The Spirit of Modesty

The Spirit of Modesty'

SHAUN P. YOUNG University of South Africa

What is the principal function of political philosophy? This question haslong been the source of discourse and debate, especially amongst thosewho practise this ancient art. For Ronald Beiner, the primary and properfunction of political philosophy is, always has been, and forever will be,to expand our analytical horizons and thereby improve our ability tojudge accurately the desirability and subsequent acceptability of ourexisting social order(s). Beiner contends, however, that contemporarytheorists have so restricted the scope and focus of their investigations thatpolitical philosophy is no longer able to fulfil its intended function. Thisis a theme which has animated much of Beiner's recent work, and providesthe foundation and focus for his book Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit:Essays on Contemporary Theory (PTS), the subject of this essay.

The Failings of Contemporary Political Theory

According to Beiner, contemporary political theory1 has forsaken itsroots; it is the bastardized, deviant offspring of the "grand tradition ofpolitical philosophy" (p. x). Beiner maintains that twentieth-centurypolitical theorists have, for the most part, purposely refrained fromundertaking the type of "grand" and "heroic" investigations that arecharacteristic of "true" political theory: they have intentionally avoidedseriously examining questions concerning the good society and the good

* Ronald Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit: Essays on ContemporaryTheory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), xiv + 240 pp., $24.95paper. Page references are to this work.

Dialogue XL (2001), 587-601© 2001 Canadian Philosophical Association/Association canadienne de philosophie

588 Dialogue

for humanity—questions that represent the very foundation of Westerntheory. Instead, political theorists are now overwhelmingly preoccupiedwith the much more "modest" enterprise of developing doctrines that canprovide the conceptual foundation for public policies in modern liberalpolities. Beiner suggests that this "practical" turn and simultaneous reluc-tance to analyze our current circumstances in relation to the fundamentalcharacter and purpose of society and politics have effectively buried thenoble and essential spirit of political philosophy. With these changes,political theorists have betrayed their "essential mission": namely, to helpus "understand ourselves at a deeper fathom by exposing ourselves to thechallenge of . . . alien thought-worlds" (p. xiii).

Rather than offering a truly interrogating critique of our existing socialorder(s), contemporary theorists merely attempt to increase our under-standing of our current situation by analyzing it from within the bound-aries of its own philosophical universe—they offer a "rhetoric ofunderstanding" rather than a "rhetoric of criticism" (pp. x, 157, 161-62).Yet, to understand one's sociopolitical circumstances only from withinthe confines of "one's own cave (emphasis in original)" (p. 154) is, Beinerargues, to restrict one's field of analytical vision unnecessarily and criti-cally. In order to comprehend fully our current predicament and therebysecure the knowledge needed to assess accurately the value and desirabil-ity of our existing social order, it is necessary to step outside of our caveand critique our situation from a truly emancipating and enlightening dis-tance. Beiner contends that contemporary political theorists have fool-ishly confined themselves to the cave of modernity and in so doingprecluded the possibility of their achieving the necessary evaluative dis-tance; the analytical usefulness of theory has thus been effectively limitedand, consequently, it has failed to live up to the standard and the promiseof its "grand tradition."

For Beiner, this narrowing of analytical "horizons" represents the prin-cipal failing of contemporary political theory and manifests itself in theform of a pervasive intellectual conservatism and philosophical myopiaand an overriding concern with concrete political matters. This limitedfocus has restricted theory's scope to the extent that theory is now inca-pable of providing the type of radical, penetrating critique which Beiner"associatefs] with the very enterprise of theory" (p. 3). What we have beenleft with, according to Beiner, is an "emasculated" and "domesticated"political philosophy. Beiner argues that the exemplar of this neutered andsubdued political theory is contemporary liberal philosophy; it embodiesall that is wrong with contemporary political theory. Subsequently, Beinerpresents his critique of contemporary political theory in the form of ananalysis of contemporary liberalism.

Beiner readily admits that he is an "avowed critic of liberalism" (p. xii).In essence, Beiner characterizes liberalism as a philosophy "that aspires

Spirit of Modesty 589

to leave individuals as free as possible to shape their lives according totheir own notions [of what constitutes a good life]" (p. 14). He contendsthat contemporary liberal philosophy "fails to offer a sufficiently robustchallenge to the individualistic self-understanding of contemporarysocial life" (p. xii). He is particularly critical of what he perceives to be the"shallow pragmatism"2 and subsequent anti-Foundationalism of con-temporary liberalism (p. xi). The "great" political theorists whose workprovides the inspiration for Beiner's criticisms were "great," Beinerasserts, "precisely because each was determined to search for an ultimateground" (emphasis in original) (p. xi). For Beiner, great political philoso-phy attempts to identify the moral foundation—the "ultimate ground"—needed to enable individuals to judge effectively the acceptability anddesirability of their existing social order, regardless of the (im)practicalityof the resulting doctrine. According to Beiner, contemporary liberalismnot only lacks but purposely eschews the search for an ultimate ground.

