NOTE: A slightly revised version of this paper appeared as: American Journal of Sociological Research 2015, 5(3A): 1-12 DOI: 10.5923/s.sociology.201501.01. The official version can be downloaded from SAP and should be used in all citations.

The Smallest Leap of Faith: a New Worldview for a Postmodern World?

Kelly C. Smith1

1Department of Philosophy & Religion, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, 29634, USA

Abstract It is undeniable that religion provides a sense of purpose, ethical direction,and social belonging that most human beings for most of recorded history havefound to be profoundly important. But it is equally undeniable that itssupernatural metaphysics and dogmatic conservatism have retarded society’sprogress in many ways and caused untold human suffering. An obvious question isthus: Is it possible to preserve the beneficial aspects of religion but excise theproblematic ones? Immanuel Kant fathered the postmodern age with his devastating critique of thepossibility of human knowledge of the Ultimate. However, Kant himself was farfrom skeptical about the possibility of objective human knowledge - as long as itsclaims were carefully qualified. The key to understanding this seemingcontradiction is his (often misunderstood) transcendental method. The methodoffers a way to have our postmodern skepticism concerning traditional religioussupernaturalism and still eat our metaphysical cake, as it were. Combining a transcendental approach with new scientific findings about thenature of the universe may allow us transcend the stalemate between scientificrationalism and faith, constructing a belief system which blends positive elementsof each perspective. Scientists in a number of disciplines are beginning tohypothesize that the universe naturally creates complexity. On the one hand, thisundercuts the most common justification for belief in the supernatural, sincethere is no need for divine intervention to explain things that occur naturally.On the other hand, it invites those so inclined to view themselves as part of auniversal telos involving the creation of complexity. Such a move requires only thesmallest step of faith to adopt and may provide believers with the sense ofpurpose, ethical foundation, and social support they long for while sidesteppingconflict with the essential claims and methods of science.

Keywords Postmodern, religion, complexity, science, faith, metaphysics,

transcendental

1. IntroductionEvery mind must make its choice between truth and repose. It cannot have both. – R.W. Emerson

Science and faith have a long andtempestuous relationship. There havebeen times when they worked harmoniouslytogether, as during the natural theologymovement that produced scientists likeNewton and Darwin, but also times whenthey have fought hammer and tong, aswhen the Catholic Church used itscoercive power to repress scientificviews that threatened religious dogma.The current situation is complex, withsigns of both renewed tension andpromising convergence. Unfortunately,it’s rare for interlocutors who debatethese issues in the fora of publicopinion to exhibit much appreciation forthe subtleties of the conceptual terrain– a state of affairs that insures suchexchanges produce much heat but littlelight.

As a corrective to this freneticmyopia, I will first place therelationship between science and faithwithin a broad historical context bycomparing the intellectual origins ofscience with those of the so calledpostmodern worldview. Then I will dowhat philosophers are often uniquelypositioned to do: identify theessential contours of the conceptualforest by stepping back from thedistracting details of particular trees.This will allow us to see some ways inwhich both sides have gone beyond their

remits to create unnecessary problems.After delineating a possibility spacefor a “minimal faith” consistent withthe essential commitments of both sides,I then discuss the complex universehypothesis as a concrete example of ascientific hypothesis that suggests away to fill this space. Of course, aswith any compromise, this requires bothsides to make concessions, and is thus aposition guaranteed to have manydetractors. Fortunately, however, mypresent purpose is not to solve theproblem at one fell swoop, but simply tosuggest a more fruitful direction forfurther conversations.

2. Historical Overview 2.1. The Scientific Revolution

The first principle is that you must not foolyourself –

and you are the easiest person to fool. – R.Feynman

It is of course impossible to dojustice to the complex religious,philosophical and scientific developmentof the last 300 years in only a fewparagraphs. It is with trepidation,therefore, that I attempt to trace a fewof the main themes in intellectualhistory that underlie the genesis andnature of postmodern thought. I beg thereader’s indulgence with this prefacehowever, since it is critical forunderstanding both the current tensionbetween religion and science as well as

an avenue for a possible rapprochement. We are all familiar with the standardaccount of the scientific revolution asthe beginning of a new age of reason andoptimism following the long dark nightof the Middle Ages. For thousands ofyears, homage to long dead thinkers,enforced by the church, strangledindependent thought. But with theremoval of these barriers, scienceblossomed and, with it, our ability toprovide explanations of naturalphenomena. Philosophers label thisinterval, stretching from roughly thebeginning of the 17th to the middle ofthe 19th centuries, the modern period. This was a time characterized by anunbounded optimism concerning ourcollective capacity to explain theuniverse and solve our problems thereby.The familiar example of the developmentof modern astronomy provides a stockillustration of the process:Copernicus’ theory of a heliocentricsolar system was initially opposed bythe church, an opposition thatculminated in the infamous trial andcondemnation of Galileo. But sciencehad the last laugh, as the heliocentricidea was taken up by new men of sciencelike Brahe and Kepler, then rapidlyenshrined within the powerful newparadigm of Newtonian physics. By theend of the modern age, the church was infull retreat and science seemed poisedto solve all the mysteries of theheavens. As science became moreprofessionalized, it began to pull awayfrom natural philosophy, concentratingon empirical investigations. But thetheoretical philosophers were still partof the movement, working to provide anexplanation for the success of these newmethods. Initially, transitionalfigures like Descartes and Leibniz

argued that it was our innate rationalgift, bestowed by a benevolent God andexemplified by the elegance ofmathematics, that allowed us to uncoverthe truths of the natural world [1,2].But it was not long before a new type ofempiricist began to argue that we cometo know, not through the operations of amysterious reason, but only by carefulinduction applied to the data ofperception [3,4]. The new scientistsquickly adopted this empiricalphilosophy as the appropriate foundationof their work – a marriage that persiststo this day.

