The Policy Space for the Indigenous Peoples

of México

MA International Cultural Policy and Management

1259916

To my family at 51 Sir Thomas White’s Road,

With love and utter gratitude

Index

Introduction and motivation…1

The indigenous issue…9

Looking for a theory to make sense of cultural phenomena…14

Current status of the multiculturalism debate…16

Brubaker: against groupism…18

Alexander: where recognition really happens; multiculturalism is happening…22

An example…29

Summing up…31

A description of the policy space for indigenous issues…33

Article 2…38

Conclusions…45

Appendix 1…47

Appendix 2…48

Bibliography…52

1

INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

The aim of this dissertation is to inform the reader about the current status of the

indigenous issue in Mexico as observed from a cultural policy studies perspective. To

approach the subject, I follow Ahearne’s take on cultural policy as constituting “not simply

a predefined object for cultural history, but also a particular ‘lens’ through which cultural

history more generally can be approached” (Ahearne 2009, 142). I begin by situating myself

in the discussion: I explain why I decided to do research on this topic; expose the

complexity of the phenomenon and some of its analytical problems; and lay out the

immense limitations of my work. Next, I expose and discuss the ideas of Brubaker and

Alexander and critically situate them within current academic discussions related to the

issue. From the discussion, I draw out some ideas with which I then move on to analyse

Article 2 of the Mexican constitution. Finally, I conclude with a reflection regarding public

policies both reflective of and informed by Mexico’s ‘pluricultural composition’.

I chose this topic for two reasons. Since I first read the article where Ahearne

explores the distinction between implicit and explicit cultural policy (Ahearne 2009), the

idea of considering all public policies as a form of implicit cultural policy has been in my

mind. I thus started to think of existing public policies that should necessarily affect

‘cultures’ or some of the cultural traits of a particular group in society. I thought of those

regarding food, specifically about the ‘most available grain to a culture’: the case of maize in

Mexico. A public policy affecting the cultivation of maize, I thought, must necessarily

affect the everyday life of most or some Mexicans. Then I remembered I had heard how

Mexico’s signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada

and the USA had transformed the country from a producer of most of our maize needs to

an importer. In this case, I thought, an economic policy –NAFTA –will necessarily have a

cultural impact; the numbers (import vs. production) here are not essentially relevant –they

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would be indispensable for a complete analysis of a specific case, though –, what is striking

is considering the possibility of a change of lifestyle that was not considered in the policy. Its

governmental evaluation is precisely designed in terms other than cultural (e.g. the price of

a kilo of tortillas). Currently, to compete with the prices of the USA market, the government

is evaluating the introduction of genetically modified (GMO) varieties of maize for

commercial production. Various groups –NGOs, intellectuals, artists, researchers, small

farmers unions, indigenous organizations –have protested: “Sin maíz, no hay país.”1 Their

claims all include a cultural component (e.g. México is the international centre of origin and

diversification of maize; for the indigenous, maize cultivation is not only seen as a means to

obtain food but as an essential part of their idiosyncrasy); via their protests, ‘culture’ has

been included into the debates and expanded the critical horizon: NAFTA is not the origin

of all maladies, it is but one more policy in Mexico’s long history of agricultural

decomposition. Peasants, in their majority indigenous, have protested claiming that the

introduction of transgenic maize is a direct attempt against their way of life and traditions.

This issue, not surprisingly, is now part of the indigenous cultural and land rights political

agenda.

Having identified NAFTA as a possible example of those “various kinds of policy”

with “unintended cultural side effects” –one of the two kinds of implicit cultural policies

that Ahearne distinguishes –(Ahearne 2009, 144), I decided to further my considerations. If

we consider the possibility that all public policies can have unintended cultural side effects,

what happens in the case of the indigenous populations of México given that they are

officially recognised as ‘cultures’ or a group of cultures and are object of specific, special

policies? Should we consider all these policies ‘cultural’? This is how I came up with the

topic of my dissertation. Because cultural phenomena are repellently densely complex and

their analysis can be approached from a variegated corpus of theories and knowledge areas,

1 “Without maize, there is no country.”

3

the research project I began, the literature I came across, naturally drove me in other

directions. Notwithstanding, the above questions are somehow present throughout the

work and, in a sense, I try to answer them, from a different perspective now, in the

conclusions.

The second reason is of a rather political character, and it is my motivation, as well.

Having decided upon my subject, ‘the indigenous populations of México’, I soon came

across the facts that substantiate the common knowledge that in Mexico ‘indigenous’ has a

synonymous relation with ‘poor’ (underdeveloped, uneducated, hungry) and ‘peasant’

(rural). The majority –around 90% –(Presidencia de México 2012, 48) of the indigenous

inhabitants of México are ‘poor’ –present a lower human development index (HDI)

compared to the non-indigenous inhabitants; live in marginalized municipalities; suffer

social lacks; live in poverty in terms of income; suffer multidimensional poverty; are

socioeconomically vulnerable –and have historically found themselves in such condition.

The fact is, as well, that 65% of the in the indigenous live in rural areas. My question here

is: Why are these populations, culturally identified as indigenous and subject of special

policies, in this situation? There must be something inherently wrong in these policies to

account for their poor results.

With this in mind I began my research. Soon I found out that I have no idea

whatsoever who these indigenous peoples are and, obviously, not a clue of what their

worldview looks like. I mention this because, as we will see later on in the policy analysis,

an important part of the problem of the ‘indigenous issue’ is due to a lack of

communication originated by faulty language and education policies, which are, in turn, due

to a problematic interpretation of how to manage or deal with pluriculturality.

As I began delving into the issue, I realized that what I would be confronted with

was an indelimitable, extremely complex subject. Academicaly, the indigenous issue has

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been studied and written about by researchers from the fields of sociology, anthropology,

philosophy, political studies, economics, cultural studies, law studies, and, more recently,

from combinations of sub-disciplines or schools within or related to these disciplines. Soon

I also realized that the indigenous issue is embedded in a very rich discursive mass,

surrounded by the rich-in-themselves worlds of journalism, public opinion and perception,

current affairs in micro and macro politics, activism, and NGOs, among many others. To

add more complexity to the matter, it should be noted that the problems, questions,

actions, and epiphenomena related to the indigenous issue do not have a historical

continuity. There are problems that are constantly referred to –injustice and

underdevelopment, for example–, but new ones arise. Claims in society regarding or related

to the indigenous issue come from different actors in society. At one moment in history,

the indigenous issue might refer to the economic and ‘cultural’ problems of the indigenous

population; anthropology, at its time, might serve as the discipline towards which the

government turns to in order to inform itself as to which is the best way to deal with the

issue and design policies; and journalism might be predominantly promoting the greatness

of Mexico’s indigenous past influenced by the ideas of a folklorist activist movement

originated at the political studies department of a private university in which an influential

group of students attended a conference on multiculturalism by a renowned philosopher

and decided to ‘do something about it’. The different discourses and actions performed by

different actors representing different political or philosophical positions –individual or

collective –and claiming adscription to groups or institutions that share cultural traits vary:

new voices arise, others tune out and new ideas inform different actors in different ways,

driving them in various performative directions. Perhaps, an analysis similar to the one

Bourdieu made on the phenomena that he considers account for the ‘cultural field’ might

be helpful. A description of the interrelations, actions, positions, etc. of the actors –and

possible actors –within the indigenous issue field could serve as an analytical blueprint

5

from which to part from; but, as we will see later, it might not suffice or could even be

rendered useless in particular cases labelled ‘indigenous issue’. For example, there is

sufficient information and available research on the historical and current official

governmental discourse and the corresponding policies regarding the indigenous issue to

understand how the government has related to the peoples that it traditionally identifies as

objects and subjects in and of the indigenous issue. Notwithstanding, that would only show

us a general, up-front political picture or scheme; we would still need a description and

analysis of the micropolitics of that same relation. Micropolitics usually come into scene by

means of another actor: journalism. Journalism usually informs of very specific cases

related to the indigenous issue. The specificity of the cases further complicates our attempt

of a general description of the indigenous issue field because it makes us notice that the

range of actors implied in a specific case is so broad that we feel a drag towards the

‘individual’, away from ‘goupism’ and labels. An attempt at a general description of the

indigenous issue field is clearly out of the limits of this work. Furthermore, this work itself

contests the pertinence of such general descriptions of the battle field.

Before moving on, I would like to expose the main limitations of this work, to

express what this essay is and, more importantly, what it is not. I have already briefly

touched on the complexity of the subject. Such complexity might best be tackled by

choosing to observe and analyse, for example, one policy (e.g. Education) and one ‘key’

interrelation (e.g. federal government-two relevant NGOs-one indigenous population); or

by choosing one or two case studies and looking at them from a cultural policy studies

perspective. I failed in my attempt to reduce the scope of the investigation. The pull from

the many different actors’ discourses constantly dragged me towards different discussions

taking place in different levels and sectors of the indigenous issue political space. I account

this to the ambiguous, open-for-interpretation space in which most of the debates about

topics related to the indigenous issue take place. This dialogical space, as we will later see, is

6

the result of a grave deficiency of policies to enact the indigenous populations’ rights

recognition as stated in the national constitution. In terms of the second possible strategy

to reduce the scope of my investigation, I kept running into a double-walled dead-end

alleyway. The first wall was the impossibility of doing ethnographical work of the one or

two case studies that I would have chosen. As we will later on see after the discussion of

the work of Brubaker and Alexander, I believe that an analysis of cases labelled as

‘indigenous’ necessarily requires close ethnographic work; and I could even suggest that any

analysis of a cultural phenomenon should include ethnographical work. Notwithstanding,

one could argue that there is enough available information to do case study analysis

without the need for ethnographical work, that is, that one could consult available

ethnographies. This is where the second wall stands: I cannot ascertain, from the distance,

that what I am reading is the actual voice (e.g. ‘will’, ‘claim’) of the indigenous people

involved in a particular case. The literature around the indigenous issue is full of statements

ascertaining what the indigenous populations want; these statements are hard to take at

face value when we consider, precisely, the policies regarding indigenous populations’

rights to language, education and consultation. The few case studies I located in which it is

clear that we are reading the actual voice of an indigenous person, family or community,

tend to demonstrate why it is convenient to follow Benhabib’s and Brubaker’s

recommendations to avoid ‘groupism’ (Benhabib 2002; Brubaker 2004) and the need for

close ethnographical work. This work is paradoxical in a sense: I have tried to inform

myself by means of a huge amount of generalisations while exposing why the indigenous

issue should best be approached in a case study basis implying ethnographical work. This

work is not an extensive analysis of the indigenous issue, nor does it extensively cover all

the discursive terrain around the issue; it does not include a vast literature review –I have

focused on only some authors–; and it does not present a profound analysis of policies –

little knowledge of public policy theory and law limited my critique. These enormous

7

limitations led me to think of this work as a ‘brief’ on the indigenous issue of México from

a cultural policy studies perspective.