In their efforts to mediate conflict and secure consensus, Beiner arguesthat contemporary liberal theorists have necessarily abandoned thesearch for an ultimate ground, and in so doing they have deprived theoryof the "intellectual resources" needed to "pass judgment" on the value ofcontemporary life (p. 6): contemporary liberalism is unable to provide themeans by which we can identify what is "sordid, empty, mechanical, anddispiriting" (p. xii), or, conversely, what is valuable, laudable, and inspir-ing about our existing social order. Liberalism's overwhelming concernwith ensuring individual autonomy and alleviating the conflicts producedby pluralism has meant that contemporary theory has been excessivelypreoccupied with developing doctrines which can secure the basis for con-sensus. However, Beiner argues that "true" political theory neitherrequires nor supports the search for consensus or compromise: true polit-ical theory is "radical, extravagant, probing, biting, and immoderate"(p. x), and it is impossible to achieve these qualities and simultaneouslyseek an "overlapping consensus."3

Much to the dismay of Beiner, many contemporary theorists have cho-sen to concentrate on trying to develop the conceptual basis for an over-lapping consensus rather than searching for an ultimate ground. Thisdecision, Beiner argues, is a mistake premised upon flawed reasoning.Beiner is convinced that the decision to pursue an overlapping consensusis a consequence of an unquestioning belief in the superiority of liberal-ism. According to Beiner, contemporary theorists have consciously orotherwise deified liberalism and in so doing have assigned theoretical pri-macy to liberal concerns, especially the maximization of individualautonomy and the accommodation of diversity. As a result, numeroustheorists have concluded that the appropriate focus of their energies (andof political theory in general) should be the development of doctrines thatprovide support for, and facilitate the realization of, the greatest degree

590 Dialogue

of individual autonomy and doctrinal diversity. Contemporary liberalstend to argue that an overlapping consensus offers the most viable meansby which to secure the desired autonomy and diversity.4

In turn, contemporary liberals have, according to Beiner, assumed thatto propose any theory that "unreasonably"5 limits or diminishes individ-ual autonomy or doctrinal diversity is akin to accepting and/or promotinganti-liberal practices. This assumption, Beiner argues, is faulty and mis-leading because it implies an unrealistic relationship between political phi-losophy and political practice: it presupposes (1) that it is possible to unitesuccessfully theory and practice;6 and (2) that theory's sole function is todirect practice. Beiner believes that contemporary theorists have deludedthemselves into believing—despite historical evidence to the contrary—that theory and practice can be effectively synthesized to produce viablepublic policies. This delusion has engendered and perpetuated the beliefthat the fundamental purpose of theory is to provide the foundation forpublic policies. This belief has led theorists to concentrate on developingdoctrines that can serve as the basis for public policies. Beiner contendsthat by focusing on developing "practical" doctrines,7 contemporary the-orists further minimize the already limited scope of liberalism and therebyexacerbate the misdirection and debasement of political theory.

The (Im)Modesty of Practicality

As noted, Beiner argues that the critical flaw in contemporary liberal the-ory is its philosophical conservatism—its "modesty." He suggests that thismodesty is the consequence of the deification of liberalism, and liberals'preoccupation with synthesizing theory and practice. Beiner believes thatthe prevailing modesty is undesirable and unacceptable because it pre-cludes the possibility of theory providing the analytical tools required forcitizens to judge effectively the acceptability and desirability of their cur-rent social order—the raison d'etre of political theory. The force of thiscriticism is necessarily dependent upon whether one agrees with Beiner'svision of the "proper" task of political theory. Beiner acknowledges thatthe majority of contemporary political theorists do not seem to affirm hisparticular conception of the fundamental mission of political theory(p. 4); indeed, he notes that many of the most prominent contemporarytheorists follow precisely the approach which he criticizes.8 Nevertheless,Beiner remains quite confident in arguing that his vision of theory is the"correct" one. Moreover, he seems to dismiss the possibility of any cogent,substantive disagreement with, or refutation of, this conclusion. ForBeiner, there seems to be but one valid conception of political theory: heis not simply saying, "mine is but one possible approach to theory";rather, he is saying, "mine is the only proper approach—all otherapproaches are to varying degrees flawed and inferior."


