The Role of Think Tanks in the U.S.

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The Role of Think Tanks in the U.S.Security Policy EnvironmentLars NicanderPublished online: 15 May 2015.

To cite this article: Lars Nicander (2015) The Role of Think Tanks in the U.S. Security PolicyEnvironment, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28:3, 480-501, DOI:10.1080/08850607.2015.1022462

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LARS NICANDER

The Role of Think Tanks in the U.S.Security Policy Environment

A number of academics say think tanks have little or no influence on publicpolicy.1 In 1984, for example, Yehezkel Dror rated the performance of thinktanks as being rather disappointing in terms of their ability to influencepolicy. But an era of increasing financial constraints upon governmentsaround the world, resulting in diminishing state budgets and cutbacks inthe state machinery, has exerted negative effects upon most states’ abilityand role in policy identification, formulation, and implementation.Traditionally, policy has been perceived by some as the domain of statesand governments. But, the financially-induced changes have eroded thisformer state monopoly,2 creating the opportunity for alternative forces toplay a greater role in the identification and formulation of policy.3

Think tanks are one such element trying to influence government policy.The focus herein is upon the role of think tanks within the security policyenvironment in the United States. More specifically, the sectors influencedby the changes are the National Security Council, the Department of State,the Department of Defense, as well as the Department of HomelandSecurity and the Department of Justice when the issues involve strategiccounter-terrorism policy. To these Cabinet departments should also beadded their relevant agencies. In researching the issue, any overview of

Lars Nicander is Director for the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at theSwedish National Defence College, Stockholm. From 1997 to 2002, he wasSecretary of the Cabinet Working-Group on Defensive InformationOperations. A political scientist, Mr. Nicander has served in various positionswithin the Swedish national security community. He is an elected member ofthe Institute of Strategic Studies in London and a Fellow of The RoyalSwedish Academy of War Sciences.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28: 480–501, 2015

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online

DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.1022462

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.1022462

think tank influence in general has been difficult to find. In contrast, JohnKingdon had a somewhat larger category of ‘‘researchers, academiciansand consultants’’ when compiling his study of non-governmental actors’influence on U.S. political decision making.4

Given the current critical juncture of the changes in government and thestate of global affairs=relations, understanding who and how security policyis influenced is crucial. Just how they achieve this has been the cause forsome heated debate. Those discussions are influenced by how academicsand practitioners view the U.S. security policy environment, such aswhether it is a closed or open system, and whether the policy process isopen to pluralistic sources of input or is an elitist project.5

In numerous ways, the U.S. policy apparatus operates in a rather specialand specific environment. My 2010 article in the Journal of Policy Studiesindicated faster degrees of change in U.S. security policy—from identifyingpossible new threats through to the legislating and implementing ofpreventive and protecting measures within society.6

Among certain matters and processes that make understanding the issue ofinfluence on foreign and security policy even more critical is the extremelyvolatile nature of international politics within the ongoing framework ofthe global war on terrorism and the Arab Spring. Getting the right policyto address the right problems is critical. Understanding how policy isinfluenced is the first modest step in this direction.

This study is part of a larger project concerning bureaucratic ability toadapt or change to reflect altered circumstances in the security policyenvironment. Other aspects are analyzed elsewhere, but the intention hereis to broach the following problematic question: What influence (direct orindirect) do the relatively independent=bipartisan think tanks have withinthe U.S. security policy domain? This question immediately imposes thenecessity of defining influence and discussing ways and means ofmeasuring it. This is to be done not only through an academic’s theoreticallens but also from the point of view of a practitioner. Setting about to answerthe research question in this manner exposes the contradictions betweenthe theoretical (academic) and practical (policy makers=practitioners). Theprimary intention is to generate an overview and learned discussion on thespecific aspect of assessed or perceived influence. As such, this does notmean that influence actually needs to take place, but the study insteadconsiders what strategies and tactics academics, policymakers, andpractitioners believe are successful. Given the size and nature of think tanksin the United States, should no influence be found in this specificenvironment, it is less likely to be found elsewhere.

In compiling this study, a questionnaire was distributed to establish the viewsand experience of established professionals working in the field, in order tounderstand the practitioners’ viewpoint and understanding of the issue.

THINK TANKS IN U.S. SECURITY POLICY 481

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Respondents were chosen on the basis of their length of service in think tanks,government, and academia, in order to elicit useful insights from experiencedpeople who have served in the various elements that potentially contribute tothe policy process. The outcome of this questionnaire was then comparedwith the existing theory on how the think tanks operate and on their influencein Congress. Information gleaned from the questionnaires was enhancedthrough in-depth interviews with those who agreed to be contacted further toallow a more comprehensive understanding of the ‘‘insider’s perspective.’’7

THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The General Role and Character of Think Tanks

In brief, a think tank can be described as an organization that fills the gapbetween knowledge and decisionmaking. According to a more detaileddefinition, think tanks are public policy research, analysis, and engagementinstitutions that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice ondomestic and international issues that enables policymakers and the publicto make informed decisions about public policy issues. Think tanks may beaffiliated or independent institutions and are structured as permanentbodies, not ad hoc commissions. These institutions often act as a bridgebetween the academic and policymaking communities, serving in the publicinterest as an independent voice that translates applied and basic researchinto a language and form that is understandable, reliable, and accessiblefor policymakers and the public.8

Think tanks can be classified in several different ways.9 According to onemodel, they can be classified according to their degree of independencefrom the state. But think tanks are usually classified according to theirprimary mission and focus, generally labeled as either ‘‘university withoutstudents,’’ ‘‘contract researchers,’’ and ‘‘advocacy centers.’’ A fourthcategory is sometimes used in the United States: ‘‘vanity=legacy centers,’’a category usually associated with a former President and his ‘‘presidentiallibrary.’’