Finally, before describing the subject of study, I would like to justify why I consider

this to be a case for cultural policy studies. To do so I will briefly discuss Bennett’s position

regarding “the proper object of analysis for cultural policy studies” (Bennett 1998, 279) as

exposed in his article “Culture and Policy, Acting on the social” (1998). Bennett begins by

discarding two “definitional options” for cultural policy studies: a broad one and a narrow

one. Respecting the broad one, he questions whether we should

view cultural policy studies as a loose alliance of a somewhat disparate set of concerns

which have little in common beyond the obvious consideration that, in some way or

another, they are all concerned with some aspect of the ways in which modern

governments involve themselves in the sphere of culture (…) but without there being

much shared ground between these except in so far as they form a recognisably distinct

component of the broader realm of public policy? (Bennett 1998, 271-271)

It is not clear to me exactly what he identifies as the problem of this definition, for he

merely “argues its insufficiency, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the role

that should be accorded cultural policy studies within the broader concerns of cultural

analysis” (272). Apparently, for Bennett cultural policy studies is an analytic direction one

can take when doing cultural analysis. I, on the contrary, tend to see cultural analysis as one

of the necessary tools for cultural policy studies. For Bennett, what “coheres the field” is “a

historically distinctive set of concerns and relationships through which cultural resources

are managed” (272). Though it is not clear from his text what ‘cultural resources’ exactly

are, I infer, from his description of the work done at the Australian Key Centre for Cultural

and Media Policy (AKCCMP) and of the four areas of concern for cultural policy that he

8

identifies, that what he is referring to are the economic and institutional resources available

to a government that can be allocated for existing cultural policies or programmes. So, for

Bennett, the proper objects of study for cultural policy studies are historical concerns to

which the government has turned to and that we can identify because there is a flow of

cultural resources directed at them via cultural policies. I find this definition problematic

because by turning the government into the key actor (i.e. as official recogniser of those

historical concerns) within cultural policy studies, cultural phenomenon affected by policies

that do not involve an explicit allocation of cultural resources go unrecognised. Cultural

policy studies in Bennett’s version could be thought of as a think tank to inform and

evaluate existing cultural policies. This might be the reason why he positively describes the

work done at the AKCCMP, covertly suggesting it as a model. Contrary to Bennett I opt

for a broader view of cultural policy studies, such as the one quoted above, simply because

it allows us to recognise and consider as subjects of study cultural phenomena that have

not been historical concerns to which the government has explicitly responded by

managing cultural resources via cultural policies; cultural phenomena in which we rather

notice a cultural effect product of one or various kinds of policies. Some, like Bennett,

might find it troubling that a broad definition seems to be an open invitation for any

phenomenon recognised as cultural to be analysed from a cultural policy studies

perspective. I find it coherent for, as I have previously exposed, I believe all policies,

implicit or explicit, have, intended or unintended, cultural effects. Following this argument,

I would say that we can find policy relations for any given cultural phenomenon. Cultural

policy studies, in this sense, should explore the cultural rationale behind policies and their

cultural impact or effect. In the conclusions I will further even more as to how

governments could operate bearing in mind these considerations.

9

THE INDIGENOUS ISSUE

Because what we were confronted with was not an indigenous “problem”: the indigenous are not a problem, what

constitutes a problem was (and is) the nation and, thus, autonomy should have been an answer to this national

problem. This is why we spoke about the ethno-national issue, and not only about the ethnic issue or the indigenous

issue.2

Héctor Díaz-Polanco (Guanache 2010, 22)

So, what exactly is the indigenous issue? And whose issue is it, anyway? Above all, the

indigenous issue is a label. As such, it is a human construct, an idea. As such, it is a slippery

conception whose usefulness is extremely contested. Though fundamentally originated

from a top-down perspective, references to the indigenous issue have historically come

from different actors in society, representing reinforcing, contradictory or dissenting

positions. In a very broad sense we could say that the indigenous issue is a concept socially

used to archive or register all events and discourses related to indigeneity in Mexico. In a

narrower sense, it refers to the question posed from a non-indigenous politics position as

to what should be done in respect to the fact that there are indigenous populations in the

territory; it points out the historically problematic relation between indigenous and non-

indigenous humans in the federal constitutional republic of the United States of México3.

The indigenous issue has a history of prominence and silence that has been

described in the work of many anthropologists, social theorists, historians, indigenous

activists, etc.4. Recently, it became notorious after the Zapatista uprising of 1994. After

2 My translation.

3 México is a toponym derived from náhuatl –the indigenous language with most speakers. The most accepted interpretation is that it means “navel of the moon”. 4 The bibliography is vast. Most articles that deal with the indigenous issue touch, in one way or another, on its history. I would point the reader to the work of Guillermo de la Peña and Rodolfo Stavenhagen because they are available in English. The best starting point, though, is in Spanish: the Programa Universitario México Nación Multicultural (México Multicultural Nation University Program) of the National Autonomous University of México, created and directed by ethnographer

10

that, this conception of the problem or group of problems related with the indigenous

populations lost intellectual validity because it was described and denounced –together with

concepts such as ‘indian’, ‘indigenous’, ‘native’, ‘ethnic’, etc. and their plural forms (e.g.

‘first nations’, ‘ethnic groups’) –as not only contestable but intrinsically colonialist (Zolla

and Zolla 2004, question 1). One of the main problems is that it groups together

sociocultural phenomena of very variegated kinds and regarding populations with diverse

traditions, interests and claims, justifying its concreteness by means of contested ideas (i.e.

that they are direct descendants of the peoples living in the territory before colonization).

As we will now see, the diversity of languages and traditions of the indigenous populations

of México is immense; grouping them all together as a single unit can only be explained in

socio-political terms, but not cultural. I am aware of the problem of speaking about the

indigenous populations of Mexico as a unit; nonetheless, I will do so in order to present a

brief general overview of whom these indigenous peoples are.

To identify indigenous Mexicans the government uses two criteria: language and

self-adscription. Using algorithms and methodologies developed by the National

Commission for the Development of Indigenous Populations (CDI) to analyse the data of

the 2010 national census, the indigenous population of México was calculated at 11 132

562 inhabitants, representing 9.9% of the total population (CDI 2012, 26)5. They are

José del Val, offers very complete information and resources. An important part of information I deal with here is linked there. [www.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx] 5 Curiously, this same document, CDI’s 2011 brief Acciones de Gobierno para el Desarrollo Integral de los Pueblos Indígenas [Governmental Actions towards the Integral Development of the Indigenous Populations], opens up by proudly stating that México has the most numerous indigenous population in the American continent given that 15.7 million people consider themselves indigenous (7). This is the figure that considers both language and self-ascription before CDI’s own methodologies and algorithms are applied. The figure of indigenous population in México referred to by politicians varies depending on the context. We could probably look for a pattern in which the lowest figure (the 6.7 million indigenous that speak an indigenous language) is referred to when the situation is that of redistribution. In the current president’s national development plan, this lower figure is referred to; not surprisingly, one of the first ‘actions’ of Enrique Peña Nieto was to start the “Crusade against hunger”, a programme coordinated by the Secretariat of Social Development which was launched in Las Margaritas, an indigenous municipality with a high degree of marginalization, which was occupied by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during

11

distributed, linguistically, into 68 language groups6. Geographically, there are indigenous

Mexicans in all the states and in all but 30 of the 2 438 total municipalities of Mexico (CDI

2006, 7). From a communicative and performative position that we will later criticize,

governmental documents insist in reporting 662 indigenous municipalities –those where

indigenous people represent 40% or more of the total population –concentrating 62.4% of

the total indigenous population (CDI 2010, 19). In an attempt to focalise indigenous

populations and considering that some of the indigenous communities inhabit territories

that cross state boundaries, they have been ‘regionalised’ into 25 areas throughout the

country7.

I will not stop to analyse these figures or present more, because it is not primordial

for this work. As I will later propose, once recognition is officially stated, it is incongruous

and even inconvenient to take measures (e.g. design and apply policies) by valuing ‘cultures’

depending on the size (relevance) of the population –though this is what may have been

happening, implicitly, in México for a long time8. This will become clearer when we touch

on the issue of poverty and redistribution. As Boltvinik has suggested, speaking about the

socioeconomic indexes of the population in general, when you have 80% of Mexicans

living in some condition of poverty9 you cannot consider redistribution policies, you

its 1994 uprising, and which is localized in Chiapas, the state with the second largest indigenous population in the country. The Crusade was identified with the indigenous issue by journalists; to no surprise, if we look at the Crusade’s website, full of indigenous imagery. On the other hand, the 15.7 figure is referred to when the situation is that of recognising our rich cultural heritage. 6 There are 364 variations of these 68 language groups. In accordance with this figure, we speak of 68 indigenous peoples. 7 Maps of ‘indigenous Mexico’ are also available. 8 I had no access to a historical demographic reconstruction of the indigenous peoples of Mexico. Apparently, there is one developed by Benitez Zenteno (Análisis Demográfico de México [Demographic analysis of México] (México: IIS-UNAM, 1961)). The point in which the indigenous became a minority is contested, as are estimates as to how many ‘indians’ inhabited Mexican territories before 1492. In 1895 they were already a minority (INEGI 2009). Nonetheless, indigenous peoples have historically been conceptualized, culturally and politically, as a minority. 9 This figure, as he exposes, can be drawn not only from his own methodology, but from the government’s own measurements (see Appendix 1).

12

require completely different policies, considering the fact that focalizing 80% is rather

absurd (Boltvinik 2013).

I want to finish this section by introducing a critical problem that will be better

explored in and after the discussion of multiculturalism. I hope that by this moment the

reader has noticed a slight but crucial discursive phenomenon: up to this moment all that I

have written and all the texts I have referred to speak about indigenous populations as

‘them’. Who are they? What do they think? How do they perceive themselves and ‘others’?

