The Radical Left in Europe. Thoughts About the Emergence of a Family

The aim of the Observatory on the political life, directed by Laurent Bouvet, is to better unders-tand and make people better understand all related aspects of political life (ideas, partys, elections, territories...) focusing on a critical and challenging perspective, fixed in the republican and democratic socialist tradition. Inside this Observatory, Fabien Escalona and Mathieu Vieira host the Center of Study and Research on the Left.

The Radical Left in Europe:Thoughts About

the Emergence of a Family

From the Western communism collapse to the rise oF a neW political Family

A significant body of literature can now be found describing how Western communism

went into a decline as a result of the break-up of the Soviet system. Political scientists

and historians acknowledge that the post-1989 period is definitional of what the crisis

for the European communist family was. However, there is more to the crisis in which communism

in Western Europe found itself than just the international dimension. The electoral and political

situation of the Western communist parties (CPs) went from bad to worse in late 1970s.

Crisis and patterns of change of the Western CPs

The first series of factors to blame for the decline of the Western CPs is related to social and

cultural changes that coincided with the advent of the post-industrial society in the late 1970s.Akin

to the ‘major transformation’ in the late 19th century, this paradigm shift first of all undermines

the social structure of Western societies. The growth of the service sector effectively confirms the

phase-out of the cornerstone of 20th century capitalism: industry. Several authors emphasise the

Fabien Escalona*Mathieu Vieira**

*Ater and PhD candidate at Sciences

Po Grenoble

** Ater at Sciences Po Lille and Phd

Candidate at Sciences Po Grenoble and Université Libre

de Bruxelles

www.jean-jaures.org

Note n°2 - Fondation Jean-Jaurès / Observatoire de la vie politique- 19 novembre 2013 - page 1

http://www.jean-jaures.org



struggle Western CPs had understanding the fragmentation of the working class and appealing

to the voters from the new economic sectors. The second shift is a cultural one. The ‘silent

revolution’1 calls into question the long-standing ‘industrial holism’ and the pre-eminence of the

economic issues forming the basis for the communist narrative, making way for individualisation

and the so-called ‘post-materialist values’.

The crisis besetting Western communism is also attributed to political and organisational factors

inherent to the communist family. The democratic centralist tendency inhibited the Western

CPs’ ability to change, alongside the ideological inflexibility. To these parties, ‘ideology (…)

is inherent to the communist identity or, to quote Claude Lefort, it is strictly speaking “the

overriding institutional method of being communist”’2. Waller and Fennema have in particular

underscored the mono-class consciousness of the communist doctrine as the first obstacle of the

CPs’ adjustment to the new sociological trends3.

The Western European CPs decided upon two options for adjusting after the break-up of the

Soviet Union during the early 1990’s in the light of national political settings: (a) a conservative

approach to holding onto the communist identity and (b) an approach involving reforms and a

demarcation from the said identity. The variety of options decided upon by the CPs and the more

or less huge efforts invested in the programme-based and organisational coping strategy may be

attributed to two specific challenges. The malleability of the national party systems is the first

change-related challenge, with the political changes of position depending to a large extent on the

political landscape being occupied by other party families: social-democratic parties and greens.

The metamorphosis of the Italian Communist Party into an authentic social-democratic party

(DS then PD) is therefore attributable to the structural weakness of social democracy in Italy.

Similarly, the dominant position of the social-democratic parties in Scandinavia has limited the

scope of the CPs, which have therefore adopted an environmentalist stance by joining forces with

former green parties. Resistance within the ranks may also conflict with the reform programmes

championed by the party leaderships.

1 Inglehart R. (1977), The Silent Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press.2 Baudouin J. (1994), ‘L’idéologie communiste entre régulation et érosion’, in P. Bréchon (ed.), Le discours politique en France. Evolution des idées partisanes, Paris, La Documentation française, p. 97. 3 Waller M. and Fennema M. (1988) (eds), Communist parties in Western Europe.Decline or Adaptation?, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. See also D.S. Bell (ed.) (1993), Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




During the early 1990s, political scientists tried to elaborate various patterns of adaptation.