An institution in the first category, ‘‘universities without students,’’ isconsidered to be the most independent and usually has more than fiftyemployees. Researchers and scholars who are trying to get away fromteaching and administrative duties often gravitate towards this type ofemployment or affiliation. Other groups attracted to this type of workoften consist of conservative scholars who believe that the academic worldhas become too radical and leftist, as well as former diplomats and civilservants who lack a traditional academic background (i.e., they do nothave a Ph.D.). The typical products (‘‘output’’) of this type of think tankare aimed primarily at decisionmakers, and usually consist of ratherdetailed monographs of primary research. The Brookings Institution

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(Washington, DC), the Center for Strategic and International Studies(Washington, DC), the Council of Foreign Relations (New York City),and the Hoover Institution (Stanford, California) are well known examplesof this category of think tanks.

Those in the second category, ‘‘government contractors,’’ are formallycalled Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs),10

and usually operate within the security and defense sector. These privatesector institutions usually have special access and operate ‘‘in-house’’ withthe government ‘‘customer’’ in order to solve a specific problem. Institutionsin this category of think tanks depend upon their size and havinga significant number of customers in order to maintain their balance andintegrity. Both RAND (Santa Monica, California) and the Urban Institute(Washington, DC) fall into this category. In contrast to RAND, the latterdeals only with issues related to welfare and the organization of society onthe local and regional levels.

Organizations in an additional category of independent think tanks,‘‘advocacy centers,’’ are usually ideology-oriented and advance variouspolicies and policy solutions based upon a certain political philosophy. Theconservative Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute(both in Washington, DC) are often labeled as advocacy centers, buta better example is the libertarian Cato Institute (Washington, DC). Theline between ‘‘advocacy oriented’’ think tanks and what in Scandinavia arereferred to as public relations and lobbying firms is somewhat more fluid.This is the main reason why the focus here is on the independent thinktanks that work primarily with security policy decisionmaking.

Origins of Think Tanks

The think tank industry developed in the United States during the seconddecade of the 20th century, at about the time of the Great War (1914–1918). Since then, this industry has been through several periods ofchange. Today, worldwide, over 6,000 think tanks operate in more thanninety countries; the largest concentration—approximately 1,700—is foundin the United States.11 This is a rapidly growing industry. According toKent Weaver, ‘‘Think tanks are more numerous and probably play a moreinfluential role in the United States than in most other westerndemocracies.’’12 Following from this assumption, the magnitude of thinktank influence is more likely to be found through a study of their influenceon policy in the United States.

Think tanks have maintained a strong position in the United States ascompared to Europe, with the usual explanation being that they somewhatcompensate for the lack of the strong political parties common in mostEuropean countries.13 Due to the balance of power between the American



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President and Congress—and the fact that American political partiesfunction mostly as election machines—members of Congress have a greaterneed for qualified knowledge and information. In addition, they have morepersonal and political freedom compared to most European members ofparliament. Colin Gray stated that U.S. think tanks are able to inform andinfluence policy due to two primary reasons: (1) their views are deemedlegitimate by officials, and (2) the staff of think tanks are generallywell-qualified and may in fact also be former officials.14 Today, the leadingindependent think tank in Europe in widely believed to be Germany’sStiftung fur Wissenschaft und Politik (SFW).

Theories on Think Tanks

Several scholars have been active in the research field of think tanks, amongthem Donald E. Abelson, James McGann, Diane Stone, and AndrewDenham. Abelson has also written a case study on two security policysituations—the ABM=SDI decision and the global war on terror—in orderto analyze the role of think tanks in these events. Murray Weidenbaum, inthe Competition of Ideas, argued that Abelson’s ‘‘description of think tankactivity is useful’’15 even though this particular concept cannot explainit completely. Numerous theoretical attempts have sought to capture thenature and essence of organizational influence on the policy process.

According to Abelson, four separate schools of thought can be usedto analyze and conceptualize think tanks. The elitist16 school argues thatthink tanks are an integral part of the power structure in the United States,forming knowledge banks and talent pools for future presidentialadministrations. Unfortunately, their products are often paired with anotherapproach, influenced by Marxism. According to this combined concept,the role of think tanks is to support and advance its donors’ directeconomic and political interests.17 Supporting the former approach withoutsimultaneously accepting the latter is reasonable and possible, as has beenemphasized by Abelson. Abelson also noted that this is the main reason thisschool of thought is sometimes perceived as being imprecise, contradictory.

The pluralistic18 approach argues that think tanks are an element in a strongAmerican tradition, through one in which this type of organization forms onlya small part of the body politic that shapes American decisionmaking, amongthem unions and other organizations, that promote and protect variousinterests. Ultimately, the state delivers some form of verdict or decisionregarding the particular interest being promoted.

The statist19 school uses an approach based upon the vision that the statecompletely and independently formulates political goals that it tries to achievedespite national and international resistance. Decisions and policies on foreignpolicy are said to be shaped by its most important participants, the President

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and the Secretary of State, meaning that policy and national security issues arecontrolled by the White House and the State Department. This approach mayimply that think tanks play a rather modest role. But the importance of ‘‘therevolving door,’’ with experts recruited from think tanks to engage in closed,policymaking environments or vice versa, is of great importance. Since boththe White House and the State Department depend upon advisers and experts,a logical conclusion is that think tanks are in a position to influence thedecisionmaking process.

The institutional20 school uses an approach that considers think tanks andtheir individual researchers as parts of a policy and expertise network, andunderstands the ways in which they cluster in different decisionmakingsituations. Through this approach, scholars can obtain a deeper appreciationof the ‘‘sub-government’’ by analyzing primary sources such as transcriptsof meetings, protocols, and other relevant documents. Yet, the lack ofoutside sources can create a picture having some limitations. This categoryis also known for its discussions on ‘‘agenda setting’’21 and its focus on theparticular phase in the decisionmaking process wherein various institutionsand interests gather to promote their ideas.

On reflection, no one single school of thought or theory can satisfactorilyexplain the role of think tanks in the policymaking process; an integratedapproach is often necessary unless a specific situation is being studied. Forexample, the static approach might be the most useful in explaining theBush administration’s decisionmaking process before the 2003 invasion ofIraq; in this case, members of an advisory group known as the ‘‘Vulcans’’(that included Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Richard Cheney) hadlinks to the same think tank (in this case the Project for the New AmericanCentury [PNAC]).22 This particular group of people formed a very tightand closed group that had strong pre-election connections to PresidentGeorge W. Bush. An example of an integrated approach could be to applyMurray Weidenbaum’s opinions on Donald Abelson’s theoretical arguments.

