CHAPTER 8

THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN A SINGLE CONCEPT:

TEACHING AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO

MOOD SELECTION IN SPANISH1

JOSÉ P. RUIZ CAMPILLO

0. Introduction

I have always felt that beneath the sometimes perplexing quirks of

Spanish—and every other language—there must lurk a strict logic, a series

of rules without exceptions, that govern the creation of meaning. Students

are always asking us why, and in answer we turn not only to the inevitable

“Just because” but to a number of traditional explanations. These

incomplete and frequently ad hoc explanations have more often than not

been useless and therefore disappointing in an instructional context, where

explanations must be not only logical but also applicable and effective.

The theoretical rebellion led by cognitive linguistics has suggested that the

logic governing human communication is neither a propositional logic that

traces a direct relationship between language and a reality external to

language, nor a form-based logic that strives to fit language into

mathematical molds divested of any communicative content. Instead, it

has argued powerfully for a sort of natural logic of linguistic

representation, defined in terms of an experience and perception of the

world and developed in order to share that experience and perception with

other members of the species. A logic of meaning, not of form, and

certainly, I would argue, a logic of common sense, that basic quality all too

often absent from our textbooks’ discussions of grammar. In this sense, the

cognitive perspective has provided satisfying and surprisingly simple

explanations for a great number of grammatical phenomena that we had

1 This article is an updated version of Ruiz (2007a).

Chapter Number

2

nearly resigned ourselves to considering the arbitrary products of a

capricious language genie.2

In my view, however, if we wish to solve the problem of explaining—and

thus of teaching and learning—how a language’s grammar works, it is not

enough simply to agree to approach language from a more human

perspective. It is not enough establish a theoretical framework that can

patiently set out the whys and wherefores of each of a language’s formal

aspects. Also necessary is a strict, manipulable mechanism that explains

the means by which a particular form, one that is fundamentally the same

each time it occurs, is used to produce the variety of meanings observable

in everyday usage. In short, we must move from an interpretive extreme to

a productive one. Only then can we provide a consistent analysis of each

of the language’s forms so that both linguist and student are able to

reproduce these infinite iterations from a limited repertoire of forms, using

as their guide only that natural logic described above. It is to this

explanatory and predictive capacity of grammatical instruction that I refer

when I talk about operationality.

Some time ago now, I wrote a long essay uniting these two objectives in a

single theoretical model of the verbal system,3 an essay whose main ideas

have since been incorporated into pedagogical materials and research.4 In

this article, I will attempt to describe how we might design an operational

sequence for teaching mood selection in Spanish that is based on a single

concept, one that identifies the essential value of the indicative and the

subjunctive. The aim of establishing this operational value is to offer the

student a single, stable foundation of meaning that can be employed any

time she needs to choose between moods, so that she can do so

automatically, deliberately, and justified by a natural logic—a common-

sense logic, one born of the human representation of the world and one

that can be used by speakers of any language.

In an attempt at orderliness, I will set out my argument in “phases”. In the

first phase, I will take a critical stance, examining a few of the myths that,

in my view, still persist in the teaching of the subjunctive. The rest of the

article will lay out in simple terms a protocol for understanding and

2 We should, at this point, recall the contributions of R. Langacker in his two-

volume Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991). 3 Ruiz (1992). 4 Alonso et al. (2005), Chamorro et al. (2006), Ruiz (2007b), Llopis (2011 and

2012).

Chapter Title

3

teaching mood selection: a logical phase to begin to understand what the

subjunctive means in terms of communication; a legislative phase to

establish the foundation for a decision-making protocol; a cartographic

phase in which I will draw the map that will guide us in the learning

process; and finally a playful phase that, despite its whimsical name,

grapples with the thorny problem of how to handle the apparent departures

from protocol observable in native speech without resorting to an

unwieldy list of exceptions.

1. Mythological phase

Very few people still believe that the Sun revolves around the Earth, that

blood is made in the liver, or that the world ends at Cape Finisterre.

Although those notions could seem quite plausible at first glance, in the

end we have accepted the reasoning of Copernicus, Harvey, and

Columbus, and today we no longer think these things, much less write and

publish them. Astronomy, medicine, and geography, then, have evolved.

They have done so by recognizing that evidence that contradicts a theory

obliges the theorist to revise his theory, not cling to it. Can the same be

said of the “science” that teaches us about the workings of languages?

It seems to me that grammar is one of the few disciplines in which myths

not only resist being supplanted by the results of scientific—or merely

contradictory—observation, but they are persistently tolerated, even

treated with the kid gloves of a believer and all too often defended with

arguments based on nothing more substantial than faith. While the

scientific myths fade away, the grammatical myths fill books, inhabit

classrooms, and make life difficult for Margaret, an eager student in

Wisconsin who is always asking what, how, and why.

I feel some obligation to refer to these myths, as my proposed explanation

for mood selection will require a minor repositioning on the part of the

reader. I do so, then, with the hope that, having recognized these myths as

such, we might feel more motivated to take on the challenge of

overcoming them. Nevertheless, any reader who is already aware of these

myths can skip straight to the next phase without fear of missing

something essential.

For organizational purposes, I will differentiate among three kinds of

myths—“romantic,” theoretical, and didactic—although in truth the three

Chapter Number

4

are fairly similar. Perhaps they are simply different manifestations of the

same sort of magical thinking.5

Romantic myths.

Magical thinking has at times served as a culture’s only explanation for

phenomena that are not understood. It was thus that the gods who set the

sun or moon adrift in the heavens were born. Yet even today the magical

approach to thinking lives alongside and competes with the scientific one;

after all, astrology and parapsychology are alive and well. Sometimes,

however ridiculous it seems, the world of rational fantasy created by

magical thinking can produce a hyper-“real” reality that makes more

immediate sense to people than a valid scientific explanation.

This magical vision, which hovers somewhere between sentimentality and

folklore, has given rise to a sort of myth of the subjunctive exemplified by

Vicente Verdú in one of his newspaper columns.6 What special value does

the subjunctive have that only a few languages enjoy? According to

Verdú:

Gracias al subjuntivo se añade una trasrealidad como el forro de raso a un

vestido de noche o, en suma, como la dimensión donde se desdobla el

soñado cuerpo del lenguaje.7

After titillating our linguistics-enamored senses with this lofty discussion

of a verbal mood, there is no room for bringing our feet back to earth and

considering the unrefined, even pedestrian, languages that lack the

subjunctive, such as English.8 Neither is there room for marching us into

the classroom and asking what practical use Margaret, the student from

Wisconsin, could make of this native speaker’s description of the

linguistic forms that make her academic life miserable. Of course not! This

5 The term “magical thinking” refers to the sort of reasoning used to support

opinions or explanations that lack a strict logical foundation and are based on the

subjective perceptions of an individual or group. 6 El País, 10-VII-1999. 7 The subjunctive adds a metareality like the satin lining of an evening gown or

like that dimension where the dream-like body of language unfurls. 8 The morphological, semantic, and distributional characteristics of the subjunctive

in Spanish are completely different from those linguistic features that are so often

identified as or associated with the “subjunctive” in other languages.

Chapter Title

5

is poetic license, and one so contagious that it can apparently be felt even

by speakers of languages that do not have a subjunctive:9

The subjunctive gets the job of describing “could-have-beens,” “might-

bes,” and “maybe-never-weres”. Anything that has happened, is

happening, or may happen on the borders of our consciousness gets

handled by the subjunctive.

Most interesting for language professionals, however, is when this

romantic approach invokes the supposed values and meanings of the

verbal mood, because it then connects with other explanatory myths whose

apparently rational foundation makes them much more influential in the

Spanish classroom. It is in this moment that primitive magical thinking

appears to give way to scientific discourse—without ever really ceasing to

shape that discourse.

Theoretical myths.

Take, for example, those ubiquitous myths that throw off concepts like

“real,” “unreal,” or “possible” like heavy boulders, which rumble along,

cutting a swath through the desks in the Spanish classroom. As Verdú

noted of Umberto Eco, both of them drifting dangerously from the magical

to the practical:

Pero ¿tan grave resulta la pérdida del subjuntivo?, le preguntaron a

Umberto Eco para el libro titulado significativamente El fin de los tiempos.

Y Eco contestó: “Me parece muy importante el subjuntivo porque él es el

único que expresa el tiempo de la hipótesis y de lo posible, de lo no-real”.

El subjuntivo es, en efecto, el tiempo que crea en el habla y la escritura la

escena cóncava de la suposición.10

A beautiful thought, no doubt. Yet if we plant our feet firmly back in their

accustomed place, we must acknowledge first that the title of the cited

book is not truly meaningful, as the subjunctive is not a “time” [tense] but

a “mood”. Second, along the same lines, Eco might want to calmly

9 Keenan (1994). 10 Is the loss of the subjunctive really such a big deal?, they asked Umberto Eco for

the book meaningfully titled Conversations about the End of Time. And Eco

replied, “I think the subjunctive is very important because it is the only tense that

expresses hypotheticals, possibility, the not-real”. The subjunctive is, in effect, the

tense that creates in speech and writing the hollow space where supposition

nestles.

Chapter Number

6

reconsider the “temporal” nature of hypotheticals, possibility, and not-

realness to avoid mixing these categories in an incoherent jumble. And

third, in quite practical and immediately verifiable terms, the subjunctive

is not, in fact, the only mood involved in the linguistic construction of

hypotheticals, possibility, not-realness, or supposition. For example:

a) It is no more closely related with the “hypothetical” than the indicative

can be:

1. Si vienes [ind],... [If you come, ...—“you-come” is a hypothetical

proposition.]

2. Yo que tú, iría [ind]... [I would go I were you ...—“I-go” is a

hypothetical proposition”.]

3. Me haces [ind] eso y no te hablo más en la vida. [You do that to me

and I’ll never speak to you again—“you-do” is hypothetical.]

4. Si pudiera, no dudes que iba [ind]. [You can be sure that I would go

[imperfect] if I could—“I-go” is as hypothetical as “to be able”.]

b) It is no more closely related to the “not-real” than any form of the

indicative could be.

5. Si te conviertes [ind] en rana, te lo doy. [If you turn into a frog, I’ll

give it to you—“to turn into a frog” is unreal.]

6. Imagínate que sale [ind] el muerto de la tumba. [Now imagine that

the dead are emerging from their graves—“to emerge from the

grave” is unreal.]

7. ¿Te casarías [ind] tú con un elefante? [Would you marry an

elephant?— “to marry an elephant” is unreal.]

What’s more, it easily represents tangible realities:

8. Estoy encantada de que estés [subj] aquí conmigo. [I’m delighted that

you are here with me—“you-be here” is real.]

9. Aunque seas [subj] mi hermana, esto no te lo perdono. [Even though

you are my sister, I can’t forgive you for this—“you-be my sister” is

real.]

10. No es porque lo haya hecho [subj] yo, pero queda mono, ¿no? [I’m

not saying so just because I made it, but it came out well, don’t you

think?—“I-make it” is real ...]

Chapter Title

7

c) It is no more closely related with “what is possible” than the indicative

is, and in no sense can it systematically formulate “supposition,” which is

precisely the function of the future and conditional tenses and of operators

such as tal vez, quizá, and so on.

11. Ahora estará [ind] en el bar. [He is probably at the bar now—“he-be

at the bar” is a supposition.]

12. Estaría [ind] en el bar en aquel momento. [He must have been at

the bar right then—“he-be at the bar” is a supposition.]

13. Igual está [ind] en el bar. [Maybe he is at the bar—“he-be at the

bar” is just a possibility.]

14. A lo mejor ha olvidado [ind] algo. [Maybe he has forgotten

something—“he-forget” is just a possibility.]

It is clear, I think, that concepts like unreality, hypothesis, possibility, and

doubt are not operational in a careful consideration of the value and

function of mood in Spanish, which is as relevant in grammatical theory as

it is in classroom instruction. What’s more, they in fact turn out to be anti-

operational, in the sense that, by relying on this unhelpful “rule,” students

will believe themselves perfectly justified in producing sequences like the

following, which are so lamentably prevalent in Spanish classrooms:

15. Yo creo que *venga [subj] mañana. [I think he’ll come tomorrow—

“I can’t swear it, I have doubts”.]

16. No lo sé, pero *esté [subj] en su casa. [I don’t know, but maybe he

is at home—“It’s just a guess”.]

