The Relationships Between Motivations of Intergroup Differentiation as aFunction of Different Dimensions of Social Identity

Nagihan TasdemirMiddle East Technical University

This article aims to classify social identity-based theories of intergroup differentiation in terms ofdifferent dimensions of social identity to understand further the motivational bases of intergroupdifferentiation. For this purpose, I attempt to incorporate three lines of research in social psychology: (a)theories examining intergroup differentiation as a function of social identity, namely social identitytheory and SCT; (b) studies suggesting social identity as a multidimensional construct; and (c) motiva-tional theories of intergroup differentiation, namely subjective uncertainty reduction theory, optimaldistinctiveness theory, and self-esteem hypothesis. It is suggested that subjective uncertainty reductiontheory explains motivational basis of cognitive dimension, that optimal distinctiveness theory explainsmotivational basis of emotional dimension, and that self-esteem hypothesis explains motivational basisof evaluative dimension of social identity. Finally, the relationships between motivations of intergroupdifferentiation as a function of different dimensions of social identity are considered.

Keywords: motivation, intergroup differentiation, social identity, dimensions of social identity

In-group/out-group differentiation is an inevitable characteristicof social life, and many social psychologists are still very busywith the issue of intergroup differentiation. At the outset of socialpsychology, Allport (1954) argued that in-groups are very impor-tant for individuals because they provide people with a sense ofattachment and belonging. Thus, he explained that people tend tolike or favor their in-groups over the out-groups (i.e., in-groupfavoritism or intergroup differentiation).

There are today many theories of intergroup relations that at-tempt to explore the antecedents and/or consequences of inter-group differentiation. Some of these theories, namely, the realisticconflict theory (Sherif, 1966) and the instrumental model of groupconflict (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998), conceptualize inter-group differentiation in terms of incompatible group interests (e.g.,scarce material resources for which groups compete). On the otherhand, other theories, namely, the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel& Turner, 1979), self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg,Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), optimal distinctiveness the-ory (Brewer, 1991), and subjective uncertainty reduction theory(Hogg, 2000), conceptualize intergroup differentiation in terms ofsocial identity concerns of individuals.

It is worth noting that these two lines of theories seem to differalso in terms of the definition of in-group/out-group differentia-tion. In instrumental theories (e.g., realistic conflict theory), inter-group differentiation is generally characterized by competition andin-group favoritism goes with the out-group derogation. In socialidentity-based theories (e.g., SIT), however, positive attitudes to-ward the in-groups may not be positively related to the negativeattitudes toward the out-groups. That is, people who favor thein-groups over the out-groups do not have to derogate the out-

groups, although there may be situations for them to behave so(Brewer, 1999, 2001). Indeed, there is research evidence indicatingthat intergroup differentiation occurs through the distribution ofpositive outcomes but not through the distribution of negativeoutcomes (at least in the absence of “realistic” group competition;Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1997; Mummendey et al., 1992).This suggests that, in general, people tend to benefit the in-groupsmore than the out-groups but not tend to harm the out-groups.Accordingly, dealing with the social identity-based theories ofintergroup relations, this article considers intergroup differentia-tion as people’s tendency to favor their in-groups over the out-groups.

There are also differences among social identity-based theoriesof intergroup differentiation. SCT (Turner et al., 1987), for exam-ple, attempts to explain cognitive antecedents of intergroup differ-entiation. SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) emphasizes intergroupdifferentiation in terms of people’s strive for positive or bettersocial identity. Other theories (e.g., optimal distinctiveness the-ory), on the other hand, offer motivational explanations and pro-pose that social identity concerns can motivate people to evaluatethe in-group members more positively than the out-group members(Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Brewer, 1991; Hogg, 2000; Tajfel &Turner, 1979).

These social identity-based theories of intergroup relations as-sume that social identity is directly and consistently related to theintergroup differentiation. That is, they typically assess socialidentity as a one-dimensional construct (Taylor & Moghaddam,1994). However, recently, researchers (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Elle-mers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002) suggestedthat social identity is best conceptualized as a multidimensionalconstruct and that at least three general and distinct dimensions,namely the cognitive, emotional, and evaluative ones, contribute tothe social identity. They argued that the relationship betweensocial identity and intergroup differentiation might vary as a func-tion of different dimensions of social identity (e.g., Ellemers et al.,

This article was published Online First May 16, 2011.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nagihan

Tasdemir, Department of Psychology, Middle East Technical University,Inonu Bulvari, 06531, Ankara, Turkey. E-mail: nagihan@metu.edu.tr

Review of General Psychology © 2011 American Psychological Association2011, Vol. 15, No. 2, 125–137 1089-2680/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0022816

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1999; Jackson & Smith, 1999). In such a context, I attempt tounderstand how motivations of intergroup differentiation may varyand how they may relate to each other, as a function of differentdimensions of social identity.

Specifically, this article attempts to classify social identity-basedtheories of intergroup differentiation in terms of different dimen-sions of social identity to understand further the motivational basesof intergroup differentiation. Accordingly, the first aim is to linksocial identity-based theories of intergroup differentiation (includ-ing motivational theories) with different dimensions of socialidentity. The second aim is to explore how motivations of inter-group differentiation may be related to one another as a function ofdifferent dimensions of social identity.

To achieve these purposes, first SIT and SCT are presented tointroduce the concept of intergroup differentiation as a function ofsocial identity. Second, the studies conceptualizing social identityas a multidimensional construct are explained. Third, motivationaltheories of intergroup differentiation, namely subjective uncer-tainty reduction theory, optimal distinctiveness theory, and self-esteem hypothesis, are considered in terms of cognitive, emotional,and evaluative dimensions of social identity, respectively. Finally,the relationships between motivations of intergroup differentiationare investigated through the frame of different dimensions ofsocial identity.

Intergroup Differentiation as a Function of SocialIdentity: Theories of Social Identity and

Self-Categorization

SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is one main approach for theunderstanding of psychological basis of intergroup differentiation.This theory attempts to explain intergroup differentiation or con-flict from a social identity perspective. SIT theorists argue thatintergroup behavior is “any behavior displayed by one or moreactors toward one or more others that is based on the actors’identification of themselves and the others as belonging to differ-ent social categories” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40).

In SIT, the people’s tendency to make intergroup differentiationis seen as a function of individuals’ desire for positive socialidentity or positively evaluated group membership. Arguing thus,SIT researchers assume that social groups or categories are asso-ciated with positive or negative value connotations; that is, socialidentities define individuals in terms of how better or worse theyare than other out-group members. Accepting individuals’ strivefor positive self-concept; SIT postulates that people are motivatedto achieve a positive or better social identity, because socialidentities derived from group memberships constitute part of in-dividuals’ self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

To explain the phenomenon of intergroup differentiation or howindividuals achieve a positive or better social identity, SIT focuseson three psychological concepts: social identification, social com-parison, and psychological distinctiveness. It is argued that, first,individuals must come to perceive themselves as group members;that is, they must be subjectively identified with the in-group.Second, social situation must involve groups that enable individ-uals to make intergroup comparisons on relevant evaluative attri-butes. Third, individuals must perceive the out-group as a relevantcomparison group (e.g., proximal, similar, or salient), whichshould increase the individuals’ strive for positive in-group dis-

tinctiveness; that is, intergroup differentiation, to achieve a posi-tive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Thus, SIT hypothesizes that when people define themselves interms of group memberships; that is, social identity, they makeintergroup social comparisons that aim to differentiate the in-grouppositively from the out-group. Similarly, Turner (1975) distin-guishes between social identity-based and material resource-basedintergroup conflict and argues that the former is motivated byself-evaluation concerns and is formed through social comparisonprocesses whereas the latter causes “realistic” competition be-tween groups.

