Manuel Bergamasco

EU foreign and security policy:

Euro-Atlantic security at the beginning of the 21st Century

Course tutor: Senator Bogdan Klich

Jagiellonian University 2014/15

“Todos somos americanos”: a redefinition of American interests or an outstretched

hand towards Cuba?

Introduction

The global geo-political interests and objectives of United States have been often, more or

less explicitly, pursued along with the economic ones. US foreign policy, especially after the

collapse of the Soviet Union, has almost always been headed by strategic goals in terms of

maintaining world political leadership, struggle and prevention of what were perceived as world’s

threats and, last but not least, conservation of the interests of both domestic economic oligarchies

and US economy. These trends were repeatedly confirmed by US Administrations over the years1,

even if they were supported by different strategic approaches or doctrines2, as regards the solution

of various international issues as well as regional balances. In this sense, the United States

established political relations and adopted different positions changing their approach time by time

depending on the historical and political context related with particular situations.

There was only one case in which US Administrations showed a firm perspective based on an

ideological approach rather than on interests: Cuba. For more than 50 years Cuban embargo has

represented the pivotal element of US-Cuban relations although characterized by more or less

strong periods of tension, tightening of restrictions as well as periods of thaw and loosening. Cuba

as the last outpost of the communist regimes in the Americas has influenced the US foreign policy

of last decades in the continent: the perception of an imminent Marxist threat, frankly speaking

much more theoretical than practical, to less than 200 kilometres from the American coasts meant in

fact the sacrifice of economic interests and benefits that would result from normal trade relations in

a constant attempt to undermine and eradicate Castro’s regime. But this crystallized and at the same

time ambiguous approach seems to have reached a historical turning point December 17, 2014

when in two contemporary speeches President Barack Obama and President Raul Castro announced

the end of embargo and the normalization of relations between the countries as well as the mutual

release of some political prisoners. Is it really the end of the historical rivalry between the United

States and their communist neighbours? It should be interpreted as the end of Cuban communism

and the openness to Western capitalism? Could it be the first step towards the definitive end of

1 This is clearly expressed in the last three US National Security Strategies (NSS) of 2002, 2006 and 2010

(nns.archive.us) in which is reaffirmed the US global commitment and the protection of US interests worldwide. 2 For a very interesting overview concerning US President’s doctrines since the post-war period and, in particular, the

post Cold War doctrines, the dialogue-based Clinton’s doctrine, the pre-emption (self)defence by G.W. Bush and the

ambiguities concerning Obama’s “realism” see: Meiertöns, H., The Doctrines of US Security Policy. An Evaluation

under International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.172-239.

revolutionary ideals facilitated by the impaired health’s conditions of Fidel Castro and his political

retirement in favour of the more moderate brother Raul? What are the conditions under which the

end of trade restrictions and the establishment of diplomatic relations will work? Can be seen as a

strategic move to defend American interests in Latin America in the light of the increasingly

importance of commercial and financial agreements concluded not only by Cuba with the Chinese

government? Is Cuba becoming a secondary priority in the Americas’ geopolitical chessboard

which is observing with concern, for example, the deep economic and political crisis of Venezuela?

In order to answer these questions and trying to understand the real significance of this decision, the

political implications and, above all, what kind of economic and geopolitical interests are behind

this breakthrough, this paper will be developed as follow. In the first part a historical reconstruction

of US-Cuban relations since the beginning of the embargo will be proposed; in particular, the

paragraph will highlight the role played by US-Cuban relations in the context of the wider US-Latin

American relations especially after the end of its economic dependence on Soviet Union. A second

part will be dedicated to the analysis of current developments. Beyond the last presidential rhetoric,

the aim is to evaluate which were the most influential facts and actors that have mostly prompted

towards this decision. For instance, it is out of question the mentioned success of Vatican

diplomacy in this reconciliation but this argument cannot be enough to fully explain such change of

direction. Finally, in the third part conclusions and final considerations will be drawn. The aim of

this last paragraph, and that of the whole work, is to understand the real reasons of this historical

change and solve the ambiguity concerning the US willingness, on the one hand, after 50 years of

fruitless efforts, of guaranteeing friendly relations with Cuban government and the resumption of

Cuban economy and, on the other hand, of making use of Cuban economy to expand their own

markets and redirect the geopolitical interests in the continent and in the world.