17. Si *pueda [subj] ir mañana, iré. [If I can go tomorrow, I will—“It’s

just a hypothesis”.]

18. Me alegra que *has venido [ind]. [I’m glad you have come—“It’s

perfectly real”.]

19. Lucy dice que yo *sea [subj] una extraterrestre. [Lucy says I am an

alien—“It’s clearly unreal”.]

Another of the ancient myths used to describe mood selection in Spanish

(and, worse, to explain it) consists of positing a contrast between

“objectivity” and “subjectivity,” applied to the indicative and subjunctive,

respectively. This opposition arises from a colossal confusion of form and

syntax that would have us believe that the speaker in example 20 is

presenting the concept of “having someone with him” as a subjective one,

and that in example 21, “all blonde women’s being dumb” should be taken

as an objective fact.

Chapter Number

8

20. Me sorprende que estés [subj] aquí. [I’m surprised that you are here.]

21. Yo creo que todas las rubias son [ind] tontas. [I think that all blonde

women are dumb.]

Of course, we can feel a more or less subtle hint of “subjectivity” in the

case of 20, but that subjectivity comes in the speaker’s surprise, expressed

in the indicative (“Me sorprende”), and not in the subjunctive, which the

speaker uses to mention a real, incontrovertible fact.11

Some might still be

tempted to defend the objectivity of the indicative in 21, claiming that the

fact is “objective for the speaker”, but they would surely have to admit that

such a notion is the very definition of “subjective”. These examples are

sufficient, I think, to allow us to gauge the value of traditional discussions

of differences in mood in Spanish.

In any case, I would argue that, pedagogically speaking, this myth is

basically harmless: it is so ambiguous and arbitrary that it simply does not

figure among the concepts that Margaret relies on when making decisions

about mood. It therefore does not steer her toward systematic error, unlike

so many of the theoretical myths discussed above, and unlike those myths

employed in the Spanish classroom or generated there, which we will

discuss next.

Didactic myths.

For me there is no doubt that recent developments in language pedagogy,

especially in Spanish, have compelled all of us, theorists and practitioners

alike, to reexamine the “mechanical apparatus” of languages—which is to

say, grammar. Everything that has traditionally been said, written, and

learned about the subjunctive has been done primarily in descriptive terms.

Native speakers have complacently accepted these terms, as they do not

need them in order to operate: native speakers produce the appropriate

mood for each case—for every case—naturally and unconsciously,

without any effort.12

11 In fact, it is the same sense of subjectivity present in 21, which poses the limited

intelligence of blonde women as a subjective opinion of the speaker (“Yo creo [I

think]”). 12 The same thing happens in language classes in Spanish-speaking countries

today: adolescent native speakers see no contradiction in studying for a test and

memorizing that the subjunctive mood is used to describe what is not real, and then

Chapter Title

9

Yet when it comes time to teach a non-native speaker, every instructor or

materials designer equipped with such myths complains about their

distressing lack of operationality. To some extent, then, instructors have

felt the need to establish more easily navigated routes toward decisions on

mood for students who wish to emulate the incomprehensible exploits of

native speakers.

In this context, firmly situated in the contemporary Spanish classroom, a

survey of the field suggests that teachers make use of a web of rules that

haphazardly combine formal, syntactic, semantic, discursive, and

pragmatic values. In practice, what the student receives is a long list of

“verbs” that require—for no apparent reason—the subjunctive, and

another list, nearly as long, of key concepts (some inherited, others ad hoc)

that the student, in her innocence, puts into use as generalized rules:

desire, obligation, necessity, request, intention, influence, emotion,

unreality, incompletion, hypothesis, doubt, uncertainty, falsity, future

status, “Ojalá [If only],” negation, impersonal expressions, subjective

reaction, nonexistence, unfamiliarity, recycled information, and so on. The

taxonomic aspect of this teaching approach (lists of verbs, participles, etc.)

is based on at least three fallacies:

a) That it is possible for the instructor to describe the differing uses

of moods, in all their variety, through lists.

b) That it is possible for the student to memorize these lists.

c) That is possible for the student to learn to use differing moods

effectively by memorizing these lists.

The first of these assumptions collides immediately with an inescapable

truth of the Spanish language: only a small portion of the uses of the

subjunctive are truly “obligatory”.13

This select group consists of the

celebrating afterward, saying, “Me alegro de que haya caído [subj] esa pregunta

[I’m glad that question came up]”. Unlike a non-native speaker, they need no

“rule” to make decisions about mood, and so the “rule” can be reduced to a simple

test question, forestalling any attempt at explaining or predicting the phenomenon. 13 Strictly speaking, it is possible to establish a mandatory subjunctive rule for only

a very limited list of verbs, didactically formulable in the infinitive (because for

mood-selection purposes they are immune to factors such as changes in the time of

reference, changes in subject, negation, speaker intent, and so forth). These verbs

are part of what I will call here “context 1,” and they correspond to the so-called

Chapter Number

10

“verbs of desire and will” such as desear [to desire], querer [to want],

intentar [to attempt], or pedir [to request]: as it is not possible to use the

indicative with these verbs, memorization will in fact produce a “correct”

usage of mood when necessary. But this means only a tiny step forward in

learning, and one of limited communicative utility, since these

unambiguous cases arise in contexts in which mood is redundant, making

an ability to determine mood correctly rather superfluous. In addition, this

memorization approach, in which students are to assemble language like a

jigsaw puzzle (“With quiero que [I want], use the subjunctive; with creo

que [I think], use the indicative . . “.), encourages the student not to try to

make sense of what she is doing when she makes a grammatical decision.

What good is it to be “objectively correct” in a certain percentage of cases

if you do not understand what you are doing? And how does it then help

Margaret expand the list of fifteen verbs she has learned to associate

automatically with one mood or the other, so that she can make mood-

selection decisions in any of the varied and practically infinite contexts she

will encounter when using Spanish in real life?

Our use of the subjunctive in Spanish is in fact determined by something

more than a so-called syntactic government that is devoid of meaning and

blatantly inoperational. The endless variations range from possible subtle

manipulations of information (Yo no digo que eres tonto, aunque lo seas

[I’m not saying you are dumb, even if you are]—what does the speaker

think of the listener’s intellectual capacity?) to contrasts that clearly

establish changes in meaning (dice que viene / dice que venga). In

between, there is an infinite assortment of decisions that have nothing to

do with the “verb” in question as it appears on our lists. What sorts of

sentences will a Spanish student produce, having learned the following

(rampant, even pandemic) jigsaw-like rule?

“With verbs of ‘understanding’ (saber [to know], pensar [to

think], imaginar [to imagine], suponer [to suppose], recordar [to

remember], creer [to believe] ...), we use the indicative if they

are affirmative and the subjunctive if they are negative”.

Dutifully following this now classic formalist myth, Margaret will no

doubt manage to gather a little bouquet of apparent successes, especially in

predicates of deontic modality (jussive, optative, volitive) and, though only

partially, performative or causative predicates.

Chapter Title

11

the limited context of her class and the fill-in-the-blank exercises in her

workbook.

22. Sé que estás ahí. [I know you’re there.]

23. No pienso que tenga esa edad. [I don’t think that’s how old he is.]

24. Recuerdo que tenía un caballo. [I remember that she had a horse.]

25. No creo que tarde mucho. [I don’t think he’ll take long.]

Yet obediently following the rule will also lead directly to failure (or error)

with some frequency, a failure that will affect not just the form but, in

many cases, the meaning that is actually being transmitted.

What MARGARET

will say

What MARGARITA

would say

26. Ella no sabe que tú *tengas 25 años.

[She doesn’t know that you are 25

years old.]

...tienes ...

27. Vale, está casado, pero yo no pienso

que *esté casado. ¿Para qué voy a

torturarme? [All right, so he is

married, but I don’t think about the

fact that he’s married. Why torture

myself?]

...está ...

28. ¿Acaso no recuerdas que yo te

*prestara cinco euros? [Maybe you

don’t remember that I lent you five

euros?]

...presté ...

29. Recuérdame que *compro el regalo de

Jorge. [Remind me to buy a gift for

Jorge.]

...compre ...

30. ¿Recuerdas que *llevaba algo en la

mano? [Do you remember that he was

carrying something?]

...llevaba ... (“He was

carrying it, remember?”)

...llevara ... (“I don’t know

whether he was carrying

something or not, do you?’)

Chapter Number

12

It seems to me inarguable that these lists are a tool of extremely limited

utility for the instructor;14

at the same time, for students they are a

permanent source of error, blinding them to the meaning of what they are

saying or could be saying with the selections they make. Yet by examining

that small part of the “list” approach that can lead to apparently positive

results, we can perhaps validate it as a tool of partial utility, or as one that

has utility in a particular phase of learning. And in fact we do, as seen in

the vast majority of our teaching materials.

At this point, one might wonder about the notions that we labeled above as

fallacies b) and c): Is it possible to memorize a list such that it allows us to

select mood correctly at an acceptable level of communication, or will we

come up against the limitations of our own memories? Worst of all, even if

we were to accept the idea that a student could make effective use of a

sufficiently lengthy list, would she be able to use that memorized

foundation to make decisions in real time, or would those decisions instead

be guided by a sort of intuition—that is, guided more by associations of

meaning than by form-based rules?

Retrieving endless memorized lists of formal patterns is obviously not the

procedure by which people learn to use a language effectively. It is no

doubt for this reason that educational discourse, in an effort to lend its

mythified jungle of verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, participles, and other

parts of speech a human soul, has always employed those key concepts to

which we referred above. In traditional pedagogy, knowing what the

subjunctive is or what it means is not important: it is enough to say that it

“is often associated” (though not always) with the expression of doubt,

unreality, emotion, or desire. Something is better than nothing, of course,

and in the absence of explanation, description will have to do.

But this kind of instruction, halfway between semantics and syntax, falls

apart for two reasons. One has to do with the way the student receives and

processes that descriptive information. Who is responsible when Margaret

uses the subjunctive in “Anna tenga novio [Anna has a boyfriend],”

believing that she should mark her uncertainty with the subjunctive? The

14 According to the typical syntactical jigsaw approach, the rule is V1[negative] + que

+ V2 [subjunctive]. However limited our descriptive ambitions, we nevertheless must

also acknowledge the frequent exception V1[negative] + que + V2 [indicative] and, if we

are being thorough, a common third possibility, V1[negative] + que + V2

[indicative/subjunctive]. And of what practical use is all this to the student—or the

instructor?

Chapter Title

13

other has to do with the operational validity of description, which presents

as qualities of the subjunctive meanings that are in fact simply products of

their syntactical or discursive context:

“Subjunctive of doubt”: Dudo que venga. [I doubt he will come.]

“Subjunctive of desire”: Deseo que venga. [I want him to come.]

“Subjunctive of unreality”: Es falso que venga. [It’s not true that he is

coming.]

“Subjunctive of emotion”: Me alegro de que venga, etc. [I’m glad he is

coming.]

Each of these examples communicates the idea of doubt, desire, unreality,

or emotion. Yet, as we saw earlier, the problem is that these ideas are

extrapolated from the main clause and not from the mood of the verb.

Although the student’s operational interpretation will quite logically be

that the subjunctive must mean all of those things and be used to express

all of them, that conviction will lead her into systematic error and an

inability to meaningfully use mood contrast in Spanish.

If we want to help that student who so eagerly tries to operationalize

general ideas in her use of the subjunctive, it is time to ask what meaning

all those “vengas” in the previous examples have in common. It is that

shared meaning—and not doubt, desire, unreality, or emotion—that

explains the use of the subjunctive in each of those contexts. And it is high

time we tried to figure out a logic to it.

2. Logical phase

The most finely honed instrument available for pulling apart the roots of

magical thinking is without a doubt the logical principle known as

Occam’s razor: Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate.15

In the case

of the subjunctive, it is worth noting that if an explanation of the

phenomenon based on a single value is in competition with an explanation

that requires dozens of different values, the former (simpler) explanation is

always preferred. Saying that mood selection is logical implies that all of

the observable qualities of occurrences of the subjunctive could be reduced

to a single value or meaning, based on which it would be possible to

explain and predict all of its uses. Does such a value for the subjunctive

really exist?

15 “Plurality should not be posited without necessity”.