Weidenbaum, in his The Competition of Ideas, partly supported theintegrated approach, underlining the difficulties in measuring with anydegree of reliability and validity the influence of think tanks on the policyprocess. Instead, he promoted the idea of the indirect influence of scholars;they compile and analyze material that might otherwise be difficult toaccess. A group of particularly important recipients are staff assistantswho work for the elected members of the U.S. Congress, and especiallythose who work for various Congressional committees.

In addition, Abelson made several interesting observations regarding theAmerican think tank environment. Two trends stand out. The first is that

many contemporary institutes have made and continue to makea concerted effort to influence public opinion and public policy. Rather



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than debating the advantages and disadvantages of various domestic andforeign policies from the comfort of their book lined offices, ThinkTanks, particularly those advocacy-oriented, prefer becoming activeparticipants in the political arena.23

In other words, an attempt is made to influence the public debate regardingspecific issues, and by doing so having an indirect influence on policy.

The other, and perhaps more relevant, observation is linked to the role thatthink tanks play in influencing the public debate and discourses on policyissues by developing certain strategies in order to be competitive on the‘‘idea and influence market.’’ Think tanks have very shifting internal andexternal resources, for example, access to media. The historian JamesSmith has noted that ‘‘think tanks have become all too savvy at competingin the market place of ideas.’’24 The ability of a think tank to promote itselfand transfer its ideas in a wider, public context is a key factor in examiningits influence. This opinion was expressed by most of the survey’s secondround interviewees, who noted that the influence is derived not only inhaving good ideas, but in letting others know the institution has them.A selection of quotes from the survey includes:

. Traditional publishing [. . .] new social media, you have to be innovative withFacebook, Twitter, the whole list of things. Blogs potential, I notice a lot ofthink tanks that are very active, their scholars have blogs. Television, debatingon television, media strategy, magazine, periodicals, influential sort of opinionin your field. All those things. You have to use everything these days. (R17,25

120703, Skype). I think getting time with the senior director at the NAC is extremely hard. I do not

think you can assume that is your principal audience unless the idea has alreadybeen highlighted with an op-ed or some other media event that would grab theattention of a senior director. (R15,26 120702, telephone)

. Media savvy? Exactly, that is the way they put it. They get their views out veryquickly, whenever there is an event in the world or some new developmentwhere their expertise would be sought. So those are some of the reasons.(R17, 120703, Skype)

These interview-obtained quotes demonstrate the way that think tanks try tostand out in a crowded marketplace of ideas. The goal is about getting theirideas and capabilities into the public arena to be noticed, and with luck togain some traction. Abelson’s categorization of think tanks from fourtheoretical approaches has been analyzed by Weidenbaum regarding theirrelevance and substance: first, elite organizations that depend upon expertsand close ties to policymakers do so in order to support their sponsors’political and economic interests. That this school of thought houses twohypotheses that are often wrongfully associated with each other—the talent

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pool for incoming administrations on one side and the purpose of supportingits sponsors on the other—makes it rather difficult to analyze which hypothesisa study actually uses. Due to this methodological problem, Weidenbaumrejected Abelson’s categorization, even though the latter has publicly statedthat he does not support the hypothesis influenced by Marxism.

All the interviewees separated the two parts of this thesis, insofar as theyagreed that think tanks act as talent pools for administrations. However,they also rejected the notion of partisanship, which they believe ruins a thinktank’s brand and reputation, and is therefore counterproductive. Thus, thenetworks are vital, as is the idea of objectivity. Again, some comments:

. Somewhat the revolving door, I think on a lower level it tends to be dynamic.(R3,27 120413, telephone)

. There are a lot of senior experts, senior fellows that tend to be there [at thinktanks] when they are not in government, there are different administrations.(R18,28 120705, F2 F)

. The most important factor is objectivity and being able to speak truth to power.(R1,29 120406, telephone)

. If you are trying to gain trust and credibility, objectivity is a critical piece. ButI think that there are so many disincentives to objectivity that it is almostimpossible to maintain it. (R4,30 120416, telephone)

The last quote is interesting insofar as it notes that objectivity is desired, butthe environment makes maintaining it very difficult. Second, think tanks canbe regarded as just one of several participants in a constantly growing and‘‘crowded marketplace of ideas.’’ Weidenbaum supported this position.Third, think tanks play a modest role in the shaping of policy as comparedto an administration’s power and resources. Weidenbaum partly supportedthis approach, adding that this influence can be of a vital and strategiccharacter at certain moments. He did not express any direct opinions thatwere limited to the White House and State Department within theframework for this school of thought.

The fourth school of thought, according to Abelson, holds that think tankshave different mandates and operate under different circumstances.Weidenbaum argued that think tanks operate in very special circumstancesthat ultimately decide whether or not an institution will be involved in thepolicymaking process. Finally, scholars active in this field of researchconcur on the difficulties of measuring influence. The main reason for thisbeing the lack of hard data regarding the decisionmaking process itself.Weidenbaum’s opinions were well-suited to develop Abelson’s thoughts onthe influence the independent think tanks have on security policy.

Other significant scholars—James McGann, Diane Stone, and AndrewDenham come to mind—use other approaches in exploring and analyzing



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this rather new and uncharted field of research. McGann has studied a numberof key factors (political, economic, and policy related) that affect the abilities ofthink tanks to offer independent advice and analyses. He has used employeeswithin the business as respondents in an early research project. This resultedin a divergent interpretation regarding what role different groups believedthink tanks should play. One such role was to predict the need of policydevelopment before certain needs became obvious, and started to have theirown life, sometimes fueled by special interests.