2.2. The Problem of InductionEverything should be made as simple as possible,

but not simpler. – A. Einstein

But no marriage is without itsdifficulties. Though it does anexcellent job of giving voice to theempirical attitudes embraced by science,as a metaphysical doctrine, empiricismleaves much to be desired. This pointwas made most persuasively in a critiqueof the powers of empiricism by one ofits early adopters, David Hume [5]. Heuncovers what he labeled “the problem ofinduction,” showing that empiricismestablishes a standard of knowledge itcan not itself meet, thus revealing afundamental contradiction at its veryfoundation that has not beensatisfactorily resolved to this day.The argument is relatively simple:

1. Empiricists claim we know nothingthat we do not derive fromexperience, a move that preventsthe importation of unjustified“knowledge” through intuition,revelation, etc.

2. To discover truth, therefore, wemust always begin with the data ofexperience, and induce the

regularities of nature from this.For example, we observe that anobject falls to earth wheneverreleased, so we induce that allsuch objects will always behavethis way under similarcircumstances. In time, suchobservations are enshrined as“laws of nature” and are used tomake precise predictions that canbe tested. Whatever honorific youapply to the resulting regularity,however, the logic remainsinductive.

3. But causal reasoning like thisrequires that the universe willcontinue to behave in a uniformfashion or we would have nogrounds to predict the futurebased on the past. Hume calledthis assumption of uniformity “theprinciple of induction” andobserved that all causalreasoning, and thus all empiricalinduction, rests on thisprinciple.

4. But the principle of inductioncan’t be justified, for to attemptan empirical justification of aprinciple required for empiricaljustification would be patentlycircular. And, since theempiricist holds that allknowledge must be generatedempirically, there is no otheroption.

5. The intellectually honestempiricist, therefore, must admitthat her entire system ofknowledge rests on a principlethat is not only unsupported infact, but unsupportable in principle.

6. Since a chain of reasoning is onlyas strong as it weakest link, allconclusions of empiricism (and

thus of science) are renderedhighly suspect.

This puts empiricism in theepistemically awkward position ofespousing a method that seems to workvery well, but in a way they can neitherexplain nor justify. The best they cando is point to the fact of their successand hope that it continues. Of course,one time-honored option in the face ofsuch a daunting philosophical problem isto simply ignore it – an approachadvocated by Hume himself and imitatedby the few practicing scientists awareof the dilemma. In one sense, there isnothing wrong with such a pragmaticapproach, especially given the enormoussuccess science has achieved using it,but at the very least the existence ofthis unresolved problem should engendera certain metaphysical modesty on thepart of scientists.

2.3. A Cure Worse than the Disease?Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own

reason!' - that is the motto of enlightenment. – I. Kant

Immanuel Kant was a philosopher whotook Hume’s challenge seriously –indeed, more seriously than Hume himself[6]. If science is so critical to ourunderstanding of the universe, hereasoned, it must be possible to placeit on a firm epistemic foundation, whichrequires defusing the problem ofinduction. And so he set out to do justthis, though whether and in what sensehe succeeded in this project is still amatter of debate. Kant accepts the empiricist idea thatwe have no direct access to informationabout the “real” world (noumena) beyondour mental representations (phenomena).Since metaphysics is about the ultimatenature of reality, any empiricist making

metaphysical claims is in the awkwardposition of using sensation as a guideto the supposedly extra-sensory causesof sensation. To make matters worse,Kant argues persuasively that oursensation is not a passive faculty onwhich the world impresses itself, butinstead involves active (ifsubconscious) interpretation (a claim richlyconfirmed by modern psychology). Thismakes it impossible to know the natureof the world beyond our experience withany confidence – we are trapped in ourown minds, as it were. To use a simpleanalogy, it’s as if we spend our entirelives locked inside a movie theatre withonly the images on the screen as a guideto the outside world. We have no way totell whether and to what extent theimages correspond to what’s outside.And since we also know that ourexpectations and desires influence whatsee on the screen, we have stronggrounds to be skeptical about any claimconcerning the world beyond the theatre. This is a radically pessimisticconclusion, to be sure, but Kant arguesthat we must not deceive ourselves aboutour epistemic situation or pretend it isotherwise. We can never know the truenature of the reality beyond our senses,period. Surprisingly, though, he doesnot think this implies skepticism. Hisunique insight is that, while we cannever know anything definite aboutultimate reality, we can know somethingabout the ways we structure itsinfluence on our experience. Inessence, he argues that there arecertain structural properties(categories) of the experiential worldthat are necessary for the function ofreason. Thus, as rational creatures, wemust think the way we do. One of the necessary features of ourperceptual world are causal

relationships, a fact which allows us tojustify the principle of induction,albeit not in the way we might wish. Toput it bluntly, although we will neverknow whether things like causalrelationships are real, we can knowthat, even if they are illusions, theyare illusions that will be shared by allother rational creatures. Casualreasoning accurately portrays the mentalworlds of all rational creatures -human, animal, alien or even divine -and this inter-subjectivity is as closeto metaphysical truth as we will everget. Given such an intuitively unsettlingconclusion, it should come as nosurprise that opinions differ on whetherthis constitutes a victory for humanknowledge. Indeed, the history ofphilosophy following Kant can plausiblybe divided into two general camps basedon reaction to his ideas. Those whotake all of Kant’s conclusions seriouslygo on to found what is typicallydescribed as “analytic philosophy”,where the goal is seen as preciselydelineating what we can and can’t knowand in what ways. But those who rejecthis account of our limited objectivityare put on a very pessimistic pathindeed. This is the seed ofpostmodernism.

2.4. Postmodernism is Born“In the consciousness of the truth he has perceived,man now sees everywhere only the awfulness or theabsurdity of existence and loathing seizes him. – F.