Chapter Number

14

In answering this question, the most common approach has been to focus

on the context in which examples of the subjunctive mood appear,

constructing its meaning from the wide range of values seen there. I,

however, would respond with a second question: What does a subjunctive

mean in and of itself? If we manage to answer that one, we will have found

what we could call the operational value of the subjunctive: a single

meaning that is present now in isolated form, one that can explain every

value apparent in every instance, from the morpheme to the word, from the

word to the phrase, from the phrase to the sentence, from the sentence to

the discourse, and from the discourse to the contextual or pragmatic

interpretation. If we manage to answer this question, we will also have

found a starting point for a mood map that traces a logical path down

which we can invite our students to venture.

My proposal to get us started down this path is simple: if mood means

something in and of itself, it must communicate that meaning in and of

itself. To find out, we will use a test of “relative isolation”, in which an

occurrence of a form is interpreted as if in a real-life context, but deprived

of that context so that it is not contaminated by additional meaning

contributed by other elements of the environment. Take, for example, a

situation in which a girl named Margarita walks up to a group of people

who are talking about her and overhears only the following words:

31. ... Margarita es tonta ...

32. ... Margarita sea tonta ...

Which of the two would make Margarita angrier, more quickly and with

greater justification? Obviously the former. With the little information she

has gathered, Margarita can be certain that in example 31 the speaker is

communicating an opinion, whether his own (Yo creo que ..., Está claro

que ... [I think that ..., It’s clear that ...]) or somebody else’s (Ana piensa

que ..., Para ella es evidente que ... [Ana thinks that ..., It’s clear to her

that ...]). But in the case of 32, strictly speaking, she has no right to get

angry straight away: none of the earlier possibilities applies here. The use

of the subjunctive only allows her to imagine, for example, that her

dumbness is being suggested as a goal (para que ... Margarita sea tonta ...

[so that ... Margarita will be dumb]), questioned (no creo que ...

Margarita sea tonta [I don’t think that ... Margarita is dumb]), refuted (es

falso que ... Margarita sea tonta [it’s not true that ... Margarita is dumb]),

or simply commented upon (es una pena que ... Margarita sea tonta [it’s a

Chapter Title

15

shame that ... Margarita is dumb]). But not even in this last case could

Margarita be “formally” offended: although commenting on something

could suggest a presupposition of the truth of that something, it never

implies the speaker’s responsibility for the formal declaration of that

supposed truth.

With all our focus on teaching the meaning of the subjunctive, have we not

forgotten to teach the meaning of the indicative? It could perhaps be

pedagogically fruitful to point out to students whose language has no

subjunctive morpheme the positivity of the indicative in Spanish. If we ask

Margaret whether she would have the right to get angry at hearing the

following speech fragment, it is quite probable that she will say yes:

33. ... Margaret is dumb ...

She will only realize the flaw in her reasoning when we point out to her

that, in addition to the possibility of interpreting “is” as somebody’s

opinion (I think / she thinks ... Margaret is dumb), the opposite is just as

likely (I don’t think ... Margaret is dumb). That is, that she should not take

offense until she hears the troublemaking utterance in its entirety. And it is

here that she can begin to understand the function of modal markers for

Spanish speakers: as a native speaker, I can go ahead and take offense

right away if the potential insult is expressed in the indicative, whereas I

would be well advised to refrain from drawing hasty conclusions if it is in

the subjunctive. We can thus devise a sort of rule—we might call it, for

pedagogical purposes, “the golden rule”—that could go something like

this:

En español, cuando alguien dice que llueve,

eso significa que alguien dice que llueve.

[In Spanish, when somebody says that it is raining,

that means that somebody is saying that it is raining.]

Yes, it seems like a crude tautology, and it is certainly a minor, deliberate

exaggeration. But I think it can be a useful starting point for understanding

the meaning of mood in Spanish. In this situation, for example, it allows

Margaret to put herself in Margarita’s interpretive position, and to become

justifiably angry if the speaker refers that information to her: “Si ese

hablante dice que soy tonta, es que alguien (el propio hablante u otro

sujeto) dice (cree, piensa, opina ...) que soy tonta [If the speaker says that I

Chapter Number

16

¡Yo no quiero decir

que llueve! (I’m not

saying it is raining!)

am dumb, it’s because somebody (the speaker himself or somebody else)

says (believes, thinks, is of the opinion) that I am dumb]”. On the

production side, Margaret could use this little rule—Assume that the

indicative, in Spanish, always represents a declaration16

—to avoid

producing sequences like the following:

34. Quiero que llueve. (I want it to rain.)

35. No creo que llueve. (I don’t think it’s

going to rain.)

36. Es difícil que llueve. (It’s unlikely that it

will rain.)

But the most important thing is not that Margaret has interpreted a few

isolated words with precision nor that, in making a decision on mood, she

has avoided being “incorrect”. The most important thing is that Margaret,

perhaps for the first time, has been able to understand why the subjunctive

is used (not just that it appears, or does not, or “tends to appear”). She may

even have begun to feel it as a form that means something in and of itself.

In reality, such a rule only hints at a stricter definition of mood’s

operational value, one able to logically account for each and every case in

which a decision on mood must be made (or in which mood in others’

utterances must be interpreted). This stricter definition, absent the logic

that governs its use, will be for the purposes of this article (just as it is for

Margaret) as follows:17

If we posit that this is—and is always—the case, we can turn this

observation into a law, freeing it from the inconstancy of rules. It seems to

offer some evidence for its “legislative” nature; namely, a speaker’s ability

to deny responsibility for having declared something when he has

expressed it using the subjunctive. Even in contexts where the truth of

something is assumed:

16 In the sense that we will use the term later. 17 This unambiguous assessment of the indicative and subjunctive moods is also

theoretically justified in Ruiz (1998) and incorporated into a classical cognitive

model in Castañeda (2004b).

The indicative represents a declaration of the concept it marks.

The subjunctive represents a non-declaration of the concept it marks.

Chapter Title

17

37. - No me gusta que grites. [I don’t like for you to yell.]

- ¡Pero si yo no grito! [But I don’t yell!]

- Yo no he dicho que grites, he dicho que no me gusta. [I didn’t say

you yell, I said I don’t like it.]

If the reader attempts this little linguistic game in any language, it will

work just as it does in Spanish. In many languages, however, this non-

declaration will only be interpretable contextually and will not be, as it is

in Spanish, grammatically marked by a mood whose purpose is precisely

the formal non-declaration of something.

Perhaps we can now begin to talk, with information rather than magic or

poetry, about the “spirit” of the subjunctive, identifying it with an

intelligible linguistic meaning that our students can understand. The next

step must be to establish a body of laws to help us move from the

universal meaning of non-declaration to the decisions on form that

Spanish, whether we like it or not, requires.

3. Legislative phase

In Spanish language instruction, as in grammar texts in general, we are so

accustomed to a merely descriptive and taxonomic approach that nobody

finds it odd to explain a single phenomenon by citing multiple rules and,

of course, the inevitable corresponding exceptions. In this article,

however, I hope to establish a single operational value for modal

morphemes, one that will function as an operational tool for students that

helps them logically deduce which mood is appropriate every time they

must make that decision. What I am proposing is a rule without

exceptions; it is thus no longer strictly a rule and is instead a law.18

The “law of usage”.

The fundamentals of the law I propose here have already been expressed

in the value attributed to moods above: that of declaration/non-

declaration. We might call it a “law of meaning”. But we could formulate

it in more didactic and manipulable terms by establishing a sort of “law of

usage” that might go something like this:

18 For a more precise understanding of the sense in which I use the concept of

“law,” see the last section of this article (“Playful Phase”).

Chapter Number

18

The next few examples make a useful start point:19

Matrix

X

(dependent clause)

Logical reasoning

Está claro

[It is clear]

que ama a Laura.

[that he loves Laura]

If I say that X is clear, that implies that

I wish to declare X.

No creo

[I do not

think]

que ame a Laura.

[that he loves Laura]

If I say that I do not think X, that

implies not that I wish to declare X

-rather the opposite.

Quiero

[I want]

que ame a Laura.

[him to love Laura]

If I say that I want X, then I will not

declare X: it would be a contradiction to

note X and ask for X at the same time.

We should not expect, however, that the complex problem of mood

selection can be resolved in the simple, intuitive way that these examples

19 For clarity’s sake, in these examples we have made the speaking subject

responsible for the declaration or non-declaration. But it should be noted that we

need only to know whether the dependent clause is a “declaration”; it does not

matter whose declaration it is. It could be the responsibility of the speaking subject

himself (Yo no creo . . . [I don’t think . . .], Yo quiero . . . [I want . . .], Está claro

[desde mi punto de vista] . . . [It’s clear (to me) . . .]), but it could also be the

responsibility of any other subject to whom the speaker attributes the information

(Ella piensa . . . [She thinks . . .], Todos niegan . . . [Everybody denies . . .], etc.) or

the responsibility of no subject at all (Han descubierto . . . [They’ve discovered . .

.], El resultado ha sido . . . [The result has been . . .]).

Does the meaning of the matrix imply that the dependent clause

(X) is a declaration?

Use the indicative. Use the subjunctive.

Yes No

Chapter Title

19

suggest. There’s no such thing as magic. In going to St. Ives, we can either

walk or go by car. A person who uses a vehicle will arrive more quickly

and better rested, but the apparent magic comes at a price: he must learn to

drive. In the same way, in learning to decide between the indicative and

subjunctive, the language learner can use either an infinitely varied and

arbitrary list of examples or a protocol that explains them all and offers a

logical path to comprehension and production. The only catch to this

reductive tool, of course, is learning to use it. The student will have to

practice with its control panel so as to avoid accidents. I will therefore

attempt to describe the functions and usage of the four main controls that

should be employed in operating this law if it is to take us to the intended

destination:

1. Why is it important to define a predicate X?

2. What do we mean when we say matrix?

3. Why do we talk about the meaning of the matrix, and not its form?

4. What, exactly, is a declaration?

Why “X”.

Let us now shift our discussion to subordination, a manner of configuring

information that poses complications when applying the logic of our new

law, thanks to the tendency of speakers (native and non-native alike) to

interpret utterances as a unit and thus to disregard their compositional

structure. It is therefore common for analyzers, faced with examples like

the following, to erroneously answer the question posed by the law of

usage—Does the meaning of the matrix imply that the dependent clause is

a declaration?—in the affirmative:

38. No creo que la ame. [I don’t think he loves her.]

39. Es mentira que la ame. [It’s a lie that he loves her.]

40. Es imposible que la ame. [It’s not possible that he loves her.]

41. Yo quiero que la ame. [I want him to love her.] (And so on ...)

Indeed, all of these are declarations, if what we interpretively extract from

them is the global sense of the utterance as a unit. The power of the law

will only be apparent once we separate the matrix (the basis of the

decision) from the concept X (the object of the decision). It will then be

obvious that the speaker, in all of these cases, is indeed declaring

something (with its corresponding indicative formulation): namely, that he

“does not think” X in 38, that X “is a lie” in 39, that X “is not possible” in

Chapter Number

20

I mean that, in my opinion,

he loves her (with more or

less certainty: knowledge,

opinion, supposition . . .)

I don’t mean that “he loves

her”: I just mean that I

don’t think that, that that’s

impossible, or that I hope

that.)

40, that he “wants” X to be the case in 41. And it will simultaneously be

obvious that in none of these cases does he declare X; that is, at no point is

it his intention to declare that “he loves her”.

The fundamental difference between a declaration and a non-declaration

of a subordinate X can be made clear with a little reductive exercise that

highlights this compositional structure, which recurs continually in

everyday Spanish usage. What is the core declaration in the following

utterances? Which verb in each could we remove without altering the

meaning (mood) of the message? Or, to put it another way, what is it that

the speaker really means when he says this?

42. Sé que la ama. [(I know) that he

loves her.]

43. Creo que la ama. [(I think) that he

loves her.]

44. Me imagino que la amará. [(I

imagine) that he must love her.]

45. No creo que la ame. [I don’t think

(that he loves her).]

46. Es imposible que la ame. [It’s not

possible (that he loves her).]

47. Espero que la ame. [I hope (that

he loves her).]

In terms of mood, it is clear that in the first group of utterances (42–44),

the function of the matrix with regard to the declaration is to establish a

level of conviction: in each case, the intention is to establish what is or

could be reality by means of the speaker’s knowledge of it. This

knowledge can be presented as complete (“I know”), fairly high (“I

think”), or simply an approximative interpretation of external indicators

(“I imagine”). In the second group of utterances (45–47), on the other

hand, the only things that are declared (the only indicatives) are the

speaker’s rejection, doubt, or hope with regard to a concept. All of these

attitudes suggest an avoidance of declaring that concept.

