THREE KINDS OF CONFUCIAN SCHOLARSHIP

kelly james clark

THREE KINDS OF CONFUCIAN SCHOLARSHIP

Introduction

Let me begin with a confession: I cannot read Chinese and I am nota trained sinologist. Although I am not a trained sinologist, I am asinophile. I am an analytically trained philosopher who specializes inphilosophy of religion and ethics. Since 1998 I have devoted myselfto the study of Chinese philosophy. When I read the Analects for thefirst time, I found the opening lines enigmatic, bewildering, and/ortrite:

The Master said, “To study, and then in a timely fashion to practicewhat you have learned—is this not satisfying? To have companionsarrive from afar—is this not a joy? To remain unrecognized by othersand yet remain free from resentment—is this not the mark of thegentleman?”1

Of course, I thought, it is good to study and then to put into practicewhat one has learned, and it is good to have friends, and it is good tobe anonymous without resentment. But why was this considered aclassic? The subsequent passages offered little by way of clarification;they simply moved me into a more enigmatic and bewildering worldof filiality, benevolence, sacrifice to ancestors, and ritual. The Analectsraised far more questions than they gave answers. Why, for example,would sacrifice to ancestors cause virtue to return to the living (Ana-lects 1:3)? Or what could possibly be the relationship between stiff,formal ritualized activity and harmonious ease (Analects 1:12)? Thebelief that such an important book had meaning beyond what I imag-ined plunged me into the sea of interpretation.

Some of the basic contours of Confucian thought began to emerge:ren (humaneness, benevolence, human-heartedness), shu (reciprocity,deference, altruism, respecting others, being other-regarding), li (com-monly translated “ritual,” but clearly more broad and less religiousthan our understanding of ritual; li includes both common etiquetteand religious ritual and so might be better translated “propriety”),and de (virtue, excellence, power, efficacy).

KELLY JAMES CLARK, professor, Department of Philosophy, Calvin College. Speci-alities: philosophy of religion, ethics, Chinese thought. E-mail: [email protected]

© 2006 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

mailto:[email protected]

Yet I felt a growing unease as I read the contemporary secondaryliterature primarily because the interpreters disagreed with oneanother and often on central points. I began to wonder how to sortthrough this multiplicity of interpretations to get to the authenticvoice of Confucius. As I learned more, I began to divide commenta-tors into two groups: Those who were attempting (i) to exegete theAnalects simpliciter or (ii) to develop versions of Confucianism thatmight prove appealing to them and their contemporaries. This paintsthe commentators with too wide a brush—I found people in (i) deeplyconcerned about (ii) and vice versa. But the methods employed, theends sought, and the conclusions reached suggest an instructive divideand offer lessons in hermeneutics.

I have witnessed this hermeneutical debate as a curious yet inter-ested outsider. I believe it raises important hermeneutical issues forChinese philosophy in particular and hermeneutics in general. Here Iwill (i) present the portraits of Confucius of the two schools describedabove and then (ii) discuss the hermeneutical issues raised by theseconflicting portraits. The discussion of hermeneutics will begin with adiscussion of the gaps, both historical and philosophical, involved inattempting to gain an understanding of Confucius. Given these gaps,I shall argue that some variance among interpretations of Confuciusshould be expected.Various attempts to overcome the gaps and to offercoherent and compelling portraits of Confucius fall, following RichardRorty, into either Historical Reconstructions or Rational Reconstruc-tions. These in turn divide into three kinds of Confucian scholarship.The aims and goals of these three approaches are so different thatincompatible interpretations of Confucius are likely, yet, I shall argue,the incompatible interpretations are not actually competitors; eachtype of Confucian scholarship admits of possibly different interpreta-tions of Confucius, each of which could be perfectly rational.

Let us begin with two important contemporary interpretations ofConfucius that are often portrayed as competitors (with the concomi-tant claim that one view is rational and the other is not).

Which Confucius?

I will present the views of Confucius as outlined by two competingschools. For ease of identification, I will call the two schools “TheConfucius as Traditionalist Interpretation” (CT) and “The Confuciusas Innovator Interpretation” (CI). I take CT to be primarily con-cerned with determining exactly what Confucius said and what hemeant by what he said; this I take to be the fairly traditionalinterpretation of Confucius; this is the Confucius of tradition, the

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Confucius who eschewed innovation. I take CI to be primarily con-cerned with what is of value in Confucius, what in Confucius mightspeak to us in our contemporary context; this I take to be the fairlyrevisionary interpretation of Confucius; this is Confucius, theinnovator.

The Confucius as Traditionalist School (CT)

Confucius identified himself and his thought with the earliestperiod of the ancient Zhou tradition (roughly 1050 BCE–250 BCE)and with portions of the Shang (roughly 1600 BCE–1050 BCE) whichexemplified Heavenly justice and were led by just rulers:“The Mastersaid: ‘The Zhou gazes down upon the two dynasties that preceded it.How brilliant in culture it is! I follow the Zhou.’” (Analects 3:14). Heconceived of his mission as one of passing on the Zhou model: “Itransmit rather than innovate. I trust in and love the ancient ways”(Analects 7:1). On another occasion he laments that he is losing hisdream of the ideal society: “How seriously I have declined! It hasbeen so long since I last dreamt of meeting the Duke of Zhou”(Analects 7:5). Confucius is more a traditionalist than a trailblazer.What did Confucius admire as he gazed upon the Shang and theZhou?

Confucius aligned himself with the golden ancient traditions ofthe Shang and Zhou in which peace and harmony permeated theland. And he emulated the majestic rulers—the Kings Wen and Wuand the Duke of Zhou—who served as moral paradigms of wisdom,virtue, and benevolence. For Confucius the ideal was real: The heav-enly principle was perfectly exemplified in these wise and benevo-lent dynastic rulers and in the just and harmonious societies thatthey created and administered. The Sons of Heaven ruled by theMandate of Heaven, which could be revoked if they were unjust.The ideal ruler is the sage-king who aligns himself and his ways withHeaven and Heaven’s ways. Confucius endorsed the sage-kingmodel and then extended it as the model for all human beings. Con-fucius believed that human perfectibility, modeled in the sacredsage-king, was attainable not only by rulers but by everyone.However, and perhaps here is where he is an innovator, one’s rightto rule is determined not by one’s heredity but by one’s moral rec-titude. The problem with appointing ministers on the basis of hered-ity is they may be unfit to rule. According to Confucius, kings mustrule wisely and justly or the Mandate of Heaven will be revokedand offered to the wise and virtuous. This revolutionary doctrinedefied the traditional stratification of social roles based on kinship

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and wealth. In its place, social roles should be assigned according tomoral merit and competence.