The history of the indigenous populations of Mexico is always the history of ‘them’. We

have characterised them, named them, grouped them, peacefully and violently invited them to

join ‘modernisation’, ‘development’, ‘growth’, ‘technology’, ‘progress’, and many other

small and big scale national projects, but we have worried little about what they think or

what they want. How can we address them? Can we look for one answer for all the

indigenous peoples?10 The fact is we have not even made an attempt to speak their

languages. Their words are always mediated. This is the main reason why I do not wish to

expand on the description of our indigenous past, present or future: there is no common

communicative ground and, as we will later on see, current policies do not –at least

explicitly –propose to change this situation. Most statistics, figures, descriptions, accounts

and researches are unidirectional: from the non-indigenous Mexicans to the indigenous

Mexicans or to non-indigenous Mexicans about the indigenous Mexicans. Indigenous

peoples are poor, we say, but have no idea what each of the more than eleven million

recognised indigenous Mexicans think about it. We will see how the constitution has set a

reasonable terrain in which policies coherent with ‘pluriculturalism’ can be designed and

applied. Before, we will discuss some recent conceptions of topics related to indigeneity in

10 This question does not only address the problems of multiculturalism and ‘groupism’ that we will now tackle, but of the democratic project itself. As such it is explored in the form of “mass as subject” by Sloterdijk in Die Verachtung der Massen. Versuch über Kulturkämpfe in der modernen Gesellschaft (Sloterdijk 2009 [2000]).

13

order to have a critical position from which to analyse the policy space for the indigenous

populations of México.

14

LOOKING FOR A THEORY TO MAKE SENSE OF CULTURAL PHENOMENA11

The indigenous issue has, directly or indirectly, been approached by intellectuals and

researchers from various disciplines. Some disciplines like anthropology and ethnography

have shown historical persistence in analysing and theorizing issues related to indigeneity.

The socio-political relevance of their accounts, theories, ideas, and proposals has widely

depended on the situation of national, international, and world affairs, and, perhaps more

recently, on the socio-cultural field of interrelations that has formed around the issue itself.

It is important to note that the relation between these disciplines and their studies related

to indigenous peoples is far from unidirectional. I believe it has rather become

multidirectional –this might account, in part, for its complexity. Research on indigenous

issue related topics has not always or not entirely proceeded from academia. During

México’s indigenista period12, for example, some anthropologists were incorporated into the

government in tailored positions designed to deal with the indigenous populations not only

by means of programmes but also by doing the research that substantiated them (de la

Peña 2005). This became a constant in the different institutions that have been created or

reformed as a response to the indigenous issue13. This situation helped the indigenous issue

permeate into academia in the form of a problem that had to be solved. Also, theories and

ideas coming from academia permeated into the many actors within the indigenous issue

11 I am indebted to Brubaker and Alexander. Their work does not only inform the present text but has pointed me in the direction of a way to look at –or, rather, ‘way not to look at’ –the social world. 12 A period starting after the Revolution (1910) in which “the indigenous peoples (…) were conceived of as being not simply an integral part of the dispossessed masses, but also bearers of a valuable culture that should enrich the national patrimony.” (de la Peña 2005, 724) 13 Currently, the Director of CDI, Nuvia Mayorga, is not an anthropologist. She is an accountant with little proven experience in indigenous issues. Her appointment was not well received by some leaders of indigenous organizations, researchers and intellectuals (Warnholtz Locht 2013; Amador Tello 2013). Until 2009, all the Directors of CDI and its predecessor INI (National Indigenous Institute) had a proven trajectory in indigenous matters. The reform of the name of the official institution for indigenous issues from ‘institute’ to ‘commission for the development’ might imply, in Fraser’s terms (Fraser 1995), a change of policy rationale from recognition to redistribution. An in depth comparison of how the programmes and policies proceeding from these institutions changed should be considered.

15

field (e.g. activists and NGOs) who at their time communicated them to indigenous leaders

and communities. Furthermore, some of the indigenous people who have benefitted from

educational programs –historically designed as a means of assimilation –have both done

research and served as communicators between researchers and indigenous peoples and

organizations. This partly accounts for the diversity of approaches that various disciplines

within the social sciences have taken. Currently, for example, multiculturalism as a theory is

approached from a political perspective which focuses on the socio-political implications of

multiculturalist theories.

In this section I will discuss the ideas of two researchers that have approached

issues of multiculturalism, ethnicity, indigeneity, assimilation, recognition, redistribution,

groupism and citizenship, among others. After reviewing the literature dealing with these

issues, I chose them because they offer a way to observe, think of, and understand culture that

might prove helpful to analyse the indigenous issue and discuss its policy space. I

emphasize ‘observe’, ‘think’, and ‘understand’ because this is what distinguishes them from

many theories that are problematic for one or a combination of three reasons: “the

tendency to take groups for granted” (Brubaker 2004, 7-8) (e.g. ‘indigenous populations’);

“uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis” (Brubaker

2004, 7-8); and/or part from a conception that there is a homogenous sociocultural

problem to be solved (c.f. Benhabib 2002). These kinds of theories can serve as a starting

point from which to approach cultural phenomena similar to the indigenous issue in

México, but not necessarily as tool kits to solve problems of multiculturalism in modern

states.

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Current status of the multiculturalism debate

Currently, theories related to or that can help observe and think of issues categorised as

indigenous14 have been grouped together under the umbrella term ‘multiculturalism’ (i.e.

‘approaches to’, ‘contestations of’, ‘theories of’). There is, as Kivisto observes, “no shortage

of multicultural theories and philosophies of multiculturalism, with a rather substantial

number of efforts having been made to specify particular versions and indicate how they

differ from other versions.” And, he goes on to explain, “the bulk of this work (…) has

‘largely revolved around normative theory’ (…) contrasted to a poverty of empirical

research on multiculturalism.” (2012, 4) This means that we have a lot of theory trying to

propose how multiculturalism should be (as opposed to how it happens) –an example of

taking ethnopolitical categories as categories of analysis–, and a lack of accounts, data,

examples, ethnographies, etc., not only to substantiate the theories but to inform about

these issues in general.15 Confronting this panorama, Sciortino and Kivisto have both

insisted on the need for a good theory. For Sciortino, the lack of a “coherent theoretical

framework” is due to “the fragmentation of research and researchers according to issues

rather than problems”; he explains that ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘nationhood’, for example,

have been considered “different forms of organization, inhabited by different kinds of

empirical actors.” Furthermore, he denounces a split in sociological scholarship “between

those who see cultural difference as mere decoy for power inequalities and those willing to

take, at face value, the description of reality performed by the individual actors.” (Sciortino

14 Most theories refer to ‘ethnic (goups)’, instead of ‘indigenous’. The main distinction appears to be that ‘indigenous’ necessarily implies an original (claim to) belonging to a territory (land). Though the terms are not necessarily synonymous, their usage has depended more on the socio-political history of particular territories. A discussion of the differences between ‘ethnicity’, ‘indigeneity’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘natives’, etc. is out of the limits of this work. However, such a distinction is not primordial here, for we will follow the cultural sociology approach that proposes to observe all of them as “difference-based interactions”. Empirically, though, the difference might be significant in the different kinds of claims that different actors could make respecting one or many of this “semantic constructions” (Sciortion 2012, 378). 15 The fact that we have more multicultural theories (as opposed to theories of multiculturalism) might be related with academia’s position within the indigenous issue field.

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2012, 366-367) Kivisto, on similar terms, tries to offer not a theory, but an “elemental

framework of analysis” that parts from a “sociological account of multiculturalism, an

account that is different from philosophical accounts, policy positions, and polemics”, and

upon which a more robust theory can be built in the future (Kivisto 2012, 5). Brubaker, in

other terms, refrains from speaking about a theory or theoretical framework and rather

focuses on how to do analysis avoiding ‘primordialism’ or ‘essentialism’; that is, to take

common sense categorisations (e.g. ‘ethnic group’, ‘multiculturalist struggle’) as something

to explain things with, instead of as a key part of what we want to explain (Brubaker 2004,

9). Though normativity was the common fashion, recent works like the ones we will

discuss, try to move away from the socio-political discussion in order to acquire critical

distance that allows for an adequate observation and analysis of sociocultural phenomena.

In general, I would say that there are two principal tendencies in academic debates over

multiculturalism. One, to distance observation, analysis and theory from the debate –to

abandon the debate –by denouncing the problems of taking for granted categorisations and

using them as categories of analysis; and, the other, to set the terms of the debate and the

terrain in which related issues should be discussed (e.g. collective rights vs. individual rights

from a political and philosophical perspective)16. Though theories coming from both

tendencies appear to be opposed in that their objectives are set in different levels of the

phenomena, they nurture each other. Theories from the former consider theories from the

latter as part of the observable phenomena. Theories from the latter are constantly

reformulated and critical positions restated due to observations from the former17. From a

cultural policy studies perspective, both serve as means to understand the indigenous issue

16 For a description of one of the more interesting fields of debate –in this case regarding the politics of the concept ‘indigenous people’ –I point the reader to Barnard’s “Kalahari revisionism, Vienna and the ‘indigenous people’ debate” (2006), an account and discussion of the controversy unleashed by Kuper’s attack on the concept. 17 Kivisto exemplifies with Glazer’s change in position regarding ‘affirmative action’. (2012, 1) Fraser’s reconsiderations and reformulations around the ‘recognition vs. redistribution’ debate could also serve as an example. (Fraser 1995; Fraser 2000)

18

and then analyse the policy space: the former as a way to observe the complete picture and

the latter as part of the politics of the phenomenon.

Brubaker: against groupism

Starting from a criticism of ‘groupism’ in the social sciences, Brubaker develops his ideas

on how not to observe issues related to ethnicity, race, nationalism, ethnic violence,

identity, collective memory, migration, assimilation, and the nation-state. In

correspondence with Sciortino, he views these themes not as “things in the world, but as

“perspectives on the world”; as “ways of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the

social world” (Brubaker 2004, 17) that can be addressed by different actors through

categories, schemas, encounters, identifications, languages, stories, institutions,

organizations, networks, and events. Curiously surprised by the fact that the concept of

‘group’ has remained unscrutinized –considering that several traditions of social analysis

have challenged it –and that there is sparse literature addressing it in comparison to the

immense literature on ethnicity, gender, identity or multiculturalism, he sets to point out

the consequences of “taking discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life,

chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis”; of treating

“ethnic groups, nations, and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can

be attributed”; of reifying “such groups (…) as if they were internally homogenous,

externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes”; of

representing “the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome

ethnic, racial, and cultural blocs.”(Brubaker 2004, 7-8) Brubaker understands this tendency

as a general social common-sense view, but one that should not be relied upon for analysis.

“Ethnic common sense (…) is a part of what we want to explain, not what we want to

explain things with; it belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytic toolkit.”