The Cuban embargo: a historical burden

It would be somewhat imprecise to include the history of US-Cuban relations within the

same framework of the other intra-American relations. Indeed, it is quite evident how Cuba

represented and represents the “exceptional neighbour” not only for the United States but, because

of its geographical position, also for the other Caribbean and Central-American states. The most

fruitful point of departure for the analysis of intra-American relations is to consider the concept of

distribution of power: according to P. H. Smith, in fact, “the United States has been stronger and

richer than its Latin American neighbors. The nature and degree of this asymmetry has varied over

time, but it has been a pervasive and persistent reality”3. The result is an unequal relationship in

favour of the United States which have enjoyed the greater freedom of action than the others and

which led them to exercise a perennial predominance and interference in the other American

countries’ affairs also threatening their national sovereignty. It is precisely in this terms that Cuba

represents the exception: the exception to the US plan of controlling politically, economically and

socially the other American governments and societies where over 50 years of embargo have not

been enough to prevent the failure of the US project on the island.

As far as the aim of this part is concerned, it could be quite interesting to point out which are the

principles and the historical background underlying US-Cuban relations as well as the US-Latin

American ones in order to figure out the reasons that have characterized US foreign policy towards

other American nations and Cuba, in particular. The features of US foreign policy are deeply rooted

3 Smith, H. P., The Talons of Eagle: Dynamics of US-Latin American relations, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 5.

in American history. Even during the Cold War parenthesis of “containment” towards international

communism the legacy of the uncontested eighteenth-century expansion and influence logic within

the Western Hemisphere had its role4. In a famous exchange of letters in 18235, the two former US

Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, arguing about some advises concerning the

engagement of the newborn United States in the context of relations between the great powers, laid

the foundations of the doctrine destined to mark the American foreign policy in the coming decades.

To a specific question of the then President Monroe whether “[s]hall we entangle ourselves at all, in

European politics, and wars, on the side of any power, against other…?” and “[d]o we wish to

acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces?” the 3rd US President,

while stressing the urgency to cooperate with Great Britain, reminded Monroe the two guiding

principles of US foreign policy namely the country’s non-involvement in European affairs and the

intolerance of “European meddling” in America. As regards the second question, Jefferson’s answer

is unequivocal: “I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition

which could ever be made to our system of States”6 indicating the island as part of what will be

defined as the United States’ “Manifest destiny”7. Divided between the Russian threat on the West

Coast and British requests for cooperation, the choice of President Monroe, which will became the

so called “Monroe Doctrine”8, the foundations of American foreign policy for more than one

hundred years, was that of preventing European countries to establish new colonies in the Americas

and not tolerate any European interference in American countries affairs.

The Cuban question assumed a considerable importance during this time when the US claims on the

Spanish colony and an increasing economic dependence of the island from the near North rather

than from Spain culminated in the Spanish-American war in 1898 and the formal independence of

Cuba in 1902. The end of Spanish interests in the Americas definitively paved the way for the US

affirmation in the continent and the control of their own interests on the island. Guantanamo Bay

and its naval base, for instance, a makeshift shelter of the US Army during the war became a

perennial US naval base thanks to the signing of the Cuban-American Treaty (1903) and the final

concession in 1934.