For Confucius, the kingly virtues are cultivated through educationand ritual: The self-cultivation necessary to the attainment of virtueinvolves rigorous understanding and practice of ritual. Confucius’sphilosophy of education was primarily moral; education enabled oneto become a good person and a good citizen. Confucius seems toaffirm a kind of essentialism, believing that full humanity is achievedonly through the proper, harmonious blend of one’s original nature(zhi: nature or native substance) and refinement (wen) by li (Analects6:18). The kind of education he was writing about occurred primarilyin the home, initially (and most importantly) with children. Home iswhere the child learns respect, obedience, patience, kindness, compas-sion, work, play, etc., from her parents through specific rituals. Thecentrality of the home for learning is not surprising as the earlyConfucians viewed society as the family writ large. The just society,according to Confucius, is, like a family, hierarchical. Hierarchicalharmony is the best description of a Confucian society. And, given hisemphasis on filial piety—when extended from the family to the city tothe state to the four corners of the earth—people are pleased to be intheir place, which pleasure is measured by their willing, natural yetritualized respect and obeisance.

The virtue most prized by Confucius is ren, translated variously ashumaneness, human-heartedness, and benevolence. Other virtuesinclude filial piety, sympathetic understanding, loyalty, righteousness,friendship, and wisdom. The ren ruler transforms society not by inces-sant activity, but by moral suasion. The virtuous ruler effortlesslyexerts attractive, noncoercive moral power or suasion (de) on both hiscitizens and his enemies. The ruler’s self-cultivation will transform hischaracter and radiate out into the state; self-cultivation is the groundsof civil reform. What is essential for a Confucian society to achieve itsend of moral transformation is a ruler who nurtures his subjects likea father his child, a system that encourages moral instruction andproper ritual conduct (beginning in the home), and an effective socialand economic infrastructure that adequately provides for the materialneeds of the people.2

My own view, and I am in the minority on this, is that Confuciusaffirmed a transcendent, nonhuman, fixed source of morality—Tian—to which humans individually and corporately are subject.Confucius’s passionate and confessional remarks about Tian andTianming indicate his belief in this anthropomorphic but nonhumandeity (Analects 2:4, 7:23, 6:28, 9:5, 9:12, and 8:19).3 As a caution tothose who would deny that Confucius believed in an anthropomor-phic deity, Schwartz contends,


Those who are convinced that, in Confucius, Heaven has simplybecome an “impersonal order” of nature must on the basis of their apriori assumptions dismiss all the above as simply concessions tospeech or a “manner of speaking.” This is a most dangerouspresumption.4

In the most comprehensive and carefully argued work on the topic,Puett contends that Confucius revered Heaven, “the greatest of thedivine powers.”5 Claiming that Confucius believed in a transcendent,nonhuman but anthropomorphic source of morality does not implythat Confucius was not a decidedly this-worldly philosopher (for thebulk of his philosophy concerns how we should live in accord withHeaven and Earth). Accept or reject the view that Confucius is atheist, the traditional view is that for Confucius, not just any harmonywould do, only the harmony that unified human beings with ultimatereality:The earthly hierarchy should resemble the heavenly hierarchy.Consider Ivanhoe:

I believe Confucius looked to the inherited culture of the Chou as thediscovered structure of the cosmos itself, a structure that is dynamicbut whose fundamental patterns do not change. Confucius neveroriginates a rite, composes new music, authors new classics, or insti-tutes new names. In short, he never innovates.What he does is appro-priate and propagate traditional patterns of behavior and apply themto solve the challenges of his day. He is flexible and creative in hisapplication of traditional norms, but he never challenges these normsthemselves.6

Ivanhoe seems to take this back when he writes, “The tao originatedwith the sage-kings (what further explanation would a traditionalistfeel compelled to offer?).”7 How could the tao originate with thesage-kings and be the structure of the cosmos itself? If Confucius’sultimate appeal is, as I believe it is, to the structure of the cosmos itself,then his meta-ethical explanation is not a simple appeal to tradition.

One should probably take Confucius’s claim to be a transmitterand not an innovator more as an expression of humility or deferencethan an absolute rejection of innovation. On the CT view he was atraditionalist, but he was also an innovator. For example, the termsjunzi originally meant “Son of a Prince,” indicating a man of noblebirth. While Confucius does use the term in the traditional sense, heextends the meaning to include any person who embodies the Con-fucian virtues of filiality, friendship, self-cultivation, ren, and righ-teousness. The junzi is the superior person who clings to his nobleparts while not allowing his self to be distracted by his ignoble parts.8

While junzi is typically translated “gentleman” or “superior man,” thesuperiority of which Confucius speaks is not due to kinship, wealth,social status, gender, or occupation. A person becomes junzi by


becoming wise and virtuous, by becoming more fully human. Thegreat person is the morally and spiritually superior person. So Con-fucius offered some rather significant innovations to the tradition thathe inherited.

And with respect to li, Confucius also considered some innovations.Confucius conceded the shift from hemp to silk ceremonial caps andat least entertained the thought that one might bow to one’s superiorsafter ascending stairs (Analects 9:3). But these can scarcely warrantwidespread ritual innovations. Neither wearing ceremonial caps norbowing before one’s superiors is morally optional. Indeed, Confuciusthinks that bowing after ascending is arrogant and so affirms thetradition. Moreover, the bulk of ritualistic patterns endorse the tradi-tional Zhou rituals. And the list of non-optional li in the Analects isquite substantive. With respect to ritual, Confucius is primarily aconserver and transmitter of the Zhou tradition with some very minordeviations; he may have permitted some minor changes, but he wasnot an innovator.

The Confucius as Innovator Interpretation (CI)

Where CT sees Confucius as marked by unwavering fidelity to thecultural patterns of the Zhou as exemplifying the Way of the cosmosand as the fixed and objective norms for human flourishing (within arightly ordered society), CI sees Confucius as starting with but per-mitting liberation from the archaic rituals of the Zhou.There is surelymuch in common with both portraits. However, I will here highlightthose portions of CI’s portrait of Confucius that seem most at oddswith CT’s portrait. One way of putting the difference between the twoschools is CI’s desire for a more relevant, less archaic Confucius; thecontemporary CI sees Confucius as an innovator, not a traditionalist;this Confucius is more liberal and even democratic, more concernedwith human rights and individual autonomy, and is in favor of creativ-ity and spontaneity. Fingarette, who formally viewed Confucius as a“parochial moralizer,” came to view him as a “great cultural innova-tor,” and “the creator of a new ideal, not an apologist for an old one.”9

Likewise, Hall and Ames reject the notion of Confucius’s Analects asa “mere repository of culture-bound ethical norms” in favor of aConfucian vision relevant to “present philosophical conversations.”10

What are the innovations CI attributes to Confucius?Fingarette, in his rich and insightful interpretation of Confucius,

contends that li (taken by him to mean “holy rite” or “sacred cer-emony”) has magical powers to transform the world. It holdsprimary status in the Analects;11 indeed li is more important thanindividual life itself.12 Magic may be as good as any term to describe


the rather mystical and enigmatic power attributed by Confucius tothose adept at li. One might think this power more appropriatelyascribed to de or ren than to li—although Fingarette concedes thatren and li are equally important in the Analects. Fingarette’s empha-sis on li leads him to downplay, for example, yi, filial piety, andrespect for those in authority.13 And he cannot believe that Con-fucius, if faced with the plurality of cultures that we face today,would maintain that the Zhou li (the li of the Zhou dynasty, theculture that Confucius enshrined) are special or privileged. There isnothing special about the Zhou li other than that it is traditional;indeed, he attributes a political motive to Confucius’s defense ofthem rather than accept the metaphysical underpinnings that Con-fucius offered.14 It seems, contra Fingarette, that li is more likely tohave magical powers and be more important than individual lifeitself if it taps into the power of Reality (say, the Dao of Heaven) orhuman nature than into the feeble power of the contingent past.Fingarette also denies that Confucius’s ideas permitted the conceptof free choice.

