegelian elements in his own theology.541 Within the Reformed tradition, a similar

theological position on the question of God’s participation in human suffering is adopted

by Paul Fiddes,542 whilst, within a different ecclesial context, the Catholic theologian

Catherine LaCugna, articulates comparable views.543 These thinkers have, Hart believes,

fallen for one of the perils that can follow from those who seek to translate Rahner’s maxim

about the identity of the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity into fuller theological

discourse, namely the abolition of the distinction between God’s immanence within

himself and his gracious presence within history.544 Such a turn, he believes, is a calamitous

one for both Christian theology and the apologetic enterprise of the Church.545

Creation, Hart asserts, adds nothing to God and it is never a requirement that God must

create in order to determine his nature or being. ‘God is good and sovereign and wholly

beautiful…, possessed of that loveliest (and most widely misunderstood) “attribute,”

538 It should be noted that, despite the Hegelian tendency in much modern Lutheran thought, the trinitarian

theology of Luther himself is actually very close to that of both Lossky and Hart. For, Luther is careful to

safeguard the transcendence of God and maintains that God is not subject, in any sense, to change and

instability. For an insightful and lucid discussion of these matters, see Knut Alfsvåg, "Impassibility and

revelation: On the relation between immanence and economy in Orthodox and Lutheran thought," Studia

Theologica - Nordic Journal of Theology 68, no. 2 (2014): 174-77. 539 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 169. 540 Robert W Jenson, "Review Essay: David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of

Christian Truth," Pro Ecclesia 14, no. 2 (2005): 235. 541 Stephen Wright, Dogmatic Aesthetics: A Theology of Beauty in Dialogue with Robert W. Jenson

(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 103. 542 '... the conclusion seems inescapable that a loving God must be a sympathetic, and therefore suffering

God.' Paul S Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 17. 543 See, for example, Catherine LaCugna, God for Us: the Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Harper

SanFrancisco, 1993). 544 TBI, 156-57. 545 ‘If the identity of the immanent Trinity with the economic is taken to mean that history is the theatre

within which God – as absolute mind, or process or divine event – finds or determines himself as God,

there can be no way of convincingly avoiding the conclusion… that God depends upon creation to be God

and that creation exists by necessity (because of some lack in God), so that God is robbed of his true

transcendence and creation of its true gratuity’ TBI, 157.

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apatheia.’546 Indeed, the freedom of God from ontic determination, Hart proposes, is the

very basis of creation’s goodness. Agreeing with Hart, Alfsvåg states that if ‘the love of

God is eternal and changeless it must be conceived as a reality independent of creation, fall

and redemption, even if this story certainly determines the circumstances under which it is

made manifest.’547 It is because creation is uncompelled and unnecessary that it can be

understood as gift and so reveal the essence of divine love, which is the very nature of who

God is and his only necessary attribute.548 The tendency in modern theology to collapse

God’s transcendence, and to assert the identity between the divine essence and God’s

revelation in Christ on the plane of history, stems, Hart suggests, from a desire to present

an image of a God who suffers not only with us and in our nature but in his own nature,

too. The ‘living God of Scripture’ is, according to some theologians, a more compelling

and attractive deity than the supposedly cold abstraction of a God derived from

metaphysical speculation.

Hart argues that this craving for a passible God is entirely misplaced.549 We long, Hart

suggests, for ‘a companion in pain, a fellow sufferer… we know we have one in Christ and

we refuse to allow any ambiguity – metaphysical, moral or theological – to rob us of his

company.’550 In rigorously defending doctrine of divine apatheia, which he holds to be a

non-negotiable doctrine that is required by the ‘very rationality of the gospel,’551 Hart

aligns himself, not only with the principal current of thought within patristic and medieval

theology, but also with a growing number of contemporary theologians who have sought

to hold together the human suffering of Christ with the immutability of God’s eternal

546 TBI, 157. 547 Alfsvåg, "Impassibility and revelation: On the relation between immanence and economy in Orthodox

and Lutheran thought," 173. 548 TBI, 158. 549 This urge, Hart argues, is ‘… a sort of self-indulgence and apologetic plaintiveness, a sense that, before

God, though we are sinners, we also have a valid perspective, one he must learn to share with us so that he

can sympathise with our lot rather than simply judge us; he must be absolved of his transcendence, so to

speak, before we can consent to submit to his verdict…’ TBI, 159. 550 TBI, 160. 551 DS, 76.

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essence. In other words, Jesus’ passion, through which he experienced genuine suffering,

belongs properly not to the divinity of Christ but to his Incarnation.552

Hart clearly holds a very different position on the question of divine impassibility from

that occupied by Jüngel.553 Hart dismisses Jüngel’s thought as ‘incoherent’ and as evidence

that the German thinker, through the influence of Barth, entirely misunderstands the

doctrine of the analogia entis.554 This orientation smacks, Hart asserts, of a ‘ghastly

Wagnerian opulence,’ a ‘cult of Verwesung [decay],’ and an ‘unwholesome theological

Liebestod’ in Jüngel’s thought.555 Furthermore, Jüngel’s notion that God must overcome

‘nothingness’ through his experience of death is, similarly, rejected by Hart.556 Hart’s most

extensive engagements with a theological opponent are, however, reserved for Robert

Jenson.557 On the matter of Jenson’s trinitarian theology, Hart is particularly critical of his

contemporary. For, in pursuing the logic of the equation between the God in the history of

salvation (the economic Trinity) and God in himself (the immanent Trinity), Hart asserts

that Jenson is defying classical Christian doctrine and is undermining the strict and

inviolable analogical interval that must exist between God in his historical revelation and

God in se. Jenson, Hart believes, is squarely within that school of modern, mainly

Protestant, thought that collapses the analogical interval by asserting that ‘the event of our

salvation in Christ and the event of God’s life in Jesus of Nazareth is in some sense the

story of God becoming the God [h]e is, within which story we are also included…’558

552 DS, 75. 553 Through the adoption of a Lutheran understanding of the communicatio idiomatum, Jüngel has a

tendency to conflate divine identity with the historical experience of Jesus. In so doing, he is open to the

criticism that he collapses God’s transcendence and, as does Moltmann, suggests that history is necessary

for the being of God. This has led to the accusation that there are Monophysite and Docetic elements in

Jüngel’s Christology. 554 TBI, 157, 241. 555 TBI, 373. 556 ‘…nothingness does not challenge God, it is not some ‘thing’ with which God becomes creatively

involved; he passes nothingness by without regard, it is literally nothing to him, it has no part to play in the

way by which he is God or in his desire to create.’ TBI, 259. 557 Given Jenson’s stature in contemporary American theology and the impact that his Systematic Theology

has made within the academy, Hart is generous in highlighting Jenson’s exciting and audacious thought

and in acknowledging his indisputable contribution to Christian thought. David Bentley Hart, "The Lively

God of Robert Jenson," First Things 156 (2005): 28. 558 Hart, "The Lively God of Robert Jenson," 30-31.

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3.2.4 Hart’s eschatology

In his most recent work, That All shall be Saved: Heaven, Hell and Universal Salvation,

Hart examines the question of an eternal hell and the issue of whether any rational soul

could ever be condemned to everlasting torture. Hart holds that the traditional majority

Christian view of hell as a state of perpetual torment is, both morally and emotionally, an

odious idea and that it represents, quite understandably, the single best argument for

someone to doubt the plausibility of the Christian faith.559 This is precisely the position of

the atheist author Casper Rigsby for whom the Christian notion of hell is ‘outrageously

unjust’ and provokes a response of anger and revulsion.560 Several New Atheist authors

adopt the same position.561 The so-called infernalist position has run through much of

Christian history, across a range of traditions and is still held today by some Christians.

Hart explores the origin of the idea of hell with reference to both traditional Catholic

teaching,562 particularly in its ‘manualist,’ neo-Thomist or neoscholastic forms,563 and to

Calvinist doctrine.564 The ‘notoriously confused reading’ of scripture associated with these

positions, Hart argues, produces a picture of God that is a ‘metaphysical absurdity,’565 for

nobody, in his view, could, logically speaking, merit eternal punishment.

Through a series of for extended meditations, which comprise the central chapters of

That All shall be Saved, Hart examines, in turn, the moral meaning of the doctrine of

creatio ex nihilo, the biblical basis for Christian eschatology, theological anthropology in

connection with the human person as the imago Dei, the meaning of freedom, and the

rationality of the human will. Drawing on both the witness of the New Testament, where

the notion of an eternal hell is remarkably elusive,566 and the teaching of the large majority

559 TAS, 65. 560 Rigsby, The Passion of the Atheist: Exploring the Emotional Aspects of Atheism, 16-18. 561 See, for example Dawkins, The God Delusion, 359-62; Dawkins, Outgrowing God: A Beginner's Guide,

99-100; Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, 229, 79-83. 562 TAS, 29, 34-37. 563 TAS, 46-48. 564 TAS, 48-52. 565 TAS, 49. 566 TAS, 93.

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of Church Fathers,567 Hart holds that any punishment must be of a limited term and lead

solely to the purification of the soul. Nowhere, he concludes, is there any biblical basis for

envisaging a kingdom of perpetual cruelty presided over by Satan, as though he were a

kind of chthonic god.568 Instead, particularly in the gospels and in the Pauline letters, there

are a large number of passages in the New Testament that appear to promise a final

salvation of all persons and, indeed, of the whole of creation. These passages include

Romans 5.18-19, 1 Corinthians 15.22, Romans 11.32, 1 Timothy 2.3-6, Titus 2.11, John

12.32, 1 John 4.14, 2 Peter 3.9, Matthew 18.14, and John 3.17, amongst other biblical

references. Basing his eschatology on these New Testament sources, as well as the very

obscure and difficult language in the Book of Revelation, Hart argues that hell can only be

understood as having been conquered through Christ’s death on the cross. For, as he

affirms, Christ will conquer individually in every soul so that ‘in the Age to come, and

beyond all ages, all shall come home to the Kingdom prepared for them from before the

foundation of the world.’569

So, although Christians down the centuries, particularly in the West, have mutated the

‘good tidings’ of God’s love ‘into something dreadful, irrational, and morally horrid,’570

this is not Hart’s position. Hart is a thorough-going universalist. 571 Hart adopts a position

that some Christians may be ambivalent about and it could be argued that he sacrifices too

much of the orthodox Christian position to justify his universalism as he chooses to ignore

those passages in the New Testament that make reference to hell. However, Hart remains

resolute in defending his position as a Christian universalist. It is an interesting perspective

and one that could certainly provide a starting point for an extended conversation with

atheist thinkers as the issue may prompt Christians to reflect carefully on their personal

understanding of hell as well as the highly problematic nature of the doctrine for atheists.

567 In this sense, as will be clear in the following chapter, Hart grounds his views on similar sources to

Henri de Lubac, who, as we shall see, advances a strong argument for universal salvation. Hart draws

particularly on Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine and Basil of Caesarea. He also refers to the ‘hopeful

universalism’ of Hans Urs von Balthasar, TAS, 102. 568 TAS, 94. 569 TAS, 129. 570 TAS, 131. 571 TAS, 52.

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Personally, I am supportive of Hart’s position although I recognise that there are other

Christians who maintain a belief in a populated hell. There is also certainly much support

for Hart’s universalism from within the Orthodox Christian tradition572 as well as amongst

many of the Church Fathers. As de Lubac does, Hart rejects the late Augustinian and

neoscholastic tradition that separates nature and grace and holds to the doctrines of

predestination and inherited guilt,573 and dismisses, on theological, philosophical and

moral grounds, the arguments for hell’s eternity as ‘manifestly absurd.’574 The Christian

belief in God as infinitely good, perfectly just, and inexhaustibly loving, makes the

possibility that finite rational beings could be subject to eternal misery an impossibility,

for such a prospect would be utterly contradictory to the nature of God. As in his other

texts, Hart’s eschatological reflections in That All shall be Saved are expressed in robust

terms, and he has little, if any, sympathy with those who hold opposing positions to his

own. His argument, however, is a coherent one that is biblically based and faithful to the

patristic tradition. Hart’s vision, which echoes the position of de Lubac, as I shall underline

in the next chapter, is an important one, for it represents a key element of the tradition that

the Church will need to draw upon as it seeks to enter into dialogue with atheists and

unbelievers for whom the notion of hell is such an abhorrent concept.

3.3 Postmodern philosophy and theology

The apologetic dimension of Hart’s project contains a number of facets. As we shall see

later in this chapter, he offers a penetrating critique of post-Christian culture and, in

particular, the arguments assembled by thinkers within the New Atheist movement. In The

Beauty of the Infinite, however, Hart’s principal concerns are with the atheistic strand, as

he interprets it, within some thinkers in the Continental philosophical tradition. He laments

the corrosive effect of Continental thought on Christian theology, for he believes its

572 See, for example, Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press,

1986), 73-76. 573 TAS, 199. 574 TAS, 202.

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economy of violence is profoundly hostile to the message the gospel of peace pronounced

by the Church. Within this pluriform set of voices, especially in the writing of Nietzsche,

Heidegger and their successors, Hart identifies what he calls a ‘tragic fatedness of

violence.’575 For example, Hart asserts that Derrida’s apparently post-metaphysical

affirmation of difference is merely an inversion of the violence within the Western

metaphysical tradition’s denial of difference.576 Hart is also critical of Levinas,’577

characterising his work a ‘prodigy of incoherence,’ as ‘Manichean, Orphic, or gnostic.’578

Hart also judges Levinas’ ethical reflections as both ‘nonsense’ and ‘morally hideous’ and

his rhetoric is dismissed as ‘mournful bombast.’579

For Hart, the rhetoric of postmodern thought, with its terrible sublimity and its emphasis

on the place of violence and strife as foundational for reality, spurs him to offer an

alternative vision, which, as I have noted, centres on the notion of God as infinite beauty,

ultimate goodness and the fount of being. And this reaches its fulfilment in the conquest

of evil, sin and death that is manifest in the resurrection, the event that, in its cardinal sign

of the empty tomb, emancipates the world from the world and its travails:580 ‘the tomb,

after all, is the symbol par excellence of metaphysical totality and the mythos of cosmic

violence.’581 The resurrection subverts the categories of truth governing the world and

ushers in the word of Christ, which cannot be silenced.582

575 TBI, 43. 576 TBI, 54-55. 577 Hart endorses Gillian Rose’s assessment of Levinas’s vision, when she describes it as ‘Buddhist

Judaism.' Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37. 578 TBI, 75. 579 TBI, 82. 580 TBI, 335. 581 TBI, 334. 582 TBI, 335. Anthony Kelly, “Easter and the Empty Tomb,” 3-4.

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3.3.1 Engagements with Nietzsche

As with the other major interlocutors examined in this thesis, Hart dedicates a significant

part of his work to the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. In the current section I will explore

Hart’s reading of Nietzsche by highlighting both the important insights and some of the

problematic issues raised by Nietzsche. Hart has a degree of praise for Nietzsche’s

denunciation of Christianity, which, it should be noted, focuses primarily on Nietzsche’s

distaste for Christian life and morality, rather than on a rejection of Christian faith or of

the teachings of Christ.583 Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, Hart argues, is primarily on

aesthetic, rather than rational, grounds.

Nietzsche, Hart points out, adopts the Hegelian emphasis on flux, derived from

Heraclitus and others in the Ephesian pre-Socratic school of philosophy. Nietzsche gives

this expression in his fable of the death of God. However, in this nihilistic move,

philosophy’s capacity to speak authentically about being and truth is regarded by Hart as

having failed. In contrast, the Christian vision is that being is to be interpreted as something

gratuitous and that truth is rooted, not in rational analysis, but in the concretely historical

form of Jesus Christ. And so, Hart believes that the history of nihilism is the forgetfulness

of the gratuitous gift of God in creation and the refusal to recognise the ontological analogy

by which the being of human existence is related to the infinite source of all being that is

God.584 For Nietzsche, in the world after the death of God, no reconciliation is possible

between pagan (or Dionysian) exuberance and gnostic (or Christian) withdrawal,

especially in the domain of ethics.585 Hart rejects this opposition. However, he argues that

it is this Nietzschean substrate that provides the platform upon which the godless edifice

of postmodern discourse comes to be built, particular as it finds its expression in the work

of Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida and others.586

583 TBI, 94. 584 TBI, 227. 585 TBI, 93. 586 TBI, 35.

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Hart acknowledges that Nietzsche presents a formidable and audacious challenge to

Christianity, which continues to resonate within both contemporary atheism as well as

within the apologetic task of the Church as it seeks to understand and respond to unbelief

in the modern world. Thus, for Hart, Nietzsche represents a form of liberation, one which

demolishes the citadels of metaphysics and reason, and a philosophical adversary whose

critique is genuinely as radical as the kerygma that it denounces. Nietzsche enables

‘theology to glimpse something of its own depth in the mirror of his contempt… the

Nietzschean attack on the gospel is first and foremost a virtuoso performance, a rhetorical

tour de force, moving from imaginative historical constructions to displays of brilliant

psychological portraiture…’587 The performative, rather than rational, quality of

Nietzsche’s assault on Christianity is, perhaps, the essential hallmark of his work. For, as

was noted in Chapter One, Nietzsche’s primary concern is not to construct a rational

demolition of Christian propositions but, rather, to attack the aesthetic character of

Christian life. As Hart astutely discerns, the key issue for Nietzsche is that it is his

sensibility, more than his reason, that suffers offense.588 In other words, Hart holds, for

Nietzsche, the Christian insistence, that the ‘other’ world is the source of all that is real,

amounts to a ‘squalid deformation of the world that is, an idealization that derogates the

actual, a soothing promise of immortality that thwart’s life’s proper instincts.’589 Hart

believes that Nietzsche’s surest blow against Christianity is constituted by this attack on

its morality, identifying the ‘brilliant’ rhetoric of Nietzsche in his On the Genealogy of

Morals, which describes the ‘logic and fearful inventiveness’ of the resentful heart.590 The

savage attack on the decadent faith of his contemporaries in this work exposes, as Hart

acknowledges, the ‘hypocrisy, egoism and impurity of motive’ that had come to be

associated with an impotent faith, which centred on the ‘preservation of the weak in their

weakness.’

587 TBI, 94. 588 TBI, 95. 589 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 118. 590 TBI, 98.

156

Despite this acknowledgement, Hart is clear that the Nietzschean vein of thought in

postmodern philosophy runs in opposition to the Christian evangel and that it needs to be

rigorously resisted and undermined. This conflict is presented as two stories, which Hart

characterises as ‘Dionysus against the Crucified.’591 He draws on an important theme in

Milbank’s work where an ‘ontology of violence’ in the nihilistic philosophical systems that

have taken Nietzsche as their foundation is identified.592 This current, Milbank argues, can

be seen in Heidegger, Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida and others. Hart concurs and

proceeds to dissect the Continental philosophical foundations of modern secular thought,

which he argues stem from the primordial, chthonic, and indiscriminating violences [sic.]

of Dionysus, Nietzsche’s pagan anti-hero, who sets the tenor of postmodern nihilism.593

Hart reads this violent and Heracleitean flux in Hegel, for whom time and history become

absorbed into the epic of the Idea and for whom strife and conflict are ineluctably

connected within the processes of negation, dialectical determination and the endless

labour of thought. Despite Hegel’s claims, this perspective is, Hart points out, deeply

metaphysical because the strife of difference is accorded a transcendental privilege of its

own, which is ‘essential to truth’s inward determination.’594 It is, then, just another

discourse of totality (a narrative for which Hegel has been critiqued by many

commentators), which represents the triumph in recent thought of Heraclitus, with the

associated notion of dynamic flow, over Parmenides, symbolising immobile totality.595

Hart’s response to Nietzsche is to seek to identify the contradiction in Nietzsche’s

rhetoric. Referring to Nietzsche’s denunciation of Christianity, Hart notes that ‘… for all

the cunning and psychological inventiveness of his genealogy, it fails at every juncture to

accommodate the complexity of what he wishes to describe.’596 For, despite Nietzsche’s

rejection of objective truth as a ‘metaphorical pleating within the fabric of language,’597

591 This is the title of Part One of The Beauty of the Infinite. 592 TBI, 35. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,

1990), 278-79. 593 TBI, 36. 594 TBI, 38. 595 TBI, 37. 596 TBI, 107. 597 TBI, 103.

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and given what he believes to be the cultural contingency of all truth claims, Hart detects

in Nietzsche’s polemic an absolutist metaphysics, which takes the form of an unreflective

naturalism, constellating around the concepts of ‘life,’ ‘instinct,’ and ‘nature’ that pepper

the Nietzschean corpus. Additionally, the Nietzschean notion of difference as opposition,

contradiction, resistance and the impulse of one human will to vanquish another’s appears

to offer a closure of meaning that represents a foundational ontology of violence. These

observations lead Hart to suspect the supposedly anti-metaphysical tenor of Nietzsche’s

critique. For, even in the context of Nietzsche’s aesthetically driven post-Christian

counternarrative, indeed in his postmodern kerygma, there remains a stake on truth.

Furthermore, Hart resolutely rejects the Nietzschean idea that the crucifixion is a negation

of the material realm. On the contrary, as Hart unfolds in an extensive excursus on the

biblical metaphor of wine, which traces the symbolic role of this substance from its role in

the Old Testament to its place in uniting the Church with Christ’s presence in the Eucharist,

God’s blessing on creation is enacted through the very medium of the physicality of earthly

materiality. And we see in the cross, the fulfilment of God’s beauty, blessing and goodness,

and in Christ’s sacrifice an affirmation of the whole of creation.598 The crucifixion is,

indeed, Hart notes, not a repudiation, but an affirmation of fleshly life, a form of suffering

that hallows life itself.599

3.3.2 The rhetoric of violence

Hart is quick to highlight and condemn a strand of violence he believes to be an ineluctable

outcome of the postmodern philosophy that has developed in the shadow of Nietzsche’s

thought. He does not propose that Nietzsche was personally violent and does note that

Nietzsche denounced the anti-Semitism that was so fashionable in his day. However,

Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power does, Hart believes, lead inevitably to the atrocious

acts of savage cruelty visited on the Jewish people (and others) by the Nazis in their acts

598 TBI, 104-09. 599 TBI, 109.

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of ‘Aryan exuberance.’600 Nietzsche advanced a joyous affirmation of a ‘world of signs

without fault, without truth, and without origin,’ which was to be the basis of Derrida’s

notions of the eternal play of difference and the ‘adventure of the trace.’ It echoes the

Kantian myth of the subject’s moral freedom and finds further development in the work of

Jacques Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Michel Foucault, all of whom assert the freedom of

the individual self to declare its right to power.601

For Hart, such notions of ‘pure affirmation,’ which are fundamentally atheological,

cannot but fail to generate ‘robust and pitiless nihilisms.’602 Seen in the light of the gospel,

Hart believes that these ‘infinite perspectives of affirmation’ reverse the Christian

understanding of the infinite, which, in contrast to thought grounded in the postmodern

sublime and in the affirmation of the autonomy of the human will, offers a vision of the

truer sublime that proceeds from a theological account of beauty, which stems from the

inexhaustible glory of being.603 In these, and many other denunciations, Nietzsche

develops a corrosive undermining of the Christian message. However, as Hart notes, this

is not without putting in its place an alternative theological framework, which fits

Nietzsche’s own form of piety. This, as we have seen, revolves around a counter-deity, the

figure of Dionysus, his own ‘god of indestructible life, ecstasy, joy, and power.’604 In

contradistinction to the cross, which is a symbol of contradiction and its solution,

Nietzsche’s Dionysian affirmation reaches beyond both contradiction and reconciliation.

Here, Hart, recalls Deleuze’s notion that the suffering of Christ is an indictment of life,

rendering life unjust, guilty and deserving of the suffering that accompanies it. Life, thus

seen, is a ‘dark workshop’ where ‘life can only be loved when it is tender, weak, in torment,

mutilated…’605 Hart cannot agree with these notions and characterises them as coarse and

childish vituperative venom.606 Furthermore, although he understands Nietzsche’s claim

600 TBI, 70. 601 TBI, 70-71. 602 TBI, 71. 603 TBI, 72. 604 TBI, 96. 605 TBI, 97. 606 TBI, 97.

159

that Christian morals are nothing but those values that are inevitable for slaves, the weak,

and the ill constituted, somehow grotesquely elevated to the status of universal law, Hart

argues that these same Christian values did indeed triumph over the noble values of

antiquity and that the Christian image of the Evil One is nothing but a distillation of the

instincts of corrupted human nature. ‘Judeo-Christian morality is the ingenious creation of

an indefatigably aggressive impotence, which transforms itself into an irresistible

power…’607

3.4 Encounters with atheism

In common with Jüngel, Hart highlights the contribution of Descartes, whose thought

paved the transition from the premodern to a modern philosophical method, as a key factor

in the loss of the sense of the sacred and the erosion of a collective understanding of the

transcendence of God. Descartes, Hart argues, thought of all organisms, including human

persons, as mechanisms and considered the soul to be an immaterial ‘occupant’ of the

body. Thus, according to the Cartesian model, the soul merely indwells and surveys a

mechanical reality with which it has no natural continuity and to which it is related only

extrinsically. For this reason, for Descartes, the human ‘natural’ knowledge of God is

merely a kind of logical, largely featureless, deduction of God’s ‘existence.’ This is derived

from the presence in the individual mind (the cogito) of certain abstract ideas, such as the

conception of the infinite, which the world is impotent to have implanted there. Thus

Descartes inaugurates a mechanical view of nature within which the soul and God are both

set quite apart from the cosmic machine: one haunting it from within, the other

commanding it from without.608 Hart sees the dissolution of a geocentric cosmos as a

‘spiritual bereavement for Western humanity,’ which has created, within the modern

period, an argument between theism and atheism that is largely no more than a tension

607 TBI, 98. 608 EG, 60-61.

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between two different effectively atheist visions of existence.609 Ontology has been

displaced by cosmology, and cosmology has been reduced to a matter of mechanics.610

In addition to his engagements with the critique of Christianity articulated by Nietzsche

and those Continental philosophers whose work builds on Nietzsche’s thought, Hart has

also sought to respond to more recent and popular manifestations of atheism. This

dimension of Hart’s project finds expression in writing published after The Beauty of the

Infinite, in his books Atheist Delusions, The Experience of God and The Hidden and the

Manifest, as well as in a number of journal articles. Within these works, Hart seeks to

challenge the rhetoric of the New Atheist movement, highlight the vacuity of post-

Christian culture and present an apologetic case for Christianity that is based on a rebuttal

of the many misconceptions and false assumptions of contemporary popular atheism.

