THE POLITICS OF ABUSE AND POETICS OFVIOLENCE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1946-1966

By

Ibrahim A. MalumfashiDepartment of Nigerian Languages and Linguistics

Kaduna State UniversityKaduna.

And

Mohammed J. KunaDepartment of Sociology

Usmanu Danfodiyo UniversitySokoto

Being the Text of a Paper Contributed for a Festschript inHonour of Professor Abdulkadir Dangambo, Department of

Nigerian Languages, Bayero University, Kano.

ABSTRACT

Analysis of postcolonial state domination hardlyappreciates the plurality of the forms suchdomination assumes, or of the equally plural formsresistance takes. The construction of thepostcolonial state as a specific form of dominationhowever teaches us to appreciate not only thevariety of the forms domination assumes, but alsoof the plurality of the forms of resistance. Theconceptual restriction of the analysis ofopposition and resistance to open, observablefields not only beclouds our understanding ofresistance, it in addition neglects the subtleforms resistances to state domination take. Suchanalyses give primacy to direct and open stateaction v direct and open resistance to it. Focusingmainly on open attacks by the state on persons,social groups, or political parties whose notionsof independence and indeed of the very constitutionof the postcolonial state radically varied with theemergent dominant neo-colonial setup, such analysesfail to appreciate the subtlety of the variousforms resistance to dominion takes, and how, incertain contexts, dissimulation, evasion orpoetic/literary expressions come to assume greaterforms of resistance to domination than open anti-state action. This paper focuses on a specific formthrough which domination and resistance to itappears: literary and poetic renditions. The paperargues that though domination and resistance areintegral to the wider struggle towards theconstruction and deconstruction of a specificpostcolonial state-form in Northern Nigeria, it is

constraining to conceptualize either as direct,open attacks (state brutality, the confiscation ofproperty of members of the opposition,imprisonment, or exile) on the opposition, or asdirect open resistance to state action. For, theviolence and resistance attendant with theconstruction of the postcolonial state is manifestmainly not openly, but more frequently andpowerfully through ideological battles, the expression ofwhich took virulent literary compositions andpoetic abuse.

THE POLITICS OF ABUSE AND THE POETICS OF VIOLENCEIN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1946 -1966

INTRODUCTION

The struggle for state formation in post-colonialnorthern Nigeria is perhaps second only to thejihad of 1804 in terms of its impact on thegeneration of ideas, literature, and groups and ofassociation wider than the struggle though, thewhole era also reflects the repression of groupsand ideas, the imposition of cultural anddiscursive homogeneity on an essentiallyheterogeneous setting, as well as the sharpening ofintolerance between social groups and classes. Itwas an era that, in its emphasis on culturaluniformity, attempted to preclude the very idea ofplurality. But it was also an era of resistance, ofopen battles won and lost, and of more subtle andhidden battles that remain unacknowledged. Takentogether, these represent the twin processes of thestruggle for, and against the imposition of aparticular form of the postcolonial state. Bothprocesses thus broadly represent the patterns ofdomination and of resistance in the post colony.Yet, the study of domination and resistance inpostcolonial northern Nigeria, as in most otherpostcolonial settings rarely takes these twinprocesses into consideration. The inner logiclinking both is hardly considered, and analysespresent both as separate. More pointedly, suchanalyses pay less, and at times no attention atall, to the multiple forms domination andresistance assume in the post colony. The neglect

of these issues not only constrains, but alsobeclouds our understanding of the nature ofdomination and resistance in postcolonial settings.This thus constitutes a specific approach to theanalysis of postcolonial state and society.

Such an approach is predicted on anunderstanding of domination that focuses either onopen, observable repressive state action, or itscorollary, open observable resistance. It is thesealone that are said to constitute domination andresistance to it (Anifowose: 1982; Abba: 1993).Consequent upon this, state and opposition actionthat falls outside of these parameters becomeresidual, unimportant issues. The implication ofthis conceptualization of domination and resistanceis two fold. First, a positivistic notion of stateviolence and repression is advanced as the basicframework within which domination and resistancecould be understood. This notion seeks to identifyonly tangible, measurable incidents ofviolence/repression, or resistance to them(Nesvold: 1969; Muller and Weede: 1990) as the mainindices for analyzing patterns of rule and specificregime types. It is our contention that such afocus gives only a partial picture of the overallensemble of state and opposition actions thatconstitute domination and resistance. We have herein mind literary works, poetic expositions andrenditions, as well as artistic representations ascrucial media through which domination andresistance are enacted and re-enacted. These arenot merely forms or leisure and communication, butare in addition, concrete battlefields for some ofthe most hotly contested political and social ideas

in the struggle for, and against the imposition ofa specific postcolonial state in northern Nigeria.These were battlefields created from, and sustainedby poetic/artistic expositions that not onlyindicate the open and subtle violence of thepostcolonial state, but also the subtlety ofresistance, and the forms it could assume in thestruggle against domination.

In a society as heterogeneous as northernNigeria, where the demands of a unitary stateproject meant the construction of culturalhomogeneity, analysis must be alive to the numerous‘earthworks’ domination creates and through whichasserts itself. Equally important would be thevarious forms through which resistance articulatesand expresses itself. Open resistance may forexample not only be too costly; it may in fact befar more effective to employ some other methodssuch as evasion, defense, dissimulation, andpoetic/literary rendition (Scott: 1985, 1990) inthe pursuit of certain objectives.

The second emerges directly from the first, andis based on the separation of the exercise ofdomination and resistance from the processes of theconstruction of the post colonial state. Fewstudies on the postcolonial state in northernNigeria admit its construction involves not justthe territorial and cultural reconstruction of pre-colonial power spaces and boundaries (Kuna: 1998).Such a reconstruction also involves a parallelprocess, that of the reconstruction of pre-colonialdiscourses, and of the more significant impositionof one ‘master discourse’: the discourse of theunitary state. Such an imposed discourse not only

presents itself as the only authentic discourse inthe post colony, it also seeks to obliterate otheropposing discourses. Analysis of domination andresistance not only neglect these dimensions ofpower and the imposition of such a discourse, theyin addition rarely focus on the forms resistanceassumes in the opposition to the imposition of a‘master discourse’.

The failure to grasp the subtlety of the formswith which both phenomena are conceptualized,contrary to positivistic conceptualizations;domination and resistance are processes whoseboundaries are being consistently contested, acontestation that is famed within certainhistorical boundaries. Such historical boundariesto a significant degree make available, or closeoff certain options to the contenders for power.While in certain situations, open violence or openresistance may be appropriate, in some othersituations both could assume muted or hidden forms.Thus with respect to resistance, Gordon, quoted byScott (1985: vii), observes that:

….the binary division betweenresistance and non-resistance is anunreal one. The existence of thethose who seem not to rebel is awarren of minute, individual,autonomous tactics and strategieswhich counter and inflect thevisible facts of overall domination,and whose purposes and calculations,desires and choices resist anysimple division into the political

and the apolitical. The schema of astrategy of resistance as a vanguardof politicization needs to besubjected to re-examination, andaccount must be taken of resistanceswhose strategy is one of evasion ordefense--- the Scweijiks as well asthe Solzhenitsyns. There are no goodsubjects of resistance.