It is quite common in the literature to give little importance to the period between Cuban

independence and the rise of Castro’s Revolution, considering them, after all, decades of relations

between Cuba and the US. But it could be interesting to re-evaluate some key decisions in US

foreign policy in this period in order to be able to affirm that, as Williams said, “Had American

policy in action between 1895 and 1959 actually been successful according to its own standards,

4 Smith, H. P., Ibid, p. 6. 5 On October 17, 1823, Monroe wrote a letter to his former teacher and good friend, Thomas Jefferson. Monroe was

asking for advice on a foreign policy matter he was considering. That foreign policy matter would become the Monroe

Doctrine, which Monroe delivered in his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. For the full text of James

Monroe’s letter to Thomas Jefferson: memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mcc:@field (DOCID+@lit(mcc/082)) ,

08/02/2015. 6 For the full text of Thomas Jefferson’s reply to President Monroe in October 24, 1823: www. let.rug.nl/usa/ presidents

/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson, 07/02/2015. 7 “Manifest destiny” was a term coined by American press in XIX century which indicated US obvious and inescapable

mission to expand their territory, their institutions and values throughout North America towards the Pacific. It was

used to encourage the annexation of Western United States such as Texas in 1836 and the Oregon Country in 1846The

term was revived in the 1890s by Republican supporters as a theoretical justification for the US expansion outside of

North America as demonstrated by the successful Spanish-American war concerning the claim on Cuban territory in

1898. For a comprehensive overview on this theme: Albert K. Weinberg, , Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist

Expansionism in American History, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1935. 8 Officially expressed for the first time in the President's Annual Message to Congress on 2 December, 1823.

then there would have been no Castro and no CIA invasion” 9. The impossibility to annex the

island10, in fact, did not prevent the United States to exercise their hegemony incorporating de facto

Cuba in the “American empire”. The almost total economic dependence and the unceasing pressure

towards an “adequate” government, guaranteed through deployment of troops in 1906, 1912 and

1917, led the United States to define and enforce “the limits on the political, economic, and social

development of Cuba”11. Given the limited economic benefits of US dependence, which were

mostly concerning a little part of Cuban population, and the impossibility of any social and

economic change an anti-imperialism feeling start growing among the mass of Cubans who after the

crisis of 1929 saw their conditions further worsened. The lack of recognition of revolutionary Grau

government in 1933 by US Administration and the possibility of a military action on island generate

an intense and prolonged anti-American agitations inside Cuba about American intervention and

American investments of capitals. Following Williams, therefore, the primary responsibility of

Cuban Revolution is to be sought in the American imperialist behaviour that, forgetting Mexican

experience, has not been able to retire with dignity from the island at sunset of world imperialism.

No wonder therefore the measures taken by President Eisenhower in 1960 after the seizure of power

by Castro and the nationalization of the major companies on the island, all American-owned. Thus,

Cuban embargo itself can be seen as the continuation of such imperialism and tendency towards

political supremacy throughout the continent and the use of force (military as well as economic)

whenever US interests are not guaranteed. The anomaly of Cuban case consists of even US

economic interests were partially damaged if is assumed that almost 80% of sugar imports before

1960 came from the island and that the majority of US companies controlled much of Cuban mines,

refineries and estates as well as trade routes. As is known, the impact of Cold War had a decisive

role in US-Cuban relations: the bilateral rivalry and the mutual capacity for nuclear destruction, as

Smith further argues, brought the concept of “national security” to the top of the US agenda and

“turned Latin America into both a battleground and a prize”12 in the conflict between US and Soviet

Union. Under the pretext of “containment”, the United States operated, more or less evidently, in

order to repel and delete any communist threat insurgence within the Latin countries as well as in

US soil and the declared Cuban rapprochement with Soviet Union in terms ideological affinity and

economic sustainment represented the primary threat for US Administration. After the initial

recognition, therefore, Castro’s regime in 1960 was diplomatically and economically isolated:

acting on the basis of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, US imposed a total trade embargo

and restrictions on entry of Cuban citizens on American soil. The apex of tension was achieved

under the new US Kennedy Administration: Operation Zapata was launched in 1961 with the aim

of destabilizing and overthrow Castro’s regime through a series of limited airstrikes, the Bay of the