People’s tendency to differentiate their own groups positivelyfrom the out-groups was first demonstrated in the studies ofminimal group paradigm (Diehle, 1990; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, &Bundy, 1971). This paradigm focuses on exploring the minimalconditions necessary for intergroup differentiation. For this, inminimal group paradigm, participants are divided into two groupson the basis of trivial criterion. The results of these experimentsshow that when participants make a choice between in-group andout-group members (for resource allocation), they favor the in-group members at the expense of out-group members. Accordingto SIT researchers, these studies evidence that minimal groupcondition, that is, in the absence of interaction within or betweenthe groups, the mere categorization of participants (e.g., on thebasis of preference for certain painter), is sufficient for individualsto discriminate against the out-group in the favor of the in-group(Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The other important theory focusing on the concept of inter-group differentiation as a function of social identity is SCT(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Being extended and elaboratedversion of SIT, SCT offers propositions about the cognitive mech-anisms underlying the individuals’ self-categorization and inter-group differentiation processes. It is actually seen as a cognitivetheory of human behavior within intergroup contexts (Taylor &Moghaddam, 1994; Turner, 1999). Turner et al. (1987) argues thatSCT explores the social–cognitive basis of intergroup behavior.

SCT provides explanations of how people come to perceivethemselves in terms of social categories to which they belong,hence of how they come to discriminate between members of theirown categories and members of other categories. This process isexplained by the metacontrast principle. It is suggested that anycollection of individuals in a given situation is likely to categorizethemselves as a group when they perceive the differences amongeach other less than the differences between them and other peoplein the same situation (Turner, 1985). Accordingly, when the valueof metacontrast ratio is high, that is, when intergroup differencesare greater than the intragroup differences, it is assumed thatpeople define themselves in terms of group memberships anddifferentiate between the in-groups and out-groups.

SCT proposes that to the extent that metacontrast ratio is high,people see the in-group members as similar to themselves. On theother hand, to the extent that metacontrast ratio is high, people seethe out-group members as different from themselves (Turner,Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). As a result, it is suggested thatthe formation of in-group and out-group prototypes, that is, thecharacteristics of one group that distinguish it from other groups,depersonalize the individual self, that is, assimilates individual tothe in-group prototype. When depersonalization takes place, peo-ple perceive themselves as no different from the in-group members

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on the relevant dimension but very different from the out-groupmembers, that is, they come to perceive themselves in terms ofgroup membership or social identity.

To summarize, it seems that in SCT social identities and inter-group differentiation are seen as depending on the social context(in which intergroup comparison takes place) and as a conse-quence of the individuals’ categorization process. Thus, it can beargued that, in SCT, depersonalization as depending on the socialintergroup context is the basic process that leads people to differ-entiate their in-groups from the out-groups.

Turner (1999) distinguishes between the original SIT, which hesees as a theory of intergroup conflict focusing on the individuals’strive, for positive in-group distinctiveness, and SCT, which hesees as a theory of group processes explaining cognitive under-pinnings of social identity. In a parallel way, it seems that explain-ing the concept of intergroup differentiation, SIT emphasizespeople’s need for positive in-group membership whereas SCTemphasizes the social context whether or not it is likely to activaterelevant social categories (Hogg, 2000). However, considering thepropositions of SIT and SCT, it can be suggested that both theoriesattempt to explain the process of intergroup differentiation as afunction of social identity.

At a theoretical level, Tajfel (1978) defines social identity as“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from hisknowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) to-gether with the value and emotional significance attached to thatmembership” (p. 63). Although Tajfel’s definition implies thatsocial identity is a multidimensional construct, involving the cog-nitive, evaluative, and emotional components, SIT and SCT theo-rists did not consider the role of social identity as a multidimen-sional construct in the exploration of intergroup behavior (Taylor& Moghaddam, 1994). Thus, before proceeding to understand whypeople tend to engage in intergroup differentiation from a perspec-tive of social identity, it seems necessary to consider the conceptof social identity as a multidimensional construct.

Social Identity as a Multidimensional Construct

Referring to Tajfel’s (1978) social identity definition, someresearchers (Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 2002)argue that social identity is a multidimensional construct. In gen-eral, they propose three components of social identity: cognitive,evaluative, and emotional components.

Ellemers et al. (1999) term these three dimensions of socialidentity as “self-categorization” (cognitive component), “affectivecommitment” (emotional component), and “group self-esteem”(evaluative component). They define self-categorization dimen-sion as “a cognitive awareness of one’s membership in a socialgroup,” affective commitment dimension as “a sense of emotionalinvolvement with the group,” and group self-esteem dimension as“a positive or negative value connotation attached to this groupmembership.” Ellemers et al. (1999) indicate that group self-esteem is influenced by relative group status (higher group statusmatches with higher group self-esteem), that self-categorization isdependent on the relative group size (smaller groups, being salientand distinctive, increase the possibility of self-categorization), andthat affective commitment is influenced by both the group statusand group formation criterion; that is, assigned versus achieved

group membership (higher status and achieved groups increase theaffective commitment).

Similarly, Jackson’s (2002) empirical study supports a three-dimensional model of social identity (including cognitive, evalu-ative, and affective ties as components) although he postulates fourdimensions, including also perceived common fate (e.g., feelingsof reciprocal support, belongingness, and kinship). Jackson (2002)operationalizes cognitive dimension in terms of self-categorization(“I am a member of Group X”), depersonalization (“I think aboutmyself in terms of group attributes”), and metacontrast (“thein-group and out-group are differentiated”). He defines emotionalor affective dimension in terms of being satisfied with groupmembership and feeling a sense of commitment or belongingnessto the group. Evaluative dimension is defined in terms of groups’relative evaluative value, that is, positive or negative, in compar-ison to other groups.

Regarding the hypothesized (but empirically not supported)four-dimensional model, Jackson (2002) concludes that the emo-tional dimension of social identity involves the perceived commonfate dimension. That is, the feelings of togetherness and unity (i.e.,perceived common fate) go together with the group related emo-tions, that is, emotional dimension, which he argues correspondswith affective commitment factor of Ellemers et al. (1999). Thus,considering studies by Ellemers et al. (1999) and Jackson (2002),they seem to offer consistent results and support three-dimensionalsocial identity including the cognitive, evaluative, and emotionalcomponents (they also conceptualize these dimensions similarly).

Cameron (2004) distinguishes between “centrality,” “in-groupaffect,” and “in-group ties” as related but separate dimensions ofsocial identity. He conceptualizes centrality dimension as the cog-nitive accessibility of a social identity and its importance in thedefinition of the self. The dimension of in-group affect is definedin terms of positive or negative group feelings stemming fromgroup’s relative status compared with other groups. Cameron(2004) regards the dimension of in-group ties as indicating theextent to which people feel bound to or part of the social group.