McGann began collaborating with Erik C. Johnson in 2005. They authoreda comparative study that measured thirteen indicators of influence inpolicymaking in different countries, among them were elements such aspolitical freedom, the political system, number of years as a democracy,number and size of political parties, the type of civil society, freedom of thepress, economic freedom, GNP per capita, the public sector’s demand forindependent policy analysis, the size of the population, philanthropic culture,the number of public and private universities and their degree ofindependence, the degree of internationalization and global integration.31 Thisdetailed account showed a diversity of possible routes of influence, and thepossibilities of think tanks to survive and influence the policymaking process.

Stone and Denham made another comparative study of think tanksin 2004, in which they concluded that the interpretations and opinionsregarding the role and influence of think tanks are diverse: some largelyoverestimate their influence, while others downplay it, sometimes evendescribing it as non-existent. Stone and Denham appear to lean towardsthe latter view, that the think tanks have almost no influence on a state’spolicy development. They claim that ‘‘it is rare to find uncontestedexamples of a one-to-one correspondence between a think tank report anda policy subsequently adopted by government. [. . .] Instead, they (thevarious authors in the book) develop wider and more nuancedunderstandings of think tanks’ policy influence and social relevance intheir roles as agenda-setters that create policy narratives that capture thepolitical and public imagination.’’32 They hold that the value andusefulness of think tanks can be described and interpreted as more indirectrather than in having direct, causal effects.

Two other scholars have conducted research on this matter and arrived atsimilar conclusions. In 2006, the British scholar Geoff Mulgan notedin ‘‘Thinking in Tanks: The Changing Ecology of Political Ideas’’ how thechanging political ecology influences think tanks. His observations, madein a European context, primarily that of the United Kingdom, are that thethink tanks’ ability to adapt to new circumstances on the political marketare decisive for success and the exploitation of new possibilities.33

Ken Weaver at the Brookings Institution in Washington in 1989 tried todescribe the growing number of think tanks, and especially the then

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relatively new category of ‘‘advocacy tanks,’’ that had emerged alongside theolder more established types: ‘‘universities without students’’ and ‘‘non-profitcontractors.’’ The Heritage Foundation’s aggressive marketing capturedWeaver’s interest, noting that its reports were apparently being marketedas being so short that ‘‘the decision makers can read them in a limousineride from National Airport to Capitol Hill.’’34

Weaver correctly argued that think tanks have different roles andpurposes: (1) as a source for specific policy strategies and action plans;(2) as a source of and a tool for the evaluation of policy proposals; (3) asa tool for evaluation of government programs; (4) as a personnel provider(a sort of ‘‘government in exile’’); and (5) as experts in general. Weavernoted that the American system allows for a specific think tank influencedue to the existence of a balance of power between the Congress and thepresidential administration, a relatively weak national political partysystem, and a diverse and available body of administrative elites.

An additional factor that is a key element in the growth of think tanks inthe United States that Weaver put forward is the American culture ofphilanthropy (and the system for tax deductions) for individuals andcorporations that support research. He noted that no single definition ormethodology can be applied in explaining what a think tank does, how itoperates, and is financed. What can be said is that the American thinktank environment is unique, and cannot be transferred without adaptationto the cultures and contexts of other countries.

Richard Higgot and Diane Stone argued that, in evolving over time, thinktanks may have lost some of their ability to influence policy.35 They describedthe ‘‘old type’’ of think tanks as being innovative and visionary, idealistic andclub-like. These institutions relied on scholarship to inform policy. The‘‘new’’ variants are much more activist and even ‘‘hyper-active’’ in nature.As such they are more political and instrumental than the earlier form ofthink tanks. Stephen Barley’s research implied an increasing level of vestedinterests being involved in influencing think tanks and their output,36

Steven Wisensale’s earlier work produced similar results, with think tankspurposing a political as opposed to scholarly approach to their work oninfluencing policy. Nevertheless, the increased number of think tanks hasnot necessarily translated into influence.37 The more numerousconservative think tanks in the U.S. possess greater resources than theirliberal counterparts. But this has not proportionally increased theirinfluence to their organizational number and resources.38

A minority of respondents to the survey considered think tank influencemarginal. Although not part of what is being addressed here, this viewneeds to be mentioned. In terms of think tanks’ effect on security policydecisionmaking, 34 percent of respondents said there was some effect andthree percent said that there was none, while 60 percent answered yes,



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definitely. These figures corresponded approximately with the perceived levelof think tank trust and credibility, about which 34 percent said they were atneutral level, and five percent thought that the level was low or very low.Those who saw think tanks as likely having less influence in the futurebased their opinion on two primary reasons: (1) a possible lack of funding,including money received from private foundations, and (2) the existenceof too many think tanks with excessive overlap in a crowded field.

Convergence Among the Four

Six points of convergence regarding the think tank phenomenon can bedistinguished among Abelson, Weidenbaum, Weaver, and Mulgan (withthe latter operating in a British context):

1. The market for ideas has become increasingly crowded.2. A stellar reputation is the key to survival and success regarding influence and

finances.3. No single model exists for the classification of a think tank; different models and

versions exist side by side in a heterogenic policymaking environment.4. Think tanks must be able to attract media and decisionmakers in order to survive

and operate. This can be achieved only if the think tank has access to excellentpersonnel and its activities are of a high standard.

5. Think tanks are a hybrid between the academic and the political worlds.6. Think tanks do not usually have the objective of influencing specific pieces of

legislation but rather tend to call attention to, and generate a public debateabout, general policy options.

A PRELIMINARY POSITIONING IN A MATRIX

In practice, the different theoretical approaches have a tendency to overlap,and the line between the different schools of thought is perhaps not asdistinct as the matrix indicates. For example, that the pluralistic schooldoes not hinder the power groups in the static school can also be observedwithin its own framework. (See Figure 1.)

Understanding Influence

To begin with, some framing of the term ‘‘influence’’ is needed. Robert A.Dahl defined it as ‘‘a relation among human actors such that the wants,desires, preferences, or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions,or predispositions to act, of one or more actors in a direction consistentwith—and not contrary to—the wants, preferences, or intentions of theinfluence-wielder(s).’’39 He then narrowed down the different ways ofunderstanding influence, where the notions of distribution, gradation, scope,and domain can serve as guides to the observation and analysis of influence.