In this paper, we argue for a subtler, non-positivistic and non-mechanistic approach to theanalysis of domination and resistance. Focusing onpoetic abuse and violence between two dominantpolitical parties in northern Nigeria specificallywithin the decades of 1946-66; we argue that theemphasis on high politics of national unity andintegration not only closes off particular issuesof state domination and resistance, such anemphasis, alone, restricts our understanding of thenature of rule, and of the opposition to it in thepost colony. We also advance the argument that theunderstanding of domination and resistance mustfocus not only on the processes of the constructionof homogeneous physical and social boundaries inerstwhile colonies. Such an understanding ispossible only when it poses the important questionof the imposition of a ‘master discourse over otherrival discourses in the post colony. Furthermore,this particular understanding must reject thenotion that the imposition of a ‘master discourse’went unchallenged or that such challengesnecessarily took open, violent forms. We argue,that though there are important instances of open

struggles against colonial and postcolonialdomination, challenges to both the physical andsocial construction of new territoriality as wellas those directed at the imposition of a ‘masterdiscourse’ in the main took literary and poeticforms.

The paper is divided into five sections, theintroduction being the first. The second examinespositivistic categories domination and resistanceas exemplified in the literature on politicalviolence. The section shows the inadequacies ofsuch approaches, and argues that to appreciate theforms domination and resistance assume in the postcolony, non-positivistic, processual conceptions ofviolence need be adopted. Section three examinesthe social and political contexts that give rise tothe specific forms of violence and resistance innorthern Nigeria. It also examines the basis fortheir expression through forms other than open andoutward struggles, in particular through poeticabuse and literary violence. The fourth sectionfocuses mainly on the nature, form and content ofsuch expressions, showing how embedded in them arestruggles over power, as well as over the discoursethrough which such power could present itself. Thefifth section concludes the paper by arguing for amore tensioned discussion of the issues ofdomination and resistance in the post colony thatcould account for the multi-dimensionality ofdomination and resistance to it.

BINARY CONCEPTIONS OF DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE:THE ANALYSIS OF VIOLENCE.

Focus on the processes of domination andresistance started gaining prominence in the early1950s with the beginning of decolonialization. Sucha focus was from the beginning characterized by aparticular conception of domination that almostplaced an exclusive concern on the question ofstability, and therefore of the construction ofcultural homogeneity. This is readily seen in theemphasis o the imposition of the idea of progress,of the instance on modernizing backward andatavistic societies, and of the continuation withthe material and discursive aspects of the colonialstate building project after independence(Chatterjee: 1986). State building is thusconceived as a process of the mobilization andassimilation of cultural plurality into culturaland territorial homogeneity (Pye: 1960). Theconstruction of homogeneity out of theheterogeneous units that constitute erstwhilecolonial societies depends on “state builders’ or“centralizing tendencies”. State building is aconsequence of the attempt to transformtraditional, tribal forms of social organizationinto secular modern forms in which the exercise ofpower is “rationally” determined in bureaucraciesand political parties (Huntington: 1968). Statebuilding is therefore a unitarist project whoseunderlying discourse typically represented bymodernization theory (Huntington 1968). Such aconception advances a particular notion of thepostcolonial state as the key to both economicdevelopment and the institutionalization of liberaldemocracy. Development and democracy then representa unilinear progression from “traditional” to

“modern” society in which the state’s dominance inbreaking down “anti-modern” attitudes is asserted.From this position, the state’s leading role insociety is justifies in terms of the exigencies ofeconomic development and national integration. Itis a conception of state building that takes theintegration of social groups and ideas as aprecondition for national unity. And it is thisconception that forms the basis for the analysis ofthe nature of domination and resistance. Such aconception becomes most visible in its treatment ofthe question of violence and repression (Kuna:1998).

From this board framework, violence was seen asinvolving either the deliberate use of forcecausing injury and physical destruction (Rutake:1995), or the use of force that has politicalimpact on individuals, groups, or systems,domestically or internationally (Chabal: 1986).Tilly (1978) provides us with a usefulclassification of such definitions which he rankedfrom broad to narrow. In narrow terms, violencerefers to “those uses of physical force which areprohibited by a normative order presumed to belegitimate” a definition similar to one advanced byGurr (1973). From this standpoint, violence has twocomponents: the intention to injure, and the use ofspecific means to affect such an injury. In broadterms, violence involves “all deprivations ofasserted human rights” (Tilly: 1978).Whether broador narrow, (Tilly: 1978) classification drawsattention to the inadequate conceptualization ofviolence from within this framework. Let us examinethis framework in greater detail.

The narrow conception of violence has led to afocus on political violence, in which analysis isrestricted to open, observable incidents ofviolence either in interpersonal or inter-groupsituations, or to violence against the state. Itwas this conception that Eckstein and Gurr (1973)emphasized, when they classified violence asturmoil, conspiracy and internal war. The focus ison those actions that pose, or could pose a threatto the state and its stability, or to the stabilityof the political system. Studies of this nature arenaturally predicted on the frustration aggressionframework used to explain interpersonal aggression.There are quite many variations of this, butwhether focus is on a “want get gap” betweenexpectations and achievement or on a disjuncturebetween “expected need satisfaction” and “actualneed satisfaction” or on relative deprivation andthe gap between expectations and capabilities(Gurr: 1973), a common thread is the attempt toapply theoretical insights gained from the study ofaggression at the micro, individual level to theunderstanding of macro social phenomena. There isthus a common emphasis on the notion on the gapbetween an original state and a succeeding one thatis then posited as the cause of frustration. It issuch frustration that causes anger which leads toviolence (Lupsha: 1971). This explanation of microlevel aggression is then applied to macro socialand political phenomena through the concept of“systemic frustration” that attempts to link anoriginally micro-level analysis of violence tomacro-political phenomena (Marcus and Nesvold:1971). The argument is that violence in the

political system occurs because of a “gap” betweena previous frustration condition that had arisen inresponse to a blocked goal or goals (Marcus andNesvold: 1971). Cross-national measures are thenconducted along a “permissiveness-coerciveness”scale to establish the degree to which a particularstate or society deploys violence in the exerciseof power.

