Mari/me Interdic/on Opera/onsMari/me Interdic/on Opera/ons journaljournal

REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

MARITIME SECURITY ISSUES

SMART BUOYS

INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TACKLE PIRACY

NMIOTC COUNTER PIRACY & WMD TRAINING

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NMIOTC MIO JOURNAL

DIRECTORCommodore A. Poulos GRC NCommandant NMIOTC

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORCdr G. Tedeschini ITA NDirector of Transformation

JOURNAL MANAGERCdr. K. Sampanis GRC N

EDITORLt G. Mantzouris GRC N

ASSISTANT EDITORLt G. Georgiev BGR N

WEB EDITORLt N. Tiantioukas GRC N

ADMINISTRATION ANDDISTRIBUTIONLtJG K. Papanastasis GRC N

EDITORIAL BOARDDr. Alex BordetskyMr M. EfthymiopoulosDr. Joship KasumDr. P. MichalasDr. S. DesautelProfessor I. KoukosProfessor G. TsialtasProfessor N. NikitakosProfessor F. Papoulias

COLUMNISTSLt A. Pothitos GRC NLCDR A. Gobjila ROU N

CONTRIBUTORSMr Michel SoulaMr. Isaac WilesCpt K. Hoffer USA NCdr G. Ioan ROU NCdr I. Chapsos GRC NMr Harm GreidanusMr. D. TrombinoMr Ingo Klaus WamserMr. G. RodotheatosMr. G. KiourtsoglouCpt T. Fairbanks USA N reserveLt I. Nellas GRC N

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CONTENTS

4 COMMANDANT’S OVERVIEWby Commodore Adrianos Poulos GRC N

7 NMIOTS PHOTO GALERY16 NMIOTCANNUALCONFERENCE

by Mr. Michel Soula

18 REGIONALCAPACITY BUILDINGby LTC (Ret) Phyllis Mihalas, Ph.D.

20 JOINT NPS-LLNL FIELD EXPERIMENTby Dr. Alex Bordetsky, Mr. Steve Mullins, Lt Georgios Mantzouris Mr.

Eugene Bourakov, Mr. Bryan Hudgens, and Mr. David Trombino

28 ATP-71 WORKSHOP IN NMIOTCby LCdr Alexandrou Gobjila, ROU N

30 MARITIME ‘ICAO’: PERHAPS AN ANSWER TOMODERN MARITIME TERRORISM?

by Professor NikitasNikitakos & Lt Ioannis Nellas GRC N

34 LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTINGREGIONALCAPACITY BUILDING TO SOMALIA

by Isaac Wiles Jr Esq

39 READJUSTING ANTI-PIRACY LAWEFFECTIVENESS THROUGH STATE PRACTICE. HOWFEASIBLE?

by Gerasimos Rodotheatos, PhD Candidate

41 PROSECUTION OF SOMALI PIRATES: ANOVERVIEW

by Mr Ingo Klaus Wamser Esq.

43 THE NEXT STEP TO THE EVOLUTION OF THENMIOTC: ACONCEPTUALMODEL

by Dr. Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos

47 “REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FORCOUNTERING PIRACY THROUGH THE HUMANSECURITY CONCEPT”

by Commander Ioannis Chapsos, GRC N

50 SOMALI PIRACY50 UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL BUSINESS

MODELby Dr Alec D Coutroubis and George Kiourktsoglou, Ph.D. candidate

52 COMPREHENSIVEAPPROACH: IMPLEMENTINGTHE EFFECT BASED APPROACH TO CONTEMPORARYMARITIME OPERATIONS PLANNING

by CDR Ioan Craciun ROU N

56 REGIONAL SURVEILLANCE CONCEPT TOSUPPORTMARITIME GOVERNANCEAND SECURITY

by Mr. Harm Greidanus

58 COALITION END-TO-END EMIO PERFORMANCEOPTIMIZATION (C3PO) JOINT CAPABILITYTECHNOLOGYDEMONSTRATION (JCTD)

by Dr. Stephen Desautel

60 A FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED

NMIOTC Journal 3

The NMIOTC MIO Journal is a professional publication of NATO Maritime InterdictionOperational Training Center, aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova-tive thinking on NATO Maritime Interdiction related issues such as doctrine, concepts, force structure,employment and readiness.

The views and opinions expressed or implied in theNMIOTC MIO Journal are those of theauthors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of NATO.The NMIOTC MIO Journal is open to receive and publish articles atjournal@nmiotc.grc.nato.int. We reserve the right to make editorial changes.

All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice (©), may be reproduced in whole or inpart without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice (©) may be reproduced for any NATOpurpose but without permission. If an article is being reproduced, the NMIOTC MIO Journal re-quests a courtesy line. To obtain permission for the reproduction of material bearing a copyright notice(©) for other than NATO purposes, please contact the author of the material rather than theNMIOTC MIO Journal.

INTERNATIONALMARITIME SECURITY COOPERATIONANDAWARENESSby Cpt Ken W. Hoffer USA N

63 MARITIMEAFFAIRS, SAFETYOF NAVIGATIONAND SECURITYby Professor Josip Kasum

68 COUNTER-PIRACY ESCORT OPERATIONS IN THE GULFOFADENby Professor Thomas Lucas and LtCdr T. Tsilis GRC N

72 ARTEMIS – ANOVELMULTIPURPOSE SMART BUOYby Mr Anastasios Kounoudes, Ph.D. and Mr Christodoulos Protopapas, Ph.D.

74 EXPANDING NMIOTC USING MOBILE TRAINING TEAMSby Lt Antonios Pothitos GRC N

76 MARITIME OPERATIONALLANGUAGE TRAINING COURSEby Cpt Teresa Fairbanks, USA Navy Reserve

78 TRAINING OF ROS REGINAMARIA IN NMIOTCby LtCdr Alexandrou Gobjila ROU N

COMMANDANT’S OVERVIEWCOMMANDANT’S OVERVIEW

by Commodore Adrianos Poulos GRC N

The fourth edition of our journal has foundNMIOTC with an increased momentum in manyaspects. Being one of the four NATO Education andTraining Facilities is a heavy responsibility, but at thesame time it is an honor to provide training to anyoneinterested in acquiring NATO standards in MaritimeInterdiction Operations. Since the Center’s inaugurationin October 2008, the number of trainees hascontinuously grown, even amidst an era of austerity.NMIOTC stands in the forefront safeguarding maritimeinterdiction and security operations by transferring stateof the art tactical / operational training to individuals,personnel, command and boarding teams of the unitsthat are going to participate in NATO led operationssuch as Operation Ocean Shield, Operation ActiveEndeavour and many more. It is not the delivery oftraining that makes our environment unique, nor theenhancement of the expertise level that students acquireafter finalizing the real hands on training, it is theexchange of knowledge and ideas that creates aproductive environment for the students - allowing themto leave the facility with a unified and strengthenedperspective. “It is practical, it is real, I need it, theyknow how to deliver it. At the same time it makes mefeel safer during the execution of the real operation”.This is the type of response we usually receive fromstudents on their feedback opinion form. These positivereviews demonstrate that we are a unique training facilitywhere student participation has increased by 30 % in thelast year and by 70 % from the initiation of the Centerthree years ago.

Apart from being a training facility, NMIOTC is alsoan organization that holds a strong and activetransformational department. The Italian Director alongwith his small but efficient team, supports ACT’stransformational activities and goals by participating innumerous events ranging from experimentation,simulation to modeling. Cooperation with Military and

Commercial Organizations, as well as with the Academiaenvironment has raised NMIOTC’s transformationalfame to a level similar to larger and more matureorganizations worldwide. It is a prototype filled withfresh, innovative ideas that our personnel effectivelyexecutes, invaluable cooperative schemes have beencreated and sustained.

On the other hand, and having in mind the abovementioned energetic environment, I would like tomention that NMIOTC is not an organization that hasstable academic and operational characteristics. Alongwith the evolution of maritime security operations andtaking into account that NMIOTC is in closecooperation with ACT and many other NATO and nonNATO organizations (such as IMO, EU, UN etc)NMIOTC evolves its training products utilizing adynamic process that is continuously updated andcalibrated in accordance with current NATO operations.Three years ago, when NMIOTC started its operation,Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) were animportant aspect in NATO objectives, but now it hasbecome evident, especially after the execution ofOperation Unified Protector that MIO attracts a lot ofinterest in the Alliance and worldwide.

The evolution of piracy, illicit trafficking of Weaponsof Mass Destruction in the maritime movement (WMDin MIO) as well as the increased threat for maritimeImprovised Explosive Devices (M-IEDs) has broughtto NMIOTC’s attention other aspects that are directlylinked and affecting maritime interdiction operations asa whole. NMIOTC’s scope, in accordance with theofficial documentation, is to provide training to improveexpertise at the individual unit level or in combinedmaritime operations environment in the following areas,within a MIO context:

a. MIO plan development

4 NMIOTC Journal

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b. Surface, Subsurface and aerial surveillance

c. Boarding process

d. MIO aspects of Special Operations

As we are all aware, the definition of MIO in AlliedPublications is: “ to enforce prohibition in the maritimemovement of specified persons or material within adefined geographic area” (This definition encompassesmany illegal activities which are known to day). So, it isobvious that piracy, WMD counter proliferation orMaritime Improvised Explosive Devices and numerousother activities are directly linked to the MIO contextand substantially influence the execution of operationsand therefore the training that needs to be delivered toassorted personnel. NMIOTC is trying to conduct thetraining in such a way that would first ensure the safetyof the boarding parties during the execution of themission and secondly to enhance safety in the maritimecommons and serve the general objectives that Allianceis trying to enable. All the above mentioned concepts,depict the dynamic structure of NMIOTC, whicheventually senses the necessity to cover the operationaltraining gaps. For that reason three new courses inCounter Piracy Operations, Counter Proliferation of

WMD and Counter Improvised Explosive Devices inthe maritime environment have been created. Thesecourses will provide modern NATO standardizedtraining to personnel prior to deployment to theoperational environment.

NMIOTC understands that there is always a cyclethat needs to be executed in order for the training to beeffective, efficient and affordable. We are alwaysconsidering how to enhance Maritime SecurityOperations (MSO). NMIOTC believes that trainingplays a crucial role. As seen in the diagram above, ourCenter trains, evaluates, exercises, contributes totransformation and draws from lessons learned. In thisway continuously feeds and ameliorates the cycle ofMSO. This cycle is a conceptual product of NMIOTCand shows diligently that training can play a major rolein modern maritime security operations.

On the other hand supporting the above mentioningidea and in order to place ourselves in the core ofmaritime security operations, we perceive thatNMIOTC’s training and transformational activities arecapable of enhancing the future maritime securityoperations in the harsh modern maritime environment.NMIOTC stands in the Center of the evolutions, as

NMIOTC Journal 5

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every other NATO entity and interconnects its productsto every possible actor trying to better enhance theexecution of maritime security operations in theAlliance. It is not only the training itself but also theparticipation in numerous activities and events thataffects and is being affected by NMIOTC’scontributions.

As NMIOTC Commandant and being honored toCommand a NATO Training and Education Facility, itis my firm belief that NMIOTC’s personnel has theknowledge, the capability and most importantly the willto better deliver unique training and transformationalactivities that start and end in continuous cooperationschemes with other NATO and non NATO entities,rendering the NMIOTC unique in the maritime domain.

Commodore Adrianos Poulos, GRC N graduatedfrom the Hellenic Navy Naval Academy in July 1981 and wasappointed as Navigation Officer and XO to various types of ships.He had the honour to Command, the Fast Patrol Boat HSKAVALOUDIS (P-25 – Missile Patrol Boat) and the “S –Kortenaer” type Frigate, HS AIGAION (F-460). Commodore’s

main appointments include, Operations Officer in the FrigatesCommand, Staff Officer to the Hellenic Navy General Staff /A1 directorate as well as in Hellenic Defense General Staff inNational Defense Planning, as Head of the Directorate. HisNATO experience includes a two year assignment to the NATO/ PfP cell in Mons, Belgium and also a two year tour as DCOSfor STRFORNATO in Naples. Since April 2011 CommodoreAdrianos Poulos is the NMIOTC Commandant.

Besides his naval education, Commodore Adrianos Poulos hasreceived a master’s degree in Operations Research from NavalPostgraduate School in Monterey California and he holds a B.S.from the Economic University of Athens. Additionally, he hasattended a number of educational programs in military colleges,such as the Hellenic Naval Staff and Command College, theHellenic Naval War College and the Hellenic National DefenseCollege.

Commodore’s awards include the Cross of the Order ofHonor, the Cross of the Order of Phoenix, the Medal ofMilitary Merit B’ Class, the Navy Force Formation CommandMedal C’ Class and the Staff Officer Service CommendationMedal B’ Class.

He is married with Constantina Stratigou, who is an EnglishTeacher in Primary Schools and he has three children, one daughterand two sons.

NMIOTS PHOTO GALERYNMIOTS PHOTO GALERY

VIP VISITSVIP VISITS

Visit of the Hungarian Ambassador11 October 2011

Visit of the Spanish Defense A0ache27 October 2011

Visit of US 6th Fleet Commandant1 June 2011

Visit of NATO’s Assistant Secretary General 5 August 2011

Visit of SACT Commandant15 June 2011

Visit of the Ukrainian Ambassador18 July 2011

NMIOTC Journal 7

VIP VISITSVIP VISITS

Visit of the Belgian MoD25 May 2011

Visit of the Commander of the US NavyExpeditory Combat Command

1 June 2011

Visit of DCOM JFC NAPLES-COM OUP &COM MCC NAPLES-MARCOM OUP

26 July 2011

Visit of the US Department of State Senior Greek Desk Officer

30 September 2011

Visit of the Italian Defense A0ache 24 November 2011

Visit of Russian Task Group Commander25 May 2011

8 NMIOTC Journal

VISITS, CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPSVISITS, CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

Exercise “Phoenix Express ’11”Presail Conference

1 June 2011

ESSM Requirements Panel Conference13-15 September 2011

NMIOTC 2nd Annual Conference28-30 June 2011

ATP-71 Working Group Mee/ng7-9 September 2011

Mari/me Opera/onal Language Course19-30 September 2011

Joint NPS-LLNL WMD in MIO experiment6 June 2011

NMIOTC Journal 9

COURSES, EXERCISES AND TRAININGSCOURSES, EXERCISES AND TRAININGS

Training of HNLMS ZUIDERKRUIZ2-9 September 2011

WMD in MIO training / experimenta/on6-10 June 2011

Training of Mari/me Expedi/onary Unit13-23 June 2011

Training of Hellenic Navy Special Forces16-18 November 2011

Training of US Coast Guard Deployed Specialized Forces

20-24 June 2011

Training of German Boarding School29 August - 6 September 2011

10 NMIOTC Journal

COURSES, EXERCISES AND TRAININGSCOURSES, EXERCISES AND TRAININGS

Exercise “Phoenix Express’11” MIO Training23 May - 3 June 2011

Training of the Russian Task Group26-29 May 2011

Training of HMS ARGYLL11-13 October 2011

ACT’s Immersive Learning Course10-14 October 2011

Training of HDMS ABSALON25 October 2011

Training of ROS Regina Maria1-3 November 2011

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NMIOTC’s training is following ACT’s trainingguidelines and principles. It is using the three key wordsthat ACT has implemented in the training concepts...

Effective Efficient andAffordableTraining is effective by having modular struc-

ture, providing ad-hoc and on request - just in time train-ing, executing specific training analysis for each targetaudience, conducting adjustable training levels on a caseby case basis, conducting tailored and customized train-ing iaw operational needs and finally by delivering a mis-sion rehearsal training.

It is efficient as it follows NATO standards, itis being enriched with subject matter experts / special-ized trainers/ experienced lecturers, by implementingday and night training scenarios and finally by havingstrong cooperations with other Institutions/Agenciesand the Academia.

It is affordable primarily because it is at verylow cost, students pay only for incremental costs likesimnition and helicopter usage and finally becauseNMIOTC has the ability of deploying its SpecializedMIO Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to customer’spremises at very low cost.

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NMIOTC’s instructors (in blue) teaching counterpiracy techniques to a MIO boarding team. Training isbeing executed with NMIOTC’s RHIBs in Souda Bayarea conducting realistic and mission reahearsal

scenarios.Recently NMIOTC’s training support team installedsmoke, noise and background noise generators insidetraining ship “HS Aris” in order to make training morerealistic and effetive for the students creating a real war

gaming zone environment.

A real pirate whaleris used for practical small vessel investigation

training. NMIOTC extensively apply the model ofrealistic mission rehearsal

before deployment.

Pictures from the monitors of the CCTV system on boardNMIOTC’s training ship “HS Aris”, where students ac-tions are being recorded and played back after training inpost evaluation training briefs. These pictures is the mate-

rial collected from 31 microcameras in hidden places insidethe training ship.

NMIOTC Journal 15

NMIOTC ANNUAL CONFERENCENMIOTC ANNUAL CONFERENCE28-30 JUNE 2011

“REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN COUNTERING MARITIME TERRORISM AND PIRACY.INFLUENCE TO FUTURE MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS”

by Mr. Michel SoulaPiracy off the Horn of Africa continues to grow in

intensity and reach. There is a great concern about thecurrent qualitative change in the piracy situation. Theinternational community is faced with rising ransomdemands, as well as more sophisticated and brutalmodus operandi by pirates which raise concern aboutthe safety of vessel crews and private citizens. Piracyhas become a thriving business model.

Naval presences in the area, including that of NATO,have disrupted a significant number of pirate attacks andcontained the number of successful attacks to somedegree, notably in the Gulf of Aden. As confirmed byNATO Defence Ministers at their meeting on 8-9 June2011, NATO is committed to continue to play itsoperational role at sea in close coordination andcomplementarity with the efforts of the other actors inthe area at least until the end of 2012.

That said, naval presences in the area are managingthe piracy problem. Ultimately, as noted by the NATOHeads of State and Government at the Summit inStrasbourg-Kehl, for a lasting solution to the piracythreat, there is a need for a coordinated multi-facetedcomprehensive international effort to counter-piracythat requires to address the situation in Somalia itself, aswell as to build the capacity of the countries in theregion to combat piracy activities themselves.

NATO is playing its part in this regard. Indeed,NATO is assisting the African Union Mission in Somaliain logistical and planning terms at the African Union’srequest. NATO also contributes to the internationalcommunity’s effort in the area of regional capacitybuilding. At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl,NATO Heads of State and Government noted that‘they are considering options for a possible long-termNATO role to combat piracy, including by taking intoaccount, as appropriate, regional requests for capacity-building’.

On 10 August 2009, the NATO Ambassadors agreedto NATO support to regional capacity building,acknowledging that NATO has an added value role toplay and expertise to convey within the area ofstrengthening maritime capabilities of countries in theregion to secure their territorial and internal waters,hence assisting them, upon their request, in developingtheir own ability to combat piracy activities. Thus, based

upon its training and mentorship credentials, NATO hasa range of capabilities which are readily exportable insupport of regional capacity building, enabling NATOto make a distinctive contribution to the developmentof an enduring regional maritime security capacity tocounter the threat of piracy.

Any NATO contribution in this area should be seen

...for a las0ng solu0onto the piracy threat,there is a need for a

coordinated

mul0-facetedcomprehensive

interna0onal effort

to counter-piracy thatrequires to address

the situa0on inSomalia itself, as well

as to build thecapacity of the

countries in the regionto combat piracy

ac0vi0es...

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NMIOTC Journal 17

as a single supporting line of effort, complementing theefforts of other players and under the umbrella of theUN-mandated Working Group 1 of the Contact Groupon Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, as well as compliantwith and wherever possible supportive of the DjiboutiCode of Conduct.

In this context, NATO has contributed to initiativesby Working Group 1 of the Contact Group on Piracyoff the Coast of Somalia to formulate regional capacitybuilding priorities. Indeed, Working Group 1 hasdeveloped a regional counter-piracy capabilitydevelopment needs assessment matrix, which provides ahigh-level awareness of the needs of regional states andstakeholders’ donations. Based on that collaborativeeffort, and in light of NATO’s specific capabilities andstrengths, NATO has explored ways in which it canassist on an added value basis countries in the region,upon their request, in building counter-piracy capacity.

Hence, NATO is currently undertaking some limitedand focused regional capacity building activities withinmeans and capabilities. Such NATO training activitiestake place during port visits of NATO warships. Thus,NATO commanders take advantage of port visits forinstance, for regional training, joint exercises, conductingship-rider programs, and donating excess equipment.These efforts, so far, have proven positive and verymuch welcome. NATO Defence Ministers, at theirmeeting on 8-9 June 2011, confirmed their commitmentto continue to provide such assistance within means andcapabilities.

Such NATO training activities within means andcapabilities have, so far, focused on the Seychelles.However, NATO is ready to extend such added valueassistance to other countries in the region, if sorequested. In this regard, the important progressachieved in the last few months in the Kampala process,which establishes a focal point on piracy for each Somalientity in its relations with the outside world, is of keysignificance. Indeed, although the Transitional FederalGovernment is recognised as the sole Somaligovernment, these focal points facilitate dealings withthe regional Somali entities, in particular Puntland,Galmudug and Somaliland, on regional capacitybuilding.

NATO is an initial partner and plays the role offacilitator of the Training Awareness and Deconfliction(TRADE), which aims at gaining awareness anddeconfliction of maritime tactical level trainingcapabilities inherent in the maritime forces operating offthe Horn of Africa. As part of its cooperation with theAfrican Union, NATO is also continuing to support the

African Union in maritime staff capacity building forthe development of an African Union maritime strategyat the latter’s request.

NATO’s regional capacity building activities are, sofar, carried out with no extra cost for NATO, and inclose coordination with other actors. Indeed, in thecurrent difficult economic climate, resources are scarceand it is therefore, extremely hard for NATO nations tomake any further financial commitment for any regionalcapacity building activities that go beyond means andcapabilities. NATO is open to external sources offunding to resource its regional capacity buildingactivities, if and when such are made available.

In conclusion, NATO is hence playing its part in

supporting regional capacity building efforts withinmeans and capabilities and the framework of WorkingGroup 1 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coastof Somalia. NATO’s efforts are complementary toother actors’ activities and are seen as part of a multi-faceted and sustainble international response to theproblem of piracy.

Mr. Michel Soula is currently Head of the Crisismanagement Policy Section in the OperationsDirectorate at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. He isdealing with the political aspects of all crises NATO iscurrently involved in. Prior to that, he held theposition of Deputy Director of the Private Office of theNATO Secretary General for seven years, working firstwith Javier Solana and then with Lord Robertson. Hewas interalia in charge of the Balkans. As French civilservant, Mr Soula started his career in the French PostMinistry before he was seconded to the FrenchForeign Service where he held various positions, inparticular in the Strategic Affairs and DisarmamentDirectorate on chemical and biological warfare.

...NATO is ready toextend such addedvalue assistance toother countries in

the region...

REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING NMIOTC ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2011

Executive Summaryby LTC (Ret) Phyllis Mihalas, Ph.D.

In Africa, threats to Regional Capacity Building(RCB) undermine the security of individuals,states/societies and regional and international tradesystems. There cannot be regional stability until there issecurity within a region. The responsibility for actionlies with individuals, communities, provinces, nationalgovernments, regional organizations and theinternational community at large. As we learned fromthe presenters and participants of the 2nd AnnualNMIOTC Conference, there are myriad of threats toAfrica’s Maritime Domain.

Threats like unreported and unregulated fishing dueto overexploitation of overfishing and pirate fishing andenvironmental crimes such as illegal dumping of toxicwaste adversely affect maritime security. Africa hasbecome a major hub for global drug smuggling, where46% of all cocaine caught in Europe airports is fromAfrica . Oil bunkering involves siphoning oil from thenetwork of pipelines that cross the oil fields into privatebarrages, which are then ferried out and sold on theblack market. Environmental crimes such as illegaldumping of toxic waste and lead-contaminated waste aswell as human trafficking (60% of the world’s humantrafficking occurs in Sub-Saharan Africa ) furthercontribute to the erosion of a secure and stable maritimeenvironment. Of course, sea piracy, one of the maintopics of the conference, continues to escalate.

