The Meanings of tôrâ in 4 Ezra

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/157006307X236280

Journal for the Study of Judaism 38 (2007) 530-552 www.brill.nl/jsj

Th e Meanings of tôrâ in 4 Ezra

Karina Martin HoganFordham University, Lincoln Center, 113 W. 60th Street, Ste. 924,

New York, NY 10023, [email protected]

Abstract Tôrâ, rendered as “the law” in the extant versions, is a central theme of 4 Ezra. Th e author of 4 Ezra had a much broader concept of tôrâ than simply the Mosaic law. While for Ezra it is bound up with the covenant, in Uriel’s speeches, tôrâ is a highly abstract concept associated with wisdom, the natural order, and “the way of the Most High.” Understanding the term tôrâ broadly as divine “instruction,” the author of 4 Ezra extends it to all of Scripture and by implication to the seventy additional books revealed to Ezra in the epilogue.

Keywords4 Ezra, Sirach, Ben Sira, Torah, Law, wisdom, instruction

Introduction

Th ere appears to be a scholarly consensus that the translation “instruction” or “teaching” better captures the meaning of the majority of occurrences of hrwt/tôrâ in the Hebrew Bible than does the more frequent translation “law.”1 It has long been recognized that the nearly ubiquitous equation of

1) See, for example, Marc Zvi Brettler, “Introduction to Torah” in Th e Jewish Study Bible (ed. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler; New York: Oxford, 2004), 1-7 (here 2); Peter Enns, “Law of God,” in New International Dictionary of Old Testament Th eology and Exege-sis (ed. Willem A. VanGemeren; Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997), 4: 893-900 (here 897); Martin J. Selman, “Law,” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch (ed. T. Des-mond Alexander and David W. Baker; Downers Grove, IL and Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 2003), 497-515 (here 509). Th e most thorough, if somewhat dated, study of the usage of tôrâ in the Hebrew Bible is Gunnar Östborn, Tôrâ in the Old Testament: A Semantic Study (Lund: Håkan Ohlsson, 1945).

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hrwt with νόμος in the LXX was a mistranslation in many cases.2 At the same time, most scholars would agree that in Late Biblical Hebrew hrwt, as a definite noun, usually modified (e.g., hrwth, Neh 8:2; hwhy trwt, 1 Chr 22:12; hçm trwt rps, Neh 8:1; hçm dyb hwhy trwt rps, 2 Chr 34:14; etc.) is best translated “law.” Th ere is less agreement on exactly how the shift in the meaning of tôrâ is related to the redaction of the Pentateuch, and when the term hattôrâ became a way of referring to the Pentateuch as a whole.3

Th e shift in the meaning of tôrâ from “instruction” to “law” may reflect a change in the status of the tôrôt of the Pentateuch themselves, as Anne Fitzpatrick-McKinley has shown. She argues that the original meaning of tôrâ may be understood, by analogy with the Indian concept of dharma (or Egyptian ma’at or Old Babylonian kittum), as advice or instruction for liv-ing in accord with the “natural order of things,” which was understood to be divinely ordained.4 Focusing on the Book of the Covenant, she postu-lates that it originated within scribal circles as a collection of “sacred moral teaching” and only later came to be understood by the Jewish people as having the status and authority of “law.”5 Although she traces the roots of this development back to the late monarchy and assigns an important role in the process to Ezra, she dates its completion to the Hellenistic period,

2) A good early discussion of the problem is C.H. Dodd, Th e Bible and the Greeks (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954; first published in 1935), 25-41, especially 30-33. See however the criticisms of his views in Ephraim E. Urbach, Th e Sages: Th eir Con-cepts and Beliefs (tr. Israel Abrahams; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 288-90. 3) Sara Japhet, “Law and ‘Th e Law’ in Ezra-Nehemiah,” in Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies ( Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 99-115 (here 99-100). Th e usage of the definite tôrâ to refer to an authoritative text is first found in the later portions of Deuteronomy (e.g., 4:8, 31:9) and the Deuteronomistic History, but there the text in question is obviously Deuteronomy itself, not the Pentateuch. Nevertheless, the later usage of tôrâ to refer to the Pentateuch may be viewed as an extension of the Deutero-nomic usage. See Enns, “Law of God,” 895. 4) Anne Fitzpatrick-McKinley, Th e Transformation of Torah from Scribal Advice to Law (JSOTSup 287; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 114-15, following B. S. Jackson, “From Dharma to Law,” Th e American Journal of Comparative Law 23 (1975): 490-512. 5) Fitzpatrick-McKinley, Transformation of Torah, 146-77. She thinks the single most important factor leading to the transformation of tôrâ was writing; once written down, it became the object of scribal exegesis and hence gradually developed its own autonomous authority.