Hall and Ames’ learned and challenging interpretation of Con-fucius holds that not only is he not an essentialist, his view of personswas diametrically opposed to essentialism. Confucius is not commit-ted to a fixed human nature but to a freely chosen, self-creation. Theyunderstand Confucian thought as an unusual combination of existen-tialism and pragmatism: “Confucius’ understanding of person makingis, as we shall see, quite distinctive. Its closest analogues in the Westerntradition are to be found among the existentialists and the Americanpragmatists.”15 Hall and Ames take “person-making” in Confucius inthe manner of the contemporary philosopher, Richard Rorty, whounderstands person-making in terms of “self-formation, self-articulation, self-creation.”16 Rather than embracing the severe ritu-alistic discipline of his predecessors, Confucius was positively aninnovator commending spontaneous creativity over ritual specificity.And far from holding to objective, fixed morality, Confucius was apragmatist with morality shifting according to human need, prefer-ence, and circumstance. Hall and Ames, opposing the view of Con-fucius’s thought as “a conservative, order-imposing philosophicalsystem,” contend that while Confucius endorses “the counsel oftradition,” self-cultivation requires evaluation and alteration of thetradition “in pursuit of appropriateness.”17 Indeed, Confucius is por-trayed more as a situation ethicist where one is motivated only by loveand guided by nothing other than one’s judgment about what mightproduce the best results in each unique circumstance. Universality hasdropped out of Confucian morality and been replaced by radicalparticularity. The Confucius of 3,000 rituals is replaced by the


Confucius of spontaneity and novelty. And Confucian conformity isreplaced by individuality.

The transcendent drops out of Confucius, replaced by radicalimmanence. Hall and Ames concede that Tian is anthropomorphic,yet deny that Confucius has any notion of transcendence at all:“Perhaps the most far-reaching of the uncommon assumptions under-lying a coherent explication of the thinking of Confucius is that whichprecludes the existence of any transcendent being or principle. This isthe presumption of radical immanence.”18 Confucius’s transcendentgrounding of morality and society in Tian has disappeared.

CI might better be called “The Confucianism School” because itspractitioners view Confucius often, self-consciously or not, throughthe lens of the Confucian tradition (which is more loosely connectedto Confucius himself than one might expect). Hall and Ames groundtheir interpretation in a highly speculative yin-yang and process cos-mology and anthropology traceable through Dong Zhongshu to theYijing. Although Dong was a Confucian revisionary, Hall and Amesuse his philosophy unapologetically:

Let us face a probable methodological criticism head-on. As anexample, some sinologist is sure to ask how we can use a concept asit is defined by the text of Tung Chung-shu’s Ch’un-ch’iu fan-lu toelucidate its usage in the Analects. It would be equally irresponsibleto say that the Confucian Tung Chung-shu (ca. 179–104 B.C.) isirrelevant as a resource for understanding classical Confucianvocabulary as it would be to accept his definition of these conceptsuncritically. The problem, then, is to try to discover in Tung Chung-shu’s presentation and elaboration of Confucian vocabulary thatwhich is consistent with the Analects and that which deviates from it.This problem echoes a similar concern to distinguish a “process”reading of Confucius from a reading of Confucius where a processvocabulary is merely the most appropriate resource available to us tomake Confucius clear to a Western reader. We are not presenting aHan dynasty interpretation of Confucius, but rather, are attemptingto use Tung Chung-shu’s commentary critically where it sheds lighton the idea being expressed in our record of Confucius.19

They concede:“There is in this approach certainly a playfulness, but italso acknowledges the profoundly organic nature of the Chinese lan-guage.”20 Playfulness, indeed! The resulting Confucianism is meta-physically rich, morally revisionary, and, interestingly, not unlikethe process and pragmatic philosophies that Hall and Ames findattractive.

The Understanding Gap

So many Confuciuses and so little time. How can one know the real,historical Confucius and his worldview as found in the Analects? In


this section, I will pose two serious problems, the first historical andthe second philosophical, for understanding Confucius. Let us turnfirst to historical reasons why understanding Confucius is difficult;that is, let us consider the historical gap between the tradition and ourcontemporary context. And next we shall consider the philosophicalproblem of the underdetermination of any interpretation of Con-fucius by the data.

The Historical Gap

Confucius claimed to be a transmitter of an ancient moral andsocial tradition of the ru (scholar–gentleman–leader) that was mani-fested in the golden ages of previous dynasties. This tradition can befound in the “canonical” Five Classics: the Classic of Change (Yijing),the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu), the Classic of History(Shujing), the Classic of Poetry (Shijing), and the Record of Rites(Liji). Viewing Confucius as the transmitter of tradition makes Con-fucius the first great Confucian (Ruist) commentator and the Analectsthe first great commentary on the Classics.21 If this is right, we aremany removes from the original tradition (Kings Yao, Shun, Yu, Wen,and the Duke of Zhou): There were the original documents (many ofwhich were based on more primitive oral traditions), editor(s), redac-tion(s), additions, editions, and, in the Analects, Confucius’s commen-tary.22 And, so the tradition goes, the Analects is difficult tounderstand, so we need commentators to explain Confucius’s com-mentary on Confucianism.

We can add a further level of remove—Confucius did not write theAnalects. It was composed by his disciples and followers over a periodof—and here estimates vary widely—twenty to four hundred years.Some of these writers seem to add their own views and style toConfucius’s original views (compare the lengthy and detailed ritualinstruction in Book 10 with the more characteristically terse sayingsof Books 1–4). Traditionally, scholars held that every word of theAnalects derived from the mouth of Confucius (although writtendown later by his disciples). This view is scarcely held by contempo-rary scholars for whom there is widespread disagreement about theauthentic teachings of Confucius. Confucius did not compose theAnalects and the existent text is an amalgam of oral tradition, recon-structions, accretions, additions, and amendments. Furthermore, theAnalects text appeared at some remove from the time of Confucius’sspeaking. Makeham contends that “Lunyu (the Analects) did not existas a book prior to about 150–140 B.C.”23 No doubt some of the textcontains the fairly authentic voice of Confucius. But other parts, basedon style and content, seem foreign; those parts seem to tell us more


about the author/editor/storyteller who attached his words to theAnalects than about the mind of Confucius; and they may tell us moreabout the author/editor/storyteller’s sitz im leben than that of Con-fucius. The most ambitious and impressive attempt to discern theauthentic teachings of Confucius is also the most skeptical: Brooksand Brooks contend that very little of the Analects derives fromConfucius. Although their views have been disputed, it seems indis-putable that Confucius is only distantly related, if at all, to various andlarge portions of the Analects.24