Although the broad conception attempted to gobeyond individual, micro level analysis ofviolence, its restricted focus on the question ofrights and of the legitimacy of violence preventsit from posing significant structural questionsabout the processes of domination and resistance.Such an emphasis on the narrow question of rightsin the analysis of the relationship betweenviolence and democracy, referring to liberaldemocratic societies, Honderich (1976) suggests afocus on those actions that hinder theparticipation of individuals in the politicalsystem such as coercion or other undueinfluences/obstacles that may affect attitudes orchoices in an election or campaigning. There arealso issues such as the regularity/irregularity orelections or of anything that any influence peopleto behave in a way they would not ordinarily behaveduring an election. Other issues include acceptingand respecting election results, and the equalityof all votes in the choice of a government.

These approaches are severely limited in theirexplanatory power. The micro level, individualisticexplanatory framework prevents such approaches fromadequately raising and considering the nature,source, legitimacy and class basis of violence.

Limited in its explanatory framework to observable,quantifiable incidents of violence, such anapproach is equally incapable of first,conceptualizing the state as a principal actor inviolence and second, of analyzing the nature andextend of state activity in terms of the impositionof its hegemony, and the various forms suchimposition could take. Equally significant is thatthis framework can not adequately provide us withan explanation of the resistance of the dominatedagainst the hegemony of the state, or of thevarious forms and nuances such resistance takes, orcould take. Such analysis, in its emphasis onviolence towards, rather than from the state, thusexcludes a significant area in the attempt tounderstand domination and resistance. Since thestate is assumed as given, the theory could notfathom, especially in the postcolonial situation,the intricate struggles over not just the gapbetween needs/expectations on the one hand andreality on the other, but also the very ideal ofthe state, its constitution, and the heatedstruggles over its postcolonial role and status. Inaddition, struggles over the modes and mediathrough which these are expressed were not even animportant consideration. Though the broaddefinition does point to important issues aboutrights and some of the contests over power, thebasis problem remains the singular focus on theends or consequences of violence, to the neglect ofits means. The approach also lacks a focus on theviolence of the state against its citizens,neglects the class basis of violence, overlooks thesystemic disenfranchisement of a large number of

people, and thus fails to account for the numerousforms and practices domination and resistanceassume.

This framework is therefore limited in offeringus a conceptualization of domination andresistance, for it fails to raise questions of thepossible forms these can assume, as well as the waythese issues are linked to state building processesin postcolonial societies. To do this, it isimportant to first conceptualize violence inrelation to state activity, and of the oppositionto such activity. This analytically andconceptually opens the issue to include historicalforces in the construction, organization andchallenges to power, rather than to a narrowconcern with individual, interpersonal or inter-group violence and on the quantification of violentincidents and resistance to them. And sinceviolence is related to the mechanisms ofexploitation and domination, a particular mode ofviolence and resistance may depend a lot on themechanisms through which surplus is extracted. Theharassment and intimidation of opposition partiesand their membership in response to actions such asthe display of party flags, adorning party badges,refusal to participate in forced labor, or growingcash crops are also explicable in terms of theoverall colonial and postcolonial projects of theconstruction and consolidation of a new powerstructure. Within the same general framework is tobe explained the various incidents of statesponsored thuggery, not as discrete events, but aspart of the state building process. Also to beconsidered are forms of violence such as

discrimination in employment on the basis ofpolitical convictions, gender, or identity, variousforms of the confiscation of property (farmlands,livestock, and work tools) measures of de-participation, and forced migration against membersof the opposition. These constitute some of themechanisms of domination and resistance. Suchmechanisms however, are not always open or visible.Especially in the context of northern Nigeria, suchmechanisms of domination and resistance have takenforms that are traditionally considered negligible.We are here referring to literary expositions, andhow such expositions became serious sites ofstruggles for power between the forces ofdomination and those of resistance. The nextsection discusses the theoretical underpinning ofthese less visible mechanisms of domination andresistance.

EVASION, DISSIMULATION, AND POETICS: DOMINATION ANDSUBTLE FORMS OF RESISTANCE.

The analysis of dissimulation and poetics asactive forms of domination and resistance inpostcolonial Northern Nigeria must be situatedwithin the historical context of the constructionof the colonial and postcolonial states. Thesepoetic forms of resistance take several dimensions.Resistance is expressed against a particularlyharsh or ungenerous emir, warhead, or fatherthrough songs and poems. Indeed young girlssometimes express resistance to forced marriagethrough their songs and poems. The expression ofsuch form of resistance is quite historically old.

Without attempting to comment on its origin, onecould say that this form of opposition to power hasbeen in practice in the old Hausa States, andpossibly in Bornu too. In some of these areas, suchforms are expressed in poems during installationceremonies. Indeed one of the mechanisms in themobilisation of opinion against Habe rule by theJihadists in 1804 was literary and poeticexpositions. This forms of resistance continuedduring the years of the Caliphate and beyond. Onecould therefore see poetics as a historicallydetermined medium for the expression of resistancein Northern Nigeria that has been used by dominatedgroups and classes.Consequently, we can analytically distinguish aboutthree forms of such resistance, corresponding tothree social groups in the society, although inreality such distinctions do not exist. There isfirst the poetics expression of the ulema againstunjust leadership in the caliphate. Although suchulema were part of the state apparatus, it assertsits independence whenever state excesses begin. Thesecond, also originating from the ulema are thosepoetic expressions generated by, or created in thecourse of the continuing struggle against colonialdomination. The third are those poetic expressionsemerging from the peasantry that reflect oppositionnot just to pre-colonial forms of domination, butalso to those forms of domination that arose fromcolonial conquest. All three elements are to acertain degree in the poetic expositions we aredealing with, though these became much sharper dueto imposition of territorial and social homogeneityover heterogeneous boundaries, and the

corresponding unitarist state project and discoursethis imposition implies.It should be stated from the onset that the Britishoverthrow of Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 resulted notjust in the imposition of the colonial state, butalso in the imposition of certain territorial andsocial boundaries that have had profoundimplications for questions of domination andresistance. To begin with, the concept of “NorthernNigeria” as a territorial, and socio-politicalfield of power as distinct from other areas thatcame to constitute Nigeria is a colonialcontraption (Kuna: 1998). The effect of theconstruction of this field of power is the attemptat the imposition practically as well asdiscursively, of a notion of homogeneity infurtherance of colonial exploitation. Since theimposition of such homogeneity was a necessaryprecondition for the construction of the colonialstate, the conquest of Sokoto caliphate draws ourattention not just to the collapse of a pre-colonial structure, but also to the more importantquestion of its reconstruction in terms ofdifferent operating logistics and field of power.Thus it was that while the caliphate’s frontierswere somewhat amorphous, a new geographical andsocial boundary carved domestically andinternationally, was imposed. The consolidation of the colonial state thusinvolves the political reconstruction of pre-colonial geographical and social spaces. It wassuch a reconstruction that enabled the retention,in a modified form of the centralized bureaucraticorganization of the caliphate, and its imposition