Nietzsche

Kant’s philosophy had an electriceffect on philosophy, catalyzing theformation of German idealism in the late

18th century. These philosophers triedin various ways to come to grips withwhat the devastating swath Kant had cutthrough traditional epistemology andmetaphysics [7,8]. One common approachwas to simply accept our inability tofind ever find truth – in other words,to adopt a radical form of epistemicpessimism. This sense of pessimismgained strength in the 19th century froma complex series of social andintellectual developments. A time ofrapid social change, the dawn of theindustrial revolution saw socialupheaval that prompted many thinkers(most famously Marx and Engels) to arguefor overthrowing the old politicalsystems. Scientific systems were alsobeing challenged in ways that lentmomentum to the pessimistic spirit ofthe age. For example, the publicationof Darwin’s Origin of Species made itdifficult to defend the traditionalclaim that human reason was anythingterribly special, since it evolved frommuch simpler systems in non-humananimals via a process that, if notrandom, at least showed no evidence ofdirection or purpose. And the pointlessslaughter of the great war at thebeginning of the 20th century proved thefinal nail in the coffin of modernoptimism. Thus grew the movement known popularlyas postmodernism. It’s important tonote immediately that this term concealsmore than it reveals, as there is muchmore diversity and nuance here than mostpeople realize. The term has been usedto lump together a variety of distinctphilosophical schools and methods (e.g.,existentialism, critical theory,deconstructionism, nihilism, etc.) aswell as a number of less preciseattitudes and dispositions that don’trise to the level of a philosophical

system. Since my goal at present is notto attempt a thorough classification ofthese views, but rather to position theconflict between science and religionwithin a broad intellectual trend, Iwill use the term “postmodern” somewhatloosely. However one decides to applythe terminology, it is fair to say that,just as the modern era was characterizedby an unbounded optimism concerning thepossibility of human knowledge andprogress, the postmodern era is markedby an extremely pessimistic attitudetowards all claims to truth, purpose andmeaning. This creates an existential problemthat is perhaps best illustrated inCamus’ Myth of Sisyphus [9]. Sisyphus wasthe mythological King of Corinthpunished by the Gods for aninsufficiently reverential attitude (andin particular, an attempt to cheatdeath). His punishment consisted ofbeing forced to push a huge boulder up ahill, only to watch it roll back downagain just as he reached the top. Hewas consigned to this repetitive,fruitless toil for all eternity, withoutany hope of relief or illusion ofpurpose. For Camus, to contemplateSisyphus’ horrific plight is to confrontthe situation we all are in, even ifmost of us refuse to accept it for whatit is. In pursuing truth withoutflinching, and in particular by refusingto be lulled into the illusion ofpurpose and meaning those in authorityfoist on the unsuspecting, thepostmodern thinker dooms herself to alife of pointless suffering and toil.She knows that she is hopelessly adriftin the sea of meaningless chaos that isour universe, and is forced to concludethat life is absurd. This attitude, like the scientificattitude, has seeped into our modern

cultural norms in ways that are notalways appreciated. Educated westernersare likely to assume, without muchcritical reflection, a skepticalorientation to claims that used to bewidely accepted. Thus, we are morelikely now than ever before to rejectbroad metaphysical claims (e.g.,religious, scientific) and remainsteadfastly dubious about thepossibility of objective standards(e.g., ethical, aesthetic). Certainly,the debate between science and religionin popular culture has been influencedby a postmodern view of intellectualexchange. Because there are no approvedstandards, the goal of modern “debate”(here and elsewhere) is not a shared, ifcompetitive, search for truth, butrather the utter destruction of one’sopponent by any means necessary,including rhetorical dirty tricks. If the postmodernist is right andthere really is no purpose or point tolife, we have limited options. We can:

1. Avoid the problem by ignoring it.2. Avoid the problem by committing

suicide. 3. Accept the problem and suffer.4. Accept the problem and learn to

love the absurd.5. Accept the problem and find a non-

objective source of purpose. The first option, while popular, iseither an act of ignorance or a willfulrejection of the truth. Either way,it’s not something anyone devoted to thetruth can endorse and the postmodernphilosopher (if not always thepostmodernist more generally) is just asdevoted to the search for truth as thescientist - she is just extremelyskeptical about our ability to find it.Not surprisingly, the temptation to killoneself and thus end the farce is a verycommon theme in postmodern discussions.

However, postmodernists have the samebasic psychological makeup as the restof us, which includes robustpsychological mechanisms to prevent selfdestruction. They thus often express alonging for suicide as something theyshould do if they could only overcometheir animal natures – a positionNietzsche labels “the most difficultthought” [10]. If we accept the postmodern problem,however, it is not easy to deal with.We can simply suffer, of course, butmost people would reject this option outof hand. We could learn to love theabsurd – as Camus puts it, “we mustimagine Sisyphus happy.” But this is abit like telling someone in great pain:“It’s mind over matter – if you don’tmind, it doesn’t matter.” Whileundeniably true, very few people findsuch advice helpful. Our final option is to discover asource of meaning for ourselves. Butthis is not easy either. Sincepostmodernism undermines not only allconventional ideas of meaning andpurpose, but their sources as well(e.g., God, the state), we are entirelyon our own in the search for meaning.Indeed, it is better to say that we arerequired to create meaning rather than todiscover it, since there is noprivileged place where it might befound. Some postmodern philosophersbelieve this can be done – for example,by devoting oneself to living an authenticlife [11,12]. While this is probablyeasier to achieve than learning to loveabsurdity, for our purposes it sufficesto note that it is still extremelydifficult – to the point where itsattainment eluded some of the greatestpostmodern thinkers. What are we to do in the face of thisdilemma? There is at least one other

option not listed above – the leap tofaith. Kierkegaard [13], himself afoundational postmodern philosopher,famously argued that one must simplychoose to believe in something thatprovides objective meaning, despite thelack of evidence (and perhaps even inthe face of countervailing evidence).Such a leap is subjective in the sensethat is a purely personal choice withoutobjective evidence. But it is alsoobjective, at least in the sense thatwhat one subjectively believes in is asource of objective truth. Of course, the most common sort ofleap is into some kind of traditionalreligion, since this provides a complexand ready made system of values. Inprinciple, however, a leap could betoward anything that allows for a senseof objective purpose. Given thecommitments underlying postmodernism, itis not surprising that mostpostmodernists consider leaping intofaith to be a perversion of theirideals. And it is certainly at leastironic to use the search for objectivetruth to justify what is manifestly atleast an arational, and perhaps even anirrational, belief system. But moreironic still is the extent to which bothsides of the modern discourse betweenscience and religious are caught in thegrip of this worldview without realizingit.