This stance is ironic because in many respects it is similar to theapproach which Beiner ascribes to, and for which he vigorously criticizes,contemporary liberal theorists. By adopting such a rigid position con-cerning what qualifies as "true" theory, Beiner significantly restricts thepossible scope of theory. If one pursues Beiner's line of argument to itslogical conclusion, theorists who refuse to embrace and enact the Beiner-ian model of theorizing are naive, complacent dupes who are bastardizingand demeaning the grand and noble vocation of theory and besmirchingthe good name of "true" theorists: those theorists who hope to contributemeaningfully to the art and reputation of their profession must adopt theapproach prescribed by Beiner.

Though Beiner does not explicitly argue that political theory should orcan have only one function,9 he does expressly demand that it have onlyone character: it must be "extreme." Beiner condemns contemporary lib-eral theory because he claims that its very character precludes the possi-bility of engaging in '"intellectual extremism'" (p. ix). According toBeiner, contemporary liberalism's preoccupation with consensus and thesynthesis of theory and practice necessitates "modest" theorizing andthus negates the potential value and validity of intellectual extremism,thereby dissuading theorists from pursuing radical10 philosophy. Yet, thecharacter of Beinerian theory generates limitations which arguably aremore restrictive than those he attributes to contemporary liberal theory.Whereas Beinerian theory espouses and requires a coercive homogeneity(e.g., theorists must theorize in a specific manner), there is no reason tobelieve that the philosophical parsimony which Beiner ascribes to con-temporary liberal theory is anything other than voluntary—no one is"physically" preventing theorists from embarking upon "radical" philo-sophical adventures, they are simply choosing not to."

Beiner might argue that the existing philosophical biases effectivelypreclude theorists from gaining the knowledge and/or perspective neededto theorize in the "correct" manner; however, unless Beiner believes thathe alone (and, possibly, a select few others) has been blessed with thephilosophical ability and insight needed to detect the apparent folly ofcontemporary theory—something which I do not believe he does—thenhis escape from the cave of contemporary liberalism would seem to refutesignificantly any such argument. Hence, though contemporary liberalismmay seek to "spread its gospel" and convert non-believers, it does notrequire that all who wish to engage in political theorizing become propo-nents of liberaltheory. Beinerian political theory, on the other hand, doesnot simply solicit converts: it demands doctrinal adherence under thethreat of excommunication. If I am correct and if restrictions are a mea-sure of "modesty," then it could reasonably be argued that Beiner's visionof theory is in one critical sense more "modest" than the contemporarytheory which he criticizes.

592 Dialogue

Of course, the legitimacy of this criticism depends upon how onedefines "modest," or, conversely, how one defines "radical." Beineremploys a contextual definition of "radical": a theory is "radical" if it isunique or uncommon in relation to contemporaneous theories and thesociopolitical-philosophical environment within which it exists. Thus,given the current global ascendancy of liberalism, contemporary liberaltheory is, according to Beiner, too "modest" to qualify as "true" theory.However, Beiner suggests that contemporary liberal theory would be suf-ficiently radical if it were expounded within an illiberal social order(p. 17). Yet, if this is true, then theory becomes the prisoner of environ-ment and circumstance. In turn, by allowing environment and circum-stance to dictate what constitutes "true" theory, the demands of such adefinition of "radical" necessarily restrict the scope of theory: such anapproach refutes, a priori, the potential validity and value of certain typesof philosophy, and thus seems contrary to Beiner's goal of promotingunrestrained theorizing.

Beiner would likely argue that the restraints which his definition of"radical" place upon theory are acceptable because the theorizing whichthey censure can offer no new insights into the possible causes of theproblems confronting the society within which it takes place;12 such the-orizing cannot help us to identify and better understand the deficienciesand/or laudable aspects of the existing social order. However, this rebuttalmisses the point: the problem is not that Beiner's definition of "radical"belittles the potential usefulness and value of a specific approach to the-ory; rather, the problem is that, partis pris, it effectively negates the valid-ity of certain approaches13 to theory and directly attempts to prevent theiradoption. From this perspective, Beiner's approach to political theorywould seem to be more limiting and thus more "modest" than that of con-temporary liberal theory.