When an area is suddenly struck by a natural disastersuch as a flooding, a massive civil unrest erupts, or theconstant maritime piracy phenomenon, it is too late tostart building the relief ship. Likewise, unilateral actionsof one nation, or an outside coalition for that matter,cannot achieve total success.

U.S. and European interests often find themselves asthe external participants during these crises. Granted,our western efforts may possess some of the criticalresources and expertise. At the most basic level, hostnations and regional partners understand theenvironments they live in. In today's strained economicclimate and scarce resources, it would be unconscionableto blindly launch into crisis effort without localparticipation and collaboration to the greatest extentfeasibly possible. Properly orchestrated, and with aframework already in place, the response(s) can beefficient, proportional and have a meaningful impact on

their nation(s) as well as ours.

So where does the effort begin? As discussed at theconference, NATO has proposed to further support theefforts of minimizing the piracy problems byimplementing a Regional Capacity Building Strategywhich follows a United Nations example. Furtherdiscussed and as outlined in the “NMIOTC Food forThought Paper” authored by Lieutenant (OF-2)Georgios Mantzouris, the presentations and follow-updiscussions at the conference proved that RCB mayboost capabilities and help to eventually solve the piracyphenomenon. These are strategic thoughts that mustbe operationally executed through tactical operations.

So why the military? We learned from thepresentation on the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Civil Affairsand Security Training Command (MCAST) that it oftentakes a comprehensive military and civilian approachthat relies on established long-term partnerships

MCAST Security Force Assistance military tomilitary training on Small Boat Opera2ons

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between internal and external governments, militaries,international agencies, and non-governmentalorganizations. These collective efforts recognize thatsynchronized regional stability and capacity building arethe capstones to a healthy global socio-economicframework. A common effort that one that certainlywill not eliminate the inevitable world crises, but can

endure, mitigate, and strategically over come with theleast amount of suffering and cost possible.

MCAST has two distinct missions; Maritime CivilAffairs (Civil Military Operations/CIMIC) and SecurityForce Assistance (SFA) (Military to Military Training).Both missions directly support the U.S. Navy’s MaritimeStrategy through persistent forward presence andcontact in the regions to build trust and enduringrelationships with partner nations. By assisting othernations in building their own security capabilities, theburden on the international community is reduced.

In recent years, maritime security threats andchallenges have evolved. In addition to nationspotentially hostile to the United States, maritime securitychallenges now include non-state, transnational, andirregular threats in the maritime domain, as well asnatural disasters, environmental and natural resourceprotection challenges. New partnerships with theworld’s maritime commercial interests and the maritimeforces of participating nations will pay dividends to theconcept of RCB.

From the tactical perspective of the MCAST, astrategy of outreach, engagement and partnership-building between MCAST, local governments, civilianpopulace and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)works to address the maritime security and stability issue.

What partnerships exist? Security of the localmaritime domain is the critical maritime enabler ofstability operations. Without maritime security, maritimeoperations and their support of operations ashore wouldbe a risky undertaking. The early establishment of localmaritime security is a necessary precondition of stabilityoperations – in which RCB can flourish.

The goal of the NMIOTC’s Second AnnualConference (June 2011) was to provide background,current capabilities of failed and actor states, as well asinvestigate models that will lead NATO to a feasible andeconomic cost benefit approach to Regional CapacityBuilding (RCB). The conference also became a forumfor creation of partnerships. Formally and informally,the list of impressive and accomplished speakers fromNATO and non-NATO organizations, private shipping,academia, and others participated and presented theirideas and thoughts regarding RCB.

LTC (Ret) Phyllis Mihalas, Ph.D., is the SeniorAdvisor to the Commanding Officer, MCAST. In 2007,LTC Mihalas retired from the U.S. Army after 28 yearsin the U.S. Army with a specialty in Civil Affairs,which included a deployment as the CIMIC Officer tothe UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Dr. Mihalashas been with MCAST for four years.

MCAST military to military training in Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (MIO) Training

JOINT NPS-LLNL FIELD EXPERIMENTJOINT NPS-LLNL FIELD EXPERIMENTNETWORKING AND INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION ON MARITIME@SOURCEDNETWORKING AND INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION ON MARITIME@SOURCED

NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND INTERDICTIONNUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND INTERDICTION

by Dr. Alex Bordetsky, Mr. Steve Mullins, Lt Georgios Mantzouris Mr. Eugene Bourakov, Mr. BryanHudgens, and Mr. David TrombinoThe Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and theNMIOTC organized and conducted the 3rd Joint NPS– LLNL MIO experiment at NMIOTC from 6 -10 June2011. The experiment focused on Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) in Maritime InterdictionOperations (MIO) C2, reachback and sensingcapabilities in the maritime environment. Participatingorganizations included NPS/LLNL-USA, NMIOTC-Greece, NATO JCBRN COE-Czech Republic,FOI-Sweden, University of Bundeswehr-Germany, aDutch NSW unit and the Hellenic Naval Academy(HNA). This iteration continues a campaign ofexperimentation that began at NMIOTC in 2008, andcontinues on an annual basis. The principal investigatorof the MIO experiments is Dr. Alex Bordetsky, founderof the Center for Innovation and Experimentation(CENETIX), which integrates and operates a MIOtactical testbed.

INTRODUCTION

The focus of the MIO 11-2 experiment was on theuse of networks, advanced sensors, and collaborativetechnology to support integrated detection andinteragency collaboration during operations to counternuclear and radiological threats aboard maritime craft.The joint tracking portion took place at the NATO MIOTraining Center in Souda Bay, Crete. These ongoingMIO events are considered as discovery experiments, inthat we continually introduce new systems, concepts andtechnologies into a setting where we can observe andcatalog their results (Alberts, p. 19).

FOCUS AREAS

In our scenario, some small maritime craft wereillicitly transporting nuclear/radiological threat materialstoward US and NATO installations overseas. Wemodeled methods of network-enabled detection andinterdiction of those threats. The experiment culminatedin the joint detection and interdiction of a suspect smallmaritime craft by international boarding teams.

From a technical standpoint, MIO 11-2 represented anincremental step in the study of several areas ofresearch, including:

• The use of ad hoc mobile networkingarchitectures to integrate tactical level boarding teams(equipped with hand-held portable and unmannedsystem-based detectors) with geographically-distributedtechnical subject matter experts and data fusion centers

• Using information management architectures toshare alerts from threats aboard small maritime craft orbetween land borders or ports of entry (POE), and totranslate active and passive detection alerts into theshared situational awareness (SA) common operatingpicture (COP)

• Surveillance techniques that enable the globallocating, tagging, and tracking of small maritime craftthat are transporting illicit materials

• Mission control operational constraints relatedto search models for stand-off and high-speed drive-bydetection, in combination with network-controlledunmanned surface vehicles (USV), aerial vehicles (UAV)(provided by the Hellenic Naval Academy

• Cyber distortion during technical expertreachback situational assessments, and measures tocompensate for that distortion

• Knowledge based and transactive memorysystem architectures for network-enabled integrateddetection

• Visibility and vulnerability of detectornetworking

OPERATIONAL PHASES

The experiment was divided into four phases.

Phase I. Simulated early detection and interdictionactivities in the Baltic Sea near the Swedish port ofKarlskrona. This led to the subsequent targetidentification at NMIOTC. (Conducted at FOI, Sweden)

Phase II. Large vessel search. Swimmers evaluateda parasite box attached to a vessel’s hull. Internationalcrews searched for shielded materials using portablesensors and mesh peer-to-peer ubiquitous networking,and posted findings over the network to the shared eventSA portal.

20 NMIOTC Journal

Phase III. Small craft tracking, detection and search.A USV served as the target small vessel for detection bytactical swimmers, setup of a primary choke-pointscreen, setup of a secondary choke-point screen andhigh-speed stand-off detection and pursuit.

Phase IV. Same objectives as Phase III, with targetmodeled by a small manned boat.

COLLABORATION SCHEMES

Reachback to and Collaboration with RemoteTechnical Subject Matter Experts

A central part of TNT MIO Experiments hashistorically been the study of collaboration betweenboarding officers/detector operators and remotetechnical experts, during the process of detection andinterdiction operations. In MIO 11-2 we exploredcollaboration between European regional (NATOJCBRN CoE in the Czech Republic) and Global (in U.S.)technical nuc/rad SMEs, with overseas POE operators.The types of operation included set-up of network-controlled choke points, primary and secondary drive-byscreening, and stand-off detection during high-speedpursuit.

In comparison with previous experiments animportant new element in MIO 11-2 was the additionof the NATO JCBRN Center of Excellence (COE) inthe Czech Republic into the MIO testbed reachbackinfrastructure. We integrated the CoE technical expertsin support of NATO boarding crews. Observationswere shared during a network-enabled detection andinterdiction process among several reachback centers(NPS, UoB, JCBRN COE, FOI-Sweden, and the ChangiC2 Center-Singapore). These observations will supportanalysis of requirements for Cooperative MissionControl as it applies to the tracking, choke pointscreening, pursuit, and interdiction, of small maritimecraft, and the sharing of SA.

Collaboration between a Boarding Team andReachback Technical SMEs

Boarding Teams received detection inputs:

- from the detector aboard the BT vessel,

- from file(s) downloaded from a tactical swimmer’sdetector,

- as a visual and verbal description of a suspectvessel/parasite box from a tactical swimmer who isconnected to the BT via an ad-hoc mobile network.

Collaboration among Regional and Global CenterExperts

Upon receiving spectrum images Regional andGlobal experts started the triage procedure collaboratingbetween the centers on Spectrum image analysis. Theyused a collaborative platform centered on white boardfeatures of image sharing and discussion (Elluminateand Slate platforms). The results of cooperativeadjudication were posted back in the Event Portal.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main objective was to examine researchquestions in terms of the feasibility and majorconstraints associated with network-enabled detectionand interdiction of maritime-sourced nuclearradiological threats to the U.S. and NATO installationsoverseas. In terms of the DNDO Global DetectionArchitecture (Figure 1), the set of the trial steps wasdesigned to explore several of the architecture’s keyelements. Research questions were as follows:

1. How can networked swimmers, (Figure 2)sensor operators, patrol boat crews, and synchronouslyconnected reachback technical experts (Figure 3) identifyillicit materials during transport/delivery to a foreignPOE via small craft?

2. What is the best method to facilitate locating andinterdicting illicit material/devices in the approaches toa target area?

3. How can we conduct blue water tracking ofillicit material delivery near a NATO / U.S. facility in theMediterranean (Figure 4)?

4. Collaboration among NATO MIO crewsexecuting network-enabled choke point (Figure 5) andtarget pursuit.

5. Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (Figure6) to support choke point screening & target vesselpursuit.

6. Detecting illicit material and interdicting targetsmall craft with coordination and shared situationalawareness between the multinational crews assistingeach other.

7. How can simulations be used as input to test theexpert reachback concept and shared situationalawareness?

GENERAL FINDINGS

The research team (Figure 7) captured numerousobservations and findings. Some of the important onesare listed as follows:

One of the major findings pertains to the structureof the expert reachback process and collaboration with

NMIOTC Journal 21

detector operators on–the-move (Boarding teamscombat swimmers).

• The two-way voice/data/video collaborationbetween detector operators and BT’s operating in afragile ad-hoc mobile networking environment provedto be feasible through the robust shared event log(Observer Notepad) with rapid data entry by BoardingTeam members, either typing or by voice inputs.

• The automatic ARAM sensor postings into theshared event log appeared to be a time saving solution.

• Each individual was able to collaborate and

guide the actions of the BTs and swimmers.

Alternatively, the SME teams at the JCBRN CoE,LLNL-NPS, Singapore, and FOI, located in officeenvironments with high-end undisturbedcommunications, were able to collaboratively analyzespectra and information using the benefit of whiteboard and VTC centered collaborative environment(Elluminate platform). At this level, any differences innational approaches to threat adjudication became easilynegotiable. Such a workspace collaborative environmentseems to be the most suitable for network-enableddetection with immediate reachback to experts in

MIO 11-2 experiment focus correlated to USDNDO Nuclear Detec2on Architecture

Networked swimmers are approaching large target vessel in this case NMIOTC’s trainingship “HS Aris”

22 NMIOTC Journal

multiple countries.

Also, technical findings on networking withswimmers, putting detectors on the network, integratingUAVs and USVs contributed to the set of solutions.Several partner participants and observers also providedobservations and recommendations. Particularly salientnotes were provided by representatives from LawrenceLivermore, NATO ACT, the NATO JCBRN CoE, andDHS DNDO, among others.

General Observations – Recommendations

Some of the most precious and valuableobservations are:

Observations (Doctrines and TTP)

a) The challenge is how to integrate the MOCand/or ship command team, while minimizing boardingteam timelines as much as possible. Key informationexchanges include:

• Between BTs and the mother ship

• Between the mother ship and MOC and SMEs

• Collaboration between the MOC and the JointForce Commander (e.g. NATO)

• Between the JFC watch floor and strategicdecision makers

b) An initial conclusion is the need for 2-3 differentcommunication pathways. Two of thesecommunications architectures may be needed. In either

case, they must ensure that clear,coherent and efficient informationexchange and direction occursthroughout the boarding or boatmission. For example:

• BT/boat crew exchangesinformation with the reach back SMEsby relaying through the ‘mother’ shipand the MOC (linear design).

• BT/boat crew exchangesinformation directly with the reachback SMEs; the ‘mother’ ship and theMOC monitor andcomment/question/intervene asnecessary.

• Reachback SMEs or the MOCmanage the information exchange anddirect sensor and other data collectionrequirements (i.e. spectra, pictures,manifest information, etc.) or directother actions according to the mission

and available ROE. (Star design)

Recommendation

c) The experimentation should include players atthe MOC echelon, including a designated key decisionmaker / commander. This will be pivotal to ensureexperimental findings regarding networked decisionmaking.

Observations (Doctrines and TTP)

d) No standard message formats (like the medevac9-line format) were used. This impacted the experimentby decreasing effective information and data requestsand exchange. It also included contextual informationsuch as the type of sensor that produced the spectra thatwere transmitted, the distance from whichmeasurements were taken, ambient conditions, etc.While not the direct jurisdiction of the researchers,standardized formats will reduce the possibility ofintroducing error variables into findings related tocollaboration effectiveness.

e) Similarly, the (international) MIO operationalworld does not employ standardized terminology.During the experiment, it was clear that numerousseparate lexicons were being employed. As above, it iswithin the capability of the researchers to establish acommon set of terms, even if only for use during MIO

NMIOTC Journal 23

The swimmers observe a suspicious object on the targetvessel, and capture spectroscopic data using the

Iden2finder radiological detector

experimentation. Absence of a lexicon could lead tofaulty findings, and might help to add some terms forpossible NATO/global use. This is now importantbecause future MIO experiments are expected to includeplayers such as whom were present at MIO 11-2, fromAsian, NATO, and non-NATO partners.

f) No standard communication ways werefollowed. One participant commented that they alreadyhave well-established communication plans for this typeof scenario.

Recommendation

a) Generate a set of protocols and standardizedmessage formats for the experiments, and familiarizeparticipants with them during a preparatory period.

b) Establish a standard lexicon of key terms. Asabove, familiarize participants with them

c) Implement the above mentioned formats andontology in the collaboration tools to encouragestandardized reporting.

d) Use standard communication plans, or developand motivate new plans that are better suited for thevirtual collaboration platform. With new plans, thesemust be communicated to all participants.

Observations (ReachbackSMEs - Training)

a) The first evercollaboration between thegeographically separatedreachback SME organizationswas seen as positive by bothorganizations. It was viewed as astart in the establishment of thisnew NATO capability, whichshould be continued and refined.

b) Few of the reachbackSMEs who participated in theexperiment are familiar with theMIO environment. Whiletechnically expert, most do notknow the operational conditionsand limitations under which theBTs work. This hinderedefficient collaboration. SMEsmust know what to ask for, how,and when. They may want to‘bundle’ several RFIs to the BTsfor efficiency.

c) The SMEs understood the tools (Elluminate,Observer notepad, discussions between the experts).The collaboration between the BT and SMEs seemedgood. The setup and manning of the CoE SME teamwas good: Two experts, one CBRN specialist, OpsOf,CIS officer. Experts found their own way how todiscuss special topics and came to the commonconclusion.

Recommendation

a) Recommend a continued interchange betweenLLNL and the JCBRN CoE SMEs to sustain this initialrelationship.

b) Conduct some level of MIO-related training forSMEs in order to understand the Boarding Teams’operating environment and the limitations of thecurrent experimentation.

c) Experts need more information about thespectra. They need background and calibration data andtraining on them.

Observations (Boarding Team Operations-Materiel)

a) Boarding Teams successfully integrated with theMOC and SMEs (using hand-held, portable, andunmanned detection systems to detect & collect

24 NMIOTC Journal

Choke point forma2on and stand-off detec2on dynamics asobserved by remote experts via online so"ware tools

MIO Experiment ParticipationName Organization Responsibilities

LeadsAlex Bordetsky NPS Principal InvestigatorDave Trombino LLNL LLNL LeadWayne Buchanan DNDO Sponsor Agency AdvisorMartin Garvey NATO SACT NATO Advisor/ObserverPeter Zielinski DTRA Sponsor Agency AdvisorO. Celebi NMIOTC Host Advisor

Design, Planning & CoordinationSteve Kreek

LLNL Nuc/Rad Technical ExpertJoel SwansonEugene Bourakov

NPS

Network EngineerSteve Mullins Experiment Plan, Design, ExecutionBryan Hudgens TOC Observer’s Notepad OperatorLCDR R. McLaughlin KU Band SATCOM Ground Station Unit & Reachback LinkCapt Chad Puff

Manage Trellisware radios & PLI data, austere environment commsCapt Rob GruberCDR John Looney CENETIX/MIO SMEMAJ Karel Vydra

NATO JCBRNCoE

CoE Operations OfficerJaroslav Kareš

Military Technical Institute Nuc/Rad Technical ExpertOta FišeraWO Marek NemLTC Adolf Labák CoE Lessons Learned RecorderCapt Richard Hanák CoE Network ManagerChristine van Burken NLDA Data Capture & AnalysisDennis Andersson

FOIFOI Data Capture & Analysis

Robert Forsgren FOI Simulation EngineerCarl-Johan Thunfeldt SNWC FOI C2 teamLT Darryl Diptee NPS NPS NOC Operations OfficerLT Georgios. Mantzouris

NATO MIOTCHost Agency Lead Rep

Ens Kostas Papanastasis Host Agency Support RepLT Jim Pierce

USNSA USN Logistics Support CoordinatorGeorgios DrikakisMaj Houtschild

NL Navy Tactical Swimmer TeamMike JanssenDennis Runhart

Supporting PartnersVance Kannapel L-3 GCS KU Band Satellite Ground Station Unit & Reachback Satellite LinkTom Calabro CDI Biometrics Identification SystemMark St. John Pac NW Slate Whiteboard-based Collaborative SA System

Marc Balbes Asynchronous,Inc.

Mobile Field Kit (MFK) Collaborative SA Tool for DetectorOperators

Herb Rubens PersistentSystems Wave Relay Mesh Tactical Network

USMC MCWL Tactical Mesh Software Programmable Radios

NMIOTC Journal 25

spectroscopic and operational data). Theyaccomplished test objectives to collect,transmit, and resolve alarms withinappropriate time margin and demonstratedhow the detectors can integrate into data-sharing information mesh network.

Recommendation

b) Opportunities exist to improvethe relay of requests and feedback betweenSMEs and Boarding Teams. BoardingTeams will eventually gain proficiency inmeasuring and transmitting keyinformation to the MOC and SMEs,streamlining collaboration with SMEs. Thiscalls for both technical advances andcollective and individual training toincrease proficiency with the equipment.This will be important as the researcherscontinue to employ NMIOTC students asboarding team and MOC player personnel.

Integra2on of Unmanned Surface and Aerial VehiclesThe Hellenic Naval Academy (HNA) UAV in MIO team par2cipated and represented by the team leaderProfessor Ioannis Koukos and the mini helo pilot LTJG Kyriakos Karanagnos2s GRC(N). The presence and

entanglement on the experiment added significant value and revealed many advantages for the use of UAVsin Mari2me Interdic2on Opera2ons. Also the use of a mini - USV which was carrying the radioac2ve

material simula2ng a fast a3ack very small incoming cra" was one of a kind prototype applica2on thatcontributed significantly to the conduc2on of the experiment and the findings that were acquired.

26 NMIOTC Journal

Small Cra" Detec2on and Interdic2on Network

CONCLUSIONS

Overall the experiment fully met the objectives thathad been set during the planning phase and acquiredprecious results for the future implementation andexecution of MIO experimentations. NMIOTC alongwith NPS and LLNL MIO expert teams will continueto stand side by side in conducting experimentationevents with utmost goal to better enhance theoperational knowledge in the areas of C2 collaborationin the maritime environment, in support of the maritimesecurity operational concept by providing state of theart means and innovative methods to counter maritimeterrorism activities in the maritime commons.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

We are grateful to CDR Dr. John Looney, Mr. WayneBuchanan, Mr. Martin Garvey, LTC Karel Vydra, DennisAndersson, Robert Forsgren, and Christine van Burkenfor very useful inputs to lessons learned andobservations.

REFERENCES

1. Alberts, David S., et als. Code of Best Practice forExperimentation. Washington, DC: CCRP PublicationSeries. 2002

2. TNT-MIO 10-2 Experiment Report, AlexBordetsky, et al., CENETIX, Naval PostgraduateSchool, Monterey, CA, 2010.

3. TNT-MIO 11-2 Experiment Plan, Alex Bordetsky,et al., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010.

4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DomesticNuclear Detection Office, Model Guidelines Documentfor Nuclear Detection Architectures, 2009.

5. Ferrari, Leonard and Cooling, Robert G., Letter of

Accord to Collaborate between U.S. Naval PostgraduateSchool and Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander,Transformation, undated.

6. NATO, Bi-SC Joint CBRN Prevention in MaritimeEnvironment Concept, 2010.

7. NATO, MCM-0087-2007, Combined Joint CBRNDefence Task Force Concept of Operations, 2007.

Dr. Alex Bordetsky is an Associate Professor ofInformation Systems at the Naval PostgraduateSchool, Monterey. He is also an Associate Chair forResearch at the Department of Information Sciences.Professor Bordetsky is Director of the NPS Center forNetwork Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX). He is Principal Investigator for one of the majorresearch projects at NPS, Tactical Network Topology(TNT) Testbed and Experimentation, conducted jointlyand sponsored by USSOCOM. Dr. Bordetsky is arecipient of prestigious Robert W. HammingInterdisciplinary Research Award for his pioneeringstudies of collaborative technologies and adaptivenetwork-centric environments. His work has beenrecently featured in the AFCEA SIGNAL Magazine,Via Sat, and the USSOCOM Tip of the Spear Journal.Professor Bordetsky publishes in major IT journalsincluding Information Systems Research,Telecommunication Systems Modeling and Analysis,Command and Control Systems, and InternationalJournal of Mobile Wireless Communications.

Mr Steve Mullins is a Ph.D. Candidate ofInformation and Sciences Department in NavalPostgraduate School conducting his reserach underthe guidance of Professor A. Bordetsky.

Lt G. Mantzouris graduated the Hellenic NavalAcademy in 1998 and has served in various GreekFrigates as Communications, and Chief ElectronicsOfficer. He has attended the British Comms andInstructional Courses and is a Naval PostgraduateSchool graduate with two Masters in SystemsEngineering and in Astronautical Engineering withdistinctions. He is a Ph.D. Canditate in thePolytechnic University of Thrace in the ElectronicsEngineering Department studying design ofmicrosatellites. He is now serving in NMIOTC as MIOinstructor and as a staff officer in Naval Doctrine andExperimentation section under the TransformationDirectorate. He is married with Argyro Vergetaki andhas two sons and one daughter.

MIO students receiving orienta2on prior toexecu2ng their roles in the experiment

NMIOTC Journal 27

ATP-71 WORKSHOP IN NMIOTCATP-71 WORKSHOP IN NMIOTC

by LCdr Alexandrou Gobjila, ROU N

NMIOTC works on issues related to Maritimesecurity and prepares updates to the ATP-71 documentwhich supports Maritime Interdiction Operations. So asto sustain today’s operational requirements, the thirdATP-71 Workshop was organized and held byNMIOTC from 7th to 9th September 2011, inNMIOTC’s facilities.

