Towards the Transgressive Art

of a Reflexive Social Theory

of the Prison System

By > G. Eric Latham, Jr. (2011)

"Intellectual despair results in neither weakness or dreams, but in

violence. Thus abandoning certain investigations is out of the

question. It is only a matter of knowing how to give vent to one's

rage; whether one wants to wander like madmen around prisons, or

whether one wants to overturn them." (Bataille, 1970 pp. 24.)

Introduction:

There are many different approaches to defining the social function of the prison system. I am,

of course, not only speaking of "should be" statements, but statements of "what is." These can

range anywhere from "protection of society" to "punishment" to "rehabilitation" etc, or can be

some combination of these. Most often, these definitions of function focus on the function inside

the prison, rather than what the vision of the prison represents within the culture at large.

Though, it is true that many approaches combine these types of functional definitions. In this

paper, I am more interested in the function of the prison on the outside. Of particular interest to

me, is Michel Foucault's [1975] theory that we are in the process of developing a disciplinary

society made up of "disciplinary individuals." Also, that the development of the prison system

was key to this process, and that this is a function of said prison system (Foucault, 1975.)

The opening quote uses the term "prisons" to represent more than just the actual prison but any

sort of confining apparatus, at least in the second reference to "them." It also uses what some

may see as a metaphorical use of the term violence. I would argue that it is not metaphorical, as

violence is of what society is made up. At least, this is true in homogenous forms of society,

which do not allow heterogeneous aspects, "filthy or noble" (Bataille, 1970 pp.146.) Clearly, in a

society made up of conflicting wills will have some form of violence, whether linguistic,

emotional, physical, and finally, social. It will help to clarify that consensus building itself is an

act of assimilating violence.

My approach to sociology, penology, criminology, or any other science is, and always will be,

one of holistic nihilism. That is to say, as I feel any science should do, that I do not assume

anything. I do not assume reason as Truth, morality as Truth, etc. Like Nietzsche [1889], I will

stick with observation over tyrannical forms of reason. The role of reason in my thought is

simply to provide accurate labels to what is observed. When approached this way, I see no other

way to interpret consensus building or homogenous forms of society. In sum, I do not approach

science with lofty ideals of "enlightenment." As Foucault has shown whether with prisons

[1975] or with asylums for the mentally ill [1965], violence has often been camouflaged in

"enlightenment."

In this paper, I will be looking at Foucault's [1975] "disciplinary society" theory, as stated. I will

also be theorizing about the outside function of the prison, to see if it still matches up with what

Foucault [1975] was talking about. I am basically seeing if this theory is still important and

accurate. Thus, this is a highly theoretical paper, like much of what I do. It will also be

interesting to include concepts from Georges Bataille and Friedrich Nietzsche. Finally, if indeed

making suggestions is even somehow useful, I will have a solution section.

Fascist Function of Prison System

In "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," Bataille [1970] deals mainly with two terms and

applies them to a social theory of fascism. These two terms are homogeneous and heterogeneous

or homogeneity and heterogeneity. In a homogeneous society, every heterogeneous aspect is

excluded or made homogeneous in some manner. This is due to the fact that production is at the

base of homogeneous society (Bataille, 1970.)

The state is not initially an element designed to eliminate heterogeneous aspects and ensure

production, though it becomes one through contact with other elements designed for this

purpose, such as armies or kings. The state, whether "democratic or despotic" comes to function

to maintain homogeneity. The difference is simply that democratic states use more assimilative

forces (Bataille, 1970.)

Bataille [1970] notes that the very term heterogeneous refers to the impossibility of assimilation.

Those materials or individuals or groups that cannot be assimilated are excluded in some

manner, even in "democratic" states. It is also noted that Science itself, has this same function.

Its function is to establish a phenomenon's sameness or homogeneity. "As a rule, science cannot

know heterogeneous elements as such" (Bataille, 1970, pp.141.) Thus often homogeneity is an

incomplete picture represented as a whole picture, both in science and in the state (Bataille,

1970.)