3. Science vs. ReligionOnly the closed mind is certain. – D. Spanley

Of course, no thumbnail history suchas this can possibly do justice to allthe complex nuances of the ideas at playhere. However, the above discussiondoes trace one very important line ofthought that helps explain the origins

of some of the tensions between scienceand religion in the postmodern world.Now I want to put flesh on this abstractdiscussion by presenting concreteexamples of the two opponents in themodern debate between science andreligion. I present these ascaricatures, so they are by definitionexaggerations, yet readers will likelysee elements of their own thinking inone or the other position and neither isso extreme that there aren’t realexamples of each. By examining theextremes, I hope to reveal more clearlywhere the opportunities for compromiselie.

3.1. The Atheist ScientistThe greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists

on reflection: when left to their instincts, theydogmatize like infallible popes. – Wm. James

The atheist scientist is a familiartrope in the modern world and has someinfluential instantiations, particularlywithin the recent neo-atheist movement[14,15,16,17,18]. He sees himself asengaged in the search for truth usingthe only method untainted by suspectmetaphysics – science. Like manypostmodernists, he is baffled by thosewith the weakness of mind to embracecomforting illusion rather than facereality without flinching. In an act ofintellectual moralizing, he even assertsthat no one deserving the label“scientist” could be anything but aconfirmed atheist. He is confidentthat, with the proper education, allhumanity will eventually shed theirchildish need for religious myth and theworld will consequently be a much betterplace. One basic problem with this attitude,of course, is that science does not, andindeed can not, avoid unsupported

assumptions. Most scientists are notaware of this, since they do not studythe philosophical foundations of theirown discipline, but it is no less truefor their lack of insight. Even theextremely brief historical backgroundpresented above suffices to illustratehow two assumptions were indispensibleduring the emergence of science as adiscipline:

1. The belief that the universe is akosmos - that is, the kind ofplace that can be explained byhuman reason.

2. The belief that the empiricalmethods of science are adequatefor uncovering the truths of thiskosmos.

The notion that we live in a kosmos isso central to the modern, scientific,worldview that people don’t often singleit out for critical scrutiny. However,it is clear that its adoption was anessential step in the creation ofscience. And if we are honest, we haveto admit that it is not possible tojustify this claim. There are alwaysrumblings at the edge of one science oranother suggesting that our knowledge ofthe universe is somehow fundamentallyflawed. The recent discovery of darkmatter and energy, whose existence wasnot even suspected 50 years ago, is acase in point: it is becomingincreasingly clear that these areactually the dominant forces in ouruniverse, yet we have scarcely begun tounderstand them [19,20]. But debatesabout the scientific anomaly du jouraside, it’s important to realize that wewill never disprove the possibility thatall of our scientific knowledge isactually false in a systematic fashion.For example, some respectablephilosophers and scientists have given amodern twist to Kant’s conclusion about

ultimate reality by suggesting theentire universe may be merely a simulation[21,22,23,24]. This implies thatanything we discover about what we call“the universe,” no matter how wellsupported by empirical evidence, may notbe about anything real at all. The notion that empiricism suffices toexplain natural phenomena is moreproblematic still. Hume’s problem ofinduction has never been resolved in away that would make a confirmedempiricist happy. There are thusexcellent theoretical reasons to besuspicious of any empirical system thatattempts to bootstrap its ownjustification. But the dream of acomplete empirical system is soseductive that a generation ofphilosophers of science (the logicalpositivists) in the first half of the20th century tried valiantly to delineateprecisely how empirical evidence cansupport scientific claims usingelaborate systems of logic [25,26].Unfortunately, this failed ratherspectacularly when these attemptsactually established that such anaccount is not logically possible[27,28]. The atheist scientist also makesproblematic assumptions about the natureof religion. Typically, thecharacteristics of the crudest sorts ofreligious beliefs – those that tend toconflict directly with science, forexample – are taken to be representativeof all religions. Thus, the viewespoused by young earth creationiststhat the universe is only a few thousandyears old is held up as an example ofthe evils of religion, despite the factthat there are large segments oftraditional religions (including a clearmajority of Christians) that oppose suchsilliness [29,30]. More subtly,

atheists who wish to attack religiontypically assume that to be religious isto believe in a divine being, and inparticular one who uses his supernaturalpowers to intervene in the naturalworld. While there are many who believeprecisely this, not all religionsrequire belief in God(s) at all (e.g.,Taoism, Buddhism) and many theologianswithin monotheistic traditions haveproposed interpretations of divinitywhich avoid supernatural claims[31,32,33]. It has even been proposedthat certain types of religious claimsmay be scientifically testable (ifperhaps unlikely to be true) [34,35].Therefore, the atheist should object,not to religion in general, but tocertain (admittedly common) types ofreligious belief. Certainly the sad state of scientificliteracy in countries like the UnitedStates is often (rightly) blamed formuch of the tension between science andreligion [36,37]. However, theassumption that quality scienceeducation will naturally convince peopleto abandon their religious commitmentsseems at least highly questionable.Increasingly, scientific investigationinto how people actually form opinionsreveals that the kinds of abstractreasoning scientists and philosopherslaud plays a relatively small role[38,39]. This suggests that most peoplemay never be able to participatesufficiently in the scientificenterprise to be able to use it as thesole source of meaning and purpose. Ifthat’s the case, presenting the choiceas starkly as the atheist scientist doeswill actually be counterproductive, sinceforces the average believer to choosebetween the mysterious authority of areligion that plays an important role intheir life and the mysterious authority