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Yet, a precise and reliable measurement of different actors’ influence—especially weighing its scope and domain—remains difficult in theory aswell as in practice, though the centrality of influence seems clear. Thequestions posed by Dahl relating to this study are highly relevant: Whatpersons or groups have the greatest effect on legislative tax measures? Whotends to initiate proposals, to win others over to them, to carry themthrough over opposition, to defeat or sidetrack proposals over others?Why do some policy questions never become public issues?

Dahl also referred to Jack Nagel’s discussion on causality. Nagel stated thatdirect influence means influence on a specific decisionmaking process—eitherin choosing some alternatives or rejecting one or more alternatives. Indirectinfluence is more connected with how often think tanks are consulted orconstitute a part of the decisionmakers’ reference framing. Influence is often

Figure 1. The Role of Think Tanks. Note that an open system refers to one that is receptiveto outsider or external input. A closed system is not open to input from anyone that is not partof the in-group.



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understood as a ‘‘causal connection between an actor’s preference on anoutcome and maybe also the form of the outcome.’’40 Influence is tied tothe ability of an individual or organization to persuade a target audience.

The basis of persuasion is not that of ‘‘forcing’’ a viewpoint or course ofaction upon another, but rather to present information in such a manneras to convince someone to freely choose a particular point of view oraction. Important within this context is that persuasion is influenced bymoral components—choosing to engage in morally beneficent actions whilerefraining from selecting morally reprehensible ones, for example.41 Thisimplies the weighing of moral judgments based upon symbolism andvalues.42 Richard Perloff defined persuasion as ‘‘a symbolic processin which communicators try to convince other people to change theirattitudes and behaviors regarding an issue through the transmission ofa message in an atmosphere of free choice.’’43

Persuasion features five different components: (1) it is a symbolic process;(2) it involves an attempt to influence; (3) people often persuade themselves;(4) it involves the transmission of a message; and (5) it requires freechoice.44 In terms of impact, persuasion can be used for three broad effects.One is to shape attitudes and opinions on something. A second use is toreinforce attitudes and opinions in an audience. The third effect is to changeattitudes and opinions.45 These now need to be tied back to think tanks andhow they embark upon attempting to persuade (and influence) policymakers.

Murray Weidenbaum studied the influence of think tanks in Washington,DC, from a more general perspective. He found their influence to begenerally underestimated and was somewhat critical of the present schoolsof research in this area. Second-round interviewees in this project seemedto be split about the influence of think tanks on the policy process. Thedifferent camps agreed that influence did in fact occur, but for quitedifferent reasons. One camp spoke of broadening the dialogue and debateon an issue or policy, and another that think tanks were used as a kind of‘‘rubber stamp’’ for a pre-determined policy. For example:

. ‘‘I think think tanks influence policy by presenting new ideas so that they help tofurther the debate. They also help influence policy by actually doing the work thegovernment officials very often do not have the time to do themselves, they arebusy working on so many issues, that think tanks help to bring a knowledgethat would otherwise not exist in government’’ (R9,46 120517, Skype).

. ‘‘They can be tremendously influential but sometimes only because theconclusions or the think tanks are the way of validating the policy’’ (R13,47

120615, Skype).

But at least three problems make the measuring of influence problematic:different channels for influence, the existence of counteractive lobbying, and

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the fact that influence can conducted at different stages of the policy process.48

Thomas Medvetz, an institutionalist, argued that perhaps the most importanteffect of think tank influence is not in promoting its own proposals, butinstead to ensure that inferior alternatives are weeded out, thus making iteven harder to state causality.49 Sun Zhiru and Zhang Zhiqiang50 proposedthat a quantitative text analysis be undertaken to measure influence. This canbe done by comparing a think tank’s policy position with the final policyoutput. Their argument was that doing so allows for assessing the preferencerealization of think tanks in the decisionmaking process.

Think tanks must compete with one another in an increasingly crowdedmarketplace of ideas, which demands innovative strategies in order toattract the attention of policymakers. The main methodological element ofthe research approach discussed here was a two-tier questionnaire torespondents with an ‘‘insider’s perspective’’ on the U.S. think tankenvironment to possibly derive their role and influence. The focus, then, ison the outcome of the quantitative part and also an overview on thinktanks influence on and in Congress. The research question is thusnarrowed down to: Which think tanks are most influential in the U.S.security policy domain?—a focus based on the assumption that they in factdo exercise significant influence.

EMPIRICS AND ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF THINK TANKS—TWOAPPROACHES

Questionnaire with an Insider Perspective (Quantitative)

An important basic assumption for this survey questionnaire for both activeand retired public officials was to find out whether or not think tanks wereperceived as having any influence on security policy, and which are themost successful among them. The result was subsequently used to identifycommon denominators.

The questionnaire was emailed to approximately 270 respondents in theUnited States; only 35 of them answered. A major reason for the lack ofresponse was that the Department of Defense, the State Department, andothers in the security community have very powerful firewalls that do notallow the reception of e-mails from overseas that could be characterizedas bulk e-mails. Several of the recipients were ‘‘friends of friends’’ who didnot know me personally. Due to this they could not verify me as the sender.I also tried to use a digital signature on my e-mails in order to prove my‘‘bona fide credentials’’ but that created even more problems with the firewalls.

The 35 who responded were highly qualified. On average, they had servedfor 22 years working with security policy within various administrations. Dueto their experience they had the right background as customers to thinktanks. An additional second round of in-depth interviews with 18 of the



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original 35 (who agreed to be contacted further) took place via Skype and viatelephone. The questions in the second round were designed to tease outanswers raised by the initial questionnaire.