Notwithstanding, he considers it a reasonable starting point. In this sense, the existence of

19

the category ‘indigenous issue’ in México is part of what we want to understand (i.e. why

we have grouped together issues in which indegeneity is claimed) and a good starting point.

Regarding indigeneity in México, one can identify many instances, degrees and origins

of groupism; for example, the top-down grouping of ‘indigeneity’ in different size and

socio-political degree units, from ‘indigenous community’ to ‘indigenous populations’,

passing through ‘ethnic groups’, ‘linguistic groups’, and ‘indigenous regions’. This grouping

tends to coincide with that of other actors, largely due to the fact that the state “is a

powerful ‘identifier’, [but] not because it can create ‘identities’ in the strong sense –in

general, it cannot –but because it has the material and symbolic resources to impose the

categories, classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting with which

bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and doctors must work and to which nonstate actors must

refer.” (Brubaker 2004, 43) Brubaker explains how, though census categories do not

necessarily coincide with self-understandings, they are used by political actors to ‘make up

people’, especially when they are linked to tangible benefits through public policy. This

phenomenon has probably been taking place in México for a long time: the government

creating or using the category of ‘indigenous’ and establishing the criteria for identification

–that translates into ‘criteria for claiming indigeneity–; and indigenous people claiming

indigeneity in order to benefit from redistributive policies.

Brubaker’s main proposal is to avoid groupism by conceptualizing ethnicity, race, and

nation in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms; by thinking of

them in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas,

discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and

contingent events; by thinking of them as political, social, cultural and psychological

processes (Brubaker 2004, 11). He goes further in suggesting that ethnicity, for example,

does not depend on the existence of ethnic groups: that is precisely what he means by

20

‘ethnicity without groups’. He is cautious, though, to explain that he does not “dispute their

reality, minimize their power or discount their significance”18, but rather looks for another

way to construe their “reality, power, and significance.” (Brubaker 2004, 11)

He proposes to pay special attention on the ways in which categories “become

institutionalized and entrenched in administrative routines (Tilly 1998) and embedded in

culturally powerful and symbolically resonant myths, memories and narratives”, because it

might prove helpful to study their politics “both from above and from below

[micropolitics]”. He observes how conflicts labelled as ‘ethnic’ are not necessarily between

ethnic groups, but rather between organizations. The fact that they are labelled as ethnic or

national conflicts is due to the availability of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ as interpretative

frames from which to understand and label the phenomenon. Labelling conflicts as ethnic

or national is part of what we need to understand.19

De la Peña (2000 in Zolla and Zolla 2004, question 1), Stavenhagen (1979), Viqueira

(1999), and Warman (2003 in Zolla and Zolla 2004, question 1) have exposed the

problematic of grouping indigenous peoples in terms of their alleged pure prehispanic

descent. It is difficult to tell which prehispanic characteristics are ‘purely’ prehispanic if we

take into account the hundreds of years of ‘cultural mixture’ to which we’ve been

exposed20. Furthermore, even if those characteristics could be discerned, categorisation

18 Barnard coincides by stating that “[t]o reject ‘indigenous people’ as an anthropological concept is not the same thing as rejecting it as a legal concept, or rejecting it as a useful tool for political persuasion.” (2006, 7) 19 As I am writing this text, the U.S.A. is considering a military intervention in Syria. The conflict in Syria has been described in terms of struggles between religious and ethnic groups. In this case, one should consider the possibility that labelling the conflict in such ways might obscure the macropolitics involved (e.g. the suggested similarities between the states the USA has previously military intervened and Syria, who supports Iran, a state with a project of backing-up their oil reserves in gold instead of US dollars). 20 Viqueira points out how some of the socio-political organizational schemes that we identify as indigenous –in the sense of ‘prehispanic inheritance’ –“are not immemorial practices purely preserved until our time; they are both a mixture of a complex dialectic between the institutions imposed first by the Spanish Royalty and later by the national governments and the creative

21

would still be problematic21. Notwithstanding, as we will later see, the governmental

recognition of their rights is precisely stated in terms of the importance of their prehispanic

descent22. This categorisation largely coincides with policies that state the importance of the

preservation of their culture, traditions and worldview. There is a discourse that seems to

point in the direction of objectivising their culture, denying its transformations and

liveliness. Bearing this in mind, de la Peña urges us to replace stereotypes and reifications

for a view of the indigenous as subjects of their own history and constructors of their own

future (de la Peña 2000 in Zolla and Zolla 2004, question 1).

Brubaker’s Ethnicity without groups is not merely a criticism of ‘groupism’. Throughout

the book, drawing from examples from his fieldwork, he also points out the benefits of

groups-free analysis. In a way, Brubaker implicitly suggests the need to do close

ethnographical work in order to understand issues related to ethnicization, nationalization

and racialization. From Brubaker’s and Alexander’s move away from the multiculturalism

discussion there seems to emerge ‘the need for ethnographical work’. Once we understand

why groupism should be avoided as a category of analysis, first-hand knowledge of the

issues that we want to observe becomes essential. This will become clear when we present

de la Peña’s work, based on ethnographic data. Indigenous people within a same

community –those communities whose unity of will and action we take for granted –can

make social and cultural claims of many sorts23; among them, to ‘indigeneity’. This drive

response of the indigenous in face of the historically shifting situations they have confronted and that have transformed them.” (1999) 21 Some of the elements of prehispanic origin that Stavenhagen identifies are commonly thought of and referred to in common parlance as ‘Mexican’, rather than as specifically ‘indigenous’. Black beans, chili, maize and courgette, for example, are considered the ‘mexican diet’. 22 Barnard identifies it as a traditionalist view: “seeing them [indigenous people] as inheritors of ancient environmental knowledge, hunting techniques, kinship practices, religious beliefs, and so on” (Barnard 2006, 3). 23 Both what they are claiming for and the sociocultural discursive and structural resources they refer to in order to state the claim (e.g. an indigenous claim for land can be expressed as a claim for ‘indigeneity’/collective rights –“This land belongs to us from ancient times and we cannot sell due to its cultural and significance” –and/or a claim for liberal/individual rights –“I have an official ownership document”, or both).

22

towards ethnography and case study research might lead us into the individual/human

rights vs. indigenous/collective rights debate24. Once we notice that groups are not

homogenous, that actors within an organization do not necessarily agree on the terms of

different claims and on how to claim them, the notion of ‘indigenous populations’ as a unit

becomes problematic for public policy.

Alexander: where recognition really happens: multiculturalism is happening

Jeffrey Alexander’s project in cultural sociology25 presents one of the most interesting

approaches to the social world proceeding from the social sciences. Essentially based on

the recognition of the symbolic, the performative and the sacred in society26; structurally

based upon the recognition of culture’s “relative autonomy from the social structural forces

that surround it” (Alexander 2007, 24); and focused specifically on civil society and the civil

sphere, Alexander exposes the importance of meaning-making and its interpretation for

sociocultural analysis. He criticizes the 2 500 year old tradition in sociological thought that

does not recognize meaning’s relative autonomy. For Alexander, “[i]f meaning has relative

autonomy from structures of political and economic force, then culture structures can

contest their dominating power” (Alexander 2007, 25). What I find here is the recognition

of human agency in society by exposing how the social structures and the cultural

structures are differentiated and do not necessarily coincide. For Alexander, “[t]he

imposition of inequality, and struggles over justice, inclusion, and distribution, are culturally

mediated. Both the creation and maintenance of inequality and the struggle against it are

24 De la Peña notes “the specific difficulties of practising cultural citizenship” because it “involves both individual and collective rights”. 25 Alexander distinguishes cultural sociology from the sociology of culture by stating that whereas the latter conceptualizes meaning as a dependant variable, the former gives its reconstruction central pride of place (Alexander 2007, 24). 26 For a very brief treatment of these issues I point the reader to the videos “The power of the sacred” (RSA 2011) and “Obama’s Victory & the Democratic Struggle for Power” (Library of Congress 2011).

23

fundamentally involved in meaning-construction, for both good and for ill.” (Alexander

2007, 25) A consequence of Alexander’s recognition of meaning as an independent variable

is a refocus in analysis of the social world from the social structure (cf. “social power and

its more political and economic forms” (Alexander 2007, 24)) to human agency (c.f.

meaning-making and interpreting as the cultural structure). To put it grossly: to stop

thinking that the indigenous issue in México is only a problem of social structure and

recognising that it is also a cultural problem in the civil sphere. Perhaps popular knowledge

is right to ascertain that ‘we have the politicians that we deserve’; corruption, for example,

is not only a socio-political problem, but also a cultural one27.

Directing his attention to civil society and its ideal civil sphere28, Alexander has set on

to analyse sociocultural phenomena like the USA 2008 elections, the Egyptian Revolution

and, more broadly, the “modes of incorporation” in the civil sphere. These latter are of

special interest to us. Because Alexander describes them from the perspective of civil

society, I would first like to point out some of the elements of his conceptualization of the

civil sphere. First of all, he recognises its relative autonomy and that of its meaning

structures:

The civil sphere is neither the product, nor much less the simple reflection, of purely vertical

economic, political, religious, racial, or patriarchal force. What it represents, rather, is an ideal

of a horizontal relationship, of a broad and universalizing solidarity. It is a meaning-

construction whose symbolic boundaries can be used to pollute and condemn restrictive and

particularistic forms of social closure. (Alexander 2007, 25)

27 One of México’s most renowned problems is corruption. It is usually thought of as a political problem proper to the government; notwithstanding I would say it is hard to find a Mexican that has not committed an act of corruption. 28 Alexander’s analysis is limited to the ‘western’ world. He identifies the origins of the ideal of civil-community as far back as the formation of the polis in ancient Greece and its continuity up to our capitalist society.

24

The civil sphere is an ideal constructed by the civil society that it gives place to. The ideals

that construct it are positive (inclusive, independent, trusting, respectful, honest, solidary,

etc.), but they depend on the dynamism and open-endedness of public opinion, and on the

amplification and circulation of their fictional and factual representations on the mass

media, among other things, to “become socially powerful”. (Alexander 2007, 26) Civil

power always depends on the ways it is institutionalized. And it is precisely in this

institutionalization where Alexander identifies the “binary discourse of civil society”.