Regarding the Cameron’s (2004) multidimensional social iden-tity model, it seems that he equates evaluative component with theemotional component. That is, he conceptualizes his in-groupaffect dimension as if determined by in-group status (i.e., positiveor negative value of group compared with other groups). However,although people may be more likely to attach emotional signifi-cance to the positively evaluated groups, emotional and evaluativecomponents do not have to go together (Ellemers et al., 1999).Actually, there is evidence that identifying themselves as a mem-ber of distinct social groups; people may display strong emotionalattachment to the negatively valued groups (e.g., Mlicki & Elle-mers, 1996).

Thus, it is arguable that Cameron’s (2004) in-group affect andin-group ties dimensions both reflect emotional dimension of so-cial identity. Consistently, as mentioned above, Jackson (2002)indicates that perceived common fate dimension (related to per-ceived in-group ties) parallels with the emotional dimension ofsocial identity. Indeed, it is notable that Cameron’s (2004) resultsalso show high correlation between dimensions of in-group affectand in-group ties and he discusses that these two dimensions bothcontribute to the feelings of group membership.

As a result, referring to Tajfel’ s (1978) social identity defini-tion, it may be argued that Cameron’s (2004) multidimensional

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social identity model involves emotional and cognitive dimensionsbut lacks the evaluative dimension of social identity, although heseems to proceed in the light of Tajfel’s definition in his study.However, it can be suggested that Cameron’s (2004) centralitycomponent represents cognitive dimension of social identity andits conceptualization is consistent with Ellemers et al. (1999) andJackson’s (2002) conceptualization of cognitive dimension. Ingeneral, they all seem to assess cognitive dimension of socialidentity as the perception of the self as a group member orknowledge of group membership. In addition, Cameron’s (2004)conceptualization of emotional dimension (accepting his in-groupaffects and in-group ties components both reflect emotional di-mension) seems to have parallels with Ellemers et al. (1999) andJackson’s (2002) conceptualization of emotional dimension. Over-all, they all seem to regard the emotional dimension of socialidentity in terms of affective commitment or emotional attachmentto the in-group.

In distinction to the researchers (Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al.,1999; Jackson, 2002) who support social identity as a three-dimensional construct, other researchers state (Jackson, 1999;Jackson & Smith, 1999) that social identity is a four-dimensionalconstruct consisting of “in-group attraction,” “depersonalization,”“perceived self-in-group interdependency,” and “intergroup com-petition”. They define in-group attraction dimension as “positiveaffect toward the in-group,” depersonalization dimension as“thinking of the self more in terms of a group membership and lessin terms of a unique individual,” perceived self-in-group interde-pendency dimension as “the future well-being of the self and thein-group are bound together,” and intergroup competition dimen-sion as “perceiving an out-group as a comparison group that is incompetition with the in-group.”

Referring to Tajfel’s (1978) social identity definition, it can beargued that Jackson (1999) and Jackson and Smith’s (1999) in-group attraction component (e.g., being glad for group member-ship) reflects emotional dimension and that depersonalizationcomponent (e.g., thinking oneself as a group member) reflectscognitive dimension. The other two components, intergroup com-petition and perceived self-in-group interdependency, can be re-garded as reflecting the cognitive and emotional dimensions, re-spectively. This can be explained in the way that as the perceptionof intergroup competition increases, the likelihood of thinkingoneself as a group member increases too; that is, these two areclosely related (Jackson & Smith, 1999). Similarly, it is arguablethat the perceived self-in-group interdependency (i.e., perceivedcommon fate) increases the likelihood of affective commitment tothe group (i.e., emotional dimension; see Jackson, 2002; Jackson& Smith, 1999). As a result, in the frame of Tajfel’s (1978) socialidentity definition, it seems that Jackson (1999) and Jackson andSmith’s (1999) multidimensional social identity model involvescognitive and emotional dimensions but lacks the evaluative di-mension of social identity.

Thus, in the light of theoretical (e.g., Tajfel, 1978) and empiricalstudies (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 1999;Jackson, 2002; Jackson & Smith, 1999), it is reasonable to suggestthat social identity is a multidimensional construct and involves, atleast, three general and major dimensions, namely, cognitive,emotional, and evaluative (Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 2002;Tajfel, 1978). These three dimensions, actually, reflect the most

agreed upon multidimensional model of social identity (Jackson,2002).

To summarize, it seems that evaluative dimension, in general,reflects social identity in terms of positive or negative value ofin-group membership compared with membership of other groups(Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 2002). Similarly, Tajfel (1981)defines the evaluative dimension as “. . . the notion of the group orone’s membership in it may have a positive or negative valueconnotation” (p. 229). Cognitive dimension, in general, reflects thesocial identity in terms of individuals’ knowledge or cognitiveawareness of group membership. On the other hand, emotionaldimension, in general, seems to reflect social identity in terms ofemotional attachment or affective commitment to the in-group(Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 1999; Jackson,2002; Jackson & Smith, 1999).

Researchers interested in the multidimensional social identityalso investigated the relationships between different dimensions ofsocial identity and intergroup differentiation. Jackson and Smith(1999), for example, found that insecure identity, including thedimensions of in-group attraction (emotional dimension of socialidentity), perceived interdependency (related to group-based emo-tions), and high intergroup competition, is likely to be related withintergroup differentiation rather than with secure identity includingthe dimensions of in-group attraction, moderated depersonaliza-tion, and low intergroup competition. On the other hand, Jackson’s(1999) results showed that among four dimensions, namely, in-group attraction, depersonalization, perceived self-in-group inter-dependency and intergroup competition; perceived self-in-groupinterdependency (related to group-based emotions) and intergroupcompetition were consistent predictors of the expression of inter-group differentiation.

In an early study, Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook(1989) demonstrated that people high in affective or emotionaldimension of social identity tend to evaluate their in-group morepositively than the out-group but people high in cognitive dimen-sion do not tend to express intergroup differentiation. In anotherstudy, that suggests self-categorization, affective commitment, andgroup self-esteem as three distinct dimensions of social identity,Ellemers et al. (1999) found affective commitment dimension (i.e.,emotional dimension) as a strongest correlate of the expression ofintergroup differentiation. Consistently, distinguishing betweencognitive, evaluative, and affective ties dimensions of social iden-tity, Jackson (2002) reported that among the three dimensions,affective ties dimension (i.e., emotional dimension) was the bestpredictor of intergroup differentiation, although he also foundcognitive and evaluative dimensions as significantly related to theexpression of in-group—out-group differentiation.

As a result, empirical evidence seems to suggest that intergroupdifferentiation may vary as a function of different dimensions ofsocial identity. Referring to Tajfel’s (1978) social identity defini-tion, it may be argued that compared with cognitive and evaluativedimensions, emotional dimension of social identity is a strongerpositive correlate of intergroup differentiation (Ellemers et al.,1999; Hinkle et al., 1989; Jackson, 2002). Accordingly, it seemsarguable that emotional dimension tends to be a “pivotal aspect” ofsocial identity (Jackson, 2002). This does not mean, however, thatcognitive and evaluative dimensions of social identity are unre-lated to the expression of intergroup differentiation (e.g., Jackson,2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987).