The relative modesty of Beiner's approach becomes even more apparentwhen one compares the goal of Beinerian theory with that of contempo-rary liberal theory. According to Beiner, the fundamental goal of "true"political theory—e.g., Beinerian theory—is the "enhancement of vision"(p. ix): theory should expand our analytical horizons and thus improveour ability to critique our current circumstances effectively. In order toachieve this goal, theorists must, Beiner argues, avoid placing any "prac-tical" limitations on their theorizing; only by providing "radical" visionsof ideal societies (the character of which may drastically vary) can theo-rists help others to more easily identify and better understand the deficien-cies and laudable aspects of their existing social order. The principal aimof contemporary liberal theory (at least as I understand it) is to developthe theoretical foundation for a "just" society—a society which recognizesand effectively accommodates both the need for individual autonomy andthe perpetual presence of a wide diversity of conflicting, irreconcilable,


and often incommensurable viewpoints. According to liberals, voluntaryconsensus is the means by which we may achieve a just society. Beinerargues that the search for consensus necessitates conservative theorizing:consensus can be reached only through compromise, and compromiserequires abandoning radical or extreme positions and demands. Hence,whereas Beiner's approach advocates and entails "radical" theorizing, theobjective of contemporary liberalism—a just society—can be achievedonly if theorists employ philosophical modesty. Thus, on the surface, itmay seem (and Beiner contends) that Beinerian theory is ipso facto more"radical" than contemporary liberalism.

However, a closer examination of Beiner's arguments reveals that sucha conclusion is mistaken. This claim is supported by the following evi-dence:14 the ability of theorists to pursue Beinerian theory successfully isnever in question. According to Beiner, history has proven that the goalof "enhanced vision" is realizable. Yet the same cannot be said of the goalof contemporary liberalism. It is generally agreed—even by Beiner andhis ilk—that a truly just society has thus far eluded humanity. From theliberal perspective, a just society has remained unrealized because therequired consensus has yet to be achieved. Furthermore, as societiesbecome increasingly pluralistic and fragmented, efforts to obtain such aconsensus become correspondingly more complicated and problematic.Hence while the goal of Beinerian theory has both been realized and con-tinues to be within the reach of virtually all theorists who choose to pur-sue it, the goal of contemporary liberal theory not only remains elusivebut is in fact becoming ever more difficult to achieve. If the above is anaccurate description (as I believe it to be), then it would seem that it iscontemporary liberal theorists, and not Beinerian theorists, who areattempting the more "radical" (e.g., ambitious) task.

This conclusion is given additional credence by Beiner's remarks con-cerning liberals' efforts to unite theory and practice. According to Beiner,one of the principal components (and mistakes) of the liberal project isthe goal of successfully uniting theory and practice. This is not a new goal;indeed, the problem of effectively synthesizing theory and practice has forcenturies been a central concern of political philosophers. In their questto solve this problem, contemporary liberals have focused on trying tomodify existing liberal philosophy so that it can respond to the increasingmultitude of conflicts troubling modern liberal societies; liberals believethat an overlapping consensus is the means by which we might alleviateor eliminate many of the sociopolitical conflicts generated by pluralism.The resulting search for consensus is thus a philosophical response toconcrete problems. The formative influence given to concrete problemsreflects and is a consequence of the belief that it is possible to translatetheory into practice effectively. Moreover, this belief is one of the driving

594 Dialogue

and guiding forces behind contemporary liberal theorizing: it signifi-cantly shapes the character of contemporary liberalism.

Beiner, however, argues that the belief that theory and practice can besuccessfully united is both unfounded and mistaken. He contends thathistory reveals that previous attempts to unite theory and practice have,generally speaking, been unsuccessful. Efforts to transform theory intopractice have failed and will continue to fail because there exists "a natu-ral and unbridgeable gap between theory and practice" (p. 178); this gapgenerates an "imperishable tension" (p. 90) which effectively precludesthe possibility of successfully uniting theory and practice. According toBeiner, the demands of theory and the demands of practice are inherentlyincompatible because "radically different existential demands are madeby civic life on the one hand and by the life of theory on the other"(p. ix).15 The sphere of civic praxis contains a "veritable infinity of con-crete particulars" (p. 178) which individuals must address. Theory, how-ever, is unable to provide for, or help, individuals to "grasp"16 theindeterminable multiplicity of concrete particulars which characterize thesphere of civic praxis: "the uniqueness of circumstance and the contin-gency of the particular can[not] be anticipated or commanded by theory"(p. 117). Thus, theory cannot guide practice because theory cannot pro-vide individuals with the "context-bound" knowledge needed to addressconcrete problems.

Concrete problems, Beiner argues, "[do] not admit of theoretical solu-tions, but must be tackled at the level of shared experiences and solidari-ties of praxis in all their concreteness" (p. 177). Subsequently, "thedemands of situated praxis" (p. 89) can only be adequately and effectivelyaddressed by practical wisdom {phronesis)}1 According to Beiner, practi-cal wisdom is distinct from theoretical wisdom (sophia) (p. 180), in thatpractical wisdom cannot be gained outside the realm of immediate cir-cumstance: "phronesis can only embody itself in the local encounter with'ultimate particulars'" (p. 90).l8 Hence, theory cannot inform prudence;19

theory can, at best, offer only general guidelines which cannot address thedemands of particular situations. If theory cannot advise prudence, thentheory can be of no help in informing our "immediate" actions. Theoristswho hope to transform theory into practice are thus hoping to accom-plish the impossible.