Ideally, the civil community “transcends primordial ties of family, ethnicity, and race,

hierarchies of class and divisions of religion” and “sustains collective obligations and

individual autonomy at the same time.” (Alexander 2007, 26), but its institutionalization

unavoidably presupposes the human qualities necessary to belong to the community (e.g.

who can vote; who can get married). Institutionalization is where we can observe the

difference between the ideal civil sphere and the discourse of civil society that necessarily

highlights the human qualities of the core group. What Alexander points to is that in every

society there is an inclusionary (ideal)-exclusionary discourse. Notwithstanding, he is

careful to note that his intention

is not to underscore the moral relativism that attaches to the civil sphere because of the

arbitrariness of its construction. What I wish to emphasize, rather, is the continuous and

omnipresent possibility for its reconstruction. In so doing, I want to highlight subjectivity

against objectivity, symbolic against material force, and agency versus structure.

It is from this perspective that Alexander describes modes of incorporation. We are now

miles away from the current discussion of multiculturalism simply because we have shifted

our attention from the apparently predominant social world to the sociocultural space

where common-day, subjective agency takes place. It is in this space that the modes of

25

incorporation –assimilation, hyphenation and multiculturalism –that Alexander focuses on,

occur: they are phenomenon happening, not theories, philosophies or ideas.

Historically, the construction of civil societies implied that the ‘primordial qualities’

(gender, language, sexuality, religion, race, origins, etc.) of its founders were not only

manifest but established the criteria of humanity for inclusion. These social systems were

divided into public and private spheres. In the public one, the principles of the civil society

prevailed, while in the private, people were relatively free to do what they liked.

Incorporation, Alexander explains, “points to the possibility of closing the gap between

stigmatized categories of persons –persons whose particular identities have been relegated

to the invisibility of private life –and the utopian promises that in principle regulate civil

life” (Alexander 2001, 242). Whether we agree that this has been the historical path

societies in the western world have followed or not, nowadays most societies and their

institutions are discursively configured around these ideals of the civil sphere. Precisely,

there in the Mexican constitution where indigenous rights were recently included is where a

discourse on equity is stated. Alexander notes that incorporation does not only occur in the

public arena but also “proceeds along extraordinarily complex paths, extending from micro

interactions, such as intermarriage, to macro arenas like labor markets.” (Alexander 2001,

242) In the portrayal of this meaning-making and interpretive civil society in which

incorporation takes place the “‘demands’ of out-group representatives and social

movement leaders should be conceived in the first instance not as connected to force but

rather as efforts at persuasion” (Alexander 2001, 242). In this light, claims for recognition

are not only demands directed to the government with specific purposes but also

discourses pointed towards “the construction of the social context” (Alexander 2001, 239)

within which these claims become culturally meaningful. Alexander recognises the

importance of “taking the place of the other” for incorporation. Though it is an individual

action, it becomes culturally meaningful because it partakes, discursively, of the civil realm.

26

He also points out how besides civil society, there are non-civil spheres (religious groups,

the family, scientific associations, church, etc.), structured and organized differently and

whose “qualities, relationships, and goods highly valued (…) bec[o]me translated into

restrictive and exclusionary requisites for participation in civil society itself.” (Alexander

2001, 240) It is in civil society’s and its institutions’ contradictory construction where

Alexander locates the origins of struggles, which “have not only been political struggles for

power, but legal, cultural, and emotional arguments about definitions of competence and

identity, about symbolic representations of the primordial qualities of dominant and

excluded groups.” This might explain why the various kinds of claims related to the

indigenous issue are predominantly framed as cultural –and, consequently, refer to meaning

(e.g. ‘world view’). The government, though, has mainly approached the issue as a social

one; there is little policy work focused on meaning-making at the civil level.

For Alexander, assimilation, ethnic hyphenation, and multiculturalism are the

“three very different ideal-typical ways” in which real civil societies have answered to the

unrealized democratic ideal of the universalising civil sphere. Because “[t]he communal life

of societies is much too layered and culturally textured” these modes of incorporation are

“not merely the result of regulative institutions guaranteeing excluded groups civil

treatment in a procedural sense.” (Alexander 2001, 243)

Assimilation refers to ‘civilizing’ or ‘purifying’ processes “that allow persons to be

separated from their primordial qualities [those considered inadequate for participation in

the civil society].” Assimilation does not imply a change of said qualities –this would rather

be thought of as enculturation–, for the persons can still privately bear them; it is rather a

provision of a “civil education, imparting to them the competences required for

participation in democratic and civil life.” What is interesting, as Alexander notes, is that,

because assimilation is “neither practiced nor understood in such a purely abstract, formally

27

universalistic way”, persons do not learn “civil competence per se, but how to express civil

competence in a different kind of primordial way” (Alexander 2001, 243-44). Here I would

like to point out two places where I find assimilation has taken place regarding the

indigenous populations of México. Historically, assimilation was predominant during

México’s indigenista period in which regional indigenous centres were created to impart

official education to indigenous peoples, scholarships for higher education were offered to

young indigenous students that wanted to pursue an academic career, and homes for

indigenous students were created near important universities to house them. Nowadays

assimilation is noticeable when indigenous peoples make institutional claims, for they have

to adopt the discourse of civil society and demonstrate civil competence in order to be

listened to. More interestingly, though, indigenous peoples have to embody indigeneity in

order to claim governmental social benefits. Indigenous peoples have to adopt both the

discourse of civil society and that which allegedly corresponds to their ‘customs and

traditions’. Furthermore, Alexander exposes, because in assimilation the private and public

split remains, civil transparency is not challenged and thus “negative representations of out-

group qualities” and “demeaning stereotypes” not only remain but are reproduced. In

assimilation, the paradoxical institutionalization of the civil sphere ideal is not challenged.

In hyphenation, “[o]utsider particularities are viewed in less one-sidedly negative

ways”; “[c]onceived as ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘foreign’, they are tolerated in both private and

public life.” (Alexander 2001, 245) This allows the emergence of new interactions and

opportunities for dialogue that can lead to intermarriage and friendship between core

group and out-group members. The problem is that this ethnic hyphenation does not

necessarily imply a revaluation of out-group qualities. Alexander notes the social instability

of both assimilation and hyphenation given that none directly challenge the primordial

characteristics of civil society and its institutions. Both could go either way: towards more

recognition and the reconfiguration of the civil society, but also towards a reaffirmation or

28

even a narrowing of the “primordial identities that are available for expressing civil

competence in a positively evaluated way.” (Alexander 2001, 245) I am prone to think that

perhaps it is hyphenation what has distinguished the years I have lived in México. Since

indigenismo, indigenous peoples’ cultures –or, rather, our idealization of them –have been

hyphenated and socially accepted; notwithstanding there has been no true revaluation of

the civil society’s primordial characteristics. As I mentioned above, policies regarding

indigenous populations have, not surprisingly, been aimed principally at the indigenous

populations, but never at the civil society or other social spheres. Cultural policies per se

regarding the indigenous issue are essentially set to hyphenate (e.g. preservation) the

indigenous peoples’ allegedly pure prehispanic cultural costumes and traditions, which

might not necessarily represent them nowadays.

The final mode of incorporation that Alexander identifies is also the more recent.

Multiculturalism is different to assimilation and hyphenation “not only in degree but in

kind”, because the discursive conflicts mediated by it “revolve around efforts to purify the actual

primordial qualities” of the civil society. Furthermore, “[i]nsofar as outsider qualities are seen

not as stigmatizing but as variations on civil and utopian themes, they will be valued in

themselves.” (Alexander 2001, 246) What is certainly problematic is how we can actually

identify it. A very close observation of how civil society’s discourse changes and perhaps

even of what attempts are made to change institutions, is essential. Alexander recognises

that multiculturalism is in its infancy and is thus “subject to strenuous debate” –precisely

those debates mentioned in the introduction. It would be interesting to study how the

indigenous claim for respect regarding their culture of maize cultivation is being integrated

among the “Sin maíz, no hay país” movement’s claims.

Rather than discussing the relevance of multiculturalism or proposing a normative

theory about it, Alexander takes it for granted as happening and thinks it represents a

29

“strengthening of the civil sphere”. (Alexander 2001, 248) Furthermore, because in

multiculturalism “particular differences do not have to be eliminated or denied (…), the

sharp split between the private and the public recedes.” (Alexander 2001, 246) In this

context, ethnicity becomes a pursuable option, rather than “an unchangeable and essential

part of identity.” (Alexander 2001, 247) This, of course, does not imply group

reconfiguration, but highlights what we have explained: that ‘indigeneity’ is a changing

cultural construct that can be claimed. Alexander is cautious to point out that though one

or another of these modes of incorporation have predominated at certain historical

moments, “in real historical time particular communities participate in all three of these

processes at the same time” and in practice they blend into one another (Alexander 2001,

248). This further reinforces our need to do ethnographical work in order to discern what

is really going on in each different indigenous community or population. What I find

relevant in Alexander’s observation of the social world is that it forefronts a sphere that

had been taken for granted as dependant on social structures: the sphere where culture

(‘the sacred’, ‘the symbolic’) is an available, relatively autonomus, discourse; where meaning

and its interpretation are central; and where human agency is given its due relevance.

An example

Before concluding this discussion, I would like to point the reader to the work Guillermo

de la Peña. His accounts of ‘indigenous issue’ cases are based on ethnographic field work.

De la Peña has studied some of the indigenous populations of Jalisco, a state in Western

México. Reading his articles one notices how a close observation of indigenous

communities tends to portray a very different picture of the indigenous issue than that

product of a normative, groupist approach. There is an almost uncountable number of

factors in each case: they go from the individual to the societal, from cultural to legislative,

30

from every day common life to cultural patterns and traditions. As he points out “many

exclusionary practices in México result from a lack of clarity in the rules concerning

indigenous political representation vis-à-vis the official institutions of the Mexican

government and also vis-à-vis Mexican society at large.29” (de la Peña 2011, 309) Through his

accounts, one can get a better idea of all the actors, relations, motivations and claims –

social, cultural, political, economic –that are present in every case. Indigenous peoples are

not homogeneous groups that relate to an unchanging cultural structure and inhabit a

static, disabling, socio-political structure. De la Peña’s accounts correspond more with

some of Brubaker’s and Alexander’s key ideas than with many other normative discourses

that have tried to make sense out of and discussed multiculturalism and the indigenous

issue as a clearly identifiable phenomenon with distinct observational and analytical

categories. He describes his method as

(…) situational analysis, which focuses on a particular sequence of interaction (and

sometimes confrontation) in a defined scenario, which seeks to understand the motivations

of the actors with particular reference to power relations and social and cultural

conditioning in a specific time and space (Van Velsen 1967; Garbett 1970). This method is

useful when one is not attempting to characterise an ideal social morphology, but rather to

understand the contradictions between rival normative frameworks and the discrepancies

between the norms and their interpretations (Gluckman 1958; Mitchell 1983). (de la Peña