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Before proceeding to following section, at this point, somefurther theoretical clarifications should be made. It was notedpreviously that SIT and SCT theorists did not consider the role ofsocial identity as a multidimensional construct while explainingthe intergroup differentiation from a perspective of social identity(Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Indeed, different theories seem toemphasize different components of social identity and pay atten-tion to some dimensions but ignore the others (Ashmore, Deaux, &McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).

In the light of the explanations above, one is likely to suggestthat SCT focuses primarily on the cognitive dimension whereasSIT focuses primarily on the evaluative dimension of social iden-tity. As mentioned before, according to SCT, in intergroup con-texts social identity is achieved through the perception of in-groupsimilarities and intergroup differences. SCT predicts that inter-group differentiation goes together with the perception of the selfin terms of a group membership, that is, cognitive dimension ofsocial identity.

On the other hand, it is arguable that the evaluative dimensionof social identity plays important role in SIT. As mentioned before,SIT assumes that social groups are associated with positive ornegative value connotations and social identities define individualsin terms of how they are better or worse than other group members.Accepting people’s need for a positive self-evaluation, SIT con-ceptualizes intergroup differentiation as individuals’ strive forpositively evaluated social identity in comparison to other socialidentities, that is, evaluative dimension of social identity. Even,SIT further proposes that a negative social identity, derived fromlower status or negatively evaluated group membership, lead peo-ple to engage in one of several strategies (e.g., leaving the group,changing the comparison dimension) in order to achieve a positiveor better social identity (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, &Blanz, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, it may be argued thatattempting to explore the concept of intergroup differentiation;both SIT and SCT do not consider the role of emotional dimensionof social identity.

In a consistent way, according to Taylor and Moghaddam(1994), SIT does not regard the emotional significance of groupmembership and SCT presents humans in the form of “thinkingmachines” ignoring both motivational and emotional issues. Thesuggestion of this article (see also below) that SIT and SCT placegreater emphasis on evaluative dimension and cognitive dimen-sion, respectively, also parallels with Turner’s (1999) theoreticaldistinction. As noted before, he claims that SIT places primaryemphasis on intergroup differentiation in terms of individuals’strive for positively evaluated social identity compared with othersocial identities, whereas SCT gives importance to the cognitiveprocess of how people differentiate their in-groups from the out-groups and define themselves as a group member.

Up to this point, I attempted to explain the concept of intergroupdifferentiation as a function of social identity and to present theempirical and theoretical evidence of social identity as a multidi-mensional construct. It was suggested that SCT mainly concernscognitive dimension whereas SIT mainly concerns evaluative di-mension of social identity. In this line, considering again the ideathat different theories of intergroup relations emphasize differentdimensions of social identity (Ashmore et al., 2004), it will beshown that there is a link between other social identity-based(motivational) theories of intergroup differentiation and different

dimensions of social identity in order to further understand themotivational bases of intergroup differentiation. Accordingly, first;it is argued that subjective uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg,2000), which offers motivational explanation for SCT, is linkedthe cognitive dimension of social identity. Second, optimal dis-tinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991), which is one important moti-vational approach to the concept of intergroup differentiation, islinked to the emotional dimension of social identity. Third, self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988), which offers motiva-tional explanation for SIT, is linked to the evaluative dimension ofsocial identity. These issues are considered below, respectively.

Motivation of Intergroup Differentiation as a Functionof Cognitive Dimension of Social Identity: Subjective

Uncertainty Reduction Theory

As mentioned before, cognitive dimension of social identityplays primary role in SCT, which explains how people categorizethemselves in terms of the category they belong to. According toSCT, social identity is achieved through the formation of in-groupand out-group prototypes, that is, the characteristics of one groupthat distinguish it from the other groups. Prototypes, in turn,increase the ratio of intergroup differences to the in-group simi-larities. Thus, people come to perceive themselves in terms of thesocial identities and their behavior is strongly influenced by prop-erties of the in-group prototype (e.g., prototypes define attitudes,feelings and behaviors that distinguish in-groups from the out-groups) (Turner et al., 1987).

Subjective uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2000; Hogg &Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999) proposes that the underlyingmotivation of self-categorization and intergroup differentiation isthe reduction of uncertainty. Accepting that uncertainty about theirbeliefs, attitudes, feelings and perceptions is an aversive state forindividuals, this theory suggests that people strive to minimize orreduce uncertainty through self-categorization. According to sub-jective uncertainty reduction theory, social contextual factors in-fluence uncertainty and challenge people’s certainty about them-selves and/or other people.

Feeling uncertainty, particularly about relatively important as-pects of self-concept, motivates individuals to reduce uncertaintythrough self-categorization, which results in the assimilation of theself into in-group prototype. This means that the process of self-categorization itself reduces subjective uncertainty, which can beexplained, as mentioned before, by metacontrast principle (Hogg,2000). That is, in-group and out-group prototypes, which guidegroup members’ behavior, attitudes, and feelings, are formedthrough the perception of within group similarities and betweengroup differences. Defining who we are, what we do, what webelieve and who they are; what they do, what they believe, pro-totypes make social world predictable and controllable for theindividuals. Hogg (2000) argues that self-categorization processalso reduces uncertainty because all in-group members or similarothers seem to agree with each other and validate their self-conceptor their beliefs, attitudes, and feelings.

Research testing the hypotheses of uncertainty reduction theorygenerally makes use of the minimal group paradigm. According toHogg (2000), in minimal group experiments participants are likelyto feel high subjective uncertainty because the situation is noveland resource allocation task is strange. He claims that it is a

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subjective uncertainty (not only self-categorization) that motivatesparticipants in minimal group experiments to define themselves interms of group membership and to differentiate their own groupsfrom the out-groups.

Minimal group paradigm experiments seem to support predic-tions of subjective uncertainty reduction theory. Hogg and Grieve(1999), for example, in a minimal group experiment categorizedparticipants randomly into Group X, Group Y or did not catego-rize. In this experiment normal minimal group condition wastreated as high subjective uncertainty condition and for low un-certainty condition participants made practice trials for resourceallocation task. As predicted, they found that only participants inthe high uncertainty condition differentiated their in-group posi-tively from the out-group (i.e., in-group bias). However, partici-pants in the reduced uncertainty condition did not show significantintergroup differentiation tendency. They also found that catego-rized participants who were in high subjective uncertainty condi-tion showed reduced uncertainty but uncategorized participants didnot show. Importantly (as mentioned later), their experiment alsodemonstrated that participants who were categorized under highuncertainty condition showed higher self-esteem (specific transi-tory self-esteem) than participants who were categorized underlow uncertainty condition.

In another minimal group experiment, Mullin and Hogg (1998)distinguish between situational uncertainty (being participated inprevious psychological research or not) and task uncertainty (mak-ing practice or not for resource allocation task) and examine theireffects on intergroup differentiation. For both types of uncertainty,participants displayed intergroup differentiation only when theywere in high uncertainty condition. In a set of experiments, Mullinand Hogg (1999) also found that participants who were led toexperience uncertainty about something important to the self werelikely to categorize themselves with the category which was rel-evant to the experienced uncertainty. Similarly, in a recent study,Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, and Moffitt (2007) foundthose participants who felt self-conceptual uncertainty tend todefine themselves in terms of groups which were high in entita-tivity (e.g., group unity).