Beiner contends that liberals have failed to acknowledge the inherent andinescapable "dualism"—the ineradicable conflicting demands (p. ix)—oftheory and practice; they either do not recognize or are unwilling toaccept that in asking theory to direct practice, they are asking the impos-sible. Yet, if it is impossible to unite theory and practice successfully, thenhow can any approach which attempts to do so be more "modest" thanone that shuns such a goal? If theory and practice have yet to be effectivelyunited, then surely this fact speaks to the ambitious character of such a


project. Given Beiner's belief regarding the (non-)viability of the liberalproject to translate theory into practice, he could argue that attempts tounite theory and practice are foolish and Utopian, but surely he cannotreasonably argue that they are more "modest" than the goal of his styleof theorizing.

The validity and persuasiveness of this argument are necessarily condi-tional upon how one defines "ambitious." Beiner equates ambition witha desire to expand analytical horizons: "the standard by which contem-porary political philosophies should be judged is . . . according to theirambitiousness in enlarging the space of critical reflection" (p. 199, n.30).Given this understanding, Beiner might argue that my criticisms are inap-plicable because they are premised upon a (seemingly) different interpre-tation of what it means to be "ambitious." Yet, this conclusion would beincorrect. According to Beiner, what is immodest must also be ambitious;and given that Beiner acknowledges the inherent "immodesty" of the goalof uniting theory and practice,20 it would seem that by his own definitionBeiner recognizes the greater "ambitiousness" of this goal. Moreover, Iam unconvinced that seeking to expand the scope of critical reflection isa more "ambitious" undertaking than the goal which motivates contem-porary liberal theorists. How can it be more ambitious to attempt whatcan knowingly be achieved, as opposed to aspiring to achieve what hasyet to be realized?

Uniting Theory and Practice

Perhaps the most curious and baffling of Beiner's arguments is his asser-tion that even if it were possible, we should not want to have theory guidepractice. Beiner believes that such a goal is undesirable because itsachievement necessarily requires a philosophical modesty which undulyand unacceptably limits the scope of political theory. By focusing on unit-ing theory and practice, theorists would be effectively precluded frominvestigating many of the questions that have animated and are a funda-mental part of the "grand tradition of political philosophy": theorists'concern with providing "practical" answers would critically diminishtheir ability to address such questions. Thus, for Beiner, the goal of unit-ing theory and practice is antithetical to the goal of political theory.Accordingly, Beiner recoils against the notion that political theoristsshould attempt to develop doctrines which can serve as the basis for pub-lic policies, and argues for the independence of theory: "The vocation oftheory must be animated by imperatives of its own that are distinct fromour need, as citizens, for salubrious maxims of political practice" (p. x).21

However, given the danger posed by the continuation of any number ofthe multitude of sociopolitical problems which currently envelop much ofthe globe, it is difficult to understand why anyone would, in essence, con-demn any effort to address directly and alleviate these problems. More-

596 Dialogue

over, it is even more incomprehensible that one would seek to prevent oreven dissuade those individuals who spend their lives examining and ana-lyzing social orders from undertaking such activities. Surely political the-orists have potentially valuable information and insights to contribute toany such problem-solving exercise. Beiner himself acknowledges the pos-sibility that theorists may be able to help improve practice (p. x). In turn,if there is even the slightest chance that theory can beneficially assist indirecting practice, then why should theorists intentionally abandonefforts to synthesize theory and practice?

More importantly, if, as Beiner notes, theorists have little hope of "pre-venting] . . . [their] well-intentioned theorizing from being drawn into thewhirlwind of political practice" (p. 150), then it would seem that to pur-posely develop radical and deconstructive doctrines is to knowingly andwilfully court disaster, and thus to act deliberately in an unnecessarily irre-sponsible and dangerous manner. Even Beiner recognizes the potentiallydetrimental impact of "radical" theory: "To be sure, one has little reasonto doubt that our political world of the last two centuries would have beena decidedly safer place if Rousseau, Marx, and Nietzsche had practicedtheory in more or less the way that John Stuart Mill practiced theory"(p. xi). Beiner also concedes that "[g]iven the conditions of modern sociallife," it is not unreasonable to question "whether philosophers should beopting for a radical-sounding rhetoric that, as it were, spins the dials all themore" (p. 61): "it might be . . . that we need least of all a . . . philosophy thatcan only help to destabilize further the often chaotic jumble of contempo-rary social relations" (p. 61; emphasis in original).