2002, 130)

Is this not the kind of approach that one considers convenient after reading Brubaker and

Alexander? Furthermore, I think that rather than a pre-established approach, de la Peña’s is

an a posteriori description of how he can make sense out of that which he has closely

observed and analysed. From his perspective “we are barely at the outset of a long process

29 My emphasis.

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of negotiation which, if successful, will lead to the normalisation of cultural rights” and

“[f]ull ethnic citizenship –where the state and civil society accept that ‘being Wixarika’ or

‘being Raramuri’ and so on is perfectly compatible with ‘being Mexican’ –will come about

through dialogue between participants who are willing to seek a profound understanding of

the culture of the other.” (de la Peña 2002, 148)

Summing up

As we have seen, both in the introduction and in the discussion of Brubaker’s and

Alexander’s approaches to the social world, our sociocultural reality is a very dense

conglomerate of interrelated meanings, actions, actors, forces, power, culture(s) and

organizations. This complexity usually takes us in two main directions: we either think of

the impossibility of making any sense out of an analysis of cultural phenomena or we

embark in a specific analytic journey with a predetermined direction, running the risk of

taking for granted generalisations, categories, and phenomena themselves. Groupism,

taking ethnopolitical categories as categories of analysis, and forgetting culture’s relative

autonomy –and thus society’s agency –are three of these risks. Both Brubaker and

Alexander have confronted their theories to particular cultural phenomena. Both their

theories proceed from close observations. What I conclude after analysing their critical and

theoretical work is that in order to understand cultural phenomena one should, above all,

have trustful, preferably first-hand, information and should consider the entire realm of

meaningful sociocultural interrelations that partake of their ‘happening’, careful not to take

for granted any gross generalisations that might not rely on empirical data. In this sense, I

propose to analyse not the ‘indigenous issue’ but issues (cases) in which indigeneity is

claimed; in those cases, the ‘indigenous issue’ is but one more of the things to be observed

and considered.

32

What about cultural policy studies? If we agree that cultural policies are necessarily

bound to a cultural phenomenon (e.g. the emergence of cultural industries; the existence of

cultural artefacts referred to as ‘heritage’), I think a comprehensive understanding of them

is necessary. Whether we decide to take a normative position (e.g. to criticize, propose and

evaluate cultural policies), a descriptive one (e.g. to describe, mainly historically, the field of

cultural policy studies) or both, it is essential to consider the whole picture; in it, the

government-culture relation is but one of the relations we have to explore. In this sense,

cultural policy is both our starting and ending position. This kind of research is complex

and does not correspond, speed-wise, with the urgency for information and evaluation

proper to contemporary public policies. Nonetheless, I believe this kind of research can

and will turn out to be helpful to analyse, inform, and evaluate not only cultural policies per

se, but public policies in general. Though the immense limitations of my work (e.g. lack of

ethnographic work; insufficient knowledge of the Mexican civil sphere and other non-civil

spheres) have impeded me to do what I claim should be done, I have tried to suggest,

throughout the text, places and relations that should be explored or refocused. I will now

relate these considerations to the existing policy space regarding indigeneity in México.

33

A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY SPACE FOR INDIGENOUS ISSUES

... For INI you are all Huichols, and we want the two sides to reach agreement.

Tania, director of the National Indigenous Institute’s Coordinating Centre for the region in 2000

(in de la Peña 2002, 140)

In this section I will analyse Article 2 of the Mexican constitution. It is in this article that

indigenous populations’ rights are recognised and upon which all other policies and

programmes are or should be based. Article 2, in a sense, is the policy that opens up a

space not only for legislation but also for debate of indigenous issues. Because collective

rights such as the ones recognised for the indigenous populations in México are somewhat

new in terms of law studies and there is little literature about them (Carbonell 2003, 841);

because politicians managed the constitutional reforms respecting those rights “without

compass and direction, letting themselves be guided by the signals sent by popularity polls

and embodying attitudes that might yield electoral benefits in the short term” (Carbonell

2003, 841); and because indigenous rights have been recognised but their interpretation,

legislation and enactment transferred to state and municipal governments, the space

opened by Article 2 is ambiguous and has thus become the legitimate terrain for indigenous

issue claims and debates. In a sense, Article 2 has become the cornerstone of the

indigenous issue.

I am indebted to López Bárcenas’ thorough research on the current status of

legislation and rights regarding the indigenous populations of México. He has not only

revised all existing policy documents and identified all the places where there is an explicit

reference to indigenous peoples or where the policies clearly refer to issues regarding them

(e.g. reforms to the agrarian law respecting legal forms of land ownership have a discernible

impact on indigenous populations and communities), but has also discussed controversial,

paradoxical or sometimes even contradictory points. His is an analysis from a law studies

34

perspective, informed by first-hand knowledge of some of the issues given his indigenous

status and activist trajectory. Considering his position, he not only took into account the

policies in which indigenous peoples’ rights are explicitly referred to, but also those towards

which indigenous peoples have sometimes directed their claims.

My analysis, based on the ideas we have discussed in the previous section, will

focus on what Article 2 implies about the government’s approach to the indigenous issue.

Mainly, though stated as multiculturalist, it rather suggests both processes of assimilation

and hyphenation. For a critical understanding of law implications regarding the issue I

support myself on Carbonell’s appreciations. Here we will not judge the appropriateness of

Article 2 but rather consider it a part of the indigenous issue phenomenon. An adequate

evaluation of ‘indigenous policies’ would be extremely problematic for two fundamental

reasons. First, if we take into account the cultural component of the claims, we would

somehow need to evaluate the cultural impact of policies that are not explicitly or even

belatedly thought of as cultural. This, to the extent of my knowledge, is something

uncommon. The design of policies that are not ‘cultural’ per se does not usually

contemplate our meaningful, relatively autonomous cultural structures and thus we lack a

starting point to compare with. All policies –nowadays even cultural policies per se –are

mainly evaluated from a particular economic and/or development position. A common

motif in discourses regarding the indigenous issue, coming from all sorts of actors, is the

allusion to indigenous peoples’ degrading economic and underdeveloped condition. This

condition is indeed verifiable by the same standards on which the policies base a part of

their rationale. What is missing here is the meaningful indigenous discourse30 (e.g. the

30 Around the indigenous issue, indigenous discourse is thought of –or rather reduced to –as essentially ‘against the state and/or institutions’ (something we can observe in the close relation between indigenous movements and left wing, radical and other sorts of non-conformist movements). I account this to the fact that multiculturalism –at least from Alexander’s perspective –implies a reconsideration of civil society’s qualities, discourse and institutions, rather than just a gradual assimilation or hyphenation of out-group qualities. Thus, indigenous claims can be

35

indigenous perspective on ‘economics’). This is precisely what I find to be the second main

problem for evaluation. As de la Peña notes:

A pressing problem in the political structure of Mexico today is that the local level of

authority –the municipio –has become an executor of programs which are often originated

in the higher levels (the state and the federal governments) and divorced from the reality of local

groups. In turn, local groups lack the formal (and often the linguistic) capacity to communicate their

demands (Warman 2003: 293–4). State and federal agencies, and the political parties, also

operate their own programmes without formal checks and balances from the local population. In

fact, it is only with the help of cultural and political brokers (the ill-reputed caciques) that many

indigenous communities manage to connect and negotiate with the political system (de la

Peña 1986).31 (de la Peña 2006, 295)

Careful not to take at face value cultural claims, we should nonetheless appreciate how

these are somehow incorporated into existing civil society institutions in a hyphenated way,

rather than in a multiculturalist one. Article 2 is demonstrative of this for it recognises

multiculturalism, but points towards hyphenation. Multiculturalism, as we have discussed

before, rather than simply recognising indigenous rights would imply an open multicultural

dialogue that would possibly point towards important social reconsiderations and

valuations that, at their time, would lead to profound constitutional reforms. As we will

now see, indigenous rights are embedded within previous conceptions of the rights,

obligations and responsibilities of Mexican citizens. This situation, as Carbonell and López

Bárcenas differently expose, makes interpretations of indigenous claims quite complicated

(e.g. Can indigenous people claim, in a particular situation, both collective and individual

perceived as a threat to national stability. Notwithstanding, indigenous claims’ discourse is more multicultural than normative. Warnholtz’s journalistic columns constantly portray this. In one of them she relates how in a particular case the indigenous are not predisposed against the construction of a dam, that they are protesting because they want complete information about its construction in order to discuss it and because they want to make sure their petitions are taken into account. (Warnholtz 2013(2)) 31 My emphasis.

36

rights?32). This is why I suggest we observe the phenomenon from a distance. From this

position, we can read the recognition of indigenous rights by the 2001 reform to Article 2

in a political sense: not as multiculturalist but as a consequence of multiculturalist

discourses and claims. Carbonell suggests leaving aside the philosophical question of why

certain minorities’ or groups’ claims have to become fundamental rights and not just solved

by the implementation of public policies, and accepting that what these claims essentially

express is certain groups’ feeling that their aspirations cannot be achieved only by typical,

classical, individual human rights. Carbonell notes how the recognition of collective rights

highlights the fact that both our jurisdictional mandates and our public institutions are

based on a determinate cultural, religious, sexual, and political point of view; that they are

not neutral as we tend to think (c.f. Alexander’s explanation of how primordial qualities

become obscured). How, he asks, can one doubt that the facts that we [in México] do not

work on Sundays or that homosexual marriage is illegal in most states are norms derived

from Catholicism. He is careful to explain that the fact that the state is not culturally

neutral does not necessarily imply that it is being managed by one group. Carbonell is of

the opinion that the recognition of collective rights does not, as many critics constantly

suggest, presuppose the debilitation of a series of important agreements assumed by

democratic societies based on fundamental rights; that, on the contrary, the coexistence of

different cultures in a same society enriches their common life and offers diverse

experiences that might nurture our moral universe (Carbonell 2001).

32 Carbonell, following Fraser, relates this to minorities’ bivalent character (2003, 859). I would go further and suggest polyvalence, considering that indigenous persons could refer to the social structure (e.g. redistribution), the cultural structure (e.g. what it means), individual rights (e.g. what he or she wants or needs) and collective rights (e.g. indigenous self-adscription) in one same claim. For a clear portrayal I point the reader to de la Peña (2002).