It should be noted that Hart does not dismiss all expressions of atheism.611 Indeed, he

articulates something close to admiration for those forms of atheism that are characterised

by a sober, philosophically-rooted and wistful tone, seeing these expressions of unbelief

that provide a searching and serious-minded challenge to Christianity.612 In contrast with

the gravitas associated with such ‘noble, precious and necessary’ modes of unbelief, Hart

has no patience with the New Atheist authors, whom he has engaged with at some length.

He regards these writers as philosophically inept and marked by the very fundamentalist

orientation and prejudiced outlook that they are so quick to condemn within religious

belief. Unlike what he regards as ‘truly profound atheists,’ the New Atheists have not

begun to understand the consequences of their path of rejection, instead choosing to peddle

609 EG, 61. 610 EG, 63-64. 611 Amongst the ‘civilised critics’ who Hart holds to have mounted imaginative challenges to the Christian

faith, marked by elegance and moral acuity, he includes Celsus, Porphyry, Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, and

Nietzsche. 612 David Bentley Hart, "Believe it or Not: David B. Hart Sees the New Atheism Movement Going the Way

of the Pet Rock," First Things 203 (2010): 36.

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beliefs that amount to no more than an ‘insipidly doctrinaire and appallingly ignorant

diatribe.’613

Furthermore, in the various forms of modern, culturally incubated, unbelief he is

referring to, Hart detects a fundamental misunderstanding in the object of atheistic

arguments and cultural unbelief, namely the meaning of the word ‘God.’ Thus, he points

out there is an illusion in public debates about religion that the word ‘God’ is used in the

same way by theists and atheists alike.614 However, there are incommensurable

understandings of God in operation. For those of faith, to speak of God properly is to refer

to the one infinite source of all that there is, the self-caused creator who is eternal,

omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and who is both perfectly transcendent of all things

and absolutely immanent in all things.615 Atheist conceptions of God, particularly in

popular expressions of unbelief within society today, tend to suggest that God is a ‘supreme

mechanical cause located somewhere within the continuum of nature.’616 Hart’s criticism

is understandable given the repeated reference to God as ‘a being’ in the books written by

New Atheist authors. God, so conceived, is really just an immense and very powerful

entity amongst other entities, a God that resembles the form of divinity believed in by

seventeenth and eighteenth-century Deists.617

3.4.1 Hart’s critique of contemporary Western culture

Hart is acutely conscious that Christianity is no longer a dominant force in Western society,

that the role of the institutional Church, which he confesses he has little affection for, has

weakened considerably and that a growing proportion of the population has ceased to

believe in the message of the gospel. And, like other authors whose thought has been

613 Hart, "Believe it or Not: David B. Hart Sees the New Atheism Movement Going the Way of the Pet

Rock," 36. 614 EG, 14. 615 EG, 30. 616 EG, 28. 617 Hart, "Believe it or Not: David B. Hart Sees the New Atheism Movement Going the Way of the Pet

Rock," 37.

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explored in this thesis, Hart notes the connection between the faith of the Church and the

contemporary climate of unbelief in our world. ‘Christianity over the centuries not only

has proved so irrepressibly fissile… but has also given rise to a culture capable of the most

militant atheism, and even of self-conscious nihilism.’618 Additionally, Hart recognises that

modern atheism has emerged in Western culture as an outcome of the death of God

proclaimed by Nietzsche, which has destroyed the ancient conception of an enchanted

world and undermined the orientation, for many at least, that places God at the centre of

life.619

Hart is a resolute opponent of the ‘ideology of the modern.’ By this, he means the

‘modern age’s grand narrative of itself: its story of the triumph of critical reason over

“irrational” faith, of the progress of social morality toward greater justice and freedom, of

the “tolerance” of the secular state, and of the unquestioned ethical primacy of

individualism or collectivism…’620 Rather than assenting to the oft-repeated claim that

reason is modernity’s crowning glory, Hart suggests that the so-called ‘Age of Reason’

was, in fact, the beginning of the eclipse of reason’s authority as a cultural value. The

modern age, he argues, is marked not by sound reason but by triumphant, unthinking and

inflexible dogmatism in all spheres of human activity (including the sciences) and that it

harbours a huge array of soothing fundamentalisms, some of which are religious and some

purely secular.621 The hallmark of modernity, for Hart, is the quest for personal autonomy

and freedom.

In the end, the outcome of this thrust for self-determination in a world shorn of

transcendent meaning is a cultural system within which we believe in nothing. This is not

to say that individuals in society have no beliefs. It is, however, Hart claims, a condition

whereby, in the modern world, we ‘place our trust in an original absence underlying all of

reality, a fertile void in which all things are possible, from which arises no impediment to

618 Hart, The Hidden and the Manifest: Essays in Theology and Metaphysics (Grand Rapids, MI:

Eerdmans, 2017), 246. 619 AD, 229. 620 AD, xi. 621 AD, xi-xii.

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our wills, and before which we may consequently choose to make of ourselves what we

choose.’622 Thus, in an age conditioned by an overwhelming consensus surrounding the

supremacy of absolute liberty and personal volition, there is a sense of the unreality of any

‘value’ greater than an individual’s choice, and of the absence of any transcendent Good,

which orders our desires towards a higher end.623 This, again, stems, Hart believes, from

Christianity’s demise.

When, therefore, Christianity departs, what is left behind? It may be that Christianity is the

midwife of nihilism precisely because, in rejecting it, people necessarily reject everything

except the bare horizon of the undetermined will. No other god can now be found. The

story of the crucified God took everything to itself, and so – in departing – takes

everything with it: habits of reverence and restraint, awe, the command of the Good within

us. Only the will persists, set before the abyss of limitless possibility, seeking its way – or

forging its way – in the dark.624

Thus, the rejection of Christianity is simultaneously a rejection of ‘everything except the

barren anonymity of spontaneous subjectivity.’625 Hart believes that, as modernity has

worked itself out, the creativity of Christian ideals has become subdued and, in some cases,

exhausted. It is for this reason that Hart regards modern Western atheism as a Christian

heresy, something that simply could not have arisen in a non-Christian setting.626 The

power that Christianity once exerted over Western culture has receded and the erosion of

the notion of ‘humanity’ propounded by Christianity has set a post-Christian culture on a

path toward the posthuman.627 This was the inevitable outcome of Nietzsche’s prophecy

concerning the narcotic banality of the Last Men.628

622 AD, 21. 623 David Bentley Hart, "Christ and Nothing," First Things 136 (2003): 47. 624 AD, 230. 625 Hart, "Christ and Nothing," 53. 626 David Bentley Hart, "The Timidity of the New Atheists," in The Unknown God: Sermons Responding to

the New Atheists, ed. John Hughes (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013), 91. 627 AD, 215. 628 Hart, "Christ and Nothing," 54.

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In addition to his engagements with the currents of unbelief running through Continental

philosophy and his dissection of post-Christian culture, Hart’s apologetic concerns, as I

have already noted, have also led him to critique the arguments and influence of writers

within the New Atheist movement. His confrontation with this particular anti-Christian

polemic has taken shape in several articles and essays. His work Atheist Delusions is also,

ostensibly, written as a response to the arguments of New Atheism although most of the

book’s chapters do not, in fact, directly address the authors who identify with this form of

atheism. Although his denunciation of New Atheist writers is forthright and direct, Hart

also acknowledges that this phenomenon is parasitic upon and, indeed, triggered by

contemporary expressions of Christianity itself, particularly in its twin manifestations as

either an insipid, washed out and indistinct dimension of Western culture, or as a form of

fundamentalist dogmatism. ‘The New Atheism is merely an example of what happens

when a new religious inspiration degenerates into an arid and infantile dogmatism, purged

of historical memory and rational depth – when, that is, it ceases to inspire serious thought

and begins to generate only therapies and catechisms.’629

Hart characterises the generation of confident, even strident, atheist proselytisers who

are associated with the New Atheist movement as those who seem to know nothing of the

religious beliefs that they reject and who have no real sense of what the experience of faith

is like.630 Modern Western atheism, Hart argues, is quite novel and must be differentiated

from personal unbelief or the eccentric doctrines of philosophical sects, which had been

the case in the past. Contemporary atheism, he suggests is ‘a conscious, ideological, social,

and philosophical project, with a broad popular constituency – a cause, a dogma, a

metaphysics, a system of values.’631 Hart asserts that the representatives of the New

Atheism movement have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of God as God is

conceived in Christianity and in other theistic traditions. A case in point, Hart believes, is

Dawkins’ discussion of Aquinas’ ‘Five Ways’ in The God Delusion632 where Dawkins

629 Hart, "The Timidity of the New Atheists," 91. 630 EG, 20. 631 EG, 19-20. 632 Dawkins, The God Delusion, 100-03.

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mistakes Thomas’ statements as reasons for why we should believe in God, which they

certainly are not.633 Fergus Kerr makes precisely the same point when he asserts that ‘the

famous “five ways” of demonstrating God’s existence… are not an attempt to refute

atheism but an effort of faith seeking understanding of itself.’634 It is an example, Hart

asserts, of the theological illiteracy of the New Atheists, an issue that extends to their

understanding of the nature of God. For the God who the New Atheists reject is, in fact, a

god, not a transcendent reality at all but a higher or more powerful of more splendid

dimension of immanent reality. The God so envisaged is essentially a very large object or

agency within the universe, or perhaps besides the universe, a being among beings, who

differs from all other beings in magnitude, power and duration, but not ontologically, and

who is related to the world as a craftsman is related to an artefact.635 In other words, the

God that is rejected by Dawkins and others is, in fact, the God of Deism, a super-being or

moral agent who is comparable to Zeus, Wotan or Odin.

Hart also addresses the implicit scientism within New Atheist thought. The New

Atheists often assert that science and faith are incompatible, particularly in relation to the

Darwinian theory of evolution. Hart, however, disagrees, pointing out that many

Christians, John Henry Newman amongst them, find nothing in the science of evolution

that is contrary to or problematic for the doctrine of creation. Creation is, according to

patristic thought, an eternal act and not a series of temporal cosmic interventions; it is a

divine act that pervades all time.636

Hart certainly matches the somewhat irascible tone of the New Atheist writers with his

own rather bellicose rhetoric. Daniel Dennett’s work, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a

Natural Phenomenon, is, for example, characterised as an attempt to ‘wean a credulous

humanity from its reliance on the preposterous fantasies of religion’ in a manner that has

633 EG, 21-22. 634 Fergus Kerr, Thomas Aquinas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 635 EG, 31-32. Hart also states that ‘the god with whom most modern popular atheism usually concerns

itself is one we might call a “demiurge” (dēmiourgos): a Greek term that originally meant a kind or public

technician or artisan but that came to mean a particular kind of “world-maker” or cosmic craftsman.’ EG,

35. 636 EG, 26.

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provoked ‘exultant bellowing from the godless.’637 The ‘tireless tractarian,’ Richard

Dawkins, is credited as having an ‘embarrassing incapacity for philosophical reasoning,’

which is articulated with ‘rhetorical recklessness’ in order to entrance his readers.

Christopher Hitchens, the author of God is Not Great, is guilty, according to Hart, of gross

intellectual caricature, whist Sam Harris’s The End of Faith is, Hart asserts, no more than

an ‘extravagantly callow attack on religious belief.’638 Harris is also accused by Hart of

displaying an ‘abysmal ignorance of almost every [religious] topic he addresses’ and of

publishing a book that is no more than ‘a concatenation of shrill, petulant assertions.’639 In

contrast to earlier, philosophically-grounded forms of atheism (stretching from Celsus

through to Nietzsche), which, as I have noted, Hart admits to having an appreciation for,

the New Atheist movement is brushed aside because of its display of ignorance,

philosophical ineptitude, vacuous arguments, self-righteous and triumphantly hectoring

tone and scarcely disguised fundamentalist logic.640

Daniel Dennett is a particular target for Hart’s invective. Dennett’s claim, in his work

Breaking the Spell, that religion is an entirely natural phenomenon (an assertion that he

holds can be demonstrated by empirical science), and as a result can be rejected as an

entirely arbitrary manifestation of human nature’s blind machinery, is dismissed by Hart

as an inconsequential and embarrassing observation that poses no challenge to faith. For

Hart, religion is of course a natural phenomenon, which is ubiquitous in human culture and

is an irreducible component within the evolution of societies and which has itself, over

time, quite clearly changed and developed. This point, however, has no bearing, Hart

believes, on the question of whether religion can be a vehicle of divine truth and a context

within which religious adherents can orientate themselves toward ultimate reality.641

Furthermore, Dennett’s critique is entirely misplaced because, as Hart points out, there is

no such thing as ‘religion’ in the abstract. The many systems of belief that are labelled as

‘religions’ are, of course, marked by their own distinctive beliefs, practices and modes of

637 AD, 3. 638 AD, 3-4. 639 AD, 8. 640 AD, 4. 641 AD, 7.

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belonging, which give specific expression to a rather more universal impulse (that Hart

allows for), which might be called the ‘natural desire for God.’642

In addition to his engagement with the so-called ‘Four Horsemen’ of New Atheism

(Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens), Hart offers a withering critique of the wider

community of popular atheist writers, which includes figures such as A.C. Grayling, Victor

Stenger, Graham Oppy, Michael Tooley, Nicholas Everitt and Stephen Law. Responding

to a collection of atheistic ‘manifestos’ by these and other authors, published as 50 Voices

of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists,643 Hart is no less scathing than he is in his other critiques

of New Atheism, concluding the that ‘the book as a whole adds up to absolutely nothing,’

that it is ‘depressing,’ and that the work reflects the ‘general vapidity of all public religious

discourse’ within Western culture.644 The obstreperous character of New Atheist

arguments is contrasted with the moral courage, noble scepticism and prophetic qualities

of previous generations of intellectual atheists who, Hart recognises, understood that their

attitude of critical suspicion was altogether different from the ‘glib abandonment of one

vision of absolute truth for another – say, fundamentalist Christianity for fundamentalist

materialism or something vaguely and inaccurately called humanism.’645

Summarising the contribution of New Atheism to contemporary culture by contrasting

it to the apocalyptic interruption of Christianity, with its power to transform lives and

society alike, Hart suggests that its appeal is rather like a form of narcotic. It soothes and

beguiles but, ultimately, offers a critique that is far less confusing and troubling that what

it seeks to displace. It cannot engage with Christianity’s notion that time has been invaded

by eternity or of its penetration of universal meaning through the particularity of the God-

man, Jesus of Nazareth, and it is quite unable to grasp the incomprehensibility of the

642 AD, 7-8. 643 50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists, ed. Russell Blackford and Udo Schüklenk (Oxford: Wiley-

Blackwell, 2009). 644 Hart, "Believe it or Not: David B. Hart Sees the New Atheism Movement Going the Way of the Pet

Rock," 36. 645 Hart, "Believe it or Not: David B. Hart Sees the New Atheism Movement Going the Way of the Pet

Rock," 36.

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Christian message, a vision centred on ‘an event whose proclamation we have always yet

to understand.’646

3.5 An assessment of Hart’s work

Having provided an overview of the principal themes in his thought, in the following

section I will offer some evaluative comments on the important contributions that Hart

makes to systemic Christian theology, particular as it engages with atheism and unbelief.

Throughout a sizeable corpus of literature, Hart demonstrates a depth of engagement with

a wide range of theological literature, which ranges from that produced by both Latin and

Greek patristic authors, through medieval writers to a significant number of recent and

contemporary theologians. Hart provides several perspectives that offer considerable

promise and potential for the Church as it seeks to listen to, enter into conversation with,

and respond to, the critiques presented by the prevailing culture of unbelief and secular

immanence, which we encounter in much of Western culture.

Firstly, Hart expounds a robust doctrine of God, which restates and develops key themes

in the classical Christian theological tradition in a manner that has the potential to be highly

fruitful in the context of a society that has, to a large degree, grown either weary with, or

become deaf to, discourse about divinity. Because his audience is primarily a theologically

literate and academic one, Hart’s project is unlikely to garner a large readership amongst

those who have rejected Christianity. However, for those who do engage with his writing

about God, God’s relationship with the created order and the place of grace in shaping

human lives, there are, I believe, ideas in his work that offer a rich field for reflection and

which may resonate with the human quest for meaning, even when this follows paths that

bypass institutional religious settings. Barber articulates this when he asserts that Hart is

amongst those theologians who ‘make a thoroughgoing case for transcendence as that

646 Hart, "Believe it or Not: David B. Hart Sees the New Atheism Movement Going the Way of the Pet

Rock," 46.

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which is necessary for any attempt to imagine new possibilities of existence.’647 In

stressing the alterity of God, Hart provides an important corrective to the tendency within

some atheist arguments and certain expressions of Christian thought alike to speak of God

in excessively precise terms and, in so doing, betray the kind of onto-theological

conceptions of divinity that are so vehemently denied by Heidegger and others. As one

reviewer of The Experience of God notes, ‘Hart’s clarity about the meaning of “God” could

help diminish the frequency of promiscuous Christian God-talk and remind talkative

Protestants of the helpfulness of Hart’s own Orthodox appeals to the “apophatic” tradition:

the wise necessity of silence before the God who cannot be adequately described in merely

human categories.’648

As I have emphasised, Hart is particularly exercised by the notions of desire, beauty,

goodness and infinity as domains within which the human experience of God can be best

understood. And in this way, he is able to introduce to the conversation that the Church

needs to have with atheism, along with less forthright expressions of unbelief, themes that

may serve as the basis for dialogue and mutual exploration. These are universal elements

of the human experience, around which meaningful encounter between theism and atheism

may take place. The weight that Hart places on the doctrine of creation, rather than that of

soteriology, within his theology, and the concomitant attention that he gives to the world

as a mirror of divinity, may hold open the possibility of dialogue between Christian

theology and those perspectives which are atheistic and which stress a this-worldly

orientation in the human pursuit of meaning. Thus, Hart’s proposition that the beauty of

the created world provides a lens through which God’s own beauty and goodness can be

perceived might be of value in resisting narrow conceptions of secularity based on the

notion that the secular and the religious spheres are in opposition to one another, and so

help in rescuing the ancient Christian understanding of the saeculum as the worldly and

647 Barber, Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-secularism and the Future of Immanence, 79. 648 Bob Robinson, "The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss: The One Theology Book All

Atheists Really Should Read?," Stimulus: The New Zealand Journal of Christian Thought and Practice 21,

no. 3 (2014): 37.

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temporal domain within which God’s presence is revealed to humanity.649 In this way, by

focusing on the sanctity of creation and the Thomistic idea of grace perfecting rather than

abrogating nature, Hart’s theology has the potential to provoke constructive dialogue

between theists and atheists in connection with the immanent domain of material

existence.650

In the remainder of this section, I will examine Hart’s perspectives on the question of

natural evil and go on to highlight some concerns relating to his discussion of this matter.

Hart rightly recognises that, for many people, the issue of human suffering, particularly as

a result of natural disasters, presents an unbridgeable barrier to faith in God. The trauma

induced by calamitous events, whether experienced directly or through the witnessing of

others’ misfortunes, can generate a form of protest atheism, which renders those who adopt

such a stance highly resistant to any position of faith. Drawing on the objections advanced

by Dostoevsky’s fictional character, Ivan Karamazov, Hart asserts that this orientation is

not so much a matter of belief as of consent, meaning that faith in God is resisted not as an

end-point of rational analysis but because of an objection to the coexistence of a

purportedly good God and the reality of creaturely pain and anguish. Insightfully, however,

Hart holds that such a position is not necessarily antithetical to belief but that it is, in fact,

far closer to a Christian view than might, at first sight, have been thought.651

Hart’s work The Doors of the Sea: Where was God in the Tsunami? extends and

develops his position on God’s relationship with suffering first set out in his article, “No

Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility,” in Pro Ecclesia.652 Hart presents his

considered response to, and endorsement of, Ivan’s rebellion. The book was written in the

aftermath of the tsunami around the shores of the Indian Ocean, which occurred on Boxing

649 Clayton Crockett, Secular Theology: American Radical Theological Thought (London: Routledge,

2001), 1. 650 Gabriel Vahanian, "Theology and the secular," in Secular Theology: American Radical Theological

Thought, ed. Clayton Crockett (London: Routledge, 2001), 13, 15, 17.

651 ‘…the pathos of his protest is, to my mind, exquisitely Christian – though he [Ivan] himself seems not

to be aware of this: a rage against explanation, a refusal to grant that the cruelty or brute natural misfortune

or evil of any variety can be justified by some ‘happy ending’ that makes sense of all our misery and

mischance.’ "Where was God?: An Interview with David Bentley Hart," 26. 652 Hart, "No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility."

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Day, 2004, and which claimed the lives of over a quarter of a million people in 14 countries.

It reflects on the questions that were posed following the disaster: ‘why did God let this

happen?’ or ‘where was God in the tsunami?’ Hart does not seek to provide any satisfactory

answers to such questions, and is quick to condemn those Christians, particularly within

the Calvinist tradition, who attempt to make sense of such atrocious suffering in various

ways, attributing it to an expression of the divine sovereignty, a manifestation of God’s

plan, a punishment for human sin, or who locate the event within a framework of ethical

deism. The indignation and rage voiced by atheists in the face of natural disasters is, Hart

argues, much closer to the vision of the gospel than the well-meaning but misplaced

attempts of some Christians to rationalise the suffering that these events generate. Here,

Hart aligns himself with elements of Voltaire’s arguments in his Poème sur le désastre de

Lisbonne, written as a response to the Lisbon earthquake of 1st November 1755, within

which the author lambasts the bland optimism of popular theodicy that stemmed from the

prevailing deist conceptions of God. The profound consternation of those who reject the

possibility of God’s goodness in the midst of human suffering does, in fact, Hart argues,

find its echo in the Christian doctrine of evil’s emptiness, lack of ultimate value or spiritual

meaning.

Drawing on classical theological notions of evil as the privation of good, Hart highlights

God’s opposition to suffering, wickedness and death. These aspects of human experience,

which cast their shadow over our existence, do not point to a deficiency in God’s goodness.

Whilst their conquest has yet to be fully realised, they have, at least in some sense, been

defeated by Christ’s death and resurrection. The devastating impact of natural disasters,

where creation ‘groans in expectation,’ can only be understood as a manifestation of that

to which God is opposed but from which God rescues humanity by Christ’s participation

in human suffering in order to raise up his creatures, wipe all tears from their eyes and

incorporate them in the divine life where there is no sorrow or suffering. The Doors of the

Sea includes an extended set of reflections on the divine victory that God has won over

evil and suffering within which Hart outlines how God, ‘who is love,’ wages war with the

demonic forces, those ‘Principalities and Powers’ that threaten creation. The suffering of

the present age, which falls under the spell of this cosmic struggle, will, Hart asserts, by

drawing on Paul, be swept away in the ‘glory that will be revealed to us (Romans 8.18).’

Thus, the moral pathos voiced by Ivan Karamazov and his successors within the

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contemporary world must be placed within the context of the Christian vision of God’s

victory over evil, which centres on the event of the cross.

For Hart, God’s triumph over evil’s chill emptiness and negation of the good – as the

privatio boni – can only be understood in the context of the equally essential doctrine of

divine impassibility, which, as has already been noted, is a central strand in his theology.

Also, developing ideas expounded in The Beauty of the Infinite, Hart’s writing on the

Indian Ocean tsunami gives him scope to highlight the simultaneous realities of Christ’s

human experience of pain and death, on the one hand, and, on the other, the immutability

of God’s infinite essence, which possesses the fullness of charity and for whom the world,

including its suffering, constitutes neither necessity nor determination in relation to God.

He provides a rigorous defense of the intimately related classical doctrines of both divine

impassibility and divine perfection, and rules out any possibility of growth, change or

responsiveness in God, for such expressions of mutability would undermine utterly the

orthodox understanding of God and the divine nature.653 ‘God in se is not determined by

creation and, consequently, evil does not enter into our understanding of the divine

essence.’654 Aligning himself with Hart’s thought, Hege described God’s impassibility in

this way:

Simply defined, divine apatheia is pure activity, pure self-giving charity, pure agape. It is

the impassive, imperturbable dynamic ground of all being expressed most clearly in the

perichoresis of the three persons of the Trinity. It does not react or respond, nor does it

require or ‘need’ any finite objects for its activity but graciously engages them in freedom

without sacrificing the divine immutability…655

653 For a perceptive reflection on Hart's defense of the doctrine of divine impassibility, see Brent A.R.

Hege, "The Suffering of God? The Divine Love and the Problem of Suffering in Classical and Process-

Relational Theisms" (John Templeton Award for Theological Promise: Laureates Colloquium, 2010,

Heidelberg). Hege contrasts Hart's position with that of Catherine Keller, who adopts a form of process-

related theism. 654 Hart, "God, Creation, and Evil: The Moral Meaning of creatio ex nihilo," 2. 655 Hege, "Short The Suffering of God? The Divine Love and the Problem of Suffering in Classical and

Process-Relational Theisms." 8-9.

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By drawing on patristic thought and Eastern Orthodox mystical theology, Hart offers an

alternative to the inadequate responses to evil and suffering, articulated by theists and

atheists alike, affirming the traditional divine attributes and presenting a vision of God’s

goodness in the midst of human peril and pain: ‘Hart suggests that divine perfection

provides an anchor, an unwavering point of reference, for the tempest tossed pilgrim to

assure her that all will be well when God’s victory over the enemies of God has been

won.’656 As I will discuss more fully below, although Hart seeks to hold together the reality

of human suffering in the face of natural disasters with the love of God, in his impassibility,

for all of creation, it is questionable whether his writing constitutes an effective theodicy.

Hart acknowledges that the issue of suffering leads significant numbers of people to reject

the possibility of God’s existence. However, the response that he offers to this concern

may fall short of offering a convincing basis for faith in the face of moral evil.