Owing to the weakness of their analytical boundaries, these categories failed to reflect the

variety of strategies applied, and brought together too different parties. In 2003, Botella and

Ramiro offered a more comprehensive framework for analysis based on the central theme of

maintaining/abandoning the communist identity4. The abandonment of the communist identity

side of the equation is matched with three subsets describing the three potential directions the

conversion of the ex-communist parties could take: ‘green’, ‘social-democrat’ and ‘non-communist

left-wing parties’.

Beyond the CPs: the emergence of a new family?

All these typologies are impractical for describing the actual situation of the present radical left

family, mainly because several parties with non-communist background do not fit well into the

categories mentioned above. March and Mudde prefer a four-components typology including

‘communist parties’, ‘greens and New Politics parties’, ‘democratic socialist parties’ and ‘social

populist parties’5, but we can note that March more recently came out in favour of a slightly

different typology, comprising ‘conservative communists’, ‘reform communists’, ‘democratic

socialists’, ‘populist socialists’ and ‘social populists’6.

The assessment underlying all these typologies is the gradual breakup of the communist family

after the demise of the Soviet Union. The aim of our paper is to show how a new radical left

family emerged in the late 1990’s from these ashes7. Adopting a Rokkanian approach we maintain

that the new radical left family emerged from the new critical juncture represented by the

global revolution and, more specifically, the social democrats-greens/radical left divide. This

new divide replaced the former socialist/communist split on the ‘workers’ side of the ‘workers/

4 Botella J. and L. Ramiro (2003), ‘The crisis of West European Communist Parties and their Change Trajectories: Communists, Post-Communists, Ex-Communists?’, in J. Botella, L. Ramiro (eds), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change. The Evolution of West European Communist and Post-Communist Parties, Barcelona, ICPS.5 March L. and Mudde C. (2005), ‘What’s Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation’, Comparative European Politics, 3, 23-49. The authors claim this category describes the emergence of a new radical left in Central and Eastern Europe.6 March L. (2011), Radical Left Parties in Europe, London, Routledge. 7 See also March, L., op.cit. and De Waele J.M. and M. Vieira (2012), ‘La famille de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe occidentale’, in J.M. De Waele and D.L. Seiler (eds), Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe, Paris, Economica, 50-85.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




owners’ divide. We next highlight our own four-components radical left family typology: the

left of social democracy, the red-green alliance, orthodox communism and the revolutionary far

left. This typology seeks to create a clear picture of the radical left through its various political

directions and positions in the political space.

Characteristics of theradical left family

The various criteria for identifying apolitical family are: the labels claimed by the parties, the

parties’ transnational federations, shared ideological qualities and a common ‘genetic origin’,

premised on the basic social conflict that gave rise to the party family8. The first yardstick is

undoubtedly the more uncertain one. The second criterion is one of the potential results of a

family’s existence and an indication of its international structure rather than sufficient evidence

to describe the actual limitations. The radical left family’s current development is such that the

ideology criterion is less a criterion for investigating what the family parties have become than

one of the features of the emerging family. Referring to a radical left family therefore involves

identifying its founding conflict, and then describing the way this latter is channelled into the

partisan competition.

The radical left family and the structure of cleavages

This kind of approach first of all involves specifying the cleavage or political divide that generated

the radical left family. Rokkan regarded the parties as political rallying agents: organisations

capable of expressing and channelling the structural conflicts permeating European societies

since the development of nation states. Rather than resulting from short-lived clashes, these

conflicts reflect deeply embedded and lasting contradictions that themselves are created by

‘critical junctures’9.

8 Mair P. and C. Mudde (1998), ‘The Party Family and Its Study’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1(1): 211–29.9 Lipset S.M. and S. Rokkan (1967), ‘Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: an introduction’, in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-National perspectives, New York, The Free Press, 1-64.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




This reminder is vital to demarcate the geographical boundaries of the radical left family. The

creation of the Soviet Union and the subsequent subjugation of the ‘popular democracies’ certainly

resulted in a critical juncture, followed by another, as the break-up of the communist bloc and

the democratic transitions then got underway. The emerging political forces (including the left)

then sought to build capitalism in Eastern Europe, which remained on the outskirts of the

‘centre’ formed by Germany, the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, France and Northern

Italy. Consequently, the structure of cleavages to the West and East of Europe are not identical.