Pigs Invasion in April and the final arrest of hundreds of Cuban exiles and dissidents13 . The

continuous series of attacks and sabotage organized by CIA and Cuban dissidents as part of

Operation Mongoose led Castro to seek military support to Soviet Union which was realized by the

installation of missile sites of different kind in 1962 towards American coasts. It is not so clear

9 Williams, W. A., The United States, Cuba, and Castro: An Essay on the Dynamics of Revolution and the Dissolution

of Empire, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1962, p.1. 10 The annexation of Cuba was impeded by the so called “Teller Amendment”, 1898, which guaranteed the control of

the island “to its people”. 11 Williams, W. A., Ibid, p.8. 12 Smith, H. P., Ibid, p.6. 13 Ulbrich, D. J., Research note: “A Program For Covert Action Against The Castro Regime, 16 March 1960”. Temple

University, 1960.

whether and what US Administration known about the real entity of this installations and for how

long Soviet missiles was left available for Cuba14 but it is widely accepted that Cuban Missiles

Crisis in October 1962 brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war. The resolution of Missile

Crisis led Kennedy to sign The Cuba Assets Control Regulations of 1963 establishing the

prohibition of transporting US goods via foreign ships that had stopped in Cuban ports.

Considering the period between the Missiles Crisis and the end of the Cold War as a perennial

attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime, especially after its military support to independence

fighters in Angola in 1976, the extremely high degree of economic dependence from Soviet Union

did not provide positive scenarios for Cuba in case of USSR dissolution also due to its exclusion

from international organizations15. In addition, the illegal emigration from Cuba to US was a

constant feature in these years as well as the mutual espionage missions: the consequence was a

large number of political prisoners in both United States and Cuban jails.

The fall of the USSR in 1991signed a dramatic turning point for Castro’s regime and for Cuban

economy. As Donald Schulz argues in “Cuba and the future”, the almost total economic dependence

from the former Soviet Bloc (CMEA16) and the simultaneous restrictions and sanctions imposed by

the United States precipitated Cuba into a very serious political and humanitarian crisis.

Considering that during 1987-1989 the 84,2% of Cuban imports came from Eastern Europe and

Soviet Union and that this amount halved in 1990 until disappearing the following year 17, it was

easy to predict a general deterioration of living conditions of the Cuban people that so much

supported the anti-Americanism of Castro and now called for a greater openness towards the big

neighbour. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, emanated to promote a peaceful transition to Cuban

democracy and support Cuban people, prohibited travelling to Cuba by U.S. citizens, trading with

Cuba by foreign-based subsidiaries of US as well as remesas familiares to Cuba. On charges of

human rights standards violation, this bill was explicitly introduced to “wreck havoc on that

island”18. In the same years the emergence of the illegal migrations flows came out again: for the

fourth time in 1994 the so called “Rafters crisis”19 (Crisis de los Balseros) brought to light one of

the many contradictions of Cuban embargo namely the “open door US refugee policy” which

permitted Cubans enter as political refugees. As Nickerud, Springer, Larrison and Issac argue, the

resolution of Rafters Crisis, which led Clinton Administration to revise the Cuban Adjustment Act

of 1966, and the launch of the “wet feet, dry feet policy” in 1995 definitely limited the conditions of

entry to the US signing a radically political change20 and, paradoxically, a greater coherence in the

US-Cuban relations. Another significant fact in the tightening of relations between these two

countries in the 1990s was the introduction of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity

14 An enlightened dissertation about the information trafficking during Cuban Missiles Crisis is given by: Coleman, G.

D., “The Missiles of November, December, January, February…: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile

Crisis Settlement”, Journal of Cold War Studies 07/2007; 9(3), pp. 5-48. 15 Cuba was excluded from OAS (Organization of American States) in 1962 and was readmitted only in 2009. 16 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the economic organization established in 1949 as reply to OEEC

in Western Europe under the leadership of the Soviet Union that included the countries of the Eastern Bloc along and a

number of socialist states elsewhere in the world such as Cuba. 17 Schulz, D. E., Cuba and the Future, Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 2-20. 18 Franklin, J., “The politics behind Clinton’s Cuba policy”, The Baltimore Sun, August 30, 1994. 19 Rafters or Balseros, were that people who emigrate illegally in self-constructed or precarious vessels from Cuba to

neighbouring states including the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands and the United States because of its disagreement with

communism and Castro’s government. It is common to consider four waves of Balseros: the first had been before

Missile Crisis, the second between 1965 and 1973, the third in 1980s and the last one in 1994. 20 Nackerud, L., Springer, A., Larrison, C., Issac A., The End of the Cuban Contradiction in U.S. Refugee Policy,

International Migration Review, Vol.33, No 1 (Spring 1999), Center for Migration Studies of New York, pp 176-192.

(Libertad) Act or Helms-Burton Act in 1996 following the felling by Cuban jets of two private

planes operated by a Miami based anti-Castro dissidents group which had been dropping pro-

American leaflets over Cuban territory. The aftermath of this bill was the strengthening of Cuban

embargo extending its application to foreign companies trading with Cuba and penalizing that

companies which favoured trafficking of former US citizens property confiscated after the

Revolution.

At the dawn of the millennium partial loosening of restrictions was granted. In 2000, the Trade

Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act was introduced in order to alleviate the living

conditions of the Cuban population and to address the lack of essential goods: some agricultural

products and medicinal supplies were allowed to export but, at the same time, the embargo would

be lifted only when Cuba would be held free and democratic elections that excludes Castro family.

“Todos somos americanos” but some differences still persist: normalization, redefinition or

geopolitical reorientation?

The second part of this work will be dedicated to the current development of US-Cuban

relations and to a critic evaluation of the historical decision reached 17 December, 2014. First of all,

it should be quite useful outline the US political framework behind this decision. After Bush

Administrations in which, except for the US humanitarian aid provided after Hurricane Michelle in

2001, the general orientation was towards the “end of the Castro regime and the dismantling of the

apparatus that has kept him in office for so long” 21 considering “unacceptable” any eventual

succession of his brother Raul in order to guarantee to Cuban people the right to freely elect a new

government, the election of President Obama in 2008 seemed to open important horizons of

reconciliation. Against the Bush idea of a country on the brink of collapse, Cuban economy,

between 2004 and 2006 grew about 8% per year favoured by an increasing nickel export and

tourism revenues and by new trade relationships with China; on the other hand, American

propaganda was even weaker in influencing Cubans which never disowned both Castro and its

government. On the wave of this situation in 2009 President Obama revoked some restrictions on

travel and remesas familiares extending the range of goods that could be shipped to Cuba with the

aim to make Cubans less dependent from its government22and in 2010 introduced a bill to end the

travel ban to Cuba allowing US citizens to freely travel towards the island. The last relevant episode

was precisely the December 2014 contemporary speeches announcing the normalization of US-

Cuban relations.

One of the conditions of this new approach concerned the exchange of some political prisoners: the

history of spying, sabotage and political dissidents between the two countries is deeply rooted in

their relation and can be traced back to the beginning of Castro regime but only the most recent

facts will be mentioned. The same day of this “historical reconciliation”, after sixteen years of

controversial imprisonment on charges of being suspected of conspiracy and illegal activities, the

last three of the “Cuban Five” intelligence officers were released by President Obama (the other two

were released in 2013) although in 2001 Cuban government already admitted they were intelligence

21 Smith, S. W., Bush’s Dysfunctional Cuba Policy. The Bush administration’s Cuba policy has reached a dead end,

November 6, 2006. http://fpif.org/bushs_dysfunctional_cuba_policy/ 08/02/2015. 22 The Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act, introduced in February, 2009.

staff with the mission to supervise Cuban dissident groups and not US government23; on the other

hand, the US obtained the release of contractor Alan Phillip Gross who was arrested in 2009 for

espionage activities concerning the distribution and installation of satellite equipment in La Habana

for creating an alternative and confidential network of communication with Washington.