of a science from which they derive nocomfort. Given such a choice, should wereally be surprised when most preferreligion, in whatever form it isoffered? In one sense, the scientist’s refusalto countenance any claim that can’t berationally justified is criticallyimportant, since it’s far too easy tofool oneself. Yet this narrow focusmust be focused narrowly – on theexplanations one is willing to entertainto explain natural phenomena, not on allexplanations that could be put forward,even if they are only tangentiallyrelevant to the practice of science. Ifa faith claim neither impinges on thedetails of natural explanation nor getsin the way of naturalistic methodologyin general, science should ignore it.Consider the case of creationism: somecreationists believe things thatdirectly conflict with science (e.g., ayoung Earth). Science is obliged tovigorously oppose such claims, sincethey directly conflict with extremelywell supported science. On the otherhand, many people will call themselvescreationists yet, when pressed toclarify, simply claim that the universe,with all its natural processes(including evolution), was created by adivine being. There is no scientificneed to debate such a claim and theatheist scientist who chooses to do sois therefore not operating as ascientist, but as someone with his own,extra-scientific, worldview. That iscertainly his right, but he can’tlegitimately claim that the authority ofscience supports such a move. And it’s quite obvious that humanneeds are richer and more diverse thansimply explaining the natural world –the persistence of religion and otherextra-scientific means of avoiding

postmodern angst establish this beyondmuch doubt. Creating worldviews thatallow people to be happy and fulfilledmay not be science’s concern, but thatmakes it no less a fundamental humanneed. Indeed, science seems to realizethis in practice if not explicitly, asit is often thought to be an importantpart of the mission of science to createa sense of wonder concerning the naturalworld [40,41,42]. What’s more, it seemsunlikely this is a need that will everbe adequately met by science alone.That does not mean that everyone needsan extra-scientific belief system, ofcourse – some individuals may beperfectly content with science alone,just as some postmodernists may be ableto create their own personal sense ofmeaning. But this misses the crucialpoint that many, perhaps most, peoplewill simply not be able to do this. Ascience that continues to push an all ornothing approach to leaps of faith, iscreating its own enemy - and needlesslyso. Thus, the thoughtful scientist must becareful to defend science only where adefense is truly necessary. True,science provides no reason to believe inthe existence of divine beings and thisis an important point. But this is notthe same as providing evidence that sucha being does not exist. The scientificmethod is a heuristic for investigatingthe natural world, not a complete guideto the nature of reality, at least notin any direct way. The scientist isthus well within her rights to oppose aspecific religious claim that conflictswith scientific evidence, or tohighlight the lack of evidence forreligious claims in general, or to warnabout the indirect threat thatsupernatural beliefs can pose toscientific methods. But true atheism

requires one to go beyond the availableevidence and make a leap of faith ofone’s own.

3.2. The Man of Unshakable FaithMen think epilepsy divine, merely because they do not understand it. But if they called everything which they do not understand divine, why, there would be no end

to divine things. - Hippocrates

The man of unshakeable faith is onewho believes in a traditionalmonotheistic religion like Christianitybased on a (relatively) literal readingof ancient texts. He has no patiencefor fancy modern theology and believesin a personal God who loves him in adirect way and intervenes in the naturalworld through miracles. He is eager touse his rational powers when theysupport his faith, but quick to lay themaside when they prove inconvenient –indeed, he immediately rejects any claiminconsistent with his own interpretationof scripture, regardless of the weightof evidence behind it. He believes theworld would be a much better place ifothers felt as he does and is in favorof a public educational systemspecifically crafted to bring thisabout. Finally, he believes science isultimately just another type of faith -on a par, in some ultimate epistemicsense, with religion. Examples of suchpeople are commonplace, but anespecially rich vein can be found withinthe creationist movement [43,44,45]. One obvious problem here is theorigins of this sort of belief. It isan inescapable fact that the vastmajority of the world’s major religionswere created by illiterate peasantsliving in a pre-scientific age. Thefounders of these religions wereprofoundly ignorant of the sorts oftruths we now expect all children to

master at an early age. Therefore,whatever insights religions may contain,they are an exceptionally poor guide tothe workings of the natural world. Noposition we choose to stake out shouldget in the way of our ability tounderstand the natural world, since thisunderstanding is critical to solving theworld’s problems. And since science isclearly the best mechanism anyone hasever devised for this purpose, noreligion should set itself againstscience. In fact, doing so is actuallya threat to religion, since it picks afight with science that it willultimately lose – a point made quitepersuasively by the head of the U.S.National Institutes of Health andevangelical Christian, Francis Collins[46]. The problem is not the use of ancienttexts per se, it’s the way the faithclaims they embody are accepted withoutreflection. This may seem an odd thingto say – isn’t the whole nature of aleap of faith to accept a claim withoutadequate empirical evidence? Yes, butthat does not absolve believers of theirresponsibility to carefully consider thecontext of each leap of faith beforemaking it. It’s one thing to carefullyconsider one’s epistemic situation andreluctantly decide that a leap is theonly option, and quite another to usesuch a leap as a cheap way to “justify”what you want to believe without thehard work of critical reflection. Toomany believers today approach faithclaims far too casually, which does notdo justice to the seriousness of theissues at stake. And it’s not enough to assess theleaps before they are made. Since welive in a world that is constantlychanging, our leaps must be periodicallyreassessed in light of new circumstance.

Communities of faith thus need to createrobust and ongoing internal cultures ofcritique. Of course, some faithsalready do this in limited ways, andwhatever internal systems are or are notin place, religious interpretations doevolve in response to changes in theworld around them [16,47]. If thisdidn’t happen, religions would die. Butmany followers of traditional religionsare not taught to cherish critique as ahealthy part of religion and those soinclined to critique tend to have littleaccess to processes for impactingofficial doctrine. Adherence to ancienttexts exacerbates the problem, sincefollowers must still regard the texts assacred and true even as interpretationschange, creating ineliminable tensions.All too often, change comes to religionsonly fitfully and with great confusionand pain. The lack of a systematic criticalculture within religion is a large partof the reason science is opposed tofaith. The fact that some believershave a sensible approach to scientifictruths does not mean that most do. Andeven the sensible believers don’t alwaysfeel a strong responsibility to chastiseothers who take their faith claims toofar. But they must, since adopting abelief of any kind is an exercise withmoral implications [48] and leaps offaith, being divorced from the need forevidence, are fertile grounds fordangerous abuse. Religions shouldtherefore explicitly recognize this factand adopt a collective duty on the part ofbelievers to limit the scope of faithclaims. To give just one of manypossible examples, if moderate Islamicvoices do not take an explicit stanceagainst Islamic radicalism, they are tosome extent tacitly endorsing jihad as alegitimate expression of faith. This is