Despite his apparent recpgnition of the potential dangers associatedwith radical theorizing, and the reasonableness of questioning the logic ofhis approach to theory, Beiner unrepentantly disagrees with and dismissesany conclusion which suggests that philosophical radicalism should bemoderated or abandoned. He steadfastly maintains that theorists notonly should but indeed must practice intellectual extremism; failing to doso, Beiner argues, would be to impoverish radically our intellectualworld.22 Indeed, Beiner believes that the need for philosophical radicalismis such that the dangers associated with its practice are well worth the risk.For Beiner, "fanaticism . . . [and] intolerance . .. are a price worth payingto avoid [philosophical] flabbiness, insipidity, and . .. desiccation."23 Yet,given the horror and misery that have been visited upon the world in thename of the realization of radical philosophical visions of the "perfect"society, can anyone sincerely suggest that philosophical speculation andintellectual aggrandizement are more important than sociopolitical sta-bility and human safety? If one is genuinely interested in and committedto the betterment of humankind's existence—and if it is likely that despiteefforts to the contrary, theory will influence practice—then it would seem


that theorists should consciously avoid, rather than champion, philo-sophical extremism.

Conclusion

In PTS Beiner laments and decries the loss of political philosophy's joiede vivre, and argues that if it is to regain its once robust and heroic char-acter, political philosophy must first be emancipated from the chains ofmodesty that currently constrain it. But is contemporary political (e.g.,liberal) theory really more "modest" than the theory that Beiner champi-ons? The rigid, coercive, and contextual character of Beiner's definitionof "true" theory would seem to undermine significantly the validity of anysuch claim. While contemporary liberal theory is certainly self-servingand (perhaps) conceited, it does not, as Beiner seems to suggest (or, at thevery least, imply), "physically" prevent theorists from undertaking thetype of philosophical adventures which he associates with the "true" call-ing of theory; and, unlike Beinerian theory, contemporary liberal theorydoes not, partis pris, negate the validity or censure the enactment of anyapproach to theory. Moreover, if, as Beiner contends, one of the principalgoals of contemporary liberal theory, namely, the successful synthesis oftheory and practice, is impossible to realize, then how can such theory bemore "modest" than theory which seeks to achieve that which can know-ingly be accomplished? In the final analysis, Beiner's criticism of the"modesty" of contemporary liberal theory is valid only if one presup-poses the value or "correctness" of his conception of theory. In turn,adherence to such a caveat would effectively preclude a truly penetratingcritique of Beiner's arguments, and thus prevent the very type of analysisthat Beiner associates with "true" theory.

While individual societies may live and die and while liberalism mayprove to be "an interim ethic that will be replaced in the course of time,"24

such facts neither diminish the importance (or, in the present case, theurgency) of developing practical solutions for concrete problems, nor dothey inflate the value of beautiful, soul-stirring, "grand," yet nonethelessimpractical, theorizing. Though theoretical aspirations need not be lim-ited to the immediately achievable, the problems of modernity generateurgent practical demands that justify a focused and pragmatic approach.The challenge confronting contemporary political theorists is not to re-establish the philosophical extremism which Beiner associates with the"true" calling of theory, but rather to develop a philosophy which moredirectly and realistically confronts the concrete problems which continueto jeopardize the exceedingly fragile sociopolitical stability of the newworld (dis)order. Accordingly, the most valuable contribution whichpolitical theorists can make is to develop theories from which we can atleast hope to generate practical solutions to existing concrete problems.From this perspective, the problem with contemporary liberal theory is

598 Dialogue

not that it is too practical in its orientation, but rather that it is not prac-tical enough: "the main problem with liberal theory [is] with closing thegap between liberal theory and the real world."25

To be sure, the present debate is animated by a dramatic difference ofopinion regarding the fundamental purpose of political theory. WhereasBeiner believes that the essential mission of theory is to expand our ana-lytical horizons and thereby (hopefully) improve our ability to judge accu-rately the desirability and subsequent acceptability of our current socialorder(s) regardless of whether this "enhanced vision" aids our efforts toalleviate existing sociopolitical difficulties, I would argue that the primaryfunction of theory is to "enhance" the human condition by trying toresolve, or at least alleviate, pressing sociopolitical problems. Yet I believethat notwithstanding the obvious differences in our beliefs, Beiner and Iagree on one important point: namely, that the overriding (if underlying)goal of theory is to stimulate change. Surely the hope of Beiner is that the"enhanced vision" gained via theorizing in the "proper" manner willenable citizens to determine what is undesirable about their current socialorder, and this enlightenment will then lead these citizens to seek changesto their society. These changes will have to occur at the level of concrete,particular practices. Hence, Beiner is hoping that theory will generateconcrete change which betters the lives of citizens, however indirectly (orunintentionally?). If this is true, then how can liberal theory, even if itseeks only modest, piecemeal reforms (pp. 10, 14), be misdirected or,worse yet, a waste of time?