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after the identification of hrwt with νόμος.6 Fitzpatrick-McKinley’s work tends to support the view that at least by the late Hellenistic period, hrwth generally meant “the law” of the Jewish people, which was equated with the Pentateuch.

While the Hebrew originals of both Sirach and Baruch apparently did use hrwth to refer to the Pentateuch, the fact that both identify tôrâ with Wisdom (Sir 24:23; Bar 4:1)7 calls into question the assumption that the older meaning of tôrâ had simply been replaced by the meaning “law” in the Hellenistic period. In Sirach at least, tôrâ is closely related to the order of creation.8 Probably it was familiarity with the older view of tôrâ as advice for living in harmony with the order of creation that prompted Ben Sira to identify the tôrâ of Moses with Wisdom. Th e message of Sir 24 is that the tôrâ of Moses is the “supreme actualization” of the divine wisdom that pervades creation.9 Th e wisdom poem in Baruch, on the other hand, sug-gests that the “law that endures forever” (4:1), which is “the book of the commandments of God” (4:1), is the exclusive possession of Israel (4:2-4). Nevertheless, the fact that Baruch (following Sirach) identifies this book with Wisdom (3:9-4:4, passim) and “the whole way to knowledge” (3:36) implies that both authors viewed it primarily as a book of divine instruc-tion, and not simply as “the law.”10

6) Fitzpatrick-McKinley, Transformation of Torah, 21, 148. Östborn (Tôrâ in the Old Testa-ment, 53, 87-88) also believes that tôrâ acquired the meaning “law” when it became a writ-ten text, but he sees this process as being essentially complete by the time of the final editing of Deuteronomy. 7) For a reconstruction of the Hebrew text of Baruch, see David G. Burke, Th e Poetry of Baruch: A Reconstruction and Analysis of the Original Hebrew Text of Baruch 3:9-5:9 (SBLSCS 10; Chico, CA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1982). Th e Hebrew text of Sir 24 is not extant, but there can be little doubt that νόμος translates hrwt in 24:23. For a survey of the twelve occurrences of hrwt in the extant Hebrew text of Sirach, see Eckhard J. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul: A Tradition Historical Enquiry into the Relation of Law, Wisdom and Ethics (WUNT 2/2; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1985), 31-33. 8) See Johannes Marböck, “Gesetz und Weisheit: Zum Verständnis des Gesetzes bei Jesus Ben Sira,” BZ NF 20 (1976): 1-21. Although Schnabel disputes Marböck’s conclusions at great length in Law and Wisdom, 29-44, he does not demonstrate conclusively that Ben Sira’s understanding of tôrâ was limited to the Mosaic law. Nevertheless, Ben Sira is appar-ently unaware of the Stoic concept of “natural law” and never clearly articulates the rela-tionship between the created order and the tôrâ of Moses. See Sharon Mattila, “Ben Sira and the Stoics: A Reexamination of the Evidence,” JBL 119 (2000): 473-501. 9) John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 58. 10) Most scholars date Baruch somewhat later than Sirach; see Burke, Th e Poetry of Baruch, 26-32.