The workshop work started with a warm welcomeaddress from NMIOTC’s Commander, Commodore A.Poulous, GRC N, who asked everybody for an active andfruitful participation. Following, NMIOTC StaffOfficers initiated the procedure of presenting anddiscussing the NMIOTC’s change proposals along withthe participants from UK, Spain, Greece, and USA.During the workshop other nations change proposalswere also discussed.

As NMIOTC, we hope that these change proposalswill improve the currency of ATP-71 document andmake contributions to the Maritime Interdiction

Operations. The discussions made over proposalsconsist of the issues that are related to todaystechnological and operational requirements that wereexperienced by the help of previous MaritimeOperations. For further studies, the final ATP-71workshop change proposals are posted to the MAROPSforum (NSA’s official site).

The workshop also included an NMIOTCCommand Brief and an NMIOTC Facilities Tour forthe participants to acquire a thorough knowledge of thetraining capabilities that NMIOTC is able to offer toAllies and Partners.

A series of changes were discussed, including thestandardisation of the equipment for the boardingteams, composition of the boarding team (based uponship sizes), the update of several sections regardingopposed boarding and the revision of chapter 9,regarding boarding and searching in an CBRNenvironment

Complete informa2on flow diagram for a typical MIO task (NMIOTC & SMIER panel rep in house development)

28 NMIOTC Journal

NMIOTC Journal 29

The agenda included also the transformation of thestructured OPTASK MIO into a formatted OPTASK,following the general tendency to move towards theman-and-machine readable messages. The initial task ofthe Workshop was to identify the Information ExchangeRequirements (IERs) for Maritime InterdictionOperations (MIO) Operations, a structured OPTASKMIO had already been developed; however, based onthe decision of the Naval Board (predecessor to theMaritime Standardisation Board) in 2004 there is arequirement that the textual solution to all maritimeIERs was to be Message Text Formats, developed usingthe rules in ADatP-3(A).

The rationale behind the decision of the Naval Boardto require all new messages being developed as MTF'swas explained and that unless all Maritime messageswere in a format that could be automated then the shipsstaff would continue to be burdened by manualprocessing of message traffic and the Naval Board didnot want a dual standard of structured and formattedmessages to exist beyond 2007.

The workshop developed the IER using the formatin specified so that the validity of that process could betested. As this was the first time a Maritime IER panelthat had been developed using APP-15, at the requestof the SMIER Chairman, GBR provided a MTFfacilitator to assist the MIO delegates develop the IER.

The initial stage in the process was to gain anoverview of all the IERs that are associated with a MIOoperation and where an OPTASK MIO might fit in, thisprocess also helped determine the if the OPTASK MIOwas the correct location for some of the IERs e.g. wouldsome IERs be better served by existing specialistmessages, e.g. communications data should be in theOPTASK COMMS, ROE should be in the ROEIMPetc. The complete information flow for a typical MIOtask was developed and it is shown on the Figure.

This process highlighted that that there are a numberIERs that are not standardised in the NATO and werebeing created on an ad hoc basis be Commanders. Theseadditional IERs are:

• COI list - Periodic update of vessels on interest

to the MIO Task

• Consolidated List of Vessels Hailed

• List of vessels hailed by a unit

• MIO Reports

• Initial Intercept Report

• Boarding Approach Report

• Status of Boarding Report

• Final Boarding Report

• After Action Report

• Clearance Message

In discussion it was apparent that some of thesereports we initially sent as voice messages they had tobe backed up by textual messages for legal reason.Examples of messages from Operation ACTIVEENDEAVOUR and Operation UNIFIEDPROTECTOR were used to determine additional IERsthat had not been expressed in the example message inATP-71 Change 4.

During the development of the message, theNMIOTC would conduct short trials of the messages toensure that the developed solution meets the needs ofthe operational community that they represent.

One of the features of the example messages wasthat a significant proportion of the messages we devotedto defining the IER for the collection and disseminationof information within the Operations. There wasconsiderable similarity between the requirements;however, there were differences in the ordering of data.This is a very inefficient method of processinginformation as significant manual intervention isrequired and training cannot be standardised.

It was considered that these messages should bestandardized, this will allow NATO and/or nations todevelop automated methods of processing thesemessages, which will significantly reduce the workloadon operational personnel. Overall the ATP-71 workshopheld successfully and produced results that are going tobe further discussed in MAROPS 2012 working group.

LCdr Alexandru Gobjila, ROU N is currently aCounter-Piracy instructor in NMIOTC.During his 13year carrier he has served on board MCM ships andFrigates of the Romanian Navy. He is also a qualifiedEnglish Language instructor.

...there are a numberIERs that are not

standardised in theNATO...

MARITIME ‘ICAO’: PERHAPS AN ANSWER TO MODERNMARITIME ‘ICAO’: PERHAPS AN ANSWER TO MODERNMARITIME TERRORISM?MARITIME TERRORISM?

by Professor NikitasNikitakos & Lt Ioannis Nellas GRC N

INTRODUCTION

The maritime domain constitutes a significant aspectof the global security agenda. In the modern era there isa large number of issues that create the need for thepolicy makers to adopt new approaches and ideas andultimately to think out of the box. The 9/11 terroristattack clearly demonstrated the enlarged dimensions theissue of terrorism has gained. Considering the fact thatthe sea covers 7/10 of the earth’s surface a spill overphenomenon is expected taking into account the fragilepolitical situation in many coastal areas all over theworld. Inevitably, the term of maritime terrorism wasintroduced and although it is frequently discussed it hasnot been actually analyzed in depth; though sooner orlater it will draw more attention. This article attempts topropose a new and innovative solution to tacklemaritime terrorism by founding a maritime equivalentto ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization).

MARITIME TERRORISM

Maritime terrorism (including criminal and politicalviolence at sea) is an issue with many parameters and adefinition that can be used to define it is the following[2]:

The undertaking of terrorist, insurgent orcriminal acts and activities

•• Within the maritime environment

•• Using or directed against vessels or fixedplatforms at sea and members of their passengersand personnel

•• Against coastal facilities or settlements,including tourist resorts, port areas and port townsand cities.

Maritime domain is a frequently spoken term andoften misunderstood, that’s why it is important toaccurately define it, so the maritime domain orenvironment consists of the following [1]:

Everything of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to,or bordering on Seas, Oceans, or other NavigableWaterways

•• All maritime-related activities

•• Infrastructure

•• People

•• Cargo

•• Vessels and other conveyances

In order to have a sense regarding the areas of dangerin the maritime domain Figure 1 is depicting the areaswhere maritime risks exist. Also in the graph we canobserve the main global choke points and the main sea-lanes where there is high density of maritime traffic [1].

Next, we will briefly discuss on the historic aspect ofmaritime terrorism. The maritime domain by defaultcarries a number of limitations, which includegeographical, operational and other parameters. Forexample, terrorist attacks on land-based targets offermore publicity and fewer possibilities for failure [2]. Inaddition is has been proven historically that terrorists actin a more traditional fashion. Operations at seas requirespecial training and set of skills from the personnelinvolved. Statistics officially confirm the abovearguments since 1968 only 2% of terrorist incidents

Choke points and Areas ofPirate ac2vity [1]

Mari0me terrorismis an issue with

many parameters

30 NMIOTC Journal

NMIOTC Journal 31

involve the maritime domain. However, since 2000maritime terrorist incidents have increased considerably(i.e suicide attack against Japanese flag ship M-Star inJuly 2010) [2].

Many often get confused in clearly understandingthe differences between maritime terrorism and piracy.In this point it is useful to discuss if there is any anexusand possible points of contact between piracy andmaritime terrorism. Nowadays, there is no obvious pointof contact between pirates and terrorists since their aimsare different. Terrorists primarily desire to impedemaritime traffic and cause great burden to global stabilityon the other hand pirates want to collect ransom byhigh-jacking a merchant ship [2].

MARITIME SECURITY

Firstly, it is crucial to conceptualize that maritimesecurity is the outcome of many factors; specificallythere are many issues to be tackled properly in order toclaim that we have reached an acceptable security level.

In the graph above the complexity concerning theissue of maritime security is shown and it is clearlyimplied how coordinated a maritime anti-terrorismpolicy and tactic should be followed in order to meet allthe challenges related to the maritime domain. Many ofthe issues stated above require a collective cooperationfrom the local, regional and international authorities todeal with this issue otherwise all other approaches willreach to a stalemate [3].

MARITIME EQUIVALENT TO ICAO

The maritime domain shares a number of similaritieswith the air space. The international community in orderto prevent friction and conflicts between statesconcerning issues with airtransportation and otherrelated issues after World War II signed a treaty inChicago on December 1944 stating their will to develop

air transport services in a safe and right manner.

The basic principles of the Chicago treaty are listedbelow [4]:

• Insure the safe and orderly growth ofinternational civil aviation throughout the world;

• Encourage the arts of aircraft design andoperation for peaceful purposes;

• Encourage the development of airways,airports and air navigation facilities forinternational civil aviation;

• Meet the needs of the peoples of the worldfor safe, regular, efficient and economical airtransport;

• Prevent economic waste caused byunreasonable competition;

• Ensure that the rights of Contracting Statesare fully respected and that every Contracting State

has a fair opportunity to operate internationalairlines;

• Avoid discrimination between ContractingStates;

• Promote safety of flight in international airnavigation;

• Promote generally the development of allaspects of international civil aeronautics.

The maritime domain space although it shares anumber of similarities with the airspace, it differshowever considerably also and not all the aboveprinciples are respectively applicable. Sea transportationcarries a number of special characteristics which needspecial consideration and acts. However the concept offounding a maritime equivalent to ICAO appearschallenging and has a hopeful dimension since theaugmented needs for maritime security need a goodbasis in order for the involved states to take the

Threats to Mari2me Security in the Mari2me Domain [1]

...mari0me domain spacealthough it shares a

number of similari0eswith the airspace, it differs

however considerablyalso...

necessary security measures.

Currently maritime shipping is monitored andregulated by IMO (International MaritimeOrganization). IMO was founded in 1948 by the UnitedNations with its overall objectives summed up to thefollowing slogan:

“Safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans”.

The IMO regulates maritime industry and alsoaddresses all the issues related to the maritimeenvironment (pollution and other) [5]. However, theconditions since the IMO was founded have changeddramatically including the technological evolution.Security in ports and in the sea domain is not easilyachievable, however there is a great need to reachacceptable security levels in ports and away from shoreand consequently new solutions should be pursued. Aneffective solution against maritime terrorism shouldfocus on exercising strict control in ports and to the sealanes in use by merchant ships through the support ofa set of technologically advanced assets (satellite, UAVs,and sea based assets). This control should be exercisedby an organization in symphony to what ICAO is doingfor air transport services.

TASK AND TOOLS OF A MARITIME“ICAO”

Maritime terrorism as it has been stressed previouslyrequires modern innovative approaches from all theinvolved states. Since the sea is providing goods andresources to the vast majority of humanity it becomesimperative for the United Nations to play a key role instructuring this new institution in accordance to whathappened with the foundation of ICAO.

The maritime domain as it has been eluded shares anumber of characteristics with the airspace, however inregards to ISR (Intelligence – Surveillance -Reconnaissance) an innovative out of the box anti-maritime terrorism strategy should be followed. The firstpart has to do with port security and it is an importantissue of national policy in each state. Port security is offundamental importance since it is the starting point formerchant ships and the place where all the loading andunloading happens. Consequently port security is animportant phase in merchant maritime traffic and needsspecial action which needs to be standardized globallyin order to reduce illegal activity at sea.

Figure 1 is clearly depicting the main choke points

Schema2c Depic2on Coverage of a Mari2me Area of Interest through an Innova2ve Air Monitoring System

32 NMIOTC Journal

NMIOTC Journal 33

and sea lanes which are currently followed by merchantships globally. The international community throughHUMINT and other sources can identify the possibleareas of a danger and act accordingly. A potential courseof action could easily involve the monitoring of all thetroubled areas through the employment of cutting edgetechnological assets (UAVs, satellites and tetheredaerostats with embedded sensors) [7]. The control ofthese assets and the classification of the collectedinformation will occur in special Command and ControlCenters which they will direct and coordinateaccordingly all the available naval and non naval assets inthe area of trouble in order to deter potential terroristactivities.

In Figure 3 a potential monitoring scheme isillustrated in the troubled area in the Horn of Africa.This air monitoring system consists of a constellationfrom tethered aerostats with embedded radar sensors(effective footprint of 200 n.m), which gathers all theinformation and promulgates it to a Command andControl Center that is located in a safe area.

CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism is a phenomenon that unfortunately isevolving to a more and more serious issue in the globalsecurity agenda. The maritime aspect of this issue is apotential area of high danger for many countries andrequires innovative out of the box approaches from allthe involved parties. The current regulating system ofmaritime industry and shipping is not adequate enoughto control and deter terrorist actions since thetechnological evolution has altered dramatically the wayterrorists act. Consequently, new regulating systems andinstitutions are needed to effectively exercise maritimecontrol collaboratively. An institution which issponsored by the United Nations and is structured afterICAO would increase the level of security since aconstant monitoring through cutting edge technologicalassets (satellite, aerostats with embedded radar sensors)would offer continuous control of the maritime trafficand reduce in the long ran terrorist incidents.

REFERENCES

1. Paul Shemella, Power Point presentation for “Responses toMaritime Violence, Overview” Center for Civil MilitaryRelations, September 2010.

2. Peter Chalk, Power Point presentation for “Maritime Piracyand Terrorism, Overview and Conceptualization” Center for CivilMilitary Relations, September 2010.

3. Kline, Jeff “Maritime Security”, in securing Freedom in theGlobal Commons, edited by Scott Jasper, 67-82. Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2010.

4. Definition based on conceptualization developed by the Councilfor Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) MaritimeWorking Group, from Peter Chalk, Power Point presentation for“Maritime Piracy and Terrorism, Overview andConceptualization” Center for Civil Military Relations,September 2010.

5. International Civil Aviation Organization, MEMO onICAO www.icao.int/icao/en/pub/memo.pdf, accessed on 28October 2011

6. International Maritime Organization, What it is,http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx, accessed on31 October 2011

7. Nellas, Ioannis, Capacity Building as an answer to Piracy inthe Horn of Africa, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School2010.

Prof. Nikitas Nikitakos is a graduate of theHellenic Naval Academy (1980) and holds a B.Sc. inEconomics (University of Pireaus 1986) and 2 M.Sc.from Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, USA(Electrical Engineering and Applied Mathematics).He spent 25 years as Naval Officer (Captain GRC Nret.) when he participated in several NATO and EUcommittees. He received a PhD in Electrical andComputer Engineering from the National TechnicalUniversity of Athens (1996). He is a professor ofShipping Informatics and Communications and he wasHead of the Shipping Trade and TransportDepartment of the University of Athens (2006-2010).Prof. Nikitakos was president of AMMITEC(Association of Maritime Managers InformationTechnology, Electronics and Communications) from2006 to 2010 and is currently president of the AegeanInstitute of Law of the Sea and Maritime Law inRhodes. He holds 3 international patents onrenewable energies at sea and he was awarded fromLloyd’s List on Maritime Technological Innovations in2006.

Lt Ioannis Nellas, GRC N graduated from theHellenic Academy in 2002 and has served in frigatesand patrol gunboat ships. He is a Naval PostgraduateSchool graduate with two Masters in Applied Physicsand in Civil-Military relations. He is currently servingin HS ELLI as Electronics Officer and his thesistackled the issue of capacity building as an answer topiracy through the introduction and implementationof innovative concepts in a pioneering fashion.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTING REGIONALLEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTING REGIONALCAPACITY BUILDING TO SOMALIACAPACITY BUILDING TO SOMALIA

by Isaac Wiles Jr Esq

A. FOREWORD

The strategic importance of Somalia to the fightagainst piracy and terrorism is significant becauseSomalia is known to generate piracy due to the lack ofan effective government, which gives rise to other legalimplications that affect implementing regional capacitybuilding to Somalia.

Critical factors that underpin and support the menaceof Piracy in the North-Western Indian Ocean andimpact regional stability can not also go un-notice – lackof economic opportunities for the youths and analternative livelihood for those likely to find Piracy as afair way of making a living and getting rich quick withminimum risk.

1. Want of effective Government and Governancein Somalia.

Somalia has been in a state of degenerated conflictand breakdown of law and order and state institutionsfor two decades since the overthrow of the latePresident Siad Barre; initially Clan warlords, and now theIslamist insurgency of Al Shabaab. This state of affairshas encouraged piracy, this state of affairs hasencouraged terrorism and this state of affairs has madeSomalia a sanctuary and indeed a safe haven forterrorism and Piracy in the eastern African region.

According to APF World News,

“Piracy hit an all-time high in the first threemonths of 2011, with 142 attacks worldwide,driven mainly by raids off the lawless Somalicoast, a maritime watchdog said [Thursday]. Atotal of 97 attacks were recorded off Somaliain the first quarter, up from 35 in the sameperiod last year,...Figures for piracy andarmed robbery at sea in the past three monthsare higher than we've ever recorded in the firstquarter of any past year….since 1991…Of the18 ships hijacked worldwide, 15 werecaptured off the east coast of Somalia, in andaround the Arabian Sea and one in the Gulfof Aden. At the last count, on 31 March, IMB

figures showed that Somali pirates wereholding captive 596 crew members on 28ships.” 1

Increase in attacks on ships in recent times reflectscontinuing political instability in Somalia. And althoughthe international military-naval presence has madesubstantial and noteworthy progress in repressing thechallenges posed by pirates; it is obvious, that militaryinterventions alone is not enough to restrain and containthe nuisance of piracy, its not enough to achieve stabilityin Somalia and its not enough restore the rules of law2there.

2. Emerging Regional Governments/Administrations in Somalia

There are two de facto or quasi states in Somalia -Puntland and Somaliland, each claiming statehoodalthough Somaliland’s claim has been for a period thanPuntland. And yet still, there are other evolving quasiautonomous bodies within the Somali emerging

federation, that further compounds and complicates thescenario; Azania (the most recent to claim the status ofa region); Galmadug, Hibin & Heeb, Hiraan, ShebelleValley, etc.

Increase in a1ackson ships in recent

0mes reflectscon0nuing poli0cal

instability inSomalia.

1 Attacks off Somalia drive piracy to record high, AFP World News: April 14, 2011, owner-unsoainternational@unsoa.org2 Developing a Strategic Response to the Emerging Regional Entities in Somalia: A Review of Options and an Assessment ofLegal & Political Implications for the International Community (2011)

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Relations between international operators andnational governments are customarily dealt with andnegotiated through the Government that is recognized;in the instant case, the Transitional Federal Governmentof Somalia (TFG) is the internationally recognizedgovernment. Hence, material and technical supportfrom the international community for building capacityand other assistances are passed on and conveyedthrough the channels of Government. But theGovernment is fragile, unstable and incapable ofexercising its sovereignty and authority beyond a certainaerial blocks within Mogadishu, nor can it engaged(adequately) with regional areas asserting autonomy andself rule. Recent report shows that the TFG andAMISOM control 8 districts in the city, Al-Shabaab isin charge of 3 and the control 5 districts remainsundermined.

The Transitional Federal Government's term expiresin August and it wants to extend its mandate for anotheryear and has done so. Somali leaders in an effort to endthe transitional period met in Kampala (Uganda) on 9June 2011 and resolved to extend the mandate of thegovernment (P/E) together with the presidential voteby one year, in order to deal with pending security andpolitical issues that have been sidelined due to politicalinfighting. The negotiation called for the resignation ofthe Prime Minister to facilitate the formation of a newgovernment. Initially the Prime Minister refused toresign but did resign subsequently on 19 June. On the23rd June, 2011 a new Prime Minister (AbdiweliMohamed Ali) was appointed. But the prevailingscenario of not having a steadfast and effectivegovernment affects regional capacity building; becauseinternational assistance and support may not alwayscascade where it is most needed. The InternationalCommunity (IC) has a quandary of whether to continuethe traditional or customary approach of engaging onlythe recognized Government and its national institutions(Transitional Federal Institutions /TFIs/), or adopt amore flexible and proactive policy that accommodateslocal aspirations, peculiarities and needs.

This dual track approach includes and incorporatesemerging administrations and their institutions for thegreater good of security and broader developmentstrategy. It is noteworthy that the IC does dialogue withPuntland and with Somaliland and supports manydevelopmental initiatives there; to the extent that theUnited States has declared it is pursing bi-lateral relationswith these entities to promote security and to stabilizeSomalia3. The Government obviously dislikes the dualtrack approach as undermining its legitimacy and

credibility and encouraging partition. Other inhibitingfactors can better be explained by the Associated Press,24 May 2011 report as follows:

“NAIROBI, Kenya

Somali poli0cians arereturning from Arab

na0ons with briefcases ofcash, and a Somali

government watchdogreport obtained by The

Associated Press

found that more than $70million of it is missing

instead of being used tofight terrorism, piracy or

hunger.

The large cash paymentsencourage poli0cians tohang onto power whilepaying li1le a1en0on to

crucial needs in a countrydevastated by two decades

of war.

A lack of a1en0on tocons0tuents' needs may

also be fueling an

al-Qaeda-linked insurgency,officials say…..”

3 Remarks by Assistant Secretary Carson at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 20, 2010

The Associated Press also attributed a report by theHead of Public Finance Management Unit of the TFG(Abdirazak Fartaag), which illustrates the depth of thesituation.

“In a 22-page report due to be releasedWednesday 25 May and obtained exclusivelyby AP, Abdirazak Fartaag documented cashpayments that came from Libya, the UnitedArab Emirates, Sudan and other donors in2009 and 2010 totaling more than $75 million.Only $2.8 million was accounted for by thegovernment. He based his report, which waswritten for the Somali government, oninterviews with politicians who witnessed thepayments or received money in Mogadishu,Somalia's capital…. that the Somaligovernment is missing more than $300 milliononce (of)internal revenues from the port,airport, khat trade and telecommunicationsare added to the Arab millions that havevanished. A separate AP investigationestablished that cash payments from Arabnations continue amid a lack of transparencyover how much money politicians accept andwhat happens with it….. Somali PrimeMinister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed toldAP in an interview in Mogadishu in April thathis government received one payment of $5million dollars from a Middle Eastern countrythis year that he "believed" to be the UnitedArab Emirates. But Finance Minister HusseinHalane told AP in April that he accompaniedthe prime minister twice to Abu Dhabi, thecapital of the United Arab Emirates, this yearand had seen Mohamed personally receive$5 million in cash each time. After more than50 phone calls and e-mails from AP over sixweeks, the government produceddocumentation showing that only onepayment of $5 million was deposited into thecountry's Central Bank. The other paymentremains unaccounted for. Politicians inposition to receive such payments have littleincentive to reach out to armed groups to endconflict because then they'd have to share themoney, Fartaag said in an interview in Nairobi

on Tuesday….The sums are a fortune,especially in impoverished, war-ravagedSomalia..”4

According to a Somali National TV Broadcast of 29May 2011 also reported by the AP of governmentreaction to the story, both the Somali Finance Ministerand Information Minister Abdikarim Hassan Jama said:

3. Want of law specific to piracy in number ofStates.

There is preponderance of the evidence that relateto the sufficiency of international legal regime for therepression of piracy and terrorism off the coast ofSomalia and elsewhere. The international legalframework applicable to piracy is encapsulated and setout in the United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS 1982). UNCLOS Conventionapproves “universal jurisdiction” over piracy and may besupplemented as the case may be, by elements of theConvention on the Suppression of Unlawful Actsagainst the Safety of Maritime Navigation5 (SUA 1846(2008), the Convention on Transnational OrganizedCrime and the Hostage-taking Convention, etc. Despite

4 Associated Press, May 24, 2011, owner-unsoainternational@unsoa.org5 The SUA Convention provides for Parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction and accept delivery of persons re-sponsible for, or suspected of, seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat of force, or any other form of intimida-tion. Some States disagree that the SUA Convention applies to acts of piracy because they believe that it is specific to terroristacts. 6 The General Assembly upon States to take appropriate steps under their national law to facilitate the apprehension and prosecu-tion of suspected pirates and urged all States, in cooperation with IMO, to actively combat piracy and armed robbery at sea byadopting national legislation.