Chapter Title

21

And to help Margaret understand that the logic of Spanish is simply the

formal manifestation of a universal logic that she can control, we might

present to her the following little exploratory exercise: Why do the

utterances marked (a) make sense, while those marked (b) do not?

(a)

He loves her, I know.

He loves her, I think.

He loves her, I imagine.

(a)

Él la ama, lo sé.

Él la ama, creo.

Él la ama, me imagino.

(b)

He loves her, I don’t think. (??)

He loves her, it’s impossible. (??)

He loves her, I want. (??)

(b)

Él la ama, no creo. (??)

Él la ama, es imposible. (??)

Él la ama, quiero. (??)

Easy: because, in accordance with the stance implied by the matrices at the

end of each example, the speaker makes no attempt in the (b) utterances,

in either Spanish or English (or any other language one might want to

translate into) to declare that he loves her. In the (a) utterances, of course,

he declares it quite clearly. The only thing distinctive about Spanish is that

non-declarations must be expressed using a morphological marker: the

(in)famous subjunctive.

Why matrix.

As we all know, every rule that attempts to describe mood usage must

refer to the element in the independent clause (or preceding the dependent

clause) that is considered to determine mood selection for the dependent

verb. These rules make exhaustive use of the term “verb” (with “verbs of

emotion,” “verbs of desire,” and so on), although at times they resort other

elements, as well (participles, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions ...) to

explain the “appearance” of one mood or another. The primary advantage

of the matrix concept in this regard is its didactic simplicity: by matrix we

always mean the element that introduces the verb whose mood we are

formulating and that determines mood selection. These matrices may be

verbs, but they can also take other forms:

Chapter Number

22

Querer que, Pensar que ...

No pensar, No creer ...

Ojalá, Quizá, Probablemente ...

Cuando, Donde, Como ...

Si ..., En el caso de que ...

Para que ..., con que ..., de que ...

Es + adj. + que ...

La + sust. + que ..., Lo que ...

Por más + adj./adv. + que ...

...20

Using the term matrix reduces the amount of meta language that the

student must master and formulates the syntactical phenomenon of

dependence in a more systematic way that is easier to implement in

practice. But there is another, much more important advantage to

identifying a “matrix” unit, one that affects the protocol’s operationality:

the matrix is referred to as a unit of meaning.21

Why the meaning of the matrix.

A cognitive analysis of grammar must recognize that the units being

manipulated are not merely formal units. Instead, it should be understood

that grammar manipulates meanings.22

I will therefore contend that no

explanation of the functioning of grammatical units will be sufficiently

operational if it is applied only to form. Instead, I will argue, an

explanation is operational to the extent that its rules are applied not to the

formal units but to the meaning with which those formal units are being

used in each instance. What advantage does this offer?

With one notable exception, which is only the tip of a massive iceberg of

inoperationality: in an instructional approach that makes use of “verb

20 To want that, To think that . . . / Not to think that, Not to believe that . . . / If only,

Perhaps, Probably . . . / When, Where, How / If . . ., In the case that . . . / So that . .

., given that . . ., because . . . / It is + adj. + that . . . / The thing that . . . / No matter

how + adj./adv. + that . . . 21 For a more detailed discussion of the concept of the matrix, see Ruiz (2008), pp.

9–11. 22 See Davis (2009) for an application of a meaning-based approach to English

teaching.

Matrix

Chapter Title

23

rules,” the verbs afirmar [to affirm] and pedir [to ask for] would be in two

different lists. According to this approach, “verbs of language” (afirmar,

contar [to recount]) call for the indicative when positive and the

subjunctive when negative, and “verbs of desire” (querer [to want], pedir)

call for the subjunctive. Yet within our list of verbs we must also create a

sublist of exceptions for those verbs whose meaning changes depending on

whether the indicative or the subjunctive is used (decir [to say], gritar [to

shout], repetir [to repeat], contestar [to answer] ...). What do we ask of

the student? The student, obviously, must memorize these lists (endless

lists that are also deeply flawed, as we will see), relying on memory each

time one of the verbs is used and juggling various sublists of “exceptions”.

How would the student’s task change if, on the other hand, we suggested

she consider not the verb as an item on a list but the meaning with which

she uses that verb in each instance? We would simply be asking her to act

like a native speaker: “Be aware of the declarative meaning you wish to

communicate, and act accordingly”.

48. Afirma que… (he wants to make a declaration) eres [ind]

simpática.

49. Pide que… (he wants to make a request, not a declaration) [subj]

seas simpática.

50. Dice que … (he wants to make a declaration) eres [ind]

simpática.

51. Dice que… (he wants to make a request, not a declaration) [subj]

seas simpática.

In teaching usage based on groups of “verbs” that triggers the mysterious

“appearance” of one mood or another, one of the greatest challenges is

that, as we have seen, it is not actually the verb, as a “type of verb,” that

triggers anything.23

Thus, a rule may supposedly be shared among various

lists of verbs (such as creer [to believe], sospechar [to suspect], pensar

[to think], recordar [to remind], ver [to see], gustar [to please], encantar

[to delight], alegrar [to make happy] ...), adjectives (triste [sad], alegre

23 R. Hadlich (1973), recognizing the inability of a generative-transformational

theory to satisfactorily explain mood in Spanish, and emphasizing that attempts at

explanation based on “syntactic features” had merely formalized traditional

taxonomic studies, called for a “descripción de alto nivel de la semántica de las

oraciones en su totalidad, más que de los verbos aislados (high-level description of

the semantics of sentences as a whole, rather than of isolated verbs)” for a more

complete description of the subjunctive in Spanish.

Chapter Number

24

[happy], estupendo [wonderful], importante [important]...), adverbs (bien

[well], mal [badly] ...), and so on, but as soon a student attempts to apply

it elsewhere, it turns out to be an only marginally operational

generalization.

The concept of the matrix therefore shifts student attention from a form-

based search for simple lexical elements to an interpretation of the real

meaning of those elements in each concrete context in which they are

produced. Mood selection becomes not a matter of identifying, for

example, occurrences of the verb pensar or its “negation,” but of being

aware of the meaning of the main predicate, interpreting its modal sense,

and acting accordingly. Consider, for example, the very different degree of

merely mechanical operationality offered by a form-based rule, compared

to the meaning-based proposal I have made here, and especially the

qualitative possibilities of the two options with regard to the student’s

understanding of what she interprets or produces:

FORM-BASED MODEL

Pensar, ver, creer ... que + IND. / No pensar, no ver, no creer ... que + SUBJ.

Pienso que estoy enfermo. [I think that I’m sick.]

No pienso que esté enfermo. [I don’t think he’s sick.]

Yo no veo que estés enferma. [You don’t look sick to me.]

No creo que sea tarde. [I don’t think it’s late.]

BUT also, inexplicably:

No pienso que estoy enfermo. [I don’t think about my being sick.]

Ella no piensa que estoy enfermo. [She doesn’t think about my being

sick.]

¿No crees que es un poco tarde? [Don’t you think it’s a little late?]

Yo no veía que estaba enferma. [I didn’t notice she was sick.]

Chapter Title

25

MEANING-BASED MODEL

What do you mean when you talk about “(no) pensar que X, (no) ver que X, (no)

creer que X”?

Pienso que estoy enfermo. [I think that I’m sick.]

“I think X” ( I)

No pienso que esté enfermo. [I don’t think he’s sick.]

“I don’t think X” (S)

No pienso que estoy enfermo. [I don’t think about my being sick.]

“X is true ( I), but I don’t think about it”

Ella no piensa que esté enfermo. [She doesn’t think he’s sick.]

“She doesn’t think X” ( S)

Ella no piensa que estoy enfermo. [She doesn’t think about my being sick.]

“X is true ( I), even if she doesn’t think about it”

¿No crees que es un poco tarde? [Don’t you think it’s a little late?]

“I think X, and I’m asking for confirmation of that belief” ( I)

Yo no veía que estaba enferma. [I didn’t notice she was sick.]

“X is true, and I didn’t realize it before, and now that I realize it, I want to make it

quite clear” ( I)

Finally, in considering the possibilities offered by the matrix concept

defined in terms of modal meaning, it is worth considering here the

phenomenon of sub-subordination. When we remove Creo que ..., Deseo

que ..., and so on, from the textbook or the blackboard and employ them in

texts or real-life conversations, these straightforward formal or semantic

clues to mood frequently end up awash in a flood of other clues of various

sorts. How will Margaret decide what mood to use in the following cases?

52. Me parece ... verdaderamente ... bonito que ... [I think it’s ... truly ...

lovely that ...]

53. Me encanta que ... pienses que ... [I love that ... you think that ...]

54. Yo no veo ... en realidad ... interesante ... que pensemos ... en influir

... en lo que ... [I don’t actually find it ... interesting ... that we think

... about influencing ... what ...]

Chapter Number

26

Despite its apparent simplicity (it does not even include any sub-

subordination), many students would choose the indicative for example

52. These students have clearly been taken in by a formal clue: either by

“me parece,” which supposedly demands the indicative, or by

“verdaderamente,” which they associate with declarations of reality that

should also, according to their rules, call for the indicative. If we instead

base our instructional approach on identifying the matrix, recognizing that

its meaning is more important than its form and that it is the meaning of

the form or forms employed in speech that determines mood, the student’s

protocol for selecting mood will be simpler and more effective:

55. Es bonito que…

[It’s lovely that ...]

56. Me parece…

bonito que…

[I think it’s

lovely that ...]

57. Me parece…

verdaderamente…

bonito que…

[I think it’s truly l

ovely that ...]

58. Me parece…

muy bonito…

y realmente…

emocionante que…

[I think it’s quite

lovely and really

exciting that ...]

For 53, on the other hand, students tend to choose the subjunctive. This

error, too, is easily explained. It has to do with a phenomenon all too

common in the language classroom. The traditional inattention to meaning

gives rise to what I will call the subjunctive of subsequence: for example,

Chapter Title

27

if students have been taught the rule “With verbs of emotion, use the

subjunctive,” they are quite likely to therefore identify any “verb of

emotion” and put the subjunctive on “what comes next,” typically

producing results like the following:

59. Me alegra mucho lo que *estés diciendo. [What you’re saying

makes me really happy.]

60. Me sorprende que lo que me *hayas dicho antes sea verdad. [I’m

surprised that what you told me before is true.]

61. Quiero que sepas que yo te *comprenda y te *ayude. [I want you to

know that I understand you and I’ll help you.] 24

Of course, any instructor could immediately attempt to correct these

errors, pointing out that the verb whose mood we select is actually

determined by the verb “pensar” (53) or “saber” (61), which “require” the

indicative, or that 59 and 60 likewise call for the indicative because they

are subordinate to a relative clause that implies knowledge of the

antecedent. This technique is not quite a strategy, but students will

nevertheless take it as such. It will help them avoid the errors mentioned

above, and even help them overcome the disorienting case of 54, which

combines in a single fragmentary utterance six of the clues that the student

is accustomed to using (no ver, en realidad, interesante, pensar, influir, lo

que [not to find, actually, interesting, to think, to influence, the thing

that]): mood must be decided based on the rules of the relative clause,

since it is the last one in the series. But, using this form-based and

persistently meaning-free stopgap, we will soon run into problems with,

for example, “long-distance dependence”. Without shifting from a merely

form-based analysis to an awareness of meaning, how can we know which

of the three matrices in the next utterance controls the verb in boldface?

62. Es imposible, como dicen todos los que saben, que haya sido ella.

[It’s impossible, as everyone who knows is saying, that it was her.]

There are also those innumerable cases in which the mood appears to be

controlled not by its own clause but by a higher-level one.

24 A variation on the subjunctive of subsequence is what we could call the

subjunctive of proximity, which consistently dumps the subjunctive morpheme

onto the first verb after the matrix and lets up on the following ones, with

lamentable results: “Me sorprende que lo que me *hayas dicho antes *es verdad . .

. [I’m surprised that what you told me before is true . . .]”.

Chapter Number

28

63. Me resisto a creer que haya sido ella. [I refuse to believe it was

her.]

64. Es ridículo pensar que estén tramando algo. [It’s absurd to think

that they are plotting something.]