But, beyond the question of the prisoners, which are the implications of this “rapprochement”?

Which interests are involved? Starting from the analysis of Obama and Raul Castro’s speeches and

the subsequent opinion of Fidel Castro, the rest of this part will try to investigate the most

important actors and elements which had influenced this decision. Obama’s speech is based on four

main points: the admission of a failed approach towards Cuba, “we will end an outdated approach

that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests, and instead we will begin to normalize

relations between our two countries”; the reestablishment of diplomacy, “I’ve instructed Secretary

Kerry to immediately begin discussions with Cuba to re-establish diplomatic relations that have

been severed since January of 1961. Going forward, the United States will re-establish an embassy

in Havana” (but what about a Cuban embassy in Washington?); the deletion of Cuba from the black

list of States Sponsor of Terrorism (since 1982), “this review will be guided by the facts and the

law. Terrorism has changed in the last several decades. At a time when we are focused on threats

from al Qaeda to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces the use of terrorism should

not face this sanction”; the increase of travel, commerce, information flows and access to financial

instruments. However, as also expressed by Raul Castro’s reply there are still some important

difference and disagree between US and Cuba: the emphasis of President Obama is on Cuban civil

society, workers as well as Cubans Americans and not on its government and the openness towards

a post-embargo scenario is expressly aimed to spread American values of freedom and democracy

through physical contact in a bottom-up process. In this sense could be read the statements: “We

welcome Cuba’s decision to provide more access to the Internet for its citizens” and “ To the Cuban

people, America extends a hand of friendship”. Concluding his speech, President Obama used a

strong rhetoric tool saying “City of Miami is only 200 miles or so from Havana ... [it] is often

referred to as the capital of Latin America. But it is also a profoundly American city - a place that

reminds us that ideals matter more than the colour of our skin, or the circumstances of our birth; a

demonstration of what the Cuban people can achieve, and the openness of the United States to our

family to the South. Todos somos americanos” 24 . On the same way, Raul affirmed the same

ambitions as well as the same differences saying: “Hemos acordado el restablecimiento de las

relaciones diplomáticas ... Esto no quiere decir que lo principal se haya resuelto, [but] el bloqueo

económico, comercial y financiero que provoca enormes daños humanos y económicos a nuestro

país debe cesar” reaffirming the needs of discussing “y resolver las diferencias mediante

negociaciones, sin renunciar a uno solo de nuestros principios”. In a quite realistic way the Cuban

President then affirms the necessity of an “actualización de nuestro modelo económico para

construir un socialismo próspero e sostenible” confirming the already started economic reforms

during his rule. The way in which Cuban leader proposes to set the normalization is through the

International Law and the UN Charter, probably in order to reaffirm the principle of non-

interference in home affairs. In the last part of his speech, Castro recalls the differences already

highlighted by Obama: "Al reconocer que tenemos profundas diferencias, fundamentalmente en

23 A detailed explanation of the events concerning the “Cuban Five” in: Morais, Fernando. Los Últimos soldados de la

Guerra Fría. La Habana, Editorial Arte y Literatura, 2013. 24 The full-text of Obama’s speech is available on: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-

president-cuba-policy-changes, 06/02/2015;

materia de soberanía nacional, democracia, derechos humanos y política exterior, reafirmo

nuestra voluntad de dialogar sobre todos esos temas” reminding that “Los progresos alcanzados

en los intercambios sostenidos demuestran que es posible encontrar solución a muchos problemas

... Debemos aprender el arte de convivir, de forma civilizada, con nuestras diferencias” 25. After a

long period of silence, for the occasion, the former Cuban leader Fidel Castro made a written

statement to a student federation at the University of Havana in which totally distrust US politics

and policies but “this does not mean I reject a peaceful solution to the conflicts. We will always

defend cooperation and friendship with all the people of the world, including with our political

adversaries”26. It seems a quite definitely openness towards US even if the words “conflicts” and

“adversaries” call to mind the old conflictual logic of US-Cuban relations.