Moreover, it should be stressed that any reference to communism has been demonised and is now

espoused by only a few conservative-minded CPs, whose power is at very low ebb. The others have

experimented with a social-democratic transformation, now enjoying a dominant position that is

barely challenged by those on the left of the political spectrum. The non-communist radical left

parties have no relevance in any of the party systems of Central and Eastern Europe. These are

reasons enough to prompt us to champion Western Europe as the main arena for the emergence

and development of the new radical left family.

As for the radical left’s status in the midst of the contemporary pattern of cleavages in the West

European situation, we believe the status is based on the revival of the ‘socialist/communist’

divide, against the background of a further critical juncture: the ‘global revolution’. The ‘socialist/

communist’ divide developed on the second side of the ‘owners/workers’ divide, dating back to

the October Revolution, and the subsequent split of the working class movement. Since then

the communist family has fractured amidst all the upheavals besetting the advanced capitalist

countries: secularisation and the advance of cultural liberalism, diverse class positions within

the workforce, the advent of a post-Fordist production system, spectacular breakthroughs in the

financial and productive globalisation, awareness of the threats hanging over the ecosystem,

etc. All of these changes have created sharp lines between (a) the social groups and countries

regarding these processes as an ‘opportunity’ and (b) the groups and countries seeing these as an

economic threat or even a threat to their identities. These oppositions are reflected by a conflict

of interests and values on the basis of mobility and a conflict between integrated territories or

those side-lined from the globalisation process. These oppositions also overlap with the older

cleavages system that may have lost its central importance but has not completely disappeared.

In this context, we argue that a new class divide has risen. The radical left has replaced the

communist family but continues to be at loggerheads with the social democrats, still accusing

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




them of being at the beck and call of the capitalist state. The major difference is that it is no

longer under the sway of an international movement led by a hegemonic party and a country

claiming to have accomplished the workers’ revolution. Another major change lies in the fact

that the fresh oppositions thrown up by the ‘global revolution’ are such that the radical left family

also intends to channel interests other than those of the lower echelons of the wage-earning

class (or at the very least interests other than just ‘class interests’). This family wishes to rally

and represent the working classes and the middle intellectual classes seeking to alter the nature

of the present globalisation process, to do away with all relationships based on domination. The

citizens in question may be found in the ranks of those losing out from globalisation and those

benefitting from it but solely because of their so-called ‘open-minded’ attitudes or because of

their immigrant background.

Meanwhile, the social democrats have been joined by another family that emerged during the

1980’s: the greens. Most of these latter are now standing to the left of the national and European

political spectrums. They are calling for incremental improvements to contemporary capitalism

that are much more consistent with the social-democratic programme than with the agendas

of the radical left. They have also espoused the series of treaties staking out the Community

framework, yet again unlike the radical left.

The radical left as the reflection of the new divide: the three components

The hallmark of a Rokkanian political family is a specific combination of a normative orientation,

social basis and a specific organisational form10.

What is striking is the extent to which the thrust of these three components of the radical left’s

family identity echoes the debates engaged in by the ‘left Eurocommunists’ of the 1970s. The

definition of Eurocommunism was always sketchy and never led to a joint strategy based on a

clear ideology. Conversely, the form of ‘left Eurocommunism’ espoused by intellectuals such

as Poulantzas, was much more ambitious. It was indeed consistent with a plan to transcend

10 Bartolini S. (2005), ‘La formation des clivages’, Revue internationale de politique comparée, 12(1), 9-34.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




capitalism and other forms of domination, underpinned by a strategy of a non-social-democratic

and non-Leninist persuasion, that would have combined continuing representative democracy

with the transformation of the state apparatus and the simultaneous creation of direct democracy

opportunities throughout society. Left Eurocommunism also wanted not to confine the struggle

for democratic socialism to that of the working class. Other classes or ‘class fractions’, particularly

the ‘new salaried middle class’, should be included in a new hegemonic bloc.