As a result, consistent to subjective uncertainty reduction the-ory, studies (e.g., Hogg & Grieve, 1999; Hogg et al., 2007) showthat self-categorization and intergroup differentiation may be mo-tivated by individuals’ need for the reduction of subjective uncer-tainty. Thus, it may be argued that perceiving their self and theothers in terms of group memberships, individuals may achieverelative certainty, at least situational and transitory certainty, aboutthemselves and the social world. In this respect, it seems alsoplausible to suggest that subjective uncertainty motivates individ-uals to differentiate their in-groups from the out-groups as afunction of individuals’ cognitive awareness of group membership,that is, cognitive dimension of social identity.

Motivation of Intergroup Differentiation as a Functionof Emotional Dimension of Social Identity: Optimal

Distinctiveness Theory

According to optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT) (Brewer,1991, 1993) social identities or groups satisfy people’s need forboth assimilation and differentiation from others. This theory

argues that people tend to identify with, or emotionally attached to,the groups which provide them with optimal distinctiveness.

ODT accepts the idea that people have two basic motivations:the need for group belonging and the need for individual differ-entiation. In this sense, it is predicted that people are more likelyto identify with, or are affectively committed to, groups, whichprovide optimal balance between these two fundamental needs. Onthe other hand, individuals avoid from identifying with groups,which are either too inclusive or too personalized. Thus, in ODT,“social identity and group loyalty are hypothesized to be strongestfor those self-categorizations that simultaneously provide for asense of belonging and a sense of distinctiveness” (Brewer, 1991,p. 475).

Originally, studies of ODT operationalize inclusiveness anddistinctiveness in terms of group size and assume that largergroups offer higher inclusiveness whereas smaller groups offerhigher distinctiveness. Brewer and Weber (1994), for example,categorized participants randomly into “over estimator” and “un-der estimator” groups and led participants to believe that they wereeither member of large group or small group. The results ofexperiment showed that majority in-group members make inter-personal comparisons but minority in-group members make inter-group comparisons. Brewer and Weber (1994) explained thatmembers of the majority group felt too inclusive and attempted tosatisfy their distinctiveness need through within group interper-sonal comparison. On the other hand, minority group memberswho felt belongingness to their in-group satisfy their distinctive-ness need through intergroup differentiation or comparison.

Consistently, Duck and Fortey (2003) reported that adolescents,who express a need for personal distinctiveness, are likely toexpress willingness to conform to the norms of groups, which arehighly distinct from other groups. In a similar way, researchersfound that the need for distinctiveness and assimilation is associ-ated with self-stereotyping (i.e., perceiving the self in terms ofin-group characteristics) (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002) andperception of in-group homogeneity (i.e., we are all alike) andout-group homogeneity (i.e., they are all alike) (Pickett & Brewer,2001). As a conclusion, these researchers argued that differentia-tion of in-groups from the out-groups satisfy individuals’ need fordistinctiveness at the intergroup level and satisfy their need forbelongingness at the intragroup level.

From a perspective of ODT, it seems tenable that the need forgroup belonging motivates individuals to differentiate their owngroups from the out-groups, which in turn satisfies individuals’need for both distinctiveness and inclusiveness. This can also beinterpreted in a way that individuals tend to feel belongingness oremotional attachment to the groups, which they perceive as distinctfrom other groups. In other words, people are likely to feel emo-tional closeness to the optimally distinctive groups (Brewer, 1991).

Thus, in the frame of ODT, it seems that identifying withrelatively small groups (Brewer & Weber, 1994), subgroups(Hornsey & Hogg, 1999), or groups that oppose to the mainstream(Duck & Fortey, 2003); individuals can feel belongingness andinclusiveness to the in-groups. It should be noted, however, thatalthough these group characteristics can contribute to the satisfac-tion of individuals’ need for distinctiveness, it seems important toargue that people can perceptually emphasize the in-group distinc-tiveness. That is, perceiving subjectively their in-groups distinctive

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from the other groups, individuals may feel attachment and be-longingness to the in-groups (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004).

At this point, it is worthy to consider the SCT, SIT, and ODTtogether. Similar to ODT, both social identity and self-categorization theories emphasize the concept of distinctiveness insocial identity processes. Actually, as mentioned earlier, accordingto SCT, social identities are achieved through the maximization ofthe ratio of intergroup differences to the intragroup similarities andaccording to SIT, people differentiate their in-groups from theout-groups in order to achieve positive in-group distinctivenessand so positive social identity. It seems arguable that these theoriesemphasize the in-group distinctiveness for different purposes.ODT conceptualizes distinctiveness as a fundamental human needas the need for inclusiveness and so as motivation of intergroupdifferentiation. On the other hand, SCT and SIT conceptualizeintergroup differentiation as a function of (distinct) social identity(Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997).

To summarize, it seems plausible that perceiving their in-groupsdifferent from the out-groups, individuals can satisfy their need fordistinctiveness/inclusiveness. According to ODT, perception ofintergroup differentiation satisfies people’s need for distinctive-ness at the intergroup level and their need for inclusiveness at theintragroup level. In other words, it is arguable that intergroupdifferentiation serves for in-group assimilation and belongingnessfor individuals (e.g., Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Pickett &Brewer, 2001). Thus, it seems possible to suggest that the need tobelong motivates individuals to differentiate their in-groups fromthe out-groups; which, in turn, lead them to attach emotionalsignificance to the in-group memberships, that is, emotional di-mension of social identity.

Motivation of Intergroup Differentiation as a Functionof Evaluative Dimension of Social Identity:

Self-Esteem Hypothesis

As mentioned earlier, SIT theorists argue that in the intergroupcontexts, individuals make social comparisons that promote inter-group differentiation in the favor of the in-groups over the out-groups. The main assumption of SIT is that intergroup differenti-ation is motivated by self-enhancement concerns. That is, becausesocial identities are part of individuals’ self-concept, people striveto achieve or maintain positive in-group distinctiveness (Tajfel &Turner, 1979). Thus, people whose in-groups are evaluated posi-tively compared with the other groups are likely to have positivesocial identities rather than negative social identities, that is, eval-uative dimension of social identity.

On the basis of SIT, self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg,1988) explains that people’s desire for positive in-group distinc-tiveness is based on a need for self-esteem. Accordingly, in linewith SIT, self-esteem hypothesis conceptualizes self-esteem interms of the evaluation of in-groups compared with the out-groups.Self-esteem hypothesis consists of two corollaries: (a) positivedifferentiation of in-group from the out-group would enhancesocial identity and thus self-esteem, and (b) low or threatenedself-esteem would increase the possibility of intergroup differen-tiation due to the individuals’ need for positive self-esteem.

It is notable that in a review study, Rubin and Hewstone (1998)found further empirical support for corollary 1 than for corollary 2.They argued that researchers investigating self-esteem hypothesis

of SIT tend to use measures of global-personal-trait self-esteem.However, they suggested that researchers should use measures ofspecific-social-state self-esteem, because these are more appropri-ate and consistent with the assumptions of SIT. Rubin and Hew-stone (1998) concluded that successful intergroup differentiationenhances certain dimensions of self-esteem, that is, specific, social,and state. Consistently, in a recent experimental study, Hunter,Kypri, Stokell, Boyes, O’Brien, and McMenamin (2004) demon-strated that the expression of intergroup differentiation increasesparticipants’ domain specific self-esteem. Moreover, they foundthat group members with low public collective self-esteem tend todisplay more intergroup differentiation. In a similar line, Fein andSpencer (1997) indicated that for participants whose self-esteemwere threatened by negative feedback, derogation of the stereo-typical other lead to enhancement of self-esteem.