Tôrâ in 4 Ezra

Th is paper aims to demonstrate that 4 Ezra, an apocalypse written in Pal-estine near the end of the first c. C.E.,11 maintains a very broad under-standing of tôrâ, as divine “instruction” in various forms. More precisely, tôrâ is used in several different senses by Ezra and the angel Uriel, to refer to the law of Moses, to Scripture generally, to a broader corpus of revealed texts, and also to a more abstract entity that is closely allied with divine wisdom, the order of creation, and “the way of the Most High.” Th is should not be a surprising claim, since several scholars have pointed out that 4 Ezra has affinities with Jewish wisdom literature.12 Moreover, Stone and others have pointed out numerous points of contact between 4 Ezra and later rabbinic literature,13 in which the term tôrâ often means “tradition,”

11) Th e dating of 4 Ezra (2 Esd 3-14) around 100 C.E., based on the dating formula in 3:1 and on the interpretation of the Eagle Vision (12:10-35), is accepted by most scholars, as is its Palestinian provenance. See Michael E. Stone, Fourth Ezra: A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 9-10; Jacob M. Myers, I and II Esdras: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (AB 42; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 129; John J. Collins, Th e Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Apocalyptic Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 196; George W.E. Nickelsburg, Jewish Literature between the Bible and the Mishnah: A Historical and Literary Introduction (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 287, 292; Bruce M. Metzger, Introduction to 4 Ezra in OTP 1:520. 12) Most recently, see Shannon Burkes, “‘Life’ Redefined: Wisdom and Law in Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch,” CBQ 63 (2001): 55-71. Th e most extensive treatment of the issue is Michael A. Knibb, “Apocalyptic and Wisdom in 4 Ezra,” JSJ 13 (1983): 56-74. Schnabel (Law and Wisdom, 147-51) assembles a list of points of contact between 4 Ezra and the wisdom tradition, stressing the wisdom background of the dialogue form. Joan E. Cook points to the generally sapiential character of the questions raised in 4 Ezra in the conclu-sion of her article, “Creation in IV Ezra: Th e Biblical Th eme in Support of Th eodicy,” in Creation in the Biblical Traditions (ed. Richard J. Clifford and John J. Collins; CBQMS 24; Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1992), 129-39. Harnisch includes the relationship of the author to the wisdom tradition as one of the “open ques-tions” about 4 Ezra in his essay “Der Prophet als Widerpart und Zeuge der Offenbarung: Erwägungen zur Interdependenz von Form und Sache im IV. Buch Esra,” in Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Apocalypticism, Uppsala, August 12-17, 1979 (ed. David Hellholm; Tübingen: JCB Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1983), 461-93 (here 485). 13) Stone, Fourth Ezra, passim; Bruce W. Longenecker, “Locating Fourth Ezra: A Consid-eration of Its Social Setting and Functions,” JSJ 28 (1997): 271-93. Longenecker makes a strong negative case against the polarization of “apocalyptic” and “rabbinic” interests, at least for the period between 70 and 132 C.E., but his suggestion that the author of 4 Ezra was among the rabbinic sages at Yavneh is unwarranted by the evidence.



including both Scripture and the evolving corpus of rabbinic interpreta-tion, the “oral tôrâ.”14 Th e possibility of a broader meaning for tôrâ in 4 Ezra than simply “the law” has been largely overlooked, however.15

Admittedly, there is an element of speculation involved in studying the meaning of any term in 4 Ezra, since not only is the Hebrew original entirely lost, but also the first translation into Greek (except for a few frag-ments preserved as quotations in Greek patristic sources). Th us the only available texts are tertiary versions, the most reliable of which are thought to be the Latin and the Syriac.16 In the case of this particular term, how-ever, it seems fairly safe to assume that where the Latin version has a form of lex and the Syriac a form of nāmōsā, the Greek Vorlage must be a form of ὁ νόμος, which in turn translates a definite form of hrwt in the original Hebrew.17 Retro-translation at two removes is a risky business, but the assumption of most scholars that “the law” in 4 Ezra can only refer to the law of Moses surely has something to do with the fact that the broader semantic range of tôrâ is obscured by the extant versions.