Ideological component

In spite of the wide variety of programmes and principles taken on board by the radical left

family, a common standard-setting framework can be identified: the quest for an alliance of all

the lower ranks of global capitalism dominated by finance, and the need to promote an alternative

modernity, against a democratic, egalitarian and eco-friendly background.

Contestation of neo-liberalism often ends up with a more wide-ranging assessment underscoring

capitalism’s inability to live up to the promises of stable democracy, meeting basic human needs

and protecting the ecosystem. The fundamental texts of Die Linke (Germany) and the Left Front

(France), for example, feature an analysis of the capitalist system, according to post-Keynesian

or even neo-Marxist principles that concludes the effectiveness of this model of productivity is

dwindling, hence the commitment to transcending the system rather than applying regulations

alone. Whereas wealth distribution measures are highlighted, attention is also paid to the issue

of redistributing power. This is reflected in a call for sovereignty to be restored for the purpose of

defining budgetary and monetary policies, expanding the public sector and facilitating economic

democracy in all sectors. We therefore argue that anti-capitalism is the socio-economic matrix

shared by the radical left parties, while breaking away from workerist, collectivist and teleological

concepts specific to the communist family. This approach remains out of step with the current

European Union rules, which is why radical left parties are challenging the EU’s institutional

structure and the policies it applies, even though they are increasingly comfortable with the EU

as a potential space for internationalism11.

11 Holmes M. and K. Roder (eds) (2012), The Left and the European Constitution. From Laeken to Lisbon, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




‘Post-materialist’ values are also hugely popular within the commitments of the radical left, in the

case of combating all kinds of diehard domination that cannot be reduced to the class cleavage,

and being in favour of low-carbon energies. For example, the emblem of Syriza features the red

flag of the class struggle, the green flag of the green movement and the purple flag of the anti-

patriarchy movement12. Several typically ‘new left’ demands developed in the wake of student

unrest in the late 1960s (feminism, rights of sexual minorities, immigrants’ rights, the quality of

life) are also featured in the manifestos of Die Linke and Left Front, and are even more prominent

in those of the radical left parties in Scandinavia. The inclusion of such issues is a characteristic

feature of the communist parties’ conversion process, as is made clear by the French case.

This ideal-typical description should not distract us from the many tensions and limitations of

this policy approach. The main one is the struggle the radical left parties have to make sure

their anti-capitalism has a positive content, in order to give way to a genuine counter-hegemonic

project. One of the reasons for this lack of a positive content is the nostalgia felt for the Keynesian

paradigm, whose effectiveness and emancipating power has nonetheless dwindled over the last

40 years. Lastly, the reference to the EU continues to be a major strategic challenge, such that

the radical left parties are at loggerheads with each other as are the factions within these parties.

Whereas some of them are keen to subvert the EU from within, others are planning for a painful

showdown including the scope for exiting the euro.

Social component

Most of the contemporary radical left parties no longer treat the industrial worker as a pre-

eminent revolutionary agent and are aware of the diverse social strata of which their electorate

is constituted. A common belief is that the voters the left attracts would be mainly recruited

from the ranks of those losing out during the current economic processes. There would even

be a mixed bag of such voters whose support it is struggling to gain in competition with the

far right. This depiction is reflected in particular in discussions seeking to equate right-wing

‘populism’ with the left-wing variety. We believe this view is wrong. It blithely fails to point out

the actual ideological differences from one end to the other of the political spectrum, while

12 Spourdalakis M. (2013), ‘Left strategy in the Greek cauldron: Explaining Syriza’s success’, Socialist Register, 49, 98-119.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




electoral sociology confirms how very short-sighted it is. The radical left family’s social basis is

more likely to include already left-leaning voters who rarely have any qualms about choosing the

right or far right. The sociological profile of these voters comprises the already politicized working

classes and intermediary and intellectual professions with an excellent academic background…

but short on heritage.