The most striking finding was that 94 percent of the respondents thought thatthink tanks have influence and an impact on decisions regarding U.S. securitypolicy. Sixty percent of the respondents believed that think tanks are heldin high esteem regarding security policy. Seventy-seven percent thoughtthat think tanks work as a ‘‘talent pool’’ for incoming presidentialadministrations. They were somewhat equivocal regarding the argument thatthink tanks are a part of the policy-generating environment in which the bestideas become successful in an open and free market, which implies that otherfactors such as networks, media policy, and so forth, also play an importantrole. Essentially then, 80 percent of the respondents believed that the primarystrategy for success for think tanks is based upon networking; nearly thesame number believe it important for the think tanks to carefully consider atwhich phase they should start to find a place in the policy process.

The study disclosed that those at the most important level for influencingdecisionmakers are the congressional staffers on Capitol Hill and theso-called GS-15 (directors within departments and agencies)—and not thepolitically-appointed Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. In otherwords, officials at the highest political level—Department Secretaries,Senators and Members of Congress—appear to be rather uninterestedrecipients of the work and efforts of think tanks. A possible reason for theinfluence of congressional staffers and GS-15-level officials is found insome recurring answers given by the respondents, namely that they mayinsert think tank findings into governmental analyses. Therefore, doing somay affect the level of trust and credibility placed in the material by seniorpolicymakers owing to the source, seemingly governmental as opposed tothink tanks. The critical importance for think tanks of establishing personalnetworks in order to influence decisionmaking was also highlighted ina study by Andrew Rich and Kent Weaver.51

The five most important ‘‘bipartisan’’ think tanks actively working withsecurity policies are, according to the respondents, the Center for Strategicand International Studies (CSIS), the Brookings Institution, the Council ofForeign Relations (CFR), the RAND Corporation, and the Center fora New American Security (CNAS). The importance of such othersignificant actors as the Heritage Foundation is somewhat downplayed,mainly because they have a tendency to function as ‘‘advocacy centers,’’with a mostly conservative bias rather than as independent experts. Thesethink tanks are active primarily within Washington, DC ‘‘Beltway,’’ withthe exception of the CFR, which is based in New York.

Also of interest is that nearly 80 percent of the respondents anticipate thatthe influence of the think tanks will remain unchanged, indicating that a very

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stable system is also largely closed and limited to the already existingstructures, thus making access to the system difficult for newcomers. TheCNAS, only eight years old and rather modest for its size, might be anexception; it is apparently able to complement its small staff with a fewhighly qualified key people and relevant networks.

Think Tank Influence in the U.S. Congress

When the respondents in the first round of interviews rated the think tanksthat work with security related issues, the five mentioned institutionsemerged as being especially noteworthy. To verify these ratings, an analysiswas done in order to find out how often their presence could be noticed atrelevant congressional hearings and sub-committee sessions (specificallythose dealing with budget, foreign policy, defense, and justice) during theperiod 2007–2012.

This analysis showed that, in the House of Representatives, ‘‘the big five’’were involved in some capacity on 93 occasions; fifteen other think tankswere involved on 88 occasions. This was even more obvious in the Senate,which is supposedly less partisan, and operates within a longer time frame.‘‘The big five’’ were involved on 58 occasions; the other fifteen wereinvolved on 21. The usual practice is for three outside experts to be calledto testify at a congressional hearing in order to highlight an issue. Two arenominated (one each) by the majority and minority sides; the third personis usually an independent expert. Here the think tanks play a role byproviding fact-based recommendations.

Individual members of Congress and the committee staffs are responsible forinforming themselves in regard to different issues, especially those regardingsecurity policy to which gaining access might be difficult. The main reasonfor this difficulty is that the American political system lacks a parliamentarypolitical system, as opposed to the rest of the Western world. Outsiders, suchas RAND’s director Michael Rich, are concerned that the members ofCongress tend to become increasingly polarized, and base their opinions onconviction rather than on empirical facts; if the facts happen to support oneside, the other side feels a need to be against it almost by default.

Verification of the influence of ‘‘the big five’’ was useful in preparation forthe follow-up qualitative interviews.

ANALYSIS OF THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE ANSWERS FROMSCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS

Notably, frameworks provided by the previously mentioned scholars(McCann, Weaver, Stone, Denham, and Johnson) proved not so useful forthe focus of this study. Denham and Stone completely rejected any form of



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outside influence on governmental policy development, a position that turnedout to wrong in this context. Thus, the indirect influence they identified mustin this case be interpreted as being done by public opinion and media.

Abelson, however, appears to be correct regarding the important role thatthink tanks play, even though conceptualizing it might be difficult. Therespondents’ answers indicate that, to some degree, a combination of theelitist and institutional schools best describes the role of the think tanks.Yet, the elitist school is too complex as a model, since accepting that thinktanks form a talent pool for coming administrations is possible, while at thesame time rejecting the ideas inspired by Marxism, mainly that think tanksexist primarily to support the interests of their donors (as Domhoff argued).Abelson rejected the Marxist position, but admitted that the theoreticalconcept of utilizing four analytical schools is not complete; still, hisdescription of them is actually limiting, as was pointed out by Weidenbaum.

A significant discrepancy of my study when compared to Abelson’sfindings is that 77 percent of the respondents believed that the WhiteHouse and the State Department are not the two most important actorsregarding the nation’s security policies. This belief could indicate that theleading role is played by other high-level institutions and power centersthat have acquired increasingly independent roles, e.g., the DefenseDepartment and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It could alsoindicate that the decisions are actually made at a lower bureaucratic level,by what might be termed ‘‘gatekeepers.’’ This could also explain why thinktanks rely so much on networking with these gatekeepers.

An alternative, and perhaps more realistic, explanation could be that thinktanks exercise influence on security policies and decisionmaking, dependingmore on their networks than on the value of their producing policy relevantanalysis. This explanation confirms Weidenbaum’s conclusions.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THINK TANKS

The assumed role and influence of think tanks in the United Statesin general—and on the field of security policy in particular—is unique.This source of competence and expertise appears to fulfill a stabilizingfunction, lubricating the ties between politics and administration, animportant role since the United States lacks traditional political partiescommon to other Western countries. That the financiers of most thinktanks traditionally avoid influencing their work, opinions, and marketing isalso a rather unusual tradition in the United States.