fundamentally different from the cultureof science, where constant critique isan integral part of the process.Scientists would thus have a much easiertime accepting leaps of faith ifreligions were more active in policingtheir ranks for overzealous applicationsof faith. People, particularly those influencedby intelligent design creationism, oftenpoint out that science involvesunsupportable metaphysical claims suchan ontological naturalism. I will notrespond to that claim specifically,except to note that it has beendecisively refuted elsewhere [49].Whatever the merits of the claim, itillustrates that there is a sense amongmany believers that science is “justanother faith tradition.” There is sometruth here, of course, since as wediscussed previously, science does makeleaps of faith. However, not all leapsof faith are created equal. Theassumptions science makes are theminimal ones that must be made in orderto pursue rational investigation of theworld. We can reject them if we wish,but the result will be a mysteriousuniverse we can not, in principle,explain. Religions, on the other hand,do not typically adopt a minimalistapproach to leaps of faith. Indeed,they often embrace, not just arational,but irrational revelation, and this is avery different matter. In particular, most traditionalreligions embrace supernaturalism -where one believes in forces andentities that, by definition, flout ourscientific understanding of the naturalworld. This is not something sciencecan countenance. It’s not that sciencecan establish such claims are false – itcan’t - but rather that any methodologywhich accepts supernatural claims is

antithetical to the scientific process.To accept the existence of somethingthat can not, in principle, be explainedthru human reason, is to open Pandora’sbox. We lose all control over whatemerges, since believing in supernaturalentities is like embracing acontradiction in logic – once you makethis move, you can use it to “establish”anything at all, no matter how contraryto reason. The real tension betweenscience and religion lies here, since noone committed to the concept of a kosmoscan accept such a move. Of course, inprinciple, it is possible to endorse acertain kind of supernatural claimwithout hindering science – for example,that God works his will only indirectly,with the natural universe as hisinstrument. But history seems to showthat, once such a power is asserted,metaphysical claims multiply in a waythat will eventually pose problems forthe rational investigation of thenatural order. Thus, to the extent thatsupernaturalism is an ineliminableaspect of religion, science is justifiedin rejecting a broad compromise.However, as we’ve discussed,supernaturalism is not a necessary partof religion, even of traditionalmonotheistic religions. When the atheistscientist fails to appreciate thediversity of religion on this point, hisignorance is revealed. On the otherhand, the fact that so few religiousbelievers appreciate this pointthemselves makes the scientist’s mistakemore understandable.

3.3. A Metaphysical OpportunityOne should keep an open mind – but not so open

that one’s brains fall out. - Bertrand Russell

I present the two sides of the science

v. religion debate as caricatures sothat we may more easily see some of theessential differences. Science is byfar the best method humans beings haveever discovered for understanding thenatural world, with a track record farsuperior (to put it mildly) torevelation in this regard. It is thusentirely appropriate that scientistsrefuse to adopt any belief which weakensscience, either by directly refutingspecific scientific claims or by puttingforward a way of thinking antitheticalto scientific methods. But in theirzeal to defend science, they sometimeslose sight of the fact that science issimply a heuristic based on its ownunsupportable assumptions. This neednot be a problem – indeed, the tentativenature of scientific claims is one ofscience’s great strengths, since itfacilitates a strong culture ofcritique. It only becomes a problem ifscientists are incautious about thescope of the metaphysical claims theymake, as in the case of the atheistscientist. Religion is a social phenomenon thatconstituted a critical aspect of thelives of most humans beings since beforethe beginning of recorded history. Itstretches credibility beyond thebreaking point to suggest either thatthis is not an essential aspect of humannature or that nothing of value can befound within the rich creations humanshave wrought in its name. But to avoidessential conflict with science,religion must also moderate itsmetaphysical claims. At the very least,it must openly embrace a more open andcritical internal culture as well aseschew supernaturalism in any form thatwould undermine the scientificinvestigation of the natural world. Wouldn’t it be nice if we could have

our metaphysical cake and eat it too?If we could, on the one hand, retain thescientific worldview with itsunprecedented ability to explain thenature world, while on the other handadopt a wider perspective which allowsus to believe our lives have purpose andmeaning of the sort religionshistorically have provided. Perhapsthis is something we should activelyseek.

4. The Complex UniverseAnd as natural selection works solely by and for the

good of each being, all corporeal and mentalendowments will tend to progress towards perfection.

– C. Darwin

There is a growing movement withinscience that may offer a possiblecompromise along these lines. It spansa number of disciplines, from physics tochemistry to information science, andthere is not yet even a sharedvocabulary, so it goes by various names(e.g., the epic of evolution, bighistory, cosmic evolution). The basicidea, however, is that the universe hasa structure which naturally manifestsincreasing levels of complexity overtime through an evolutionary process.It’s beyond the scope of this paper toargue for this position in detail, sobelow I will only trace the generaloutlines. Of course, the idea that the universeis progressive is nothing new. Butprevious discussions have been hobbledby non-natural metaphysical commitmentsand anthropocentrism, among otherthings. Yet increasingly, scientists areusing rigorous scientific techniques tomodel the universe in general, and lifein particular, as a system thatspontaneously produces complexity