I have no objection to Beiner's vision of the "proper" approach to the-ory; however, I do take issue with Beiner's argument that his vision of the-ory represents the only accurate depiction of the "true" aim of theory.Why is it that theorists who choose to apply their skills toward resolvingpressing political matters should consider themselves, as Beiner suggests,to have forsaken the true calling of their vocation? Why is it demeaningto political philosophy to want it to be "cognizant of and practically rel-evant to the actual political problems of the world"?26 Ideally, theory is adynamic enterprise, motivated and guided by the desire to improve theconditions of human existence; surely there is more than one possibleroute to enlightenment and improvement. Contra Beiner, I believe thatcontemporary liberal theory can help guide us on such a journey.

Furthermore, I would argue that the disagreement between Beiner andcontemporary liberal theorists (including myself) is not one in which oneis "right" and another "wrong"; rather, it is simply a case in which the par-ties involved have different, irreconcilable views, the validity of which canneither be irrefutably proven or disproved. Beiner would likely reply thatthis is a typically "liberal" (and unproductive) response to his arguments:To this, I suspect, there is no retort which would significantly alter hisopinion. Yet I believe that there is no need for either Beiner or myself to


apologize for or modify our respective viewpoints. As Beiner argues,political philosophy neither requires nor desires uniformity. Indeed, "themost engaging conversations are those where the differences of opinionare sharp and vigorous rather than muted or pacified" (p. 175). If this istrue, then there is no need to fear, condemn or ostracize "practical" polit-ical theory.

PTS exhibits an impressive scope and depth, offering insightful andthought-provoking analyses of the ideas of many of the most influentialpolitical theorists of the twentieth century. Despite the diversity of thematerial and the fact that it represents a compilation of a number of indi-vidual essays and book reviews composed over the course of fifteen years(1983-97), the book possesses an amazing degree of continuity and man-ages to maintain its focus through the entirety of the text. It is well writtenand its arguments are equally accessible to philosophers and laypersons.Importantly, one need not agree with Beiner in order to enjoy and benefitfrom this book. Even though I do not accept its principal thesis, readingit forced me to re-examine seriously my understanding of the principalfunction and goal of political philosophy, and for that I am grateful.27

Notes1 It is extremely difficult to determine whether Beiner means to distinguish

between his use of the terms "theory" and "philosophy"; he quite often seemsto use them interchangeably. Hence I will do likewise.

2 I have borrowed this term from Patrick Neal. See his "Does He Mean WhatHe Says? (Mis)Understanding Rawls's Practical Turn" Polity, 27, 1 (1994):77-111, especially p. 84. Hereafter referred to as "Does He Mean What HeSays?"

3 Simply put, an overlapping consensus is a consensus comprising all of the con-flicting, irreconcilable, and incommensurable comprehensive religious, moral,and philosophical doctrines which are likely to survive in a just, constitutionaldemocracy. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1993), p. 15.

4 This is not to suggest that all contemporary liberal theorists argue for or nec-essarily support a distinctly Rawlsian overlapping consensus. Rather, I meanonly that, regardless of the type or degree of autonomy and diversity they arepromoting, contemporary liberal theorists, generally speaking, maintain thatsome type of "overlapping" consensus (e.g., one that incorporates a pluralityof doctrines, even if it is only a plurality of "reasonable" doctrines) is requiredto achieve the desired autonomy and diversity.

5 I have included the term "unreasonably" in order to emphasize that most con-temporary liberal theorists do not suggest that there should or can be norestrictions on the type of beliefs which should be tolerated.

6 By successfully I mean that one can effectively translate theory into public pol-icy.

600 Dialogue

1 The term "practical" is used here to refer to doctrines whose goal it is to pro-vide in some manner the theoretical framework for solutions to concrete prob-lems.

8 Included within this list are such notable individuals as Bruce Ackerman, SirIsaiah Berlin, Ronald Dworkin, Jiirgen Habermas, Stuart Hampshire, WillKymlicka, Charles Larmore, Thomas Nagel, Richard Rorty, and MichaelSandel.

9 I have emphasized the term "explicitly" because I believe that although Beinermay argue that his vision does not necessarily preclude the possibility of the-ory performing more than one function, it is very clear that Beiner assigns oneoverriding purpose to the practice of theory.