Despite Hart’s important insights in relation to the problem of evil, questions have been

raised about the effectiveness of Hart’s writing on human suffering. Several reviewers of

The Doors of the Sea have discerned in this work a rather awkward and ill-conceived effort

to engage with an issue that, because of the hugely problematic task faced by those who

seek to examine the question of human suffering from a position of faith, may well be best

left alone. Hart, indeed, in the book, starts by renouncing the pious platitudes that

sometimes follow catastrophic natural events, calls for silence and states that ‘we probably

ought not to speak.’657 Yet, he fails to heed his own advice and, far from remaining silent,

concludes that, in fact, he ‘must speak.’658 Heedless of the many anti-theodicy positions,

which have been adopted from theologians such as Kenneth Surin, Donald MacKinnon,

D.Z. Phillips and Rowan Williams, Hart enters into a sustained examination of the problem

of evil, which characterises the matter as an intellectual, rather than a pastoral, one, and

within which the victim’s plight seems to be rather marginalised.659 Thus, his focus is on

656 Hege, "Short The Suffering of God? The Divine Love and the Problem of Suffering in Classical and

Process-Relational Theisms." 7. 657 DS, 6. 658 DS, 6. 659 Tim Middleton, "Objecting to Theodicy and the Legitimacy of Protesting Against Evil," Science &

Christian Belief 29, no. 1 (2017): 8-12.

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the object of evil and not on those who are blighted by it. And in his appropriately orthodox

stance on the impassibility of God, the human suffering of Christ, which might be a helpful

way of connecting the trauma of those involved in the Boxing Day tsunami to the

incarnation of God within the world, is overlooked. The result is a position that gives

insufficient attention to the human dimension of suffering and the consequent expressions

of lament that natural disasters precipitate. In the wake of atrocious events, such as the

Indian Ocean tsunami, questions surface inevitably in connection with how it could happen

or, more pointedly, how God could let it happen. Yet, as Nelson concludes, the Doors of

the Sea is ‘far from a satisfying answer to these kinds of questions,’ and merely serves to

offer reflections in a ‘frequently bizarre and obfuscating idiom.’660 Although Hart is

hesitant about the value of theodicies, he does seek to develop one himself, which is centred

on the impassibility of God. The shortcoming of his approach, however, is its lack of

attention to the pastoral problem of human suffering.

3.6 Conclusion

Hart is a very creative thinker who has made an important contribution to Christian

theology through his writing. He offers a rich vision of the trinitarian God by unfolding a

dense theological project based on the notions of infinity, beauty, peace and goodness. He

focuses on Christ as the form of God’s revelation in the world, a presence within which

human creatures are able to participate through their sharing in God’s presence in the world

(methexis). The ontology of peace that the kingdom of God announced by Christ ushers in

is, Hart holds, the only enduring and health-giving alternative to the currents of violence

that have bedevilled the modern world and which he traces, philosophically, into

postmodern thought. His work, as I have shown, includes an engagement with atheism and

unbelief in contemporary Western society, particular in the species of atheism known as

New Atheism. Unfortunately, however, there are some problematic elements and several

660 Derek Nelson, "The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? by David Bentley Hart," Book

Review, Dialog: A Journal of Theology 48, no. 4 (2009): 395.

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shortcomings in Hart’s work that render it less effective than he would wish it to be in

addressing the climate of unbelief in society today.

With respect to the key issue being explored in this thesis, namely the possibility of

dialogue between Christianity and atheism, Hart’s work provides many important

resources that offer opportunities for a constructive engagement between the Church and

atheistic thought to be advanced. Indeed, there are important strands in his thought that the

Church may be able to draw on as it seeks to address the challenges presented by its

position within the climate of numerical decline and the loss of faith that characterises

much of the Western world. These elements include Hart’s thoroughgoing and insightful

reflections on God’s identity with infinity; his rigorously worked out theology of both

divine transcendence and divine apatheia; his creation-focused approach to the Christian

story; the attention that he gives to beauty, truth, and goodness as dimensions of human

experience within which God’s presence in the world may be discerned; his rejection of

the doctrine of hell and his affirmation of universal salvation; and the fact that he does

recognise, at least in some expressions of atheistic thought (notably in Nietzsche), currents

of truth and modes of intelligent dissent that the Church needs to be heedful of. Some of

Hart’s ideas will, consequently, be returned to in the final chapter of this thesis where I

will offer a number of proposals for how Christianity and atheism may enter into dialogue

will be explored.

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Chapter 4:

Henri de Lubac’s response

to atheism and unbelief

4.1 The Christian vision in the context of

unbelief

The French Jesuit Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) is considered to be one of the most

important theologians of the previous century and is a pivotal figure in twentieth-century

Catholic thought.661 In the context of this thesis, I regard de Lubac as holding particular

importance because of the great interest he had in atheism throughout his life, which is

reflected in many of the articles and books that he wrote during his career. I will show that

de Lubac’s concerns with atheism and unbelief are more tightly focused than those of

Jüngel and Hart. Although he offers a fascinating critique of the ‘Religion of Humanity’

developed by August Comte, who might be regarded as a proto-Type I atheist, de Lubac’s

principal focus is on the thought of Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche, who all demonstrate

Type II atheist tendencies. Like both Jüngel and Hart, de Lubac is also sensitive to the role

of the Church in creating the conditions that made atheism and unbelief inevitable. In this

context, his significance stems from the deep concern that surfaces early in his career

concerning the inability of the Catholicism of his times, due to its narrow theological

661 De Lubac has exerted a considerable influence on Christian theology that extends well beyond

Catholicism. For a discussion of de Lubac's reception among Protestants and an exploration of his

understanding of and engagement with Protestant thinkers, see Kenneth Oakes, "Henri de Lubac and

Protestantism," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury,

2017).

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vision, to engage effectively with the social and spiritual crises of twentieth-century

Europe.

De Lubac was a leading figure in a movement that sought to revitalise the Catholic

Church through the act of ressourcement. This initiative sought to recover an authentic

Catholicism through the translation, study and explication of the works of the Church

Fathers662 and also by close attention to the thought of Thomas Aquinas. De Lubac and

other theologians who were associated with this development were described, mainly by

their detractors, as nouvelle théologiens.663 De Lubac’s work was to arouse suspicion and

condemnation within the Catholic hierarchy, particularly after the promulgation of the

encyclical Humani generis in 1950.

In this chapter I will focus on de Lubac’s thought concerning the question of atheism,

which is unquestionably indispensable for an understanding of his theological project as a

whole.664 As well as discussing his lament over the loss of a sense of the sacred within

contemporary society and what he sees as the affaisement spiritual (spiritual decline)

amongst Christians, I will also consider his constructive perspectives on the phenomenon

of unbelief, which were to gain expression in several of the constitutions issued by the

Second Vatican Council.665 Questions of unbelief, culture, history, interreligious dialogue,

662 The works were published in the series known as Sources chrétiennes (Christian Sources), which by

1999 had grown to more than 440 volumes. They were edited by de Lubac along with his fellow Jesuit,

Jean Daniélou. See Rudolf Voderholzer, Meet Henri de Lubac: His Life and Work (San Francisco: Ignatius

Press, 2008), 50-51; see also Jacob W. Wood, "Ressourcement," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de

Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017). 663 The movement they belonged to, which is generally regarded as flourishing in the period between 1935

and 1960, is known as La Nouvelle Théologie. This was a term that was first coined by the anti-modernist

Dominican theologian, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "Where is the New

Theology Leading Us?," Catholic Family News Reprint Series 309 (1998). This is a translation of the

article originally published by Garrigou-Lagrange as ‘La nouvelle theologie où va-t-elle?’ just after the

Second World War: Angelicum, 23 (1946), 126-45. In the article, Garrigou-Lagrange asserts that the

nouvelle théologiens were leading the church to perdition. It should be noted that de Lubac himself resisted

the application of the label and never used it to describe his project. See Henri de Lubac, At the Service of

the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned his Writings (San Francisco:

Ignatius Press, 1993), 361. 664 Patrick X. Gardner, "An Inhuman Humanism," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan

Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 226. 665 See Aaron Riches, "Henri de Lubac and the Second Vatican Council," in T&T Clark Companion to

Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).

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the social role of the Church, the Eucharist, scriptural exegesis, mystery,666 paradox,

ontology, and the common destiny of humanity are all central concerns of de Lubac, and

these run as strands within an interwoven chord through a literary corpus that includes

nearly forty published works. His key texts include: Catholicisme: Les aspects sociaux du

dogme,667 De la connaissance de Dieu,668 Surnaturel: études historiques,669 Augustisme et

théologie moderne,670 Le Mystere du surnaturel671 and Petite catéchèse sur nature et

grâce.672 De Lubac also published an important work on atheism, which will be explored

later in this chapter: Le drame de l'humanisme athée.673 Additionally, his output includes

significant contributions to a Christian theology of religion,674 a Christian response to

Nazism,675 works on ecclesiology, the Christian faith and scriptural exegesis,676 short

studies of Christian paradoxes,677 biographical and theological studies of a number of

666 At the heart of de Lubac's hermeneutical project is a conviction that Christian faith is centred on a

unfied 'mystery' to which believers ascend, but never fully grasp. Kevin Storer, Reading Scripture to Hear

God: Kevin Vanhoozer and Henri De Lubac on God's use of Scripture in the Economy of Redemption

(Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 73. 667 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism : Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard

and Elizabeth Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988). Hereafter, this work is referred to as C. 668 Henri de Lubac, The Discovery of God, trans. Alexander Dru (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans,

1996). Hereafter, this work is referred to as DG. 669 Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: etudes historiques (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1991), Hereafter, this work

is referred to as S. 670 Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot Capel Sheppard (London: G.

Chapman, 1969). Hereafter, this work is referred to as AMT. 671 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroad, 1998).

Hereafter, this work is referred to as MS. 672 Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. Richard Arnandez (San Francisco:

Ignatius Press, 1984). Hereafter, this work is referred to as BC. 673 de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism. Hereafter, this work is referred to as DAH. 674 Henri de Lubac, Aspects of Buddhism (London: Sheed and Ward, 1953); Henri de Lubac, La rencontre

du Bouddhisme et de l'occident (Paris, 1952). In addition to these works, de Lubac includes several

penetrating pieces on the plurality of religious expression in his collection of occasional articles: Henri de

Lubac, Theological Fragments, trans. Rebecca Howell Balinski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989). 675 Henri de Lubac, Resistance chretienne au nazisme (Paris: Cerf, 2006). 676 Henri de Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, trans. Michael Mason (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,

1999); Henri de Lubac, The Motherhood of the Church, trans. Sergia Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius

Press, 1982); Henri de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, trans. James R. Dunne (Shannon, Ire:

Ecclesia Press, 1969); Henri de Lubac, Christian Faith: An Essay on the Structure of the Apostles' Creed,

trans. Illtyd Trethowan and John Saward (London: Chapman, 1986); Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum:

The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, trans. Gemma Simmonds (London: SCM, 2006); Henri

de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. Mark Sebanc (Grand Rapids, Mich:

W.B. Eerdmans, 1998). 677 Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, trans. Ernest Beaumont (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987);

Henri de Lubac, More Paradoxes, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002).

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important thinkers,678 a study of the relationship between Christian dogma and history,679

and works that collect short pieces and reflections on a range of theological and religious

topics.680

4.2 The relationship between nature and

grace

4.2.1 Opposition to neoscholasticism

De Lubac began his novitiate within the Jesuit order in 1913, although his training was

interrupted by the First World War. This experience exposed de Lubac to a variety of

religious positions amongst the soldiers he served with, ranging from ardent faith through

indifference to atheism.681 Because of the expulsion in 1902 of religious teaching

communities from France, de Lubac’s philosophical and theological training was initially

undertaken at St Mary’s College, Canterbury, on Jersey, in Hastings, and at St Leonards-

on-Sea, before the Jesuit order was able to resume its presence at the scholasticate at

Fourvière near Lyon.

The years of training following demobilisation were formative ones for de Lubac as he

was exposed to the rigidly conservative and fiercely anti-modernist neoscholastic thought

678 Henri de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and his Meaning (New York: New American Library,

1965); Henri de Lubac, The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin (New York: Image Books, 1967); Henri de

Lubac, The Eternal Feminine: A Study on the Poem by Teilhard de Chardin, followed by Teilhard and the

Problems of Today, trans. René d Hague (London: Collins, 1971); Henri de Lubac, La postérité spirituelle

de Joachim de Flore (Paris: Lethielleux, 1978); Henri de Lubac, The Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study of

Proudhon, trans. Canon R. E. Scantlebury (London: Sheed and Ward, 1948); Henri de Lubac, Pic de la

Mirandole: etudes et discussions (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1974). 679 Henri de Lubac, Theology in History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996). 680 de Lubac, Theological Fragments; de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on

the Circumstances that Occasioned his Writings. Hereafter, this work is referred to as ASC. 681 These conversations were to provide the inspiration for de Lubac's book The Discovery of God. See de

Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned his

Writings, 42.

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that dominated French Catholic theology at the time. This theological culture, derived from

Aristotelian categories and language, was marked by a form of ‘extrinsicism.’ De Lubac

refers to such a position as a ‘separated theology.’682 This led to apologetics being reduced

to a rational, rather than mystical, demonstration of the credibility of the Christianity.683

In this theological framework, an appeal is made to an order of pure nature (natura pura)

that is abstracted from humanity’s supernatural finality such that grace is regarded as

extrinsic to, rather than imprinted within, human nature. This teaching was profoundly

infused with Suárezian and Molinist684 orthodoxy and characterised by the adoption of

abstract rationalism, the application of intellectual proofs, and a sharp separation between

the orders of nature and grace. It also reflected the dominant influence of the Italian

Dominican theologian, Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534), particularly in connection with his

interpretation of Aquinas.685 Cajetan’s Thomism involved a two-storey conception of

reality with the self-sufficient natural order lying ‘beneath’ an entirely separate

supernatural realm. It was a theological climate that decoupled nature from grace, reduced

theological formation to the rote learning of formulae, known as manualistic training, was

rigidly authoritarian and marked by a degree of spiritual aridity.686 De Lubac characterises

this approach to the theological enterprise as disproportionately abstract, lacking in depth

and characterised by a misleading superficiality.

The issue of theology’s excessive rationalism, positivism, pettiness and defensiveness,

all of which lead it to fail to engage with the profound mystery of Christian doctrine and

682 Henri de Lubac, Memoire sur l'occasion de mes ecrits, 2e ed. rev. et augm. ed. (Namur: Culture et

verite, 1992), 188. 683 Jordan Hillebert, "Introducing Henri de Lubac," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed.

Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 8. 684 Luis de Molina (1535-1600) sought to reconcile the absolute sovereignty of God and the liberty of the

human will by introducing the notion of scientia media: a knowledge midway between God’s knowledge

of actually existent beings, past, present, and future, and God’s knowledge of purely possible being. 685 As Milbank notes in his text on de Lubac, ‘Cajetan… says that human nature in actuality is fully

definable in merely natural terms. This means that there can be an entirely natural and adequate ethics,

politics, and philosophy and so forth.’ John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the

Debate Concerning the Supernatural (London: SCM Press, 2005), 17. 686 Referring to this approach to the formation of clergy, de Lubac notes ‘To anyone… who consults the

plan of the manuals in use and their tables of contents, it quickly becomes apparent that the proportions of

the doctrinal edifice are at times poorly balanced: certain parts are hypertrophied; others, on the other hand,

are greatly reduced.’ See Henri de Lubac, "Disappearance of the Sense of the Sacred," in Theological

Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 227.

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the depths of the divine-human relationship, is boldly expressed in de Lubac’s first

published article, ‘Apologetics and Theology.’687 In addition to tidying up the profound

mysteries of the gospel, de Lubac holds that neoscholasticism also promotes a perspective

that isolates humanity from divinity and drives a wedge between philosophy and theology.

This theological orientation was, de Lubac notes, undergirded by the influence of Jansenist

thought, which played an important role in shaping the intellectual climate of the French

Church during the nineteenth century.688 In three key works689 de Lubac writes at length

about the principle of pure nature advanced by Baius and Jansenius, in order to recover the

authentic spirit of Augustine’s thought. After offering a sustained critique of the failure to

understand the relationship between nature and grace by both these thinkers, de Lubac

traces in the thought of Augustine the presence of grace in the divine act of creation through

the imago Dei and asserts that the doctrine of pure nature is a perversion of Augustine’s

theology.690

After their disastrous separation, in a development that made secularisation virtually

inevitable, de Lubac draws on ancient sources through the process of ressourcement in

order to reintegrate nature and grace.691 In de Lubac’s major work, Surnaturel, which has

yet to be translated into English, he argues against the calamitous notion of ‘pure nature’

and develops a theology based on the ‘natural’ (both human and non-human) being, which

is ordered so that it participates in God.692 It is also in this work that de Lubac asserts that

theological extrinsicism paves the way for modern secularism in that it isolates the

supernatural from the mundane physical realm of natural action and experience. For de

Lubac, there is a double danger in theological extrinsicism: pure humanism without

687 de Lubac, "Apologetics and Theology,” in Theological Fragments, 91-104. San Francisco: Ignatius

Press, 1989. 688 David Grumett, "De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate," Modern Theology 31, no. 1 (2015):

125-26. 689 Surnaturel, The Mystery of the Supernatural and Augustinianism and Modern Theology. 690 For de Lubac, the only way of correcting the distortions introduced by Baius, Jansenius and their

successors is to appropriate once again the thought of Augustine. S, 157-83; AMT, 235-77; MS, 19, 22. 691 John Webster, "Theologies of Retrieval," in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John

Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain R. Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 588. 692 De Lubac notes that in this work he wanted to ‘present a sort of essay in which contact between

Catholic theology and contemporary thinking could be restored.’ de Lubac, At the Service of the Church:

Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned his Writings, 34.

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reference beyond humanity and of the illusory piety of a religion without humanity

produced by the neoscholastic understanding of grace.693

Following the encyclical, Aeterni Patris, neoscholasticism became the official doctrine

of the Catholic Church and was adopted by the Magisterium in sharp opposition to

Modernism, which was characterised by the adoption of Enlightenment rationality,

epistemology and ethics; positivism in science and philosophy; a worldview that eschewed

the supernatural order of reality; and the application of historical-critical methods in the

study of Scripture that were based on naturalistic assumptions. Pope Pius X strengthened

the place of neoscholasticism in official Catholic teaching by issuing a Syllabus of Errors,

and then issued the encyclical, Pascendi Dominici gregis, in 1907, which sought to repel

threats emerging from Modernism, both within and outside the Church.694 Following the

formal ratification of the propositions as the basis for the training of Catholic clergy in the

new Code of Canon Law, published in 1917, neoscholasticism was established as an all-

embracing dogmatic system that defined the doctrinal and methodological framework

within which formation for the Catholic priesthood was to be situated.695 Many early and

mid-twentieth century Jesuit and Dominican thinkers sought to oppose the dualistic

theological climate associated with neoscholasticism by overturning what they saw as a

grotesque distortion of Thomism through a return to the Fathers and Aquinas, and by

focusing on the concrete existential circumstances of lived human experience. An early

force in this movement was Pierre Rousselot. Indeed, the imprint of Rousselot’s thought

can be seen in several of de Lubac’s key works, which reject the notion of a state of pure

nature, introduced into theology by Cajetan and others, and which affirm the intrinsic

orientation of humanity toward the divine by stressing the natural desire in all people

(whether recognised or not) for God.696

693 John Milbank, "Henri de Lubac," in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in

the Twentieth Century ed. David Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 82. 694 Robert Royal, A Deeper Vision: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Twentieth Century (San

Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015), 123-27. 695 Tracey Rowland, "Neo-scholasticism of the Strict Observance," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de

Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017). 696 John M. McDermott, "De Lubac and Rousselot," Gregorianum 78, no. 4 (1997).

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Another seminal influence on the Nouvelle Théologie movement was the proto-

existentialist philosopher, Maurice Blondel (1861-1949). Blondel’s key work, based on his

doctoral thesis, L’Action,697 develops an existentialist phenomenology grounded on the

premise that humans are marked by an intrinsic and indelible orientation toward the

supernatural. He argues that simply by acting, thinking and living, each person admits a

tacit affirmation of the secret and active presence of the transcendent God in their life.698

The work seeks to unite faith and science by eschewing both intellectualism and fideism

and, in so doing, embraces the concept of action in order to demonstrate the necessity of

the supernatural order within the natural domain and so maintain a position that is faithful

to the tradition of the Fathers of the Church.699

Blondel develops an integrated and systematic approach to the question of human

existence, which he argues consistently owes its ultimate end to God; human destiny must

always be seen to end with the supernatural. Central to Blondel’s thought is a ‘philosophy

of insufficiency.’700 Developing Augustine’s notion of the cor inquietum (restless heart),

he preoccupies himself with human destiny and holds that all people are confronted with

the choice of either embracing or rejecting transcendence. Blondel believes, however, that

it is only when the human person orients their life toward the supernatural that they will

find existential fulfilment.701 In advancing this thesis, Blondel has to repudiate

neoscholasticism, which he claims undermines authentic Catholic thought, fails to address

the challenges of modernity and is, in fact, as de Lubac also holds, the very cause of

697 Maurice Blondel, L'action: Essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une science de la pratique etonnant

(Paris: Alcan, 1893). 698 Stephen Bullivant, The Salvation of Atheists and Catholic Dogmatic Theology (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2012), 61. 699 For an overview of Blondel's thought and a discussion of his inflence on de Lubac and other Jesuits, see

Jon Kirwan, An Avant-garde Theological Generation: The Nouvelle Theologie and the French Crisis of

Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 2, 51-64, 108-27. 700 Blondel speaks of the 'supernatural insufficiency of human nature.' Maurice Blondel, The Letter on

Apologetics, and, History and dogma, trans. A. Dru and I. Trethowan (London: Harvill P, 1964), 141. By

this, he means that humans are confronted with their inability to find ultimate satisfaction within the natural

world and that they must therefore reach beyond themselves – always in response to a pre-existent action of

divine grace – to a transcendent end. 701 Kirwan, An Avante-garde Theological Generation, 52-53.

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secularism. Neo-scholastic theologians attacked Blondel’s thought, accusing him of

Kantian immanentism.702

In response, de Lubac and the other Fourvière Jesuits became disciples of Blondel703

and used Blondel’s proto-existentialist philosophy of transcendence as the starting point

for their own attacks on neoscholasticism and for the development of an alternative

theological perspective.704 This is one that, drawing on the thought of the Fathers, rejects

abstract rationalism and instead emphasises history, the concrete experience of humanity,

pre-conceptual, paradoxical, and mystical approaches to our relationship with God, and the

intrinsic desire of all human creatures for the beatific vision.705 For Blondel, neither

intellectual (or propositional) atheism, which is based on lack of belief in God, nor an

existential, lived and practical atheism that is founded on a refusal of God and a failure to

allow oneself to be enveloped by mystery, are tenable. De Lubac believes that, although

one can think of oneself as an atheist, the rejection of false conceptions of an authentic

God on the one hand, and, on the other, a life based on ethical principles, will, in fact,

unwittingly give honour to God.706 Blondel’s position, particularly as it was interpreted by

de Lubac, is one that has considerable potential as a starting point for the development of

a constructive dialogue between Christianity and atheism.

702 This prompted Blondel to set out his defense in a series of articles entitled ‘Lettre sur les exigences de la

pensee contemporaine en matière d’Apologetique.’ 703 De Lubac discusses the impact of Blondel on his own thought in de Lubac, Theological Fragments,

377-403; and de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that

Occasioned his Writings, 19-26. A more detailed exploration of Blondel's role in shaping de Lubac's

theology is provided in Francesca Murphy, "The Influence of Maurice Blondel," in T&T Clark Companion

to Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); see also Myles B Hannan, "Maurice

Blondel: The Philosopher of Vatican II," The Heythrop Journal 56, no. 6 (2015). 704 This group, in addition to de Lubac, included Gaston Fessard, Jean-Guenolé-Marie Daniélou, René

d'Ouince, Alfred de Soras, Auguste Valensin and Jean Zupan. See Kirwan, An Avant-garde Theological

Generation, 7. 705 ‘God is above all things’ and is ‘anterior even to conceptual thought.’ DG, 127. 706Bullivant, The Salvation of Atheists and Catholic Dogmatic Theology, 61.

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4.2.2 The desire for God and the supernatural finality of

humanity

At the heart of de Lubac’s efforts to revitalise Catholic theology in ways that are rooted in

the tradition of the Fathers and the thought of Thomas Aquinas707 is a conviction that the

divine mystery can only be understood by recovering the unity of the doctrines of creation

and redemption; the cosmos is created in, through and for Jesus Christ.708 Human nature

contains the imprint of divinity – the imago Dei – and this instils in all people an orientation

toward, and desire for, God.709 Such a perspective is clearly at odds with the notion of

natura pura and, consequently, de Lubac rejects a dualistic conception of nature and grace

as if the gift of God’s presence is ‘super-added’ to a pure nature that is altogether isolated

from its divine source. It is entirely wrong, he argues, to derive from Aquinas any

suggestion that human nature could have attributed to it an exclusively natural or

proportionate ultimate end. In his seminal work, Surnaturel: études historiques, published

in 1946, de Lubac demonstrates how Thomas’ thought had been obscured and

misrepresented and that his notion that God had created humans with an ultimate end that

is ordained with beatitude and which is therefore beyond the power of human nature and,

instead, given solely through divine grace, had been wilfully neglected by neoscholastic

theologians.710

Following his reading of Thomas, and stemming also from his adoption of Blondel’s

philosophically rigorous defense of the intrinsic connection between the natural and the

supernatural that characterises the essence of human creatures, de Lubac holds that this

707 The relationship between the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Henri de Lubac on the question of nature

and grace is explored in some detail in Jacob W. Wood, To Stir a Restless Heart: Thomas Aquinas and

Henri de Lubac on Nature, Grace, and the Desire for God (Washington: Catholic University of America

Press, 2019). 708 See Colossians 1.15-20. 709 In a letter to Maurice Blondel, written on 3rd April 1932, de Lubac asks: ‘How can a conscious spirit be

anything other than an absolute desire for God?’ 710 Mansini describes Surnaturel as 'the most influential event in Catholic theology of the twentieth century.

Guy Mansini, "The Abiding Theological Significance of Henri de Lubac's Surnaturel," The Thomist: A

Speculative Quarterly Review 73, no. 4 (2009): 593; see also Philip J Donnelly, "The Surnaturel of P. Henri

de Lubac, SJ," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings of the Third

Annual Convention (June 28-30, 1948) (1948).