The patterns obviously differ from one country to another but several cases do illustrate our

argument. During the 2012 presidential campaign in France, the flow of potential voters for

Jean-Luc Mélenchon mainly hailed from the left part of the political spectrum, this latter being

described by Rey and Chanvril13 as a ‘world without walls’ for French voters. During the ballot,

Mélenchon’s supporters were primarily from the working class but over one-third belonged to the

intermediary professions or managerial staff mostly employed in the public sector14. In Germany,

where a huge number of voters switched their allegiance from the SPD to Die Linke in 2005 and

2009, the party did particularly well in winning over workers and the unemployed while doing

just as well for all levels of education15. In the Netherlands’ latest general elections, the trend

in the voting intention figures for the SP was diametrically opposed to the trend for the labour

party (PvdA). The huge flow of voters changing from one movement to another is underscored

by several post-election surveys.

When Syriza managed to achieve a dramatic breakthrough in the May 2012 general elections

in Greece, the new voters were mainly recruited from the ranks of first-time voters, non-voters,

Pasok constituents and communist voters but much less from the right16. As in Germany, the

social classes amongst which Syriza achieved its greatest successes were particularly working class,

while also covering students and employees with higher education qualifications who have been

downgraded and/or are feeling disadvantaged. The process of voters switching their allegiance

between the socialists and the radical left is also reported in Spain, with the IU even sometimes

managing to draw people not or no longer casting their votes. In conclusion, it would be wrong

to speak of any frontal assault going on between the radical left and far right.

13 Rey H. and F. Chanvril (2013), ‘Les flux à l’intérieur de la gauche : un univers décloisonné’, in P. Perrineau (ed.), La décision électorale, Paris, Armand Colin, 91-108.14 Enquête CSA for L’Humanité, 22 April 2012.15 Landwehrlen T. (2012), ‘Die Linke’, in J.M. De Waele and D.L. Seiler (eds), op. cit., 125-56.16 Mavris Y. (2012), ‘Greece’s austerity election’, New Left Review, 76, 95-107.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




Organisational component

The radical left parties do not yet stand out with a genuinely specific type of organisation that is

consistent with the two aforementioned components. The fact that there is no radical left party

‘model’ is hardly surprising in view of the variety of situations, ranging from the conversion of

a party to its creation from scratch, via the merger of political parties or their partnership in a

lasting electoral coalition.

The continuing shared characteristics are (1) how small all the existing parties are, (2) the spurning

of the vanguard party model and (3) an eagerness to forge ties with the social movements, while

paying respect to their independence. The Dutch SP’s rejection of Leninist principles thus went

hand in hand with key organisational changes, from the phase-out of ‘mass organisations’ to

extending decision-making to all members17. One of the key features of changes experienced by

the French CP was the decision to shelve democratic centralism plus more diverse forms of active

commitment and an open-minded attitude towards the young anti-globalisation movement18.

Syriza is typical of the attempts to encourage and forge links with the struggling sections of

society. The Left Front in France is envious of this ability to interconnect the various social

movements, without claiming to be leading them. The creation of a ‘ front des luttes’ (struggle

front) is a reflection of this strategic concern. The actual existence of Die Linke in Germany is

attributable to some extent to the rebellion of trade unionists who used to have close ties with

the social democrats. Some members of the workers’ movement have turned towards the German

radical left, which has more ties with the green and anti-globalisation movements than the SPD.

One of the key organisational challenges of the future will be to address the coexistence of the

radical left’s diverse traditions within merged parties or coalitions. Die Linke is currently rife with

tensions between the social-democratic dissidents from the West and the more reform-minded

factions from the former PDS rooted in the East, which did not live through the same historical

experiences and are not fearful of the same things going awry (a naive form of pragmatism, on

the one side, and a sectarian limitation, on the other)19. The disagreements about the relation to