If one wishes to understand Confucius (and not Confucianism),then, one must make some informed but speculative judgments aboutwhich passages are authentic and which are accretions. For example,do the wu wei (effortless action) passages reflect the mind of Con-fucius or are they additions from a Daoist-influenced disciple? Theonly explicit reference to wu wei is 15:5, although other passages, suchas 2:1 and 2:3, seem consonant with wu wei thought. But Book 15 isnearly universally accepted as a late addition to the text, while Book2 is thought to be among the more original layers.The effortless actioncommended in the wu wei passages is decidedly more appealing toour modern ears than the severely ritualistic actions commended inBook 10. But there is no explicit wu wei (but perhaps a bit implicitly?)in the Classics which Confucius took as his “scriptures.” Even grantingthat Confucius offered some innovations (despite his protestations tothe contrary), are the wu wei commendations the kind of innovationthat Confucius considered? For that matter, are the heavy and lengthyritualistic passages of Book 10, for example, redolent of Confucius’sthought? They clearly are of a different style than the other Analects.Could they have come from a much later group of rulers who wereritually adept but empty of humaneness? Waley contends thatChapter 10 was added later “to meet the demands of a later Confu-cianism that was preoccupied above all with the details of ritual.”25

On the other hand, Confucius certainly was a friend of ritual andwas keenly aware of and influenced by the Liji (the Classic of Rites);is Book 10 then so odd? Waley contends that the more authenticportions of the Analects are unconcerned with “the details of ritual.”However, there are a good number of analects that are ritually fairlyspecific, and yet they all belong to Books 1–9, which are generallyconsidered authentic and fairly specific.26 In addition, there is noreason to think, from some analects being nonspecific, that Confuciuseschewed ritual specificity in toto.

Finally, could Confucius himself really have said or thought that“[h]uman beings can broaden the Way—it is not the Way that broad-ens human beings” (Analects 15:29)? Could Confucius have meantwhat some interpreters take this passage to mean, that morality is a


relative, pragmatic, human construction, not something transcendent,absolute, and objective?27 The rest of one hundred and some refer-ences to the Dao in the Analects suggest a way more fixed, a preex-isting ideal to be lived up to, not one that is created by humans. Thatis to say, the Way of Confucius is the Way of Antiquity (of the SageKings).28 It should be noted that nearly every contemporary scholartakes Analects 15 to be a late addition, and yet they often emphasize15:29 as a key to understanding Confucius.

If the Classics and the Analects are not sufficiently perspicuous,interpretation is inevitable. With each successive layer of interpre-tation we are deeper and deeper into messy hermeneutics, relyingon interpretive principles that cannot be justified directly or indi-rectly from the texts themselves. Each commentator must makephilosophical assumptions that guide her interpretation. Unfortu-nately, perhaps because of the influence of philosophical assump-tions, in the commentarial tradition there is no fixed view ofConfucius or Confucianism and no fixed view on the canon. DanielGardner writes:

The commentarial corpus in its vastness is itself proof that for theConfucian tradition there was no such thing as a timeless, normativereading of a classic, no matter what any individual commentatormight have thought or claimed. The array of commentaries on eachand every text in the canon makes manifestly clear that any glosscould mean—and did mean—quite different things to differentpeople.29

In addition, Confucianism appears as an amalgam of philosophicalinfluences, ideas, and texts that were synthesized by the syncreticphilosopher Dong Zhongshu and endorsed during the Han Dynasty(roughly 206 BC–220 AD) under Emperor Wu (in roughly 136 BC).Indeed the historically developed Analects themselves may be acacophony of voices rather than a choir singing the same tune. Dong’sphilosophy, as mentioned above, is highly syncretic and revisionary.Although Confucius was once thought to have authored or at leastedited the Yijing, scholars now believe that he had little to do with theYijing and was almost certainly unaware of the highly metaphysical“wings” that were likely appended after his death to its ancient prog-nosticating text constituted by sixty-four hexagrams. The sparse,unspeculative, practical Confucius spawned Confucianism, a highlydeveloped, metaphysically rich, and abstract system. Even in theMencius, perhaps Confucius’s most faithful commentator, we find asystem that is foreign to the simple, terse Analects.

Commentators assumed that beneath the apparent diversity of thetexts was a single pattern (“the one thread”). The Han etymology ofthe term jing (translated “Classic”) is the thread that held together the


bamboo strips on which texts were written, symbolically suggesting aunifying thread of meaning. But the sheer variety of genre within theClassics, each of which is accorded equal canonical status, resists aneat and simple hermeneutic. In the Five Classics alone we findhistory, prehistory, post-historical reconstruction, official documents,laws, theology, poetry, divination, moralizing, legends, metaphysicalspeculation, social criticism, statecraft, religion, rites, and superstition.Although apparently disparate, fragmentary, and developed over along period of time, the entire corpus was considered a comprehen-sive, unified, and harmonious whole with one book being used toexplain another book. Indeed, even if the Analects is a redactedcollection from a variety of sources, one might think that they shouldbe approached as a harmonious whole; after all, the redactor(s)should be assumed to be rational unless we have good reason tobelieve otherwise.

Later commentaries, through which Confucius would come to beread, would involve considerably more system-building, revealing theintellectual superstructure “latent” in the comprehensive and authori-tative texts. The early Middle Ages in China saw the spreading influ-ence of Buddhism. It is not surprising then that in order to counteractthe appeal of Buddhism, some of its commentators would understandConfucianism along Buddhist lines or would make Confucianismmetaphysically richer. In response to the decline of Confucianismand the rise of Buddhism, the Song Neo-Confucians, following theConfucianism of Mencius, would be downright speculative andmetaphysical.

The historical gaps between Confucius and Confucianism, on theone hand, and our world, on the other, create huge but not insur-mountable obstacles to our understanding of the text. But even sup-posing a fixed canon, a single author or set of authors (about whomwe have a great deal of independent evidence), and decent knowl-edge of the sociohistorical context of the author’s life and writing,the philosophical problem of underdetermination rears its uglyhead.

Underdetermination

There is a nearly universal acceptance of underdetermination oftheory by data in the philosophy of science. But underdeterminationhas a much wider application: Much of contemporary philosophyembraces the claim that one’s view of the world—involving one’sphilosophy, ethics, and politics, for example—is underdetermined bythe available evidence. There are competing world-hypotheses, eachof which adequately and fully accounts for the data (however “data”


is construed on these matters). A plurality of beliefs may be rationalgiven any body of evidence. It does not follow from this that all of thebeliefs are perforce justified or warranted. Nor does it follow that theyare all true. On the naïve Baconian view one could fairly straightfor-wardly collect “facts” and then infer the true theories that explain thefacts. When experiments are performed on those facts, the world willtell us which of the competing theories is true. However, the claim ofunderdetermination is that any theory of the world can account for allof the “facts” given enough adjustment within one’s set of beliefs.The “facts” alone, the world, cannot tell us which theory of the worldis true. The evidence cannot by itself tell us which of two compet-ing theories is true. In order to determine what is good by way ofbelief, one must bring in other, non-evidential—philosophical orpragmatic—considerations.30

We can extend underdetermination to the interpretation of texts,especially texts that contain ambiguities, apparent inconsistencies,multiple authors, little independent knowledge of the author, andunderdeveloped ideas (such as one finds in the Analects). Underde-termination of texts is exacerbated by the sociohistorical–cognitivedistance of the sort mentioned in the previous section between theauthor(s) of a text and its interpreters. Underdetermination, ofcourse, creates serious epistemological problems: What is rational forus to believe, given a set of data, when competing hypotheses orinterpretations explain the textual data equally well?