on other areas in what is now Northern Nigeria thatwas never parts of the caliphate. There were twomain sources of resistance to the consolidation ofsuch a state. The state derives its control fromthe pre-colonial power structure; for the strengthof Islam within the ulema, their students and thewider public makes it possible to criticize stateactions as either just or unjust, or whether indeedstate functionaries were acting on the basis of theshari’a. The expression of resistance was throughpoems, and other activities such as migration tothe eastern part of the caliphate, but it veryrarely took open revolts, though there was thattoo. The ground for opposing state actions andfunctionaries became ever sharper due to thetensions that emerged from caliphate’s loss oflegitimacy in agreeing to serve directly under“white” or “infidel” rule. “White” rule was notjust alien, it was also contrary to Islam, andmust, at least for a significant part of the ulemaand the general society, be resisted in whateverform it appeared. Pre-colonial resistance to thecaliphal state, often organised along religiouslines, also began to be defined by the British as“Militant Islam” that poses a serious threat to thewhole colonial state structure. This engendered acategorization between “official” and “militant”Islam, and sources of opposition were dealt with inthose terms. Such resistance was addressed throughthe deposition or killing of those emirs thateither resisted, or did not support British policyopenly, or those that were sympathetic to“militant” Islam. Equally noteworthy, is that theorganization of such resistance, in the cases where

it reached open revolts, was dealt with severely bya scorch earth policy (Birniwa: 1987; Bello: 1991;Abubakar: 1980). This was not the only form ofresistance against the colonial state apparatus.Resistance from the late 1930s to the early 1940sbecame influenced a great deal by the beginning ofagitation for independence. The ulema, the emergenteducated class, and the peasantry opposed bothcolonial rule and the Emirs that now rule on behalfof colonialism. Again both state domination andresistance to it were defined in terms of thedistinction between “official” and “militant” or“fundamentalist” Islam (Saeed: 1982). The wholecolonial state structure became geared towardsdealing with the “threat” of “militant” Islam, asrepresented by some sects such as the “Tijjaniyya”.Such established Islamic “fundamentalism” was wellrooted in certain cities, and it became the centerof opposition to the “new” political arrangementintroduced by colonialism. As such, the centralpolitical ideas on which opposition was based orcould be based, such as the notions of the fairnessof rulers, of justice, of resistance againstcolonial rule as justified, as well as of theexclusiveness of the Muslim constituency and therole of the ulema as guardians of that constituencydid not die with the Sokoto Caliphate. Such issuesand roles re-emerged as powerful battlegrounds forstruggles against the state in the subsequentpolitical history of Northern Nigeria (Hiskett:1984; Birniwa: 1987).The reconstitution of pre-colonial and inparticular emirate authority indicates that thetransfer of power raises the very serious question

of legitimacy of pre-colonial institutions, andtherefore on the texture of the relationshipbetween rulers and the ruled (Kuna: 1997). Theemirate system was now reconstituted as the nativeauthority system, and though emirs directly ruledthe people, none was deceived as to the presence ofthe British in the background. This in effectproduced a situation similar to the one thatexisted on the eve of the jihad of 1804, namely, arift within the state apparatus in which thepolitical leadership’s syncretistic activities wereopposed by the ulema. Here, the problem wascompounded by the fact that the new politicalarrangement and the pre-colonial state apparatuswere geared towards legitimizing alien, and aboveall, an un-Islamic system. Moreover, theorganization of the new state structure through theconstruction of customary law, and of nativeauthority administrations added a new source oftension. Native authorities were at various levelsmanned by, or through the pre-colonial statestructures. Since this was a closed administrativesystem organised on the principle of the benevolentdespot, emphasis on descent and social standingrather than education and merit became the basis ofa serious conflict between the emergent educatedelites and emirs.These tensions, situated as they were within thecolonial unitarist conception of state, began toinfluence the organization of struggles along twomain patterns and justificatory ideologies: the“conservative Islamic tendency”, reflecting thosegroups supportive of the existing NA establishmentas represented by the emirs and chiefs who occupied

its summit, and the “Islamic revolutionarytendency” that wanted a complete change or re-organization of the system. The former tendencyreflects not just an attempt to maintain tradition,for note must be made that some sections of thissocial force vouched for gradual changes in theadministrative system. It in addition, and this iswhere a critical difference with the later tendencylies, calls into being the pre-colonial stateapparatus, in order to justify not just its rule,but also the unitarist state project. In thissense, it relied on the long tradition of jihad andconquest by the founders of the caliphate, andposed its current relevance in terms of finishingthe task of expanding the frontiers of theCaliphate that was interrupted by the colonialconquest in 1903. The ultimate goal was to ensure asmooth transition from a colonial to a neocolonialstatus, against the backdrop of the achievements ofa pre-colonial state structure, and the things itrepresents (Birniwa: 1987).The cultural/political associations that startedemerging during the late 1930s to the early 1940sultimately reflected this general divide, thoughsome of these associations initially did notdemonstrate such overt and sharp distinctions. Thefirst of such cultural associations, the NorthernGeneral Improvement Union was founded in 1941, andit drew membership from both tendencies. Thus,people like Abubakar Imam, Wazirin Zazzau Sanusi,Mallam Julde, Malam Jumare, R.A.B. Dikko, JohnGarba, Sa’adu Zungur, the Emir of Zazzau, theResident, the District Officer (D.O) and othersbased in Zaria were its originators (Kano: 1973).

The diversity of opinions such an organizationconsisted of was bound to generate heated debates,and it did when people like Sa’adu Zungur hadfundamental disagreement as to the nature andpurpose of the organization. Such organization hadmembership drawn from the remnants of the pre-colonial state apparatus as well as from thecolonial state, and were more often that notorganised as for a protection of such interest(Kano: 1973). The more radical members of thisorganization like Sa’adu Zungur could not accept asituation where women were discriminated against ora situation where the unjust practices of the Emirsand Native Authorities could be condoned. Thisopposition was only justified and supported throughextensive quotations from the Qur’an, but was alsoexpressed through poems and songs. The NGIU wastherefore disbanded, and its members transferred toother locations within and outside the province.Sa’adu was transferred to Anchau to fightinfectious diseases. Although the NGIU was disbanded, this did notappear to have stopped the organization ofinterests along the two major tendencies weidentified above, throughout Northern Nigeria- fromBauchi, Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina, to Zaria andthrough the pages of newspapers such as the GaskiyaTa Fi Kwabo and the West African Pilot, issues suchas the role and operation of the nativeauthorities, the position and role of emirs in taxassessment and collection, gender inequalitiesespecially in education, the “backwardness” of theNorth, and the nature of the emergent postcolonialstate were raised and debated. Three volatile