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natural desire to see the essence of God is a sign that human nature has been created so that

it reaches its fulfilment through communion with God. This human nature, created in God’s

image, is capax Dei, ontologically ordered in the very act of creation toward the beatific

vision.711 Yet it is a communion that is possible only, as Thomas puts it, ‘from another’s

bestowing,’712 that is, through the gratuitous gift of God. God, then, ‘denies the gods of

our desires, but… is nonetheless the sole God of human desire.’713 To underline this, de

Lubac draws on Saint Ephrem.714 The divine orientation of each person is, in de Lubac’s

terms, an ‘image,’ an ‘imprint,’ or a ‘seal,’ and constitutes the mark of God upon us. This

‘natural desire to see God’ (as Thomas puts it) is intrinsic to humanity through the

ordination of creation, although it can only ever be actuated by God in order to bring to

each person the perfect happiness that the natural order is unable to bestow.715 Supernatural

finality can therefore never be constructed by any person but is an ineradicable component

of our true selves and is the condition of our ability to know and to respond to God.

Nicholas Healy condenses de Lubac’s position on the connection between nature and

grace in the form of five interrelated theses, which set out the human creature’s relation to

God.716 Firstly, de Lubac asserts that as created by God and for God, the ultimate end of

human nature is supernatural beatitude. This truth, de Lubac points out runs from the

Fathers through the whole Christian tradition.717 Aquinas underlines this same principle:

‘The ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the vision of God in His essence.’718 For

both these authors, as with de Lubac, this supernatural finality is given by God ab initio,

711 Reinhard Hütter, ‘Aquinas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God: A Relecture of Summa Contra

Gentiles III, c. 25 apres Henri de Lubac,’ The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 73, no. 4 (2009):

588. 712 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1, q. 62, a. 4. 713 DG, 6. 714 ‘Our spirit bears the imprint of inscrutable Nature through the mystery within it.’ DG, 7. 715 MS, 183. 716 Nicholas J. Healy, "The Christian Mystery of Nature and Grace," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de

Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 188-95. 717 It is famously expressed in Augustine’s statement: ‘You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are

restless until they find their rest in you.’Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin

Books, 1961), I, 1. 718 Thomas Aquinas, The Light of Faith: The Compendium of Theology (New York: Book-of-the Month-

Club, 1998), 104.

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in the very act in which humans beings are created in the image of God. Alternatively,

‘nature was made for the supernatural.’719 Secondly, as already noted, the ultimate end of

human nature can never be achieved by human effort; it is radically beyond our innate

power. For this reason, the final end of human nature can only be brought about through

the gift of divine grace. Thirdly, there is, in every human person, a natural desire to see the

essence of God,720 which is a sign that human nature was created in the image of God and

destined, in conformity with de Lubac’s first thesis, for eternal blessedness with God.721

Fourthly, de Lubac acknowledges that, hypothetically, God could have created intellectual

natures that are not destined for supernatural beatitude. Finally, the affirmation of an

ultimate end of human nature which is supernatural does not involve a denial that nature

also has a ‘proportionate’ natural end. De Lubac’s position, as summarised in these theses,

is clearly in fundamental opposition to the ‘extrinsic’ theological axioms of

neoscholasticism, which segregate the orders of the natural and the supernatural. ‘Man’s

calling… means the calling of man (vocatio hominis) is not only human, but also divine.’722

4.3 Engagements with atheism and unbelief

4.3.1 The roots of atheism and secularism

De Lubac was acutely aware of the erosion of faith in Europe and, in particular in his own

nation, France. He lamented the loss of a connection with the sacred, belief in God, and

the triumphalist philosophical positions that seek to replace God with humanity. In the

aftermath of the French Revolution, Catholicism had been repressed and efforts had been

made to exclude religion in any shape or form from public affairs and culture in France.723

719 de Lubac, Theology in history, 231. 720 The visio beatifica. 721 This orientation is an intrinsic openness to a mystery that infinitely surpasses nature. It is, for de Lubac,

‘essentially in nature and expresses the heart of it.’ (S, 487) 722 Total Meaning of Man in the World, 614. 723 Royal, A Deeper Vision: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Twentieth Century, 189.

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Furthermore, the growing threats of liberalism, materialism, socialism and atheism eroded

Catholicism’s loss of temporal authority in Europe and forced a succession of popes to

redefine the Church in opposition to the trend towards secularisation. This task was,

however, a very difficult one to fulfil as anticlericalism and Gallicanism intensified and

the ancien régime, within which a close relationship between Church and state had

developed, saw its status weakened considerably. Conservative papal resistance to

secularism reached a new height during the papacy of Leo XIII, who, as was noted earlier

in this chapter, sought to realise ultramontane objectives, which advocated supreme papal

authority in matters of faith and discipline, by issuing the encyclicals Aeterni Patris (1879)

and Rerum Novarum (1891). Alas, Leo’s calls for a Thomistic revival did little to

strengthen either the theological rhetoric or social status of the Catholic Church and the

formal adoption of neoscholasticism, the introduction of the clerical oath, and the adoption

of the Latin manuals in the formation of its clergy, created an austere climate within the

Church. As O’Meara notes, ‘its ability to inspire Christian life or to address concrete moral

issues was limited.’724

De Lubac holds that the focus in neoscholastic thought on epistemological justifications

for the Thomist system means that theology is unable to engage effectively with the

atheistic philosophies prevailing in European consciousness. The theological extrinsicism

that he was exposed to in his own training led to apologetics being cut off from the content

of Christian faith.725 This results, he argues, in Catholic apologetics being captivated by ‘a

kind of unavowed rationalism, which had been reinforced for a century by the invasion of

positivist tendencies.’726 Apologetics, he asserts, falls far short of the Church’s great

tradition and in its superficiality simply fails to show how Christian dogma is a ‘source of

universal light.’727 As a result, an increasing number of people across Europe chose to

reject the Church and its teachings. In tandem with the loss of the sacred within society, de

724 Thomas F. O'Meara, Church and Culture: German Catholic Theology, 1860-1914 (University of Notre

Dame Press, 1991), 189. 725 Bryan C. Hollon, Everything is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri de Lubac

(Eugene, Or: Cascade Books, 2009), 34. 726 de Lubac, "Apologetics and Theology," 93. 727 de Lubac, "Authority of the Church in Temporal Matters," 214.

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Lubac is conscious of the spiritual decline within the Church and thus amongst many

Christians.728 This process of spiritual weakening stems, he asserts, from an amnesia

regarding the Church’s tradition, which leads it to be open to distortion by ideologies that

seek to seize and disfigure it, the greatest example of which, in de Lubac’s own time, was

Nazism, to which many within the Catholic Church in France sadly acquiesced.729

Consequently, unbelief, de Lubac argues, is not restricted to those outside the Church but

‘also prevails within the ecclesiastical world as well.’730 Lamenting the often simplistic

and nominal faith of contemporary Catholics, he goes on to state:

There is an easily observable contrast in many men between their secular knowledge and

their religious instruction; the former is that of a grown man, who has studied for a long

time, who has specialised in some professional skill, who knows life, who is cultivated; the

second has remained that of a child, wholly elementary, rudimentary, a mixture of childish

imagination, poorly assimilated abstract notions, scraps of vague and disconnected

teachings gathered by chance from experience.731

The pervasiveness of such a superficial form of Christianity leads many to obliterate any

sense of mystery or profundity in their faith and to regard ‘Catholic’ merely as a label or

badge, rather than as a mark of the Church’s universality. Lifeless Christianity is, for de

Lubac, not just precipitated by intellectual and theological errors that stem from

neoscholasticism. In his essay, ‘Christian Explanation of Our Times,’ he also traces the

erosion of Christian consciousness to privatisation in matters of faith.

As we have seen, de Lubac holds that unbelief and secularism have theological, as well

as cultural and philosophical, roots. He believes that the breakdown of the traditional

dogmatic synthesis of nature and grace, as elaborated by the Fathers and by Aquinas, led

to the notion that nature and the supernatural are each self-contained orders, with the one

728 See Henri de Lubac, "Temptations Against the Church," Life of the Spirit (1946-1964) 7, no. 84 (1953);

and Henri de Lubac, "Temptations Against the Church - II," Life of the Spirit (1946-1964) 8, no. 85 (1953). 729 Henri de Lubac, De Lubac: A Theologian Speaks, trans. Angelo Scola (Los Angeles, Calif: Twin Circle,

1985), 1-2. 730 de Lubac, "Disappearance of the Sense of the Sacred," 225. 731 de Lubac, "Disappearance of the Sense of the Sacred," 225.

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added to the other. The consequences of this theological extrinsicism are the separation of

being and Christian life, of the world and the Church, and of reason and faith. Thus, for de

Lubac, the neoscholastic conceptualisation of the relationship between nature and grace

amounts to an extrinsicism that leaves nature wholly divorced from God and creates the

conditions that make possible, or even inevitable, atheist humanism.732 De Lubac traces

this dualistic conception from Baianism to the modernist immanentism of the twentieth

century and, with Congar, denounces it as the ‘disease of modern Catholicism [which has]

blinded us to the full character of the desire of nature.’733 In Surnaturel and in other later

works that develop the thesis set out in this key text, de Lubac argues that it is the

neoscholastic notion of pure nature, which holds that nature has an integrity apart from the

supernatural, that leads to the flattening of conceptions of humanity, and an extrinsicism

in theology that regards grace as added externally to humanity as a closed and sufficient

whole. For this reason, neoscholasticism, in de Lubac’s view, is partly responsible for the

growth of immanentism, secularism, humanism and atheism.

De Lubac is not denying that there is a distinction between the natural and the

supernatural. He asserts, however, there remains an intimate relationship between them,

‘an ordination, a finality… nature was made for the supernatural, and, without having any

right over it, nature is not explained without it.’734 Problems emerge when this intimate

connection becomes broken in both theological and philosophical thought. The isolation

of the supernatural, which, as we have seen, de Lubac traces through the neoscholastic

distortion of the thought of the Fathers and of Aquinas, may have been advanced in order

to protect the supernatural from any contamination. Yet, the outcome is that it becomes

decoupled from the living spirit of human affairs and social life and, as a consequence,

leaves human society open to the invasion of secularism. This theological move ushers in

conceptions of progress and human maturity that are founded on a total secularisation that

732 Royal, A Deeper Vision: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Twentieth Century, 191. 733 ‘… this gift [grace] presented itself as something superimposed, as an artificial superstructure, indeed as

an arbitrary imposition, and the nonbeliever had an easy time entrenching himself in his indifference

precisely on what theology told him… Today, this secularism, having often become atheistic and following

its own path, is trying to invade the consciousness of Christians themselves.’ Henri de Lubac, "The Total

Meaning of Man and the World," Communio: International Catholic Review 35 (2008): See 619-22. 734 de Lubac, "Disappearance of the Sense of the Sacred," 231.

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amounts to the expulsion of God from social life, from culture and from the relationships

of private life. Furthermore, it generates a sense of human reality characterised by an

atheistic attitude in which human fullness is understood to be entirely independent of a

religious dimension.735

In addition to de Lubac’s exploration of the theological grounds for atheism and

unbelief, which highlight his sensitivity to the entanglement of atheism and theism and his

rejection of a simple binary opposition between these two positions, de Lubac also offers

some brief reflections on the problem of suffering. This is an issue that lies behind unbelief

for some, although not all, people. It should be noted that de Lubac does not develop a

systematic account of human evil neither does he attempt to present a coherent theodicy.

His discussion of this matter is mainly confined to the experience of suffering encountered

by Christians. His discussion of the issue is expressed within a number of fragmentary

remarks in his work Paradoxes of Faith.736 Through a series of compressed statements, de

Lubac acknowledges the agony of suffering, struggle and death as marks of the human

predicament. Nonetheless, citing John 16.20, he sees within suffering the possibility of

transfiguration and for the troubled Christian who is afflicted by sorrow, de Lubac

commends both prayer and the sacrament of confession. For suffering can, in the end, bring

a blessing as it frees us from sentimentality and offers a gateway into the love of God. And

recalling Pascal’s statement that ‘Jesus Christ will be in agony until the end of the world,’

de Lubac contemplates Jesus’ suffering as that under which the one who suffers can shelter.

Furthermore, with Augustine, de Lubac identifies evil as something that does not have a

positive reality: ‘It is an antagonistic force, the pure power of negation, of refusal, of

opposition, of revolt.’737

735 de Lubac, "The Total Meaning of Man and the World," 621-22. 736 de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 171-89. 737 de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 189.

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4.3.2 The consequences of atheist humanism

De Lubac’s most systematic and important work on the subject of unbelief was published

in 1944 as Le drame de l’humanisme athée.738 It is a key text in which he traces the self-

destruction of humanism, and, for this reason, it is of central importance in the context of

this thesis. It is particularly significant to the extent that it is representative of a notable

development in intellectual thought in the middle of the twentieth century, which was the

serious engagement of many Catholic theologians and philosophers with atheistic

thought.739 In the book de Lubac provides a detailed analysis of the thought of Feuerbach,

Nietzsche, Marx and Comte, as well as three fascinating chapters on the fictional atheists

that populate the pages of Dostoevsky’s greatest novels. Emerging from these engagements

is de Lubac’s central thesis, which is that absolute atheism ultimately leads to the absolute

enthronement of humanity. Throughout the work, de Lubac is most concerned, not with

reason-centred atheism, but various expressions of what he calls anti-theism, which have

as their common foundation the rejection of God.740 Such expressions of atheism form the

bedrock of an anti-theistic secular mentality and form of cultural organisation, which leads

to the complete negation of God and which inevitably has far-reaching and dramatic

consequences for humanity.741 It is marked by an absolute denial of God whilst its positive

character is marked by its deeply held anti-theism, a ‘belief system’ that demands complete

commitment from its adherents and which seeks to shift the course of human culture. It is

based on a deeply rooted confidence in human nature, the rejection of any form of divine

authority, and a desire that humanity take control, improve society and espouse both

intellectual and moral self-mastery.742 Yet, the outcome of a humanism founded on the

denial of God not only conceives of humanity in ways that are removed from the sense of

the sacred or of humanity’s transcendent orientation, it leads to the erosion of humanity

738 The Drama of Atheist Humanism. 739 See Stephen Bullivant, "From “Main Tendue” to Vatican II: The Catholic Engagement with Atheism

1936–1965," New Blackfriars 90, no. 1026 (2009): esp.181. 740 DAH, 12. This corresponds to the Type II form of atheism in the typology outlined in the opening

chapter of this thesis. 741 Jürgen Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie - New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of

Vatican II (London: T. & T. Clark, 2010), 96. 742 Hollon, Everything is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri de Lubac, 15-16.

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itself. ‘... [T]he rejection of God is matched by a certain similarity in results, the chief of

which is the annihilation of the human person… Exclusive humanism is inhuman

humanism.’743 With respect to the typology of atheism that I outlined in Chapter 1, this

form of anti-theism resonates most closely with Type II atheism.

The Drama of Atheist Humanism, as its title suggests, is set out like a play. In the first

act, de Lubac explores the hostility against God that is held by many of the nineteenth

century’s most prominent atheists. De Lubac wrote this book not as a resentful reaction

against atheism. It is, rather, a serious effort to better understand the intellectual position

held by some of the most prominent atheists of the nineteenth century.744 Focusing on

Feuerbach, Nietzsche and Marx, de Lubac notes that these thinkers were not, primarily,

interested in the speculative question of God’s existence. Rather, their focus is on the

problem facing humanity.

The problem posed was a human problem – it was the human problem – and the solution

that is being given to it is one that claims to be positive. Man is getting rid of God in order

to regain possession of the human greatness that, it seems to him, is being unwarrantably

withheld by another. In God he is overthrowing an obstacle to gain his freedom.745

Modern humanism is, for de Lubac, built upon resentment (Nietzsche coined the term

ressentiment although the sense in which he uses this concept is rather different) and begins

with a choice, the choice to reject God and adopt a position of anti-theism. Drawing on his

study of the French politician and philosopher, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon,746 he notes that,

for Proudhon, the cause of anti-theism is not, essentially, to do with God himself, but upon

a certain recourse to his authority.747 For Feuerbach, who, de Lubac argues, provides the

743 DAH, 12, 14. In characterising atheist humanism in this way, de Lubac anticipates the critique voiced

by Lévinas, see Emmanuel Lévinas, "On Maurice Blanchot," in Proper Names (London: Athlone, 1996),

127-28; see also Geroulanos, An atheism that is not humanist; Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie - New

Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II, 96. 744 Andreas Gonçalves Lind and Bruno Nobre, "(De)dramatizing Atheist Humanism: Henri de Lubac and

Emmanuel Falque in Dialogue," Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 76, no. 2/3 (2020): 933. 745 DAH, 24-25. 746 de Lubac, The Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study of Proudhon. 747 DAH, 25.

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link between Hegel and Marx, the attributes humans assign to God are, in fact, those

belonging to humanity and, in so doing, ‘[man] impoverishes himself by enriching God…

he affirms in God what he denies in himself.’748 Thus, distilling Feuerbach’s thesis, de

Lubac states that ‘after the movement of the religious systole, by which man rejected

himself, he must now, by a movement of diastole, “take back into his heart that nature

which he had rejected.” The hour has at last struck when we must exorcise the phantom…

the kingdom of man has come.’749 This form of atheism is a positive atheism, based, as

Maritain puts it, ‘on an active struggle against everything that reminds us of God,’750 and

amounts to ‘anti-Christianism,’751 rather than a negative atheism that employs the rejection

of belief in God through the negation of a metaphysical assertion.752 It is, as we saw in

Chapter One, a Promethean atheism753 within which ‘man projects his being into

objectivity, thereby making himself an object to that image of himself now considered as

the Divine Subject.’754 So, for Feuerbach:

If the divinity of nature is the basis of all religions, including Christianity, the divinity of

man is its final aim… The turning point of history will be the moment when man becomes

aware that the only God of man is man himself. Homo homini Deus! [‘man is a God to

man!’]755

Feuerbach’s thought was taken up by Engels and Marx, who both believe that Feuerbach

makes the criticism of religion substantially complete,756 and argue that religion does not

make man but it is man that makes religion, and that its eradication is the precondition of

the emancipation of humanity.757 In another work, de Lubac is critical of the tendency that

748 DAH, 28-29. 749 DAH, 29. 750 Maritain, The Range of Reason, 104. 751 DAH, 12. 752 Jordan Hillebert, "The Death of God and the Dissolution of Humanity," New Blackfriars 95, no. 1060

(2014): 676-77; see also Palmer, "The Meaning of Atheism," 1-2. 753 Marx considered Prometheus to be the 'the noblest of saints and martyrs in the calendar of philosophy.'

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, On Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 15. 754 Hillebert, "The Death of God and the Dissolution of Humanity," 677. 755 DAH, 30. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 27. 756 DAH, 38. 757 DAH, 39-40.

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he observes in both Marxist and Fascist ideologies, which hold that humanity, through

science and technology, can wield an unlimited sway over nature and create its own

history. Such frameworks reduce us to an inextricable knot of natural relationships and

must, he argues, be resisted in order to recognise our ‘cosmic preparation’ and the divine

foundations of anthropology.758

De Lubac notes that Marx shares his own analysis of excessive individualism as

dehumanising. However, Marx only succeeds in replacing it with the opposite excess. This

is because Marx, by denying the existence of God and defining humanity entirely in terms

of ‘a network of social relations,’759 ends up abandoning any means of guaranteeing the

‘inviolable depths’ of the human person, which leaves the individual to derive their value

solely from its function within the social whole. Marx, in de Lubac’s view, sacrifices the

individual at the altar of an impersonal future.760 De Lubac is far more respectful of another

socialist, Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), than he is about Marx. Proudhon is sharply

critical of the Church and espouses a form of anti-theism based on opposition to God.761

However, de Lubac acknowledges that much of Proudhon’s criticism is justified. And,

despite his highly problematic relationship with Christianity, Proudhon was never without

a Bible and professed that the idea of God was both inescapable and universal.762

De Lubac deepens his exploration of anthropocentric atheism in his discussion of

Nietzsche and his notion of the ‘death of God,’ which occupies the remaining part of the

first act of The Drama. He notes that, for Nietzsche, God cannot ‘live’ anywhere but in the

human mind and that the way to get rid of God is ‘not so much to refute the proofs of his

existence as to show how such an idea came to be formed and how it succeeded in

758 De Lubac cites Leo the Great in order to underline this point: ‘O man, awaken! Know the dignity of thy

nature; remember that thou wert made in God’s own image.’ (BC, 15-18) Leo the Great, In Nativitate

Domini, sermo 7, 2 PL 54, 267-68. 759 C, 359. 760 DAH, 66; C, 359. Gardner, "An Inhuman Humanism," 236. 761 de Lubac, The Un-Marxian Socialist: A Study of Proudhon, 207. 762 For de Lubac, Proudhon's anti-theism is not so much the denial of the idea of God as it is the

purification of this idea. De Lubac holds that this position should serve as a wake-up call to Christians. See

Voderholzer, Meet Henri de Lubac: His Life and Work, 147.

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establishing itself in the human mind and in “gaining weight” there.’763 This view, de

Lubac believes, is highly destructive, and he describes Nietzsche’s influence as eating

away ‘like an acid at the consciousness of our contemporaries.’764 As Jüngel does in God

as the Mystery of the World, de Lubac acknowledges that the phrase ‘the death of God’

does have some currency in theological reflection on the crucifixion and notes that

Nietzsche, with his Lutheran background, is likely to have heard Luther’s chorale,765 and

would have been aware of Hegel’s use of the notion.766 However, the meaning that

Nietzsche attaches to the relationship between God and death is, of course, quite new, and

de Lubac suggests that Nietzsche issues the phrase ‘God is dead,’ not as a statement of

fact, a lament or a piece of sarcasm, but as a choice. ‘It is an act. An act as definite and

brutal as those he himself was later to adopt.’767

I herald the coming of a tragic era… We must be prepared for a long succession of

demolition, devastation and upheavals… Europe will soon be enveloped in darkness; we

shall watch the rising of a black tide.768 Thanks to me, a catastrophe is at hand. A

catastrophe whose name I know, whose name I cannot tell… Then all the earth will writhe

in convulsion.769

Nietzsche’s prophecy was, of course, to be demonstrated in the atrocities experienced by

Europe during the twentieth century, in the carnage of two world wars, the horrors of the

Holocaust and through the devastating impact of fascist and communist regimes. In other

words, the ‘death of God’ announced by Nietzsche and the atheist humanism that it

763 DAH, 45-46. 764 DAH, 398. See also Henri de Lubac, Affrontements mystiques (Paris: Editions du Temoignage chretien,

1949), 12. 765 O grosse Not, Gott selbst ist tot (What a calamity, God himself is dead). 766 DAH, 47. 767 DAH, 48. 768 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 174. 769 DAH, 64.

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provoked had fatal repercussions for humanity.770 Atheism leads, de Lubac believes, to the

self-destruction of humanity, for ‘where there is no God, there is no man either.’771

In the second act of The Drama, de Lubac interprets atheist humanism as a form of

dépassement, or overtaking, foreshadowing a theme that would be more fully worked out

in his 1968 publication, Athéisme et sens de l’homme.772 For the atheist humanist in the

wake of Feuerbach, all theology is reducible to anthropology,773 since atheism presumes

an understanding of the Christian faith, even claiming that it can exalt its role, despite

rejecting its supposed mythology as this is replaced with anthropological truth.774 De Lubac

traces this tendency to strip the Christian faith of its profound mystery and transcendent

orientation to the influence of Hegel on nineteenth century philosophy. As Hegel holds that

God is not the infinite as set wholly over-and-against the finite (a point that de Lubac

would, in fact, agree with) but rather that the divine spirit becomes absolute spirit precisely

in and through the mediation of finite spirit, the Christian kerygma becomes susceptible to

the ‘overtaking’ proffered by advocates of atheist humanism and thus, as Feuerbach

believes, religion becomes identical with self-consciousness.775

One of the more peculiar expressions of the anthropological transposition of religion to

emerge during the nineteenth century is found within the work of Auguste Comte (1798-

1857), whose thought was of immense influence in France at the turn of the century to the

770 For de Lubac, this humanism is unrecognisable from the Christian vision of humanity as anchored in the

love of God and orientated to the supernatural, which he advances. 771 DAH, 65. Here De Lubac adopts the phrase coined by the Russian Christian philosopher, Nikolai

Berdyaev. De Lubac makes the same point in The Discovery of God, where he writes ‘Man without God is

dehumanzied.’ DG, 193. 772 De Lubac writes, 'contemporary atheism considers itself capble of absorbing into itself the Christian

substance and of transforming the believer... into an atheist.' Henri De Lubac, Athéisme et sens de l'homme:

une double requête de Gaudium et spes (Éditions du Cerf, Vol. 67, 1968), 24. 773 DAH, 422. 774 De Lubac, Athéisme et sens de l'homme: une double requête de Gaudium et spes, 29; see also Hillebert,

"The Death of God and the Dissolution of Humanity," 679. 775 Hillebert, "The Death of God and the Dissolution of Humanity," 680.

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extent that de Lubac refers to it as ‘like the air one breathes.’776 De Lubac allocates an

extended portion of The Drama of Atheist Humanism to an exploration of Comte’s work,

showing how the French philosopher seeks to displace Christianity with the positivist

‘religion of Humanity.’777 This amounts to a radical reconstruction of religion based on

Comte’s well-known ‘law of three states.’778 These states describe the transitions through

which humanity has moved from an initial condition characterised by a primitive belief in

God, through a second, metaphysical, state centred on reasoning, and into a third state

marked by the ‘definitive religion’ of positivism. This final state is marked by an

understanding of intellectual, moral and social questions in terms of immanent natural

laws.779 Comte sees human nature as a social whole, a great organism that through its

perfection over time is worthy of our admiration. However, in contrast to the esteem that

Comte has for human sociality, he dismisses Christianity as a form of slavery and a

principle of division that encourages human beings to gaze upwards instead of focusing on

union with each other.780 Comte’s anti-theism seeks to redress this tendency by redirecting

our feelings, our thoughts and our action around Humanity, which is the new ‘Supreme

Being,’ in order to realise truth and coherence in society.781

Following his discussion of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Comte, de Lubac

examines the atheistic sentiments expressed by several of the protagonists in Dostoevsky’s

776 DAH, 135. Significantly, Comte professes a radical agnosticism with respect to the question of God. He

eschewed the term atheist and never applied this label to himself, regarding it as a ‘mere temporary

negativism.’ DAH, 160-61. Rather surprisingly, although he never tired of dismissing the Christian gospel,

de Lubac notes that Comte had a life-long admiration for Thomas à Kempis’ work, The Imitation of Christ.