Abrams and Hogg (1988) also distinguish between global andspecific self-esteem and argue that it is the specific self-esteem,that is, transitory and related to the in-group attributes, that isenhanced by intergroup differentiation. Accordingly, they arguethat self-esteem hypothesis particularly explains intergroup differ-entiation experienced in the studies of minimal group paradigm, inwhich there is no “realistic” reason for participants to favor theirown groups over the out-groups. Accordingly, it seems arguablethat mere positive differentiation of in-groups from the out-groupscan enhance individuals’ specific-social-state self-esteem.

Thus, it seems possible to suggest that intergroup differentiationmay increase, at least, specific-social-state self-esteem and may bemotivated by self-enhancement concerns (Abrams & Hogg, 1988;Hunter et al., 2004; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel & Turner,1979). In other words, it seems arguable that motivated by self-enhancement, in comparative intergroup contexts, people tend toperceive their in-groups more positively than the out-groups as afunction of evaluative dimension of social identity.

Presenting the motivational theories of intergroup differentia-tion as a function of different dimensions of social identity, thisarticle suggests that social identity-based intergroup differentiationmay contribute to the satisfaction of individuals’ various needs,which are subjective uncertainty reduction, distinctiveness/assimilation, and self-enhancement. It seems now important toexplore how these motivations may be related to one another interms of different dimensions of social identity.

The Relationships Between Motivations of IntergroupDifferentiation as a Function of Different Dimensions

of Social Identity

This article suggests that the need for subjective uncertaintyreduction, distinctiveness/assimilation, and self-enhancement maymotivate individuals to differentiate their in-groups from the out-groups as a function of cognitive, emotional, and evaluative di-mensions of social identity, respectively. In the remainder of thisarticle, it is suggested that these powerful human motivations ofintergroup differentiation may operate interdependently as a func-tion of different dimensions of social identity. Consistently, in anexpected way, researchers conceptualizing social identity as amultidimensional construct reported that the different dimensionsof social identity tend to be significantly and positively related toeach other (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson,2002). First, however, before exploring how these three motiva-

131MOTIVATIONS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

tions may be interdependent, it seems of interest to consider eachdimension of social identity individually in terms of motivationalantecedent and consequence of intergroup differentiation.

First, it seems appropriate to argue that through intergroupdifferentiation subjective uncertainty reduction may increase self-esteem as a function of cognitive dimension of social identity.From a perspective of subjective uncertainty reduction theory(Hogg, 2000), self-categorization and intergroup differentiationreflect a fundamental human motivation to achieve or maintaincertainty about one’s attitudes, beliefs, feelings, or self-concept.This theory predicts that in-groups are a source of unambiguoussocial knowledge for members and thus individuals tend to favortheir in-groups over the out-groups.

Actually, Hogg (2000) defined subjective uncertainty reductionas a core human motivation whose satisfaction is likely to increasepeople’s self-esteem. He explained that reduction of uncertainty isadaptive for individuals and achieved certainty lead people to feelgood about their self, which in turn increases self-esteem. As aresult, it may be argued that motivation of intergroup differentia-tion as a function of cognitive dimension of social identity, that is,subjective uncertainty reduction, may result in higher self-esteem.That is, defining themselves in terms of in-group similarities andintergroup differences; people can acquire a degree of certaintyabout their self and so may experience increase in their self-esteem.

In a similar vein, Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson (1998)illustrated a need for cognitive closure (a desire for a definiteanswer to a question) as a motivation of intergroup differentiationand reported a positive relationship between collective self-esteemand a need for cognitive closure. The relevant suggestion alsoseems consistent with the researchers who suggest, in general, thatself-concept clarity (or self-certainty) and self-esteem is closelyrelated to each other (e.g., Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990;Sedikides & Strube, 1995). In addition, it is notable that systemjustification theory (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), which proposesthat even negatively evaluated (e.g., lower status) group membersmay be satisfied with their position, implies that uncertainty is anaversive state for individuals that so people are motivated to justifythe existing social structure. This may be interpreted such that inorder to avoid decreases in self-esteem (or to maintain self-esteem), which may stem from subjective uncertainty, people tendto support, implicitly or explicitly, existing social order.

Second, it seems suitable to claim that the satisfaction of needfor distinctiveness/assimilation through intergroup differentiationmay increase self-esteem as a function of emotional dimension ofsocial identity. ODT (Brewer, 1991) proposes that people tend tofeel belongingness or emotional attachment to the groups, whichprovide them with sufficient inclusiveness within groups and suf-ficient differentiation between the in-groups and out-groups. Inother words, this theory predicts that people are likely to besatisfied with the optimally distinct social groups.

According to ODT, even negatively evaluated groups (e.g.,minority groups) may be a source of positive social identity whenthey satisfy individuals’ need for distinctiveness/assimilation orbelongingness (Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001). Thus, it may beargued that motivation of intergroup differentiation as a functionof emotional dimension of social identity, that is, the sense ofbelongingness to the group, may increase people’s self-esteem. Inconsistency with the suggestion, some researchers argue that the

need to belong is a fundamental human motivation (Baumeister &Leary, 1995) and self-esteem monitors social attachments andalerts individuals to avoid the possibility of social exclusion(Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995).

Third, it seems arguable that self-enhancement motivation ofintergroup differentiation may increase self-esteem as a function ofevaluative dimension of social identity. In a similar vein, self-esteem hypothesis of SIT (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) assumingself-enhancement as a basic motivation of intergroup differentia-tion, predicts that in comparative intergroup contexts, people’sperception of positive in-group distinctiveness increases self-esteem. It is also true that with self-enhancement concerns, peopletend to be members of positively evaluated (e.g., higher status)groups rather than negatively evaluated (e.g., lower status) groups(e.g., Reid & Hogg, 2005). Consistently, as mentioned before,researchers reported that self-esteem, at least specific-state-socialself-esteem, may be both a cause and a result (more likely) ofintergroup differentiation (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hunter et al.,2004; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).

As a result, as illustrated in Figure 1, it seems that intergroupdifferentiation may be a source of self-esteem in different ways asa function of different dimensions of social identity. For example,it is arguable that evaluative dimension may define social identityas negative in comparison to other social identities; however, thisdoes not necessarily make people unsatisfied with their socialidentity because emotional and/or cognitive dimensions of socialidentity can offer a sense of belongingness and/or self-certainty forindividuals, respectively. In a similar line, emotional dimensionmay define social identity as too inclusive or too distinctive (e.g.,majority group membership); however, cognitive and/or evaluativedimensions of social identity may provide with subjective uncer-tainty reduction and/or positive in-group distinctiveness, respec-tively, which can also render individuals content with their socialidentity. In this line, it is worthy to consider that different fromSIT; multidimensional conceptualization of social identity sug-gests that people may be happy with their social identities regard-less of value connotation of their own group in comparison to theother groups.