“….a leakeddocument thataccuses the TFG

of mishandling atleast $300million is

irresponsible.”

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these enabling resolutions and conventions, a numberof States are yet to enact specific national lawcriminalizing piracy, or adopting legal Procedures for thecriminal prosecution of suspected pirates.6 Perhaps thisis so because the legal regimes that applies within States’territorial seas, is a matter of national law andsovereignty, not harmonized with or regulated by theUNCLOS Convention. What this means is that acts thatwould ordinarily constitute piracy under UNCLOS onthe high seas, may constitute “armed robbery at sea”within the territorial sea and legal jurisdiction of aconcerned/member State subject to national law. Sucharrangements of criminality relates to issues of nationalsovereignty and whereas, treaties are based on mutualcooperation, it may not always be practical/expedienton the part of a concerned/member State to reachagreement on every facets of international cooperationand therefore, some agreements tend to be moreconstrained and perhaps more restricted then others.

There is also the challenge of inadequate or the wantof Domestic Legal Framework (on Piracy) in someStates, which adversely affects the issue of lawenforcement of the crime. The complexity of the issueis further aggravated by the absence of a coordinatedstrategy approach among States with different legalsystems. To this end, Working Group2 (WG2) of theContact Group for Piracy of the Coast of Somalia(CGPCS) is in hot pursuit of a consensus on the issueof legal principle(s) that facilitates a more coherent andintegrated legal approach to piracy.7 In the words of theChairman of WG2 on Legal Issues of piracy off theCoast of Somalia, of the Contact Group for Piracy ofthe Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),

WG2 and the United Nations Office for Drug and

Crime (UNODC) have started building the Judicial andCorrections capacities of the countries that havevolunteered to put on trial suspected pirates. TheContact Group for Piracy of the Coast of Somalia(CGPCS) leads and coordinates efforts by States andrelevant organizations to counter piracy and armedrobbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.Notwithstanding, the United Nations Political Office forSomalia (UNPOS) and the UN Office for Legal Affairs(OLA) in collaboration with the United Nations Officefor Drug and Crime UNODC) are in the meantimeworking to compile national legislation on piracy, whichcould help States wishing to review their laws.

4. Djibouti Code of Conduct

The Djibouti Code of Conduct is a vital piece ofcounter-piracy strategy that was adopted on 29 January2009 under the auspices of the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) as a way of facilitating theimplementation of relevant binding international law forthe repression of piracy and armed robbery againstShips in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf ofAden. It sets forth a framework for the suppression ofpiracy at sea off the coast of Somalia. It recommendsamong other things, review and reform of domestic lawsto criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea, with awide range of other integrated capacity developmentsupport strategies for member States including a TrustFund to support and fund counter-piracy initiatives andstrategies for States combating Piracy off the Coast ofSomalia. Although the Code is a critical and essentialpiece of counter piracy mechanism, which shouldstrengthen regional maritime and law enforcementcapabilities when fully implemented; the reality is thatthe Code is a Nonbinding Instrument.

This seems to illustrate a limitation of obligation; inthat, it may be interpreted as not having sufficient legalresponsibility attached on the part of some as it providesthe option to cooperate or not to cooperate. Perhapsother pressing domestic issues, in the forefront of someregional States agendas, combating piracy may notfeature very permanent. And this in my opinion seemscounter-productive and contrary to the intent andpurposes of the Code, as a collaborative strategy.

B. ASSUMPTION

The prevailing situation of piracy and terrorism andthe legal implications of the lack of governance, the lackof law specific to piracy in number of States, inadequateor lack of domestic legal framework in others, issues ofemerging entities, corruption in Somalia, (the limitation

7 UN Report Global Counter-Piracy Activities: NATO’S Role

“The world was notengaged in an armedconflict with pirates;rather, the crime of

piracy was an issue oflaw enforcement, evenwhen the military wasused to capture them.”

of the Code of Conduct), etc., all have legal implicationsof implementing regional capacity building for Somalia.It seems obvious that an effective government inSomalia would invariably help stamp out piracy and goa distance to help restore maritime trade in the North-Western Indian Ocean, and help secure maritime safetyand security. In this effort, the Security Councilmandated the Secretary-General and the United NationsPolitical Office for Somalia (UNPOS), and it is themandate of UNPOS, to promote an inclusive politicalprocess for durable peace and security in Somalia inaccordance with relevant resolutions including 1744(2007) and 1772 (2007), and encouraged “all States andregional organizations fighting piracy and armedrobbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish aninternational cooperation mechanism to act as acommon point of contact, between and among States,regional and international organizations on all aspectsof combating piracy and armed robbery at sea offSomalia.”8

The Secretary-General also mandated UNPOS totake the lead in overseeing the implementation ofcounter-piracy initiatives for Somalia, and off the coastof Somalia. Security Council also pursuant to resolution1814 (2008) obliges the UNPOS to interface with andbuild effective partnership with the United Nationscountry team in this regard. If indeed the crime ofpiracy was an issue of law enforcement, that “the worldwas not engaged in an armed conflict with pirates;rather, the crime of piracy was an issue of lawenforcement,…” then a comprehensive regional orglobal law enforcement policy framework interventionsmust ultimately requires a return to an effective centralgovernment control and the rule of law in Somalia.Somalia is tactical and strategic to any counter-piracystrategy. Therefore removing and do away with theselegal implications mentioned, would ameliorate andimprove regional capacity building initiatives to the State,and strengthen its capacity and legal framework as firstresponder against any act of piracy and terrorismoriginating ashore.

Mr. Isaac Wiles is a Doctor of Jurisprudence andhe is currently a Legal Adviser at UN Political Officefor Somalia (UNPOS), Nairobi. Mr. Wiles has over 25years of professional experience as a qualified lawyerand public administrator with the last eleven years ininternational affairs and tact, international law andcivil affairs with the United Nations system

If indeed

the crime of piracywas an issue of lawenforcement, that

“the world was notengaged in an armedconflict with pirates;rather, the crime of

piracy was an issue oflaw enforcement,…”

then acomprehensive

regional or global lawenforcement

policy frameworkinterven0ons must

ul0mately requires areturn to an effec0vecentral governmentcontrol and the ruleof law in Somalia.

8 Resolution 1851 (2008)

38 NMIOTC Journal

READJUSTING ANTI-PIRACY LAW EFFECTIVENESSREADJUSTING ANTI-PIRACY LAW EFFECTIVENESSTHROUGH STATE PRACTICE. HOW FEASIBLE?THROUGH STATE PRACTICE. HOW FEASIBLE?

by Gerasimos Rodotheatos, PhD Candidate

SIZE OF THE PROBLEM

Piracy on the High Seas is not a new problem. In itsmodern incarnation, it is rather its root causes andmethods, as well as the means of fighting it. For manyyears, it was conceived as an old-fashioned and fadingproblem for maritime shipping. According to statistics,it is apparent that there is a significant rise of incidentsduring the last ten years (i). This change does not onlyconcern quantity, but also quality. Today’s pirates havedistanced themselves from obsolete tactics, means andscope. Enhanced operational capacity, modernintelligence and telecommunication technologies anddirect targeting of seamen are the main characteristicsof modern piracy. This clear increase of incidents couldnot have been a reality without the occurrence of aseries of factors on land. Political instability, corruptionand extreme poverty serve as an excellent breedingground for unlawful activities on the East, and morerecently, West coast of Africa.

COMMON CONCERN AND EFFORTS TOTACKLE IT

A vast amount of effort taken by the major NavalPowers and littoral states is a sound proof that today’spiracy (ii), not only effects a limited number ofneighboring nations or shipping lanes, but also hasvarious implications on regional or even, sometimes,global level (iii). Though it is hard to measure the volumeof effects per country or per economic sector, theinternational community seems to have understood thetrends of impacts and has already started movingtowards the achievement of a solution in a dynamic way.

Ironically though, international community’sincreased effort has not met with exceptional results.This kind of “non-success” should lead us to someconclusions only after the assessment of methods used,in combination with policy objectives and engagedcapacity. Usually, if a machine does not work, one couldeasily blame this piece of steel for it! But is it always dueto the equipment’s flaw or the inability of the user and,more generally, the influence of external parameters?

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PRACTICALTOOL AGAINST PIRACY

This article views International Law as nothing more,

or even less, than a practical tool in the hands of thoseable of resolving a problem or/ and willing to promoteinternational cooperation. As an institution ofInternational Politics, International Law is often beingcriticized as a setback for International Relations or justa “romantic” conception only sponsored by the weakestparties.

In our case, International Anti-Piracy Legislation hasoften been criticized as “obsolete”, “inadequate” or“insufficient”. However true is the fact that thejurisdictional basis contained in the Law of the SeaConvention (LOSC), esp. articles 101-107, codifiescustomary rules dating back to early 20th century, thoseregulations remain valid and applicable even undertoday’s circumstances. Of course, the InternationalCommunity has not contained itself in tackling onlyPiracy; a series of other grave crimes occurring on theHigh Seas (e.g. human and drug trafficking, illegalfishing, terrorist acts, weapons of mass destructionproliferation etc.) have been dealt with by variousinternational agreements and resolutions (iv). Howeverwell structured can all these agreements be, they areuseless unless their implementation receives equaldevotion.

Because of International Law’s features, internationalregulations are being domestically implementedaccording to the will, capacity and national interest ofstates. Since there is absence of imposing mechanisms,states are free to interpret and transpose internationalrules. It is obvious that this scheme can lead to lack ofuniformity, a clue that is more than essential forachieving the targets set by every internationalagreement.

The following examples are indicative of states’devotion/ effort to the common target of fightingpiracy.

i) Practical capacity: When a naval ship engagesinto an interdiction operation certain issues might occur;e.g. arrested persons should be detained onboard, crewmembers might be asked to participate in a prosecutionprocedure while, sometimes, there is a lack ofknowledge and experience for carrying out such kind ofoperations. On a state level, naval forces are oftenordered to implement “selective patterns ofengagement” (v), which means they tend to operate

NMIOTC Journal 39

under the prism of national interest and outside thespirit of international cooperation.

ii) Legal Capacity: Since there is no hierarchy orobligatoriness in State Jurisdiction regarding repress ofPiracy on the High Seas, even states that participate inAnti-Piracy operations lack adequate domesticlegislation. Without a clear framework and/ or mandate,naval ships are keen on following Catch and Releasetactics, or else, states are rather unwilling to prosecuteand prefer extradition.

All these paradigms lead us to the conclusion that nomatter how strong is the naval power used and no matterhow concise is the operating framework, if there is a lackof original will by the actors, all attempts could direct usto deadlocks.

IS THERE LIGHT AT THE END OF THETUNNEL?

Even though International Law is usually perceivedas a suppression mechanism, its role as an important toolfor deterrence should not be ignored. In our case, solidimplementation of rules is a key element in deterringvarious unlawful acts on the High Seas, since a robustand continuous enforcement of law can only act in adissuasive way for pirates, terrorists and armed robbers.As it has been mentioned, there is no lack ofinternational regulations, without this meaning that noimprovements are needed, but serious flaws can betraced in the implementation phase. While somescholars suggest that International Anti-Piracy legislationand institutions should undergo major revisions (vi), itshould be more subtly taken into account that specificreforms on domestic level can lead us to more successin shorter time. Of course it’s not only regulations thathave to change; capacity building, continuous trainingand assistance to interested states could also fill in the

puzzle. To sum up, a reasonable degree of uniformity,that would start piling up res judicata, could be anenormous leap towards desirable results.

REFERENCES

(i) IMO has recorded 434 Acts of Piracy and Armed RobberyAgainst Ships in the first nine months of 2011. Accordingly, 489acts took place in 2010, holding the record since 1984. Forupdated facts see: ΙΜΟ, Reports on Acts of Piracy and ArmedRobbery Against Ships, MSC. 4/ Circ. 176, November 1st2011.

(ii) World Community’s concerted efforts have focused theirattention on the East African Coast. See Arsanjani, M. H.,Reisman, W. M., East African Piracy and the Defense of WorldPublic Order, in Hestermeyer, H., Matz – Lück, N., Seibert –Fohr, A., Vöneky, S., (eds.), Law of the Sea in Dialogue,Springer, Heidelberg, 2011, pp. 149-151.

(iii) For an overview, see: Mair, St., (ed.), Piracy and MaritimeSecurity. Regional Characteristics and political, military, legal andeconomic implications, SWP Research Paper 3, German Institutefor International and Security Affairs, Berlin, March 2011.

(iv) For a brief description, see: Satkauskas, R., Piracy at seaand the limits of international law, Aegean Review of the Lawof the Sea and Maritime Law, vol. 1. No. 2, 2011, pp. 217-235.

(v) Thus meaning that some states choose to engage only in certaincases, in order to protect “national” vessels or cargoes, and do notfulfill their obligation to repress any kind of piracy on the HighSeas, according to LOSC art. 100.

(vi) For example, see: Madden, M., Trading the Shield ofSovereignty for the Scales of Justice: A Proposal for Reform ofInternational Sea Piracy Laws, University of San FranciscoSchool of Law Maritime Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 2, 2008-2009, pp. 139-166.

Gerasimos Rodotheatos is a PhD Can. on the Lawof the Sea and Researcher with the European Centrefor Environmental Research and Training, PanteionUniversity of Athens. He holds an MA onEnvironmental Governance and SustainableDevelopment, a BA on International and EuropeanStudies and has graduated the Rhodes Academy ofOceans Law and Policy (2011). Member of theHellenic Society of International Law andInternational Relations, since 2007. His research andeducational activities include: Law of the Sea, Air andSpace Law, Environmental and Development Law andPolitics. E-mail: yrodo@panteion.gr

...

if there is a lack oforiginal will by theactors, all a1emptscould direct us to

deadlocks

40 NMIOTC Journal

PROSECUTION OF SOMALI PIRATES: AN OVERVIEWPROSECUTION OF SOMALI PIRATES: AN OVERVIEW

by Mr Ingo Klaus Wamser Esq.

LEGAL SYSTEM OF SOMALIA

Starting in the 7th century the Horn of Africa regiondeveloped an indigenous law system called Xeer beingable to cope with civil as well as criminal law problems.Xeer is not an authority based law but a system of eldersserving as judges mediating cases by using precendents.The law is compensatory rather than punitive.Imprisonment is by fact unknown to the Xeer systemand fines occur only as direct payments to the victimexceeding the amount of compensation for example incases of deliberate and premeditated cause of damages.Parallel to the Xeer legal system existed the Sharia lawsystem distinctly separated from the Xeer system andrestricted to matters of family, inheritance and morality.

With the formation of the British Somalilandprotectorate in 1886 and Italian Somaliland in 1893 thetwo European authorities imported their own legalsystems. Nevertheless they accepted the existence of acustomary and a religious law system. As a consequenceboth administrations established the supremacy ofcodified and secular Western law, particularly forsignificant criminal cases. In addition bothadministrations allowed affairs between Somalis besettled through the customary Xeer system at least whenthreats to the general public order were not concernedand regarding family and inheritance matters Shariarulings were allowed.

After gaining independence during the 1960s auniform penal code, a code of criminal court proceduresand a standardised judicial organisation were introduced,basing mainly on the Italian system of application andinterpretation of a legal code. English common lawideas were executed in matters not governed bylegislation. Even after the suspension of the 1961’sconstitution in 1969 other sources of law wererespected.

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991the judicial organisation was rapidly declining handingthe legal system back over to the Xeer system for generallegal matters and to the Sharia system in family,inheritance and morality affairs. Estimated resultingfrom years of civil war and a significant decline in valuesdue to war related cruelties religious (Islamic) extremismspread leading to an overwhelming jurisdiction of the

Sharia system even in general legal cases. This lead alsoto the Islamic Courts Union maintaining militias actingas both police and military forces and trying to keep upsome form of law and order. Keeping Somalia-relatedtopics in mind the ICU succeeded in counter-narcoticscampaigns like the ban of khat.

The prosecution of marine related crimes involvingpiracy as well as environmental crimes and fisheriesregulations seems to be beyond the abilities andresources of local judicial organisations. In addition, theprosecution of piracy seems to lacking of acceptance,because the rest of social values, which are left afterdecades of civil war, do not include a sense of guilt forcriminal behaviour not harmfully involving the localcommunity. Furthermore some statements could lead tothe conclusion that piracy is seen as a justified reactionon alleged pollution caused by Western companies.

WORLDWIDE PROSECUTION OFSOMALI PIRATES

During the last years the presence of internationalwarships resulted in the arrest of a significant number ofSomali pirates handed over to justice. Basing on Art. 100

The prosecu0on

of marine relatedcrimes involving piracy

as well asenvironmental crimes

and fisheriesregula0ons seems to

be beyond the abili0esand resources of localjudicial organisa0ons

NMIOTC Journal 41

UNCLOS and other relevant international conventionson piracy most states actually have legal possibilities toprosecute piracy under their national jurisdiction at leastwhen the flag state of the attacked vessel or a nationalof this state is involved. Even states not havingincorporated the crime of “piracy” are able to prosecutethe deviant behaviour as armed robbery or differentother crimes included in the pirate’s action. Court trialson piracy in the HoA-region took place in Germany,Spain and the US recently. The advantage of theprosecution in Western countries is the availability ofjudicial infrastructure and a good access to the courtsystem for witnesses and experts. As a consequence itwould be easier to transport the offenders to a court faraway from the crime scene instead of transporting allthe other people involved to Somalia.

Nevertheless it can not be expected that trials abroadwill have much impact on the Somali community andthe lack of a sense of guilt on crimes like piracy being intheir situation not a tangible wrong. A person notreturning from a raid is in many cases not seen as a lossdue to the unknown situation of imprisonment inSomali culture. The inconveniences of just being awayfrom the clan and the relatives are covered byaccommodation and access to ample food and medicalcare.

PROSECUTION IN SOMALIA

From a criminological point of view it would bemuch better to prosecute piracy in Somalia especiallywhen laying the focus on the aim of punishment ofgeneral deterrence. As soon as the local community canexperience a trial in a piracy case, as soon as it canexperience the physical and psychological situation ofthe victims, the local community might get into theposition of realizing the guilt included in piracy detachedfrom the acceptance of the fact that the behaviour isconsidered illegal. Due to the participation of Somalipeople in a trial not only as the accused hopefully theacceptance of these decisions would by far exceed theacceptance of the decisions only done by foreignersstanding outside the tribal culture and the ancient Somalicustomary law system.

In addition the support of a local prosecutioninfrastructure could offer the possibility to establish lawenforcement capabilities for the marine environment ingeneral including the enforcement of environmental andfisheries management regulations. This would put anend to the justification of piracy as result of thedestruction of the marine environment by Westerncompanies and would offer a road to a self-determinedfuture.

From international side it would be necessary tosupport the establishment of local prosecutionresources by creating a criminal justice infrastructure likecourt rooms and a form of detention centre hardenedenough to withstand attacks and civil unrest. In additionaccommodation for witnesses and experts would benecessary. The supporting efforts should definitelyinclude a strong professional involvement ofinternational lawyers and staff to ensure a proper use ofthe facilities and prevent an instrumentalisation of thecourt by extremist groups.

Through the establishment of a local criminal lawsystem the piracy in the HoA-region can be suppressedmuch better and on the long hand cheaper than by navaloperations including the well known shortfalls and aworld wide transfer of pirates for prosecution.

Ingo Klaus Wamser Esq.Born in 1979 Ingo Klaus Wamser graduated from

the University of Passau in 2002 as Diplom-Juristfollowed by two years of working experience withinthe Bavarian Department of Justice and the militaryindustry. When starting his own law office at Passauin 2005 he was in the age of 25 the youngest holder ofa bar admission in Germany. Actually he is alsoadmitted to the bar in Gibraltar and at theInternational Criminal Court located at the Hague. Ingo Klaus Wamser is lecturing on the law of the

sea at the Montanuniversität Leoben in Austria andon the legal framework for private security guards atthe Chamber of Commerce and Industry of LowerBavaria (IHK Niederbayern). He is a volunteerdelegate at IMO for a shipping related NGO and afrequent contributor to conferences on maritimesecurity, law enforcement and criminal prosecution ofinternational crimes. “Wamser Legal” is a highly specialized law firm

for international criminal law, law enforcement andmaritime security law. The regional focus is on clientsin Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean arearanging from individual clients to worldwideoperating shipping and insurance companies andgovernment agencies. In 2006 “Wamser Legal” wasrecognized as a PFSO training centre by DAHamburg. Current research and consulting activities are

mainly concentrated on the international prosecutionof maritime crimes and the use of private securitycompanies in providing maritime security services forships and offshore installations.

42 NMIOTC Journal

THE NEXT STEP TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE NMIOTC:THE NEXT STEP TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE NMIOTC:A CONCEPTUAL MODELA CONCEPTUAL MODEL

by Dr. Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos

INTRODUCTION

The NATO Maritime Interdiction OperationalTraining Center (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Crete standsout as one of the most important aspects of Greece’sVoluntary National Contributions to NATO. In an ageof fiscal constraints, the NMIOTC is an initiative ofprime importance to Greece. Souda Bay itself stands outas an important hub to commercial maritime trade, forcountries and companies. Greece remains in theforefront of countries with commercial maritimesupremacy and importance. As such, the NMIOTC is aNATO initiative that attaches both military andcommercial importance.

The location of Crete in the SoutheasternMediterranean region stands out as an important hubfor commercial trade and also for NATO, U.S., andregional naval forces, given its strategic location betweenthe Straits of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, and the SuezCanal. The NMIOTC holds all necessary credentials andit is a success story for naval training and operations.Given its geo-strategic importance, its ability to combinethe necessary tools for successful training andoperations, and its role as a catalyst for interoperablemultinational forces, the NMIOTC could be looking toa new age of evolution. While NATO looks for smarterdefense tactics, techniques, and procedures, this paperasks for smarter initiatives that will be used to enhancethe role of the NMIOTC in the field of training,education, research and operational support to currentand future emergent real-world requirements.

The topic that will be analyzed is this paper is partof a greater research effort that is currently beingconducted by the author. The largeracademic/professional research is on NATO, Greece,and the future of transatlantic collaboration. This paperis merely a proposal with a concept attached to it. Itexamines a possibility on the future evolution of theNMIOTC. It is a document with proposals and issuesfor consideration.

The preliminary proposals within this paper werepresented at the 2nd annual conference of the NMIOTCin June 2011. The feedback received at that eventtogether with an on-site examination forms the finaloutcome delivered by this paper.

Primary sources of information include academicresearch, analyses, and interviews that were conductedboth in Greece and at NATO in my academic capacity.Secondary sources of information include books andarticles on current NATO policies and issues.

Greece needs to request a new foreign and securitypolicy concept for the long-term with specific initiatives.NATO needs to exceed expectations with bold stepsbeyond the anticipated results of the NATO StrategicConcept (Lisbon, 2010). In accordance with theMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) it was createdwith, the NMIOTC needs to pursue all possibilities forits evolution.

The questions that are raised in this paper are: Canthe NMIOTC stand out as a successful model for acenter that does much more than was initially anticipatedby its MOU? Can the NMIOTC be upgraded andsupported by NATO allies in a deeper and moreconstructive manner that will bring a balance of intereststo the region and to NATO allies in expandingcollaboration? Can the NMIOTC stand out in itsevolution as a key training core of NATO to join theNATO Defence College and the NATOCommunications and Information Systems School inItaly and the NATO School in Germany?

The topic that willbe analyzed in thispaper is part of agreater research

effort that iscurrently being

conducted by theauthor

NMIOTC Journal 43

44 NMIOTC Journal

To avoid any misinterpretation, the forthcomingtopic that is presented below is in no way associated tothe people or existing work of the NMIOTC. It is alsonot associated with any heads of state or governments,any international organizations (directly or indirectly),or any other institutions. What you will read below arethe sole opinions and statements made by the authorderived by academic and professional research only.They are as stated part of a larger research that iscurrently being conducted and will be published at a laterdate on Greece’s future role with NATO.

The work of the NMIOTC is a reflection of thewider issue of maritime security and the tremendouspotential for the international work of organizations. Itreflects the importance of Greece as a NATO memberstate with a new capability for the future: to takeinitiatives in difficult fiscal times with a view toaddressing new challenges. This paper is a conceptualproposal. It requests an advancement in both regionaland alliance capacity building to address the emergentneeds and challenges that NATO faces.