This phenomenon has been analyzed by using some of the better-knowntheories and approaches in this field of research. The results were appliedto a questionnaire given to respondents who have been working in theAmerican government on security-related issues for a considerable time.

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In my study, the role of think tanks in the security was limited to theAmerican context. From the questionnaires, the findings and indications are:

1. Think tanks have (assumed) influence over the decisionmaking process regardingU.S. security policy (according to 94 percent of the respondents).

2. The most important think tanks were thought to be CSIS, Brookings, CFR,RAND, and CNAS. Such indirect influences as networks, appearances inCongress, and other methods that are difficult to measure must also be takeninto account. Also worth noting is the overrepresentation of ‘‘the big five’’ ina congressional context.

The common denominator for four of ‘‘the big five’’ is the perception thatthey are bi-=non-partisan, politically mainstream, have a solid financialbasis, have recruited highly respected employees (scholars, secretariesof state, diplomats), and have been operating for at least 40 years. TheCNAS is the exception; it is considerably smaller, and was created as lateas 2007. Nevertheless, it became highly influential—notably so within theObama administration—and is considered to be independent, even thoughsome former employees have been perceived as being on the conservativeside of the political spectrum (for example, General David Petraeus).

Four conditions are necessary to emphasize in summarizing the very specificAmerican environment for think tanks. First, again, the American politicalsystem does not have the traditional European-style political parties thatcomprehensively control a government. This leads to an independent searchfor knowledge that is relevant for long-term policy making. Second, theexistence of a political ‘‘spoils-system’’ makes possible a change in high-levelcivil servants every fourth year: this means that approximately 1,000politically-appointed civil servants most probably leave their positions everyfourth year, thus generating a need to re-create institutional knowledge, oftenby using think tanks. In addition, those employees leaving their positionsbecome available for recruitment by the think tanks. Third, the Americansystem is known for its philanthropy and generous taxation benefits, thusproviding a source of funding for the ‘‘big five’’ and others.

A fourth factor, not appearing in my work but deserving mention, is thequestion of equal access and information availability. The United States hasa rather young Intelligence Community, with a culture of ‘‘academicoutreach’’ and the secrecy legislation that goes along with it.52 Consequently,employees of think tanks have the same access to information as civil servantsin the projects on which they are working. For this reason, sorting out theirrecommendations by merely labeling them as ‘‘uninformed,’’ as sometimeshappens in Europe, is not possible.

Ultimately, then, think tanks play a very important role in the creation ofsecurity policies, and enjoy a great level of trust and confidence within the



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American bureaucracy. Merely presenting the best proposals and ideas is notenough; their influence depends on their networking skills. In addition, thinktanks have an indirect influence by being a base for a ‘‘government in exile.’’Another factor for success is where in the policy process a certain think tankchoses to focus.

The most important recipients and consumers of think tank products aregovernment personnel just below the politically-appointed level, the‘‘machinists’’ of the political system. This group must be able toconsistently and quickly deliver accurate information to their superiors.

The need and demand for the services of think tanks are likely to remain at thesame level for the foreseeable future; this continuity also applies to the structureof independent institutions studied here. The reason for this is primarily thatit takes considerable time to create a trusted brand. In this context, that thenewcomer CNAS so quickly became the fifth member of this club is notable.

Ultimately, then, Murray Weidenbaum’s ‘‘overlap’’ on Donald Abelson’stheoretical approach regarding the pluralistic school appears to be the mostdeveloped theory for an analysis of the think tank phenomenon. His studiesin other fields of research support this argument. Based upon the empiricalfindings in this study, other theories are of a lesser interest. How this thinktank influence is being created and evaluated warrants further research.

Two hypotheses—based upon the pluralistic school—appear to be ofimportance: first, necessary elements for success are independence andintegrity; second, to a high degree think tanks create their influence andimpact by using indirect methods, such as networks and other personalcontacts.

REFERENCES1

Yehezkel Dror, ‘‘Required Breakthroughs in Think Tanks,’’ Policy Sciences,Vol. 16, 1984, pp. 199–225; Richard Higgot and Diane Stone, ‘‘The Limitsof Foreign Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,’’Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 15–34.

2R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks,’’ P.S.: Political Scienceand Politics, Vol. 22, September 1989, pp. 563–579; Geoff Mulgan, ‘‘Thinking inTanks: The Changing Ecology of Political Ideas,’’ The Political Quarterly, Vol. 77,No. 2, April–June 2006, pp. 147–155.

3R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks’’; Murray Weidenbaum,The Competition of Ideas: The World of the Washington Think Tanks(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011).

4John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York:Pearson, 2011), p. 54.

5Donald E. Abelson, Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy (Montreal:McGill-Queens University Press, 2006); R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World

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of Think Tanks’’; Murray Weidenbaum, The Competition of Ideas: The World ofthe Washington Think Tanks; Eric Swank, ‘‘Clinton’s Domestic Policy Makers,’’Journal of Poverty, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1998, pp. 55–78.

6Lars Nicander, ‘‘Shielding the Net—Understanding the Issue of Vulnerability andThreat to the Information Society,’’ Policy Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2010, pp. 283–300.

7The 18 respondents—interviewed through personal meetings (F2F), throughSkype and by phone—have been renamed R1 through R18. Because ofconfidentiality issues, quotes from all respondents have not been used tohighlight claims in this article but will be presented in upcoming articles on thesame subject.

8James G. McGann and Erik C. Johnson, Comparative Think Tanks, Politicsand Public Policy (Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005); JamesG. McGann, Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisorsand Advocates (New York: Routledge, 2007).

9R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks.’’

10FFRDCs conduct research for the United States government. They are administeredby universities and corporations in accordance with the U.S Code of FederalRegulations, Title 48, Part 35, Section 35.017. See http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/gennotes.cfm och http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf05306/.

11James G. McGann, 2012 Global Go to Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 24.

12R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks,’’ p. 570.

13See among others, ibid., p. 570.

14Colin S. Gray, ‘‘‘Think Tanks’ and Public Policy,’’ International Journal, Vol. 33,No. 1, Opinion and Policy, Winter 1977=1978, pp. 177–194, at p. 190.