A strictly syntactic analysis would see the selection of a subjunctive that is

“formally” dependent on the verb creer or pensar as a surprising exception

that requires an explanation. Yet for an approach that instead consider

what what is said is really saying, the selection is perfectly logical;

utterances of this sort are not considered exceptions, saving us our initial

bewilderment and subsequent fumbling attempts to explain the

inexplicable.25

The reason could be a simple one: what if it is not the verb

that determines the selection but the matrix; that is, those words that

communicate the modal attitude with which the subordinate verb is

uttered? Could simply identifying and interpreting it correctly be enough

to enable even an intermediate language student to draw the appropriate

conclusions?

Of course, practically speaking, a teacher could decide to ignore these

25 See, for example, Fukushima, N. (1990), “Sobre la cláusula superregente,” in

Bosque (ed.), Indicativo y subjuntivo, Madrid: Taurus, to get a good idea of the

ease with which a formalist analysis can turn normal, logical phenomena into

exceptional and inexplicable ones.

MATRIX

Declarative

implication

about the content of X

‘X’

65. Creo ... [I believe]

(therefore, I declare) ...

que quiere ...

[that he wants]

66. No creo ... [I don’t believe]

(therefore, I do not

declare) ...

que quiera ...

[that he wants]

67. Me resisto a creer ... [I am

reluctant to believe]

(that is to say, I’m not

entirely convinced,

therefore I do not

declare) ...

68. Me resulta verdaderamente

ridículo, a pesar de lo que

digas, creer ... [I find it

patently ridiculous, despite

what you say, to believe]

(that is to say, I

absolutely do not

believe, therefore I do

not declare) ...

Chapter Title

29

ambiguities: the indicative is a possibility for both 63 and 64, so they

could still reflect the application of the rule “creer/pensar + indicative”.

This would reinforce the pattern set forth in the two examples, but in

exchange it sets the student up for confusion every time she runs into

reality. And the reality is that mood is not created by the mere proximity

of a particular verb in a line of text but by the speaker’s awareness of what

he means by what he says.

By employing the concept of matrix, understood as a group of words used

by the speaker to express his modal attitude toward some concept, we can

not only see both options as possible but, more importantly, understand the

difference in their meanings. In the case of 64, if the speaker’s intention is

to question X, he will use as his matrix “It is ridiculous to think X,” with

the concomitant awareness of saying that “he does not share a belief in X,”

and he will communicate that modal attitude with the subjunctive:

If, on the other hand, the speaker wishes to refer only to what others think

about X, he will use “pensar” as his matrix for X and will signal the

content of that outside opinion with the indicative:

And I do not claim merely that this awareness of meaning could help

Margaret to use mood in Spanish properly. Without this awareness

(whether learned or simply acquired through use), Margaret is doomed to

(“no se puede pensar X” [it’s impossible to think X], “es falso

X” [it’s not true that X] . . .)

“Es ridículo pensar . . “.

[It is ridiculous to think]

que + subjuntivo

[that + subjunctive]

“Es ridículo . . .

. . . pensar . . .

que + indicativo

Chapter Number

30

error, if not on this part of the road then a little further on.26

How else can

she overcome, for example, typical mistakes in communicating indirect

requests? Any experienced teacher will recognize these structures:

(“Tienes que venir con nosotros. [You have to come with us.]”)

69. Me han pedido que *tenga que ir con ellos. [Lit. They’ve asked me

to have to go with them.]

(“Necesitas descansar. [You need to rest.]”)

70. Me ha aconsejado que *necesite descansar. [Lit. He has advised

me to need to rest.]

I do not see many options: either Margaret ends up realizing that what is

being asked or advised is not “tener” or “necesitar” but “ir” and

“descansar,” or the mistake will persist, however repeatedly it is corrected.

It is precisely this constant awareness of what we are saying with what we

say—a transcendence of formal units by indissolubly uniting form and

meaning—that the concepts of the matrix and of “X” are intended to

contribute to theoretical explanations of and pedagogical approaches to

mood selection.

Why “declaration”.

Various studies have attempted to establish a concept or set of concepts

that could provide a global explanation of the contrast between indicative

and subjunctive. These studies have therefore sought a law that can

unfailingly identify the moods’ contrastive value, which I have located

here in the modal value of declaration. Because of its apparent similarity

to what I am proposing in this article, I must inevitably refer to the

semantic concept of assertion.27

My intention, however, is to differentiate

the concept of declaration from its inoperational cousin.

The most immediate problem with using the concept of assertion as the

value for the indicative mood as compared to the subjunctive is that it fails

to explain the selection of the indicative in the context of what we could

call “supposition matrices”. Strictly speaking, asserting something (like

26 I want to emphasize that, however subtle the difference in meaning in this last

example may seem, the logic that a student would have to apply in order to

understand it is exactly the same one she has to apply in basic cases such as

Pienso que . . . / No pienso que . . . . 27 Bybee and Terrell (1990).

Chapter Title

31

affirming or avowing) implies stating it with assurance and confidence.

How then, could this definition of the indicative include all those matrices

that select the indicative for X without thereby signaling an affirmation of

X? (Creo que lo saben and Pienso que lo saben [I think they know it] are

not assured or confident statements that they know it.)

The act of declaring (or manifesting) something, on the other hand, does

not necessarily imply the truth of what is said: the things that somebody

can explicitly make known as a formal manifestation of his state of

knowledge of the world28

may be affirmations of a particular reality X (as

in 71), but they may also be suppositions29

of a possible state of things that

should not be judged in terms of X’s verifiability (72):

71. Os aseguro que está debajo de la cama. [I assure you that it is

under the bed—affirmation that it is there.]

72. Me parece que está debajo de la cama. [I think that it is under the

bed—supposition that it is there.]

The concept of declaration should therefore be understood technically as

an act of representation by the speaker that is further back in the line of

descent than an affirmation, and so is broader and more inclusive:

If we apply these definitions to the following examples, we will find that

assertion is an accurate label only for the indicatives from 73 to 75, while

the concept of declaration, as we understand it here, can be associated

with all of the examples and can thus be appropriated as a value for the

indicatives in 76 through 78, as well:

73. Sé que está durmiendo. [I 76. Creo que está durmiendo. [I

28 “Declare: to make known formally, officially, or explicitly”(Merriam-Webster

definition) 29 It is important here not to interpret my use of “supposition” in terms of

differentiating the concept from “imagination,” “prediction,” “belief,” “personal

conviction,” “suspicion,” etc. Indeed, I use it here in a technical sense precisely to

refer to what all of these terms have in common: namely, a subject’s lack of total

control over a reality (an affirmation or avowal) that he nevertheless manifests

(that is, declares) as part of his vision of the world.

Assertion (positive declaration)

DECLARATION

Supposition (approximative declaration)

Chapter Number

32

know that she’s sleeping.]

74. He visto que está

durmiendo. [I’ve seen that

she’s sleeping.]

75. Es evidente que está

durmiendo. [It’s clear that

she’s sleeping.]

believe that she’s sleeping.]

77. Supongo que estará

durmiendo. [I imagine she

must be sleeping.]

78. Me parece que está

durmiendo. [I think that she’s

sleeping.]

This is a major problem for assertion as an explanatory concept, yet I find

a second problem much more relevant: the explanation’s apparent

dependence on propositional logic and thus the ease with which it is

associated with ideas, such as “truth value,” that are of very limited

operationality with respect to language.

Mythical pairs such as objective/subjective or real/unreal, built on this

simplistic foundation, have proven to be failures as “laws” in many ways.

Among their greatest failings is their inability to explain the selection of

the subjunctive with “verbs of emotion” (or as arguments in factive-

emotive predicates, to use the more technical, if not more useful,

terminology). As has so often been noted, these well-intentioned theories

have real difficulty accounting for cases such as 79 and 80, where the

subjunctive is selected to refer to concepts whose objectivity, reality, and

truth value are not in question—are in fact inarguable—and such as 81 and

82, in which, although the reality of the content is not demonstrated, the

alleged “mood of reality” is nevertheless selected.

The utterance “The truth”

79. Me alegra que estés [subj]

aquí. [I’m glad you’re here.]

80. Siento mucho que fracasaras.

[subj] [I’m really sorry you

failed.]

81. Yo creo que está [ind] en

casa. [I think she’s at home.]

82. Me imagino que se lo

llevarán. [ind] [I imagine

they’ll take it with them.]

The listener, in fact, is there.

The listener, in fact, failed.

Is she really at home?

Will they take it or not?

Chapter Title

33

In my view, it is clear that any theory that establishes reality, objectivity,

or affirmation as qualities of the indicative must also grapple with this

point30

or will otherwise inevitably fall headlong into the simplistic naiveté

of magical thinking.31

In the context of the so-called “comment matrices,” the discourse

perspective—which sees the indicative as rhematic, or new, information

and the subjunctive as thematic, or shared, information—offers a good

explanation for this apparent contradiction.32

Without having to call into

doubt the truth of the dependent proposition X, the subjunctive can be

understood from this perspective as a way to signal that the predicate is

merely the subject under discussion and about which the matrix is saying

something:

83. Me alegra que lo hayas decidido. [I’m glad you’ve decided.]

(“I report that something makes me happy; I do not report that ‘you

have decided,’ because that information is shared and there is no

need to declare it again”.)

In my view, this approach has the indisputable advantage of clearly

distinguishing between linguistic and extralinguistic realities. The belief,

even unconscious, in an inevitable relationship between these two realities

has for centuries made grammatical rules, which arose from entirely

accurate intuitions, quite inoperational. And yet the approach has obvious

limitations: the evaluation it carries out is discursive in nature, but values

do not inhere in the form itself. Rather, they manifest themselves in a

fairly advanced level of actualization of grammatical meaning, which is

inevitably influenced by a number of factors in addition to the operational

value of each form. Almost certainly for that reason, despite partial

successes in that area (pragmatic-discursive information management),

30 For precisely this reason, Bybee and Terrell’s sensible study must reject the

elegant hypothesis of assertion/non-assertion; resigned to the model’s asymmetry,

they add the concept of presupposition. 31 As does, for example, the famous “explanation” given by the RAE in 1973: “Es

tal la fuerza subjetivadora de los sentimientos, que imprimen su matiz modal al

verbo subordinado, afirme o no la realidad del hecho [Such is the subjectivizing

power of emotions that they impose their mood upon the dependent verb, whether

or not that verb affirms the reality of the sentence’s content]” (Esbozo de una

nueva gramática de la lengua española). 32 See Mejías-Bikandi (1994). In Spanish teaching, this position is well represented

in Matte Bon (1992).

Chapter Number

34

this hypothesis has been unable to offer a universally applicable and

operational analysis of mood.33

The concept that I propose here, on the other hand, is defined on the more

formal basis of the system’s accumulation of meanings, where a form (a

morpheme) is linked to a meaning (a declaration)—even in isolation, as

we saw earlier. Furthermore, it establishes no necessary relationship

between language and extralinguistic reality: the conditions under which

the speaker declares or does not declare a matrix-dependent X are shaped

not by the verifying possibilities offered by external reality but by the

speaker’s declarative attitude. It is this attitude which through a natural

logic compels or enables the meaning of the matrix that the speaker has

chosen. It thus becomes clear why, for example, either mood might easily

be used to formalize the single discursive function of “supposition”.

84. Supongo que se habrá casado. [I suppose he’s probably gotten

married.]

(“I suppose X” implies that X is a declaration by the subject.)

85. Es posible que se haya casado. [It’s possible that he’s gotten

married.]

(“It’s possible that X” does not imply that X is a declaration by the

subject: the subject is merely classifying X as “possible”.)

It seems particularly relevant to wonder, in cases like these, whether it is

really the discursive status of the information that determines mood, since

both examples could perfectly well represent new information.

At this point I think we can posit declaration as the operational concept so

that the law remains unambiguous. I will formulate the concept in two

ways. The first will be more rigorous and technical in nature; I propose the

second for pedagogical purposes.

1. A declaration is the formal expression34

of a subject’s vision of

the represented world, through which he establishes a particular

state of things in that world, regardless of the degree of certainty

that he has and expresses about that state of things.

33 A lengthy discussion of the problems with this discursive analysis of mood can

be found in Ruiz (2008). 34 Remember the formal sense of the word itself: “to make known formally,

officially, or explicitly”.

Chapter Title

35

2. A declaration is the formal expression of what a subject wishes to

make “public” that he knows (assertion) or thinks (supposition).