WHY ONE SHOULD SUPPORT THENMIOTC?

The statement here is that the NMIOTC’s role canultimately be positively evaluated by NATO’s militaryand political committees on its work as it is operationallyrelevant and trained to the highest NATO standards. Itshould, however, do more to evolve on the basis of theMOU it was created with, that is, training Alliance andpartner forces on countering maritime challenges. It alsoinvolves attracting participation of more NATOmember states with an interest in maritime securityconcerns as well as establishing interoperability amongstAlliance members and partner forces in multinationalnaval operations.

The statement made requests a new negotiation on apolitical level on the future role of the NMIOTC. Thisis a conceptual theory proposal. Given the emergentchallenges in the maritime security sector today, the needfor more capable and interoperable forces, the need fora smarter technological defense, and, finally, the geo-strategic location of Souda Bay, one may realize thesignificant role in global stability that the NMIOTC canand will play. One recent example of successfulcooperation is the use of Souda Bay by the Alliance toprotect ships operating in the Mediterranean, toimplement the no-fly zones in Libya, and to controltrafficking of illegal goods in and out of Libya1. Thisstatement requests that Greece look at the operational

significance of the NMIOTC as a center for training.

The NMIOTC can be seen as one aspect of a seriesof future initiatives by Greece in NATO. It can portraya new, important, and credible role for Greece inNATO’s future and also re-engage Greece in theinternational arena with innovative and leading-edgeproposals in the field of training and preparedness aswell as interoperability in countering threats. Such aproactive approach may boost regional participation inmaritime security operations. Finally, Greece’s initiativeto pursue an evolution of the NMIOTC will contributeto more cohesion amongst transatlantic allies and wouldultimately result in a smarter collective defense.

NEEDS TO CONSIDER REGARDING THEEVOLUTION OF THE NMIOTC

The NMIOTC’s role and impact to training formaritime operations is expected to increase. This meansthat the NMIOTC should evolve structurally as well asfiscally. It should also develop its standards such thatthey are more consistent with the needs and interests ofall member states, in spite of the fact that the Center isa Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) of Greeceand not NATO-funded.

STRUCTURAL PROPOSAL

The NMIOTC as a training center needs to create aseries of key structural assets. These assets will lead thecenter into the forefront of training procedures in anera of new and emerging challenges. This paper’sstructural proposal is: to consider the creation of amilitary/professional and academic research branch thatwill have the responsibility of examining andintroducing new methods and tools for deeper and moreextensive training tactics, techniques, and procedures.An example of a research branch is the NATO DefenseCollege in Italy. Their research branch will attractcountries for more participation in the professional andacademic fields. Such a branch is needed to preparebetter methods and tools to deliver training thataddresses emergent challenges and threats in themaritime sector. It could also combine land and aircomponent cooperation in the framework of pursuinginteroperability of forces. Taking this a step further, allthree components (air, land, and sea) could pursuecyber-training for enhanced network operations thatcould be used to engage the enemy against any possiblecyber-attacks. It will render the NMIOTC a center ofsmart defense preparation for joint/multinationalmaritime operations.

1. Ivo H. Daalder & James Stavridis, “NATO's Success in Libya” article posted at the NY times [31st October]. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/opinion/31iht-eddaalder31.html?_r=1

NMIOTC Journal 45

Conceptually, the NMIOTC should base itsarguments for evolution on the following two aspects:

a. The need for a conceptual maritime securitypolicy on smart defense measures.

b. The need to develop better civil-militaryrelations in the field of collaboration outside NATO(military and business sectors). The private maritimesector may offer more contributions for research anddevelopment since their interests are similar to theinterests of NATO (that is, to safeguard the freemovement of goods in the global marketplace).

FISCAL PROPOSAL

NATO is looking to increase its policies on maritimesecurity. For training purposes the NMIOTC, isconsidered now to be the first major tactical trainingcenter in NATO to be the third major training centeralongside the NATO School and NATO DefenseCollege. In the case of the NMIOTC this may mean thatfiscal investment will only increase. In the framework ofregional capacity building in the SoutheasternMediterranean region, the NMIOTC could stand as afocal hub.

Based on the aforementioned assumptions, afeasibility study, a study for regional and collectivecapacity building in the long-term (keeping in mind theneeds for smart defense measures to counterchallenges), and a planning procedure on maritimesecurity interests (where to invest according to strategicimportance of location) may be needed. In this case, thelocation of the NMIOTC will stand out as the mostimportant of all other possible locations in theframework of NATO’s needs.

The feasibility study should follow from anevaluation of the work of the NMIOTC - the ‘LessonsLearned’ thus far from the work of the center, anindependent evaluation of the current and ongoingwork of the NMIOTC.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NMIOTC TOGREECE

As stated earlier, the NMIOTC is a voluntary nationalcontribution to NATO. This makes it a unique case, asGreece is downsizing its other contributions to NATO2.It is an incentive to uphold the best of standards and toupgrade those standards to meet the needs of NATOallies. As such the role of the NMIOTC is clear: The

NMIOTC needs to become a default setting to allmaritime training and preparation in maritimeinterdiction operations. There is a need for a politicaland strategic move to invite all remaining NATOmember states to join the efforts made at the NMIOTC– that is, to have more NATO members become“supporting nations” at NMIOTC.

Greece needs to propose to NATO the creation ofan Allied Maritime Security Policy, based on futureneeds. It should project smart defense capabilities3 in theforefront of training and interoperability in counteringthreats in the maritime sector. It should enhance bothinternational as well as regional capacity building with aglobal maritime view. The NMIOTC should also seekan enhanced bilateral collaboration with other states thatare not NATO members but are Alliance or regionalpartners. Taking it a step further, the NMIOTC shouldalso seek a civilian capacity center for maritime security- one that complements efforts made in the militarysector. This should incorporate the research andtechnology development branch proposed earlier. Acivilian training center should foster continued interestof both the military and the civilian sectors. Theseefforts can be enhanced further should interested partiessupplement NATO joint funding.

This project is clearly relevant to the national interestsof Greece. There is a growing insecurity due to piracy.Once again, Greece is a global leader in the commercialmaritime sector. Greek shipping companies have a greatfinancial stake attached to the commercial shippingindustry. Greece needs to provide structural assurancesof military support to protect freedom of movement aswell as their assets and employees. The NATO MIOTraining Center can provide the assurances for thehighest level of training.

CONCLUSIONS

The NMIOTC holds the key for NATO success inmaritime security training procedures. This NATOEducation and Training Facility can also be attractive toprivate investment, easing the overall financial burden.Souda Bay represents a geo-strategic location withoutconflicting national or international interests. Afeasibility study would address any conflict of interestwith other NATO member states.

Notwithstanding the operational capacity of theNMIOTC to the highest levels of NATO standards, itsevolution on a political level requires the following:

2. Greece to Cut Participation to NATO missions; article posted at the Atlantic Council of the USA [23rd September 2011]:http://acus.org/natosource/greece-cut-participation-nato-eu-military-missions3. Defense Ministers gather in Brussels to discuss Operations and Capabilities, [5 October 2011], http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0BAA643A-776377D4/natolive/news_78747.htm

46 NMIOTC Journal

a. A strong national and international political willand the ability to negotiate for the evolution of thecenter.

b. Additional academic and political research aswell as greater effectiveness in crafting the message onthe progress made to date by the NMIOTC.

c. Feasibility study and business planningprocedure to attract possible private stakeholders withan interest in military and civilian training against piracyattacks.

d. New smart defense capabilities towardscomprehensive interoperability of forces.

e. A civilian maritime training center that wouldleverage the best practices of the private and academicsectors in addition to the military sector in addressingpiracy operations.

OTHER AREAS OF JOINT INTERESTS:

The use of the Center as a hub for joint maritimeintelligence sharing.

The need to project Souda Bay as a hub forinternational investment. It will inspire growth anddevelopment. It can become a regional opportunity forCrete, for Greece and the region.

An evolved role to the NMIOTC will grant inter-organizational collaboration between the UN, EU and

NATO at the maritime training levels of operation.

The NMIOTC stands out as a successful center inthe training of forces, while NATO operates (e.g.: Libyacase).

PORTRAYING THE INTERESTS OFGREECE TO NATO CONTRIBUTION:

Greece is a country that is, was and will always be asea power.

Greece and the Greek Fleet according to the Bureauof Transportation Statistics4 and the World Fact book5,is today the largest in the world, with 3,099 vessels of1000 tons or more (December 13, 2007) accounting for18% of the world's fleet capacity.

Greece can have a deeper association withinternational organizations, academia, and maritimecompanies. E.g.: 28 member states of NATO plus 60cooperative countries; also, India, China, and Australia,New Zealand and Singapore, among others.

EXPECTED RESULTS:

The region of Crete and the wider Mediterraneanregion will recreate a financial trade history around themaritime sector. It provides the opportunity to enhanceanti-piracy training but also operations of smart defensecapabilities.

The feasibility investment plan for NATO, includingthe civilian capacity mentioned earlier in the paper, willattract significant stakeholders.

The enhancement or evolution of the NMIOTCstands out as a win-win in addressing emergent threatssuch as Piracy (Somalia, Gulf of Aden), Terrorism,Regional Instability (Libya, Syria), Enlargement ofNATO, and collaborating with non-NATO partners(India, China, et al).

A research center may raise awareness for otheremergent challenges, such as Training for NaturalDisasters and Relief Operations.

Dr. Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos iscurrently a Visiting Scholar at the Center forTransatlantic Relations (CTR) SAIS Johns HopkinsUniversity. He is also the Head of StrategyInternational, in Thessaloniki Greece.

Contact Emails: marios.efthymiopoulos@strategyinternational.orgmefthymiopoulos@jhu.edu

4. Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Services US Department of Transporationhttp://www.bts.gov/5. CIA World Fact Book, Greece: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html

Use NMIOTC

as a hub

for joint

mari0me intelligencesharing

“REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR COUNTERING“REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR COUNTERINGPIRACY THROUGH THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT”PIRACY THROUGH THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT”

by Commander Ioannis Chapsos, GRC N

HUMAN SECURITY, DEVELOPMENTAND MARITIME SECURITY

The 1994 United Nations Human DevelopmentReport (UNHDR) introduced a new security approach,broadened and deepened beyond the stratum of thestate, putting emphasis on the security of human beingsper se and the web of their social and economicrelations. The concept of this form of security, thehuman security, goes beyond military threats; it isprimarily focused on the standards of everyday living,human dignity and safety from diachronic threats suchas lack of food and medicine, poverty and restrains. Italso refers to the prevention of the phobia of an acutecatastrophe, aiming to preserve the ordinarily living ofthe citizens with freedom, equality and justice.

This new concept of global security is directlyinterdependent with development. Although we are notable to explain how they interact, inequality, low growth,unemployment and weak economic institutions areidentified as parameters of the socio-economicdevelopment, increasing the risks of violence. In thisframework, maritime security became one of theprimary concerns and contemporary challenges ofglobal security, since it contributes to economicdevelopment from local to regional up to internationallevel. The sea-based trading system developed mostlyby littoral states, offers access to and distribution ofenergy resources, raw materials and all kind of productsaround the world; hence, since almost 80% of the globaltrade is transported in ships’ hulls, littoral statesdeveloped maritime infrastructure in order to establishthese energy supply chains and ensure the secure flow ofgoods to the international markets. But maritimesecurity, besides piracy, is threatened also by maritimeterrorism, illegal drug trafficking, gun-running, humansmuggling, maritime theft, fraud, illegal fishing andpollution, which can all disrupt maritime supply chainsto the heavy cost of the global economy.

MODERN PIRACY

The phenomenon is attributed to violent non stateactors who perceive contemporary piracy not as apopular lifestyle but as the means to survive. The rootcauses of their appearance are stemming from the lackof human security, ineffective social security and bad (or

even complete absence of) governance in theirhomeland. Additionally, the absence of littoral states’will to thwart piracy by exceeding sometimes theirjurisdiction, the absence of a legal system andinfrastructure that will robustly support their potentialeffort and the existence of ungoverned areas inside theirterritories due to lack of law enforcement efficiency, defacto establish safe havens for such activities.

There are three ‘chock-points’ of internationalshipping identified as the most risky in terms of piracyattacks incidents: The Malacca strait in South East Asia,the coast of Somalia/ Gulf of Aden and the coast ofNigeria/ Gulf of Guinea. All three of them are directlyrelated also to energy security, as the primary routs of oiltankers towards the energy dependent economies ofEurope, India, China, Japan, US. Inevitably, piracyproves to be interconnected also with food andeconomic security.

Piracy in South-East Asia occurs mainly against shipsat anchor or in ports of Indonesia, the Philippines andViet Nam and is a form of opportunistic theft. A secondtype of piracy occurs in the Straits of Malacca andSingapore when ships are underway; armed piratesboard vessels to steal cash and valuables, but they useviolence rarely. The last type of piracy in the region is thetheft or hijacking of an entire ship, aiming to turn it intoa “Phantom ship”. In 2011 reported incidents offMalaysia were sharply decreased, partly because of aseries of proactive counter-piracy measures that thelittoral states of the Straits—Indonesia, Malaysia andSingapore— undertook since 2004, includingsurveillance and reconnaissance of the Straits throughcoordinated sea and air patrols, intelligence sharing andsecurity enhancement.

In the Gulf of Guinea -and especially off Nigeria-

...piracy proves to beinterconnected also

with food andeconomic security

NMIOTC Journal 47

the situation is different, as reported by the crews.Attacks are usually perpetrated from heavily-armedpirates in coastal waters and rivers against vesselsassociated with the offshore oil and gas industry ant theyare much more violent. Loss of life and crew members’kidnapping for ransom is frequent. The ships themselvesare usually not hijacked .

The ‘modern pirates’ of Somalia are not interestedin the ships or their cargoes per se, since they don’t haveaccess to port facilities where they could unloadshipments; they foresee only in ransom for releasingcaptured vessels and crews, that range from $2 to $5million per ship . Hence, there is no logical or practicalreason for killing hostages. On the contrary, this actiondeprives them the profit from pirating vessels, which istheir primary objective and motivation. The above areeven further fostered by the deed that in many cases,where poor fishermen boats from Sri Lanka were seized,or crewmembers from poor states such as Bangladesh,the crews were released since there were not options andfinancial capabilities for ransom being paid .

The international effort is focused though on theHorn of Africa, where a multinational naval flotilla hasbeen deployed under numerous UNSC mandates in theregion. But all their efforts seem to be inadequate, sincethey have to patrol a vast area, while the use of seizedvessels from the pirates as ‘mother ships’, expanded theirarea of operations from 200 to 600 miles offshoreSomalia. The result, according to the ICC and the IMBis awesome and disappointing as well: during the firsthalf of 2011 piracy at sea hit an all-time high , and theransom paid were more than doubled . At their lastcount, on 13 June, IMB figures showed that Somalipirates were holding captive 439 crew members on 23ships .

THE HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH –REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

The above figures provide clear evidence that a shiftin existing strategy is required. But in order to determinea new one, we should focus on the root causes andtactics of the other side, the one of modern pirates’.

A S. Korean Special Forces unit rescue operation(Jan. 21, 2011), which resulted to the shooting of eightpirates onboard the ‘Samho Jewelry’, initiated a newphase of violence escalation , which was with thecapturing of a Danish family sailing in the area , and thekilling of a four member US sailing crew . This provesalso that the use of force deteriorated the alreadyinsecure environment, since when you exceed theamount of violence you try to suppress, inevitably this

brings more violence as a response . On the other hand,the loss of life from the side of the Somali pirates is notoften included in the public discussion about piracy andits impact. According to media reports, that at least 62pirates have been killed at sea in the first five months of2011, which amounts to 7% of the estimated 2,000active pirates, while a total of approximately 200-300pirates have not returned from their expeditions, notincluding those lost at sea.

On March the Reuters interviewed a pirate who made$2.4 million from ransoms only in 2010 , either byinvesting or participating in hijackings. The lack ofhuman security conditions in the region become evident,when he stressed that he spend some of the money heearned from the ransom on weapons, privatebodyguards, cars, tracks, boats, etc. But despite theexistence of organized crime networks which need tobe pre-established in order to procure all the abovegoods and services, what is shocking is that they fundlocal residents through the clan-elders, in order to copewith every day living; obviously, the total absence of acentral state’s governance, and the lack of thefundamental needs for the everyday living, leads thepopulation to the solution of piracy in order to survive.The coastal villages e.g. around Harardheere and Hobyo,receive about 5% of the total ransom payments forallowing the ships to anchor there. We could be able tounderstand the importance of this income for localpopulations, if we bear in mind that children in Somaliaare suffering some of the highest malnutrition rates inthe world , even before the recent famine. This localinformal economy is further enhanced by feeding bothpirates and hostages, negotiating ransom deliveries,investment in crew recruitment , etc. Furthermore, thefact that the term ‘child pirate’ emerged, supports theabove perception: During an Indian Navy operation, 61pirates were arrested and surprisingly 25 of them werechildren under the age of 15 .

Another indication of the lack of governance inSomalia is the inability to prosecute and imprison thearrested pirates, known as the problem “catch-and-release” . Somalia’s lack of security infrastructure is alsostressed by the fact that approximately 200 convictedpirates are held in Kenya’s prisons. In an internationaleffort to resolve this major problem in the semi-autonomous adjacent regions of Somaliland andPuntland, the UN funded and opened Hargeisa Prisonin Somaliland, in order to enhance prosecutioncapacities ; additionally, the UNSC announced theurgent need for establishing specialised courts in Somaliafor trying pirates .

The EU Training Mission of Somali Security Forces,

48 NMIOTC Journal

NMIOTC Journal 49

launched last May in Uganda, could includegovernmental anti-piracy forces training to confront theperpetrators ashore, instead of contracting privatesecurity firms, as Puntland authorities recently did withthe South African firm Saracen International in order totrain 1.000 men for this purpose . Following the USCoast Guard initiative, which donated a ship to Nigeriafor strengthening the regional maritime security , theabove EU mission’s expansion proposal could also findprompt application. A potential deployment of agilecoast-guard ships to Somalia, operating in the area ofthe already known piracy safe havens, under theguidelines and supervision of NATO or EU experts,will deny the pirates the access to their sanctuaries andcut them off from the areas they replenish and keep thehostages ashore.

The establishment of the 3 piracy informationsharing centres, envisaged to be commissioned inMombasa Kenya, Dar es Salam, the United Republic ofTanzania, and Sana’a, Yemen are also importantinitiatives . If they could further cooperate with thesatellite navigation system that was installed in SouthAfrica during the 2010 Soccer World Cup, will increaseeven more the capabilities in terms of awareness andsurveillance .

If we examine the overall annual coast of counteringpiracy and combine it with all the above, our findingsare awesome . According to various studies, the annualcoast of piracy to the global economy was calculatedbetween $7bn and $12bn. But despite that vast amountof money, piracy attacks continue to occur and mostimportant, none of the above expensive measuresaddresses the root cause of the phenomenon.Estimations also foresee that this cost is set to virtuallydouble by 2015 . On the contrary, the UN humanitarianassistance to Somalia was announced to beapproximately $530million for 2011.

CONCLUSION

All the data quoted above advocate to the perceptionof resolving the piracy problem ashore by addressing itsroot causes, since the military solution proved to befutile . Even the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moonidentified piracy as a consequence of the overallinsecurity, lack of a stable national government andunderdevelopment in Somalia, stressing that “…Piracyis not a water-borne disease. It is a symptom ofconditions on the ground, including the overall securityand political situation in Somalia” .

If all this anti-piracy funding could be dedicated to

restore robust and legitimate governance in Somalia,fight poverty and improve the conditions ofautochthonous population’s everyday living, maybe wecould fight piracy ashore; not by using solely militarymeans, following the traditional enemy centric strategicculture of the traditional western armed forces, butthrough a contemporary human centric approach,applying the human security doctrine, fighting thecontemporary security challenges from the localpopulation’s perspective. The international communityhas to undertake civilian initiatives to foster robustgovernance and effective law enforcement agencies inthe country.

The escalation of violence is the not the means tocounter piracy and the ‘witch hunt’ and shooting frominternational Naval forces is just a short-term andinefficient response. An effective local ‘coast-guard’ i.e.,could be a far more effective and long-term option, sinceit would deny also the approach from the sea to thealready globally know pirates’ safe havens. If we couldprovide them other alternatives for survival than piracyand organised crime activities, all actors, state and non,would have many things to gain.

CDR Ioannis Chapsos of the Hellenic Navy is aninstructor in the Security and Strategy Department atthe Hellenic Supreme Joint War College. He is a 1989graduate of the Hellenic Naval Academy and servedmost of his career on fast patrol boats. He also servedin National Defence Planning with the NationalDefence General Staff and the Human Resources/Education Department of the Hellenic Navy GeneralStaff. CMDR Chapsos holds the 1st Chair at the

International Association for Maritime SecurityProfessionals (IAMSP), and he is a member of theInternational Advisory Board of the Research Institutefor European and American Studies (RIEAS).He is specialized in Global security, the Human

Security Concept, Maritime Security, contemporaryconflicts and security challenges, focusing on Africa.He earned a Master’s Degree in “Terrorism,International Crime and Global Security” from theCoventry University (UK) and currently he is a PhDCandidate in the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki/Department of Journalism and Mass Communication,in the field of Global Security and the Media.E-mail: john.chapsos@gmail.com

chapsosi@jour.auth.grSkype: ioannis.chapsos

* Detailed information about the used references can by requested from the author or the NMIOTC Journal editors

50 NMIOTC Journal

SOMALI PIRACY SOMALI PIRACY

UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL BUSINESS MODELUNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL BUSINESS MODEL

by Dr Alec D Coutroubis and George Kiourktsoglou, Ph.D. candidate

This article investigates Somali Piracy not as a merecriminal activity that challenges and eventually breachesthe international Law of the Seas, but rather as anelaborate business model, that has far reaching tentaclesin (Geo)-Politics, Business, Trade and Shipping.

To begin with and based on Michael E. Porter’stheory of the ‘Competitive Advantage of Nations’, thepiracy business model is analysed in terms of its‘National Determinants’. The latter are the four broadattributes of the Somali Nation that have all alongnurtured the environment in which piracy has come toflourish:

a. Its ‘Factor Conditions’ or ‘Factors of Production’which refer to human resources (pirates, investors,facilitators/negotiators of ransoms), knowledgeresources (sources of information and intelligence onvessels and trade patterns), physical resources(equipment), capital resources (‘Seed Capital’ for theinitial support of a piracy mission) etc.;

b. Its ‘Demand Conditions’ which are directly relatedto the local clan system’s need for income and continuity,but also the mechanisms through which the local needsand aims resonate in the Piracy Industry;

c. Its ‘Relating and Supporting Industries’ whichactually nurture (the disruptive in some cases) innovationand upgrade featured by the pirates. The mostprominent among these industries is the financial one. Itprovides the venture(s) with the necessary means for thetransfer and legalisation of the crime proceeds;

d. Its ‘Structure and Domestic Rivalry’ or alternativelythe context within which a piracy organisation wascreated and is still managed.

In the next step and always within the aboveconceptual framework, the analysis moves on to fleshout the features of the phenomenon that have renderedit in the last four to five years so uniquely successful andat the same time so appealing to questionable investorsof sorts.

The analysis tries to draw a distinction between‘Comparative’ and ‘Competitive’ advantages of SomaliPiracy. Since Somalia does not feature a ‘Tradition inPiracy-practice’, it is the belief of the authors that thephenomenon has remarkably evolved due mainly to theconfluence of certain parameters nurtured (eitherintentionally or unintentionally) by the Somalisthemselves.

NMIOTC Journal 51

Even more, it is claimed within this article that thepiracy venture has evolved to a point of no returnbecause it has ceased long ago to be just anopportunistic source of alternative income. SomaliPiracy has created its own self sustained evolutionarysystem, the so called ‘Piracy Diamond’, which cannot beundone merely through the resurrection of mainstream,legitimate business and production. The businessventure has intriguingly merged a set of disparate,mainly local (and international in some cases)stakeholders, like kingpins, semi trained ex-securitypersonnel, money launderers, politicians and others, intoa mosaic powered by diverse drivers like geography,international trade, poverty, lawlessness and lack ofcentral political authority. Its mechanism has gone bynow ‘supercritical’, which means that even if some ofits initial ‘comparative advantages’ were neutralised, itwould still keep on its developing course using its self-developed ‘competitive advantages’. These were createdand sustained through a highly localised process that isstill developing. The role of the entire nation in thisprocess seems to be as strong as, or stronger than ever.