15Murray Weidenbaum, The Competition of Ideas: The World of the WashingtonThink Tanks, p. 58.

16Joseph G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America’sRightward Turn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Thomas R. Dye,Who’s Running America?, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986); G.William Domhoff, ‘‘Social Clubs, Policy Planning Groups, and Corporations:A Network Study of Ruling-Class Cohesiveness,’’ Insurgent Sociologist, Vol. 5,No. 3, 1975, pp. 173–184; John S. Saloma (III), Ominous Politics: The NewConservative Labyrinth (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984).

17G. William Domhoff, ‘‘Social Clubs, Policy Planning Groups, and Corporations:A Network Study of Ruling-Class Cohesiveness.’’

18David Newsom, ‘‘Foreign Policy and Academia,’’ Foreign Policy. Vol. 101, 1995–1996,pp. 52–67.

19Theda Skocpol, ‘‘Government Activism and the Reorganisation of American CivicDemocracy,’’ Paper given at the conference The Transformation of the AmericanPolity, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA., 3–4 December 2004; StephenKrasner, Structural Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

20Hugh Heclo, ‘‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,’’ in AnthonyKing, ed., The New American Political System (Washington, DC: American



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http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/gennotes.cfm

http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ffrdclist/gennotes.cfm

http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf05306/

Enterprise Institute Press, 1978); Evert A. Lindquist, ‘‘Think Tanks or Clubs?Assessing the Influence and Roles of Canadian Policy Institutes,’’ CanadianPublic Administration, Vol. 36, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 547–579; DianeStone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996).

21John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Denis Stairs, ‘‘Willand Circumstance and the Postwar Study of Canada’s Foreign PolicyInternational Journal,’’ Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, Vol. 50,March 1995, pp. 9–39.

22James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York:Viking, 2004).

23Donald E. Abelson, Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy, Preface.

24James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans.

25R17: Senior counsel and co-author to the 9=11 Commission, former CIA officer,consultant to Homeland Security projects and Bipartisan Policy Center,counterterrorism advisor to the State Department and to the Nuclear ThreatInitiative, 25 years of experience within the U.S. security policy environmentand U.S. government.

26R15: Adjunct professor at Georgetown University, former career intelligenceanalyst at the CIA, former National Intelligence Officer, over 30 years ofexperience within the U.S. security policy environment and U.S. government.

27R3: Senior Risk Management scientist in the Department of Human ServicesScience and Technology Directorate, former Federal on-scene coordinator forseveral major incidents, 7 years of experience in the central government and 30years of experience in the Coast Guard.

28R18: Served as a soldier, a lawyer, a professor, and a diplomat, and has workedfor the White House, the Pentagon, the World Bank, the United Nations, anda large international law firm. Currently a senior fellow and adjunct professorat Georgetown University with a total of 15 years of experience within U.S.security policy and U.S. government.

29R1: Former Chairman of the Department of Grand Strategy and Mobilizationat National Defense University, served in the U.S. Air Force, including twotours to Vietnam, adjunct professor at Georgetown University and over 40years of experience within the U.S. security policy environment and U.S.government.

30R4: Cultural anthropologist, who works on defense and national security issues,has held positions at a variety of think tanks, including RAND and the Institutefor Defense Analysis, former scientific advisor to the United States Army HumanTerrain System, with a total of 13 years of experience within the U.S. securitypolicy environment and the U.S. government.

31James G. McGann and Eric C. Johnson, Comparative Think Tanks, Politics andPublic Policy, pp. 1–21.

32Diane Stone and Andrew Denham, Think Tank Traditions: Policy Analysis AcrossNations (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 11.

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33George Mulgan, ‘‘Thinking in Tanks: The Changing Ecology of Political Ideas.’’

34R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks,’’ p. 567.

35Richard Higgot and Diane Stone, ‘‘The Limits of Foreign Influence: ForeignPolicy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,’’ p. 34.

36Stephen R. Barley, ‘‘Building an Institutional Field to Corral a Government:A Case to Set an Agenda for Organization Studies,’’ Organization Studies,Vol. 31, No. 6, 2010, pp. 777–805, at pp. 791–792.

37Steven K. Wisensale, ‘‘The Family in the Think Tank,’’ Family Relations, Vol. 40,No. 2, April 1991, pp. 199–207.

38Andrew Rich, ‘‘US Think Tanks and the Intersection of Ideology, Advocacy andInfluence,’’ NIRA Review, Winter 2001, pp. 54–59, at p. 59.

39Robert Allan Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, Modern Political Analysis, 6th ed.(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Publishing, 2003), p. 17.

40John H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press, 1975), pp. 29, 55.

41Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes inthe 21st Century, 4th edition (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 11.

42Ibid., p. 12.

43Ibid.

44Ibid., pp. 12–15.

45Ibid., pp. 24–25.

46R9: Founder and Director of Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation,lecturer in counterterrorism and U.S. foreign policy, Senior Fellow at John HopkinsUniversity, and nonresident Senior Fellow at George Washington University,a total of 14 years of experience within the U.S. security policy environment.

47R13: 37 years of government service including Assistant Inspector General forSecurity Oversight, Senior Advisor for Policy to the Assistant Secretary ofDefense, Assistant Secretary of State, and Director for Intelligence Policy.

48Andreas Dur, ‘‘Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note onMethodology,’’ Forum Section, European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2008,pp. 559–576, at p. 561.

49Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America (Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress, 2012).

50Sun Zhiru and Zhang Zhiqiang, Measuring Think Tank Influence UsingQuantitative Text Analysis (International Conference on Information, Businessand Education Technology: Atlantis Press, 2013).

51Andrew Rich and R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘Think Tanks in the US Media,’’ TheHarvard International Journal of Press=Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2000, pp. 81–103.

52Lars Nicander, ‘‘Understanding Intelligence Community Innovation in thePost-9=11 World,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,Vol. 24, No. 3, Fall 2011, pp. 534–568.



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The Role of Think Tanks in the U.S.

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Transcript of The Role of Think Tanks in the U.S.