DAH, 186. 777 This human-centred religion has its own forms of worship, dogma, regime and even a notion of

scientists as ‘high priests.’ DAH, 216-19, 241. 778 This is also known as the ‘Law of three stages.’ Comte describes these as: the theological or fictitious

state, the metaphysical or abstract state, and the scientific or positive state. DAH, 139. 779 DAH, 172. See also Hillebert, "The Death of God and the Dissolution of Humanity," 236-37. 780 Comte sees all forms of monotheism as blind and at the root of injustice. DAH, 170. 781 Like Feuerbach, Comte regards religion as ‘a vampire that feeds upon the substance of mankind’ and

seeks, as his predecessor had done, to substitute God with humanity. DAH, 39, 171-72.

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novels.782 De Lubac notes that ‘Dostoevsky’s books abound in atheists.’783 These include

Raskolnikov,784 Stavrogin, Kirillov,785 and Ivan Karamazov, all of whom seek, in a

Nietzschean way, to reach a region situated ‘beyond good and evil.’786 De Lubac

recognises that Dostoevsky’s faith was always a troubled one and that he exhibits some

sympathy for his fictional atheists. Nonetheless, in the chapter ‘The Bankruptcy of

Atheism,’ de Lubac charts the destructive qualities exhibited by the ‘man-gods’ he creates.

Like Nietzsche, he saw the divine sun setting on the horizon of Europe. However, unlike

Nietzsche, this was not something to be hailed as a triumph. Dostoevsky believed Europe

would turn to Christ.787 As Makar Ivanovich states in The Adolescent, ‘to live without God

is nothing but torture… Man cannot live without kneeling…’ After exploring the complex

and sometimes tortured nature of the atheistic characters in the novels, de Lubac holds

Dostoevsky to be a prophet, a mystic and a profound Christian. His Orthodox faith,

wracked with doubt as it was at times, was to sustain him all his life and led to his view of

the universe as imbued with symbolic power.

In the final act of The Drama, de Lubac adopts a more polemical tone as he moves from

the narration of atheistic thought into a theological analysis. This shift sees him examine

the impact of atheistic humanism on humanity and on humanity’s relationship with God.

‘It is not true,’ he writes, ‘that man cannot organise the world without God. What is true is

that, without God, he can ultimately only organise it against man.’788 The atrocities

experienced in Europe during the twentieth century were, for de Lubac, the outworking of

the spiritual crisis provoked by the atheistic humanism of the previous century, just as

Nietzsche had predicted when he spoke of himself as a ‘man of impending disaster.’ For

782 For other studies of Dostoevsky’s fiction, which highlight the atheistic qualities of many of its key

characters, see Stephen Bullivant, "A House Divided Against Itself: Dostoevsky and the Psychology of

Unbelief," Literature and Theology 22, no. 1 (2008); Rowan Williams, Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and

Fiction (London: Bloomsbury, 2009). 783 DAH, 309. 784 The principal chararacter in Dostoevsky’s 1866 novel Crime and Punishment. 785 Stavrogin and Kirillov are chacters from Dostoevsky’s 1872 novel Demons. 786 DAH, 282. 787 DAH, 333. 788 Through his service within the French armed forces during the First World War and by fleeing the

Gestapo during the Second World War, de Lubac had witnessed first-hand the atrocious consequences of a

world ‘organised against man.’ DAH, 14.

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de Lubac, then, atheist humanism, far from dignifying humanity, leads to the annihilation

of the human person.789 ‘Man without God is dehumanised.’790 For de Lubac, then, atheist

humanism amounts to what Levinas calls ‘an atheism that is not humanist.’791 By liberating

themselves from obedience to God, atheists have also delivered themselves from obedience

to the human subject. The ‘death of God’ is, in fact, a refusal of all foundations. It is an

‘ontological revolt’ whereby the individual is constituted by the very power of this

negation. Eradicating God does not lead to the affirmation of humanity, but rather to the

abyss of uncertainty and the self-destruction of humanity.792

4.3.3 Mysticism and human reason in the context of faith

An important element within de Lubac’s project that is significant in the context of the

relationship between Christians and non-Christians is connected with his mystical

understanding of Christianity. Indeed, mysticism runs as a leitmotif throughout his

theology.793 De Lubac does not, however, restrict his attention to Christian mysticism. He

recognises its place in other world religions, which he grounds in his understanding of

human nature as a limitless openness to God. He even raises the question of whether it may

be possible to speak of an atheistic mysticism, a theme that he explores in the final section

of his work The Drama of Atheist Humanism, ‘Nietzsche as a Mystic.’794 To underline this

point, de Lubac cites Nietzsche: ‘I am a mystic, and I believe in nothing.’795 In his essay

on Nietzsche’s mysticism, which forms the final chapter of The Drama of Atheist

789 ‘If man takes himself as a god, he can, for a time, cherish the illusion that has raised and freed himself.

But it is a fleeting exaltation! In reality, he has merely abased God, and it is not long before he finds that in

doing so he has abased himself.’ DAH, 67-68. 790 DG, 193. 791 Emmanuel Lévinas, Proper Names (London: Athlone, 1996), 127. 792 Hillebert, "The Death of God and the Dissolution of Humanity," 684-87. 793 De Lubac had planned a book-length study of Christian mysticism. He compiled copious notes for this

work and wrote the first part of it. Alas, however, he considered the book was beyond his abilities, and

sadly it was never completed. See Bryan C. Hollon, "Mysticism and Mystical Theology," in T&T Clark

Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 307-08; de Lubac, At the

Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned his Writings, 113. 794 DAH, 469-509. 795 de Lubac, "Mysticism and Mystery," 42.

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Humanism, de Lubac seeks to unite the Nietzschean concepts of the Overman and the idea

of the Eternal Return, which he understands to be elements of Nietzsche’s exaltation of life

and of his desire to establish ‘a European Buddhism.’796 Rooted in his inclusive

understanding of salvation, de Lubac holds that all people can receive grace from God and

be led on to mystical experiences even if they are outside the visible Church.797 Despite

this affirmation, de Lubac rejects the idea that different forms of religious mysticism can

be conflated such that they a constitute a shared experience among all the world’s religions.

He also, as I have noted, opposes extrinsicism that conceives of God, in nominalist fashion,

as one being among others (albeit of greater power and proportion) and, as a corollary, any

form of theology disconnected from lived experience. These tendencies, de Lubac argues,

are behind the loss of the sense of the sacred in contemporary life and the reason why so

many people are turning away from their Catholic faith.798 For de Lubac, theological

extrinsicism, nominalism in matters of faith, and the suffocating rationalism of theology

lead to the erosion of the mystical sense of the sacred, which needs to be restored through

the participation in the life of the Trinity through union with Jesus Christ in grace.

De Lubac’s interests in mysticism form a backdrop to his understanding of the

relationship between faith, belief and reason, a topic that forms the central theme in his

work The Discovery of God and which is discussed in some detail by David Grumett.

Despite his insistence that the Christian faith is fundamentally mysterious, de Lubac

refuses to oppose reason and faith, private and public belief, or theology and action. The

faith of the Church is, of course, given formal expression in its Creeds. However, for de

Lubac, the act of faith is not provided by credal affirmation, but arises prior to it. For this

reason, the ‘objective language of the Creed must be the manifestation of the existential

language of the act to which it testifies.’799 In other words, the definitions of belief

contained in the Creeds are products of human reason, yet describe a transcendent reality

and, as such, the Creeds cannot be of purely natural origin.800 This is helpful rejoinder to

796 DAH, 489. 797 Voderholzer, Meet Henri de Lubac: His Life and Work, 212. 798 Hollon, "Mysticism and Mystical Theology," 309-12. 799 de Lubac, Christian Faith: An Essay on the Structure of the Apostles' Creed, 318-19. 800 David Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007), 113.

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the position of many atheists, who dismiss the Creeds as irrelevant and unbelievable. In

relation to Christian belief, de Lubac asserts that belief is not simply knowledge about God,

but knowledge of God in which God actively reveals himself. For this reason, belief is

dependent on God for its specific content as well as its original possibility. The human

affirmation of God is, then, a sign of the illuminating presence and activity of God in

humanity.801 This notion stems from his understanding of nature being graced and his

understanding of a désir naturel, which provides the basis for why an act of faith by the

human person is possible. Thus, the idea of God emerges spontaneously as part of a

reflective process that includes both rational and mystical elements.802 The act of faith, for

de Lubac, is the ‘fundamental attitude which makes one a Christian, the spiritual reality

which lies at the root of all Christian life.’803 At the heart of the Christian’s belief in God

is a position of trust, because it implies a relation between the believer and the object in

whom the believer places their belief. As Augustine urges, ‘that you should believe in him;

not that you should believe things about him.’804

Because human beings are reasoning beings, reason must complement trust in the

Christian’s affirmation of faith, and thus reason, de Lubac argues, can indeed be used to

argue for God’s existence.805 Thus, whilst faith is essentially personal, objective reason,

particularly as it has been used in constructing the classical proofs for God’s existence, has

801 ‘In no way can the soul attain the knowledge of God , unless God himself stoops down to her, in order

to raise her up to himself. For the human spirit would never have the strength to stay the course, so as to

attain some measure of divine light, if God did not draw it to himself – inasmuch as it is possible for the

human spirit to be thus drawn – and illuminate it with his own brightness.’ DG, 134. 802 Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed, 114-15. 803 de Lubac, Christian Faith: An Essay on the Structure of the Apostles' Creed, 275. 804 de Lubac, Christian Faith: An Essay on the Structure of the Apostles' Creed, 141. Augstine, Homilies on

the Gospel of John 29.6, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 28 vols; Grand

Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1961, I.7, 185. 805 De Lubac argues that reason allows access to a level of perfection that is in itself complete. This is

because God’s revelation ‘can be received by us only in a human mode.’ de Lubac, Christian Faith: An

Essay on the Structure of the Apostles' Creed, 322. For this reason, de Lubac defends the notion of a

Christian philosophy. He asserts that Christian belief has impregnated philosophy with the axioms upon

which it is built and that no philosopher, despite what they may think, can escape from dependence on the

Christian tradition. There is, nonetheless, a radical insufficiency in philosophical logic. In the submission

of Christian faith to revelation lies the ‘beyond of philosophy.’ Henri de Lubac, "Retrieving the Tradition:

On Christian Philosophy, Sharon Mollerus & Susan Clements (trans.)," Communio 19, no. 3 (1992): 484,

88.

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a role. In The Discovery of God, de Lubac mounts a trenchant defence of the validity of

such proofs:

All the objections brought against the various proofs of the existence of God are in vain;

criticism can never invalidate them, for it can never get its teeth into the principle common

to them all. On the contrary, that principle emerges more clearly as the elements with

which the proofs are constructed are rearranged. That is because it is not a particular

principle which the mind can either isolate and sift so as to determine its limits, or reject

out of hand: it forms part of the substance of the mind.806

The function of the proofs of God’s existence is essentially to clear away obstacles to a

clearer perception of divine reality: the proofs are ways, and not foundations of a system

of knowledge.807 The idea of God is not, therefore, dependent on the proofs. Rather, the

proofs are dependent on the idea which provides the ‘inspiration, the motive power and the

justification of them all.’808 For de Lubac, it is clear that Christians mean something very

different when they speak of belief in God from atheists when they deny that they believe

in God. Christian faith in the idea of God is, de Lubac argues, present in the mind without

the assistance of concepts or arguments, whereas, for the atheist, the denial of God often

(although not always) stems from rational argumentation based on the lack of evidence.

These aspects of de Lubac’s thought are exceptionally helpful in providing the Church

with resources to speak about the nature and character of Christian faith. They stem from

de Lubac’s conviction that a principle that transcends nature is essential to human life and

which gives human nature its purpose and meaning. The New Atheists, particularly

Richard Dawkins, are quick to dismiss the traditional proofs of God. De Lubac, however,

is insistent that the affirmation of the existence of an Absolute is essential for human

flourishing. In addition to the classical proofs, de Lubac also supports the proof of God’s

existence advanced by Teilhard de Chardin, whose argument is cosmological as the world

806 DG, 62. 807 DG, 73-74, 116. 808 DG, 39. Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed, 120.

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goes through a process of convergent evolution, the sufficient reason and cause of which

is the action of a unifying being.809

Although de Lubac assembles a strong case for a pre-conceptual foundation to faith, he

does not advocate an inevitable confession of faith and accepts that the option of denial is

a legitimate position to take. This acknowledgement is instructive and needs to be taken

seriously by the Church as it confronts the challenge of unbelief in contemporary society.

Yet, even where there is doubt, there always remains the possibility of faith beyond it.

‘Whenever we say “No,” we imply that on a deeper level there is a “Yes” which provokes

and originates it; rebellion always implies an acquiescence which is both deeper and more

free.’810 These, again, are important and helpful aspects of de Lubac’s project in connection

with the question of faith, which may shape the dialogue between Christians and

unbelievers. I will draw on additional resources within de Lubac’s project that can

contribute to the Church’s engagement with atheism in Chapter 5.

4.4 De Lubac’s soteriology

Although de Lubac is critical of atheistic humanism and seeks to trace both the roots and

consequences of unbelief in relation to developments both inside and outside of the

Church, he, at the same time, espouses a doctrine of salvation that is communal, rather than

individualistic, which lays the foundations for the Second Vatican Council’s

acknowledgement that unbelievers may be saved. This notion is developed in de Lubac’s

first major work, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, which was

published in 1938. The book is profoundly Christocentric, as de Lubac explores the

question of human disunity – both with the supernatural and amongst people – and how

the unity of the human race (again, both with God and with one another) is restored through

Christ: ‘all infidelity to the divine image that man bears in him, every breach with God, is

809 de Lubac, Theology in History, 521. 810 DG, 195.

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at the same time a disruption of human unity.’811 Yet, ‘the redemption being a work of

restoration will appear to us by that very fact as the recovery of lost unity – the recovery

of supernatural unity of man with God, but equally of the unity of men among

themselves.’812 The notion of the rupture and healing of unity between humanity and God,

as well as among people, is a thread that runs throughout Catholicism. The work underlines

the importance of history as the stage for the drama of salvation, unfolds a vision of the

Church as the temporal vehicle by which humans travel to final union, both with God and

with each other, and conceives of salvation as the healing of God’s image (the bearing of

God’s likeness) and the reunification of the natural and the supernatural, and argues for the

orientation of the entire human race toward the beatific vision.813

De Lubac begins the work with a series of charges made by contemporary ‘free-

thinkers’ who accuse the Church of being disinterested in ‘our terrestrial future and in

human fellowship,’ assert that Christians are only interested in their own souls, and that

they are unconcerned about advancing solidarity with those outside the Church.814 In

outlining these objections, de Lubac indicates that he is less interested in responding to

those who resist Christianity on historical, scientific or philosophical grounds than he is in

engaging with those who are repelled by what they perceive as the individualism of

Christianity and the detachment of the Church from the concerns of humanity.815

Individualism, de Lubac argues, is a particularly pernicious modern ill that has afflicted all

areas of society, including the Church, but which may be addressed from a Christian

perspective as the Church reopens herself to the theme of unity that is at the heart of the

teaching of the Fathers. Despite the riches that the Church is able to draw upon through its

patristic sources, de Lubac concludes that, when criticisms of the Church have been

presented, the misunderstandings are sometimes none other than the fault of Christians: ‘if

811 C, 33. 812 C, 35. De Lubac is quoting the 6th century writer, Paschasius Radbertus: Opus imperfectum in

Matthaeum, hom. 33. 813 Benjamin M Durheim, "All the World is Church: The Christian Call in Henri de Lubac," Obsculta 2, no.

1 (2009): 39. 814 C, 13-14. 815 This corresponds to the Type II atheism identified in the typology set out in the opening chapter of this

thesis.

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so many observers, who are not lacking in acumen or in religious spirit, are so grievously

mistaken about the essence of Catholicism, is it not an indication that Catholics should

make an effort to understand it better themselves?’816 This insistent nostra culpa paves the

way for de Lubac to set out in some detail a vision of Catholicism that is communitarian

and which, at its heart, seeks to explore the relationship between the Church and the

ontological unity of humanity. In this way, de Lubac presents a soteriology that

circumscribes the entire human family whether individual persons are inside the Church

or not and regardless of whether they identify as Christian or in some other way. The

central thesis of Catholicism is that the Apostle Paul, Augustine, other patristic sources,

and Aquinas all regard salvation as primarily social, rather than individual and that, as the

Mystical Body of Christ, the Church is the mediator of an all-inclusive salvation that is

offered to every part of creation, including all people. Indeed, for de Lubac, the Church is

a symbol of humanity.

4.4.1 The dignity of the person and the unity of humanity

For de Lubac, the dignity of each human person is rooted in their supernatural finality:

Deus qui humanae substantiae dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti (God, who in a wonderful

manner, created and ennobled human nature).817 For this reason, ‘the unity of the Mystical

Body of Christ, [which is] a supernatural unity, supposes a previous natural unity, the unity

of the human race.’818 This notion is, de Lubac holds, axiomatic for the Fathers, who

conceive of God creating humanity as a whole. For Irenaeus, Origen, Gregory Nazianzen,

Gregory of Nysa, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus, Hilary, and others, the lost sheep of the

Gospel that the Good Shepherd brings back to the fold is none other than the whole of

human nature; its sorry state so moves the Word of God that he leaves the great flock of

the angels, as it were to their own devices, in order to go to its help. The Fathers designated

816 C, 11. 817 C, 25. 818 C, 25.

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this nature by a series of equivalent expressions, thus demonstrating that it was in their

view a genuine reality.819

The key here for de Lubac is clearly the unity of the human race. ‘The human race is

one. By our fundamental nature and still more in virtue of our common destiny we are

members of the same body.’820 This is the basis of de Lubac’s social ecclesiology whereby

the Church, which is ‘Jesus Christ spread abroad and communicated,’821 ‘brings beings

into existence and gathers them together into one Whole. Humanity is one, organically one

by its divine structure; it is the Church’s mission to reveal to men that pristine unity that

they have lost, to restore and complete it.’822 ‘She summons all men so that as their mother

she may bring them forth to divine life and eternal light.’823 De Lubac is not, of course,

denying the individual side of Christian faith and spirituality. Rather, he is situating it

within the larger life of the Church and the salvation history for which the Church is, by

the grace of God, the bearer.

Stressing the place of history in Christianity,824 de Lubac emphasises the role of Christ’s

redemption, not in effecting a liberation from the world, but a restoration of its original

goodness and the rescuing of the human race from its bondage to sin. In this way, the

process of salvation gives real value to history because ‘if the salvation offered by God is

in fact the salvation of the human race, since this human race lives and develops in time,

any account of this salvation will naturally take a historical form – it will be the history of

the penetration of humanity by Christ.’825 The penetration of history by God is, for de

Lubac, the real meaning of the Incarnation. This notion forms the basis of de Lubac’s

Christian humanism, which is altogether different, and in profound ways opposed to, the

humanism of immanence that seeks to replace God with humanity, which emerged in the

nineteenth century and which led to such catastrophic consequences in the twentieth

819 C. 25-26. 820 C, 222. 821 C, 48. 822 C, 53. 823 C, 65. 824 C, 308. 825 C, 141.

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century. De Lubac’s humanism, drawing on patristic principles,826 holds that the liberation

of the intellect and the renewal of the life of the spirit are closely intertwined. He asserts

that ‘in revealing to us the God who is in the end man, Jesus Christ, the Man-God, reveals

us to ourselves, and without him the ultimate foundation of our being would remain an

enigma to us.’827 As Rowan Williams puts it, ‘we are oriented… towards revelation, to an

irruption of God’s truth that simultaneously fulfils and judges our natural life and

desire…’828

4.4.2 The Church as the means for salvation

De Lubac is clear the Church is the social embodiment of grace, which is a notion that he

bases on the presupposition of the primordial unity of the human race.829 As I have noted,

this conception enables him to envisage salvation as the restored unity of humanity in

Christ,830 the Church being both the means and the end of this restored unity and thus

eschatologically coterminous with redeemed humanity as the Body of Christ. A key theme

in Catholicism is that the Church, as the continuation of Israel, is a community – in all of

its facets – that is on its way through history to the shared salvation promised by God.831

This takes us to the heart of his soteriology, which is grounded in the principle that

anthropology is closely interwoven with Christology. In other words, what it is to be human

is inseparable from union with Christ in the whole Christ as mediated by the Church.832

Referring to the Fathers, he asserts: ‘For them, in fact, in a certain sense, the Church was

826 C, 321. 827 de Lubac, "The Total Meaning of Man and the World," 626-27. Emphasis added. 828 Rowan Williams, "Foreword: A Paradoxical Humanism," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac,

ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), xviii. 829 Foreshadowing the thought of Edward Schillebeeckx, De Lubac’s ecclesiology is highly sacramental:

‘If Christ is the sacrament of God, the church is for us the sacrament of Christ; she represents him, in the

full and ancient meaning of the term, she really makes him present.’ C, 29. 830 C, 35. 831 Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie - New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II,

96. 832 Susan K. Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac (Edinburgh: T&T

Clark, 1998), 129-30.

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nothing else than the human race itself, in all the phases of its history, in so far as it was to

lead to Christ and be quickened by his Spirit.’833

This soteriology is worked out in what is perhaps the most important chapter of

Catholicism, ‘Salvation Through the Church.’ This begins with a rejection of the statement

attributed to Saint Cyran that ‘Not one single drop of graces falls on the pagans.’834 De

Lubac believes that all people receive some sense of divine revelation. And, for de Lubac,

when good works and right intention are encountered in those outside the Church this

should be a cause for celebration. ‘Outside Christianity humanity can doubtless be raised

in an exceptional manner to certain spiritual heights, and it is our duty – one that is perhaps

too often neglected – to explore these heights that we may give praise to the God of mercies

for them: Christian pity for unbelievers, which is never the fruit of scorn, can sometimes

be born of admiration.’835 Humanity, in de Lubac’s view, ‘is made up of persons who have

all the same one eternal destiny, in whatever category or century their birth has placed

them… in spite of great differences of understanding and of function, all members of the

human race enjoy the same essential equality before God.’836 With respect to the ultimate

destiny of unbelievers, de Lubac goes on to state that God, ‘desiring that all men should be

saved, but not allowing in practice that all should be visibly in the Church, wills

nevertheless that all those who answer his call should in the last resort be saved through

his Church: Sola Ecclesia gratia qua redimur (It is only by the grace of the Church that we

are redeemed).’ Thus, ‘revelation and redemption are bound together, and the Church is

their only Tabernacle.’837 This is a fascinating element in de Lubac’s theology that has

immense significance for the Church’s understanding of itself in relation to the culture of

atheism and unbelief in the modern world.

833 C, 191. 834 C, 217. 835 C, 223. 836 C. 232-33. 837 C, 226.

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Based on these patristic principles, de Lubac asserts that ‘unbelievers’ are, ‘in the design

of Providence, indispensable for building the Body of Christ’ and, for that reason, ‘they

must in their own way profit from their vital connection with this same Body.’838

By extension with the dogma of the communion of the saints, it seems right to think that

though they themselves are not in the normal way of salvation, they will be able

nevertheless to obtain this salvation by virtue of those mysterious bonds which unite them

to the faithful. In short, they can be saved because they are an integral part of that

humanity which is saved.839

This is an important statement, which articulates the clear direction of de Lubac’s

capacious, comprehensive and social understanding of both salvation and the Church. It

signals a key contribution in his project to the question of the status of unbelievers within

the divine economy and, as we shall see in a fuller discussion of the matter in the final

chapter of this thesis, provides the starting point for a constructive, generous and fruitful

dialogue between Christians and unbelievers.

In developing his thesis of universal salvation, de Lubac must inevitably revisit the

ancient formula extra Ecclesiam nulla salus.840 De Lubac does not deny the validity of the

statement. However, as other Catholic theologians had done in the mid-twentieth century,

he seeks to move beyond an interpretation of it based on who is saved and posit, instead, a

notion of how all of humanity is saved. Affirming that the Church is God’s willed vehicle

for salvation within the matrix of human history, de Lubac wishes to preserve what he

regards as the truth of the formula without interpreting it in a narrow, triumphalist or

ultimately uncharitable way.841

The Church is not a smug society ringed about in unapproachable superiority; not a fortress

bristling with dogmatic guns to repel the hordes of infidels against whom She wages a

perpetual warfare. No! Her doors are open to all and sundry, to sinners even, though not to

838 C, 233. 839 C, 233, emphasis added. 840 This was first expressed by Cyprian of Carthage in the third century. 841 Royal, A Deeper Vision: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Twentieth Century, 156.

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sin. Her boundaries extend as far as the furthermost limits of the universe, for She is

Universal and Divine.842

Thus, de Lubac affirms, in line with Augustine,843 other Fathers and Aquinas, that ‘the

grace of Christ is of universal application, and that no soul of good will lacks the concrete

means of salvation, in the fullest sense of the world.’844 De Lubac is adamant that the

formula does not mean that no one is ever saved if they do not belong exteriorly to the

Church.845 Rather, he interprets the statement to mean that ‘it is by the Church and by the

Church alone that you will be saved.’ This is because ‘it is through the Church that the

salvation will come, that is already coming to mankind.’846 ‘Those who do not know the

Church are saved by her…847 This inclusive conception of salvation extends, in de Lubac’s

thought, not just to those living outside the Church today but to people who were born

before the Incarnation. It is evident, therefore, that his soteriology is rigorously universalist

and incorporates the whole human family.

De Lubac’s arguments in Catholicism also find expression in several of his other articles

and works. Thus, in The Discovery of God, de Lubac holds that God seeks out all people,

whether or not they are conscious of this and regardless of the extent of their faith in God.