10 I use, as I believe Beiner does, the terms "radical" and "extreme" interchange-ably.

11 In other words, liberals' choice to pursue an overlapping consensus and thesynthesis of theory and practice does not coerce anyone else's choice, nor doesthis choice prevent others from pursuing different goals.

12 Indeed, Beiner would probably also argue that because such theorizing pre-serves existing philosophical prejudices and restrictions, it actually precludesthe identification of, and thus perpetuates, existing problems.

13 The term "certain" has been used here to emphasize the fact that Beiner's def-inition of "radical" does not simply negate the validity of liberalism; rather, itnegates the validity of any approach that happens to be reflective of the exist-ing social order. Hence, for example, if one lived in a Marxist society, adher-ence to Beinerian theory would automatically dismiss the value and validityof Marxist political theory.

14 The "evidence" which follows this statement is by no means an exhaustive listof the reasons for claiming that Beinerian theory is more modest than contem-porary liberal theory.

15 This conflict of demands is what Beiner refers to as the "dualism" of theoryand practice (p. ix).

16 Beiner agrees with Hans-Georg Gadamer's assertion that theoretical wisdomcannot help individuals to " 'grasp . . . [particular] "circumstances" in theirinfinite variety'" (p. 87).

17 Beiner associates phronesis with a number of terms including "practical wis-dom," "prudence," "practical judgement," and "practical reason" (pp. 176,180).Hence, I will, as Beiner has done, use all of these terms to refer to the conceptof phronesis.

18 Practical wisdom is acquired "at the moment when . . . [one] concretizes hisor her abstract understanding of ethical requirements in particular situations"(p. 180).

19 To exemplify this point, Beiner (paraphrasing Hans-Georg Gadamer)employs the following statement: "science may be disciplined byphronesis, butphronesis cannot be disciplined by science" (p. 177).


20 The fact that when Beiner speaks of the immodesty of liberalism he is referringonly to its goal of uniting theory and practice does not diminish or negate theimmodesty of the endeavour.

21 Beiner states that it is not the place of theory "to offer immediate guidance onquestions of policy" (p. 198, n.30).

22 Beiner asserts that "our intellectual world would be radically impoverished ifthe great critics within the tradition [of Western thought] had been merelySwiss and German clones of John Stuart Mill" (p. xi; emphasis in original).

23 Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1996), p. 138. For example, Beiner agrees with Jean-JacquesRousseau's contention that religious fanaticism is superior to liberalismbecause "insofar as it [religious fanaticism] is a source of 'grand and strongpassion which elevates the heart of man,' [it] is to be preferred to the deadeningeffect of bourgeois [e.g., liberal] rationality, which pacifies the human spirit asit domesticates the passions" (p. 135).

24 Charles Anderson, Pragmatic Liberalism (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1990), p. xi.

25 Daniel Bell, "The Limits of Liberal Justice,"Political Theory, 26 (1998): 557-82,especially p. 572.

26 Neal, "Does He Mean What He Says?, p. 84.27 I would like to thank Catherine Bird, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Leah Brad-

shaw, Peter Trnka, and an anonymous referee for Dialogue for their helpfulcomments and suggestions.

War andInternational

JusticeA Kantian Perspective

Brian OrendPaper $32.95 • ISBN 0-88920-360-1

"For many reasons this book.. .isa valuable contribution to thejust war tradition."

- J. M. Betz, Choice

"With a nice combination of insight and ingenuity, Orend discoversand constructs a Kantian account of just war—which is marked by aunique emphasis on jus post helium, the justice of post-war settlements.He then develops this account precisely and elegantly and applies it tohistorical and contemporary cases. The result is an important contri-bution to the philosophical analysis of morality and war."

- Michael Walzer, Princeton University

"Late in life, Kant wrote a famous essay about how lasting peace mightbe established among states. But did he contribute anything of note tothe just war tradition? The first half of Brian Orend's pioneering workshows that Kant's scattered remarks on this topic indeed provide a richand coherent account of the morality of war. Here Kant's ideas for pre-venting the recurrence of war (jus post helium) play an essential anddistinctive role. The second half of Orend's book develops this accountfurther by displaying its practical political relevance to our currentdebates and situation—to the role of NATO and the UN, and to high-tech warfare and humanitarian interventions. Opening a new topic inKant scholarship as well as a new perspective on international rela-tions, Brian Orend has delivered an impressive first book that is likelyto refresh and stimulate debate."

- Thomas W. Pogge, Columbia University

Visit our website at www.wlupress.wlu.ca

Wilfrid Laurier University PressEmail: [email protected] • Telephone: 519-884-0710 ext. 6124 • Fax: 519-725-1399

The Spirit of Modesty

Documents

Transcript of The Spirit of Modesty