37

Why are there specific policies for indigenous peoples in México? To simplify our answer

by stating that it is due to the identification of a problem or group of problems by the state

could lead us into conceptualizing the phenomenon in a reductionist way (e.g. giving the

government a centrality that it does not necessarily have). Though acquiring an official,

mandatory status only through governmental means, the recognition of indigenous rights

proceeds from struggles and debates within broader socio-political realms, both national

and international. México’s first explicit policy action regarding indigenous right’s

recognition was the ratification of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) legally

binding 169 Convention (1989). Macro and micro politics have played an important role in

México’s contemporary policy history regarding indigenous peoples. López Bárcenas notes

how we mistakenly tend to consider the 2001 reform to Article 2 as the first official

recognition of indigenous rights, because this had already occurred, given that international

treaties –such as ILO Convention 169 –have constitutional character (López Bárcenas

2010, 81-116). He also notes how the text of the 2001 reform is a reduced and adapted

version of the text in Convention 16933 (López Bárcenas 2010, 53). Criticisms denouncing

the government’s disregard for indigenous peoples and their problems have highlighted the

fact that the recognition of their rights seems to have more to do with international

relations than with a genuine interest. There are various motivations behind public policies

regarding the indigenous populations, coming from different social actors; thus, one should

be careful not to interpret them as a portrayal of the relation between the state and the

indigenous, or as descriptive of the indigenous peoples’ situation.

33 Carbonell explains that it is a common phenomenon in Latin America, given that Convention 169 was the only available legal instrument to proceed from (2003, 844-45).

38

Article 2

In a general sense, I would describe the Mexican government’s approach to

multiculturalism as predominantly hyphenating. Though indigenous peoples’ rights have

been recognised and thus have to be respected in the public realm, there is no explicit will

to adapt the existing institutions and legislation in accordance with Mexico’s ‘pluticultural’

composition. López Bárcenas sums it up by exposing “an existing incongruency in the

federal constitution in recognising, on the one hand, the nation’s pluricultural composition,

but, on the other, mandating the elaboration of specific policies of a monocultural

character.”34 (López Bárcenas 2010, 73-4); something that “does not contribute to the

establishment of a new relation between indigenous peoples, the government and society in

general, which was the original rationale behind the reform.”35 (López Bárcenas 2010, 72).

Another characteristic is what I call ‘retrograding groupism’; that is, not only to categorise

all indigenous peoples as a homogenous unity, but doing so by alluding to their prehispanic

descent and their costumes and traditions. Indigenous peoples, for example, now have the

right to choose their authorities but have to do so according to their costumes and

traditions (Constitution 2008, A/III). Leaving besides its ambiguity, it reinforces the

mistaken view of indigenous peoples as socially and culturally unchanging communities.

It is important to note that Article 2 only comprises the recognition of rights and

an ambiguous description of when and how those rights can be claimed. Article 2 does not

establish any obligations for the federal government. Responsibility for enforcement,

legislation and policy and programmes design and implementation is passed on to state

governments. López Bárcenas has thus criticised the reform as an incomplete expression of

34 All translations of López Bárcenas quotes are mine. 35 The 2001 constitutional reform is considered an incomplete version of the San Andrés Accords subscribed in 1996 by the government and EZLN (in representation of indigenous organizations) after two years of negotiation after the Zapatista uprising of 1994. The Accords were vetoed by president Ernesto Zedillo who sent a similar, but controversially different proposal to the congress, where it was archived until president Vicente Fox called for it.

39

mere good will (López Bárcenas 2010). His criticism, I believe, proceeds from the fact that

very little legislation has taken place at state level since the article was reformed. Most states

have limited themselves to include an adaptation of Article 2 in their constitutions (López

Bárcenas 2010). From our perspective, though, it could be considered culturally adequate,

as state governments can legislate in accordance with the indigenous peoples in their

territory, creating policies and programmes adapted to their specific needs, precisely as

Article 2 suggest. This could represent an escape route away from ‘groupism’.

After establishing that the Mexican nation is one and indivisible, the nation’s

pluricultural composition is recognised. What is relevant here is that it is “originally based

on its indigenous peoples, who are those descendants of the populations that inhabited the

country’s current territory when colonization started and that preserve their own social,

economic, cultural and political institutions or a part of them.”36 (Constitution 2013) Apart

from all the legal controversies that this definition of who indigenous peoples are might

arise, we should note its retrograding aspects. If we consider that the official criteria to

count indigenous people are language and self-adscription, both ‘descent’ and ‘preservation’

seem to be uncalled for to define them. Whether this latter are truly taken into account in

claims of indigeneity or not, they do tell us something about the way in which the

government views indigenous peoples. Due to a long history of persistent ‘racial’

discrimination, there have been little efforts, if any at all, to seriously and openly speak

about the genetic characteristics of the population37. Thus, ‘prehispanic descent’ and

‘preservation’ rather point towards a discursive reinforcement of an image of indigenous

peoples as the bearers of part of our past, a past that they have (and should?) preserve.

36 My translation, aided by that of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (2008, online). Whenever not specified, the translation is that of the SCJN (see Appendix 2). 37 PhD candidate in Biological Sciences, Alejandra Ortíz Medrano, has just called my attention to an article on mitochondrial DNA variation in the Mexican mestizo population (Guardado-Estrada, et. al. 2009), suggesting thus that there is available information on this topic.

40

All throughout Article 2 there is an implicit and explicit insistence that indigenous

rights are ‘below’ or come after, traditional (liberal) constitutional rights.

Indigenous people’s right to self-determination shall be exercised within a framework of

constitutional autonomy safeguarding national unity. (…)

A. This Constitution recognizes and protects the right to self-determination of indigenous

people and communities and, consequently, their right to autonomy, so that they may:

(…)

II. Enforce their own legal systems to regulate and solve their internal conflicts, subject

to the general principles of this Constitution, respecting constitutional rights, human rights, and in a

relevant manner, the dignity and integrity of women. The Law shall establish the cases and

validation procedures by the corresponding judges or courts. (Constitution 2008)

(…)

The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and the States shall determine those elements of self-

determination and autonomy that may best express the conditions and aspirations of indigenous people in

each State (…).38

Autonomy became a key topic in the indigenous issue after the Zapatista uprising and has

remained at the heart of many debates. It tends to be analysed in secessionist terms. López

Bárcenas considers the specifications that autonomy should be realized within

“constitutional principles” and safeguarding “national unity” as absurd. First, because

indigenous peoples have never manifested any separatist intentions; and, second, because if

this were the case, a claim for sovereignty would not be directed at the constitution but at

an international state level (López Bárcenas 2010). From my perspective, the recognition of

autonomy is the topmost expression of the hyphenating discourse in Article 2. It allows an

out-group to fully, privately and publicly, express their cultural difference safeguarded by

38 My emphasis.

41

the law (e.g. against discrimination), without compromising core-group institutions. We

should, nonetheless, keep in mind that we are at a discursive level and that, as we have

already suggested, the modes of incorporation take place within the civil sphere. I consider

it plausible to think that hyphenation can very well lead to forms of multiculturalism.

Perhaps that is what is happening with the joint protests of indigenous peoples and civil

organizations against GMOs and in favour of alimentary sovereignty. One could further

think that in situations of crisis39, as with multiculturalism, the institutions’ cultural bias

becomes visible and civil society might question the primordial qualities that gave place to

them. This questioning necessarily involves the meaning-making and interpreting symbolic

relations proper of cultural structures. When this occurs, other available cultural structures

can be considered and claimed. Furthermore, wherever the constitution feels hyphenation

could seriously compromise traditional liberal rights, it makes them explicit (e.g.

“respecting (…) in a relevant manner, the dignity and integrity of women”; “guaranteeing

the participation of women under equitable conditions before men”).

Though the general tendency of Article 2 is towards hyphenation, there is still an

important part that can be related to processes of assimilation. The primordial one is

consistent throughout history: for indigenous peoples to claim their recognised rights they

have to demonstrate competence in civil society’s institutional language, Spanish. Privately,

in their communities, they can go about with their ‘traditions’, but to participate of the civil

sphere, they are expected to claim their rights by institutionalized civil society’s standards.

In section B of Article 2 there are two mentions regarding indigenous peoples’ right

to consultation: one in respect to education (Constitution 2008, B/II) and one in respect to

national, state and municipal development plans (Constitution 2008, B/IX). Consultation,

as a concept, appears to point towards multiculturalism. Notwithstanding, if we consider

39 I am not thinking in a prescriptive way, that is, ascertaining that we are in fact experiencing a crisis, but rather considering the high presence and usage of the word in common parlance.

42

that there are 68 indigenous languages and the current status of language and education

policies regarding indigenous populations, we can clearly determine that the government, in

some respects, is still approaching multiculturalism from an assimilationist perspective. The

Secretariat for Public Education has a special department for indigenous education, the

General Direction for Indigenous Education. The main objective of indigenous education

is to offer indigenous persons a bilingual education40 that “recognises their cultural

heritage” (Constitution 2008, B/II) –note that it does not refer to their cultural present. In

respect to language, one of the two federal laws that were created after the reform to

Article 2 was the General Law for Indigenous Peoples’ Linguistic Rights. An institute –the

National Institute for Indigenous Languages (INALI)41 –was created to manage its

mandates. Its main objectives can be summed up as: protection, preservation, promotion

and development of indigenous languages. Though promotion is thought of in a

multiculturalist way, if we look at INALI’s current programmes, efforts have been directed

first to processes of hyphenation and assimilation. (López Bárcenas 2010, 311-317). Two of

its principal programmes are to research and map indigenous languages in order to

establish criteria for their preservation, and to train and certify translators, mainly as legal

aids for judicial cases in which indigenous peoples are involved. In this panorama,

consultation is rather a top-down, assimilationist policy. Indigenous peoples are to be

consulted but in official institutional speak. To do so, they have to learn Spanish or claim

the right to an interpreter. López Bárcenas criticises the efforts and resources put into the

translation and promotion of, for example, the text of the reform to Article 2 into

indigenous languages because

40 López Bárcenas notes: “…there is no reference to an [national] intercultural education but only to a pluricultural and bilingual indigenous education, which suggests that only the indigenous population has a right to this kind of education…” (López Bárcenas 2010, 134) 41 Both the law and the institute were created in 2003.

43

If this disposition’s end was to promote the contents of the Constitution, it is hard for it to

reach its objective because not only is the majority of the indigenous illiterate, but those

who aren’t can read it in Spanish, because whomever can read an indigenous language it’s

because they can read Spanish. (2010, 78-9)

As we have seen, though Article 2 proceeds from the recognition of

pluriculturalism, its regulations correspond to processes of hyphenation and assimilation. It

would be interesting to research what kinds of processes are taking place in the civil sphere

in order to examine their relation to Article 2 and thus determine how effective policies

deriving from this rationale are being or can be.