The main theme of the international discussionaround Somali Piracy is that the answer to the puzzlewill come ‘from ashore’ through the development ofalternative sources of income for the locals. With all duerespect to the good-will of the international community,it is the view of the authors that this is a manifestlysimplistic argument given that:

a. There are no (and neither will be) available sourcesof legitimate income except the traditional ones ofagriculture, fishing and (to a lesser degree) trade;

b. Even if there were, the income (per capita)generated by these alternative professional activitieswould pale compared to the cash generated via piracyransom payments.

Hence, it is the view of the authors that the countryis hopelessly condemned to business oblivion.

Although the solution to the problem of piracy surelylies ashore, the authors claim that it will not come in theform of alternative, more legitimate sources of income,but rather through the negation of one (or potentiallymore) of the determinants that have rendered thescourge sustainable, innovative and eventually successful.This would be the gradual replacement of local rivalries(among politicians, clans and disparate militias) by anation-(re)building process. Such a process could divertsubstantial physical and mental effort from illegitimateactivities towards a creative virtuous circle. An approachthat focuses on humanitarian aid and development couldbe far less costly than the current support of the

Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Moreinterestingly, a ‘Somalia left to itself is in many respectsless threatening than a Somalia that is being buffeted bythe winds of international ambitions to control thecountry’. At the same time a progressive degenerationof local rivalries would steal from Piracy (and its‘Diamond’) its most important determinant(s), thelifeline of indispensable human, financial and technicalresources.

On the face of it, Somalia's history shows very clearlythat in the absence of international intervention, thecountry has been quite ‘inoculated’ (a word used byintelligence operatives) against al-Qaeda andinternational terrorist organisations of sorts but notagainst local rivalries. The gist of this study is that unlessthese national hostilities get reasonably and effectivelyaddressed by the Somalis themselves the high seas piracyoff Eastern Africa will keep on festering for a long timeto come.

Dr Alec D Coutroubis (BSc (Hons), DIC, MSc, DBA,MBA, PhD, FCMI, CEng, CSci, MIChemE, FIMarEST,FHEA) is a Principal Lecturer & Teaching Fellow at theUniversity of Greenwich and Visiting Professor of ShiManagement at ALBA Graduate Business School, Greece. Hehas published extensively on a numerous topics relating toMaritime Engineering, Marine Management and Educationthrough a number of Books, Monographs as well as numerouspopular press publications.

George Kiourktsoglou obtained his B.Sc. in MechanicalEngineering in 1992 from the Aristotelian Technical Universityof Thessaloniki in Greece. As an intern, he worked for the IsraeliPublic Corporation of Electricity. Having concluded his militaryservice he went to the U.S.A. to study Nuclear Engineering andApplied Physics at Cornell University. From the latter hegraduated in 1996 with an M.Sc.. From 1996 till 2009 heworked for Royal Dutch Shell both in Greece and abroad,assuming various roles in Downstream Marketing, Strategy,Negotiations and eventually in Health, Safety, Environment andSecurity (H.S.S.E.). Sponsored by Shell Hellas, he graduated in2006 from Alba in Athens with a Diploma in Management andtwo years later with an M.B.A. in Shipping from the sameCollege. Currently he is doing research, as a Ph.D. candidate atthe University of Greenwich. His field of interest is MaritimeSecurity with a special focus on the “Piracy around the Gulf ofAden and the Horn of Africa”. George is a member of theAmerican Nuclear Society, the Chartered Management Instituteand the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science Technology inLondon. He speaks Greek, English, German, Japanese andFrench.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: IMPLEMENTING THE EFFECTCOMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: IMPLEMENTING THE EFFECTBASED APPROACH TO CONTEMPORARY MARITIMEBASED APPROACH TO CONTEMPORARY MARITIME

OPERATIONS PLANNINGOPERATIONS PLANNING

by CDR Ioan Craciun ROU N

Abstract: The ambition of this paper is toincrease awareness of the implementation ofcomprehensive approach, as a multilateralconcept, in the Alliance’s Operational

Planning Process with a special focus onMaritime Operations Planning.

INTRODUCTION

The global security environment of the post-ColdWar era is changing rapidly due to globalization, and amore dynamic and interconnected world. As aconsequence a new set of “risk conditions, ranging from‘failed states’ and ‘disruption of access to criticalresources,’ to ‘increasing ethnic tension’ and the‘challenge of conflicting values and world views” hasemerged. To be able to deal with this diversity,unpredictability, uncertainty and complexity it must beseen in light of a security agenda addressing concernsand vulnerabilities of our modern society with a greaterfocus on societal security. Furthermore, a generallyagreed strategy characterized by continuedinternationally political, economic, military and civilengagement must be created.

But, to meet these requirements there is a need fornew mutual expectations, arrangements, and institutionsto help manage the security affairs in the comingdecades. Coordination and cooperation between variousactors from the international community across a broadspectrum of policy areas will provide the basis toachieving key objectives necessary for lasting security.NATO allies, for example, have adopted thecomprehensive approach concept to meet the challengesand requirements of different operational environmentsshared with different international actors. At the sametime, the EU seems to be adopting a concept based onsimilar comprehensive approach principles and, with asimilar meaning and UN has introduced the concept ofthe integrated mission. All these concepts addressee thecontemporary operating environment exposed to thepotential use of violence by regular or irregularopponents and actors being subject to recent researchand comments. In both national and multilateral forums,a consensus approach has formed around the need for‘comprehensiveness’ at the conceptual level and

‘integration’ at the practical level.

As this paper in my opinion covers a certain/littleamount of unknown terrain, I have chosen to formulatea relatively modest objective. The ambition is to increaseawareness of the implementation of comprehensiveapproach, as a multilateral concept, in the Alliance’sOperational Planning Process with a special focus onMaritime Operations Planning. It is not my intent toexplore any of these multilateral concepts and associatedprocesses of the multilateral organizations, NATO, UNand/or EU.

BATTELESPACE COMPLEXITY

There is no doubt that the changes in theinternational system combined with rapid technologicaladvancement have affected the nature of warfare. Whatused to be based on simple symmetrical measures forstrategic reference within the logic of strategic choicefor parties to a conflict is no longer valid . The result isa war fighting environment that depicts two separatedomains for strategic reference, a physical and acognitive one. As a consequence, the complexity of thefuture strategic environment generated by this

The ambi0on is toincrease awareness of the

implementa0on ofcomprehensive approach,as a mul0lateral concept,

in the Alliance’sOpera0onal PlanningProcess with a special

focus on Mari0meOpera0ons Planning

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asymmetry requires us to expand our perception of thebattle field, Joint Forces and planning for operations.

We need first to explore and understand the non-linear relationship generated by the complex interactionsin the battelespace and than the best ways to employJoint Military Forces capable of operating in concertwith political, economic and civil levers to achieveeffects across the spectrum of conflict ranging fromArticle V force on force operations, to Non-Article V -Peace Support Opera¬tions and/or HumanitarianAssistance. It is more than obvious that ‘Joint operationscan only succeed through compre¬hensive coordinationat all levels and the Alliance military approach will beeffects-based, expeditionary and manoeuvrist incharacter . In other words, comprehensive approachshould drive planning at the political/military strategiclevel which should then guide lower level planning inorder to determine the objectives to be accom¬plishedby Joint Military Forces to reach the desired end state.The Joint Force Commander will orchestrate the actionsof his Components Commanders but it is they who willhave to coordinate their activity to deliver operationalsuccess.

REBALANCING THE LOGIC OF “ENDS-WAYS-MEANS”

The non-linear relationship generated by the complexinteractions in the battelespace has forced us to re-examine the way we think and plan strategically,operationally, and tactically. But this has to be exploredby taking into considerations that the complexinteraction of the physical and cognitive domains interms of strategic reference produces results that haveblurred the lines between the characterization of thetraditional strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Aphysical event on the tactical level that would normallybe insignificant in a symmetrical context may havestrategic or operational consequences in the form of acognitive effect ‘en masse’ .

Consequently, one of the most importantdevelopments in Western military was the effect-basedthinking. In the context of military science this new wayof thinking has been seen as the meeting place betweenthe social sciences and the long domination by thenatural/physical sciences of time and space within theoperational planning process . Effect-based thinking isactually an attempt to explain the complexity producedby the non-linear strategic interaction in modernconflicts and find ways to make these interactions moremanageable. Thus, for the purpose of the operationsplanning process the complexities of an asymmetricbattlespace are divided up into different dimensions for

strategic reference and in addition to the militarydimension, the political, economic, social, infrastructureand information dimensions have to be addressed aswell. The main reason of using the battlespacedimensions is simply to rebalance the logic of “ends-ways-means”, as the essence of the operations planningprocess, in both physical and cognitive domains. Bydoing this the non-military dimensions are opened upfor the operations planning process from thecomprehensive approach perspective and provide thefoundation for building future comprehensive approachcapacities.

The comprehensive approach and effects-basedphilosophy together as mentioned in the UK JointDoctrine Note issued by UK MoD in March 2007 “offermore sophisticated ways of analyzing complex situationsand planning operations, as well as the means ofincorporating and coordinating the efforts of allinstruments and agencies required to counter irregularactivity.” However, establishing test variables to measureprogress in a comprehensive approach operation is notan easy task.

REBALANCING MARITIME ENDS-WAYS-MEANS

It is axiomatic that Joint operations are about allcomponents working together as partners to in¬tegratetheir capabilities towards the accomplishment ofcommon objectives. Most likely, the operational activitiescarried out by Joint Military Forces could be categorizedinto three generic themes: preemption/prevention,engagement and rehabilitation/reconstruction. It is

Effect-based thinking isactually an a1empt toexplain the complexity

produced by the

non-linear strategicinterac0on in modern

conflicts and find ways tomake these interac0ons

more manageable.

more than obvious that Maritime Component will rarely,if ever, be able to accomplish the full spec¬trum ofmilitary effects alone. The same is true for Land and AirComponents.

The complexity ofthe maritimeenvironment demands abroader perspective ofMaritime Component“employment across thespectrum of conflict,ranging from peace,crisis prevention andresponse operations, to war and conflict resolution” . Inpractice, maritime operations may move from one partof the spectrum to another as the operationalenvironment changes. In any case Sea Control and/orsecured access to project power from the sea remainessential for operational success.

In such circumstances and under the comprehensiveapproach principles the Maritime ComponentCommander faces his own business: the conduct ofmaritime operations, including those to securingmaritime access in consent with integration with othersea users and followed by activities to stabilize rebuildand transition the maritime sector to civil control. Itfollows that coordination and cooperation between allsea actors has become even more essential to themaritime environment and that all of these elementsmust be taken into account when the planning processof the maritime campaign is conducted. It won’t be aseparate or isolated process but it will be part of thecollective collaborative effort aimed to balance maritimeends-ways-means to accomplish joint effects. But whatare the factors which should be considered under acomprehensive approach to maritime plan¬ning?

First of all, liaison with the main internationalmaritime actors and host nation maritimerepresentatives must be considered from the firstplanning phases as providing the basis for thecomprehensive approach framework. Even if thisnormally begins at the strategic level it must be mirroredat operational and tactical level to include here MaritimeComponent level. This will facilitate the unification ofeffort between all parties under a clearly defined andarticulated comprehensive approach strategy and allowmaritime commander to employ his forces andcontribute to joint effects requested by the political,economic, civil and military domains. This, in turn, willallow all stakeholders, including host nation, tocomplement and mutually reinforce each other’s effortsto achieve their end states.

Another factor needed to be considered by themaritime planning process is the establishment of theminimum maritime force requirements. A minimummaritime forces needs to be assessed to support the

operational militaryresponse optionsevaluation and than theinternational standardsrelated to forcedeployment in dedicatedarea have to beconsidered. This willsynchronize the use ofmaritime areas by

different maritime actors especially the commercialshipping.

Than, operations planning process must account forthe needs, expectations and perceptions of non-NATOmaritime civil actors during the operation executionphases; they are shaped by a different environment andapply different proce¬dures and practices. They can bestrongly independent and may not wish to be openlyassociated with the military which considerablycomplicates the comprehensive approach.

Once the operation is moving to its last phasesplanners need to understand that maritime civilianconsiderations begin to dominate and the maritimeplanning process must be adapted to reflect this and amore collegiate approach taken.

From the outset of the planning process plannersmust understand these requirements. Only after dueconsideration can lines of operation and courses ofaction be developed.

THE NEED FOR MARITIME PLANNERSTRAINING

The doctrinal entrenchment of the political, military,economic, social, infrastructure and informationdomains (PMESII) within the sphere of every officer’sbattle planning training will ensure that the principals ofcomprehensive approach are well understood andapplied in consonance with current developments withinthe military doctrine.

But the establishment of more detailed practices andprocedures will not in itself ensure improvement, if thepersonnel do not receive specific effect managementtraining. If personnel are not trained in managing theeffects cascade and using the PMESII mental modelling,they will likely resort to what they know best from themilitary dimension. Therefore diminishing the possiblenegative side effects of the ‘old school’ thinking will be

...the establishment of more detailedprac0ces and procedures will not in

itself ensure improvement, if thepersonnel do not receive specific effect

management training

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paramount to ensuring the success of the operationsplanning process at all levels including the tactical level.

The current dynamics of the NATO missionenvironment and the establishment of a new NATOPeacetime Establishment (PE) have clearly raised theneed for educated and qualified NATO operationsplanners at strategic, operational and tactical level. Thecourses currently recognized to fill this standard are theNATO School’s Operations Planning Courses (S3-54,S3-43, and S3-45). These courses are taught atoperational level and now the school is developing underSHAPE’s guidance another operations planning courseto be taught at strategic level. In other words officer’sbattle planning training needs are efficiently satisfied atoperational level and soon at strategic level. Thisdedicated training is not covered at all at tactical levelunless it is planned as an internal HQs training. This iswhy there is real need for an institutionalized trainingprogram dedicated to tactical maritime planners.

NMIOTC could start considering this training gapand design an alternative planning course taught attactical level for maritime planners. As a minimum thenavy officers involved in operations planning processeffect-based oriented should be educated in managingthe effects cascade and using the PMESII mentalmodelling. Having the same skills and using the samemethods, the overall process would benefit exponentiallyin terms of understanding situational awareness anddesigning lines of operations in consent with the othermaritime actors involved in a contemporary conflictmanagement.

CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this paper was to increase awarenessof the implementation of comprehensive approach, asa multilateral concept, in the Alliance’s OperationalPlanning Process with a special focus on MaritimeOperations Planning.

Comprehensive approach itself has many differentinterpretations, however most identify the central thrustof it as an attempt to create more synergy between themilitary and non-military resources, and to maximize thedesired effect at all levels of policy and plans. In thisregard comprehensive approach represents a desire fora more effective doctrine when dealing with asymmetricor complex conflicts.

The effective implementation of comprehensiveapproach within the operations planning process willincrease the effectiveness of NATO operations byproviding practices and procedures within the non-military dimensions of PMESII that can act as the

foundation for future military- non-military cooperation.

The present state of the comprehensive approachreflects doctrinal problems at the lower echelonsimplementation. This includes Maritime Componentlevel where there are difficulties in cooperation andcoordination with civil maritime actors and the lack oftactical training which make the comprehensiveapproach even more difficult to implement.

Moving from a kinetic analysis planning processes toan array of comprehensive approach practices andprocedures inspired by an asymmetric environment isnot an easy task. But the flexibility of the planningprocess should come from the comprehensive approachdimensional understanding of the battlespace and withcontribution of skilled and educated planners.

REFERENCES

1. ACT – Multiple Futures Project, Navigating Towards2030, Findings and Recommendations – Final Report, April2009

2. Dr. Mitchel, William (2008) Comprehensive ApproachCapacity Building: Implementing the Effect Based Approach toMilitary Operations, Royal Danish Defence College, Nov. 2008

3. UK MOD Doc. (2005) The Comprehensive Approach.Joint Discussion Note 4/05 (JDN 4/05)

4. Phister, Paul W. Jr, Timothy Busch, Igor G. Plonisch,(2004) Joint Synthetic Battlespace: Cornderstone for PredictiveBattlespace Awareness, Rome, NY: Air Force ResearchLaboratory/Information Directorate, 2004

5. AJP-3.1 ALLIED JOINT MARITIMEOPERATIONS, April 2004

6. Fischer, Kristain & Jan Top Christensen. (2005) Improvingcivil-military co-operation the Danish way, NATO Review,Summer 2005

7. Canadian Government Doc. (1999) Challenges Defi ningand Measuring Success in the New Strategic EnvironmentTechnical Cooperation Program Panel JSA-TP-3 ProceedingsReport (1999) Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

Cdr Graciun Ioan ROU N is a Director in theNATO School Oberammergau. He contributed theabove paper in the NMIOTC Annual Conference 2011presenting some general thoughts and ideas during theDiscussion Board Session. The paper points wereaccepted by the Conference Committee and includedin NMIOTC’ s food for thought paper for RegionalCapacity Building in NATO.

REGIONAL SURVEILLANCE CONCEPT TO SUPPORTREGIONAL SURVEILLANCE CONCEPT TO SUPPORTMARITIME GOVERNANCE AND SECURITYMARITIME GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

by Mr. Harm Greidanus

PROJECT SUMMARY

Piracy is an issue of concern, posing serious threatsto ships on innocent passage. The seas off the Horn ofAfrica are affected, but also West Africa is seeing anincrease in the number and severity of incidents. While,especially for Somalia, the root causes of piracy are onland, it is necessary for the moment at least to takeprotective measures also at sea. Increasing maritimesituational awareness can be one of those measures, asgood situational awareness is a key element in counter-piracy operations and risk avoidance.

In the PMAR project, the Joint Research Centre ofthe European Commission is currently studyingpossibilities to obtain maritime situational awarenessfrom a civilian background, primarily for the benefit ofcounter-piracy actors in the region. The conceptenvisions the production of (1) real-time maritimesituational awareness pictures that contain positions oflarge and medium vessels on a digital map, and (2)historic piracy risk occurrence and vessel trafficdistribution maps. These products are intended for usein the medium term by authorities in the region forcarrying out maritime security tasks. In the short term,they may also be of use to foreign operators who fulfil

that role at present, and to any stakeholders (commercialor government) in planning and executing theirlegitimate activities. While primarily developed forcounter-piracy, it is foreseen that most elements of thesystem can also be used for local maritime governancein a wider sense, including monitoring for illegal fishing,smuggling and pollution.

The maritime surveillance information should becompiled from a variety of data sources: vessel reportingsystems (technically: LRIT, AIS, VMS, VTS, voyage data)and observation systems (VDS or imaging satellite,surface radar, observer’s reports). Some of these dataare collected by Flag States, some by Coastal States,some by shipping industry and some can be purchasedcommercially. Existing space technologies play animportant role in collecting and communicating data(satellite observation and communication). Since acomplete picture of the maritime activities only emergeswhen all these data are combined, regional data sharingis key to adequate maritime situational awareness. Aregional approach is also the most cost effective one forpurchasing commercially produced data and exploitingspace technologies. The need to build up regionalmaritime surveillance capabilities to enhance maritime

56 NMIOTC Journal

AIS data from various sources, 6-22 Dec

Internationaly Recognised Transit Corridor

NMIOTC Journal 57

governance, including combating illegal fishing, was alsoone of the conclusions of the “First Regional Workshopon Piracy for Eastern and Southern Africa”, organisedby COMESA and IOC, held 19-20 July 2010 in theSeychelles.

It is the intention that the resulting maritimesituational pictures will be unclassified, intended for usein constabulary / civilian tasks. Nevertheless, they aresensitive and therefore only for use by trusted parties,while their detailed content can be adapted for differentusers depending on their legal remit and to coversecurity concerns.

Today’s technology does not allow the detection ofsmall uncooperative vessels over wide areas, nor do merevessel reporting and observation systems enableinterception of suspect vessels. Therefore, conventionalairborne and maritime patrol will always remain needed.

The present phase of the study is analysing theinformation content of the various possible input datasources and developing the processing and handlingneeded. A trial, collecting test data, was carried out atthe end of 2010, and a new one is scheduled for Oct-Nov 2011. The concept design should be completed,including a cost-benefit analysis, by mid-2012. Thisshould enable to make justified choices on how toproceed with further implementation.

Mr. Harm Greidanus studied astrophysics atLeiden University, The Netherlands, and in 1989received the Ph.D. degree. After that, he worked inremote sensing research at the TNO, the NetherlandsOrganisation for Applied Scientific Research, in TheHague, The Netherlands. His main topic was imagingradar, using various types of radar and from differentplatforms – ground-based, airborne and satellite; butthe research also included optical and infraredobservation systems. The work was predominantlyconcerned with maritime applications (bathymetry,surface waves and currents), but also extended tosome land mapping. In 2003, he went to the JointResearch Centre of the European Commission, inIspra, Italy. There, the work concentrated on vesseldetection from satellite radar images, and morerecently on the analysis of maritime surveillanceconcepts and systems integrating a variety of datasources. The research is application-oriented in thecontext of EU-level needs. These applications includefisheries control, maritime border security, maritimepollution control and, in the last years, counter-piracy.Currently he is involved in two EU-funded projects onthe latter subject, one related to the Horn of Africa andone related to the Gulf of Guinea. He has authoredover 100 publications in the scientific literature.

Radarsat-2 UltraFine (3 m res)Location of canoes- Blue: AIS- Green: GPS

COALITION END-TO-END EMIO PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION (C3PO)COALITION END-TO-END EMIO PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION (C3PO)

JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD)JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (JCTD)Data sharing to combat maritime illicit activities

by Dr. Stephen Desautel

The Coalition End-to-End EMIO PerformanceOptimization (C3PO) JCTD was conceived to providea repository for data collected during ship boarding’s.Currently there is no single system that allows all willingpartners to share collected data and query against thatdata base, in a near real time, for operationally relevantinformation. The sharing of boarding data will allow allpartners to leverage the efforts and expense of otherpartners while enhancing cooperation and trust. Theresults will include greater efficiencies in executing themission, enhanced safety and security of the boardingteams, and a much greater capability for themultinational forces to combat piracy and other illicitmaritime activities.

Building partner capacity is a primary mission notonly for the United States Government, but for manynations all over the world. With over 95% ofinternational trade moving by sea, world economies havebecome critically dependent upon free anduninterrupted sea trade. This increased globalization oftrade by sea requires renewed cooperation in themaritime environment. With continued economicglobalization, container volume is expected to double inten years, creating increased strain on already taxedinspection and boarding resources. The basic concept

and strategy to keep up with this growth are to shareassets and data in order to overcome the scale of theproblem, especially considering the current worldeconomic situation.

On Oct. 24 2011, the UN Security Council adoptedan India co-sponsored resolution on piracy in Somalia,incorporating—at India's initiative—the issue ofprosecution of convicted pirates not only for acts ofpiracy also for hostage taking. The resolution calls forinternational cooperation in sharing information for thepurpose of law enforcement and effective prosecution.

Piracy is not a problem unique to NATO and the EU.

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It is a worldwide problem affectingthe entire world’s ability to shipgoods and trade in the maritimeenvironment. Even so, piracy is onlya small subset of the larger problemof international maritime illicitactivities. Human and drug

trafficking, illegal bunkering, hazardous waste dumping,and illegal fishing are some of the other problems thatneed to be addressed. International cooperation and thesharing of information freely and openly is required toaddress all of these problems.. The economicsovereignty of every nation supported by internationaltrade is impacted by the inability to protect seafarers, andto monitor, regulate, and enforce maritime laws.Additionally, criminal syndicates have also adapted andmigrated to the sea, taking advantage of the gray areas

in blue water law enforcement, the lower shipping costsand avoiding air interdiction. International air traffic datasharing has vastly improved over the last 20 years dueto international cooperation. Maritime data sharingneeds the same level of effort.

To combat these illicit activities sea-faring nationsneed to analyze and track activities that allow or enablepiracy and other illicit maritime activities to flourish.