‘Sometimes we think we are looking for God. But it is always God who is looking for us,

and he often allows himself to be found by those who are not looking for him.’848 De

Lubac’s soteriology, which is centred on the salvation of the entire human family,

represents a significant element in his project and was to lay the groundwork for the

optimistic position regarding the salvation of atheists, which finds expression in three of

the key documents to emerge from the Second Vatican Council, Lumen gentium, Gaudium

842 Jordan Pearson, "Salvation through the Church," Blackfriars 20, no. 234 (1939): 689. 843 De Lubac notes that, for Augustine, divine mercy was always at work among all people (De ordine, lib.

2, c. 10, n. 29) and that even the pagans had their “hidden saints” and their prophets (Contra Faustum, lib.

19, c. 2) C, 219. 844 C, 219. 845 C, 234. 846 C, 236. 847 C, 237. 848 DG, 168.

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et spes and Nostra aetate.849 Whether de Lubac was a thorough-going universalist with

respect to human salvation is not altogether clear. It may be that his thought is more in line

with the mainstream of twentieth-century Catholic thought as this is encountered in

Rahner, Ratzinger, and Congar, as well as other thinkers.

Finally, it should be noted that De Lubac’s significant contribution to a renewed

Catholic understanding of salvation must be set alongside other important theological and

social endeavours that took place within the Catholic Church during the decades before the

Council that are congruent with de Lubac’s thought, and which helped to lay the foundation

for the Council’s focus on the engagement of the Catholic Church with contemporary

culture. These include the concord that was to develop between the Catholic Church and

the French Communist Party850 as well as the priest-worker initiative, which was started

by Jacques Loew in the Marseilles docks in 1941, and which saw Catholic priests taking

up positions in factories within the major industrial centres in France.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that de Lubac was a highly innovative and significant

theologian who made critical contributions to Catholic theology in connection with a

number of important themes: the relationship between nature and grace, the question of

atheism, the communal nature of salvation, the role of the Church as the Mystical Body of

Christ in the world and the correspondence between the orders of creation and redemption.

In his works, particularly in his key text, Surnaturel, de Lubac sought to restore contact

849 For an exploration of de Lubac’s influence on and involvement in the Second Vatican Council, see

Riches, "Henri de Lubac and the Second Vatican Council." 850 La main tendue (outstretched hand) is the term used to describe the formal position of openness and

dialogue between Catholicism and Communism.

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between Catholic theology and contemporary thought851 by developing a critique of

neoscholasticism, which, in his opinion, swallows up the mystery of faith.852

As with any theologian, de Lubac is not without his critics. It has been pointed out that

de Lubac’s work is, at times, marked by a lack of systematic rigour or technical precision

and that it contains relatively few references to biblical scholarship.853 This may reflect the

fact that he did not receive specialised formation in systematic or historical theology and

never completed a doctoral thesis. Another arena of criticism is centred on de Lubac’s

reading of the relationship between nature and grace. The debate between de Lubac and

his followers on the one hand, and neoscholastic thinkers on the other, was one of the most

complex, profound and intriguing issues of twentieth-century theology, and the arguments

have persisted well into the present century. In recent years, the controversy provoked by

Surnaturel has shown little sign of dissipating, and neoscholasticism has reasserted its

position in conservative Catholic theology.

Notwithstanding some shortcoming in de Lubac’s work and the controversy he

provoked through his attacks on neoscholasticism, there are many valuable elements of his

project that position him as an important thinker in the Christian response to atheism.

Indeed, his commitment to engage theologically with contemporary culture, particularly

the phenomena of atheism and unbelief, has been hugely influential on other authors who

have sought to pursue similar lines of enquiry, especially those who identify as part of the

Radical Orthodoxy movement.854 Against a backdrop of a combination of theological

rationalism, which relegates mystery to an ever more circumscribed and less credible area,

and the denial of God in contemporary culture, de Lubac develops a theological position

851 ASC, 34. 852 Mettepenningen, Nouvelle Théologie - New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II,

98. 853 Randall S. Rosenberg, The Givenness of Desire: Concrete Subjectivity and the Natural Desire to See

God (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 35. 854 Simon Oliver, "Henri de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy," in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac,

ed. Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical

Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 158-65, 72, 75, 90, 254-55, 59; James K. A.

Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology (Milton Keynes: Paternoster

Press, 2004), 12, 18, 35, 43, 46, 253 n.13.

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that sees God as infinite mystery and one by whose grace the recreation of human existence

is possible.855 His interrogation of atheist humanism identifies the destructive and anti-

human orientation of this position, although, as we have seen, particularly in his study of

Proudhon, de Lubac also recognises the validity of some atheist criticism of Christianity.

Perhaps of greatest importance, however, is de Lubac’s communion ecclesiology, which

is centred on a radically inclusive and comprehensive Catholic ecclesial vision. This

provides a starting point for dialogue between Christianity and atheism that offers great

potential. I will explore this more fully in the final chapter of this thesis.

855 See Francesco Bertoldi, "The Religious Sense in Henri de Lubac," Communio 16, Spring (1989): 6-8.

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Chapter 5:

Christianity and atheism in

dialogue

I have sought in this thesis to underline the importance of developing a constructive

dialogue between atheism Christianity and set out the groundwork that may pave the way

for Christians and atheists to relate to each other in a nuanced and meaningful way. I have

also highlighted the resources, particularly as I have encountered these in the thought of

Jüngel, Hart, and de Lubac, that I believe the Church can draw upon as it seeks to lay the

foundations for a robust and yet sympathetic dialogue with atheists and unbelievers that

goes beyond presumptions and prejudices. I have stressed the complexity of atheistic

arguments and the different ways in which these are expressed by outlining a four-fold

typology of atheism. I have also underlined the intimate connection between belief and

unbelief, the recognition of which is, I believe, a key element in bringing Christians and

atheists into conversation with each other. The overcoming of the binary distinction

between atheism and Christianity is, I argue, a vital element in the development of fruitful

exchange between those who do and do not believe in God as it can enable both groups to

learn from one another and to see how closely entangled belief and unbelief actually are.

I believe that atheism, in its many manifestations throughout history and in

contemporary societies, presents the Church with a great moment of clarification, offering

a perspective from which Christians can learn much about how they are perceived from

the outside, and that it offers to Christian theology, as each of the theologians examined in

this thesis affirm, a resource for its renewal. There is no doubt that atheism has reshaped

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the circumstances in which Christianity now operates by radically changing the conditions

for belief within the West.856

In this final chapter I set out my own perspectives on both the challenges of and

opportunities for dialogue and engagement between Christianity and atheism. It is my view

that atheist-Christian dialogue is both desirable and important, and that there are many

occasions that make not only dialogue, but other forms of partnership and cooperation,

possible. I am, of course, aware that not all atheists or Christians will wish to enter into

dialogue. However, when respectful, charitable, and meaningful conversations between

atheists and Christians take place, the outcomes can be both constructive and fruitful, for

these encounters provide both believers and unbelievers with the opportunity to better

understand each other and, furthermore, to learn from each other. This mutual learning is,

I believe, one of the principal benefits of atheist-Christian dialogue.

In the remainder of this final chapter I will highlight the importance and desirability of

developing a constructive dialogue between atheism and Christianity, highlight the

resources for dialogue that are provided by my three dialogue partners, Eberhard Jüngel,

David Bentley Hart, and Henri de Lubac, offer some perspectives on how engagement by

Christians with each of the categories of atheism within the typology that I offered in

Chapter 1 may be advanced, outline several principles that need to characterise dialogue

between Christianity and atheism, examine the role and place of the Church’s ministry in

an age of unbelief (including patient listening, partnership and collaboration), and conclude

with some remarks on the way in which atheism and Christianity can engage positively

with each other in our religiously complex society.

856 Mohler, Atheism Remix: A Christian Confronts the New Atheists, 106-07.

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5.1 Towards a constructive dialogue between

atheism and Christianity

There is little doubt that atheism will present a continuing challenge to Christianity in the

twenty-first century, and that it will have an increasingly public nature. It is certainly true

that atheism has become a far more legitimate cultural option than was the case in previous

generations. Atheism as a modern phenomenon is not going to go away. In the light of this

reality, the Church will need to frame its thinking in response to the reality of contemporary

atheism and unbelief.857 The same applies to thoughtful Christians for they will have to

confront the reality of atheism and unbelief in contemporary society, not in a hostile way

but in a manner that is respectful, charitable, and open to learning from those who reject

the existence of God. Christians will need to recognise that churchgoing is no longer a

normal social activity, that churches, church buildings, and the culture that they are

associated with have become alien to many, and that people searching for spiritual reality

will tend to look beyond churches in order to find it.858 Personally, I know many people

who find churches dreary and uninviting, encounter in the Christian liturgy something that

is incomprehensible and off-putting, experience sermons as boring, and have major

objections to the moral stance adopted by church communities on certain issues in society,

particularly the validity of same-sex relationships.859

I am conscious that the challenge of the New Atheist movement, which although less

vociferous than in it was in the first decade of the current century, continues to be felt and,

as numerous surveys have confirmed, atheism and non-religion have become increasingly

popular labels for people in Western societies to adopt with respect to their beliefs. I am

also aware that although it was once impossible not to believe and only later possible not

to believe, for millions of people living in the West today, the default position is that it is

impossible to believe in God. This is a position that I consider needs to be accepted. Where

857 Mohler, Atheism Remix: A Christian Confronts the New Atheists, 87-88. 858 Stuart Murray, Post-Christendom : Church and Mission in a Strange New World (London: SCM Press,

2018), 169. 859 See Jessica Rose, Church on Trial (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2009), 63-83.

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belief does persist, it is often only in a vaguely theistic form of ‘spirituality’ where people

believe in belief rather than in God.860 Simon Critchley refers to the seemingly

contradictory presence of beliefs amongst those who retain an atheistic identity as the faith

of the faithless, or the belief of unbelievers. Drawing on experiences of Oscar Wilde, who

used the incipit of Psalm 130, De Profundis (‘From the depths I cry to thee, O Lord’), as

the title for a complex letter that he wrote to his inconstant lover, Lord Alfred Douglas,

Critchley notes that even agnostics and atheists have an experience of faith in a way that

is not so dissimilar to theists. ‘Those who cannot believe,’ he asserts, ‘still require religious

truth and a framework of ritual in which they can believe.’ Unbelievers do, then, require

an experience of belief, although this cannot be a traditional conception of religion defined

by an experience of a postulate of ‘transcendent fullness, namely God.’861

5.2 Resources for dialogue in the theology of

Jüngel, Hart and de Lubac

In this section I will return to the contributions that the key thinkers who I have explored

in this thesis, Eberhard Jüngel, David Bentley Hart, and Henri de Lubac, have made to the

theological analysis of atheism. My focus will be on the resources that each theologian

offers to the Church as it enters into dialogue with atheists. As I noted in the Introduction,

and as will have become clear in the chapters dedicated to the thought of each theologian,

the circumstances and types of unbelief that prompted each of these interlocutors to engage

with atheism were different and, for this reason, they each focus on distinctive aspects of

the atheistic critique. Consequently, I argue that the resources that they provide for the

Church as it works to develop a constructive relationship with atheists and atheism will be

unique to each thinker.

860 Mohler, Atheism Remix: A Christian Confronts the New Atheists, 106-07. 861 Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (London: Verso, 2014),

1-7.

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5.2.1 Eberhard Jüngel’s perspectives on atheism

As I noted in Chapter 2, Jüngel’s primary concern is with what he calls the ‘unthinkability’

of God, a problem that he believes underpins equally both atheism and contemporary

theology.

Both the atheism and the theology of the modern day stand equally overshadowed by the

dark clouds of the unthinkability of God. Both faith and unbelief seem to regard these

shadows as their destiny. At the end of the history of metaphysics, God appears to have

become unthinkable.862

These words provide the starting point for Jüngel’s magnum opus, God as the Mystery of

the World.

In Chapter 2, I examined Jüngel’s genealogy of atheism, which is centred on the notions

of the worldly necessity of God and of the derivative notion of the death of God declared

by Nietzsche. There is, I argue, much that might be learnt from Jüngel’s engagement with

atheism as he seeks to understand the phenomenon of unbelief, identify its emergence as a

consequence of moves made within Christian theology, and respond to it in a manner that

presents a renewed theological vision which is founded on God’s engagement with human

experience, worldly existence and death. I shall proceed by discussing a number of strands

in Jüngel’s theology of atheism that may be helpful for the Church as it seeks to make

sense of modern atheism.

Firstly, it is clear from his writing that Jüngel is committed to taking atheism seriously

on its own terms and that he seeks to treat atheists with a high level of respect. ‘Anyone

who has to talk about the overcoming of godlessness by God [must] take the atheist

seriously as a particularly mature form of homo humanus.’863 This same point is expressed

in bold terms in a key article by Jüngel where he notes the need to ‘understand atheism

862 GMW, vii. 863 Cited in Jürgen Moltmann, "Eberhard Jüngel," in How I have Changed : Reflections on Thirty Years of

Theology (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997), 9.

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better than it understands itself’ and to unfold the ‘moment of truth within atheism.’864 For

Jüngel, atheism functions as a genuine and legitimate alternative to Christianity in the

modern world.865 This, I believe, is a commendable aspect of Jüngel’s thought and one hat

the Church needs to be heedful of as it operates within an increasingly secular society

within which a growing number of people reject the existence of God and identify as

unbelievers. Centred on the false notion of God’s necessity, God as the Mystery of the

World contains Jüngel’s sustained attempt to critique the binary of atheism and theism,

which has been a central concept within my thesis. The metaphysical deity, in its

abstraction, will always be nothing more than a conceptual idol.866 He argues that as

modernity ran its course God became nothing more than our own self-consciousness,

whether this was the ‘I think’ of Descartes, ‘I work’ of Marx, or Nietzsche’s ‘I will’, all of

which are expressions of Fichte’s self-positing ego and versions of modernity’s sovereign

self.867

Secondly, and following on from the seriousness with which Jüngel attends to modern

atheism, I consider that his project, particularly in God as the Mystery of the World, can be

seen as a rigorously worked out theological attempt to offer a critique of the sub-Christian

aspects of ‘theism’ and to point to a genuinely Christian concept of God that is ‘beyond

theism and atheism.’ Jüngel is therefore an example of a thinker who is sensitive to the

intimate connections between belief and unbelief. In this sense, as will be discussed below,

Jüngel has much in common with de Lubac. For both theologians believe, albeit for

different reasons, that modern atheism was germinated in the soil of Christian theology.

As Webster notes about Jüngel’s observations, ‘atheism is as much a child of theology’s

theistic self-alienation as of philosophical unbelief.’868 God as the Mystery of the World is

864 Eberhard Jüngel, "Towards the Heart of the Matter," The Christian Century (1991): 230. The same

point is made in GMW: ‘Theology must take atheism more seriously than it does itself by preventing it

from becoming a substitute religion.’ GMW, 97. 865 Derek Nelson, "The Indicative of Grace & The Imperative of Freedom: An Invitation to the Theology of

Eberhard Jüngel," Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44, no. 2 (2005): 169-70. 866 Paul R. Hinlicky, Beloved Community: Critical Dogmatics after Christendom (Grand Rapids, Michigan:

William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015), 127-28. 867 Hinlicky, Beloved Community: Critical Dogmatics after Christendom, 131. 868 Webster, "Theologies of Retrieval," 587.

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fundamentally a work of dogmatic theology and cannot be understood an apologetic text

that is aimed at a non-Christian readership.869 Jüngel asserts that ‘atheism as the negation

of theism is a critical moment of Christian theology which should be brought to bear in the

concept of God.’870 In developing this argument, Jüngel is placing his work within the

parameters set out by Simon Weil, who remarked that ‘there are two atheism, or which one

is a purification of faith.’871 Even though, of course, there are many more species of

atheism than two, Weil’s statement signals the prophetic quality that atheism may have in

challenging illusions of religious belief and behaviour and, for this reason, it may be

cathartic. Atheism is then, for Jüngel, a catalyst for theology to rethink the doctrine of God.

Thus, Jüngel attempts to ‘develop a conceptuality of the divine being within the context of

modern intellectual and cultural atheism, a context shaped by the collapse of “metaphysical

theism” in both its philosophical and theological forms.’872

The third key strand in Jüngel’s response to atheism is his insistence that God can only

be apprehended as the one who comes into the world in his humanity. I see this as the

central theme in his thought. Jüngel’s theistic reconstruction can only be understood

therefore when the fundamental connection between his trinitarian doctrine and the notion

of God’s suffering and death is grasped. Jüngel’s trinitarian interpretation of God is as a

God who comes to humanity in language and in history as the Crucified One and who, as

a result, cannot be sought through metaphysical or ontological philosophical frameworks.

These only serve to make God unthinkable. ‘The atheism born out of modern philosophy

is a child of resignation.’873 To think of God’s essence and existence as united in God’s

worldly presence requires, Jüngel argues, to confront God’s union with perishability.

Theology must be ‘prepared to destroy the understanding of God as superior to us (supra

869 ‘It is not a concern of Christian talk about God to present an apology (defense) over against atheism.’

GMW, 253 n.15. 870 GMW, 97. 871 Weil, Gravity and Grace, 103. 872 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 3. 873 GMW, 185.

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nos) in order to think God in the way that he has revealed himself in his identity with the

man Jesus’874

For the many atheists who find the notion of an abstract and detached God

inconceivable, I believe that Jüngel’s project offers a focal point for thinking about God as

present in the world through God’s union with Jesus and, most importantly, in Jesus’

suffering and death. In this way, I suggest that Jüngel actually sides with the atheist in his

or her rejection of abstract philosophical notions of divinity, accepting their critique as he

seeks to characterise God in human terms as one who enters into the predicament of our

perishability. Furthermore, in asserting that ‘the dimension of historical factuality can be

regarded as the place of the thinkability of God… when the character of the temporality of

historical reality is taken seriously,’875 Jüngel provides a valuable starting point for

Christian theology to respond to those atheistic thinkers, such as Gilles Deleuze, who assert

that being is laid out in a ‘plane of immanence,’ or ‘plane of Nature.’ The notion that God

is revealed in hiddenness, in the cross of Christ and in human language through the

‘analogy of advent,’ represents, I argue, a vision of God’s presence as embedded in the

immanent sphere of historical reality. Jüngel provides a severely negative evaluation of the

theistic tradition, rejecting the notion that the God can be thought about as an essence that

is separate from concrete historical reality.876 By stressing the centrality of language,

humanity and history as the loci in which God is to be encountered, Jüngel provides a

helpful starting point for dialogue with those philosophical and cultural perspectives that

seek to erase notions of transcendence and which assert that mundane existence is the only

dimension of reality.

In summary, the atheistic question of where God is can only be addressed, according to

Jüngel, in a Christological manner. Drawing on both Hegel and Bonhoeffer, Jüngel locates

God in the death of Jesus and asserts that the concept of the ‘death of God’ is the only way

in which the question of where God is can be answered. From Bonhoeffer’s perspective,

874 GMW, 187. 875 GMW, 189. 876 Webster, Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to his Theology, 80.

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based on his notion of ‘the church for others,’ the task of Christians engaging with

unbelievers in our pluralistic world is essential. This is because dialogue is appropriate for

a theology of the cross that seeks to eschew triumphalism’s desire to control and claim

absolute knowledge. Christians are ‘free in the promise of the gospel to participate in the

give and take quest for the discovery of shared values that can guide action for the common

good.’877 This is certainly a position that Jüngel agrees with.

The whole thrust of God as the Mystery of the World is Jüngel’s attempt to work this

notion out theologically and, in so doing, to confront cultural and intellectual atheism, the

modern expressions of the death of God, with its own origins in the Christian faith.878

Jüngel’s judgement is that atheism can only be rejected when theism is overcome,879 for it

is the belief in the necessity of God, metaphysically conceived, that is the at the root of

contemporary atheism.880 Jüngel’s criticism of certain strands of Christian theology which

have been founded on a metaphysical understanding of God’s essence is insightful and

important, and may challenge Christian theology to place a greater focus on the this-

worldly sphere of revelation and the ongoing presence of God today. Theology must leave

behind both the unchristian theism and atheism and appeal to the specific content of the

Christian affirmation of God’s self-identification with the Crucified One, through which

the depth of God’s humanity is laid bare.

Jüngel, as I highlighted in Chapter 2, takes atheism very seriously, he locates unbelief

in notions of an abstract and philosophically-conceived ‘metaphysical’ deity, and he

regards atheism as a valuable source from which Christianity can learn a great deal. His

focus on God’s presence in the world in the Crucified One, as God enters the human

experience of perishability and death, is an important one and his work, particularly within

God as the Mystery of the World, provides the Church with significant resources for

entering into a constructive dialogue with atheism. For this reason, within the Protestant

tradition, Jüngel may represent the key thinker for the Church to draw upon as it seeks to

877 Childs, "Lutheran Theology and Dialogical Engagement in Post-Christian Society," 149. 878 DeHart, Beyond the Necessary God, 9. 879 GMW, 43. 880 Zimany, Vehicle for God, 89.

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engage with atheism and unbelief. Whilst supporting much of Jüngel’s analysis of

atheism’s origins in metaphysical conceptions of God, I should also add that Jüngel’s

thought by itself is not sufficient to address all of the objections raised by atheists. Jüngel,

I have argued, restricts his analysis to Type I and Type II categories of atheism in my

typology and does not engage at all with Type III or Type IV expressions of atheism. For

this reason, in entering into a constructive dialogue with atheism, I suggest that the Church

needs to also draw on the projects of David Bentley Hart and Henri de Lubac, I shall

examine the thought of these thinkers in the context of atheism and unbelief in the next

two sections.

5.2.2 David Bentley Hart’s contribution to atheist-Christian

dialogue

The second interlocutor I examined in this thesis, David Bentley Hart, has, as I discussed

in Chapter 3, much to say about atheism, both as he encounters this in Continental

philosophy in the wake of Nietzsche, and in the arguments of several members of the New

Atheist movement. In his key works, The Beauty of the Infinite, Atheist Delusions, and The

Experience of God, as well as in several journal articles, Hart highlights a series of

shortcomings and misunderstandings in the work of philosophers and cultural

commentators who align themselves with an atheistic position. His project is a fascinating

one and it contains many resources, which will be identified later on in this section, for the

Church to draw upon as it engages in the task of developing a constructive dialogue with

atheism.

In addition to a profound misconception of the mystery of God, Hart argues that

contemporary atheists, particularly those aligning themselves with the New Atheist

movement, misunderstand the ontological contingency of all creatures upon God, as they

frequently state that existence is a purely natural phenomenon. Naturalism, Hart argues, is

a false philosophical precept and is radically insufficient in its explanatory range.881

881 EG, 18.

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Despite these arguments, Hart, in common with Jüngel and de Lubac, acknowledges that

atheism is not necessarily untenable and accepts that it may be perfectly rational for

someone to reject the notion of a transcendent source for existence in a context where no

sense of God or of any transcendent reality is present to them.882

Hart also shares the views of both Jüngel and de Lubac in connection with the role of

the Church and Christian thought in generating conceptions of God that have inadvertently

promoted atheism, and in so doing further demonstrates the entanglement of belief and

unbelief. He refers, for example, to the emergence of the understanding of reality in terms

of a purely mechanical cosmos, which became a kind of ontology at the beginning of the

Modern era. Although the reasons for the shift to this perspective from the older theocentric

view of reality (when the universe was regarded as a kind of theophany that reflects the

divine light of creation) can be traced through scientific, social and ideological

developments, Hart notes that theology also contributed to the tendency for people in the

West to acquire the habit of seeing the universe as subject to investigation and

understanding solely in accordance with a mechanistic paradigm. According to this

worldview, God is reimagined as a divine designer and maker, the ‘god of the machine,’

rather than the transcendent ground of all reality.883

The first area where Hart makes an important contribution to atheist-Christian dialogue

is in connection with the doctrine of God. Hart is attentive to the misunderstandings that

are widespread in modern atheistic rhetoric concerning the nature of God and recognises

that the word ‘God’ is used in entirely different ways by Christians (together with those of

other faiths) and atheists.884 In other words, two incommensurable worlds collide when

theists and atheists speak about God. Atheists, Hart argues, have by and large come to

understand God not as the truly transcendent source and end of all contingent reality, who

creates through ‘donating’ being to a natural order that is complete in itself, but only as a

882 EG, 19. 883 EG, 57-58. 884 As Keith Jones, a former Dean of York, puts it: ‘Atheists frequently express their astonishment that

anyone with any intelligence should believe in God. The difficulty I find with them is that the God in

whom they disbelieve is so different from the God in whom I believe.’ Keith Jones, Adam's Dream:

Human Longings and the Love of God (London: Mowbray, 2007), 1.

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kind of supreme mechanical cause located somewhere within the continuum of nature.885

As McGrath notes in commenting on Dawkins’ conception of God in The God Delusion,

‘genuine believers will not even recognise their beliefs in his presentation.’886 For Hart,

drawing on the patristic tradition and in agreement with classical Christian and other

theistic thought, God is utterly and essentially transcendent of the world. This

understanding of God’s nature is entirely different from the pervasive error in many

contemporary arguments about belief in God, Hart argues, especially, but not exclusively,

on the atheist side, which is the habit of conceiving of God simply as some very large

object. God, by contrast, is not in any sense an object. Rather, Hart asserts, God is the

infinite actuality that makes existence possible and who has created a world that is open to

investigation and encounter, either through acts of logical deduction and induction and

conjecture, or by contemplative or sacramental or spiritual experiences. Evidence for God,

then, saturates every moment of the experience of existence, every employment of reason,

every act of consciousness, every encounter with the world around us.887

Another important facet of Hart’s conception of God pertains to God’s immutability

and freedom from the created order. In relation to this doctrine, Hart stands in opposition

to the position held by Jüngel, who stresses the suffering of God through God’s experience

of perishability. Hart recognises the shift away from affirmation of divine apatheia in

much, particularly (although not exclusively) Lutheran, contemporary theology. However,

Hart believes that it is a non-negotiable feature of any genuinely Christian doctrine of God

because, he argues, only an impassible God can truly be God, the source and ground of all

beings rather than merely one supreme being among other finite beings. For Hart, divine

apatheia is pure activity, pure self-giving, charity, pure agape.888 Hart recognises that

reconciling the temporal event of God in our midst with God’s event to himself in his

eternity presents a challenge, and notes the current in modern theology, particularly in the

885 EG, 28. 886 Alister E. McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion : Atheist Fundamentalism

and the Denial of the Divine (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 13. 887 EG, 33-34. 888 Brent A.R. Hege, "The Suffering of God? The Divine Love and the Problem of Suffering in Classical

and Process-Relational Theisms" (paper presented at the 2010 John Templeton Award for Theological

Promise Laureates Colloquium, 2010), 8.