[50,51,52,53,54]. A proposed candidatefor the first biological law everdiscovered has even arisen that predictsincreasing complexity as a fundamentalproperty of all evolving organisms [55].Together, these suggest that it may bepossible to view the universe asexhibiting a purpose, in some sense ofthat term, without the baggage that hasbeen associated with this idea in thepast. It’s not just that the universe getsmore complex, it’s that it manifests aseries of processes that areincreasingly adept at creating complexity,generating powerful feedback. Thus, therate at which complexity is generatedseems to be increasing as well,particularly once the ability to producecultural information comes on the scene[56,57,58,59]. The universe hasevolved from a smear of energy andsimple matter only a cosmologist couldfind interesting to a place populated byat least one species capable ofcontemplating its place in the universe.Stars formed in a universe of hydrogenand began manufacturing heavierelements. Over time, these elementsformed planets where ever more complexchemical interactions became possible.Eventually, a complexity threshold waspassed and living systems arose,enabling the new dynamic of evolution bynatural selection, increasing the rateof complexification exponentially. Theselife forms passed through a series ofmajor transitions (e.g., eukaryotes,multicellularity), with more capacity togenerate novelty at each level, untilsome organisms develop the mentalcapacity to make sociality, reason andculture possible [60,61]. The resultingcultural evolution creates science andother rational disciplines, within whichthe evolution of ideas increases the

rate of complexification even further. The complex universe hypothesis holdsthat someone with sufficient knowledgeof the scientific principles and theinitial conditions could have predicted,moments after the big bang, that auniverse populated by stars, planets,and complex chemistry would come intobeing. He could also predict theevolution of living organisms, theemergence of intelligence, and the riseof cultural systems. If this hypothesisis correct, it means that the universeproduces the kinds of complexity we seeall around us, including our scientificculture, in a perfectly natural fashion.Intuitively, we feel that complexityrequires some kind of directive plan,implying a rational designer – a pointthe proponents of intelligent designcreationism make much of [62,63]. Butif the complex universe hypothesis iscorrect, there is no more need topostulate supernatural forces to explainour existence than to explain theformation of crystals forming in asupersaturated solution – under theright conditions, these things happenspontaneously. We do need to be clear about what thishypothesis is not saying. The claim isnot that the universe is deterministic,just that it is sufficiently predictablethat some major trends can be predictedwith confidence. This is similar to theway in which, although quantum phenomenaare thought to be intrinsically randomat the level of individual events, it isnevertheless possible to predict thebehavior of large aggregates of suchevents with enormous (indeed,unprecedented) precision. Biologicalevolution is actually a process fueled byrandom variation, so it is only possibleto predict events that are probable inthe aggregate, despite random variation

in particular cases. It would thereforebe absurd to claim that the universe wasdestined to produce humans if by “human”we mean something with all thepeculiarities of biology and culturethat we possess. The patterns ofevolution are predictable only in theirbroadest strokes – given the rightconditions, we can predict that lifewill probably evolve, becomemulticellular, develop sociality andreason, etc. But we can’t typicallypredict which species will develop whichtype of trait in which form at whichpoint in time. And we certainly couldnot predict, 10 seconds after the bigbang, that a species of hairy,intelligent ape with arms and legs wouldarise on the third planet orbiting Sol,much less that one of them would one daywrite a paper for the American Journal ofSociological Research discussing thepredictive limits of the complexuniverse hypothesis. We do not yet know whether thishypothesis is true. What we can sayright now is that it is broadlyconsistent with what our best sciencetells us about the universe. It alsoseems an empirically tractable questionwe will one day resolve – for example,when we have much better data about thedistribution of life in the universe andthe systematic principles governing itsevolution. In other words, it’s alegitimate scientific hypothesis onwhich we do not yet have definitivedata. I will thus leave the empiricaldebate to future scientists. But what would the extra scientificimplications be should this trend beconfirmed? We could, as the atheistscientist will urge, view it as a brutefact that is not in need of furtherexplanation. But doing this creates twosorts of problems, one scientific and

one extra scientific. First, whenscience adopts the notion of a kosmos,it accepts the mission of explaining theuniverse. Generally speaking, we thinkthat to explain something is to show howit is at least more likely than not tooccur [64]. A view of the essentialnature of the universe as eithermysterious or the result of purehappenstance is thus at the very leastless than ideal. It’s not that there isanything inconsistent about this idea –there isn’t – it’s just that thisundermines the concept of a kosmos onwhich science is built, suggesting thatat some level the universe is simply notexplicable via human reason. Second,it is difficult to see how we couldderive any sense of meaning or purposefrom an accident of history. Indeed,this difficulty may go a long waytowards explaining why humans beingscreated theistic religions in the firstplace, since these allow us to believethat the universe has a structure inwhich we have a meaningful place,despite our profound ignorance of itsdetails. We have seen how a sense ofmeaning and purpose is something humansneed deeply and will pursue vigorouslyregardless of what science says. Thus,in the same way it’s a mistake forreligions to hinder the investigation ofthe natural world when they can avoidit, it’s also a mistake for science tocreate needless conflict between thatinvestigation and the search formeaning.

What is the alternative totraditional accounts of religion then?One possibility is to imbue thecomplexity trend with value, which is notso much a fact about the universe as achoice about how we wish to viewourselves in relation to the facts wehave. Just as science is careful to

make only the minimal assumptionsnecessary to allow for the possibilityof rational inquiry, here we need toadopt a minimal set of attitudesnecessary to derive meaning from theuniverse science reveals to us. Thisseems to require two fundamentalelements:

1. A deep appreciation, perhaps even areverence, for the universalnature of this trend (in space, intime, in the levels of reality itencompasses, etc.). Some viewthis kind of association with areality that transcends our ownpersonal (and even humanity’scollective) interests as the veryessence of religion [65,66].

2. The notion that complexity is agood in the sense that it issomething we should both value andfoster. It is difficult to seehow we could derive a robust senseof meaning and purpose from themere universality of a naturalproperty. For example, we are allmassive objects subject togravity. One can certainlyappreciate the universality ofthis claim, but by itself thisdoes little to assuage apostmodern sense ofpurposelessness.