The C3PO JCTD is designed to support the monitoringof suspicious activities by providing all participatingpartners the ability to share and obtain informationabout the ship, the route, the cargo, and crew manifestto include identifying any crew previously highlighted asa person of interest.

Identity resolution operations, allow the ability toidentify an individual through measurable characteristics,

such as fingerprints or iris patterns. To enable thiscapability the C3PO JCTD will speed up access to theship boarding data repository through automatedinterfaces that will parse and organize the informationcollected from the disparate systems that currently exist.Data will be available on a query basis through a newdata center in Miami Florida and connected to theNATO BRITE system in San Diego, California.Partners may use the shared data to their best advantage.Enhancing maritime interdiction operation with identityresolution operations provides civil/law enforcementefforts and some military missions with the ability toprecisely identify highlighted individuals even withforged documents.

C3PO is funded by the United States and will besupported by the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy. Nofunding is required to participate as a partner. Theinformation will be available via the Internet on a securesocket layer server with password protection. Forcountries with handheld collection devices or kits, theC3PO system will allow both uploads and downloadsof information through the internet with the aid of datatransfer protocols.

The potential will be available, with the correctequipment, to have near-real-time information about theship, the cargo, or crew and other concerns. The C3POportal will allow participating boarding crews to bebetter prepared prior to the boarding, be more efficientduring boarding, and to share what they find during aboarding. This effort will contribute significantly tocapturing much of the relevant data required to counterpiracy by more effectively targeting the use of maritimeassets to deter or prevent illicit maritime activities.

Footnote: Graphics provided by Dalji,Globalspec, the US NationalMaritime Intelligence Center, Christian Science Monitor, biometrics4u

Dr Stephen Desautel currently works for the USEuropean Command in Stuttgart, Germany. He is anexpert in applying biometric techniques in MaritimeInterdiction Operations environment. His team isworking on the expanded MIO concept trying toprovide viable solutions in order to effective combatthe phenomenon of maritime terrorism. The abovementioned paper was presented to the NMIOTCannual conference as a proposal to NATO in theeffective application to Regional Capacity Building.His team ideas where discussed extensively during theconference discussion board and included to theNMIOTC food for thought paper that was presentedto NATO IMS.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED INTERNATIONALA FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED INTERNATIONALMARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION AND AWARENESSMARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION AND AWARENESS

by Cpt Ken W. Hoffer USA N

INTRODUCTION

I recall a quote from former California GovernorArnold Schwarzenegger, who stated, "Start wide, expandfurther, and never look back". So you might ask, whatdoes this have anything to do with Maritime SecurityCooperation and Awareness ?

In the context of International maritime securitycooperation, technical solutions and ad-hoc securityarrangements can not adapt fast enough, to deliver atimely response to an ever expanding spectrum ofasymmetric threats emanating from the shoreline andcarried to sea. All too often we are faced with thechallenge of reacting to situations which cause seriouseconomic and political challenges rather than plan adeliberate and tailored response to control and resolve apotential security threat . Give the unprecedentednature of transnational crimes in today's global maritimeenvironment, increased demands for security dependson a wider scale of networks that are willing tocollaborate to protect everyone's national security andeconomic interests at sea. It involves an enhanced or"expanded" network of inter-regional maritime securitycoordination centers which serve to deliver acollaborative response to maritime threats.

IS IT A BRIDGE TOO FAR?

The development of standards for safe navigation,communication, and operation of maritime shipping haslong been an area of international cooperation.Maritime Security Cooperation and Awareness (MSCA)is largely the responsibility of different national agenciesin a domestic setting. In some nations, there are explicitoversight or co-ordination centers. To achieve awarenessat a regional or even global level, many of the functionscurrently managed by individual nations will have to beundertaken by organizations which will enable allstakeholders to operate more efficiently and effectivelytogether. One model for understanding maritimesecurity cooperation and awareness (MSCA) organizesactivities in layers:

International governance architectures often form inresponse to a need to coordinate behavior amongcountries around an issue such as maritime security. Inthe absence of an overarching governance organization,countries would have to align and coordinate activities,such as internet domain names and cellulartelecommunications through numerous bilateralagreements, which would become impossibly complexto administer worldwide. Fortunately, internationalorganizations such as, the Internet Corporation of

Layers of Mari2me Security Coopera2on and Awareness (MSCA)

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Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and theInternational Telecommunications Union (ITU) servesimultaneously as a forum, a multilateral treaty, and agoverning body to standardize these activities globally.These examples serve to illustrate that an overarchingconcept to regulate and coordinate our collective effortsis possible and can serve a common good...in this caseglobal INTERNET coverage and cellularcommunications. The precedence is there. MaritimeSecurity Cooperation is achievable and simply requiresthe political will and a community of interest toimplement.

WHO SHOULD LEAD?

Given the plethora of maritime security initiativeswhich are now rapidly evolving in many nations andregions around the world, the challenge of linking thebest of these diverse processes to form an effectiveinternational framework for maritime securitycooperation and awareness is compounded by differingcultural norms, political agendas and technical standards.Given the inherent linkage of maritime safety andsecurity, international co-operation in these activitiescould follow one of several conceptual models whichcould successfully close the gaps and provide effectiveglobal maritime security cooperation. A prime examplewhere success has been achieved is in the civil airindustry. The International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO), founded by like-minded states, was originallydesigned to improve air safety standards. It has alsoachieved great success in sharing information and settingnew security standards for passengers and air cargoworldwide to counter the growing threats fromhijacking, terrorism and air piracy. There is no reasonwhy this same conceptual approach would not work formaritime transportation.

Enhanced maritime security begins with a frameworkof domestic law enforcement and defense activitiescoordinated amongst various national agencies. Thiscollaborative framework extends individual mandatesand collective interests to facilitate broader co-operationfor geographic regional activities, and can culminate inintra-regional global initiatives.

The enablers for greater maritime securitycooperation and awareness (MSCA) include:

Whether operating at a domestic level, or a globallevel, any initiative for MSCA must tackle the difficultlegal and policy issues which surround agencyresponsibility and co-ordination with other domestic orinternational groups. Sovereign governments mustconfirm that it is in their national interest to work with

neighboring states and commercial or non-governmental agencies to improve maritime security.

Timely and effective information sharing mustremain a central priority for the stakeholders who havea responsibility to inform and update information in linewith desired operational outcomes. These networksmust link constabulary with military networks where itmakes good operational and economic sense to do so.There are practical concerns on how such informationis to be structured electronically and securely managed.In many ways, new surveillance and communicationtechnology is making MSCA more feasible, but suchimprovements carry with them the challenges ofexpense and increased complexity for establishing therequisite infrastructure that not all national partners canafford. Commercial maritime organizations have avested interest in improved maritime security (since itdirectly impacts their costs and risks) but companiesmust often be convinced that their participation inMSCA initiatives will offer real affordable benefits

within clear regulatory structures. Finally, co-operationbetween current regional MSCA initiatives leverages thetrusted relationships built between participants overmany years of operation.

The growing number of national and regionalinitiatives creates independent systems and processeswhich detract from common standards. Throughalignment of best practices, implementation of theseenablers can provide a framework for superior maritimesecurity cooperation and awareness on a global scale.Selecting the coordinating body for such a largeundertaking must be made through consensus formedby all participants. This international community ofinterest will determine activities such as surveillance andinformation requirements, as well as, establish standardsfor the tools and applications needed to share andconduct collaborative risk assessments. The keyobjective here is aligning and linking the broad spectrum

Enablers of Mari2me Security Coopera2onand Awareness

of maritime security capabilities which will enable therelevant agencies to rapidly sort through volumes ofdata to quickly assess the appropriate level of responseto deal with a specific threat.

The United Nations, as an international body with areputation for impartiality among many participants, isan obvious choice for facilitating, providing legitimacyto, but not necessarily executing, global MSCA.Cooperation promotes a convergence of nationalstrategic and security interests. International institutionshelp facilitate alignment of interests and provide aforum for establishing a reputation for implementingthe efficient employment of complex strategies.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO)Maritime Security Directorate has a mandate which fitsclosely with enhancing international maritime security.It is a logical candidate for consideration as a facilitatorfor aligning processes and coordinating standards thatenable regions to build on existing internationalcooperative frameworks to achieve global MSCA,leading to improved maritime security.

SO WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The IMO seems to be the logical choice, to carry thisconcept forward. In fact, there are several initiatives inIMO that include a comprehensive security regime forinternational shipping which entered into force on 1 July2004, as well as mandatory security measures, adopted inDecember 2002. IMO has lead the effort incoordinating repression of piracy in Horn of Africawhich is now codified in the Djibouti Code of Conductwhich was signed in January 2009. Seventeen nationalsignatories have agreed to co-operate, in a mannerconsistent with international law, delivering andenforcing the rule of law at sea and conduct sharedoperations, including the sharing of related information,through a number of centers and national focal pointsusing existing infrastructures.

This ground breaking effort has set the stage to"expand further" the concepts for broader interregionalcooperation to improve security on a global scale. IMOcould facilitate the expansion of this concept, but itrequires a coalition of the willing to set in place theappropriate governance architectures and standards toimplement. In short, collective political will to get onwith it and "not look back ".

The CJOS COE in concert with the Joint Staff(former US JFCOM) are now examining this challengeto assure safe an secure access to the Global MaritimeCommons. The Multi-National Experiment 7 (MNE 7)Project is a two year interagency effort to develop

solutions to address the challenge of a establishing afederated network of Inter-regional Maritime Securityregimes which will serve all nations to guarantee accessto a safe and secure Global Maritime Commons.

CONCLUSION

The development of relevant and effective solutionsthat meet all nations' needs in the maritime commonsdepends on each nation's level of commitment andinvolvement in contributing to this importantinternational effort.

The outcomes of this research and development willprovide fresh innovative approaches on how theinternational community can build or enhance existingmaritime security regimes in order to assure allstakeholders can be assured of their access andlegitimate freedoms to operate and prosper in a safe andsecure global maritime environment. The findings ofthese studies will be published in 2012. A preliminaryanalysis will be presented at the next CJOS/CSW COECombined Maritime Security Conference which will beheld in Halifax, Nova Scotia Canada from 4 to 7 June2011.

Details and registration for this conference areavailable at www.maritimesecurityconference.org.

Seventeen nations are currently committed to thestudy, the X factor in this equation remains…whichnation or nations will demonstrate the political will andcommitment stand before the IMO General Assembly,to table a resolution to establish a Convention forMaritime Security Cooperation and Awareness?

Captain Kenneth Hoffer is a staff officer in CJOSCenter of Excellence in Norfolk Virginia currentlyworking on issues relevant to maritime security.

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This ground breakingeffort has set the stage to

"expand further" theconcepts for broader

interregional coopera0onto improve security on a

global scale.

MARITIME AFFAIRS, SAFETY OF NAVIGATION ANDMARITIME AFFAIRS, SAFETY OF NAVIGATION ANDSECURITYSECURITY

by Professor Josip Kasum

ABSTRACT

In this paper, maritime affairs are systematically determined.The analysis of the subsystem of safety of navigation and securityindicates its importance. Its successful functioning in interactionwith other subsystems is a precondition for optimum continuationof maritime traffic. The author also points out that the level ofsafety of navigation and security differ for various categories ofships. Therefore, possible problems are presented and ways toresolve them are recommended.

Key words: maritime affairs, ships, safety of navigation,security

MARITIME AFFAIRS

Maritime affairs may be observed in two ways. It may

be considered as a skill to navigate and/or a system ofvarious activities related to the exploitation of the sea.Maritime affairs may be systematically determined as anentirety of interactions between man and sea. It can bepresented as a general model review (Figure 1).

According to the current concept of maritime affairs,in compliance to the recommendations given by theInternational Maritime Organization – IMO containedin the Convention Safety of Life at Sea – SOLAS, thesubsystem of ships consists of two categories of ships:SOLAS ships and Non-SOLAS ships. The ships towhich SOLAS Convention regulations are applied aredetermined in Chapter 1, Regulation II of the SOLASConvention. Such ships are also referred to as SOLAS

General model review of the mari2me affairs system

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VESSELS

NAVIGATION

WARS

NAVY

MARITIMEHERITAGE

EXPLOITATION OF THESEA AND THE SEABED

MARITIMEMANAGEMENT

MARITIMEARCHAEOLOGY

OTHER

ENVIRONMENT

SAFETY OFNAVIGATION

&SECURITY

ships, while those to which the SOLAS Convention doesnot apply are referred to as Non-SOLAS ships. Non-SOLAS ships are: cargo ships < 500 GT, war ships,wooden ships of primitive build, pleasure ships, fishingvessels and yachts. It may be concluded that the systemof maritime affairs consists of a series of subsystemswith a relatively great number of interactions betweenthe subsystems, the system and the environment.Further on, a particular attention is given to maritimetraffic in relation to the interaction of maritime trafficsubsystem with the subsystems of safety of navigationand security.

MARITIME TRAFFIC

Maritime traffic may be observed according to thedivision to two kinds of ships. For instance, Conventionor SOLAS ships are engaged in 80% of the global trafficof various goods [14]. The traffic of Non-Conventionships corresponds to the total capacity of fishing andwar ships of particular countries and is considered to besignificant. It is necessary to note the outstandingincrease of the ships categorised as pleasure boats –ships for sports and recreation. The example of theRepublic of Croatia may be analysed, where nauticaltourism business is significant. The number of pleasureboats is constantly increasing, as well as the trafficdensity and the accommodation density of such vesselsin corresponding ports. The ratio between Conventionand non-Convention vessels in the Republic of Croatiais exceptionally disproportionate (Figure 2). It may beconcluded that there is an outstanding discrepancy inthe ratio between Convention and non-Conventionships. The situation is similar in the countries withoutstanding nautical tourism activity [9]. With referenceto the safety of navigation and potential risk, thesituation may, to a certain extent, be compared to a

hypothetical example from aviation, by asking thefollowing question: What would happen to the safety ofair navigation if, along with 1,000 passenger planes, there

were 160,000 smaller, sports planes? It may beconcluded that in general, the traffic of vessels innautical tourism is exceptionally increasing, and that thusthe possibility of damage for the society and property isalso increasing. To a certain extent, the activities ofnautical tourism assume the characteristics of criticalinfrastructures [1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 13].

SAFETY OF NAIGATION AND SECURITY

The subsystem of safety of navigation and securityshows its specific aspects in technical and technologicalmaritime navigation process. Recently, there has been anincrease of terrorist, pirate and other threats [4, 3, 7, 8],therefore the subsystem of safety of navigation andsecurity is becoming more important. It can beconsidered as vital for a successful functioning ofnavigation process. It is therefore necessary to define itspossible sensitivity to various types of threats [15].Further on, the meaning of concepts of safety ofnavigation and security are explained. The safety ofnavigation may be considered as a system consisting ofa series of subsystems and activities. The function ofthe safety of navigation system is to maintain thenavigation safe. The importance of the controlsubsystem may be pointed out. Its activity is importantfor the functioning of other subsystems and of thesystem as a whole. The safety of navigation may bepresented in the general model review (Figure 3). Inorder to perform the tasks related to the safety ofnavigation and security, the countries with businessactivities in maritime and internal navigation constitutefunctional bodies of the government administration. Itmay be concluded that, for the reasons of safety ofnavigation and security, recommendations given byinternational organisations engaged in navigation areadopted in national regulations and implemented inpractice. An example can be the Law on SafetyProtection of Commercial Vessels and Ports Open toInternational Traffic (International Ship and Port FacilitySecurity - ISPS Code). Its implementation is compulsoryin countries with maritime industry. Its main purpose issecurity and it relates to the security of merchant ships,i.e. of Convention or SOLAS ships and to the securityof ports open to international traffic. It may beconcluded that the law is implemented in practice, butonly at SOLAS ships and in international traffic ports.The concepts of safety and security need to bedistinguished. It can be concluded that SOLAS ships,despite the highest level of safety of navigation andsecurity in conformity with present resolutions, stillindicate certain sensitivity to various kinds of threats.

When comparing SOLAS ships and non-SOLAS

Conven2on and non-Conven2on ships in theRepublic of Croa2a in 2007 [10]

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non-conventional

conventional

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ships and especially pleasure boats in nautical tourism, itis necessary to point out that adequate legal regulationsdo not exist or they are insufficient [6, 10]. For example,the security for such ships does not correspond tocurrent solutions and demonstrates extreme sensitivityto various types of threats. Hence, it is necessary toundertake suitable measures for improvement.

MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT

It is assumed that in most cases the number of non-Convention ships in relation to Convention ships ishigher or increasing. The risks are various andpredictable. Some examples of risks are terrorist attacks,environment pollution, biological pollution, humantrafficking, illegal trade, etc. It is evident that a relativelybig group of non-Convention ships is in the area forwhich there is no suited form of ISPS code. Thereforethe appropriate security code for non-Convention shipsand nautical tourism ports has to be developed:(International Non-Convention Ship and NauticalTourism Port Facility Security Code – InSNTPS Code)[10].

When creating the InSNTPS code for non-Convention ships it is proposed to start from the basicelements (levels one to four):

1) non-Convention ship,

2) organisation,

3) nautical tourism port, and

4) other supporting elements.

The first level refers to non-Convention ships. It isproposed to analyse pleasure boats, fishing and otherships. It is assumed that military and police ships areadequately protected by corresponding legal regulations.Pleasure and fishing ships in various countries aresteered by individuals with various unequal and non-standardised skills and licences. Differences are inacquired skills, authority and formal licences. Therefore,it is proposed to standardise at international levelofficer’s qualifications, education programme and officialform of various licences. Special education programmesrelating to security need to be developed andimplemented in the existing programmes for obtaininglicences. At the second level, organisation forms needto be recognised or developed. Non-Convention ships,except fishing boats, mostly refer to pleasure boats. Thecharacteristic of these ships is individual, i.e. free orpersonal engagement of owners or users in navigationand other procedures relating to ships. Therefore anyform of organising them is, to put it mildly, undesirable.However, this category of ships may be classified invarious forms of organisations. Organisation is a fromof trade, sports or similar association, for instance,

General model review of safety of naviga2on

INTERNATIONALAND DOMESTICREGULATIONS

SEARCHAND

RESCUE

MATERIAL ANDLEGAL

RELATIONS

PRETECTION OFSEA AND INLANDWATERWAYS

MANAGEMENT OFMARITIME ANDRIVER TRAFFIC

ACCIDENTSAND

VIOLATIONS

PROTECTION OFPOLUTION FROM

SHIPS

DIVING

PROTECTION OFMARITIME DOMAIN

CONTROLOF

WATERWAYS

OTHER

CONTROLOF

NAVIGATIONALSAFETY

charter agency, user of the ship, owner of the ship,sports club, diving club, etc. It is proposed to developprogrammes of organised educational courses andissuing permits relating to security. The third level relatesto the proposed general term, nautical tourism port. Itis assumed that such a port is an organised coastalinfrastructure for organised berthing and guarding ofships. A nautical tourism port needs to be considered asthe basic element of coastal part for which appropriatesecurity procedures and permits have to be developed.The fourth level includes other ancillary supportingwhich are expected to be partially included in the model.These are port authorities, information and flows ofinformation, various verification procedures, etc. Insome countries, for instance in the Republic of Croatia,

there are organised voluntary guards of non-Conventionpleasure boats. They have to be appropriately includedin the system. It is certain that adequate areas need tobe discussed and co-ordinated at international level.Therefore, it is proposed that the development of thesecurity system of non-Convention ships isimplemented through an international organisation, likeUnited Nations - UN or International MaritimeOrganization - IMO. The procedure of creatingappropriate security system of non-Convention ships isvery complex and comprehensive. Therefore it isproposed to develop an outline of the security system ofnon-Convention ships according to the proposedalgorithm (Figure 4). Complex dynamic systems, intowhich the security of non-Convention ships may be

General algorithm of the development of InSNTPS

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categorised, is not easily developed and structuredwithout suitable programme support. The method ofdynamic modelling may be functional in understandingthe behaviour of dynamic systems. Therefore, afterdeveloping the model it needs to be dynamicallymodelled and future effects need to be simulated.

CONCLUSION

Maritime affairs are considered to be a skill tonavigate and/or an organised system of various activitiesrelated to the exploitation of the sea. Maritime affairs issystematically analysed as an entirety of interactionsbetween man and sea. According to the InternationalMaritime Organisation and the Convention of theprotection of human life at sea, there are SOLAS andnon-SOLAS ships. SOLAS ships are engaged in 80% ofthe modern global traffic of various goods. The numberof non-SOLAS ships is constantly increasing, especiallyof the ships in nautical tourism. The safety of navigationand security are crucial for a successful functioning ofboth categories of ships. However, internationalregulations relating to security substantially differ. Forinstance, ISPS code is implemented for SOLAS ships,while there is no corresponding regulation relating tonon-SOLAS ships, in spite of their high number andconstant growth. It is therefore proposed to continueresearches in developing the International Non-Convention Ship and Nautical Tourism Port FacilitySecurity Code – InSNTPS Code, which will greatlyreduce certain types of threats for the society andproperty [10].

REFERENCES

1) “European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection”EU Center,http://www.eucenter.org/index.php?action=programs&process=detail&id=99,http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de /EN/Aussenpolitik/ Aussenwirtschaftsfoerderung/ Verkehr/InternationalerSeeverkehr_node.html

2) Kasum, J., Božić, Fredotović, K., Vidan, P., How nauticaltourism ports affect the environment, International Conference onmanagement of natural resources, sustainable development andecological hazards, Wessex Institute of Technology, South Africa,2010, Gordon Bay, 2010, p. 123-133.

3) Kasum, J., Ivančić, P., Stanivuk, T., Maritime accidents andactivities of international community, GIS Odyssey 2010Proceedings: Space, Heritage & Future, Zagreb, HIZ GISForum, Croatia, UNIVERSITY of SILESIA, Poland,2010, p. 63-68

4) Kasum, J., Vidan, P., Skračić, T., Maritime radiationprotection and seamen’s safety, ISEP 2010, Ljubljana, Slovenija,

Electrotechnical Association of Slovenia, 2010. M3-M3

5) Kasum, J., Mišević, P., Perkušić, M., Environment, nauticaltourism ports, regulations, HAZU, Zagreb, 2011, p. 97-104.

6) Kasum, J., Gržetić, Z., Marušić E., Contribution to thedevelopment of management and strategic decision-making innautical tourism ports, Promet-Traffic&Transportation, Vol.19,2007,.5., p. 295-299.

7) Kasum, J., Baljak, K., Vidan, P., Evaluation of the existingpiracy protection measures // ISEP 2007 Applications ofIntelligent Transport Systems, Ljubljana, ElectrotechnicalAssociation of Slovenia, 2007

8) Kasum, J., Baljak, K., Vidan, P., A Contribution to theEnhancement Measures Against Piracy, 14th TIEMS AnnualConference 2007 : Book of Proceedings, Split, Hrvatskihidrografski Institut, 2007, p. 518-527

9) Kasum, J., Marušić, E., Gržetić, Z., Contribution to theDevelopment of the Model of Managing Reambulation in Ports,Promet, 3, 2006, Vol.18, p. 223-228.

10) Kasum, J., Marušić, E. Gržetić, Z., Security of non-Convention ships and nautical tourism ports, TIEMSCONFERENCE, Seoul, 2006, p. 206-211.

11) Lipowicz, A., “EU to Spend Far Less for InfrastructureProtection” Washington Technology 5 July 2005, LexisNexis.George Mason University Library, Fairfax. 19 Oct. 2006

12) “Romanian President Urges EU to Establish IntelligenceCommunity” People’s<http://english.people.com.cn/200610/19/eng20061019_313299.html

13) “The European Parliament (EP) Tues. Rejected a Proposalto Require Retention of Communications Data” CommunicationsDaily 9 June 2005. LexisNexis. George Mason UniversityLibrary, Fairfax. 19 October 2006

14) “U.S., European Union Agree on Passenger Data” LosAngeles, Times http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-briefs7.6oct07,1,5837271.story?coll=la-headlines-business

15) “US to Vow At EU Summit to Respect Rights in Anti-Terror Fight” Agence France Presse 21 June 2006. Lexis Nexis.George Mason Library, Fairfax. 19 October 2006

Professor Josip Kasum is currently Vicedean for PR & Development in Faculty ofMaritime Studies at the University of Split andan Adviser to the Director of the HydrographicInstitute of the Republic of Croatia.e-mail: jkasum@pfst.hr

COUNTER-PIRACY ESCORT OPERATIONS IN THECOUNTER-PIRACY ESCORT OPERATIONS IN THEGULF OF ADENGULF OF ADEN

by Professor Thomas Lucas and LtCdr T. Tsilis GRC N

The Horn of Africa, a peninsula in East Africa, is aregion comprising the countries of Eritrea, Djibouti,Ethiopia, and Somalia and is laved by the south part ofthe Red Sea and the Gulf of Africa (GOA). It is one ofthe most strategically important international waterways,and it carries almost the 95% of European Union (EU)trade (by volume) transported by sea and 20% of globaltrade.