issues dominated these debates: forced conscriptionof Northerners to fight at the war front, forcedlabor at the tin mines in Jos, and the diversion offood meant for the people to the war front. Atdifferent fora across the Northern provinces, suchissues were raised and expressed through literaryand poetic forms. It was clear that the colonialgovernment and the native authorities, at the headof which were the emirs, were the subject ofdiscussion. Such debates and discussions weremainly justified on religious grounds, though forthe ‘conservative Islamic tendency’ reform was thewatchword, while for the ‘radical Islamic tendency’a fundamental change in the system was the maingoal. Such debates also became increasinglyorganised in associations whose ideologicalpositions vis- a vis colonial rule, nativeauthorities and emirs became sharper and began toassume two distinct, if incoherent camps. Thus itwas in that kind of scenario that the BauchiDiscussion Circle (later the Bauchi GeneralImprovement Union), was formed in 1943. It wasduring these years also, that the Zaria ZumuntaAssociation, Sokoto Youth Social Circle, andCitizens Associations of Kano were established. Asthe 1940s drew to a close, some of theseorganizations began to merge into politicalparties. Thus was formed the Northern PeoplesCongress (NPC) from a merger of various culturalassociations, amongst which are: the Jam’iyyarMutanen Arewa, Bauchi Community Centre, the SokotoYouth Social Circle, and the Citizens Associationof Kano. By 1951, the NPC had shredded its radicalmembers, and had clearly become the establishment

party whose general goal was the defense of theexisting power structures. Due to its compositionand membership in its formative years, the NPCcould, and did make a claim to radicalism, for itopenly criticized the traditional establishment andadvanced some radical reformist ideas whichseriously alarmed the colonial state and the emirsspecifically. This tension led not just to stepsfor shedding such radicalism, but it also led tothe emplacement of mechanisms for accommodatingreforms aimed at improving rather than changing thecolonial establishment. Both issues were talkedthrough first, the attempt an unsuccessful one, toprevent NA and government officials fromparticipating in politics (Sklar: 1965), and of“coercing old guard” emirs into accepting theinevitability of peaceful reforms, if violent onesare to be deflated (Yakubu, 1999). It was theattempt to shed the NPC of its radicalism andradical elements that culminated in the riftbetween the conservatives and radicals at the NPC’sJos convention in 1950 in which several radicalmembers were expelled (Dudley: 1968; Sklar: 1965).The “Islamic revolutionary tendency” is itselfhistorically grounded, for it derives from the longtradition of protest activity and resistance by theulema and the peasantry. In this sense, thecritical issues it draws to demonstrate itsrelevance is fairness, legitimacy and piety. Itthus also traces its origins back to the jihad andits leaders, for it claims that there was afundamental distinction between the ideals andpractices of the original Jihadists and theirheirs: the former emphasized fairness, justice,

piety, learning, contemplating and the principle ofnon- hereditary succession, while the laterdemonstrates unfairness, injustice, un-Islamicpractices, the confiscation of peasant property, aswell as hereditary succession. To this tendency,the object of resistance lies not just in sweepingaway the injustices perpetrated by the whole statestructure, but that resistance against colonialismand its divisiveness is also a religious duty. The Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) isin the main then an organization that championedthe objectives of the ‘radical Islamic tendency’.Initially launched in 1946 under the name theNorthern Elements Progressive Association (NEPA)resolved to foster “mutual understanding andcooperation” between the peoples of the north, aswell as to clear away the belief that “theNortherner is silent because he is satisfied”(NEPA: 1947). NEPA’s objectives, right from thestart, were radically political and were expressedin pungent criticism both of the colonialestablishment and of the emirs who cooperated withthem. The disbandment of NEPA in 1949 led to theformation of NEPU in 1950. Consequently NEPU’sobjectives were radically different from NPC’s, andthere was a strong association between theobjectives of both associations. NEPU was inaddition committed to the “total emancipation ofthe talakawa from the domination of a privilegedfew through the reform of the existing autocraticpolitical institutions” (NEPU: 1950). It wasagainst not only the native administrations. Itsarticulation of the anti-colonial struggle in anti-imperialist and Pan-Nigerian nationalist terms

meant it was also against regionalism as well asthe colonial state. By thus declaring itselfagainst regionalism and autocratic power, NEPU wasseen as posing a serious threat to the wholecolonial project. This threat became even moreserious in view of NEPU’s efforts to buildalliances within and between regions. The distinctiveness of both parties was thereforehistorically embedded in the kind of issues bothcame to represent. Beyond the parties lies twosocial forces that were locked in conflict over thenature of domination, the exercise and limits tosuch domination, the relationship between rulersand the ruled, as well as the nature of theemergent postcolonial state. Such conflicts hadbeen greatly influenced by religion, and theirexpression indeed took place mainly throughreligious language. The expression of such conflictand the opposition to them had been predominantlypoetic and literary. This is not to say resistanceto domination has not been organised, but thatgiven the context in which these forces operated,poetic abuse and literary violence had come toassume a position of greater significance asvehicles of action. And it is to the poetic abuseand literary violence that characterizes thepolitics of Northern Nigeria in the decadesencapsulating 1946-1966 that we now turn.

POLITICS OF ABUSE, POETICS OF VIOLENCE: THE ART OFDOMINATION AND RESISTANCE

Although the struggle between these socialforces in the literary and poetic arena actually

commenced long before the beginning of the strugglefor independence, it was this struggle that gave itspecifically serious and violence undertones in theearly 1940s. The sharpening of the debates overself government, the influence of expandingnewspaper publications and readerships acrossnorthern Nigeria, the influence of anti-colonialstruggles elsewhere, as well as the support ofresistance against colonial rule and emirs began tobe expressed more frequently in the poetic arena.Such literary and poetic expression not only denoteconcrete messages against injustices in theoperation of native administrations, emirs, andsubsequently of the postcolonial state, they arealso media for mobilisation by political parties inan effort to influence the course of thedevelopment of the North and of Nigeria in general.More pointedly, in such expressions are to be foundverbal attacks against the increasing imposition ofcolonial policies and discourses that areidentified as divisive. To grasp the politicalconflicts and tensions embedded in such poeticrenditions; this section focuses on suchexpositions.

The struggle between the forces of dominationand the forces of resistance is clearlydemonstrated in the struggle for power between theNPC and the Colonial authority on one hand, andNEPU and the talakawa on the other. These two setsof couplets popular at the time, gives us a graphicpicture of the nature of such struggles and of someof the issues involved. The NPC’s composition readsthus:

Sarki da alkali duk namu ne. Kowa ya zage mu bulaliya

The Emir and Muslim Magistrate all belong to us.Who ever abuses us will be flogged!