To some extent, these ideas take usinto the realms of religion and ethicswhere many a scientist fears to tread.Certainly these are not areas amenableto empirical investigation in the sameway scientific questions are, and whenscientists do venture into thisterritory they sometime do so in anunfortunately naïve fashion. But it’salso important to realize thatscientists already make this sort ofmove routinely, whether they realize itor not as it’s (fortunately) a rare

scientist who would argue that there areno moral goods, even if they may seethese most clearly in the epistemicvirtues of their discipline. But neither claim is entirely divorcedfrom science and its empiricaltechniques either. We should not builda sense of meaning on something thatdoes not actually exist, and theexistence of a complexity trend in anopen empirical question (if a difficultone to resolve at present). And if atrend does exist, the details of itsstructure and function may help usspecify precisely what it is we shouldbe reverent of. Similarly, if we aregoing to be thoroughly naturalistic inour approach, refusing to engage insupernaturalism, then we need to thinkcarefully about whether and to whatextent we can enrich the traditionaldiscussion of moral values withempirical knowledge. Ethical theoriststend to want to draw a line in the sandbetween ethics and the empirical world,but if we view ethics as another aspectof a purely natural complexity trend,then there is surely much that fieldslike psychology, sociology, evolutionand even economics can contribute to ourmoral understanding – as recentexplorations have suggested [67,68,69]. This kind of approach is certainly notnew, even if explicit discussion of itsdynamics are rare. It may be that thatthe complex universe hypothesis is justone of a family of attempts to derivemeaning from a purely natural universethat are gaining ground in the popularimagination. For example, deep ecologyattempts to combine an appreciation forthe universality of complex ecologicalrelationships with the view that thiscomplex ecological system has value (andeven rights) we are obligated to respect[70,71,72,73]. There thus may be any

number of ways to realize this kind ofminimal leap of faith other than thecomplexity trend hypothesis. Such pluralism might seem to undercutany claim to objective truth, but thisconclusion would be hasty. Just as wecan predict the broad contours of anevolutionary trajectory but not itsdetails, the fact that variants of thesame basic approach are emerging couldindicate an important convergence. Itmay thus be a common feature of theevolution of social/cultural/rationalbeings that they begin with asupernatural conception of the universeand their place in it, only to abandonthis is favor of more minimal leaps offaith under the influence of scientificculture. It could even be that somespecific features of the ethicalorientation of all rational creatures,wherever they emerge in the universe,are shared [59]. There is thus thepossibility that these beliefs, even ifthey are subjective and contingent insome ways, are also objective (or atlast inter-subjective) in others. Ifso, this would allows us to offer aresponse to the postmodern dilemmasimilar to what Kant offered in responseto the problem of induction: if suchbeliefs are universal features of allbeings with the rational capacity tocontemplate such matters, then we willat least never lose a debate concerningtheir truth, since all creatures capableof joining the conversation will agree.

5. ConclusionBefore I came here I was confused about this subject.

Having listened to your lecture I am still confused, but on a higher level. – E. Fermi

The current standoff between scienceand religion owes much to the history of

ideas, and in particular the postmodernmovement, though in ways few of theinterlocutors are consciously aware of.Modern science tends to borrow frompostmodernism a deep skepticism aboutthe possibility of any ultimate truths,especially as put forward by traditionalauthority structures like the church.Like Hume before them, scientists don’tworry too much about their ownmetaphysical assumptions. This would beless of a problem if they were at leastaware of the difficulties, however, asit might make them more cautious intheir opposition to leaps of faith ingeneral. By way of contrast, postmodernphilosophers are at least keenly awareof the psychological dilemma created byrejecting all sources of meaning as wellas the extreme difficulty of fillingthis void without the traditionalguarantors of objectivity. For theirpart, religions tend to embrace thepostmodern leap of faith too fully,using the fact that something is a faithclaim to insulate all aspects of faithfrom critical scrutiny, openingPandora’s box to release a bewildering,and sometimes dangerous, array ofbeliefs. It seems as if all parties tothe debate are talking past each otherin important ways, preventing what mostmight view as a desirable compromise.How can we break this stalemate? Those with a scientific worldview mustbegin to seriously consider thepossibility that a minimal step of faith(as opposed to a leap) can be taken inways that enrich rather than hinder theefforts of science to make sense of theuniverse. Stepping into the aminimalist kind of faith may actuallyhelp preserve our dedication to rationalinquiry while allowing us to reap thepsychological benefits of meaning andpurpose science alone can not provide.

But the fact that there is a place forfaith does not mean that all faiths arebeyond critique. Those coming fromtraditional faith perspectives mustembrace a far more critical attitudetowards faith claims and, in particular,strive to purge themselves of the sortof supernaturalism that no one dedicatedto rational explanation can countenance.And it is critical that this go beyondpaying mere lip service to an abstractideal – religions need to activelyencourage their followers to critiqueelements of faith as circumstanceschange, providing concrete structuresand processes to allow faith traditionsto evolve more rapidly. I put forward the complex universehypothesis as an example of a scientifichypothesis capable of supporting aminimal step of faith that could helpbridge the gap between the faith andscience communities. While it is notscience’s job to develop extrascientific claims that would allow us tofind meaning and purpose, there’s alsonothing about such a move that scienceneed oppose. This approach simply addsa psychological dimension to ourexisting scientific understanding of theuniverse. It explains why we exist in abig sense – we are neither accidents ofan uncaring universe nor products of anintelligent designer, but insteadintegral parts of a universal processthat transcends our own existence.Viewing the creation of complexity in apurposeful way doesn’t so much changethe facts we believe in as change ourattitude towards them. Of course, even if we enthusiasticallyembrace meaningful universal complexity,it will not answer all questions.People will continue to wonder why theuniverse has this character ofcomplexification, and one possible

answer is to insert the will of asupernatural creator. But this is not aproblem unique to this worldview, sinceit’s a move that can be made in responseto any worldview, even that of the“hardest” science [74,75,76]. Theimportant point is that there is nothingintrinsic to the complex universe systemthat requires a supernatural explanation. To inject a pessimistic note, it mustbe allowed that this proposal mayultimately be unworkable. Traditionalreligions may be too wed tosupernaturalism to change their waysfundamentally. What’s much worse is thepossibility that most people maycontinue to prefer the simple answers tocomplex questions such systems provide,in which case any alternative along thelines I propose here will have a verylimited following. I can only hope thatI have identified a logical space inwhich a compromise could occur – itremains to be seen whether anyone willactually occupy it and how comfortableits accommodations will prove to be.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The current work has benefited fromexchanges with a number of scholars, butI would like to express a special noteof thanks to Terry Bristol, Roy Clouser,John Hartman, Todd May, Andy Mount andStan Salthe. Any imperfections thatremain despite their efforts areentirely the fault of the author.

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