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case of those theologians who have been influenced by Hegel (such as Moltmann, Jüngel,

and Jenson), that desires a God who suffers, not simply with us and in our nature, but in

his own nature as well.889 Hart responds to this challenge by stressing the doctrine of divine

apatheia by which, he argues, God does not suffer in his essence, despite the fact that Jesus,

as a human person, did quite clearly experience suffering.

One of the key challenges for the Church in addressing the unbelief of those who assert

that the world holds no evidence for God concerns the question of how divinity may be

encountered within human experience. This is another area where Hart has much to offer

in the context of the dialogue between Christianity and atheism. For in Hart’s aesthetical

theology, which is most fully worked out in The Beauty of the Infinite, a sustained argument

is developed that centres on the manifestation of God in the beauty of creation. ‘Beauty,’

Hart notes, is a term that elides precise definition and since the eighteenth-century

distinction between beauty and the sublime, much modern and postmodern philosophy has

focused on the latter term, and beauty has, correspondingly, been corroded of its value,

regarded as mere negation or a spasm of illusory calm in the midst of being’s sublimity.890

Hart, however, is critical of this move and argues that beauty is a category that is

indispensable to Christian thought. Indeed, all that theology says of the triune life of God,

the gratuity of creation, the Incarnation itself, and the salvation of the world, both makes

room for and depends upon a thought and narrative of the beautiful.891 Hart’s

understanding of beauty as an experience that mediates God’s infinite and unseen presence

in creation is of great importance in the context of atheist-Christian dialogue. This is

because in the conversation that the Church can attempt to open up with unbelievers,

reference to beauty, along with the other transcendentals, goodness and truth, avoids the

need to present a case for the Christian faith that is based on metaphysical propositions or

upon historical evidence, both of which are frequently dismissed as unintelligible by

atheists. Beauty is a concept that all people can relate to and will have some experience of.

Hart argues that such experiences have a sacramental quality in that they bring us to a

889 TBI, 159. 890 TBI, 15. 891 TBI, 16.

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mystical encounter with the source of all beauty, which is God. This is clearly expressed

and holds the potential to provide a valuable starting point for dialogue between Christians

and atheists.

Hart’s affirmation of universal salvation and his associated rejection of the notion that

a loving and merciful God would consign individuals to the eternal torment of hell,

although open to the criticism that he is sacrificing an important dimension of orthodox

Christian belief, was outlined in Chapter 3. This aspect of Hart’s theology, which was

explored in some detail in his most recent work, That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell,

and Universal Salvation, strongly echoes the position of Henri de Lubac’s social and

communitarian understanding of salvation, which I examined in Chapter 4 and which I will

discuss again in the next section. Both thinkers draw their inspiration from the Church

Fathers, who were generally in agreement that God’s salvation in Christ is offered to the

whole of creation and that all people will be enfolded in God’s love and find eternal peace

in heaven. Hart is surely correct in identifying the doctrine of eternal perdition and the

conception of hell as profoundly disturbing and notes that they will be, for lots of atheists,

the basis of their unbelief. Hart’s position, although it is one that I personally support, may,

however, be questioned by some Christians who will point to references in the New

Testament relating to hell that Hart chooses to ignore.

In summary, Hart’s project is rich in possibilities for informing the conversation

between Christianity and atheism. Within the Orthodox tradition, he stands as the most

prominent thinker to have examined atheism and unbelief and his work contains many

resources that offer a starting point for the Church to use as it works to engage

constructively with atheism and atheists. Perhaps most importantly, Hart challenges

atheists to reconceive of God in ways that are aligned with classical Christian thought, he

points to a dimension of human experience, namely beauty, in which the infinity and peace

of God may be mysteriously encountered, and he works out a theology of salvation that is

all-encompassing, generous and universal, even though his soteriology may be disputed by

some Christians. Hart’s work, it should be acknowledged, is unlikely to be widely read by

atheists and his theology may well be dismissed by those who reject the existence of God.

Nonetheless, it is my view that Hart is a highly perceptive, insightful and provocative

thinker who has, in his extensive suite of publications, developed a set of valuable

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resources that the Church may draw upon as it engages in the challenging task of patiently

listening to and constructively talking with atheists.

5.2.3 Henri de Lubac: A Catholic response to atheist

humanism

As I discussed in Chapter 4, atheism was a preoccupation of Henri de Lubac throughout

his career. Amongst Catholic theologians, de Lubac is preeminent as a thinker who took

atheism seriously, developed a significant interest in its place within society and who offers

a range of meaningful resources that may assist the Church in working towards a

constructive dialogue between Christianity and atheism. Dialogue with unbelievers of

various types, both in his personal experiences of serving in the French army during the

First World War (encounters that prompted him to write his work The Discovery of God)

and in his theologically-framed engagements with Comte, Feuerbach, Proudhon, Marx and

Nietzsche, were to be crucial in stimulating de Lubac’s interest in atheism. Indeed, de

Lubac respected what atheism can offer to the Christian faith. The atheist, for de Lubac,

can be the one ‘who provides the salt that will prevent my ideas of God from petrifying

and so becoming false.’892

The issues of atheism, secularism and humanism pervade de Lubac’s entire project,

colouring his writing about the supernatural and its relationship to the natural, as well as

prompting deep unease about the state of the Church. In this latter context, de Lubac was

wary both of a secularised and purely sociological view of the Church and by the inveterate

individualism of modern culture, which he saw invading people’s approach to worship and

their relationship to the Church.893 De Lubac regarded the social and collectivist atheism

892 DG, 188. 893 Raymond Moloney, "Henri de Lubac on Church and Eucharist," Irish Theological Quarterly 70, no. 4

(2005): 334.

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that he witnessed in the West, particularly in connection with Communism, as

fundamentally out of step with the recognition of persons in their irreducible value.894

In common with both Jüngel and Hart, de Lubac identified the Church as a key

contributing factor in the emergence of modern unbelief and atheism and therefore

underlined the principle explored in this thesis that belief and unbelief are complexly

interwoven phenomena. His focus, however, is rather different from these two thinkers.

Where Jüngel traces the genealogy of atheism through forms of metaphysical theism that

seek to demonstrate the necessity of God and which construct a picture of God’s essence

in abstract terms that is detached from the historical reality of this world, and where Hart

focuses most pointedly on the Christian doctrine of hell (which he regards as the principal

source of a Christian-generated atheism) and the experiences of human suffering as

grounds for unbelief (which he argues have been addressed inadequately by the Church),

de Lubac’s central concern was with the dualistic theological legacy of neoscholasticism,

which separated grace from nature.

There are several areas in de Lubac’s theology that I believe offer particular promise in

connection with Christianity’s dialogue with atheists. The first of these concerns de

Lubac’s understanding of the social nature of the Church and his related doctrine of

collective salvation although there is some uncertainty about whether de Lubac was, in

fact, a thoroughgoing universalist with respect to the question of human salvation. The

second arena in which themes in de Lubac’s project can form the starting point for

potentially fruitful conversations with certain expressions of atheism is the sphere of the

natural. De Lubac’s notion that nature is already graced and that the natural and

supernatural effectively coinhere offers the potential for a theologically-grounded

conversation to begin with those philosophical perspectives that emphasise the identity of

reality with the immanent frame and which, for this reason, focus on the horizontal, rather

than the vertical, horizon of human experience. Finally, de Lubac, like Jüngel, is alert to

the need for the Church to be self-critical and to heed the voice of the atheist. He recognises

894 Aidan Nichols, Divine Fruitfulness: A Guide Through Balthasar's Theology Beyond the Trilogy

(London: Continuum, 2007), 61-62.

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in the atheist critique of Christianity certain truths that need to be confronted and used as

a starting point in the renewal of faith. Each of these aspects of de Lubac’s project will be

discussed in the remainder of this section.

The key issue to focus on at this juncture is the potential that de Lubac’s soteriology

offers to the Church in its dialogue with those who are not part of its visible structure. De

Lubac, like Hart and other theologians who affirm universal salvation, offers a vision of

human destiny that is exceptionally generous, rooted in the patristic understanding of

God’s love and salvific intention being made available to the whole world. Drawing on a

principle that is present in many of the writings of the Fathers, de Lubac stresses the

collective nature of salvation, which is based on the mysterious bonds that unite humanity,

and, for this reason, the corporate nature of Christianity is a basic premise of his thought.895

‘The unity of the human family as a whole is the subject, we have said, of some of the

deepest yearnings of our age.’896 De Lubac’s communion ecclesiology is, then, founded on

a vision of radical inclusivity. It is clear from his work Catholicism that de Lubac identifies

the Church, or the Mystical Body as he calls it, at least potentially, as the whole of the

human race.897 His understanding of catholicity is grounded in a generous and open

embrace of all that is good, worthy and true and it is clear that his inclusive vision informs

his entire theological project. Catholicism, for de Lubac, implies the inclusion of all human

beings in their depth and mystery.

In the context of the dialogue between Christians and atheists, the importance of de

Lubac’s communion ecclesiology, and his insistence that salvation is essentially collective,

is, I believe, enormous. I recognise, of course that whether unbelievers can make sense of

eschatological notions such as salvation and eternal life is another matter entirely, and it

895 Moloney, "Henri de Lubac on Church and Eucharist," 334. 896 C, 195. 897 ‘… the unity of the Mystical Body of Christ, a supernatural unity, supposes a previous unity of the

human race.’ C, 3. This aspect of de Lubac's soteriology is discussed by Susan Wood in Wood, Spiritual

Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac, 79-85. It is a notion that is also expressed by

Pope John Paul II, who described the Incarnation as ‘the taking up into unity with Christ not only of human

nature, but in this human nature, in a sense, of everything that is “flesh”: the whole of humanity, the entire

visible and material world.’ Cited in Shortt, God is No Thing: Coherent Christianity, 107.

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may be that for many atheists such doctrines are out of place and lack validity within their

worldview. However, the generosity of de Lubac’s vision does, nonetheless, provide a

starting point for the Church to highlight its reach within the whole of humanity, to

underline the love of God for all people (and, indeed, for the whole of creation), to counter

the oft-repeated objection that Christianity is solely about individuals obtaining salvation

for themselves, and to articulate a conception of human unity under God’s reign that

transcends religious identity or belonging to the Church.898 De Lubac’s thought was to gain

formal expression in the conciliar documents to emerge from Vatican II, particularly article

16 of Lumen gentium, where it is acknowledged that ‘people who have not yet received the

Gospel are related to the People of God in various ways,’ a statement that is followed by

an endorsement of the possibility of salvation being available for all people.899 The position

of the Catholic Church, as expressed in Lumen gentium, on the salvation of unbelievers

clearly bears the imprint of de Lubac’s thought and is of great significance for the wider

Church and for the dialogue between Christians and atheists.900

The second arena in which I believe de Lubac offers both the Church and wider society

much that is important concerns his theology of the supernatural. For de Lubac, the natural

and supernatural dimensions of reality are interwoven.901 I consider this to be one of de

Lubac’s most significant insights. It has its corollary in political theology, which is the

refusal of any notion of a purely secular state, and it provides an important basis for atheist-

Christian dialogue. The Church and its practices will necessarily be part of any stable, free

898 For an extended discussion of the question of whether atheists can be saved, see Bullivant, Faith and

Unbelief, 71-94. 899 ‘Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church, but who

nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they

know it through the dictates of their conscience – those too may achieve eternal salvation.’ Flannery,

Vatican, Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents, Volume 1, 367. The spirit of

sympathetic concern for the motives and feelings of atheists, and an approach to atheism and agnosticism

that is marked by openness and respect, is also evident in Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Ecclesiam suam,

which was given on 6th August 1964. 900 This is the starting point for Stephen Bullivant’s fascinating and important exploration of the place of

the salvation of atheists within Catholic dogmatic theology, a work that traces the history of Catholic

thought on this issue from anathama to dialogue, and which draws extensively on the thought of both Henri

de Lubac and Karl Rahner. Bullivant, The Salvation of Atheists and Catholic Dogmatic Theology. 901 Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed, 149.

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society and civil authorities must provide space for them.902 As is also true for Jüngel, de

Lubac’s conception of the worldly sphere as graced provides scope for the Christian

affirmation of the material and the natural and offers scope for the development of a

dialogue with both individuals and philosophical systems that wish to stress the horizontal

(or immanent) field of human experience in opposition to a vertical (or transcendent)

conception of existence and being, a position that tends to be associated, although not

exclusively so, with Type IV atheism. In a society where there is a growing indifference to

transcendent valuations of life, de Lubac’s project provides the starting point for the

Church to highlight the connection between the natural and the supernatural and to point

to the orientation of all creatures to God, as their creator. In connection with the social

sphere, it should also be added that de Lubac’s thoughtful and constructive engagements

with Buddhism provides a very helpful model for inter-religious dialogue and interfaith

understanding, which highlights how Christianity can learn from a Dharmic faith.903 Given

the concern that some unbelievers have about the multiplicity of religious traditions within

contemporary society, which may be interpreted as confusing and at odds with the notion

of a single expression of truth, de Lubac’s willingness to draw connections between two

very different traditions may be instructive.

The third area of de Lubac’s project that I wish to highlight concerns his sensitivity to

the warranted criticism of the Church and of certain forms of Christianity that can be found

within atheistic argumentation. This is particularly the case, de Lubac argues, in the case

of Nietzsche’s opposition to Christianity. As Grumett notes,

De Lubac argues convincingly that Nietzsche's protest is not, in fact, against Christian faith

per se, but against the Christianity of his own time, asking rhetorically: 'His cutting scorn is

aimed at our mediocrities and hypocrisies; he aims at our weaknesses embellished with

902 Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed, 149. 903 De Lubac had a deep interest in Buddhism and published a number of imporatnt works on this religious

tradition. See de Lubac, Aspects of Buddhism; de Lubac, "The Notion of Good and Evil in Buddhism and

Especially in Amidism."; de Lubac, La rencontre du Bouddhisme et de l'occident; de Lubac, "Buddhist

Messianism?." For an examination of de Lubac’s engagements with Buddhism, see David Grumett, "De

Lubac, Christ and the Buddha," New Blackfriars 89, no. 1020 (2008).

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fine names. Can we blame him completely? Must everything that "bears the name of

Christian today" be defended against him?’904

This observation leads de Lubac to underline the importance of self-criticism for the

Church, a process that he believes demonstrates discernment, judgement and choice. An

appropriately self-critical attitude is:

…a striving for realism in action – a determination to bar all that cannot justify its claim to

genuineness. It is an examination carried out in humility, capable of recognizing the good

achieved, but out of an essentially apostolic discontent and a perpetually restless spiritual

dynamism.905

The humility that de Lubac indicates is a characteristic of self-criticism is important and

needs to inform the Christian response to the justifiable criticism that can be expressed by

atheists in a reaction against what they may see as the deficiencies of the Church within

the social sphere, in its historical record and in its moral position on some issues that face

humanity. Where this attitude is present, the possibilities for constructive conversations

and fruitful dialogue will be extended. As Grumett argues, ‘criticism of the Church is, at

its best, self-criticism… [it is] an attempt to plumb the depths of the truth and tradition of

faith in Christ by means of attentive and rigorous theological and historical

discernment.’906 The observations remind Christians that in their interactions with atheists

an attitude that is humble, reflective and self-critical will be important if mutual

understanding and trust are to be developed.

I consider that De Lubac’s analysis of the predicament facing humanity in the modern

era, which is characterised by growing secularism, atheist humanism and a watered-down,

superficial form of Christianity, is remarkably perceptive and remains relevant to this day

as the Church grapples with the challenge of religious indifference (identified in Chapter

1 with Type III atheism) or, worse, hostility to various forms of faith and belief (a position

904 Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed, 111. The quotation is taken from de Lubac’s work

Theology in History, 495. 905 de Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 284-85. 906 Grumett, De Lubac: A Guide for the Perplexed, 132.

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more closely associated with Type I and Type II atheism). De Lubac certainly offers a set

of very important resources for Church and Christian theology as they seek to develop a

constructive dialogue with the increasing number of people within society who reject the

existence of God and who are often critical of institutional religion, whether this is

expressed as scepticism about the place of the Church within contemporary society, the

denunciation of Islamist extremism, or in various forms of anti-Semitism, which persists

within contemporary society.

5.3 Engaging with different categories of

atheism

The four-fold typology of atheism, which I introduced and discussed in Chapter 1,

demonstrates that atheism is far from a monolithic or homogenous phenomenon and that

there are different reasons why people who reject the existence of God may adopt their

position. At the outset, it should be recognised that, as Timothy Keller asserts, ‘non-belief

in God is itself an act of faith, because there is no way to prove that the world and all that

is within it and its deep mathematical orderliness and matter itself all simply exist on their

own as brute facts with no source outside themselves.’907

In this section I will return to my typology and note the approaches that may be adopted

by Christians as they seek to develop a constructive dialogue with the different expressions

of atheism that are associated with the typology. I will highlight the specific stumbling

blocks to belief associated with the four categories of atheism and offer remarks on the

potential for dialogue with each position. I am aware that each category of atheism in the

typology will present its own challenges that may, on occasions, make dialogue with

Christians difficult. However, the rewards of developing a mutual understanding between

Christians and the different types of atheist discussed here are considerable and, although

907 Timothy Keller, Making Sense of God: An Invitation to the Sceptical (London: Hodder & Stoughton,

2016), 227.

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dialogue will never be straightforward, the impetus to pursue an agenda of patient listening,

mutual learning, and productive discussion between Christians and each expression of

atheism is real and pressing one.

5.3.1 Type I atheism

As I noted in Chapter 1, Type I atheism is grounded in the application of reason and logic

to the question of God’s existence and focuses on the purported lack of evidence for

religious, specifically Christian, belief. Sometimes, particularly by New Atheist thinkers,

the Christian faith is presented as a hypothesis to be tested, rather like a scientific idea.

Type I atheists will stress the lack of evidence for God’s existence and argue that those

who believe in the reality of God despite the absence of such evidence are foolish.

Christians may find this a difficult argument to refute because their faith is in God who is

spirit, a presence in the world that is, in some sense, profoundly mysterious and

unknowable. My own experience of faith has been a highly complex one and, although it

has taken me through the process of training for ordination as an Anglican priest, it has

been severely tested at times as a result of bereavement and a journey through serious

illness.

I therefore accept that the evidence for faith will not be subject to scientific scrutiny,

which atheists often argue rules out the possibility of miracles,908 but will lie within the

sphere of personal experience, specifically in acts of prayer, contemplation, and worship,

as well as in engagement with the riches of the Bible and the works of other Christian

authors. These have all been important to me personally in my life of faith. Theists,

however, may argue that only someone who is omniscient and omnipresent can say from

his or her pool of knowledge that there is definitively no God because the absolute denial

of God’s existence requires infinite knowledge.909 I believe that Type I atheism needs to

be taken seriously and carefully understood, for the issue of evidence is clearly an

908 Rhodes, Answering the Objections of Atheists, Agnostics, and Skeptics, 63-76. 909 Rhodes, Answering the Objections of Atheists, Agnostics, and Skeptics, 30-31.

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important factor in driving this form of unbelief. I suggest that Christians may encounter

in this expression of atheism a mode of unbelief that can offer a purificatory role in helping

them to reflect on their own faith and the religious convictions that are associated with it.

Of my three dialogue partners, Eberhard Jüngel gives the most serious attention to the

arguments of Type I atheists although David Bentley Hart, particularly as he engages with

the New Atheist movement, also offers responses to this expression of atheism.

5.3.2 Type II atheism

As I noted in Chapter 1, Type II atheists are far less interested in matters of reason and

evidence in relation to the question of God and will emphasise the concerns that they have

about God as an authoritarian presence who opposes the human will. Their resistance or

rebellion will be based on a hostility to Christianity and a revulsion about the notion of

God, and their focus will be on the replacement of God by humanity as the supreme

principle within the organisation and development of society. This form of ‘substitutionary

humanism,’ which was powerfully articulated by Feuerbach, but which persists to this day,

finds expression in an emotional, rather than intellectual, opposition to God, as well as an

objection to the role of the Church within Western societies. Although Eberhard Jüngel,

David Bentley Hart and Henri de Lubac all engage with the thought of Type II atheists

(notably Feuerbach and Nietzsche), other Christians may struggle to counter the arguments

of Type II atheists for they are drawn on what may be acknowledged to be legitimate

principles of atheist humanism that prove to be highly refractory to alternative positions.

Type II atheists may conceive of God as a despotic deity who is opposed to human freedom

and who demands obedience and adherence to a strict moral code. This is not a perspective

on God that I support and I believe that the notion of a despotic God needs to be challenged

by stressing the qualities of love, mercy, peace, beauty, and forgiveness, which are amongst

the attributes of God as God is conceived within Christianity. As with the position of Type

I atheists, although for different reasons, I suggest that the perspectives of Type II atheists,

particularly in the conception of a controlling and oppressive deity, may offer an important

starting point for the purification of Christianity’s understanding of the nature of God and

also as an opportunity to re-educate atheists about how God is understood by Christians.

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5.3.3 Type III atheism

Type III atheism is less about intellectual argumentation or emotional rebellion in relation

to the question of God’s existence and much more closely connected to a lack of interest

in religious concerns and a failure to engage with matters of belief. I would suggest that it

is probably the most widely-held position today in secular Western societies and is

especially common amongst teenagers and young adults. I am also aware that some people

in this category may not be entirely dismissive of the possibility of an unseen and

unreachable dimension to human experience, despite their lack of engagement with

organised religious institutions, and may describe themselves as ‘spiritual but not

religious.’ This openness to the spiritual may be encountered in their interest in art, music,

literature, the beauty of the world, or even in sacred architecture, and it can provide a

valuable arena of common ground with Christians that may prompt meaningful

conversations and a fruitful form of dialogue. I have met many people, whose position I

respect, who describe themselves as ‘spiritual but not religious’ and this is a position that

is becoming an increasingly common one to hold within contemporary Western societies.

David Bentley Hart and Henri de Lubac both offer insights into the secularisation of

Western society and resources that can contribute to the development of a dialogue with

Type III atheists. I suggest that Hart’s emphasis on beauty as a medium for the human

encounter with divinity is especially helpful in this respect.

5.3.4 Type IV atheism

Type IV atheism is quite different from the other categories of atheism discussed above in

that it is rooted in philosophical positions that emphasise the sheer materiality of reality,

the irreversible nature of the ‘death of God’ within Western societies, and an ontology that

is securely laid out on what Deleuze refers to as the ‘plane of immanence.’ Type IV atheists

construct atheological frameworks that, although they may still draw upon religious themes

(as is evident in the work of Badiou, Deleuze, and Nancy), move towards the eradication

of divinity or transcendence within human worldly experience. This category of atheism

will, again, not be an easy one for Christian to engage with. However, as I have already

noted, the thought of my dialogue partners, Eberhard Jüngel, David Bentley Hart, and

Henri de Lubac, does provide resources that point to the presence and experience of God

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within this world that may offer a starting point for the development of a dialogue between

Christianity and Type IV atheism. Indeed, the thought of each of these theologians provides

a helpful resource for overcoming the binary distinction between atheism and Christianity.

5.4 Approaches to dialogue

Having reviewed the key themes in the theological perspectives on atheism in the work of

Jüngel, Hart and de Lubac, and the resources that they have made available to the Church

in its task of entering into a conversation with atheism, and having noted the approaches

that can be adopted in engaging with each of the expressions of atheism that constitute the

typology I have offered in this thesis, in this section I will examine further aspects of the

dialogue that Christians may look to open up with unbelievers in a way that is constructive,

open and respectful. I will highlight the need of the Church to recognise that there are, for

many people, substantial and perhaps insurmountable, barriers to faith, which stand in the

way of belief in God or of any form of religious identity. I will also identify the latent

religiosity that may continue to persist in some forms of atheism, along with an ongoing

openness to transcendence that can be a characteristic of populations even within secular

Western societies. At the heart of a respectful and constructive dialogue between atheists

and Christians will be a recognition that the two positions are closely connected and that a

binary distinction between unbelief and belief with respect to God may not always be

straightforward to sustain. With this point in mind, I next outline a set of principles that

need to underpin the fruitful conversations between atheists and Christians that are needed

if both groups are to live together harmoniously and respectfully in our complex

contemporary society which continues to be shaped by both secular and religious currents.

Finally, I will comment on the religious value of atheism and the learning that the Church

may derive from those who deny the reality of God.

Firstly, it is clear that the question of God (die Gottesfrage) is a fundamental one, and

that the matter is deeply interwoven with the issue of what it means to be human,

preoccupying religious adherents and unbelievers alike. The matter of God’s existence or

non-existence will continue to dominate discourse on religious themes for some time to

come with both Christians and atheists able to offer perspectives on this issue from which

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the other group may have much to learn. A key task of the Church in engaging with atheists

and other kinds of unbelievers is to accept, therefore, that unbelief is now widespread

within Western societies, as well as in other parts of the world. This need not be lamented

and instead should be accepted. However, even as atheism is recognised as an increasingly

common form of identity, as I outlined in Section 1.4, it will be important for Christians to

try to understand the reasons that are advanced for the denial of God’s existence.

A second principle of dialogue concerns the way in which Christianity is often

dismissed far too hastily and is poorly understood by many of its detractors today. Indeed,

the idea of God that is attacked by those who reject God’s existence often bears little

resemblance to the understanding of God that is held by Christians. There are, therefore,

circumstances, particularly in connection with atheist caricatures of the Christian

conception of God that are frequently articulated by unbelievers, where the views of

atheists should be challenged. A third principle I propose is that atheism and agnosticism

are perfectly understandable and valid positions for individuals to hold in society today.

There may be a boldness and grandeur of vision associated with some aspects of the

atheistic rhetoric and Christians should accept the rational validity of the atheist stance.

Similarly, atheists may be able to acknowledge some of the important contributions that

Christianity (as well as other religious traditions) has made and continues to make within

Western culture. This may be in connection with its art, architecture, musical legacy, and

in the role that churches play in promoting social well-being and in advancing justice,

mercy, and peace.