The NEPU composition on the other hand is:

Allah da Manzonsa duk namu neKowa ya zage mu sai hawiya.

Allah and His Messenger all belong to us.Who ever abuses us will go to hell!

The NPC composition was reflexive of asituation in which the unitarist state legacy ofcolonialism in conjunction with the nativeauthorities, created a condition in which themachinery of coercion, intimidation and propagandawas set against NEPU leaders and followers. Thiswas also reflexive of the strategies and methodsadopted as from 1954 which started emphasizing theuse of extra-judicial methods on NEPU loyalists.Indeed by 1946, a lot of associations thatquestioned the legitimacy of colonial rule or thoseindividuals or groups that “flouted nativeauthority rules” were either processed through thealkali courts, or directly banned and exiled by thecolonial government. The Northern GeneralImprovement Union launched in 1941 in Zaria forinstance was granted permission to organizelectures, but when its motives were found to beanti-colonial, it was disbanded. The BauchiDiscussion Circle was similarly banned in 1943.

These measures were increasingly perfected bycolonialism, and it was these that formed the basisfor dealing with opposition and resistance in thepostcolonial period. Thus even in the pre-Siyasaera, banning associations, the restriction over theexchange and/or prohibition of exchange of ideasand nationalist feeling among the nascent politicalgroups were some of the measures, sometimes subtle,taken to deal with the opposition. This was why theEmir of Bauchi, in declaring the BGIU illegal, hedid so, not directly but in a subtle manner, “noone is saying you should not associate” he toldMalam Sa’adu Zungur, “but what is not right, isorganizing your meetings during working hours andusing N.A. properties” (Kano: 1973).

The Second World War, though fought on theshores of the European continent, was a dominantissue in the African continent all the same and didhave quite a significant impact on the politicaldebates in northern Nigeria. The soldiers thatparticipated actively in executing the war cameback with their own “progressive” ideas. Throughthat they shaped opinions, thoughts, and ideas ofothers they associated with. Some of these weredirectly used in the campaign against forced laborin both colonial and emir’s projects, as well asagainst over taxation. More pointedly, such ideasfurther strengthened the opposition against theexcesses of the native authority administrations,as well as against the arrest of NEPU supporters,imprisonment on false charges by colonial and Emirsjudges. That was why in Hadeja the alkali (muslimMagistrate) was referred to as “alminjir” (thetrap) and his popular praise was:

Ya alminjir maganin ‘yan NEPUDaure mai gaskiya don marasGaskiya ya ji tsoro

Oh you the trap, the solution toNEPU menace, imprison those not guilty,So that the guilty could shiver (Dan Asabe, 1995)

In such catastrophic situations, most NEPUmembers and loyalists were tortured. Some peoplelike illa Ringim and Danjani Hadeja were towed inbetween horses from Sabon Gari Mai ‘ya’ya to Kano,simply because they allegedly attended a politicalrally without permit. Others were forced torenounce their Islamic religion, especially infront of ‘terrorist’ Emirs like that of Kano. Atthat period in time, the British magistrate courtswere NEPU saviors, while Shari’a courts were the denof torture and false imprisonment. This was becausein front of Sharia judge no pleas were taken, onlyjail terms, if you happen to be of the opposition(Dan Asabe, 1995).

Peasants in the villages were also taxed hatsinkambi, certain fixed amount of money on eachhousehold, to be paid in kind after harvest,regardless of the harvest situation. Manyhouseholds were forced to construct roads that wentbeside their houses, and refusal to participateattracted severe flogging; sometimes almost leadingto death (Maiturare: 1989). Such other things likenoman gandu (forced farming for the emir), KudinUshira (confiscating the goods of a dead person),sleeping with the most beautiful bride by the

district head on tour to his locality, and modernday slavery in which peasants were made to carryloads for emirs or district and village heads,without payment.

From 1954, when the NPC took over the reign ofleadership in Northern Nigeria, with the help ofthe colonial government, things went bad for theopposition, especially NEPU. From that year NPCwent to war with the talakawa. Whoever refused tosupport the NPC and the state establishment had theNA police sent against them. The Muslim clericswere told that the NPC was the party of ShehuUsmanu Danfodiyo, and that it was legitimate todeal with kafirai, such as NEPU people by jailing,flogging and the confiscation of homes, andfarmlands.

These atrocities and such others like them madeNEPA and subsequently NEPU to look for an avenue tofight back. Among such avenues was alliance withNCNC and establishment of newspapers to counter theNPC propaganda and at the same time set the recordstraight regarding the volatile political situationin Northern Nigeria. But then the media environmentlike all other environments in Northern Nigeria wasNPC dominated, as such as from 1954, provinces weregiven the go ahead to set up their news-sheet, suchthat by 1956, 19 news papers had been establishedin Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Bauchi, Zazzau, and inother areas in Northern Nigeria (Yahaya:1988). InKano, considered NEPU’s stronghold, Sodangi was theofficial NPC news sheet. Through it, many of thepropaganda wars against the opposition were fought.

Consequently, when the alliance with the NCNCtook off, Zik’s chain of newspapers increased, with

the establishment of Daily Comet, in Kano. Sincepropaganda can only be successful in a languageunderstood by the general public, it was decided toreserve some few pages inside the Daily Comet forthe teeming Hausa readers/supporters of NEPU. Withthe establishment of such a medium, the excesses ofthe Daily Mail and Sodangi (the English and HausaNews sheet) established by the NPC controlledregional government, were responded toappropriately by the opposition. Accordingly, a newwave of violent confrontation began over the pagesof newspapers. In the course of trying to check theexcesses of the N.A controlled press, NEPU’s DailyComet extensively and critically analyzed thepolicies of the NPC controlled government,especially on the eve of elections (1956, 1959, and1961). It at the same time exposed its ideals andvision of politics, leadership, and the role of theemergent postcolonial state. Since propaganda is avery good weapon as a campaign strategy, bothparties vigorously made use of it!

The objective campaign of ideas, issues andmanifesto were thrown overboard, especially by NEPUloyalists, who had for long been looking for anavenue to unleash their anger on the NPC and itsleaders who had at various times treated theminhumanely and violently. As such the politicalfigures of both parties, Aminu Kano (for NEPU)Sardauna, Tafawa Balewa, Emir Sanusi (for NPC)featured prominently in the “war” of letters; NEPUand its supporters were made to look like demons,while Malam Aminu Kano and NEPU leaders weredescribed as those without kaciya (subtle pagans).

On the other hand NPC as a party had beendescribed as a party of “Sodomites”, the Emir ofKano Sanusi as a “blind confused NPC stalwart,”while others ware referred to as “landlords ofharlots and lesbians.” The tones of the letterswere violent, and they some times included openabuse in the use of adjectival connotations like“ignorant”, “stupid”, and “indolent”. Learned ulemaof note, because of the political divides were madeto look like nincompoops, while the lowest of theladder, like “gyartai” was made to look like thePremier in status, depending on the politicalparty.