Let us raise the problem of underdetermination within the contextof an apparent conflict in the Analects. Suppose one reads the Ana-lects and is struck by different answers given to the same question, ordifferent explications of the same concept. Consider, for example, theenigmatic relationship between ren and li. In the Analects, there arepassages which suggest that li produces ren (and so, some haveargued, are merely instrumentally valuable and maybe even dispens-able should other li prove equally or more effective in producing ren)and those that identify li with ren (and so, some have argued, li are notmerely instrumentally valuable and are indispensable to Confucius’smoral visions). If we could settle Confucius’s precise view on thismatter we could settle whether Confucius was a traditionalist oran innovator. Consider the following explanations of this apparentconflict:

1. Confucius was not consistent.2. Confucius changed his mind.3. The competing views provide two equally good answers

(perhaps to different questions) that offer nuances unaffordedby a single answer.


4. Some (or both) of the competing texts are later redactionsreflecting multiple authorship and perspectives within differentsitz im leben.

5. The different perspectives are accommodations to the ques-tioner; they may not be socially, morally, or spiritually ready tohear the best answer that Confucius did offer to those betterpositioned.31

6. There is a broader explanation which Confucius never explicitlystated that accommodates and harmonizes the apparently con-flicting views.32

Given the text itself, I see no reason to prefer any of (1)–(6). That is,there is no textual evidence which determines any of (1)–(6); thetextual evidence does not imply (1)–(6). Although various attemptshave been made to specify Confucius’s view, they amount to incon-clusive cases more than compelling arguments. The textual data donot entail a single, compelling interpretation.

If one brings in extra-textual beliefs, then one might have reason toprefer one of the above hypotheses over the others. For example, ifone were to believe, as did many ancient commentators, that theauthor of the Analects is a sage and that the Analects is the infallibleproduct of the sage, then one would reject (1), (2), and (4) and plumpfor a harmonizing solution, say (3), (5), or (6). If one were to believethat Confucius was not a sage and that the Analects is a joint projectthat took centuries to complete, one might believe (1), (2), or (4). Buteven if one brings one’s extra-textual beliefs to bear on the matter,there are still competitor hypotheses, many beyond our imagining,that are equally compatible with the textual data.

The problem of underdetermination need not arise only within thecontext of apparent contradiction; it can arise with any passage orconcept, or even translation.33 Consider both a translation and inter-pretation of a passage from Confucius, Analects 2:11. Analects 2:11could clarify Confucius’s understanding of the regulative role of thepast. Consider the following, rather traditional translations:

“A man is worthy of being a teacher who gets to know what is new bykeeping fresh in his mind what he is already familiar with.” (Lau)

“Both keeping past teachings alive and understanding the present—someone able to do this is worthy of being a teacher?” (Slingerland).

“If by keeping the old warm one can provide understanding of thenew, one is fit to be a teacher.” (Dawson)

“Warming up the old so as to understand the new, such a one can bea teacher.” (Brooks and Brooks)

Slingerland notes that there are two dominant but incompatible inter-pretations of this passage in the Confucian tradition. The first claims


that Confucius was intent on keeping the past alive, while the secondholds that Confucius is simply saying, “Use what you’ve learned toknow what to expect of the future.” The first interpretation, of course,would favor CI and the second would be neutral with respect to thatissue. Brooks and Brooks’ terse comment on this passage affirms thetraditionalist view:“With 2:2, this confirms Confucius’s position as thereinterpreter of a classic text tradition for a later age, and reinforcesthe authority of the classics themselves.”34

There are translations and interpretations of 2:11 that allow for andeven suggest reform:

“[One who] re-warms the past and knows [how to] freshen it, may beregarded as a teacher.” (Wawrytko)35

Wawyrtko’s interpretation would permit freshening the past, presum-ably even revising it. Hall and Ames’ translation may seem neutralwith respect to the competing portraits of Confucius, but their com-mentary is not. They write,

The interplay between “learning” and “reflecting”—between appro-priating widely from the cultural tradition and elaborating on itthrough an investment of one’s own creativity—is a recurring themein the Analects. The principle that each event is sui generis requiresthat whatever is learned be creatively adapted to the new set ofcircumstances in order to be rendered appropriate (2/11):“He who inreviewing the old can come to know the new has the makings of ateacher.” One must be creative to take full advantage of appropri-ated culture, both in adapting it for his own time and place, and inusing it as a structure through which to realize his own possibilities.He must labor assiduously to acquire the culture transmitted fromancient times but must also be able to take it a step further inmaximizing the possibilities of the prevailing conditions.36

Summarily speaking, reflecting on what one has learned will enableone to transform the appropriated culture and generate novel mean-ings.37 Hall and Ames contend that those who fail to avail themselvesof their tradition will lack “the shared ground necessary to commu-nicate” with their society.38 So the traditional rituals can be creativelyengaged and expanded, perhaps eventually discarded, but slowly so asnot to seem like a lunatic to the rest of one’s culture: “A person wholives in his own separate world is generally perceived as mad and athreat to communal meanings and values.”39 Culture can be changed,but very slowly so as to preserve stability. Confucius is the innovator:“The authoritative person, the person of jen [ren], realizes or createsritual (li) through personal signification.”40

A single passage with varying translations is taken as evidence oftwo quite different views of Confucius. The text itself underdeter-mines its interpretation. Note that there are two levels of underdeter-


mination in this example: first at the level of translation and second atthe level of interpretation. Although I will not argue it here, thesedifferences could also collapse into a single level, because it could beargued that all translation is essentially interpretation.

Historical versus Rational Reconstructions

If understanding Confucius is plagued by the historical and philo-sophical gaps described above, then it should come as no surprise thatit is possible for competing versions of Confucius to emerge. Extra-textual judgments,“hermeneutics,” must guide us to an understandingof the text. I use the term “hermeneutics” here in the old-fashionedsense of text-interpretation as related to understanding the Analectsor, more precisely, the authentic teachings of Confucius. I believe,following Gadamer, that all understanding, not mere text-understanding, is interpretation (and so all understanding requireshermeneutics). However, I restrict my comments here to text-understanding. While I think there are some general and generallyaccepted, perhaps tacit, rules that guide the understanding when inter-preting texts (if there were no such rules, we would not be able tounderstand anything anyone said to us or anything that we read), I donot believe there is a hermeneutical method, an Archimedean point,that will resolve controversial disputes when the texts themselves, forthe reasons already cited, resist consensus. I take this to be a nearlyempirically verified claim based on the tremendous variety of incom-patible interpretations that various highly significant texts haveafforded throughout human history. On this matter, of course, theConfucian texts are no different. Unless we wish to brand interpreterswho disagree with us as either irrational or, worse, immoral, we shouldconcede that equally rational, sincere truth-seekers can reach widelydivergent but, in some cases, equally rational interpretations oftexts. A multiplicity of interpretations may be inevitable given thehistorical and philosophical reasons that the text resists consensusinterpretations.