17 Voerman G. (2012), ‘Du maoïsme à la social-démocratie. Le potentiel d’adaptation du Parti Socialiste néerlandais’, in J.M. De Waele and D.L. Seiler (eds), op.cit., 108-24. 18 Andolfatto D. and F. Greffet (2012), ‘Le Parti communiste français : une reconversion sous contraintes’, in J.M. De Waele and D.L. Seiler (eds), op.cit., 157-76.19 Spehr C. (2013), ‘Die Linke today: fears and desires’, Socialist Register, 49, 159-73.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




social democracy are indicative of the strains surrounding the discursive and election strategy of

the party, in common with the radical left coalition in France. Spain’s Izquierda Unida has also

suffered from the poor image conveyed by internal wrangling. Lastly, Syriza’s transformation into

a party has intensified the dispute between the current leadership and the left-wing platform

fearful of the ‘social democratisation’ of the party elites should they come to power. The gradual

merging of the various components of the radical left therefore cuts two ways: a) it gives strength

to parties or coalitions that harness a wide range of expertise, experiences and various social

footholds and b)it brings the coalitions and parties face to face with the threat of breaking up or

never-ending factional struggles.

Typology of the radical left family

Our typology of the radical left family comprises four branches or varieties: the orthodox

communists, the left of social democracy, the red-green parties and the revolutionary far left.

This typology is based on two main criteria: the communist identity and the political space. The

first criterion refers to the ‘identification with/demarcation from’ the communist identity. The

second illustrates the location of the radical left parties in their national political spectrum in

light of the space occupied by the social-democratic and green families.

The orthodox communists belong to the most side-lined part of the new family, insofar as it

is in fact a survivor of the former communist family. A highly conservative relationship with the

communist identity is a typical feature of these parties, as well as their refusal to join forces with

other radical left parties for electoral purposes. Mainly based in Southern Europe, particularly

in Greece and Portugal, they hail back to the powerful communist parties.

The branch we call ‘the left of social democracy’ comprises (a) the communist parties that

have embarked upon an ideological, strategic and organisational conversion process and (b) the

social-democratic dissidents at odds with a centre-left approach they had tired of within their

original party. This branch is in a way akin to ‘parliamentary anti-capitalism’ with no faith in the

strength of the social movement alone to overturn the existing order. Respect for representative

democracy requires it to refrain from straying as a matter of principle from relationships with

social democracy, particularly at the local level. While the libertarian and green realms are present

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




in some of these parties, the social issues and the challenge to capitalism continue to be central

to their ideological identities and key strategic concerns.

The red-greens variety includes parties that have adopted a strategy for revamping the communist

identity as a result of assuming an environmentalist stance. Emerging from a pattern of social-

democratic domination or even hegemony to the left of the political spectrum, these partnerships

operate in the field of the ‘New Politics’ and libertarian left. These parties are primarily active in

Northern Europe, where they are established as serious rivals to the social-democratic family. If

this is borne out, this new ideological profile could turn out to be the potential ‘winning formula’

for an anti-capitalist left that struggled in the past to carve out a place in this region. The red-

greens variety can also be found in Southern Europe, where orthodox communist parties still

pre-empt a ‘traditional’ left identity.

The revolutionary far left is also on the side-lines of the new family, not only because of the

impaired condition of its troops but also, and more importantly, because of its spurning of electoral

alliances and sticking to its ‘anti-system’ approach. Leninist, Trotskyite or Maoist-inspired, these

parties suspect the other radical left parties of giving in to a reformist approach once they come

to power. They should not be confused with the orthodox communist parties. They reject the

conservative and authoritarian attitudes of these parties, along with their instrumental views on

the social movements. However, challenging the Eurocommunist theories, they believe power

should be obtained by the masses and a council-based democratic system that has to be established

in the short term to replace the capitalist state. The idea of a sudden break with the political and

social system therefore continues to be central to their view of the rise to power of socialism. The

Socialist Workers Party in the United Kingdom and the New Anti-capitalist Party in France are

the most eminent representatives of this branch, along with Antarsya in Greece.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




Table 1. State of radical left parties in Western Europe*Countries Parties Last general

election resultRank in the party system

Government participation

Components

Cyprus AKELProgressive Party of the Working People

32.7(+1.6)