I have tried to analyse Article 2 from a distance; that is, considering it part of the

studied phenomenon, instead of as a portrayal of the government-indigenous people’s

relation. An in-depth analysis of how derivative and related policies have interpreted it

could shed more light into other governmental levels’ and bodies’ approach to the

indigenous issue. Superficially, I notice that the combination of hyphenation and

assimilation has led to a separation of indigenous peoples’ culture into social and cultural

issues. Their recognised ‘culture’, or rather the core-group, institutional, retrograding

conceptualization of their culture –considered as unchanging (e.g. their preserved

‘prehispanic’ traditions, clothes, artefacts, language, etc.) –is to be studied, safeguarded and

promoted (hyphenation); while their social situation –the institutional view of their

situation –is to be remedied (assimilation). In terms of groupism, we could say that, in

respect to ‘culture’ there is a tendency away from it (e.g. differentiating the 68 indigenous

languages; distinguishing each people’s worldview); and in respect to their social situation,

there is a tendency towards it (e.g. regionalise indigenous peoples in order to justify and

carry out welfare and social programmes). What I think is really interesting is the function

of language in the case of the indigenous issue. To what extent can hyphenation take place

44

when there is a linguistic barrier? The government’s response seems to be assimilationist:

though indigenous people have a right to speak their languages and to make an official use

of them (e.g. declare in their languages in judicial cases), the government will only ‘hear’

Spanish. I hypothesize that in cases where there is a linguistic barrier, hyphenation is not

only an unstable process, as Alexander explains, but it tends to move either towards

assimilation or multiculturalism. Until civil society and its institutions explicitly and wilfully

decide to move towards a comprehensive understanding of indigenous culture (e.g.

learning one of their languages), it will be difficult for multiculturalism to take place.

45

CONCLUSIONS

In this work I approached México’s indigenous issue as a cultural phenomenon that has a

discernible policy relation with the government. Considering Brubaker’s and Alexander’s

conceptualization of difference-based phenomena, this policy relation was observed as part

of the phenomenon itself, rather than as the centre of the phenomenon. This allowed us to

analyse Article 2 of the Mexican constitution from a discursive point of view. As we have

seen, the government’s recognition of the nation’s pluriculturality is corresponded with

assimilation and hyphenation policy discourses. An analysis of the extent to which this

discourses correspond to what is happening at the civil society level would help us

appreciate their appropriateness. From a theoretical point of view, though, one can criticize

the government’s tendency towards groupism simply because it does not portray the

complex reality that multiculturalism implies nowadays. Also, recognition of

multiculturalism is, in a sense, a recognition that intercultural relations are occurring or can

occur at the civil society level. These relations expose the primordial qualities upon which

institutions are built. In this situation, the ideal civil sphere is open to cultural

interpretations. Hyphenation and assimilation are not theoretical suited to facilitate a

dialogical reconstruction of the civil sphere. Thus, multiculturalist policies might be more

adequate. Notwithstanding, we have seen that Article 2 only creates a policy space that is

yet to be filled up by state policies, and that multiculturalist policies could very well be

designed without contradicting its mandates.

In this panorama, my recommendations would be: a) to stop grouping indigenous

peoples as a single sociocultural unity; b) to approach the indigenous issue as a national

problem of multiculturalism, instead of conceptualizing indigenous peoples as the problem; c)

to carry out extensive ethnographic work that can better inform of the indigenous-non

indigenous relations situation; d) to stop thinking of indigeneity as synonymous of

46

prehispanic, and to consider it a national cultural characteristic not inseparably bound to

indigenous peoples; and e) to consider multiculturalist policies aimed at the whole society

and not at one particular group.

Finally, if we agree with Alexander in respect to culture’s relative autonomy in the

social world, we should accept that all public policies are not culturally neutral. In that

sense, all policies have a cultural component to it and a resulting cultural impact. I believe

cultural policy studies could broaden its focus of attention and consider public policies as a

proper field of study.

14,972 words

47

Appendix 1

Population distribution according to poverty condition in México (2010, %)

Red: Extreme poverty Green: Poor by income

Dark grey: Moderate poverty Mild grey: Vulnerable due to social lacks

Light grey: Not poor nor vulnerable

1st column (left to right): National 4th: Children

2nd: Senior citizens 5th: Zones for priority attention

3rd: Indigenous

48

Appendix 2 ARTICLE 2.42 The Mexican Nation is one and indivisible.

The Nation has a multicultural composition, originally sustained on its indigenous peoples, who are those regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations that originally inhabited the Country’s current territory at the time of colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

The fundamental criteria to determine to whom the provisions on indigenous people apply shall be the self-identification of their indigenous identity.

Those communities which constitute a cultural, economic and social unit settled in a territory, that recognize their own authorities according to their uses and customs are the ones that comprise an indigenous folk.

Indigenous people’s right to self-determination shall be exercised within a framework of constitutional autonomy safeguarding national unity. The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and of the States shall recognize indigenous people and communities and shall also include the general principles established in the previous paragraphs of this Article, as well as ethnic-linguistic and land settlement criteria.

A. This Constitution recognizes and protects the right to self-determination of

indigenous people and communities and, consequently, their right to autonomy, so that they may:

I. Decide the ways of their community life as well as their social, economic, political

and cultural organization.

II. Enforce their own legal systems to regulate and solve their internal conflicts,

subject to the general principles of this Constitution, respecting constitutional

rights, human rights, and in a relevant manner, the dignity and integrity of women.

The Law shall establish the cases and validation procedures by the corresponding

judges or courts.

III. Elect, in accordance with their traditional rules, procedures and practices, their

authorities or representatives to exercise their form of internal government,

guaranteeing the participation of women under equitable conditions before men,

respecting the Federal Union Pact and the States’ sovereignty.

IV. Preserve and promote their languages, knowledge and all those elements that

constitute their culture and identity.

V. Maintain and improve their habitat and preserve the integrity of their lands as

provided in this Constitution.

42 In the translation of this Article the terms selected were those used in the Convention No. 169 of International Labor Organization, Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, since this Article was inspired in the aforesaid Convention and it provides better understanding of the meaning.

49

VI. Attain preferential use and enjoyment of any natural resources located in the

sites inhabited and occupied by the communities, save for the ones pertaining to

strategic areas as provided in this Constitution. The foregoing rights shall be

exercised respecting the nature and classes of land ownership and land tenure set

forth in this Constitution and the laws on the matter, as well as the rights acquired

by third parties or by members of the community. To achieve these goals,

communities may constitute partnerships under the terms established by the Law.

VII. Elect representatives before town councils in those Municipalities with

indigenous population.

The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and the States shall recognize

and regulate these rights in Municipalities, with the purpose of strengthening their

participation and political representation in accordance with their traditions and

standards.

VIII. To have full access to State jurisdiction. To protect this right, in all trials and

procedures to which they are party, individually or collectively, the particularities of

their customs and culture must be taken into account, respecting the provisions of

this Constitution. Indigenous people have at all times the right to be assisted by

interpreters and counsellors who are familiar with their language and culture.

The constitutions and laws of the Federal District and the States shall determine

those elements of self-determination and autonomy that may best express the conditions

and aspirations of indigenous people in each State, as well as the provisions for the

recognition of indigenous communities as entities of public interest.

B. In order to promote equal opportunities for indigenous people and to eliminate

any discriminatory practices, the Federation, the Federal District, the States and the

Municipalities, shall establish the institutions and shall determine the policies needed to

guarantee full force and effect of indigenous people’s rights and the comprehensive

development of their towns and communities. Such policies shall be designed and operated

jointly with them.

In order to decrease the needs and lags affecting indigenous towns and

communities, authorities are obliged to:

I. Promote regional development in indigenous areas with the purpose of

strengthening local economies and improving the quality of life of their people,

through coordinated actions among the three levels of government with the

participation of the communities. Municipal authorities shall equitably determine

the budget allocations that indigenous communities shall directly administer for

specific goals.

II. Guarantee and increase educational levels, favouring bilingual and cross-cultural

education literacy, the conclusion of elementary education by students, technical

training and medium and higher education. To establish a scholarship system for

indigenous students at all levels. To define and develop educational programs of

50

regional content which recognize the cultural heritage of their peoples in

accordance with the laws on the matter and consulting it with indigenous

communities. To promote respect for and knowledge of, the diverse cultures in the

Nation.

III. Assure effective access to health services by increasing the coverage of the

national system of health, but benefiting from traditional medicine, and also to

support better nutrition for indigenous people through food programs, especially

for children.

IV. Improve indigenous communities’ living conditions and their spaces for

socializing and recreation through actions facilitating access to public and private

financing for housing construction and improvements, and also to extend the

coverage of basic social services.

V. Foster the incorporation of indigenous women to development by supporting

productive projects, protecting their health, granting incentives to privilege their

education and their participation in decision making processes regarding

community life.

VI. Extend the communication network enabling the integration of communities,

by constructing and expanding transportation routes and telecommunication

means. To develop the conditions required so that indigenous people and

communities may acquire, operate and manage means of communication, in

accordance with the terms set forth by the laws on the matter.

VII. Support productive activities and sustainable development of indigenous

communities through actions aimed at, allowing them to attain economic self-

reliance, applying incentives for public and private investments which foster the

creation of jobs, incorporating technology to increase their own productive

capacity, and also insuring equitable access to supply and marketing systems.

VIII. Establish social policies to protect indigenous migrants in Mexican territory,

as well as in foreign countries, through actions designed to guarantee the labor

rights of farm workers43; to improve health conditions of women, support children

and youth of migrant families with special educational and food programs; to

ensure that indigenous people’s human rights are respected and promote their

cultures.

IX. Consult indigenous people when preparing the National Development Plan and

the States and Municipalities plans, and if appropriate, to incorporate their

recommendations and proposals.

43 In the context of the Mexican constitution, labourers means workers dedicated not only to farming but also to any other agricultural jobs. (Becerra, Javier F., Dictionary of Mexican Legal Terminology, México, Escuela Libre de Derecho, 1999, p. 766.)

51

To guarantee compliance with the obligations set forth herein, the House of

Deputies of the Congress of the Union, the Federal District and the State Legislatures and

Municipal councils, within the scope of their respective jurisdictions, shall establish specific

items allotted to the fulfilment of these obligations in the expenditure budgets they shall

approve, as well as the procedures enabling communities to participate in the exercise and

supervision thereof.

Notwithstanding the rights herein set forth to the benefit of indigenous individuals,

their communities and people, any community equated to them shall have, as applicable,

the same rights as the indigenous people, as provided by the Law.

52

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