Yet some of the disagreement results from what appear to bedifferent goals for understanding Confucius. Following Rorty, Iwould like to develop two quite different approaches to understand-ing historically important philosophers—Historical and RationalReconstructions—which yield different interpretations of thesethinkers because they are asking different questions about them.41

After briefly presenting the differences of approach for the Histori-cal and Rational Reconstructionists, I will suggest three differentways that Confucian interpretation could proceed. In fact, they can


produce quite different, apparently incompatible interpretations ofConfucius which, for reasons to be specified, are not competitorinterpretations.

Historical versus Rational Reconstructions

In his article “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,”Richard Rorty contends that there are two dominant approaches tothe history of philosophy and that both should be done, but doneseparately.42 The Historical Reconstructionist lets the historicalsubject speak on his own terms, while the Rational Reconstructionistuses the contemporary philosophical idiom to guide his understand-ing of the historical subject.

Historical Reconstruction lets the philosophers under studydescribe themselves in their own terms: “It is useful to recreate theintellectual scene in which the dead lived their lives.”43 Their job isto “make clear what the dead really said.”44 Historical Reconstruc-tion proceeds by bracketing one’s own philosophical predilectionsand language as best one can to let the historical figures speak forthemselves, philosophical warts and all. The Historical Reconstruc-tionist is not concerned with whether or not the historical subject’sviews are morally or intellectually benighted. Rorty contends thatHistorical Reconstructions are such that practitioners should beable to reach agreement about the figure’s views. By placing theirwords in their sociohistorical-linguistic context (and correcting forthe use of a different language), practitioners can ideally, using aprinciple of charity, come to reasoned agreement about the Histori-cal Reconstruction.

Rational Reconstruction, on the other hand, seeks what is usefulin the works of historical figures for contemporary discussions.Rational Reconstructions always anachronistically treat their his-torical subjects as part of the present debate. Rational Reconstruc-tionists speculate about what a given historical figure might havesaid about a certain given topic (which is of relevance to us today).Rorty writes,

When we anachronistically say that he “really” held such doctrineswe mean that, in an imagined argument with present-day philoso-phers about whether he should have held certain other views, hewould have been driven back on a premise he never formulated,dealing with a topic he never considered—a premise that may haveto be suggested to him by a friendly rational reconstructor.45

There is nothing wrong with such anachronistic Rational Reconstruc-tions, Rorty writes, as long as practitioners acknowledge that that is


how they are proceeding. Rational Reconstruction is an anachronisticand highly speculative approach—what would this or that historicalthinker say about this or that philosophical problem which they neverexplicitly addressed and scarcely had the language/context to con-sider? Given the anachronism, speculation, and lack of direct evi-dence, we should expect widespread disagreement about RationalReconstructions.46

My observation as an outsider is that those who defend the Con-fucius as Traditionalist Interpretation (CT) are more in the HistoricalReconstruction camp, while those who defend Confucius as InnovatorInterpretation (CI) are more in the Rational Reconstruction camp.CT attempts to exegete the Analects simpliciter in its sociohistoricalcontext, while CI attempts to develop versions of Confucianism thatmight prove appealing to contemporary scholars. This involves a dif-ference in emphasis and degree. Practitioners of CI seem quite inter-ested in Historical Reconstruction, yet, or so it seems to me, whenpush comes to shove, they slip into Rational Reconstruction. On theother hand, practitioners of CT seem quite concerned that Confuciusproves to be relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions.Nonetheless, the CT/CI divide seems to fall along the HistoricalReconstruction/Rational Reconstruction divide. If both sides wouldsimply concede that they were doing Historical/Rational Reconstruc-tion, we could see that the two interpretations were no longercompetitors. The mistake seems to be that CI wishes to be taken asdoing Historical Reconstruction, while they are (sometimes self-consciously) offering a Rational Reconstruction.

Three Kinds of Confucian Scholarship

Given the distinction between Historical and Rational Reconstruc-tions, there are at least three types of approaches to Confucian schol-arship, each of which could manifest quite different interpretations ofConfucius. The first two approaches—historico-critical and canonicalcriticism—fall under the category of Historical Reconstruction. Thethird is the Rational Reconstruction approach. Let me briefly outlinethe three and discuss their benefits and costs.

Historical Reconstruction No. 1: The Historico-Critical Method

This method most closely approximates the Historical Reconstruc-tion approach outlined by Rorty. This approach attempts to find theauthentic voice of Confucius from among the various sayings attrib-uted to him in the Analects (and in other writings). The version of


Confucius that emerges from this approach might be stripped of, say,the later Daoist-influenced portions or outwardly ritual portions (orthey may not). Using the philological methods of Brooks and Brooks,Van Norden, Slingerland, or Ivanhoe, they will, as best they can,determine the authentic teachings of Confucius. They will let Con-fucius speak in his own voice without regard to contemporary philo-sophical concerns. I suspect this interpretation will reveal thetraditional, fairly conservative Confucius (CT). The benefit of thisapproach, or so it seems to me, is that it is more likely to be faithful tothe Confucius that is found in the Analects. The cost of this approachis that Confucius’s views may be deemed parochial, archaic, or evenvicious (say, with respect to human rights, women, or non-rulers).Thus, Confucius may be viewed by non-sinologists as largely irrel-evant to current philosophical and/or social issues and, hence, worthyof continuing to be ignored. Explicators of Confucius, aware of this,are often eager to show that Confucius nonetheless has something tooffer contemporary people (say, with respect to family values, humanrights, women, or non-rulers). But when they do so in some of thesecases, they initiate discussions that go beyond the direct evidence in,say, the Analects. That is, they begin to move in the direction ofRational Reconstruction. However, even the historical Confucius hasviews that are relevant to contemporary discussions and should berecognized as such.

Historical Reconstruction No. 2: Canonical Criticism

Canonical criticism prescinds from the historico-critical approachto a focus on texts, rather, to offer an interpretation of the canonicalConfucius—that is, an interpretation of the teachings of Confucius asfound in the entire, canonical Analects. The canonical critic may notbe unaware of or unappreciative of the historico-critical approach,but she has embarked on a different project of understanding theConfucius given in the entire canonical “text.” Canonical critics aremore likely to be harmonizers than historico-critical scholars. Theirtask is to make sense of the whole text, not to discard those portionsthat do not prima facie “fit” with more “central” or “ancestral” parts.While harmonizing may seem quaint, there are two reasons to think itreasonable. First, while there is a surface simplicity to Confucius’sthought, it also contains a great deal of depth and breadth. What, onthe surface, may seem contradictory may simply be evidence of adeeper and more harmonious view of a great mind that requiressynthesis and sensitivity on the part of the interpreter to understand.Second, even if the Analects is the product of a redactor or series ofredactors, the principle of charity demands that we treat them as


rational, that is, we should not think of them as stupid collectors ofvarious traditions unaware of or unconcerned about contradictions.The benefit of this approach is that we would come to understand, say,a complete and profoundly influential text. In addition, we might findinsights that could not be gleaned from the historico-critical approachabout what some people believed in pre-Han China. The costs areidentical to those of the historico-critical approach.