14) See Urbach, Th e Sages, 286-93; see also Hindy Najman, Seconding Sinai: Th e Develop-ment of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism (JSJSup 77; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 109-16. 15) Th e only exception (apart from this author’s dissertation) is Stefan Beyerle, “‘Du bist kein Richter über dem Herrn’: Zur Konzeption von Gesetz und Gericht im 4. Esrabuch,” in Recht und Ethos im Alten Testament (ed. Stefan Beyerle, Günter Mayer and Hans Strauß; Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1999), 315-37, on which see below. Schnabel (Law and Wisdom, 143-47) insists that the law in 4 Ezra is always the Mosaic tôrâ, understood as given to Israel alone; nevertheless he points to the close correlation in the book between the law and wisdom (149-51). Michel Desjardins, in “Law in 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra,” SR 14 (1985): 25-37, notes the association of the Law with wisdom and understanding in 2 Baruch (30-31) but opines that in 4 Ezra, “the dominant view . . . is that adherence to the Law does not lead to wisdom and understanding” (36). Michael P. Knowles (“Moses, the Law, and the Unity of 4 Ezra,” NovT 31 [1989]: 257-74) is primarily concerned with the depiction of Ezra as a second Moses in the epilogue and his comments on the significance of the law in the rest of the book are brief. Nevertheless, he makes the intriguing observa-tion that in 4 Ezra “the Law itself functions as a good yetzer or impulse when properly nurtured in a humble recipient” (270). Burkes (“‘Life’ Redefined,” 59-63) makes much of the wisdom-tôrâ correlation in 4 Ezra but does not consider the possibility of meanings for tôrâ other than the law of Moses. 16) Stone, Fourth Ezra, 3. 17) By this author’s count, tôrâ is mentioned no fewer than 28 times in 4 Ezra: 3:19, 20, 22; 4:23; 5:27; 7:17, 20, 24, 72, 79, 81, 89, 94, 133; 8:12, 29, 56; 9:11, 31, 32 (twice), 36, 37, 38, 54; 14:21, 22, 30. Th e phrase referring to tôrâ is lacking in the Syriac version of 7:79. Myers (I and II Esdras, 126) remarks on the obvious importance of “the law” to the author of 4 Ezra; he counts 26 occurrences in chs. 3-14.



Another difficulty with studying the usage of a key term such as tôrâ in 4 Ezra is that the book does not present a unified perspective on any theo-logical issue, and particularly in the case of tôrâ offers contradictory assess-ments. In earlier scholarship the self-contradictory character of the book was explained via a source-critical approach,18 or by viewing it as the prod-uct of a conflicted mind.19 It was later argued by Egon Brandenburger and Wolfgang Harnisch that the contentious dialogues between Ezra and the angel Uriel that make up the first two-thirds of the book reflect first-cen-tury C.E. theological debates; it is therefore critical to distinguish between views expressed by Ezra and those placed in the mouth of Uriel.20 Both Harnisch and Brandenburger argue that the author speaks through Uriel in the dialogues, which is more plausible than the view that he speaks through Ezra.21 Nevertheless, it is worth considering the possibility that

18) G. Volkmar, Das vierte Buch Esra (“Esdra Propheta”), Vol. 2 of Handbuch der Einleitung in die Apokryphen (Tübingen: Fues, 1863); Richard Kabisch, Das vierte Buch Esra auf seine Quellen untersucht (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprechts Verlag, 1889); G. H. Box, Th e Ezra-Apocalypse (London: Pitman and Sons, 1912); see also his introduction and annotated translation of 4 Ezra in APOT 2:542-624; W.O.E. Oesterley, II Esdras (Th e Ezra Apocalypse) (WC; London: Methuen, 1933). 19) Hermann Gunkel, “Das vierte Buch Esra,” in APAT 2:331-402; Earl Breech, “Th ese Fragments Have I Shored against my Ruins: Th e Form and Function of 4 Ezra,” JBL 92 (1973): 267-74; A. Peter Hayman,“Th e Problem of Pseudonymity in the Ezra Apocalypse,” JSJ 6 (1975): 47-56; Alden L. Th ompson, Responsibility for Evil in the Th eodicy of IV Ezra (SBLDS 29; Missoula, MT: Scholars, 1977). Stone, Fourth Ezra, builds upon this approach. 20) Th e first scholar to draw attention to the dialogue form and to suggest that the author speaks primarily through Uriel was W. Mundle, in an article entitled “Das religiöse Pro-blem des IV. Esrabuches,” ZAW NF 6 (1929): 222-49; see especially 235-36. His suggestion was picked up by Egon Brandenburger in his brief discussion of 4 Ezra in Adam und Chris-tus: Exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Röm 5:12-21 (1 Kor 15) (WMANT 7; Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1962), 27-36. Th e first thorough historico-theological analysis of the dialogues of 4 Ezra was Wolfgang Harnisch, Verhängnis und Verheißung der Geschichte: Untersuchungen zum Zeit- und Geschichtsverständnis im 4 Buch Esra und in der syr. Baruchapokalypse (FRLANT 97; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1969). Harnisch later argued that the fifth and sixth episodes are not original to the book, in the previously cited essay, “Der Prophet als Widerpart und Zeuge der Offenbarung.” Th e most comprehensive reading of 4 Ezra along these lines is Egon Brandenburger, Die Verborgen-heit Gottes im Weltgeschehen: Das literarische und theologische Problem des 4. Esrabuches (ATANT 68; Zurich: Th eologischer Verlag, 1981). 21) Th e only scholar who maintains that “the author’s deepest convictions come from the mouth of Ezra” is Th ompson, Responsibility for Evil, 296.