As will be clear by now, each of these formulations includes the two basic

ideas that I have indicated are necessary for the concept to function as an

operational tool:

a) A declaration is not an assertion. It is, in fact, what an

assertion and a supposition have in common (“a subject’s vision

of the represented world”; “what a subject makes public as what

he knows or believes”).

b) Declaring or not declaring something is not a question of

accuracy with regard to extralinguistic reality. It is rather a

question of the subject’s declarative attitude, in accord with the

meaning of the matrix he chooses, aware of its implications.

In practice, I prefer to describe the modal contrast established by the

subjunctive in terms of the negative concept of non-declaration. It suggests

an attitude of declarative inhibition that in my view is most immediately

comprehensible to a person who, oblivious to terminological subtleties,

must use it in mood selection. But if there were a concept formulated in

positive terms that could confer some interpretive advantage, it would

probably be the concept of “mention,” understood technically as mere

“naming”, as when we refer to “making mention” of something.35

In this regard, it should be clear that a subject declares the concept of

“being daytime” (offering it as his vision of the world) through the

matrices of the (a) utterances, and only mentions that concept (by naming

it) through the matrixes of (b):

35 A thorough theoretical justification of this concept can be found in Ruiz (1998);

the concept is also taken up by Castañeda (2004) and can be linked to the cognitive

notion of “basic reality” (as opposed to “elaborated reality”) identified by Achard

(2002) as a characteristic of the subjunctive in French.

(a) Declaration [ind] (b) Mention [subj]

Sé

[I know]

que es de día.

[that it’s daytime]

Es posible

[It’s possible]

que sea de día.

[that it’s daytime]

Me parece que es de día. Me gusta que sea de día.

Chapter Number

36

And so, now equipped with our “machine” and having defined the

meaning and effects of the four main “buttons” on its control panel, we

can set out. Although for that, I think, a map would come in handy ...

4. Cartographic phase

The appendix included at the end of this article shows a possible sort of

“mood map” in Spanish, designed for pedagogical purposes. But why

should we need a map for a theory that is proposing a single value for the

indicative and subjunctive in every context? The theory implies that a

teacher could explain any concrete example of mood using only the

concept of declaration, and that the student would be able to figure out the

appropriate mood supplied only with that concept. And that is, indeed, the

hypothesis.

Yet we are all aware that mood selection requires near-constant decision

making in a wide variety of contexts. It would be naïve in the extreme to

think that there was no need to accompany the person learning to make

these decisions as she ventures out onto the roads, learning the shifting

local conditions under which she will apply our “law of usage”.

What the map offers us, then, is a didactic route. Before beginning, the

student is provided with a compass; the route leads from the starting point

to all possible destinations, preferring boulevards to side streets, side

streets to dirt roads, and dirt roads to a trek across the fields. All along this

route—and this is the important part—the student will have at her disposal

a logic that will help her make decisions. A communicative logic, a logic

of the linguistic representation of the world that can tell her not only why

the indicative or subjunctive but at the same time why not the other. I will

now describe this logic for each context and offer examples for expanding

it to include other matrices.

[I think] [that it’s daytime] [I like] [that it’s daytime]

¿No ves

[Can’t you

see]

que es de día?

[that it’s daytime]

No veo

[I don’t see]

que sea de día.

[that it’s daytime]

Chapter Title

37

Context 1: Declaring an objective

Why subjunctive. When a person says that he wants something, that

something is not what the subject knows or thinks: it is only what he

wants. He therefore does not declare that something formally: Quiero que

Ana sea mi amiga [I want Ana to be my friend]. He does not say that she

“es” my friend.

Why not indicative. If we said, Quiero que Ana es mi amiga, we would

be saying that, in our opinion, Ana es mi amiga [Ana is my friend].36

So

why say quiero, thus presenting it as an objective to be fulfilled? Is it a

desire or a belief? Would this not be a huge little contradiction?

In the pedagogical context, distinguishing this sort of matrix from all the

others is a fairly easy exercise: begin with simple matrices (such as [no]

querer X [(not) want X], [no] desear X [(not) desire X], [no] aconsejar X

[(not) advise X], [no] prohibir X [(not) prohibit X], and so on) and

gradually incorporate others in which the logic is less immediately

apparent (as occurs with performative or causative predicates). But

identifying these matrices is above all tremendously productive for

explaining the way mood functions, as it provides a useful meaning-based

(not form-based) maxim:

“If the matrix is from context 1, never declare X: it would be a terrible

contradiction”.

36 Remember our “golden rule”: cuando alguien dice que Ana es su amiga, dice [he

declares] que Ana es su amiga.

Quiero que S

Chapter Number

38

This apparently simple maxim is important for a number of reasons, but

mainly for the certainty it provides the student that no contextual accident

(no obstacle on the “road”) can modify it. The difference between verbs

like creer and verbs like querer is that, while the use of mood for the

former must be decided with careful attention to all sorts of contextual

factors (e.g., negation, time, subject, speaker intention), querer should

always not-declare the subordinate predicate, no matter the context (quiero

+ S, no quiero + S, quería + S).37

In developing a way to teach this logic, teachers could begin by helping

students learn to be alert to the somewhat abstract idea of “objectives”.

Other, more immediate concepts to guide students toward the sense that

“X is an objective” could be those of desire, request, intention, or

acceptance. Although the classification is only lexical, and therefore

debatable, it can point toward the idea that, at bottom, all of these matrices

suggest the same thing: when someone declares that he desires, requests,

or intends X (or does not desire, request, or intend X), X is posited only as

a virtual objective, desirable or not, that depends on further action or

circumstances to become a reality that can be positively declared.

Likewise, accepting or rejecting the notion that somebody is doing

something (or not) or that something is happening (or not) implies the

presence of a somebody/thing that has been previously established as an

objective and that depends on a subject’s consent in order to be produced

or not:38

37 This would be, as indicated in note 13, the only homogeneously identifiable

group of verbs that could be taught as such without encountering any exceptions;

that is, as “verbs that (in every context) require the subjunctive”. Nevertheless, as

will be seen shortly, we must also include a wide range of elements that should,

like those verbs, be considered intention matrices, in that they carry the same

meaning in terms of declaration (ojalá [if only], la intención de que [the intention

that], etc.). 38 Desire: To desire, to want, to need, to appeal, to aspire . . .

Accept: To allow, to oppose, to resign oneself, to prevent, to tolerate, to permit, to

consent . . .

Attempt: To attempt, to intend, to contribute to, to make an effort to, to try, to

avoid, to make, to provoke, to achieve, to obtain . . .

Request: To request, to encourage, to instruct, to command, to forbid, to oblige, to

plead, to pray, to advise, to invite, to beg, to demand, to propose . . .

Chapter Title

39

Desire for X

Desear, querer, necesitar, apetecer, aspirar a . . .

Acceptance of X

Permitir, oponerse a, resignarse a, impedir, tolerar,

dejar, consentir . . .

Attempt at X

Intentar, pretender, contribuir a, esforzarse por, tratar

de, evitar, hacer, provocar, lograr, conseguir . . .

Request for X

Pedir, animar a, mandar, ordenar, prohibir, obligar,

rogar, aconsejar, invitar, suplicar, exigir, proponer . . .

X IS AN

OBJECTIVE

(desirable or

not)

Ojalá, Quiera Dios que . . .

Tener ganas de que . . ., estar dispuesto a que . . ., hacer

falta que . . .

Tu intención de que . . ., la finalidad de que . . ., destinado

a que . . ., el deseo de que . . .

Ser imprescindible que . . ., ser necesario que . . ., ser

recomendable que . . .

A condición de que . . ., siempre y cuando . . ., sin que . . .,

para que . . .

X IS AN

OBJECTIVE

(desirable or

not)

The protocol, then, offers Margaret two options: memorizing a virtually

unlimited list of verbs of this sort that “must” take the subjunctive, or

developing her understanding and awareness of those verbs’ modal

implications. To put it another way: she can either learn the list and rely on

her memory in her real-life linguistic production, or she can become

capable of generating the list on her own by understanding the modal

implications of the items on it. After all, that list is not a collection only of

verbs, as one might expect. The same logic shapes sequences as formally

diverse as the following:39

39 If only . . ., God willing . . . / To feel like . . ., to be willing to . . ., to need to . . . /

Your intention that . . ., the goal of . . ., destined to . . ., the desire that . . . / To be

essential that . . ., to be necessary that . . ., to be advisable that . . . / On the

condition that . . ., As long as . . ., Without . . ., So that . . .

Chapter Number

40

All in all, the most important advantage of becoming aware of context 1’s

local logic is, in communicative terms, the ability it offers to make a

correct decision for every instance of “two-context matrices”:40

What list

of forms will enable us to organize matrices like the ones underlined

below? What rule will enable a student to perceive the differences in

meaning among the these utterances?

86. ¿Te parece que me veo muy gorda? [Do you think I’m looking

really fat?] / ¿Te parece que nos vayamos ya? [Is it okay if we

leave now?]

87. Mi sueño es que viene Claudia y me besa. [My dream (that I have

at night) is that Claudia comes over and kisses me.] / Mi sueño es

que me bese Claudia. [My dream is for Claudia to kiss me.]

88. Yo friego siempre que tú quitas el polvo. [I’ll scrub whenever you

dust.] / Yo friego siempre que tú quites el polvo. [I’ll scrub as long

as you dust.]

89. La cosa es que no sabe dónde están. [The thing is, she doesn’t know

where they are.] / La cosa es que se lo digas, lo demás no importa.

[The important thing is that you tell her; nothing else matters.]

Will she be able to understand that difference—and then produce it

herself—based only on the “feeling” that something is a declaration

(information) when interpreting or uttering an indicative, and the “feeling”

that something is an objective (something that must be done or that has to

happen) when interpreting or uttering a subjunctive? Furthermore, will she

even need to understand it? In my view, she quite clearly will. In addition,

having been trained to use this logic of declarative meaning, she might

very well end up using the mechanism to accurately interpret and engage

in mood selection for a formally unlimited number of these “two-context

matrices”. In addition to those cited above, for example, there are:41

40 In the examples provided here, matrices that belong to both contexts 1 and 2A. 41 He says that . . ., Remind me to . . ., She shouted that . . ., With his cry that . . ., I

repeat that . . ., Do not insist that . . ., She wrote me that . . ., He insinuated that . .

., I answered that . . ., The police suggest that . . ., What I propose is that . . ., We

have decided that . . ., The decision is that . . ., Our conclusion is that . . ., The

consul has determined that . . ., Be assured that . . ., etc.

Chapter Title

41

No creo que + S

Context 2A: Declaring a piece of

information

Why indicative. When a person says that he believes something, he

means that that something comprises part of what he knows or thinks

about the world: Yo creo que Ana es mi amiga [I believe that Ana is my

friend].

Why not subjunctive. If we say, Yo creo que Ana sea mi amiga, we are

saying that we believe it (that Ana es mi amiga) but we avoid making a

declaration of it. Is it not a huge little contradiction to declare that we

believe something and not then declare it formally?

Context 2B: Questioning a piece of

information

Why subjunctive. If we say we do not believe something, it is clear that

we are questioning its content and that we therefore have no intention of

X IS A

DECLARATION

/

X IS AN

OBJECTIVE

Dice que . . ., Recuérdame que . . ., Gritó que . . ., Con

su grito de que . . ., Te repito que . . ., No insistas en

que . . ., Me escribió que . . ., Me insinuó que . . ., Le

contesté que . . ., La policía sugiere que . . ., Lo que yo

planteo es que . . ., Hemos decidido que . . ., La

decisión es que . . ., La conclusión es que . . ., El

cónsul ha determinado que . . ., Asegúrate de que . . .,

etc.

Yo creo que + I

Chapter Number

42

Es bonito que + S

declaring that something. We intend to declare only that we do not believe

it.

Why not indicative. If we said, No creo que Ana es mi amiga [I don’t

think that Ana is my friend], we would be declaring that Ana es mi amiga

[Ana is my friend]. So why would we say something that we do not

believe, explicitly bringing into question the very concept that we are

declaring formally? Would it not be a huge little contradiction?

Context 2C: Commenting on a piece

of information

Why subjunctive. When we say that something es bonito [is lovely], it is

true that we could sometimes declare that something (in the sense that it

could be, in fact, what we think or know). But if we say that something es

bonito, we wish only to declare that it es bonito. Everything else is just the

subject that we are speaking about (such as the concept that Ana sea mi

amiga [Ana is my friend]).