This is not to say that Foucault's [1975] theory on the development of a disciplinary society is

automatically negated. This is because the picture of homogeneity, itself, can be seen to promote

actual homogeneity through self-regulation. In my interpretation of both Foucault [1975] and

Bataille [1970], this follows without problem.

Bataille [1970], finally links heterogeneous existence to anything in everyday intersubjective life

that can be seen "as something different." For him, it, being heterogeneous reality, is linked with

"mystical thinking" and is of the unconscious structure. The distribution differs across different

social systems, but overall Bataille [1970] rejects both notions of a homogeneous society being

dominated by a heterogeneous class and the notion of a homogeneous society oppressing

heterogeneous material. Instead, he leaves both options open and, in his analysis of fascism at

least, sees them both occurring at the same time (Bataille, 1970.)

In fascism, the leadership figures such as Mussolini clearly represent "something other" by show

of force, compared to the cattle of homogeneity. Thus, the ruling power or authority is easily

seen as heterogeneous in fascism. Yet, it is in a sense, a heterogeneous granted authority aimed

at elimination of a different other. This different other is the other heterogeneous elements in

society. In fascism, at least, this differentiates the heterogeneous grouping into two separate

groups, "filthy and noble." The noble heterogeneous gain their nobility (and their own

heterogeneity) in their extreme expression of the homogeneous desire to eliminate either internal

heterogeneous elements or external ones (Bataille, 1970.)

When we look at the current democratic state and its prison system in the light of Bataille's

[1970] work on the structure of fascism, we must ask ourselves: "Are these similar?" It does

certainly seem that, at least within the prison itself, there is a fascist system occurring according

to Bataille's definition. As Johnson (2002), notes throughout his text, there is a type of alienation

that occurs with guards, with their limited autonomy. We could perhaps compare this to guards

of the concentration camps. Despite the fact that ours is a supposedly democratic type of camp,

it could be argued that the policy makers, both political and intellectual, have become

heterogeneous in their willingness to apply camouflaged force (Foucault 1975) in dealing with

the undesirable internal heterogeneous elements of society.

It is also important to note that all heterogeneous existence is linked with what Bataille [1970]

labels "unproductive expenditure." Bataille [1970] also deals with this notion and expands upon

it in "The Notion of Expenditure." Bataille [1970] is focused on the current practice of his day,

in maintaining a position of classic utility. This would be one that negates and avoids loss,

despite there being historical examples of functional social uses of loss, such as "potlatch." In

his time frame, and I would argue in our post-postmodern intellectual wasteland as well,

"Humanity recognizes the right to acquire, to conserve, and to consume rationally, but it

excludes in principle nonproductive expenditure" (Bataille, 1970 pp. 117.)

When we combine this with what Bataille [1970] was dealing with in "The Psychological

Structure of Fascism," we see that another function linked with Fascism is the homogeneous

elimination of heterogeneous/nonproductive expenditure. This tends to occur with all

homogeneity, yet with Fascism it is completed through a ruling heterogeneous figure (Bataille,

1970.) If we look at our own prison system, especially in the light of drug laws, we see that one

function of it is the confinement and attempted elimination of nonproductive expenditure. Drug

use, like many other forms of inner experience are invalidated in our society (Laing, 1967.)

There may also be a stigma against it because the drug, a non-scientific concept, does not exist in

nature. Thus from a naturalist perspective, which can also argue for legalization due to social

norms being unnatural as well, it can be seen as an external threat that may result in the

unproductivity of an internal, and once homogenous, actor or actant (Derrida, 1992.)

At any rate, the result is the same. Exclusion, confinement, and rehabilitation/assimilation (both

forms of elimination)are the results. These have each at some point in time been an approach to

the American prison system (Blomberg & Lucken, 2000.) If we look at the American prison

system from a Bataillean perspective, it would seem fairly clear that it is indeed a fascist system.