Now, it is questionable how these motivations of intergroupdifferentiation may be related to each other as a function ofdifferent dimensions of social identity. For this purpose, this articleprovides a framework which is illustrated in Figure 2. This frame-work suggests that, in social contexts, as a first step, subjectiveuncertainty reduction (as a function of cognitive dimension ofsocial identity) motivates intergroup differentiation which, in turn,increases self-esteem. This increases, as a second step, the likeli-hood of satisfaction of need for assimilation/differentiation (as afunction of emotional dimension of social identity) through moreintergroup differentiation which, in turn, increases self-esteemonce more. As a third step, this framework suggests that peoplewith increased self-esteem are motivated by self-enhancement (asa function of evaluative dimension of social identity) to differen-tiate their in-groups positively from the out-groups in order toachieve (so that people not acquire the sense of belonging) ormaintain (so that people acquire the sense of belonging) positivesocial identity. In addition as explained later, present frameworksuggests that under certain conditions, people may achieve positivesocial identity through intergroup differentiation as a function ofcognitive (subjective uncertainty reduction) and evaluative dimen-

132 TASDEMIR

sions (self-enhancement). The relevant empirical and theoreticalliterature which seems to support this newly offered framework isconsidered below step by step.

As mentioned before, SCT (Turner et al., 1987) explains howindividuals come to perceive themselves in terms of group mem-berships in social contexts. Subjective uncertainty reduction theory(Hogg, 2000) proposes that this self-categorization process ismotivated by subjective uncertainty experienced in social contexts.Thus, the suggestion of present framework that in social contextsmotivation of subjective uncertainty reduction initiates intergroup

differentiation as a function of cognitive dimension of socialidentity seems reasonable. As noted previously, it seems also truethat reduction of subjective uncertainty may increase self-esteemas a function of cognitive dimension. Consistent with this sugges-tion, in one study, Reid and Hogg (2005) imply that in intergroupcontexts, the need for subjective uncertainty reduction precedes theneed for self-enhancement, that is, they demonstrated that highsubjective uncertainty participants tend to identify with both low-status (negatively evaluated) and high-status (positively evaluated)groups but low subjective uncertainty participants (with self-

Intergroup Differentiation

Higher Self Esteem

Assimilation/ Differentiation

Emotional Social Identity

Intergroup Differentiation

Higher Self Esteem

Subjective Uncertainty Reduction

Cognitive Social Identity

Intergroup Differentiation

Higher Self Esteem

Self Enhancement

Evaluative Social Identity

Figure 1. Motivations of intergroup differentiation as a function of different dimensions of social identity.

Intergroup Differentiation

Higher Self

Esteem Belonging to group

More Intergroup Differentiation

Higher Self

Esteem

Self Enhancement

Intergroup Differentiation

Cognitive Social Identity

Emotional Social Identity

Evaluative Social Identity

Uncertainty Reduction

Positive Social

Identity

Figure 2. The relationships between motivations of intergroup differentiation as a function of differentdimensions of social identity.

133MOTIVATIONS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

enhancement concerns) tend to identify with only high-statusgroups.

The suggestion of present framework that subjective uncertaintyreduction may provide a means to the satisfaction of need forassimilation/differentiation via increasing self-esteem also seemsreasonable. Initially, it may be argued that motivated by subjectiveuncertainty reduction and differentiating between the in-group andout-group, people are likely to experience a degree of in-groupdistinctiveness which in turn may be promoted by the need forassimilation/differentiation (see Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001). Inother words, it may be claimed that reduction of subjective uncer-tainty as a function of cognitive dimension increases self-esteemwhich increases the perception of in-group distinctiveness as afunction of emotional dimension and this motivates more inter-group differentiation to satisfy the need for assimilation/differentiation. In a similar way, within the frame of ODT, Leon-ardelli and Brewer (2001) proposed that members of groups, whichprovide for inclusiveness/differentiation, tend to display strongintergroup differentiation to maintain their in-group distinctiveness(i.e., the sense of belonging to the group).

Related to the present suggestion, from a perspective of SCT,Hogg (1993) propose that the perception of in-group similaritiesand intergroup differences and the formation of in-group prototypeincrease the likelihood of social attraction (i.e., liking) toward thein-group and its members, which in turn increase the engagementin intergroup differentiation. Additionally, in one study, Gaertnerand Schopler (1998) showed that in-group entitativity (e.g., per-ception of in-group homogeneity, similarity, and connectedness)mediates the relationship between the salience of intergroup con-text and in-group favoritism. Consistent with present framework,they argued that although intergroup salience influences in-groupfavoritism, in-group entitativity is a more central antecedent ofintergroup differentiation. Gaertner and Schopler (1998) explainedthat the perception of in-group entitativity strengthens the expres-sion of intergroup differentiation above the intergroup saliency.

In support to this, distinguishing between “social identification”(related to cognitive dimension) and “group satisfaction” (relatedto emotional dimension), Leonardelli and Brewer (2001) claimedthat social identification is a necessary antecedent of intergroupdifferentiation but not a sufficient antecedent for stronger inter-group differentiation. That is, individuals who are satisfied withtheir in-groups (i.e., optimally distinctive groups) tend to engage inmore intergroup differentiation. In a similar line, in a study con-ducted in a work organization, Bergami and Bagozzi (2000) re-ported that affective commitment to the organization (emotionaldimension) mediates the relationship between self-categorization(cognitive dimension) and intergroup differentiation.

These considerations, actually, seem to support previously men-tioned studies, which indicate that compared with the cognitiveand evaluative dimensions, emotional dimension of social identityis a stronger predictor of the expression of intergroup differentia-tion (Ellemers et al., 1999; Hinkle et al., 1989; Jackson, 2002).These explanations may imply that the strongest motivation ofintergroup differentiation is the need for differentiation/assimilation or belongingness (Brewer, 1991), although the needfor subjective uncertainty reduction (Hogg, 2000) may initiateintergroup differentiation.

In the following way, the present framework suggests thatexperiencing subjective uncertainty reduction (i.e., defining them-

selves in terms of group membership) and/or perceiving them-selves as a member of optimally distinctive in-group (i.e., acquir-ing a sense of belonging to the group), people feel good about theirselves (higher self-esteem) and then are motivated by self-enhancement to favor their in-group over the out-group. Consis-tently, as mentioned earlier, within a frame of subjective uncer-tainty reduction theory, Reid and Hogg (2005) demonstrated thathigh uncertainty predicts both negatively and positively evaluatedgroup membership but low uncertainty (giving a way to self-enhancement concerns) predicts only positively evaluated groupmembership.

From a perspective of ODT, Brewer, Manzi, and Shaw (1993)also showed that when need for differentiation is aroused groupsize predicts in-group enhancement but when need for differenti-ation is not aroused both group size and status predict in-groupenhancement. Thus, Brewer et al. (1993) seem to propose that theneed for differentiation/assimilation may precede the need forself-enhancement. Different from these researchers (Brewer et al.,1993; Reid & Hogg, 2005), however, the present framework,attempting to integrate three major motivations of intergroup dif-ferentiation, suggests that subjective uncertainty reduction maygive a way to the satisfaction of need for assimilation/differentiation via increasing self-esteem which may give a way tothe motivation of self-enhancement via again increasing self-esteem. It is worthy to note that the relevant suggestion has alsoparallels with the research arguing that people with higher self-esteem are more likely to have self-enhancement concerns thanpeople with lower self-esteem (e.g., Kobayashi & Brown, 2003).Indeed, the present framework suggests that in order to be moti-vated by self-enhancement concerns (to favor the in-group over theout-group); people need to develop a degree of subjective certainty(or self-certainty) (Hogg, 2000) and/or a sense of belongingness(Brewer, 1991), which provide them with an amount of self-esteem.