Why not indicative. If we said, Es bonito que Ana es mi amiga [It’s

lovely that Ana is my friend], we would be doing two completely different

things at the same time: declaring that the concept that Ana is my friend

“is lovely”, and also declaring that Ana “is” my friend. And that is not the

way these things generally work (in Spanish or in other languages). When

we want to declare that Ana is my friend, we simply say Ana es mi amiga

(…y eso es bonito) [Ana is my friend (…and that is lovely)], or we choose

matrices that make it clear that what follows is a declaration: Creo que

Ana es mi amiga [I think Ana is my friend], Sé que Ana es mi amiga [I

know Ana is my friend], Supongo que Ana será mi amiga [I suppose Ana

must be my friend], Está claro que Ana es mi amiga [It’s clear that Ana is

my friend], etc. But we choose comment matrices such as Es bonito [It’s

lovely], Me encanta [I love it], or Me parece bien [I think it’s great]

because it is already declared or assumed that Ana es mi amiga, and the

only thing we wish to declare now is our opinion of that concept: (Eso) es

bonito [It’s lovely]. In any language.

As represented graphically here, the greater difference between contexts 1

and 2 is a result of their different functions: whereas context 1 defines

matrices in which X is not information but simply the virtual projection of

an objective, the matrices for context 2 are used to manipulate information

Chapter Title

43

about the represented world. Therefore, unlike context 1 (where the law

compels the use of the subjunctive, without any possible play), context 2

constitutes the very center of the conflict between moods in Spanish. Here,

indicative and subjunctive are options that are recommended by law in

some cases, prohibited in others, and often subject to the speaker’s

willingness to play with that law in order to create special effects of

meaning (as will be discussed later).

In pedagogical terms, however, protocol permits a progressive approach

that starts small and eventually encompasses the entire process. This

approach involves distinguishing among three possible attitudes toward

information, which can be formulated as phases of the treatment of

information in conversation:42

By relating each of these possible attitudes toward a concept X with the

matrices logically used to communicate those attitudes, we can easily draw

up a list of matrices for context 2 and identify their corresponding

42 For a practical examination of these phases in the classroom, see Ruiz (1995).

PHASE

ATTITUDE MOOD

Verific

ation

A DECLARING

Saying what one thinks, what one knows, or

what considers obvious; or confirming what

others think, know, or consider obvious.

Ind.

B QUESTIONING

Calling into question established or suggested

information, to varying degrees, whether merely

indicating the possibility or expressing doubt

about it, or flat-out denying or contradicting it.

Subj.

Comm

ent

C COMMENTING

Once a corpus of previously established

information is available, with enough consensus

for the affirmative phase to be said to have ended

and for that information to have become a topic

of conversation (as “concepts”), it is no longer a

matter of verifying those concepts but of

evaluating them, opining on them, saying

something about them.

Chapter Number

44

“recommended moods” (indicative for A, subjunctive for B and C).

Moving down the road step by step, and focusing for now on affirmation

matrices, would a student skilled in this logic be able to guess in which

phase to place each of these basic sequences (using their meaning to

associate them with a particular mood)?43

Next, expanding this logic to comment matrices, would she be able to

distinguish which of the following sequences belong to each group,

despite their formal similarity?44

43 A. DECLARING X: I believe that . . ., There’s no doubt that . . ., I imagine that .

. ., I think that . . ., It seems to me that . . .

B. QUESTIONING X: I don’t believe that . . ., It’s not possible that . . ., I don’t

think that . . . 44 A. DECLARING X: I think that . . ., It seems to me that . . ., It’s clear that . . .

B. QUESTIONING X: I don’t think that . . ., It doesn’t seem to me that . . ., It’s

not true that . . .

C. COMMENTING ON X: I hate it that . . ., I think it’s great that . . ., It’s

wonderful that . . .

Chapter Title

45

And now, incorporating context 1: could Margaret distinguish among the

boxes on the right only by interpreting the modal sense of each matrix,

despite their formal resemblance?45

45 1. X is an objective: It is necessary that . . ., I propose that . . .

2A. DECLARING X: It’s true that . . ., I think that . . .

2B. QUESTIONING X: It’s a lie that . . ., I deny that . . .

2C. COMMENTING ON X: It’s logical that . . ., They object that . . .

Chapter Number

46

Although this logic requires a drastic shift in the student’s approach to

grammar, any student can begin to employ it once she understands it. Two

possible challenges might be the unfamiliarity of the process and the

necessity of student reflection on language in general (rather than on what

we understand as “grammar”).46

But it also offers a number of advantages.

It provides a meaning-based (not memorization-based) approach to

learning—that is, a permanent invitation to feel the subjunctive as a

meaning, not to use it like the pieces of a meaningless jigsaw puzzle. And

the ability it cultivates is certainly much more broadly applicable than that

acquired by fracturing mood usage into endless, nearly useless lists of

rules.

Context 3a: Identifying an entity

Why indicative. When someone refers to una cosa que tiene / tendrá

cuatro patas [a thing that has four legs], that person is formally declaring

that the thing tiene / tendrá cuatro patas. By declaring that he knows or

supposes that it has four legs, he makes it clear that he knows what

specific thing he is talking about and has identified it (for example, a

chair).

Why not subjunctive. If somebody refers to a thing that he knows and

has identified but says ... una cosa que tenga cuatro patas, then he is

avoiding declaring his knowledge of the characteristics of a thing that he

nevertheless knows and has already identified. Is that not a huge little

contradiction?

46 It must be acknowledged, however, that it is rather odd that a demand for

reflection on language should be considered a challenge in a language classroom.

. . . una cosa que + I

Chapter Title

47

Context 3b: Not identifying an entity

Why subjunctive. When someone refers to una cosa que tenga cuatro

patas [a thing that has four legs], that person is avoiding declaring that the

thing tiene cuatro patas. By not declaring the object’s characteristics, he

makes it clear that he does not know what specific thing he is talking

about; that is, he has not yet identified it among all those objects that

might aptly be described in that manner (a chair, a cat, and so on).

Why not indicative. If somebody refers to a thing that he does not know

and has not identified but says ... una cosa que tiene cuatro patas, then he

is declaring his knowledge (tiene cuatro patas) of a thing that he has not

yet identified. Is this not yet another huge little contradiction?

The logic of mood selection here clearly depends on the concept of

identification and is based on a prior theoretical reasoning that is not

strictly necessary in an instructional context:

The declaration or non-declaration of the verb X (given that the

verb’s only function is to characterize the entity) suggests the

declaration or non-declaration of the entity itself (in this case, a

nominal syntagm: a thing, a person…).

As a result, just as the declaration of a concept X implies partial

or total experience of that concept, the declaration of an object

should be understood as indicating the subject’s experience of

that object and thus that the subject has identified that object.

I admit, in any case, that this contrast formulated between identified and

unidentified objects may be just as pedagogically problematic as the

traditional formulation, especially in cases such as the following:

90. Tráeme EL vaso que esté más limpio. [Bring me the glass that is

cleanest.]

91. LA mujer que me haya robado va a tener problemas. [The woman

who robbed me is going to be in trouble.]

. . . una cosa que + S

Chapter Number

48

Why do we use the subjunctive here, if the glass or the woman is, in a

sense, identified, as the definite articles suggest?47

The answer involves

recognizing a difference in concept between the kind of identification

produced by the article and the kind of identification produced by the

indicative. To avoid having to define these terms with precision, however,

it will perhaps suffice to specify the different senses that article and mood

can be understood to identify in each case:

a) The article implies that the object is identifiable for the listener.

Dame el libro. [Give me the book.]

(“You know what book I mean”.)

b) The indicative (in relative clauses) implies that the object is

identified by the speaker:

Dame el libro que hay en el cajón. [Give me the book that’s in

the drawer.]

(“I know what book I mean”.)

In my view, this approach offers satisfactory explanations for the above

examples. In 90, the definite article indicates that the listener can identify

the glass in question, given that only one of the possible glasses can be

“the cleanest”. The subjunctive merely indicates that the speaking subject

has not yet identified it among all the others; that is, he does not determine

which of them it is. And an identical analysis can be made for 91: a woman

has stolen something, and that woman in particular, whom the speaker

nevertheless has not yet identified or distinguished from the others, is the

one (“la”) who is going to be in trouble.

Whether through this technical definition of identification or any other

definition applied to the same meaning, the implications of context 3’s

particular logic do not stop here. I have used as my example a fairly

typical relative clause, with a person or thing as an antecedent, to provide

a traditional, easy, and immediate route toward the reasoning that should

guide our mood-selection process in this context. Yet this same local logic

can be applied to any structure whose purpose is to specify the entity being

47 This widespread notion has even generated rules such as “If the object has a

definite article, use the indicative” and similar.

Chapter Title

49

discussed, whether it be an object, a person, a place, a way of doing things,

a quantity, or a moment, regardless of its formal nature:48

... that the speaker

identifies

... that the speaker

does not identify

An object ...

Una cosa que tiene pelos

[A thing that has hair]

Lo que tiene pelos

[The thing that has hair]

Una cosa que tenga pelos

Lo que tenga pelos

A person ...

La chica que me quiere

[The girl who loves me]

Quien me quiere

[Whoever loves me]

La chica que me quiera

Quien me quiera

A place ...

A way of

doing things

...

An amount ...

El sitio que te dije

[The place I told you]

Donde te dije

[Where I told you]

La manera en que lo hace

[The way he does it]

Como lo hace

[How he does it]

Según te dijo [According

to what he told you

La cantidad que necesitas

[The amount you need]

Cuanto necesitas

[However much you need]

El sitio que te dijera

Donde te dijera

La manera en que lo haga

Como lo haga

Según te dijera

La cantidad que necesites

Cuanto necesites

48 Clearly, the traditional adverbial clauses of time, manner, quantity, and place

can be explained with the same logic as relative clauses. For more on causal and

temporal adverbial clauses, see Chamorro (2006), pp. 189–190. A discussion of

“if” conditional clauses is found in Ruiz (2008), pp. 28–31.

Chapter Number

50

A moment ... El día que llega

[The day she arrives]

Cuando llegó

[When she arrived]

Hasta que llega

[Until she arrives]

En cuanto llega

[As soon as she arrives]

...

El día que llegue

Cuando llegara

Hasta que llegue

En cuanto llegue

...

Certainly, it should be understood that the logic generated by applying the

“law of meaning” to the specific conditions of each context can expand to

become a universal logic, in that it treats mood selection as a meaning-

based phenomenon accessible to the cognitive and communicative

schemas of speakers of any language. These speakers must learn to

associate the formal markers of mood in Spanish with an understanding of

the declarative import of each predicate. If Margaret, for example, can

answer the following questions about what she is doing in her own

language and the declarative import thereof, she will be on her way to

understanding the functions of the indicative and subjunctive in Spanish:

When you say in English ... ... do you mean to declare that

Ana is your friend?

1. I want Ana to be my friend.

NO (it’s just a desire)

2A. It is true that Ana is my friend. YES (it’s my opinion)

2B. It is doubtful that Ana is my friend. NO (it’s not exactly my opinion)

2C. It is cool that Ana is my friend. NO (the only thing I’m trying to

say, really, is that that concept is

cool)

... are you referring to

something that you’ve

identified?

3a. (I can see) a thing that has four legs.

YES (because I can see it)

3b. (I can’t see) anything that has four

legs.

NO (because I can’t see it)

Chapter Title

51

A direct application of the law will inevitably lead to the expansion we

have indicated in each case. Similarly, assuming that real-life use of

Spanish is the goal, learners must also understand the logic of the many

cases in which native speakers, blessed with the knowledge and freedom

to do so, play with this law in order to say something special.

5. Playful phase

Just as every rule has its exceptions, every law has a little play in it. We

must come to grips with instances of mood that do not seem entirely

consistent, at first glance, with the basic logic that we have outlined

previously in the “law of usage”. For example, the following:

92. Se sospecha que estén escondidos. [One suspects that they’re

hiding.]

(subjunctive with declaration matrices: 2A)

93. Es falso que están escondidos. [It’s not true that they’re hiding.]

(indicative with questioning matrices: 2B)

94. Lo que me sorprende es que me quiere. [What surprises me is that

she loves me.]