Yet, eventually, the ruling heterogeneous elements of officially fascist nations fell, either from

external force (as with Hitler) or from internal forces of homogeneity (as with Mussolini.) At

least in Mussolini's case, we see the stampeding cattle of homogeneous society even turning

upon the heterogeneous force that it once granted homogeneous authority. (I honestly find the

treatment of Mussolini's corpse to be on a qualitative level of disgust near that of holocaust. The

homogeneous society remains guiltless for the havoc their homogeneity indeed created.) Why

no stampeding here? The difference is, of course, camouflage, which is where Foucault's [1975]

work fills in the gap.

Foucault and the Disciplinary Society

With Foucault's [1975] genealogical work on the prison system and modes of punishment and

discipline, we see a reflexive social theory developed out of a reflexive historical methodology.

He shows how the transition of modes of punishment was not simply a transition from inhumane

to humane, as social science had pretty much suggested up to that point. While the "enlightened"

ones patted themselves on the back, Foucault [1975] was showing that we saw an increase in

social control. We had transitioned from control over the body to control over behavior. The

enemy of the monarch had become the enemy of the people. The "disciplinary gaze" was now

infinite and based in society as a whole. Just in case this was not enough, we saw the

development of panopticistic technologies. This is not just the classic watch tower symbol but

was located in hospitals, classrooms, etc (Foucault, 1975.)

While Bataille [1970] noted that often homogeneity was a type of illusion, the "disciplinary

gaze," panopticistic technologies, and scientific knowledges that developed as a result of this

transition moved us towards a self-regulation (Foucault, 1975.) In sum, it made homogeneity

real, at the very least in the presentation of self. Here I am referring to Goffman's (1959)

presentation of self and front/back stages. While arguments of deterrence continue today, what

has happened as a result of our prison system is, at the very least, a front stage deterrence. This

obviously increases pressure on individuals to present themselves in a certain way for the threat

of incarceration is always present (Foucault, 1975.) Thus, homogeneity in the front stage is

made quite real, through the fascist and self-disciplinary function of the prison system.

This is similar to the concept of "slave morality" (Nietzsche, 1887) developed by one of the

largest theoretical influences on both Bataille and Foucault. From my interpretation of Nietzsche

[1887], "slave morality" seems to apply to a type of morality or ethics which attacks difference

or heterogeneous material. The origin of "evil" is developed in reaction to others actions. This is

opposed to "master morality" in which the definition of "good" is determined by the individual

actor taking the action. In this form of morality, there is no "evil." There is simply "bad," and

"bad" is any action that would be detrimental to their will (Nietzsche 1887.)

Now to mainstream sociology, the idea of a heterogeneous society operating on a system of

master morality seems to go against the entire field. Yet, Nietzsche [1887] shows historical

examples of this in ancient times and shows this type of sociality was reversed through historical

developments such as the development of Socratic philosophy and the Christianization of the

West. There is also the position that those behind the disciplinary society would be enacting

master morality and any attempts to drag that down would be slave morality. This is erroneous

for a couple reasons. First, there is no one behind the disciplinary society. The heterogeneous

material at the top of our social order are simply heterogeneous due to taking the goals of

homogeneity to the extreme, as is seen in fascism (Bataille, 1970.) The disciplinary society of

slave morality is above all a sociological development, the result of human social error portrayed

as liberty and truth. Second, Nietzsche [1887] notes that the social order has been reversed.

When we fully apply Nietzsche to Bataille, the heterogeneity at the top, at least in normative

power, is the slave-master. Whereas those that actually represent master morality would not

really care enough to help push a particular way of thinking or behaving upon the rest. Master

morality is focused on the self-will, and slave morality is focused on the actions and wills of

others, whether that is in social control of others or self-regulation due to fear of others

(Nietzsche, 1887.)