2 - Orthodox-communism

Denmark SFThe Socialist People’s Party

9.2(-3.8)

5 + Red-Green

ELThe Unity List

6.7(+4.5)

6 -Red-Green

Finland VASLeft-Wing Alliance

8.1(-0.3)

5 +Red-Green

France FdGLeft Front

6.9(+2.4)

4 - Left of social democracy

& Red-Green

Germany Die LinkeThe Left

8.6(-3.3)


Greece SYRIZACoalition of the

Radical Left

26.9(+10.1)

2 -Red-Green

DIMARDemocratic Left

6.3(+0.2)

6 + Left of social democracy

KKECommunist Party of

Greece

4.5(-4.0)

7 - Orthodox communism

Iceland VGLeft-Green Movement

10.9(-10.8)

4 -Red-Green

Ireland SP/ULASocialist Party /

United Left Alliance

2.7 5 -Revolutionary

far left

Luxembourg DéiLénkThe Left

3.3(+1.4)

6 - Red-Green

Netherlands SPSocialist Party

9.7(-0.1)


Norway SVSocialistic Left Party

4.1(-2.1)

7 -Red-Green

Portugal PCPPortuguese

Communist Party

8.2(+0.1)

4 - Orthodox communism

BELeft Bloc

5.4(-4.7)

5 - Red-Green

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




Countries Parties Last general election result

Rank in the party system

Government participation

Components

Spain IUUnited Left

6.9(+3.1)


&Red-Green

*Parties listed here are those able to claim one or more representatives at the Lower House. The Italian radical left is therefore not included in this table. Sources: http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/ and authors.

These family components of the radical left are indicative of different traditions and policy

decisions, underpinned by national backgrounds and the dynamic processes of the party systems.

These analytical categories are obviously unable to accommodate the intricate nature of all the

radical left’s national configurations. Not only for this reason but also because we hypothesize the

gradual acculturation of the unorthodox branches of the radical left family, they should be regarded

as porous entities. Radical left parties, or, more frequently, some of their factions or members, may

shift from one category to another. The case of the Left Front in France is instructive under this

heading: several factions of its far left rival (NPA) have thus entered this coalition, while some

have even joined the Left Party founded by socialist dissidents. This party has also welcomed

green dissident into the fold, who may be described as ‘red-greens’.

conclusion

The eurocommunist parenthesis was closed before the mid-eighties and was followed either by

a confinement in an orthodox identity, or by a dilution into mainstream social democracy. This

attempt to organize a new left, which would have been post-Keynesian as well as post-capitalist,

may well have been renewed since the end of the 1990s. The collapse of the communist family

and the marginalization of its more orthodox units created a window of opportunity for the

other protagonists of what was still a chaotic space of the radical left20. Since then, these new

players in the field have shared ideas and common struggles and have built new international

organizations. Thus, the external and internal borders of a new emergent political family can

be identified. However, this emergent family must still cope with numerous challenges, among

them its own cohesion and electoral attractiveness. It has still a long way to go before becoming

a genuine anti-systemic movement, as the social democratic family used to be a century ago.

20 Moschonas G. (2011), ‘The European Union and the Dilemmas of the Radical Left: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, Transform!, 9, 8-23.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org

http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/




appendix

Table 2. Radical left parties Parliamentary elections results, % (2000-2013)Countries Parties 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 09 10 11 12 13