Piracy and absence of the rule of law in war-tornSomalia are directly linked. In the early 21st century,when the second phase of the Somali civil war began,piracy off the long coastline of Somalia began to be athreat to international shipping. The lack of a substantial

government, the disintegration of the Somali armedforces, and the possibility of gaining quick wealththrough ransom caused a rapid increase in pirate attacksand armed robbery in the GOA and the Somali Basinregion (SBR).

Some observers also allege that illegal over-fishing ofthe Somalian waters by foreign poachers and thedumping of toxic waste have motivated some Somaligroups engaged in piracy. Big trawlers taking advantageof the lack of Somalian authority were illegally fishingvast amounts of sea life, estimated at $300 million’sworth, leaving local fishermen with empty nets. Also, itis hinted that a large amount of nuclear waste, including

Interna2onal Mari2me Bureau Piracy Map for 2010 (From Interna2onal Chamber of Commerce, 2010)

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lead, cadmium, and mercury has been dumped inSomalian waters by other nations and individuals. This isallegedly contributing to the radical decrease in sea life.Early on, Somali fishermen started demanding thatpoachers pay fines, giving their groups names such asthe National Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia orSomali Marines. Later, they realized there was moremoney to be made from straightforward abductions forransom.

Increased pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden (GOA)has gotten the attention of the international community,and many countries are engaged in counter-piracyoperations to protect vulnerable shipping and providehumanitarian aid. The European Union Naval Force(EUNAVFOR) Somalia—Operation ATALANTA, isthe European Union’s first naval operation. In February2009, the Internationally Recommended TransitCorridor (IRTC) was established in order to introducesafer and more organized passage for all merchantvessels transiting the GOA. The IRTC is a corridorbetween Somalia and Yemen within international waters,consisting of two lanes, each of five nautical miles (nm’s)width, one eastbound and one westbound, with a spaceof two nm between them. The total length of the transit

corridor is 480 nm, and a vessel maintaining 14 knotsrequires 34.5 hours to pass through it. Vessels thatintend to pass through the IRTC are grouped accordingto transit speed. Groups of 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20knots transit speed are formed at specific hours anddates, and traverse the IRTC under the coalition’sescort/convoy services.

This thesis uses simulation to identify the key factorsinvolved in escorting vulnerable shipping through theGulf of Aden. Specifically, a scenario in which a groupof merchant ships travels under escort of a warship ismodeled using an agent-based simulation environmentknown as Map-Aware, Non-uniform Automata(MANA). The simulation is run to address the followingquestions:

• How does the number of merchant ships affectthe ability of the frigate to defend them?

• How many pirates can a convoy adequatelyhandle?

• What factors should be taken underconsideration when we have an escorted convoy?

The scenario simulated in MANA, shown in Figure

Interna2onally Recommended Transit Corridor(From h3p://www.eurocean.org/np4/file/863/Piracy_Gulf_of_Aden___Indian_Ocean.pdf, 2010)

1, involves coalition force operations using a warshipwith a helicopter to protect a convoy of merchant shipstransiting westbound in two columns along the IRTC.This area usually includes many fishing or other

individual traveling vessels, and the pirates behave likeone of them until they approach a potential target, attackit, and attempt to capture it. The scenario commencesfrom the point that the pirates have reached high

Parameter Es2mates and Predic2on Profiler for Final Fi3ed Model

Map of the Scenario

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velocity heading towards the convoy. The pirates can beidentified by one of the merchant ships or by theescorting warship.

The merchant ships are sailing in two-columnformation. As soon as one realizes it is being approachedby a quickly moving, suspicious vessel, it signals the fleet,increases speed, and begins evasive tactics while theentire convoy flees. The warship, which may be sailingbeside, before, or behind the merchant formation,increases speed and heads towards the merchant underattack. At the same time, orders are given for a helicopterto take off, which heads towards the provocation.

Using state-of-the-art design of experiments (DOE),over 300,000 convoy operations are simulated. TheDOE distinguishes between decision factors (i.e., thosevariables that we can control) and noise factors (thosevariables we cannot control), and varies the following:

• Decision factors: warship position, convoyspeed, number of merchant ships, distance betweenmerchant ships, and helicopter takeoff delay

• Noise factors: number of pirates, pirate speed,communication latency between merchant ships andwarship, and distance from convoy at which piratesreveal identity

As a measure of effectiveness (MOE), the meanmerchant (blue) casualties are computed. Three primaryanalysis techniques are used to quantify how meanmerchant (blue) casualties are affected by the factorsabove: multiple-regression analysis, robust analysis, andclassification and regression trees.

The analysis finds that in the scenario modeled:

• The three most influential factors in theregression analysis are the number of pirates, piratespeed, and convoy speed,

• The most successful convoys have fewer than 14merchant ships and travel at greater than 18 knots,

• The warship should patrol in front or on theflank of the convoy,

• It is important to be able to identify pirates at 4kilometers from their target,

• More than three pirate vessels are especiallydifficult to counter, as are pirates that travel at more than39 knots.

This thesis provides many opportunities for follow-on research:

• The scenario may be expanded using more thanone escort warship or Unmanned, Aerial Vehicles

(UAVs) to patrol over the convoy for the whole or partof the trip.

• The scenario may also include other MOEs,such as the time it takes for the warship to interdict thepirates.

• Finally, the scenario may be expanded to ahigher level of detail. It may include the time it takes thewarship or helicopter to stop and arrest the pirates orthe actual self-protection measures the merchants maytake to deter or delay the attack, like razor-wire barriersor water, spray, and foam monitors.

THESIS DISCLAIMERThe reader is cautioned that the computer

programs presented in this research may not havebeen exercised for all cases of interest. While everyeffort has been made, within the time available, toensure that the programs are free of computationaland logical errors, they cannot be consideredvalidated. Any application of these programswithout additional verification is at the risk of theuser.

Thomas Lucas is a Professor of OperationsResearch at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) inMonterey California. He has been at NPS since 1998.Previously, he worked for six years as a statisticianand project leader at RAND and for eleven years as asystems engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company. Hisprimary research interests are simulation, warfareanalysis, design of experiments, and robust Bayesianstatistics. In addition to his regular faculty duties,Professor Lucas is a co-director of NPS's SEEDCenter for Data Farming—see http://harvest.nps.edu.SEED is an acronym for Simulation Experiments andEfficient Design. The Center's mission is to advancethe collaborative development and use of simulationexperiments and efficient designs to provide decisionmakers with timely insights on complex systems andoperations.

LtCdr T. Tsilis graduated the Hellenic NavalAcademy in 1965 and has served in various Hellenicships (frigates, fast patrol ships), mainly on fast patrolships as chief engineer. He has received a Mastersdegree in Operational Analysis from NavalPostgraduate School in Monterey California. He iscurrently serving in Souda Naval Base.

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ARTEMIS – A NOVEL MULTIPURPOSE SMART BUOYARTEMIS – A NOVEL MULTIPURPOSE SMART BUOY

by Mr Anastasios Kounoudes, Ph.D. and Mr Christodoulos Protopapas, Ph.D.

SignalGeneriX, a Cypriot R&D company has recentlyjoined forces with Hellas-Sat and the Maritime Instituteof Eastern Mediterranean for the development ofARTEMIS, a novel, multi-purpose, energy autonomousSmart Buoy able to operate in extreme environmentalconditions providing real-time data from a wide rangeof environmental and security sensors.

The consortium is building on its own technologythat has been developed for a variety of environmentaland water monitoring applications both for on-shoreand offshore deployments in Cyprus. The pictures belowshow a smart buoy designed for real time monitoring ofwater quality in dams and a smart buoy designed foroffshore environmental monitoring deployments in theMediterranean.

The aim is to build a multi-purpose, low cost, energy

efficient, autonomous smart buoy able to operate inextreme weather conditions and which could be easilymodified so as to pursue various missions such asMilitary and maritime terrorism surveillance, Securityand Border Control, Search and Rescue, Sub-seasurveillance, Meteorology and EnvironmentalMonitoring.

ARTEMIS uses the latest cutting edge technology inbuoy design and construction materials, embeddedelectronics, satellite communications, renewable energysystems, mooring systems, and sensor data acquisition,

processing and fusion. By optimizing the form andfeatures of the following sub-systems, an ideal buoy canbe developed to match specific needs, applications, andbudget.

Buoy Structural Design: The buoy which exceeds8m height has an octagonal shape and is divided in threesections namely the top level which includes the satelliteantenna and long-range surveillance sensors, the mainlevel which includes the doorway and powering systemand the lower level which is below the waterline andincludes the buoy’s electronics. The buoy which is mostlyconstructed with aluminum is designed in such a way soas to minimize movement due to wave and maximizethe period of oscillation. The octagonal design of themain and upper levels serves as a base for thedeployment of photovoltaic’s while the black ballast tankat bottom serves as a fuel reservoir. The buoy includesboth topside and subsurface sensor deploymentplatforms with a variety of mounting options.

Hybrid Powering SYSTEM: ARTEMIS includes aninnovative hybrid powering system, essential forextremely long power autonomy. Based on theWisense® energy management system, the buoy canswitch from solar powered to diesel powered optionaccording to weather conditions, power consumptionand operating scenario. The system can automaticallyadjust sensor sampling rates, communication optionsand also perform ‘sleep and wake-up’ and ‘hibernation’modes if needed to optimize its power consumption.ARTEMIS is expected to run whole seasons without theneed of re-fueling.

Buoy for Dam (right) Offshore Buoy (le")

ARTEMIS site and top view

NMIOTC Journal 73

Sensors and Data Acquisition. The buoy includestwo sensor deployment platforms; one for underwaterand one of surface sensors located below the lower andover the top level respectively. All sensors are easilyintegrated to the sensor interface which provides bothpowering and data acquisition functionalities as well aslocal and remote server data logging capabilities. Thesystem is fully customizable since it is designed to ensureremote adaptation of sampling frequencies and dataacquisition scenarios as operation priorities change.ARTEMIS can house from one to hundreds off theshelf analogue and digital sensors, meeting the needs ofdifferent demanding environmental, search and rescue,security and military applications.

Communications and telemetry. Hellas-Sat, a satelliteowner and a major satellite communication provider isproviding a high data-rate channel for ARTEMIScommunication needs. A satellite antenna equipped witha 3-axis antenna positioner mounted at the top of thebuoy ensures robust high speed data transmission. Thededicated satellite link significantly expands thecapabilities of ARTEMIS beyond traditional telemetryapplications since it can now accommodate videostreaming in real time. This feature is essential fordemanding surveillance application where day or nightvision is required. ARTEMIS also offers severaltelemetry options for remote data access and sensorcontrol on a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days ayear basis, providing consistent and high quality data.

Data Management. ARTEMIS boasts apowerful data management system, based onthe Wisense® platform (Figure 3), whichenables both the buoy administrator andselected users to have access to real time andhistorical buoy data. Wisense® enable theARTEMIS administrator to fully control thevarious buoy systems remotely while alsoprovides the user a powerful data presentationand charting platform for data analysis. Inaddition, ARTEMIS is equipped with andinstant messaging and alerting mechanism, ableto inform selected users about any change insignificant parameters according to pre-definedscenarios. The systems also builds ontoWisense® powerful reporting tool to provideany user with customizable data reports andevent logs according to their needs.

The above mentioned concept is beingpresented here in NMIOTC MIO Journalaiming to produce useful ideas, share maritimerelated technological knowledge and at the sametime present to NATO and International

Community that through technological advancements itis possible to increase maritime surveillance with lowcost applications, which is now the most importantfactor that drives all operations in Alliance. It is our firmbelief that technologies like the aforementioned willchange the traditional maritime interdiction operationsin the future in a more network centric environment.Our sole intention is to build and prove throughexperimentation, simulation and modelling that thistechnology will help to minimize costs and increasemaritime interoperability and surveillance for bettercountering the phenomena of piracy and maritimeterrorism that has been increased in the maritimecommons during the last decade.

Mr Anastasios Kounoudes is the CEO of SignalGenerix Company and currently the lead advisor forArtemis project.

e-mail: a.Kounoudes@signalgenerix.com

Mr Christodoulos Protopapas is the CEO of HellasSat. He attended through his representative theNMIOTC Annual Conference and presented a paperfor smart buoys and cutting edge technologies in themaritime satellite surveillance environment.

e-mail: chproto@hellas-sat.net

ARTEMIS-Wisense® Monitoring pla1orm

74 NMIOTC Journal

EXPANDING NMIOTC USING MOBILE TRAINING TEAMSEXPANDING NMIOTC USING MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

by Lt Antonios Pothitos GRC N

Within the last three years, NMIOTC has establishedits existence, as a NATO Education and Training Facilitybeing the sole Center in Alliance relevant to MaritimeInterdiction Operations (MIO).

Annual Conferences, Semi-Annual Courses, newcourses that the Center continuously is developing -Weapons of Mass Distruction, Countering thephenomenon of Piracy, Countering ImprovisedExplosive Devices and the influence they have in aMIOperation – as well as Experimentation, simulationand modeling is providing the relevant knowledge that

makes us feel a key player in the tactical maritimeenvironement training area.

Since NMIOTC started its full operational programof work, had the offer of providing its products throughMobile Training Teams (MTTs) to the customers. The

last month an MTT took place in Croatia, Split. TwoNMIOTC Instructors traveled to Croatia providing thewhole Course of 1000 Series (Command Team MIOIssues) to 22 XOs, Operational Officers, NavigationalOfficers, Weapons Officers, Boarding Team Officersand Assistant Boarding Team Officers of the CroatianNavy. The course lasted one week, from 17 to 21 ofOctober 2011.

The tools that NMIOTC MTT used to deliver thetraining were extracted from Alliances official techniquesfor educating its members.

Our main concern, was to establish a mutualcooperation with the trainees. We were prepared to teach

them, we were most willing to guide them, we wereleading them on how to use the provided knowledge butmost importantly we had to make them believe on us.These were the main challenges we had to face.

NMIOTC instructors along with Croa2an officers on aceremonial gradua2on photo a"er the end of the course. TheChief of the Croa2an Fleet and the Chief of the Coast Guard

were also present.

Students spli3ed in syndicates and worked on the last day on athree hour 2me dynamic table top exercise answering

ques2ons regarding real mari2me scenarios which werefocused on Adria2c sea’s opera2onal environment in order to

facilitate Croa2a’s training needs.

... a table top exercise wasimplemented in order to

maximize the effectiveness of thetransferred knowledge and leaveto the students practical ideasand techniques regarding theexecution of maritimeinterdiction operations.

NMIOTC Journal 75

Also having the language barrier we had to beproactive and well prepared to avoid misunderstandingsand finally reach our goals which was to transfer, shareand exchange knowledge in the maritime interdictionfield.

During all days of training we were continuouslyreviewing students’ performance. All attendees answereda number of questions that covered mainly the wholesubject, after each presentation.

Finally a table top exercise was implemented in orderto maximize the effectiveness of the transferredknowledge and leave to the students practical ideas andtechniques regarding the execution of maritimeinterdiction operations.

The effort that the Instructors had to make, forproviding through Mobile Training Teams the sameCourses, the same Modules and eventually the sameknowledge as in NMIOTC, had to be doubled .

It was a difficult task, successfully completed andmost importantly proving to ourselves that teachingdoes not always needs state of the art facilities but onlycutting edge education skills that overcome all obstaclesand make the class environement from cold friendly,from static dynamic and from indifferent challenging.

This is the way of stemming new ideas and creatingan environment that leaves behind solid knowledge andunforgettable experiences.

Lt Antonios Pothitos GRC N is an NMIOTCEducation and Training staff officer for tthe last threeyears. He has participated on various NATO MIOoperations and he has served all his Navy careermainly on board frigates as Communications andOperations Officer. He is a qualified instuctor fromNATO school Oberammergau and also from nationalaccreditation authorities. He speaks fluent Englishand he is married with four children.

During gradua2on the Deputy of the Croa2an Navy,the Chief of the Croa2an Fleet and the Chief of the

Coast Guard were present and briefed by NMIOTC’sinstructors on the training result of the course.

An NMIOTC Instructor delivering a class inNego2a2on techniques. Subjects such as MIO

Intelligence, MIO theory, air assets andcapabili2es, counter piracy and many more were

presented to the Croa2an Navy Officers class

... teaching does not alwaysneeds state of the art facilitiesbut only cutting edge educationskills that overcome all obstaclesand make the class environementfrom cold friendly, from static

dynamic and from ... indifferent challenging

76 NMIOTC Journal

MARITIME OPERATIONAL LANGUAGE TRAINING COURSEMARITIME OPERATIONAL LANGUAGE TRAINING COURSE

by Cpt Teresa Fairbanks, USA Navy Reserve

The NATO Maritime Interdiction and OperationalTraining Center (NMIOTC) successfully completed thefourth annual presentation of the Maritime OperationalTerminology Course (MOTC) from 19-30 September2011, in beautiful Souda Bay, Crete, Greece. NMIOTChosted and executed the MOTC event with studentsponsorship provided by NATO Allied CommanderTransformation (ACT), Norfolk, Virginia, USA.NMIOTC reports to ACT’s Education & Trainingbranch as a NATO instructional facility.

MOTC is just one of many course offerings at thetraining facility. This course enables forces to gain abetter understanding of surface, sub-surface, aerialsurveillance and special operations activities in supportof NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).NMIOTC’s aim is to increase allied and partnerexpertise in MIO while developing interoperability andcooperation.

The objective of MOTC is to familiarize NATO,Partners for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD),Istanbul Cooperative Initiative (ICI) and other alliedmaritime officers with the use of the English-languagemaritime operational procedures, along with theassociated terminology used by NATO naval forces.Students also receive instruction in NATO’s OperationalPlanning Process (NATO OPP) and ship tacticalsimulator training.

After completion of the course, students will be

MOTC is just one ofmany course offeringsat the training facility

NMIOTC Journal 77

prepared to operate alongside NATO maritime forcesin a variety of contingency operations or serve as part ofa joint NATO maritime staff. The course was wellattended with students representing the countries ofAlgeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Greece,Czech Republic, and Mauritania.

The course introduced students to the history,structure, and functions of NATO with the mainoperational focus on the many challenges facing NATOand coalition maritime forces in suppressing piracy offthe Horn of Africa (HoA) and Gulf of Aden regions.The class schedule featured briefings covering relatedtopics such as NATO Anti-Piracy Operations, HOAGeopolitical Analysis, and Naval Guidance and Controlof Shipping (NCAGS). These and the other coreMOTC courses are designed to help a naval officer onanti-piracy patrol with NATO forces to betterunderstand the type of environment he or she would bemost likely to encounter.

MOTC is conducted in a dual format, a traditionalclassroom environment and a hands-on-simulator event.This is the second year that an extraordinary simulatorexercise has been part of the curriculum, well receivedby the students, where they have the opportunity toapply learned knowledge from the classroom and applythis as they take on various roles as CommandingOfficer, Operations, and Communications officers. Thescenarios take the theme of encountering unknowncontacts while patrolling the waters off of a fictionalcountry, and allow the student to demonstrate skills inhandling various situations. This is designed to helpnaval officers on anti-piracy patrol with NATO forces tobetter understand the type of environment he or shewould be most likely to encounter.

MOTC instructors actively encouraged students toengage in class discussion and interact as much as

possible, improving their English skills and enhancingthe learning experience for both students andinstructors. Students were tasked with giving a 20minute presentation about their home countries inEnglish during the second week. The MOTCparticipants are evaluated by instructors based on theirgraded results from daily quizzes, a comprehensive finalexam and daily class participation.

Course Director Lt Georgios Mantzouris, GRC N,expertly coordinated all aspects of the program for thestudents from initiating the student sponsorship fromNATO ACT through to graduation. He also arrangedseveral events which allowed the students opportunitiesto learn about the Crete culture by touring ancient ruinsand historic sites around Chania. Students andinstructors also participated in several social eventswhich were pleasant occasions for more sharing andinteraction between all represented countires.

The success of MOTC 2011 was made possiblethrough the close cooperation between the HellenicNavy, NATO ACT and the U.S. Navy (USN). TheHellenic Navy provided multi-service instructors,advanced training facilities and logistical support withsponsorship assistance from NATO ACT, while foursenior officer instructors from USN Reserve unit NRNATO ACT HQ UNIT provided the English-languagemaritime terminology expertise.

Captain Teresa Fairbanks is a member of US NavyReserve unit in ACT, Norfolk, Virginia. She is anexperienced educator from the US teaching Englishlanguage skills and techniques to various schools andacademies. For a second consecutive year she hasprovided skilled language techniques to MOTCstudents helping them to better familiarize with NATOmaritime English abbreviations and language.

MOTC is conducted ina dual format,

a tradi0onalclassroom

environment and ahands-on-simulator

TRAINING OF ROS REGINA MARIA IN NMIOTCTRAINING OF ROS REGINA MARIA IN NMIOTC

by LtCdr Alexandrou Gobjila ROU N

Between 01st and 03rd of November 2011, aRomanian frigate and its crew members received theNMIOTC partial training of “1000 - 3000” courses,taking advantage of the period spent in Souda forreplenishment, while participating in Operation ActiveEndeavour.

This training is quickly becoming a tradition for thefrigates of the Romanian Navy. Almost all ships havepaid a visit to the center, prior their deployments, mainlyin support of Operation Active Endeavour.

For ROS REGINA MARIA this training is not anovelty, but for the current command team, theopportunity to receive MIO training and to practiceprocedures in the NMIOTC simulator was well received.Subjects such as Legal Issues (Module 1040), INTELSupport to MIO (Module 1030), Air Assets (Module1070) and Maritime Interdiction Operations Phases(Module 1050) were on the agenda. The training periodended with a simulator session, a good occasion for thejunior officers to practice all the MIO procedures in arealistic setting.

There was a total participation of eight (8) officers,most of them for the first time in a deployment.

The Boarding Team members of ROS REGINAMARIA were trained in the following subjects:

(1). Tactical Sweep (Module 3030) - During thismodule, the trainees learned step by step the roomclearing fundamentals. They also learn and executetechniques on how to clear corners, ladders andstairwells. Additionally they learned and executed tacticalmovement in passageways, small compartments and alsoon open decks.

(2). Crew Control / Suspect Crew Handling(Module 3040) - The Module’s main objective is toimprove the Boarding Party’s skills necessary to safelyapproach, neutralize and secure crew of a suspect vessel(SV). During this module, the trainees learned and putinto practice a full skill set of dealing with compliant ornon compliant crew members and also arrest andsearching techniques.

(3) Small Skiff Investigation (Module 7100) - thistraining was a new procedure for the crew. The teamslearned how to approach and investigate a small craft,and how to clear it. This was a last minute addition to thetraining, well received and implemented.

There was a total participation of twenty-four (24)trainees, who are serving as Boarding Team membersonboard their ship.

Despite the port period for replenishment waslimited to three (3) days, training was tailored to complywith the requirements of the upcoming deployment.During the training there was full coverage concerningsecurity issues of the trainees and the cooperation andcoordination between instructors and trainees wereexcellent.

LCdr Alexandru Gobjila is currently a Counter-Piracy instructor in NMIOTC.During his 13 yearcarrier he has served on board MCM ships andfrigates in the Romanian Navy.LCDR Gobjila is alsoa qualified English Language instructor.

78 NMIOTC Journal

NMIOTC Journal 79

NATOMaritimeInterdictionOperationalTrainingCentre

Marathi Souda Bay, Crete

Zip 73200Greece

Phone:+302821085716 Email:

journal@nmiotc.grc.nato.int

www.nmiotc.gr

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