In a more recent statement pronounced January 28, 2014 at the Community of Latin American and

Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in Belen-Heredia (Costa Rica), Cuban President affirmed the

four conditions of US-Cuban dialogue: the end of embargo, the restitution of Guantanamo Naval

Base, the interruption of propaganda transmissions on island via Radio and TV Martí and the

reward to the Cuban people for the human and economic damages caused by the US policy. If the

last one seems almost unrealistic from a practical point of view, the end of embargo is out of doubt

on Obama’s agenda and now the question has to pass the Congress. As regards the transmissions is

quite clear that the new generations are less ideologically influenced and more awareness of its own

life and this instruments cannot be enough without economic and civil guarantees. The most

controversial issue concerns the Naval Base of Guantanamo: the assistant secretary of the Bureau of

Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson declared that “the issue of Guantanamo is not on

table in these conversations”27 reaffirming the strategic importance of having a military base and

prison (even if in a closing phase) in the Caribbean and adding that there were no plans to shut

down the US government-funded Radio and TV Matrí.

Moreover, both President Obama and Castro recognized the role of Vatican in this reconciliation.

Obama, in particular declared: “His Holiness Pope Francis issued a personal appeal to me, and to

Cuba’s President Raul Castro, urging us to resolve Alan’s case, and to address Cuba’s interest in the

release of three Cuban agents who have been jailed in the United States for over 15 years [and] I

want to thank [Him], whose example shows us the importance of pursuing the world as it should be,

rather than simply settling for the world as it is”. The crucial role of Pope Francis as mediator in this

(partial) change of perspective is proved by the reception in the Vatican of the countries’

delegations in October 2014 “in order to promote constructive dialogue on sensitive issues, which

give rise to a satisfactory solution for both parties"28 and by sending a letter to the two leaders in

previous months invoking dialogue and the a solution to their historical problematic relations.

Beyond the official statements and merits of the political and spiritual leaders, it could be

interesting to briefly focus the attention on other “external” factors that may have led to this

agreement. For example, it could have been a decision driven by the growing international

unpopularity of Cuban embargo? Probably yes. After the Cold War, in fact, the countries in favor of

maintaining these restrictions decreased steadily: since 1991, the United Nation claim for the end of

25The full text of Raul Castro’s speech in mother tongue on: www.cubadebate.cu/opinion/2014/12/17/alocucion-del-

presidente-cubano-los-cinco-ya-estan-en-cuba, 07/02/2015. 26 www.nbcnews.com/storyline/u-s-cuba-relations/cubas-fidel-castro-breaks-silence-ties-u-s-adversaries, 07/02/2015. 27 Roberta Jacobson declaration at House of Representatives hearing, Wednesday February 4, 2015

www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-cuba-usa-guantanamo, 07/02/2015. 28 Official note of State Secretariat of Vatican, 17/12/2014. www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state, 07/02/2015.

embargo and the following motions approved by General Assembly were approved with the vast

majority of votes29. In addition, the dramatic economic and social environment in Venezuela which

is on the brink of bankruptcy and political chaos, the messages of friendship and solidarity launched

from Cuba (last circumstance in CELAC Summit) and its oil dependence from La Habana, may

have led the US to stabilize and put under control a relationship that could become very dangerous

for economic and political stability of US as well as the whole Continent. On the other hand, Cuba

can feel itself more economically secure from eventual upheavals.