Rational Reconstruction

Contemporary Rational Reconstructionists discard the more con-servative, traditionalist, absolutist, ritualistic, and hierarchical ele-ments of Confucius in favor of a Confucianism that can speak to us inour own day and age. This approach need not ignore HistoricalReconstructions, but it has different goals. Hall and Ames, forexample, contend that there are two ways to understand the relation-ship between the original teachings of Confucius and later interpre-tations of Confucius:

Either Confucius, for whatever reason, has been used as a medium toconceal the novel ideas of innumerable creative individuals, or he isin fact a “corporate” person who is continually being seen in a newway by virtue of the participation of later thinkers in the ongoingtransmission of cultural values.47

Rejecting the former, they enthusiastically embrace the latter. Con-temporary reconstructed versions of Confucianism, of the “corpo-rate” Confucius who is continually being seen in new ways, oftenemphasize, as we have seen, individual creativity, anti-essentialism,human rights, pragmatism, and ren. This is true in our time. In timespast, Confucianism developed in ways remarkably similar to, forexample, Daoism, Yijing metaphysics, or Buddhist theology. RationalReconstructionists tend to view the Confucian tradition more flexiblyand find contemporary philosophical categories appropriate to expli-cating Confucianism.

The benefit of reconstructing Confucius is that when appropriateand compelling contemporary philosophies are engaged, Confucian-ism seems relevant and informative. Rational Reconstruction isworthwhile because one might be less concerned with exactly whatConfucius may have said or thought, and more concerned about whata living, evolving tradition might have to say to us about the nature ofourselves and our place in the world. That is, one might think that theConfucian tradition has some insight into the truth (which insights thehistorical Confucius may or may not have had). Given the lineage, itis natural to try to locate one’s Confucianism in the source, and so


some apparently tendentious readings of the Analects emerge. Butthese tendentious readings are tolerable, given that the goal of theRational Reconstructionist is a coherent and viable worldview. Thehermeneutics of worldview are, of course, different from the herme-neutics of understanding an ancient person, and different again fromthe hermeneutics of understanding an ancient canonical text. Con-fucius is treated as a source of truth primarily by way of inspiring atradition that can change in quite dramatic ways so as to grasp thetruth.48

The cost of Rational Reconstruction is threefold. With respect toscholarship, one may wonder what connections a Rational Recon-struction has to any historical figure. With respect to the connectionsto contemporary philosophical categories, one may wonder if Confu-cianism is necessary; if contemporary philosophical categories areadequate for one’s conception of oneself and one’s place in the world,why burden oneself with understanding obscure Chinese terms?49

And, third, the contemporary philosophical categories that RationalReconstructionists rely on may be judged to be insufficiently compel-ling to merit any serious consideration; Confucianism may not seemterribly appealing if the contemporary philosophy it is aligned with isnot itself compelling.

Conclusion

The argument of this article is that we should expect, given the his-torical and philosophical gaps, widely divergent interpretations ofConfucius. Indeed, we have suggested that there are three kinds ofConfucian scholarship: the first two, the Historico-Critical Methodand Canonical Criticism, are forms of Historical Reconstruction,while the third is Rational Reconstruction. Each of these three kindsof scholarship, given their different aims and methods, may producedifferent portraits of Confucius/Confucianism.

What, more positively, should be done? I suggest, as a preliminaryfirst step, that people self-consciously concede the nature of theirproject as either Historical Reconstruction (Historico-Critical orCanonical) or Rational Reconstruction. By carefully following thecurrent canons of these various forms of discourse, some consensusinterpretations should emerge at least at the level of HistoricalReconstruction. While every Historical Reconstruction must over-come the historical gap and admit underdetermination, generallyaccepted extratextual commitments can settle our understanding ofsome of Confucius’s teachings (until some better or other extratextualcommitments gain sway). General acceptance of lesser underdeter-


mined doctrines does not undermine the claim of underdetermina-tion. That we accept certain interpretations and reject others isdetermined by other, non-textual assumptions that we make and,in cases of interpretation consensus, agree upon. Given currentlyaccepted canons of criticism, no reasonable portrait of Confuciusshould emerge that ignores the converse golden rule, ren, li, yi, andshu. Nor should one emerge without a strong sense of filiality (defer-ence) and hierarchy. But, again, what exactly Confucius means bythose terms, and how they are related, and which is more central to hisphilosophy—here the various doctrines are so underdetermined andconsensus on extratextual canons of criticism so diverse, disagree-ment about Historical Reconstruction is inevitable. With respect toRational Reconstruction, there is little reason to expect consensusbecause Confucius is being asked to address entirely different issuesin an entirely different idiom than the one he used. But, in some cases,there need be no clash of interpretations if we understand that eachinterpretation is under a description—either as Historical or RationalReconstruction. By paying careful attention to one’s goals and aims,one may see that the differing interpretations are not genuinecompetitors.

How should we face the bewildering variety of interpretations andattempt to come to an understanding of Confucius? Here I have littleto say other than read articles by, study under, or discuss with sinolo-gists. Do not restrict yourself to the present; read ancient commenta-tors as well. Read a wide variety of commentators from a wide varietyof perspectives. Read the work of historians (who seem to me to beless ideologically committed to Confucius holding any particularview). But, more importantly, read the original text and read it againand again and again. Read it in multiple translations (understandingthat every translation is an interpretation). Do not be held captive bythe current, sometimes trendy, understandings of Confucius. Listen tothe text. If you can read Chinese, do your philological work verycarefully. If you cannot read Chinese, read the philological work ofthose who can. Do all of this critically, knowing that every scholarspeaks from a perspective (which may not be all that clear to them-selves or to others). Ask hard questions; do not accept pat answers.Finally, look to the text for answers (knowing that you must rely onexperts who, again, understand Confucius from a perspective). Thenread the original text again!

Finally, and most importantly, put into practice what you havelearned. Confucius’s thought is first and foremost a way of life to belived, not an esoteric text to be understood. While I do not commendevery Confucian practice, there is enduring wisdom in ren, respect,


reciprocity, and family values. Put what you have learned into prac-tice. After all, “To study, and then in a timely fashion to practice whatyou have learned—is this not satisfying?”*

CALVIN COLLEGEGrand Rapids, Michigan

Endnotes

* I am grateful to Lauren Pfister, David Tien, Ryan Nicholson, Terence Cuneo, DelRatzsch, Lee Hardy, Daniel Bays, and especially Matt Halteman for their critical andconstructive comments.

1. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from the Analects are from Edward Slinger-land, trans., Confucius Analects (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003).

2. Versions of this view of Confucius can be found in Bryan Van Norden, ed., Confuciusand the Analects (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 18–23; Slingerland,Confucius Analects; D. C. Lau, Confucius: The Analects (New York: Penguin Classics,1979), Introduction; and Raymond Dawson, Confucius: The Analects (Oxford andNew York: Oxford University Press, 1993); A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (LaSalle: Open Court Publishers, 1989), 18–22 (who then seems to endorse the Confucianas Innovator interpretation in the following pages); Philip Ivanhoe,“Review of Think-ing through Confucius,” Philosophy East and West 41, no. 2 (1991): 241–54; andBenjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: TheBelknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1985).