neither of the two voices in the dialogues articulates the views of the author at the time of writing. Th e structure of the book as a whole suggests that the problems of theodicy raised in the dialogues do not admit of a rational solution, since Ezra never fully accepts the answers offered by Uriel in the dialogues but is consoled by the symbolic visions in the fourth, fifth and sixth episodes.22 Th e concluding (seventh) episode, usually called the epi-logue, is most likely to reflect the author’s own understanding of tôrâ at the time of writing the book. Nevertheless, a consideration of the meanings of tôrâ in 4 Ezra must begin with the views of the two interlocutors in the dialogues.

1. Ezra’s View of the tôrâ in the Dialogues (3:1-9:25)

Each of the three dialogues begins with a lament by Ezra, who is grieving over the destruction of Jerusalem by “Babylon” (i.e., Rome). In keeping with Deuteronomic theology, Ezra assumes that this happened because Israel failed to keep the covenant. In the first lament (3:4-36), he questions whether this failure was entirely their fault, because God created Adam (i.e., all humankind) with an “evil heart” (which is probably equivalent to the Hebrew [rh rxy familiar from rabbinic literature).23 Ezra first men-tions the tôrâ in connection with the theophany at Sinai (3:17), so for Ezra the tôrâ is clearly bound up with the covenant and is given only to Israel (3:19; cf. 4:23). It is immediately after recounting the events at Sinai that Ezra turns to the problem of the “evil heart” (3:20-22, NRSV translation):

(20) Yet you did not take away their evil heart from them, so that your law might produce fruit in them. (21) For the first Adam, burdened with an evil heart, transgressed and was overcome, as were also all who were descended from him. (22) Th us the disease became permanent; the law was in the hearts of the people along with the evil root; but what was good departed and the evil remained.

22) Th is observation was first made by Breech, “Th ese Fragments,” 270-74. For a helpful synthesis of various views on the non-rational nature of Ezra’s consolation, see Shannon Burkes, God, Self and Death: Th e Shape of Religious Transformation in the Second Temple Period (JSJSup 79; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), 216-19. 23) Stone, 4 Ezra, 63-65. On the rabbinic concept of rxy, see Jonathan Schofer, “Th e Redac-tion of Desire: Structure and Editing of Rabbinic Teachings Concerning yēs ̣er (“Inclina-tion”),” Journal of Jewish Th ought and Philosophy 12 (2003): 19-53; idem, Th e Making of a Sage: A Study in Rabbinic Ethics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 84-115.



Taken out of context, this passage sounds as though it is describing the universal human condition, but for the mention of “the people” in 3:22.24 Th e conclusion of Ezra’s first lament is that sin is universal, but Israel has kept the commandments better than other nations. His closing remark implies that keeping the commandments is not Israel’s obligation alone (3:34-36):

(34) Now therefore weigh in a balance our iniquities and those of the inhabit-ants of the world; and it will be found which way the turn of the scale will incline. (35) When have the inhabitants of the earth not sinned in your sight? Or what nation has kept your commandments so well? (36) You may indeed find individuals who have kept your commandments, but nations you will not find.