Finally, which is the geopolitical value of this choice for the United States? According to George

Friedman, “the geopolitical foundations behind the American obsession with Cuba have ...

evaporated” 30and so, the normalization of relations occurred because Cuba is no longer a strategic

threat but rather, the last bastion of a “romantic” and declining socialism: the current geopolitical

threats, in fact, are elsewhere such as the delicate game of balance with a renewed “Russian

imperialism” in the Ukrainian issue and the more sophisticated and elusive spread of terrorism and

Islamic State.

Final remarks

Concluding this work answering the initial question whether the normalization of US-Cuban

relations are occurred as a redefinition of American interests or a genuine outstretched hand towards

Cuba some further considerations can be drawn. The answer to this question is: probably both, even

if the protection of US interests in the region still play a relevant role in US Agenda much more

than the instauration of genuine relations of friendship and solidarity. In the same way, the total

openness of Cuban markets and political system to American products and values should be a

concrete opportunity to gain each other in terms of economic performance and respect of human

rights standards. One the other hand, the United States have full consciousness of the secondary role

that Cuba began playing after the collapse of Soviet Union in terms of geopolitical relevance and

threat. From this perspective, with the engagement in the Middle East first, the spread of terrorism

and the nuclear threats brought by states such as Iran and North Korea (even if Cuba is still formally

on the black list of State Sponsor of Terrorism) then, and ultimately the controversial issue of

Ukraine, the Cuban question has unavoidably lost a geopolitical priority for United States remained

rather a functional partner to stabilize and control in a new way in order to guarantee the stability of

Americas.

It could be more interesting drawn some considerations from the Cuban point of view. The results

achieved with last declarations put us directly in the heart of the matter: the almost total agreement

about the end of embargo and other economic issues reflects the mutual necessity to gain benefits

each other. The problems rises when the issues become political: the refusal of abandoning

Guantanamo and the propaganda broadcastings by US and, above all, the resistance of Castro’s

government towards the democratisation and Westernisation of Cuban political system and society

seem to be the last remnants of an ideological and strategic battle that no longer has nothing to do

with the new generations of both Cubans and Americans which are much less ideologized than

29 “Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the forty-sixth session. Necessity of ending the

economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”, UN General

Assembly, 1991. The last 2011 motions against Cuban embargo was approved with 187 votes in favour, 3 abstentions

and only 2 against (US, Israel), www.un.org/en/ga/62/plenary/cuba/bkg.shtml, 08/02/2015. 30 Friedman, G., The Geopolitics of U.S.-Cuba Relations, December 23, 2014. Stratford Global Intelligence,

previous. The brave attempt by Raul Castro to implement a modern socialism since his settlement to

the government in 2006 seem to have paid and the Cuban economy increased significantly in recent

years also thanks to Chinese investment and a partial loosening of embargo. But apart from this, the

normalisation of US-Cuban relations has not discouraged the Castros from their “romantic” extreme

attempt to defend the ideals of Revolution, even appealing to Vatican mediation, in the unequal

“struggle” against new US imperialism. It could be said that whether Obama saying “Todos somos

americanos” could means “Todos become capitalists” for the Castros this statement is still

interpreted “Todos somos americanos pero somos diferentes” resizing significantly Obama’s speech

and US ambitions at least until Raul Castro settles the government.

Another interpretation could see a “long-term post-Castro Cuba strategy” by US government as

based on another personal strategy in the medium-term of President Obama: the 2016 elections.

Inhabited by many Latinos and Cubans, Florida has always been one of the key states in the race for

the White House and a openness to Cuba could represent a great success giving a relevant

advantage to Democrats in the next presidential election. Probably, it is too early to predict what

will be the real effect of the normalization of US-Cuban relations. Until 2018, when Raul Castro

will retire, the political future of Cuba will be characterized by a strenuous defence of what remains

of the Revolution. Then we will see.

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