3. See my “The Gods of Abraham, Isaiah, and Confucius,” Dao: A Journal ofComparative Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2005): 109–36, and “Objectivity, Relativism andTranscendence in Masters Kong and Rorty,” in Morality, Human Nature, and Meta-physics: Rorty Responds to Confucian Critics, ed. Yong Huang (forthcoming).

4. Schwartz, World of Thought, 123.5. Michael Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early

China (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002). Other contemporary sinologists whohold this view include Slingerland, Analects, xviii–xxii; Julia Ching, “The Problem ofGod in Confucianism,” International Philosophical Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1977): 3–32;Lauren Pfister, “Discovering Monotheistic Metaphysics: The Exegetical Reflectionsof James Legge (1815–1897) and Lo Chung-fan (d. circa 1850),” in Imagining Bound-aries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts and Hermeneutics, ed. Ng On-cho, et al.(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999), 213–54; and Schwartz, World of Thought. It isrejected by Van Norden, Confucius, Introduction; Robert Louden, “ ‘What DoesHeaven Say?’: Christian Wolff and Western Interpretations of Confucian Ethics,” inVan Norden, Confucius, 73–93; and David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking throughConfucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

6. Ivanhoe, “Review,” 244.7. Ibid., 250.8. I deliberately use gender-specific terms because the Analects seem to be more instruc-

tion for male rulers.9. Herbert Finagarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper Torch-

books, 1972), vii, 60.10. Hall and Ames, Thinking, 6.11. Fingarette, Secular as Sacred, 7.12. Ibid., 17.13. For a thorough critique of Fingarette on these matters, see Charles Wei-hsun Fu,

“Fingarette and Munro on Early Confucianism: A Methodological Examination,”Philosophy East and West 28, no. 2 (1978): 181–88.


14. See Fingarette, Secular as Sacred, 57ff.15. Hall and Ames, Thinking, 73.16. Ibid., 72.17. Ibid., 100.18. Ibid., 206.19. Ibid., 42–43.20. Ibid., 43.21. One might look at this quite differently: Confucius is so great that his philosophy

preceded his birth by hundreds of years!22. In this section I am following arguments from John Makeham, “On the Formation of

Lun Yu as a Book,” Monumenta Serica: Journal of Oriental Studies 44 (1996): 1–25 andTransmitters and Creators (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University AsiaCenter, 2003); Daniel Gardner, “Confucian Commentary and Intellectual History,”The Journal ofAsian Studies 57,no.2 (1998):397–422;John Berthrong,Transformationsof the Confucian Way (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Michael Nylan, The Five“Confucian” Classics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Van Norden, Con-fucius; and E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects: Sayings ofConfucius and His Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

23. Makeham, “Formation,” 1.24. For refutations, see Edward Slingerland, “Why Philosophy Is Not ‘Extra’ in Under-

standing the Analects, a Review of Brooks and Brooks, The Original Analects,”Philosophy East and West 50, no. 1 (2000): 137–41, 146–47; and Van Norden, Con-fucius, 13–18.

25. Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (repr., New York: Random House, VintageBooks, 1983), 55.

26. See, for example, Analects 2:5; 3:4, 15, 18; 7:18; and 9:3.27. See, for example, Hall and Ames, Thinking, 227–29.28. See, for example, Analects 1:2; 3:24; 4:15; 17:5; and 19:22.29. Consult Daniel Gardner, “Confucian Commentary and Intellectual History.” The

Journal of Asian Studies 57, no. 2 (1998): 398.30. This view originated with Duhem, was endorsed by Willard Van Orman Quine, and is

nearly universally accepted by Western philosophers. Quine first defended under-determination and accepted its consequences in Quine, “The Two Dogmas of Empiri-cism,” in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), 20–46.Quine raises the problem of underdetermination of whole languages in his Word andObject (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960). In the case of radical translation, there are anumber of incompatible translation manuals that completely capture all of the lin-guistic behavior of the speakers of the native languages. Quine extends the problemof underdetermination to ontology in Quine, Ontological Relativity (New York:Columbia University Press, 1969); there are incompatible ontologies each of whichcompletely captures our sensory data.

31. This is the strategy of Huang Kan (488 AD–545 AD). See Makeham, Transmitters,123–27.

32. See Kwong-Loi Shun, “Ren and Li in the Analects,” in Van Norden, Confucius, 62–70.33. To see how they might arise for translations, see any review of Hall and Ames such as

A. C. Graham, “Review of Thinking through Confucius,” Bulletin of the School ofOriental and African Studies, University of London 51, no. 3 (1998): 591–92, andIvanhoe, “Review”; or see Fu’s critique of Fingarette in “Fingarette and Munro,”181–89.

34. Brooks and Brooks, Original Analects, 303.35. Sandra Wawrytko,“Prudery and Prurience: Historical Roots of the Confucian Conun-

drum Concerning Women, Sexuality, and Power,” in Confucius and the “Second Sex,”ed. Chengyang Li (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 174.

36. Hall and Ames, Thinking, 48.37. Ibid., 47.38. Ibid., 49.39. Ibid.40. Ibid., 178.


41. Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” in Philosophy inHistory, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984; reprinted in Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophi-cal Papers Volume 3 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 247–73).

42. Rorty, Truth and Progress, 247–254.43. Rorty, Truth and Progress, 248.44. Ibid., 252.45. Ibid.46. Although a great deal of Confucian scholarship—indeed much of contemporary

history of philosophy—is Rational Reconstruction, the only sinologist that I am awarehas explicitly conceded that his project is Rational Reconstruction is David Tien. SeeDavid W. Tien, “Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affec-tions in the Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472–1529) and Alvin Plantinga,” TheInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55, no. 1 (Feb 2004): 31–55. The noteon Rational Reconstruction is in footnote 20.

47. Hall and Ames, Thinking, 243.48. But, one wonders, why attempt to root one’s views in Confucius at all? Why not,

rather, root one’s Nietzschean and Heideggerian views in the Zhuangzi? My readingof the Zhuangzi is nearly perfectly aligned with some Confucius scholars’ understand-ing of Confucius. Since I take the Zhuangzi to be self-consciously anti-Confucian, Ifind it curious that there are views of Confucius on offer that seem virtually identicalwith the ethics of the Zhuangzi. See my “The Polished Mirror: Reflections on NaturalKnowledge of the Way in Zhuangzi and Plantinga,” in Chinese Philosophy: In an Eraof Globalization, ed. Robin Wang (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004),163–83.

49. This is a concern, of course, for the history of philosophy in general, not merely forChinese philosophy.

Chinese Glossary

Analects see Lunyu

Chou see ZhouConfuciusChunqiu

Ch’un-ch’iu fan-lu

Dao/daodeDong ZhongshuDuke of ZhouEmperor WuFu Wei-hsunHanHuang KanjingjunziKing ShunKing Wen

King WuKing YaoKing YuliLiji

Lunyu

Mencius

MenciusrenruShangShijing

shuShujing

Shun Kwong LoiSongTao see Dao/dao


TianTianmingTung Chung-shu see Dong

ZhongshuWang Yangmingwenwu wei

yiYijing

yin-yangzhiZhouZhuangzi


THREE KINDS OF CONFUCIAN SCHOLARSHIP

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