Th e apparent incoherence of Ezra’s view of the tôrâ comes into sharp focus with this last statement: how could “individuals” from other nations keep the commandments if they were given only to Israel?25

Ezra’s single statement about the tôrâ in the second dialogue may be read as an attempt to answer that question. Ezra concludes a catalogue of biblical metaphors for the election of Israel (5:23-27) with a literal state-ment of his point: “and from all the multitudes of peoples you have gotten for yourself one people; and to this people, whom you have loved, you have given the law that is approved by all” (5:27). Th e idea that the tôrâ is “approved by all” may be derived from Deut 4:6, “You must observe [the statutes and ordinances] diligently, for this will show your wisdom and discernment to the peoples, who, when they hear all these statutes, will say, ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and discerning people!’” Ezra believes

24) Th e idea of the law being “in the hearts of the people” may derive from Jer 31:31-34, but while there it is presented as a future solution to the problem of the broken covenant, here Ezra doubts that even an internalized tôrâ can compete with the “evil heart.” Knowles (“Moses, the Law, and the Unity of 4 Ezra,” 273) suggests that by the end of the book Ezra has come to accept the efficacy of the Law as a remedy for the “evil heart.” Th e notion of tôrâ as a “remedy” (μs) for the [rh rxy is attested in the rabbinic literature; see Schofer, Making of a Sage, 91. 25) Bruce W. Longenecker (in Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11 [JSNTSup 57; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991], 56) suggests that Ezra may have in mind gentile proselytes who observe the Mosaic laws. While this suggestion makes sense of this particular verse, it is rendered unlikely by Ezra’s statement on the law in his second lament (5:27), and also by 4:23, in which Ezra starkly contrasts Israel and the Gentiles and refers to “the law of our ancestors” (parallel to “the written covenants”).



that although the other nations were not “given” the same law as Israel, they know about it and recognize its validity—and hence are bound by it.26

Ezra’s apparently conflicting assumptions about the tôrâ—that it is a gift marking Israel’s election, and also a set of obligations incumbent upon humanity in general—can in fact both be found in the book of Sirach, although not juxtaposed in a single passage. As noted above, Ben Sira is believed to be the first author explicitly to equate the figure of personified Wisdom with “the law that Moses commanded us as an inheritance for the congregations of Jacob” (24:23), although the connection between wisdom and the tôrâ is implied already in Deut 4:6 (quoted above).27 Sir 24 as a whole emphasizes the election of Israel (especially 24:8-12), although not as vehemently as the conclusion of the wisdom poem in Baruch (Bar 4:1-4).28 In the context of a long passage on moral responsibility (15:11-18:14), by contrast, Ben Sira implies that keeping the commandments is expected of all the descendents of Adam. “It was [God] who created humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice [Heb.: rxy]. If you choose, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice” (15:14-15). Later in the same passage, he slips from a discussion of the creation of humankind in which he says that God “filled them with knowledge and understanding, and showed them good and evil” (17:7) to a description of the covenant-making at Sinai which begins, “He bestowed knowledge upon them, and allotted to them the law of life” (17:11)—without indicating any change in the antecedent of “them.”29

26) Stone (Fourth Ezra, 131) notes that the translation “that is approved by all” (which he follows) is supported by the Latin, Syriac and Georgian versions, but that the other versions differ. Th e textual variants probably reflect the translators’ discomfort (shared by some modern commentators) with what the verse implies. 27) Gerald T. Sheppard, “Wisdom and Torah: Th e Interpretation of Deuteronomy Under-lying Sirach 24:23,” in Biblical and Near Eastern Studies: Essays in Honor of William Sanford LaSor (ed. Gary A. Tuttle; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 166-76; see also his book Wisdom as a Hermeneutical Construct: A Study in the Sapientializing of the Old Testament (BZAW 151; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 63-68. 28) Along the same lines, the passage on Moses in Ben Sira’s Praise of the Ancestors (Sir 44-50) concludes, “and [God] gave him the commandments face to face, the law of life and knowledge, so that he might teach Jacob the covenant, and Israel his decrees” (45:5). 29) A similar collapsing of the interval between creation and Sinai can be seen in some of Uriel’s statements about the tôrâ in the third dialogue; see below.