Finally, it should be elucidated that the framework offered inthis article shows that under some conditions (e.g., majority groupmembership), cognitive dimension is followed by the evaluativedimension of social identity instead of emotional dimension. Thismeans that people may also reach a sense of group belongingness(i.e., positive social identity) as a function of evaluative dimension.That is, as hypothesized by SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) peoplemay promote intergroup differentiation in the favor of in-groupsover the out-groups and so may achieve positive in-group distinc-tiveness. Stated in a different way, the present model suggests thatpeople who acquire a sense of belonging to the group (e.g.,optimally distinctive group) engage in intergroup differentiation(as a function of evaluative dimension) to maintain or affirm theirpositive social identity. On the other hand, people who experiencesubjective uncertainty reduction but do not acquire a sense ofbelonging to the group (e.g., majority group) engage in intergroupdifferentiation (as a function of evaluative dimension) to achievepositive in-group distinctiveness and positive social identity (seeLeonardelli & Brewer, 2001).

Conclusions

The main objective of this article was to classify social identity-based theories of intergroup differentiation in terms of differentdimensions of social identity to understand better the motivational

134 TASDEMIR

bases of intergroup differentiation. First, it was claimed that whileattempting to explain the concept of intergroup differentiation,social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and self-categorizationtheories (Turner et al., 1987) concern primarily the evaluative andcognitive dimensions of social identity, respectively. Second, itwas suggested that subjective uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg,2000), ODT (Brewer, 1991), and self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams& Hogg, 1988) do explain motivational basis of intergroup differ-entiation as a function of cognitive, emotional, and evaluativedimensions of social identity, respectively. Third, this article of-fered a newly developed framework in which social identity-basedtheories of intergroup differentiation were integrated and thusmotivations of intergroup differentiation were connected to eachother as a function of different dimensions of social identity.

More specifically, it was suggested that three major dimensions,namely, the cognitive, the emotional, and the evaluative ones,contribute to the social identity and thus intergroup differentiationmay contribute to the satisfaction of people’s need for subjectiveuncertainty reduction (Hogg, 2000), distinctiveness/assimilation(Brewer, 1991), and self-enhancement (Abrams & Hogg, 1998),respectively. Furthermore, considering that these dimensions op-erate interdependently (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1999), it was predictedthat through intergroup differentiation subjective uncertainty re-duction may give a way to the satisfaction of need for assimilation/differentiation, which may give a way to the motivation of self-enhancement to favor the in-groups over the out-groups. Accord-ingly, this article has important implications for researchersstudying the social identity and intergroup processes.

First, different from SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), conceptual-izing social identity as a multidimensional construct, this articlesuggests that there are various motivations of intergroup differen-tiation and before motivated by self-enhancement concerns tofavor the in-groups over the out-groups, individuals are likely to bemotivated by the need for subjective uncertainty reduction (Hogg,2000) and/or distinctiveness/assimilation (Brewer, 1991). Further-more, the present framework predicts that intergroup differentia-tion may be a source of self-esteem (at least specific-state-socialself-esteem) in different ways as a function of cognitive, emo-tional, and evaluative dimensions of social identity. In this line, theconsiderations of present article seem to imply that social identitiesregardless of value connotations attached to them (which aregenerally determined by consensually defined criteria) may beuseful and adaptive for individuals’ psychological well-being.

Second, this article has implications for the researchers inter-ested in the reduction of intergroup conflict. It was stated that thestrongest motivation of intergroup differentiation seems the needfor assimilation/distinctiveness or belongingness (Baumeister &Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991) compared with the needs for subjec-tive uncertainty reduction and self-enhancement. This implies thatpeople who have a need for belongingness are more likely todiscriminate against the out-groups, which may be in the form ofout-group derogation in order to achieve a sense of belongingness.Indeed, this may imply that people, who could not satisfy theirneed for belongingness through interpersonal relationships(Baumeister & Leary, 1995), are more likely to engage in inter-group discrimination.

Third, as mentioned earlier, this article has bearings on thesystem justification theory of intergroup relations (Jost et al.,2004). This theory holds that under some conditions people may

exhibit out-group favoritism in contrast to in-group favoritism tojustify existing social order and possibly to avoid subjective un-certainty. In a supporting way, conceptualizing social identity as amultidimensional construct, this article suggests that motivation ofsubjective uncertainty reduction as a function of cognitive dimen-sion may increase people’s self-esteem and so may make peoplehappy with their (publicly negatively evaluated) social identities.

This also has implications for the cross-cultural studies of in-tergroup relations. Some cross-cultural researchers argue that incollectivist cultures, which emphasize interdependence betweenin-group members, people are more likely to exhibit intergroupdifferentiation than people in individualist cultures, which empha-size individual independence within groups (Triandis, 1995). Thatis, in collectivist cultures group attachment and resulted intergroupdifferentiation are expected more likely to be seen than individu-alist cultures (Brewer, 1999). In the frame of present article, it maybe argued that in collectivist cultures intergroup differentiation ismore a function of emotional dimension (the need for inclusive-ness/distinctiveness) but in individualist cultures it is more afunction of evaluative dimension (the need for self-enhancement).In a supporting way, in a study comparing individualist NorthAmericans and collectivist East Asian cultures, Yuki (2003) re-ported that for Americans in-group status (whether positively ornegatively evaluated group) predicts group identity and grouployalty but for Japanese variables, such as feelings of connected-ness with in-group members predict group identity and loyalty.

It seems important to mention some of limitations involved.First, I was interested in the category-based social identity andintergroup differentiation. Recently, researchers distinguished be-tween top-down (based on social categories) and bottom-up (basedon within group relations) processes of social identity formationand intergroup differentiation (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).It is possible that in the latter type of social identity formation, theorder of social identity dimensions and corresponding motivationsof intergroup differentiation may be different from the former type.

Second, attempting to classify social identity-based theories ofintergroup differentiation, I did not consider the individual differ-ences and sociostructural variables, which are likely to influencethe intergroup behavior and possibly the motivations of intergroupdifferentiation. Third, I was confined to the social identity-basedtheories of intergroup differentiation to understand motivations ofintergroup differentiation. Terror management theory (Solomon,Greenberg, & Pyszcsynzski, 1991), which also makes motivationalpropositions about the concept of prejudice (or intergroup differ-entiation), was not integrated into the framework offered.

Finally, however, the framework provided is likely to contributeto the more complete understanding of the relationships betweensocial identity and intergroup differentiation. Specifically, Ishowed that different motivations of intergroup differentiation,proposed by different researchers and different theories of socialidentity, may be connected to each other as a function of cognitive,emotional, and evaluative dimensions of social identity.

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Received September 3, 2010Revision received January 11, 2011

Accepted January 11, 2011 �

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