A good example of the violent nature of theseletters/commentaries was that of Danjani Hadeja(Dan Asabe, 1995). In trying to show that his partyNEPU was also a party of Islam, he attempted toshed the NPC of any Islamic ideals it may have had.He quoted extensively from Qur’an Hadith, and othernotable views of learned ulema to show why NPCshould not rule the North and how hypocritical itsleaders were:

You indolent, ignorant, stupid andnincompoop; let me tell you, in theIslamic law, there is nowhere thatracism is made an accepted norm. Thereis no where that it is allowed for oneto use money to win election. There isno where that it is stated we shouldrevere the Sardauna and disparage thegyartai (local artisan).

Let me ask you, which verse of theQur’an states that an Emir can buyvehicles with public money?Which verse states that it is lawfulfor (NPC) leaders to sodomise? What isthe relationship between the Sardaunaand the Emir of Kano? Why is the Emirof Kano always in the habit of visitingthe Sardauna in Kaduna? What “sweet”thing does the Emir of Kano have thatthe Sardauna always pays him a visit inKano? Official tour? Why doesn’t theSardauna pay such visits to the Emir ofZazzau?What about the other Emirs? Is itbecause they don’t give up theirbuttocks for…” (Daily Comet; 1960: Ourtranslation)

We can the safely say then, politics of abusebetween the NPC and the NEPU was rooted, as we hadcause to say, in the conflict between two socialforces whose conceptions of power, its exercise,and of the colonial state and traditional authoritysubstantially differed. Wherever the Qur’an wasused as a campaign material both parties lay claimto be the final authorities. Thus when one MalamShehu Usman, a supporter of NPC posed the thesisthat NEPU as a party and its followers are not partof Islam in their newspaper, Sodangi (1960), DanjaniHadeja was swift in his reply:

Don’t you know that Allah says, weshould follow our leaders,

especially those who follow him;that is those leaders who guide tothe straight path, who dissuadefrom the wrong path?Or do you want us to follow theseulama, who blindly follow the Emirand the Sardauna (while the Emirand Sardauna) follow the dictatesof the colonialists! (Ourtranslation).

If the struggle in newspaper articles was violentin its expositions about the relations ordomination and resistance in northern Nigeria,poetic confrontations were even more violent. Suchexpositions were from the beginning reflexive ofthe two central tendencies, i.e. the ‘radical’ andthe ‘conservative.’ Looking at the extreme twopositions especially the compositions by ShekeraSa’ad and Gambo Hawaja, certain characteristics ofthe “political rivalry” can be discerned. Bothparties depended for their support on similarappeals to the general sentiment of Islamicidentity in the Northern region. Most of the poetswere at pains to present their party as the partyof Islamic reform. When NPC’s poets insisted on theSardauna’s holy genealogy as an item in thelegitimization of his political authority NEPUpoets were quick to dismiss such claims. In WakarYabon Sa Ahmadu Bello (In praise of Sir Ahmadu Bello),a list of Sardauna’s ancestors, according to thereceived genealogy was given to show to theelectorate what a good material they had as theirleader. This may look quite propagandist, but it

was more than that. In a political setting,especially, where the politics involves courtingreligions, and in this case Islamic sentiments, anacceptable genealogy was considered an essentialqualification for supreme authority and even senioroffice. In the case of the Sardauna, the Shehu’sfamily was linked to the noble Quraysh throughUqbah b. Nafih, the ancestor of the Fulani. Invarious jihad poems, Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo wasreferred to as being a Sherif that is a member ofQuraysh and thus related to the Prophet Muhammad(SAW).

In response to this saintly image of theSardauna, NEPU poets, and in particular GamboHawaja, responded thus:

I am going to tell you the truth, so that you hear.Stop dragging the name of a saint in bad things.For the Shehu did not associate with unbelievers,Only the Muslims who are trustworthy.The Shehu did not stay in hotel in his life.He did not tell lies, nor drank wine or beer.During his life, the Shehu did not cheat on us.May God bless the venerable Shehu of all. You play mates of Satan; you will not see theShehu, Stop dragging the name of the Shehu in politics.

Essentially then, the bitter political rivalryhad reached a crescendo, the person who wasreferred to as “grand son” of the Shehu has nowbecome “a rogue”. To Gambo Hawaja, it is not justbecause one happens to come in line of succession,from good family that one becomes good. To show the

fallacy of the argument, he cites the cases ofgrand sons betraying their grand fathers or viceversa. Kan’ana, te father of Prophet Ibrahim wasnever a saint, while the two grand children ofProphet Muhammad (SAW) Hassan and Hussaini did notexploit their people, they died as men of honour.Thus since the Shehu (Sardauna’s grand father) didnot associate with white women, did not tax kola-nut sellers, did not drink beer, nor wrongfullydetained political opponents, how can Sardaunaclaim to be his grand son, Gambo avers .

One can only understand fully all these abuses,innuendo, and poetic abuses after taking intoconsideration the bitter political climate thatengulfed the Northern Region as from 1951, as wellas understanding the position of NEPU and itssupporters in the debacle. It is like similitude ofan enemy beaten at all fronts. In this instancewhat NEPU, its leaders and supporters tried to dowas to fight violence with violence, fightexclusion with force, and make sure that the NPCmachinery of coercion, intimidation andexploitation did not dampen their morale, nor forcethem out of the contest for leadership or relevancein the politics of Northern Nigeria.

CONCLUSIONIn the case of Northern Nigeria, as we saw in

this paper, the interplay of domination andresistance often took subtle, hidden forms. That isnot to say that such subtler forms of dominationand resistance were non-violent. As the battle forthe control of political power by the NPC and NEPUshowed, war was waged not openly in the main, but

literary and poetic expositions. This did not makesuch struggles less violent or insignificant thanopen physical confrontations. This merely drawsattention to the fact that domination andresistance take various forms, and that more oftenthan not, their manifestation is hidden. Equallyimportant is that we can not fully grasp the natureof the contestations between the two parties, andthe social forces they each represent until wesituate the whole struggle within the context ofthe formation of the postcolonial state in NorthernNigeria.

The paper also recognizes the critical role theunitarist colonial state building project anddiscourse has played in the struggle for power inNorthern Nigeria, as well as the role of thecolonial government in supporting the forces oftradition. It also put across the position that thestruggle for power in Northern Nigeria was in themain organised within the broad frameworks of a‘conservative’ or a ‘radical’ Islamic tendencies,and that this had a significant influence on thechoice of a particular medium for the expression ofresistance.

REFERENCES

Abba, Alkassum (1993) The Politics of Mallam Aminu Kano:Documents from the Independence Struggle 1950-1960. Kaduna:Vanguard Publishers.