(indicative with comment matrices: 2C)

But these usages are only apparently inconsistent. If we apply a formalist

rule (e.g., O1 [alegrar, encantar, gustar ...] + V2 [subjunctive]), we will also have to start

drawing up a list of exceptions to account for cases such as example 94—

and despite all our efforts, our understanding of this phenomenon will be

no more complete. If we apply the law, on the other hand, we are able to

understand the decision as a logical one and interpret it correctly:

a) The subjunctive is always permitted (by law) in evaluation or

comment matrices—Lo que me sorprende es que me quiera

[What surprises me is that he loves me]—so the expectation is

that the speaker would use it.

b) If the speaker has chosen the indicative anyway, he has done so

deliberately.

c) As the indicative always means a formal declaration, the

speaker’s intention was to declare that the person loves him,

while at the same time expressing his evaluation of that concept.

d) As a result, the speaker has simply made use of the

communicative schema of evaluation, and he declares the concept

Chapter Number

52

in a marked way, believing that in formulating his utterance he

should make it clear to the listener that, in fact, she loves him (for

example, because the listener was not already aware).

Applying a law enables us to determine which mood is canonically

indicated and at the same time to understand what special effect can be

created through the deliberate logical manipulation of that law. This

manipulation constitutes what I call play. The fundamental difference

between play and exception is that while an exception suggests a simple

contradiction of the rule, play always moves within the established

boundaries of what the law permits. This necessary obedience to the law’s

logic explains the two most important characteristics of play:

a) that it is not always possible to play;49

b) that whenever there is play, there is also, intentionally or not, the

expression of differentiated communicative effects with respect

to the “lawful” formulation.

These two characteristics can be seen just as clearly in the other two

examples presented above. Utterance 92 is a case of play within a context

(declaration matrices) in which, logically speaking, it is not always

allowed (for example, matrices that affirm or verify X—sé que ... [I know

that ...], he visto que ... [I’ve seen that ...]—or those that only speculate on

the possibility of X—es posible que ... [it’s possible that ...], es probable

que ... [it’s likely that ...], es verosímil que ... [it’s plausible that…]). As

the first condition—play being permitted with a supposition matrix—has

been fulfilled, we can recognize the variation in the degree of supposition

between Se sospecha que están and Se sospecha que estén. This difference

is the logical result of declaring or not declaring the informational content

of the supposition. Similarly, in the case of 93, on the one hand play

should logically be permitted (for example, somebody must have

previously declared that están escondidos [they’re hiding] for the speaker

to deny that declaration as a declaration, and not just the idea it contains).

On the other hand, it should be understood that the decision to play makes

that differentiated meaning (rejection of the declaration as a declaration,

not just the idea) explicit.

49 For example: contexts 1 and 3, in an absolute way; matrices of context 2A that

imply verification (“factive” predicates), such as “Sé que . . . [I know that . . .],”

“He descubierto que . . . [I have discovered that . . .]”; or any of the other cases that

lack the necessary environmental or intentional conditions.

Chapter Title

53

In any case, it is essential to understand that play does not occur any time

either mood could logically be selected (we could simply call that “double

option”). In order to be truly explanatory as a concept, play must be

understood as an apparent violation of the “law of usage” that in fact

instrumentalizes its own law (the “law of meaning”) to create a

differentiating effect. For example, the indicative in 95 and the subjunctive

in 96 are not examples of play, as both are in strict accordance with the

law of usage (you will recall that what we must consider is the meaning of

the matrix):

95. Dice que vienes [He says that you’re coming; dice = declares I]

96. Dice que vengas [He says for you to come; dice = asks S]

The most operational way to explain these situations is simply to

recognize that “decir” is a “two-context” matrix (1/2A): a single matrix for

which mood selection depends on the meaning that infuses each utterance.

On the other hand, even using the same verb, we find moments of play, as

in the following:

97. Yo no he dicho que somos hermanos. [I didn’t say that we are

siblings.]

Strictly applying the law “Saying I don’t say X does not mean declaring X

but in fact quite the opposite,” I then choose the subjunctive:

98. Yo no he dicho que seamos hermanos.

And, in fact, any native speaker will read utterance 97 as “canonical” (that

is, obtained via a strict application of the law and thus pragmatically

unmarked), just as that same native will see 98 as less “canonical” (that is,

marked in some way), and thus feel compelled to reinterpret:

“If somebody says that he is not saying X but in fact says X, then:

a) he is referring to an earlier declaration made by another person

(someone has declared that ‘we are siblings’ and the speaker

rejects that person’s declaration);

Chapter Number

54

b) or in fact he is telling me that he is declaring X (claiming that

they are siblings)—that is, that the facts are as he has declared

them: he’s not just going around saying it”.50

The concept of play is not simply tacked on here to rationalize those

apparent inconsistencies that can arise in real-life usage of mood with

respect to a particular operational hypothesis (in this case, the “law of

usage” established above). It is, rather, a necessary demonstration that the

law works without exception. This hypothesis is, of course, quite relevant

for instruction: in a learning context, play reinforces law, offering it as a

valid tool for grammatical decision making (“If you always follow the law,

you’ll always do the right thing”). The student can at last take in and

comprehend the idea that other options are possible when she learns to use

the law in this direct manner. And so I would offer Margaret a simple

recommendation: “Don’t play until you know how to play”. After all, we

can claim no pedagogical success when Margaret produces an objectively

correct utterance such as “Lo que más me gusta es que tiene mucho dinero

[What I like best is that he has a lot of money]” if she is not aware that she

is playing; that is, if she is not aware that she is positively declaring that he

has a lot of money and not merely commenting on it. (Our supposed

success falls even more dramatically to pieces if he does not, in fact, have

a lot of money.)51

6. Conclusion

This, in short, is the foundation, the geographical model, and the guiding

logic for our excursion. We must build on it further: more work, reflection

on language in general and on Spanish in particular, confirmations that the

logic works and allows effective decision making, gradual expansion to

new matrices, immersion in the arena of discourse, awareness of pragmatic

circumstances. Because although offering Margaret a metaphorical car

may put her learning on wheels, she still has to learn to drive. First by

going in circles on a closed track, avoiding accidents and getting a feel for

being in control, then cruising in the city and on the highway, and finally

navigating rough dirt roads. Or, less whimsically, simply traversing those

paths that the student tends to or wishes to wander in her use of Spanish.

50 In fact, in the case of this matrix, there is yet a third “lawful” interpretation of

the subjuntive, the intentional subjunctive (context 1): “Yo no he dicho (pedido)

que seamos amigos” [I haven’t said (asked) for us to be friends]. 51 More examples of play can be found in Chamorro (2006), pp. 183, 184, 189.

Chapter Title

55

By this logic, then, we will have to patiently accompany Margaret on the

long road of trial and error that will one day lead her to “feel” the

subjunctive the way a native speaker feels it in everyday use. Or maybe

even feel it—why not?—like the satin lining of an evening gown. But

that’s another story.52

6. References

Achard, Michel. “The Meaning and Distribution of French Mood

Inflections”. In Frank Brisard (ed.): Grounding: The epistemic footing of

deixis and reference. Cognitive Linguistics Research Series 21. Berlin:

Mouton de Gruyter, 2002. Print.

Alonso Raya, Rosario, Alejandro Castañeda Castro, Pablo Martínez Gila,

Lourdes Miquel López, Jenaro Ortega Olivares and José Plácido Ruiz

Campillo. Gramática Básica del Estudiante del Español. Barcelona:

Difusión, 2005. Print.

Borrego Nieto, Julio, José Jesús Asencio Gómez and Emilio Jesús Prieto

de los Mozos. El subjuntivo. Valores y usos. Madrid: Sociedad General

Española de Librería, S.A., 1985. Print.

Bosque, Ignacio (ed.) Indicativo y subjuntivo. Madrid: Taurus, 1990. Print.

Brisard, Frank. (ed.) Grounding. The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and

Reference, Berlin-New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2002. Print.

Bybee, J., and T. Terrell (1990) “Análisis semántico del modo en

español,” in Bosque, I. (ed.). Print.

Castañeda Castro, A. “Implicaturas generalizadas de cantidad en el

rendimiento de algunas formas y oposiciones del sistema verbal español”

Language Design V. 5, 2004, 79–103. On line PDF file available:

Ministerio de Educación de España. Web 24 marzo 2012.

<http://elies.rediris.es/Language_Design/LD5/castaneda.pdf>

52 A lengthy real-life example of a didactic application of this approach can be

found in Alonso et al. (2005) for levels A1–B1 of the Common European

Framework of Reference for Languages, and in Chamorro et al. (2006) for level C1.

Chapter Number

56

——— . “Una visión cognitiva del sistema temporal y modal del verbo en

español,” in L. Cifuentes Honrubia and C. Marimón Llorca (eds.),

Estudios de Lingüística: el verbo, nº monográfico de la Revista ELUA

(Estudios de Lingüística de la Universidad de Alicante), 2004, pp. 55–71.

Print.

Chamorro Guerrero, María Dolores, Gracia Lozano López, Aurelio Ríos

Rojas, Francisco Rosales Varo, José Plácido Ruiz Campillo and

Guadalupe Ruiz Fajardo. El Ventilador. Curso Superior de Español

Lengua Extranjera, Madrid: Difusión, 2006. Print.

Davis, Joseph. Rule and meaning in the teaching of grammar. Language

and linguistics compass, vol. 1, issue 3, 2009, 199-221. Print.

Hadlich, Roger. Gramática Transformacional del Español, Madrid:

Gredos, 1973 Print.

Keenan, Joseph. Breaking Out of Beginner’s Spanish, Austin: UTP, 1994.

Langacker, Ronald Wayne. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume I:

Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford University P, 1987. Print.

———. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume II: Descriptive

Application. Stanford: Stanford University P, 1991. Print.

Matte Bon, Francisco. Gramática Comunicativa del Español, Madrid:

Difusión, 1992. Print.

Mejías-Bikandi, Errapel. “Assertion and speaker’s intention. A

pragmatically based account of Mood in Spanish”, Hispania 77:529-39,

1994. Print.

Llopis García, Reyes Gramática Cognitiva para la Enseñanza del Español

como Lengua Extranjera. ASELE, Colección Monografías, nº14.

Ministerio de Educación, Madrid, 2011. Print.

Llopis García, Reyes, Juan Manuel Real Espinosa and José Plácido Ruiz

Campillo. Qué gramática aprender. Qué gramática enseñar, Madrid:

Edinumen, 2012. Print.

Chapter Title

57

Ruiz Campillo, José Plácido. “El subjuntivo es lógico: una actividad de

concienciación,” in Cervantes no. 2, pp. 33–36, Istanbul: Instituto

Cervantes de Estambul, 1995. On line PDF file available: Sede electrónica

del Ministerio de Educación. Gobierno de España. Biblioteca RedELE,

Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Web 24 marzo 2012.

<http://www.educacion.gob.es/redele/revistaRedEle/2004/segunda.html>

———. La enseñanza significativa del sistema verbal: un modelo

operativo, en Biblioteca RedELE, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia,

1998. Web 24 marzo 2012.

<http://www.educacion.gob.es/redele/Biblioteca-Virtual/2004>

———. “El concepto de no-declaración como valor del subjuntivo.

Protocolo de instrucción operativa del contraste modal en español”, in

Pastor, C. (coord.): Actas del programa de formación para profesorado de

ELE 2006–2007. Instituto Cervantes, Munich, Germany, 2007(a). Web 24

marzo 2012.

<http://www.cervantes-muenchen.de/es/05_lehrerfortb/Actas05-

06/3JosePlacido.pdf>

———. “¿El subjuntivo es lógico? Aprendiendo a pensar en subjuntivo /

Aprendiendo a decidir en subjuntivo”. Flash presentations in MarcoEle,

Revista de didáctica de ELE, 2007(b). Web 24 marzo 2012.

<http://marcoele.com/el-subjuntivo-es-logico>

———. “El valor central del subjuntivo: ¿informatividad o

declaratividad?”. MarcoEle. Revista de Didáctica ELE, nº 7, 2008. Web

24 marzo 2012. <http://marcoele.com/el-valor-central-del-subjuntivo-

%c2%bfinformatividad-o-declaratividad>

Terrel, Tracy and Joan Hooper (1974) “A semantically based analysis of

mood in Spanish”, Hispania 57, 1974, 484-94,. Print.

Terrel, Tracy. “Assertion and presupposition in Spanish complements”,

Current studies un Romanic Linguistics. Eds. Marta Luján and Fritz

Hensey. 221-45. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1976.

Print.