Cyprus AKEL 34.7 31.1 32.7

Denmark SF 6.4 6.0 13.0 9.2

EL 2.4 3.4 2.2 6.7

Total 8.8 9.4 15.2 15.9

Finlande VAS 9.9 8.8 8.1

France PCF 4.9 4.5

FG 6.9

Germany PDS 4.0

Die Linke

8.7 11.9 8.6

Greece KKE 5.5 5.9 8.2 7.5 4.5*8.5**

SYRIZA 3.2 3.3 5.0 4.6 26.916.8

DIMAR 6.36.1

Total 8.7 9.2 13.2 12.1 37.731.4

Iceland VG 12.5 8.8 14.3 21.7 10.9

Ireland*** SP/ULA

0.8 2.7

Italy**** PRC 5.0 5.8

PdCI 1.7 2.3

Total 6.7 8.1

Luxemburg Déi Lénk

3.3

Netherlands SP 5.9 6.3 16.6

Norway SV 8.8 6.2 4.1

Portugal PCP 6.9 7.5 7.9 7.9

BE 2.7 6.4 9.8 5.2

Total 9.6 13.9 17.7 13.1

Spain IU/IU-ICV

5.5 5.0 6.9

Sweden V 8.4 5.8 5.6

United Kingdom

RES 0.3

*Parliamentary elections of June 2012.**Parliamentary elections of May 2012.

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org




***Although Sinn Féin is a member of the GUE-NGL group, we do not consider that it can be classified within the radical left family.****The radical left electoral coalition Civil Revolution did not obtained seats at February 2013 Parliamentary elections, that is why it is not listed here.Sources: De Waele et Vieira (2012: 72-73) and http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/

Table 3. Radical left parties European elections results, % and seats (1989-2009)1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

% Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats

GUE-NGL*

8.1 42 5.3 33 6.7 42 5.2 41 4.8 35

Rank 6 5 5 6 6

Total Left

51.2 265 47.3 296 43.1 270 38.3 301 37.2 274

Total EP 518 626 626 785 736

*From 1989 as Communist and Allies (CA) and Left Unity (LU) Groups ; from 1994 as Confederal Group of United European Left (GUE) ; from 1999 as Confederal Group of United European Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL).Source: De Waele et Vieira (2012: 78)

Table 4. Radical left parties government participation after 1990Country Party Date Type of participation

Cyprus AKEL 2003-2013 Coalition

Denmark SF 1994-1998 Support

1998-2001 Support

2011- Coalition

EL 1994-1998 Support

1998-2001 Support

2011- Support

Finland VAS 1995-1999 Coalition

1999-2003 Coalition

2011- Coalition

France PCF 1989-1993 Support

1997-2002 Coalition

Greece SYN/KKE 1989-1990 Coalition

DIMAR 2012-2013 Coalition

Iceland VG 2009-2011 Coalition

Ireland Democratic Left 1994-1997 Coalition

Italy PRC 1996-1998 Support

PdCI 1998-2001 Support

PRC/PdCI 2006-2008 Coalition

Norway SV 1994 Support

2005-2009 Coalition

2009-2013 Coalition

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org

http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/


CAUTION: the aim of the Jean Jaurès Foundation is to keep public debate alive and to renew the reflection on socialism. The Foundation is publishing policy papers and commentaries of which the theme, the originality of the issue, or the quality of the argumentation help reaching this objectif without endorsing each one of them.



Country Party Date Type of participation

Spain IU 2004-2008 Support

Sweden V 1998-2002 Support

Sources: March (2011: 208) and authors.

Table 5. European affiliations of radical left parties in Western EuropeCountries Parties NELF

New European

Left Forum

EACLEuropean

Anti-capitalist

Left

NGLANordic

Green Left Alliance

GUE-NGLConfederal Group of United

European Left-Nordic Green Left

PELEuropean Left Party

Cyprus AKEL Observer + Observer

Denmark SF + + +

EL + + +

Finland VAS + + Associate +

France PCF + +

PG +

FdG +

Germany Die Linke + + +

Greece KKE +

SYN + + + +

SYRIZA +

Iceland VG +

Italy PRC + Observer Associate +

PdCI + Associate Observer

Luxembourg Dèi Lénk + Associate +

Netherlands SP + Observer +

Norway SV + + Associate

Portugal PCP Observer +

BE + + +

Spain IU + + +

Sweden V + + +

Sources: March (2011: 157) and http://www.european-left.org/about-el/member-parties

www.jean-jaures.org


www.jean-jaures.org

http://www.european-left.org/about-el/member-parties


The Radical Left in Europe. Thoughts About the Emergence of a Family

Documents

Transcript of The Radical Left in Europe. Thoughts About the Emergence of a Family