Abubakar, Sa’ad (1980) ‘Peoples of the Upper BenueBasin and the Bauchi Plateau Before 1800.’ In Obara

Ikime (Ed) Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan: HeinemannEducational Books.

Anderson Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflectionson the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and NewYork: Verso.

Anderson P. (1974) Lineage of the Absolutist State, VersoLondon and New York.

Anifowose, Remi (1982) Violence and Politics in Nigeria: TheTiv and Yoruba Experience. Enugu: Nok Publishers.

Bello Omar (1991) “The Burmi Massacre” Seminarpaper, presented at Centre for Islamic Studies, UDUSokoto Seminar Series

Biriniwa H.A. (1987) “Conservertism and Dissent: AComparative Study of NPC/NPN and NEPU/ PRP HausaPolitical Verse from Circa 1946-1983-1987” PhDthesis University of Sokoto

Chabal, Patrick (Ed) (1986) Political Domination in Africa:Reflections on the Limits of Power. Cambridge: University ofPress.

Chatterjee, Partha (Ed) (1986) Nationalist Thought andthe Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse? Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press.

Coleman, James (1958) Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.Berkeley: University of California Press.

Daalder, Hanns (1967) Government and Opposition in the NewStates. Government and Opposition vol. 1 #2.

Daily Comet 11/4/60.

Daily Comet 4/6/60

Daily Mail 30/5/60

Danasabe Aliyu et all: (1995), Muhammadu DanjaniHadeja African Publishers, Kaduna.

Diamond, Larry (1988) Class, Ethnicity and Democracy inNigeria: The Failure of the First Republic. New York: SyracuseUniversity Press.

Diamond, Larry and Marc Plattner (1994) NationalismEthnic Conflict, and Democracy. Baltimore: The John HopkinsUniversity Press.

Dudley, Billy (1968) Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria.London: Frank Cass Publishers Ltd.

Eckstein, Harry and Ted Gurr (1975) Patterns ofAuthority. New York: John Willey.

Eghosa Osaghae et al. (Eds.) (1994) Urban Violence inAfrica. Ibadan: IFRA.

Goddy Emeka Ejiofor (ND). Dabaru, Tunani Da KoyarwarMallam Aminu Kano NNPC Zaria

Graham, H.D and Gurr, T.R (Eds.) (1969) Violence inAmerica: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. New York:Signet Books.

Gurr, Ted (1973) The Revolution Social Change Nexus: SomeOld Theories and New Hypotheses. Comparative Politics #5.

Hirsch, Herbert and David Perry (Eds.) (1973)Violence as Politics. Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers.

Hiskett M, (1983) Abdullahi Fodiyo Tazyin Al-Warakat

Hiskett M. (1984) The Development of Islam in West Africa,London.

History Burearu, Sok/class 1/Bo] 1/p.2, No. 5.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780:Programme, Myth, reality. London: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Hodgkin, Thomas (1956) Nationalism in Colonial Africa.Aylesbury and London: Hazell Watson and Viney Ltd.

Honderich, Ted (1976) Political Violence. New York: BasilBlackwell/Cornell University Press.

Hoover, Dean and David Kowalewski (1992) ‘DynamicModels of Dissent and Repression.’ Journal of ConflictResolution, Volume 36, Number 1.

Horowitz, Donald (1971) Three Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict.World Politics, Volume XXIII, Number 2.

Huntington, Samuel (1968) Political Order in ChangingSocieties. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jalingo, A.U (1982) ‘Islam and Political Legitimacyin Northern Nigeria.’ Kano Studies, New Series,Volume 2, Number 3 82/85.

Kano Aminu (1973) Rayuwar Ahmad Mahmud Sa’adu Zungur,Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria.

Kuna M.J. (1998) “The Nation-State and Violence.Incorporation, Exclussion and State Formation inNigeria. The Case of Northern Nigeria, 1930-1966,Seminar paper presented at the Department ofPolitical Science UDU Sokoto.

Last, Murray (1970) ‘Aspects of Administration andDissent in Hausa-land, 1800-1968.’ Africa vol XL,#4.

Lichbach, Mark (1987) ‘Deterrence or Escalation?The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression andDissent.’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 31 Number 2.

Lupsha, Peter (1971) ‘Explanation of PoliticalViolence: Some Psychological Theories versusIndignation.’ Politics and Society, vol.2 #1.

Markus, G.B . and Nesvold, B.A (1971) ‘GovernmentalCoerciveness and Political Instability: AnExploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns.’Comparative Political Studies vol. 5 #2.

Moore Jr., Barrigton (1966) Social Origin of Dictatorshipand Democracy. Boston Beacon Press.

Muller, Edward and Erich Weede (1990) ‘Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: aRational Action Approach.’ Journal of Conflict Resolution,vol. 34 Number 4.

NAK/PLT/2, NEPA, KANO.

NEPU: The Sawaba Declaration, NEPU, 1950.

Nesvold, Betty (1969) ‘A Scalogram Analysis ofPolitical Violence.’ Comparative Political Studies vol. 2No.2.

Nieburg, H.L. (1969) Political Violence: The BehaviouralProcess. New York: S Martins Press.

Pye, Lucien (1963) Communication and PoliticalDevelopment. New Jerse: Princeton University Press.

Rutake, Pascal (1995) Burundi in Search of Democracy.Codesria Bulletin #1.

Saeed, Asmau (1982) ‘The British Policy Towards theMahdiyya in North Nigeia: the Study of the Arrest,Detention and Deportation of Shaykh Sa’id b. Hayat,1923-1959 Bibliographical Note’. Kano Studies, NewSeries vol.2 #3.

Scott, James (1988) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms ofPeasant Resistance New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, James (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance:Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sklar, Richard (1963) Nigeria Political Parties: Power in anEmergent African Nation. London and Lagos: NokPublishers International.

Sodangi 6/4/60,

Sokoto History Bureau Sok/class 1/Bo] 1/p.12, No. c337.

Tilly, Charles (1978) From Mobilisation to Revolution. NewYork: McGraw-Hill.

Tilly, Charles (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States,AD 990-19 Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.

Yahaya Ibrahim Yaro (1988) Hausa A Rubuce:Tarihin Rubuce-Rubuce Cikin Hausa, NNPC Zaria,

Yakubu, A. M. (1999). Sa’adu Zungur: An Anthology ofPolitical and Social Writings NDA, Kaduna

Yusuf, A.B. (1978) A Freedom Fighter: Annotated Memoirs ofMallam Illa Ringim. Sokoto: Sidi Umaru Press, Sokoto.

Zimmermann, Ekkart (1983) Political Violence, Crises andRevolutions: Theories and Research. Cambridge: SchenkmanPublishing Company, Inc.