When we apply this to Foucault's [1975] theory, it is much clearer. Regardless of crime and

arrest rates, there is a self-disciplinary front stage function of the prison system. Those who are

going to commit criminal acts in a fashion that will get them in prison have moved beyond

concerns of presentation of self. Yet, the vision of the prison and all its panopticons and

power/knowledge deters front stage deviance for those on the outside (Foucault, 1975.) This is

not to suggest that front stage is fake or real or back stage is real or fake, in my interpretation of

Goffman (1959.) In sum, the prison system and other forms of democratic oppression is a front

stage representation of normative power... a PR-friendly form of Fascism. Resulting in, or

moving towards, the great human "triumph" when we develop the "correct" way form of

sociality. Sadly, the connection between power and knowledge that Foucault [1975] suggests is

seen clearly here, as this goal of finding the "correct" and ultimate truth of everything is often the

goal of science. This goes back to Bataille's [1970] point that science cannot understand

heterogeneity, as its goal is to eliminate it.

Conclusions and (Dis)solutions

Before concluding I must point out that certain introductory sociology textbook authors have

brought up a trend that may be problematic to Foucault's theory: if we are becoming a society of

disciplinary individuals, then we should not be seeing increases in prison populations

(Alexander, Thompson, & Edles, 2012.) This objection shows a general lack of understanding

the complexity of Foucault's works and is nothing more than the result of an error of over-

simplification and a desire for the postmodern Derridian conclusion (Ritzer, 2008) of ultimate

individual freedom due to all social controls being text. This is quite simple actually. Foucault

was writing at what was the beginning of the War on Drugs, which represents an expansion of

normative power into areas of deviance. It may take longer to see the expected results of this,

due to these expansionary phases. Yet, I would argue that it is already occuring and the

increased incarceration rates only help to further the push towards disciplinary individuals.

To conclude, labelling the prison system as "fascist" is not mere rhetoric when we look at

Bataille's [1970] structure of fascism. It is a system which endorses and promotes slave morality

and self-regulation of front stage deviance (and perhaps even back stage deviance.) In sum, it

promotes and furthers the goal of homogeneity through elimination of the "lower" forms of

heterogeniety. If the media's treatment of Charlie Sheen's masterful winning is any hint, we may

be seeing the elimination of heterogeniety in "upper" levels of society. Though, if we de-

socioeconomic class Bataille's [1970] work on heterogenity, we can see that in our democratic

fascism all heterogenity is being treated as the "filthy" type. The prison system not only

alienates inmates and guards (Johnson, 2002), but it further alienates heterogeneous elements

outside of the system itself. This would suggest that Foucault was aboslutely correct.

As far as solutions are concerned, I remain suspicious of developing any. This is due to the fact

that it may promote a further expansion of normative power parading as humane treatment. Yet,

a severe decrease in penalties, would certainly help allieviate the situation. I would also suggest

that guards be allowed to fraternize with inmates. This would help seperate the intersubjective

divide that has caused so many problems in sciences such as psychology (Foucault, 1954.) In

our approach to social science, including criminology and penology, we should take a reflexive

approach. Science should seek to understand heterogeneity instead of eliminate it. Penology is

actually in a fine position to do this as it can be seen as a sort of reflexive criminology. Yet, I am

not confident that such deforms in science and structure could occur, but it is deformation that is

necessary, not reformation. My ultimate dissolution would be the complete abolishment of the

prison system, something like a romanticized "old west" that allows for areas of deviance and

areas of the protection of normative power. The problem is, however, that slave morality (or

what could be termed slave sociality) and homogeneity are structured to expand... leaving us,

nowhere with only our transgression. We need dissolution not mere deconstruction for full

liberty.

"NON-KNOWLEDGE LAYS BARE. This proposition is the summit, but must be

understood in this way: lays bare, therefore I see what knowledge was hiding up to that

point, but if I see, I know. Indeed, I know, but non-knowledge again lays bare what I have

known. If nonsense is sense, the sense which is nonsense is lost, becomes nonsense once

again (without possible end)" (Bataille, 1954 pp.52.)

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