The fourth principle is connected with the need for atheists and Christians to listen

attentively and carefully to each other. Atheists need to be listened to with patience and

humility, rather than be demonised or condemned by Christians who are unable to hear the

important insights that they can offer with respect to both the Christian faith and the

standing of the Church. The same is also true of atheists, who should give due respect to

the views of Christians even where they may disagree with their beliefs. Perhaps the most

appropriate religious response to atheism is to genuinely engage with it and to ask atheists

questions such as ‘What is it like to be you?’ and ‘What challenges do you face living in a

culture with a Christian history?’ Alas, this does not always happen and the stereotypes

that believers and unbelievers sometimes hold about each other persist. They can be

unhelpful and undermine, rather than encourage, serious engagement, learning and

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dialogue. Sadly, slogans such as ‘religion is evil,’ and ‘atheists are going to hell’ still frame

the discussions that form part of atheist-Christian dialogue. Such viewpoints, which I

encountered on numerous occasions during my time working as a university chaplain, do

little to promote mutual understanding between the two groups.

As I have already underlined in this thesis, it is also the case that the binary distinction

between theism and atheism is often illusory, and that Christianity and atheism are much

more closely connected than may sometimes appear to be the case. It is a key theme within

my thesis and is certainly a point that is well understood by all of the interlocutors that I

have entered into dialogue with. This point has also been carefully articulated by other

thinkers, including the atheist philosopher John Gray, the Marxist Catholic literary theorist

Terry Eagleton, the Catholic theologian John Caputo, the Catholic philosopher Charles

Taylor, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, the contemporary English philosopher

Christopher Watkin, and the theologians and cultural critics Kutter Callaway and Barry

Taylor.910

A sixth and final principle, which I believe to be crucial and very much at the heart of

this thesis, concerns the profound learning that individual Christians and the wider Church

can derive from a range of atheistic critiques. As T.S. Eliot wrote in a letter to Richard

Aldington in 1927, ‘Atheism should always be encouraged (i.e., rationalistic not emotional

atheism) for the sake of Faith.’911 Atheists can therefore encourage Christian theology and

the Church itself to be appropriately self-critical and, in so doing, provoke renewed

thinking about the nature of God, the way in which the gospel is articulated in

contemporary society, and about the place of the Church in culture today. In this sense,

910 See Callaway and Taylor, The Aesthetics of Atheism: Theology and Imagination in Contemporary

Culture. 911 Cited in Spencer, Atheists: The Origin of the Species, vii. John Macquarrie makes the same point:

‘There is such as thing as straightforward atheism, and it deserves to be treated with respect, as one

possible interpretation of this ambiguous universe in which we find ourselves.’ John Macquarrie,

"Believing in God Today" (paper presented at the The Adelaide College of Divinity Annual Lecture in

Theology, 1988), 1-2.

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atheism provides a genuine opportunity for the Church to both reflect on its own identity

and faith, and to engage with the culture within which it stands in a constructive way.

As Rupert Shortt correctly states, ‘all serious religious practice ought to involve healthy

doses of self-criticism.’912 It is also the case, of course, that atheists have something to

learn from those who hold religious beliefs, which is a theme that has been explored by

several atheist authors, including Ronald Dworkin,913 Alain de Botton,914 and Tim

Crane,915 and which is examined in some detail by Guy Collins as he interrogates the

thought of Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, and Slavoj Žižek.916 In order for more

atheist-Christian dialogue to occur, which I believe is a crucial process in building a

harmonious society, atheists and Christians may need to abandon the either/or dichotomy

that often frames the discussion between them and seek to better understand the complex

cultural and sociological forces that define someone’s relationship to religion.

5.4.1 The relationship between faith and reason

One of the most frequently cited arguments for atheism concerns the proposition that it is

unreasonable and that rational thought must preclude the possibility of affirming the

existence of an invisible God. This notion raises the long-standing issue of the relationship

between reason and faith. In the context of the debate with Type I atheists, especially the

New Atheists, faith means ‘belief without evidence.’ According to leading atheist thinkers,

such as Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens, there is no empirical evidence that can confirm the

object of Christian faith, namely the reality of God.917 Jüngel, Hart, and de Lubac all use

reason to explicate the faith that they hold and affirm the philosophical traditions to which

Christianity is wedded. Faith and reason for these thinkers are not in conflict in the way

912 Shortt, God is No Thing: Coherent Christianity, 31. 913 Dworkin, Religion without God. 914 Alain De Botton, Religion for Atheists: A Non-believer's Guide to the Uses of Religion (New York:

Vintage International, 2013). 915 Tim Crane, The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist's Point of View (Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017). 916 Guy Collins, Faithful Doubt: The Wisdom of Uncertainty (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2014). 917 Haught, God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens, 44-45.

243

envisaged by the New Atheists. Hart argues, for example, that it is entirely appropriate to

believe in both God and in reason but not in one without the other.918 Despite affirming the

role of reason in Christian theology, Christian theologians also acknowledge its limitations.

De Lubac argues that the idea of God is preconceptual. It is naturally present to the human

mind prior to any explicit reasoning or objective conceptualisation.919 He also believes that

the power of affirmation is greater than that of conception or argument.920 Hart also notes

that theology has contributed to forms of nihilism, particularly the philosophical

nominalism associated with William of Ockham, which shattered the unity of faith and

reason.921

Problems arise when Christians seek to utilise reason-based arguments for God in their

dialogue with atheists, whether these are derived from natural theology, involve

cosmological arguments, arguments from design or arguments from religious experience.

They may also call upon some adaptation of Thomas’ Quinque viæ, which takes these

arguments out of their context as ways for believers to come to know God by reason and

misunderstands them as an apologetic resource. The so-called arguments for God’s

existence rarely succeed in persuading unbelievers of the credibility of religious belief and

may, in fact, involve a category error. For the basis of atheism for many, notably Type II

and Type III atheists, is not necessarily centred on rational argumentation. It is, instead,

connected with emotional and instinctive factors.922 Confronting such atheists with reasons

to believe in God is unlikely to be an effective strategy and it may be more appropriate for

Christians to simply acknowledge that atheism will persist in contemporary society and

accept that there are legitimate and understandable grounds for reasonable unbelief.

918 EG, 19. 919 DG, 54. Jacques Maritain makes the same point in stating that the human mind ‘before entering the

sphere of completely formed and articulated knowledge… is indeed capable of a prephilosophical

knowledge.’ Jacques Maritain, Approaches to God, trans. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 5. 920 DG, 112. 921 TBI, 133. 922 Joseph L. Walsh, "The Confrontation between Belief and Unbelief," CrossCurrents 15, no. 1 (1965):

45.

244

In the context of the dialogue between Christians and atheists, the question of reason

and how it is connected to faith is a complex one. Christians may need to challenge the

atheistic notion that faith can be reduced to a series of propositions that are given

intellectual assent and emphasise the mystical, experiential, and intuitive nature of faith.

Faith may be better characterised as trust or hope, rather than as an outcome of logic.923

Faith may, of course, still be accompanied by belief in the doctrines of the Church and will

seek to make sense of these in the theological enterprise of fides quaerens intellectum (faith

seeking understanding). The resources offered by apophatic theology and the long history

of Christian mysticism, which both stress the unknowability of God, may be helpful for

Christians as they seek to articulate the way in which God is apprehended in his

hiddenness.924 As Elizabeth Johnson states, ‘the reality of God is mystery beyond all

imagining [and] we can never wrap our minds completely around this mystery.’925 The

humility to acknowledge doubt and uncertainty may also highlight how challenging the

holding of a position of faith can be for some Christians and temper the caricature of people

of faith as those who always hold certain convictions about the nature of God.

5.4.2 The question of transcendence

A further arena that I consider to be a provide a fruitful starting point for atheists and

Christians to engage in dialogue concerns the notion of transcendence. Atheists and

Christians may understand this term in different ways. In my experience, many atheists

will, quite understandably, locate that which is transcendent within the material realm

923 As Kierkegaard asserts in The Sickness unto Death, John Habgood argues that being a Christian is more

like falling in love than solving a philosophical problem. John Habgood, Varieties of Unbelief (London:

Darton Longman & Todd, 2000), 27. Similarly, Eagleton argues that faith is not about a choice but derived

from grace. ‘Faith is a gift from God and Christians are rarely in conscious possession of all the reasons

why they believe in God.’ Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 138. In discussing von Balthasar’s negative theology, Lösel

makes the same point: ‘Faith is not a human work but, rather, God’s grace at work in us.’ Lösel, "Love

Divine, All Loves Excelling: Balthasar's Negative Theology of Revelation," 598. 924 The medieval devotional classic The Cloud of Unknowing highlights the very issue raised here: ‘For

though we through the grace of God can fully know about all other matters, and think about them – yes,

even the very works of God himself – yet of God himself no man can think.’ The Cloud of Unknowing,

trans. Clifton Wolters (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), 59. 925 Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, 7.

245

whilst many Christians will locate transcendence within an invisible and unreachable

divine realm. In acknowledging the former position, it will be important for Christians to

recognise that transcendence may have a horizontal as well as a vertical dimension. This

recognition allows Christian theology to learn much from the radically immanent forms of

philosophy that characterise Type IV atheism. The thought of Gilles Deleuze, who was

discussed in Chapter 1, notably his assertion that reality is confined to the ‘plane of

immanence,’ is particularly conducive to Christian reinterpretation. For, although Deleuze

is generally critical of religion and constructs a form of anti-theology, he does not claim

that philosophy is necessarily atheistic and recognises that the idea of God can function as

‘a transcendent ideal which incites us to take thought beyond the limits of possible

experience.’926 As I noted in Chapter 1, Deleuzian theology therefore represents a secular

trajectory for Christian thought and presents a radical recasting of theology as a thinking

of transcendence within immanence – a theology within, of and for the world, the saeculum

– of and on the plane of immanence. For this reason, a number of theologians who follow

Deleuze’s impulse towards immanence, as well as to anti-hierarchical, anti-organisational

ontologies, as they seek to develop theologies of the material world, find in Deleuzian

thought an alternative site to think about God.927 Thus, notwithstanding his atheism,

Deleuze is able to resource important developments in immanent forms of Christian

theology, such as creation-centred eco-theologies, body-centred expressions of feminist

theology, and politically-motivated liberation theologies.928 He therefore represents a key

atheistic thinker from which the Church may learn a great deal as it works out a theology

that focuses on this-worldly manifestations of God’s presence. This same terrain is

explored by Fiona Ellis in her notion of theistic, or expansive, naturalism. This ‘involves

acknowledging that we are natural beings in a natural world, and gives expression to the

demand that we avoid metaphysical flights of fancy and ensure that our claims remain

empirically grounded’ as well as a recognition that ‘God is not part of the natural world.’

926 Philip Goodchild, "Why is Philosophy So Compromised with God?," in Deleuze and Religion, ed. Mary

Bryden (London: Routledge, 2000), 156. 927 Simpson, Deleuze and Theology, 52, 77. 928 Kristien Justaert, Theology after Deleuze (London: Continuum, 2012), 34-37, 49-52, 132.

246

She argues that our understanding of the traditional naturalism versus theism debate must

be reconfigured, and that ‘both naturalism and theism can be true.’929

5.4.3 Christian ministry in an age of unbelief

Karl Rahner noted that

Christianity has entered upon an epoch which presents it with a fundamental challenge and

for which there has never yet been a precedent… church-related Christianity has not yet

become sufficiently aware of its radically new situation today [and] is conducting itself

with more or less anxious defensiveness.930

I have highlighted in this thesis how atheism and unbelief present a significant challenge

to the Church within an increasingly secular society and I envisage this challenge is only

likely to grow and intensify over the coming years. It appears that the era of Christendom

in the West is drawing to a close and that we are moving into what might be called a post-

Christendom period. Although census data suggests that Christianity remains the largest

religious category within the United Kingdom, this label will be for many a largely cultural

one and provides little evidence either for an active faith commitment or regular

participation in acts of Christian worship. Church attendance has dropped dramatically in

recent years, churches have become largely marginalised within contemporary society,

levels of biblical literacy are declining, and Christian values exert very little influence on

the majority of the population.

I consider that the key question for the Church as a whole and, indeed, for each

individual church community, is how the challenge of atheism and unbelief can be

addressed in a constructive and meaningful way. The challenge will be to identify ways of

engaging with atheism that are not marked by the anxious defensiveness that Rahner

describes. Mindful of the principles for dialogue that I outlined above, in the remainder of

929 Fiona Ellis, God, Value, and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2-3. 930 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol. 21: Science and Christian Faith, trans. Hugh M. Riley

(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1988), 138.

247

this chapter, I will outline some approaches that may be helpful for Christians as they seek

to engage with those who deny the existence of God and who may hostile to the presence

of the Church in contemporary society.

5.4.4 Patient listening

As I have already noted, there is no doubt that Christians need to take the atheist critique

seriously and to listen to atheists with patience, sensitivity, charity, and humility. This will

involve an acknowledgement that both unbelief in its harder or resolute form of positive

(or explicit) atheism, and in its softer manifestations as either negative (or implicit) atheism

or agnosticism, are reasonable and understandable worldviews for people to hold in society

today. They are increasingly widespread perspectives within Western culture and are likely

to become more significant over the years to come. Consequently, these are positions that

need to be engaged with carefully and thoughtfully. This trend is particularly apparent

amongst students and other young people, many of whom have rejected the religion of

their childhood years, and now identify as having no religious affiliation or, if they do

retain some spiritual values as ‘spiritual but not religious,’ practice a form of individualised

consumer spirituality that has been termed Moralistic Therapeutic Deism. Such a position

stems from a belief that God wants the individual to be good, that God can have a

therapeutic function to help them feel good and that God is a decorative concept rather than

an active agent in the world.931 It represents a belief system that is not necessarily hostile

to the notion of God’s existence or reality but may still eschew a formal religious

commitment.

As I have argued earlier in this thesis, atheism can offer to the Church a purificatory

function and be the source of learning for Christians. Rather than resistance and

denunciation, Christians will do well instead to enter into respectful dialogue and

conversation with atheists in an effort to understand their objections to religion and the

931 See Andrew Root, Faith Formation in a Secular Age : Responding to the Church's Obsession with

Youthfulness (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), xv-xxii, esp xvi.

248

Church as well as the basis for their denial of God. I have found from personal experience

that this is entirely possible as I have a number of friends and colleagues who identify as

atheists but who, nonetheless, retain a strong interest in religion and acknowledge the

important role that religious communities play within our society. I have found that not all

atheists are hostile to the place of faith in society and certain understandings of secularism

will allow for the expression of religious commitment within a pluralistic culture.

Considerate and honest engagement between believers and unbelievers may therefore be

possible under some circumstances and yield important insights for both parties. This may

be achieved in a number of different settings: in the workplace, in chaplaincy bases, in

structured interfaith dialogue programmes (to which unbelievers may be invited), within

friendship groups, and in more formal debates and discussions that may be set up by both

religious and secular bodies. These are all scenarios that I have had personal experience

of.

In university environments, despite the efforts made by chaplains to promote and

facilitate constructive dialogue, it must be acknowledged, however, that the exchanges

between Christians and atheists will not always be harmonious. As a university chaplain I

found that Christians, particularly those engaged in evangelistic endeavours, came across

as self-satisfied, judgemental and intolerant, and were likely to provoke hostile responses

from atheists and other non-Christians (including members of other religious traditions)

who were be dismissive of their views. Alas, I found that dialogue between believers and

unbelievers, under such circumstances, was rarely productive or constructive.932

5.4.5 Partnership and collaboration

There is little doubt that in Western societies people holding traditional religious identities,

including Christianity, which has been the focus of this study, a range of more diffuse

932 For an extended discussion of this issue, based on data collected from several universities in the United

Kingdom, see Mathew Guest et al., Christianity and the University Experience: Understanding Student

Faith (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); see also Don Thorsen, What’s True about Christianity?: An

Introduction to Christain Faith and Practice (Claremont, CA: Claremont Press, 2020), 29-36.

249

spiritual orientations, and those espousing different forms of atheism, will coexist for a

long time to come. Given this reality, I believe that it is important to think about the

standards and moral values that can be held in common within a religiously diverse culture.

This will be critical if we are to live well together and move beyond the misunderstandings

and rancour that can sometimes characterise the interactions between believers and

unbelievers. In seeking common ground, the identification of values such as social

responsibility, justice, wisdom, ethical behaviour, and compassion will be both important

and helpful in enabling theists and non-theists to recognise that there are vital norms that

they share and that in doing so the possibility and potential of fruitful dialogue can be

promoted.933

Additionally, I am aware that there are many practical actions that those who do and do

not believe in God can collaborate on. I have found that there is no reason why Christians

and atheists cannot work together to support initiatives that promote social justice and

human wellbeing. This may be at an individual level or involve cooperation between

formal organisations and communities. Examples of such collaboration include the

constructive contributions that both representatives from faith communities and humanist

organisations make to public bodies such as council-run interfaith networks and Standing

Advisory Councils for Religious Education, as well as in projects such as food banks,

night-shelters, disaster relief initiatives, and in projects to address social ills such as gang

culture, knife crime and drug addiction. Churches and chaplaincies also have a long history

of offering welcome and hospitality to their local communities by hosting art exhibitions,

concerts, fêtes, memorial services, running reading groups, by promoting opportunities for

the sacred dimension in the world of the human imagination to be explored,934 and by

acting as focal points for expression of public grief in the wake of traumatic events. The

challenge to individual churches in an increasingly secular society is to become resources

for the whole of the community within which they are located and to seek to serve all of

933 Paul Hedges, Towards Better Disagreement: Religion and Atheism in Dialogue (London: Jessica

Kingsley Publishers, 2017), 172-73. 934 See Paul Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Religion and

Theology (London: Routledge, 1999); Mark Knight, An Introduction to Religion and Literature (London:

Continuum, 2009).

250

the people who live in the neighbourhood whether or not those people choose to attend

acts of worship offered by the church. This service will be both practical and pastoral.935

Through the occasional offices of baptisms, weddings and funerals, churches will also

welcome family and friends of those around whom the services are centred who may not

have a faith but who are, nonetheless, open to the role of churches as centres of community

belonging. In all these ways, as Paul Tillich argues, the Church can show to those who do

not routinely attend churches that its symbolic role remains important in society today and

that the life of the Church remains meaningful for our existence as human beings. This is

particularly important in the Anglican tradition where the parish priest is charged with the

cure of all the souls in his or her parish, regardless of religious commitment. They represent

ways of demonstrating that the Christian message of salvation is ultimately a message of

healing, which is appropriate to the situation that fractured communities often find

themselves in.936

5.5 Conclusion

In this thesis I have sought to demonstrate that it is possible for the Church to develop a

constructive dialogue with atheism. I have showed that part, although by no means the

only, element in this process involves dismantling the binary distinction between

Christianity and atheism by highlighting the close relationship that exists between belief

and unbelief. I have highlighted the difficulties that emerge when these two forms of belief

and identity are posited as being in clearly opposed to each other. Drawing on Jüngel, Hart

and de Lubac, whose projects I explored in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I have underlined the

serious attention that Christian theology must give to atheism, the parasitic relationship

between atheism and Christianity (with both positions containing concealed elements of

the other), the role of Christian thought, as well as the history and actions of the Church,

935 See Avis, A Church Drawing Near: Spirituality and Mission in a Post-Christian Culture, 155-200. 936 Tillich, Theology of Culture, 49.

251

in encouraging some expressions of atheism,937 the resources that each of my dialogue

partner offers to Christians as they enter into dialogue with atheists, and some of the lessons

that the Church may be able to derive from various atheistic critiques. I have also pointed

to the remarkable complexity and diversity of atheist positions by setting out a four-fold

typology of unbelief in which each category is internally differentiated and which also, to

some extent, overlap with each other.

As the Church looks to its future in an increasingly secular Western society it will need,

I believe, to accept that it will have a diminishing role in cultural life, remain of marginal

interest to many people and recognise that large swathes of the population will choose to

ignore it. This appears to be an irreversible trend in Western culture. However, this does

not mean that the Church needs to abandon its source of hope for humanity, which is

located in the love of God for all people as revealed in Jesus Christ. There is, I recognise,

dwindling interest in the traditional metaphysical discussion of the existence and nature of

God and I have found that claims of the various metaphysical proofs for God are commonly

ignored or dismissed as unworthy of serious consideration. For God is not a component or

object within the field of empirical investigation. God is, rather, a supra-objective ineffable

mystery who lies beyond our comprehension and can never be grasped or domesticated in

human language.938 Christians will therefore be wise to complement philosophical

discussion with action within the world. This may take purely secular forms as they affirm

the creativity, freedom and transcendence that is proper to humanity. The place of the

Church in contemporary society will be most compelling when it translates the love of God

into practical initiatives that demonstrate the qualities Jesus commended in the Beatitudes:

poverty of spirit, comforting those who mourn, meekness, pursuing righteousness in

individual and corporate life, being merciful, working for peace and even, in some parts of

the world, suffering persecution.

937 See Hedges, Towards Better Disagreement: Religion and Atheism in Dialogue, 96-108. 938 Masterson, Atheism and Alienation: A Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary Atheism,

155, 57.

252

As Jüngel, Hart and de Lubac all, in different ways, argue, the affirmation of God can

promote an expansive liberation of the creative possibilities of human life because this

position remains open to the transcendent reality that touches all people. Christianity, as

Tillich notes, expresses humanity’s self-interpretation in the vertical line – the line above

to the unconditional. However, Christianity is equally able to discern the presence of God

in the horizontal plane of human relations and activities without losing its commitment to

transcendence in the vertical plane. The vertical, then, is a dynamic power that is manifest

in many different spheres of reality and every finite thing can become a bearer of the

infinite. It is the greatness of Christianity that it shows the positivity of life.939 Recognised

or not, all people are open to what Goethe describes at the end of the second part of Faust

‘the grace from above, which must participate in us.’ This grace can be found outside as

well as inside the Church, in families, the workplace, within nature. It is not confined to

religious worlds for God is greater that religion.

As I have highlighted in Jüngel’s project, the Christian vision is centred on the

penetration of the finite by the infinite as this was made known in the Incarnation. For Hart,

God’s infinity is apprehended in beauty whilst for both Hart and de Lubac, the salvation

of humanity is mediated through the presence of the Church in the world, even to those

who have no formal attachment to it.940 In these different ways the apparent meaningless

nature of human life is challenged and given meaning. It is distilled in the reconciliation

that the Apostle Paul writes of – the reconciliation between the divine and the human and

between individuals within our world. The Christian notion of agape is the love that

accepts the unacceptable, the one that is difficult to like, those who have different outlooks

and perspectives including the atheist and the unbeliever. Christians are surely charged

with the command to love all people, to respect their views even where they are contrary

to the values of the gospel, to listen to them with patience, humility, respect and sensitivity,

and to demonstrate in acts of charity, kindness, compassion, mercy, and generosity the very

939 Paul Tillich, The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Christian Message, ed. Durwood Foster (Cleveland,

Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1996), 50, 55. 940 David Bosch refers to this as ‘comprehensive salvation.’ David J. Bosch, "Transforming Mission:

Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission," (1991): 399-400.

253

love that God bestows on creation through Christ. This attitude will be at the heart of the

Church’s understanding of culture where it seeks to recognise the ultimate meaning that

shines through even the most atheistic positions and expressions. For the divine ground

shines through every creative human act. The secular realm is, then, I believe, not to be

considered godless just because it does not speak of God. To characterise the secular world

in this way is to deny God’s power over, and presence within, the world and shut God away

within religion and the Church.

A generous and compassionate Christianity will, I believe, seek not a defensive

relationship with the culture in which it is located, or to make recourse to apologetic

strategies and modes of evangelism that may be off-putting. It will need, rather, to elevate

gentle persuasion and plausibility over evidence and credibility in order to make any

headway in a postmodern culture that is suspicious of universal norms and totalising

metanarratives.941 This will be no easy task. It is likely that future surveys and the 2021

decennial census in the United Kingdom will indicate a further fall in the number of people

identifying as Christian and that church attendance will continue to decline, particularly

amongst young people. A degree of realism will therefore be required by Christians as they

confront life within a Western culture that has a dwindling regard for religious

commitment. Church communities within this context will need to adopt a number of

approaches if they are to make any connection with the people and places that surround

them. These will include community participation, affirming and valuing all who live

within the local neighbourhood, focusing on relationship-building rather than missionary

programmes, seeking to reach out rather than to draw in, using contextual language in

speech about God, recognising the power of deeds rather than words, rejecting a dualistic

understanding of the relationship between the secular and the sacred, and working tirelessly

for cultural transformation by upholding diversity, human welfare and social justice.942

941 Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World (Downers

Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 16. 942 Stuart Murray, A Vast Minority: Church and Mission in a Plural Cutlure (Milton Keynes: Paternoster,

2015), 141-42.

254

Entering into a constructive relationship with atheism will require of Christians

humility, sensitivity, honesty, and the capacity for self-criticism. It will be a difficult and

demanding process. However, in our complex society it is a challenge that I believe the

Church must face with courage and tenacity if it is to remain a viable part of Western

culture. To shirk this challenge would be to accept defeat and involve retreating into

isolation. For bridges to be built with those outside of the Church, Christians have no

choice but to acknowledge the reality of unbelief, not only in society at large but also in

their own lives.

This very point was made by Karl Barth. In the Introduction, I opened my thesis with

Barth’s honest acknowledgement of the atheist within himself in his response to Max

Bense’s essay ‘The Necessity of Atheism at the Present Day.’ His statement provides a

fitting example of how belief and unbelief can coexist within an individual and many

Christians, if they are honest, may recognise the reality that he speaks of. Despite his

recognition that atheism can lurk within the believing soul, Barth nonetheless moves on to

affirm his resolute commitment to the gospel. I will end the thesis with the full statement

that Barth made. It sounds a positive note of faith that offers a message of encouragement

to Christians today:

I know the rather sinister figure of the ‘atheist’ very well not only from books, but also

because it lurks somewhere inside me too. But I believe I know even better the real God

and the real man who is called Jesus Christ in the unity of both. He let the atheist depart

once and for all and long ago, completely, and that goes for Max Bense as well as for me.

Only in our bad dreams can we want to become ‘atheists.’943

943 Karl Barth, Fragments Grave and Gay, trans. Eric Mosbacher (London: William Collins, 1971), 45-46.

255

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