Ezra’s view of Israel’s claim to the tôrâ derives from the “covenantalized wisdom” of Ben Sira and the wisdom poem of Baruch and does not reflect the later rabbinic teaching that the tôrâ was explicitly rejected by other nations.30 His purpose in the first two laments is not so much to denigrate other nations as to elevate Israel in God’s eyes, by putting in perspective their collective failure to keep the covenant. Ezra’s increasing despair in the third dialogue reveals that although he readily accepts Uriel’s teaching that the rewards of tôrâ-observance are not to be sought in this world, but rather in the world-to-come (7:17-18; cf. 7:10-16), he believes that very few people are able to keep the commandments, due to the existence of the “evil heart” (7:45-48). Nevertheless, Ezra maintains a positive view of the tôrâ, as a divine gift intended to offset human sinfulness, throughout the third dialogue (see 7:133, 8:12 and 8:29).31

2. Uriel’s View of the tôrâ in the Th ird Dialogue (6:35-9:25)

Uriel’s understanding of the tôrâ does not emerge until the third dialogue (which is longer than the first two dialogues put together), in the context of a discussion of “Israel’s portion” or “inheritance” (7:10-16). In the lament that opens the third dialogue, Ezra betrays his assumption that the world was created for Israel’s sake (6:54-55), and ques tions why it is that Israel does not possess this world as an inheritance (6:59).32 Uriel’s response is that “when Adam transgressed my statutes, what had been made was judged” (7:11). Th e plural “statutes” contrasts with Ezra’s statement in his first lament that Adam was given “one commandment” (3:7), and recalls the juxtaposition of the creation of humankind and the giving of com-mandments or the tôrâ in Sir 15:14-15 and 17:7-11 (see above). A few verses later, Uriel spells out more clearly the notion that God gave the tôrâ to all “those who came into the world, when they came” (7:20-25):

30) Contra Stone, Fourth Ezra, 132. On the rejection of the tôrâ by the Gentiles, see Urbach, Th e Sages, 532-33. Th e term “covenantalized wisdom” is used in the present author’s dis-sertation, Th eologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra: Wisdom Debate and Apocalyptic Solution (Univer-sity of Chicago, 2002), to refer to the incorporation of Deuteronomic covenant theology into the Jewish wisdom tradition. 31) Interestingly, in both 8:12 and 8:29, “your law” is the object of verbs of instruction, in the first case by God himself and in the second by human teachers. 32) According to Stone (Fourth Ezra, 188), the view that God created the world for the sake of Israel appears with some frequency in the rabbinic literature; it is also found in T. Mos. 1:12 (another text of the first c. C.E.).



(20) Let many perish who are now living, rather than that the law of God that is set before them be disregarded! (21) For the Lord strictly commanded those who came into the world, when they came, what they should do to live, and what they should observe to avoid punishment. (22) Nevertheless they were not obedient, and spoke against him: they devised for themselves vain thoughts, (23) and proposed to themselves wicked frauds; they even declared that the Most High does not exist, and they ignored his ways. (24) Th ey scorned his law, and denied his covenants; they have been unfaithful to his statutes, and have not performed his works. (25) Th at is the reason, Ezra, that empty things are for the empty, and full things are for the full.

Uriel uses what must have been a familiar exegetical motif in Second Tem-ple period wisdom circles, the law-giving at creation, to affirm one side of Ezra’s view of the tôrâ: that obedience is demanded of all people.33 At the same time, he uses Deuteronomic language (e.g., “what they should do to live, and what they should observe to avoid punish ment”) to challenge Ezra’s belief that Israel has kept the law better than the other nations.34 Uriel does not exempt Israel from the charge that the wicked “scorned [God’s] law and denied his covenants,” a direct contradiction of Ezra’s claim that Israel “believed [God’s] covenants” (3:32, 5:29). Th e speech as a whole, and the last verse in particular, chastises Ezra for implying that no one can really be expected to keep the commandments perfectly (3:35; cf. 3:20-22, 26).35

When Uriel’s uses of the term tôrâ are isolated from Ezra’s, it becomes clear that Uriel is pushing Ezra toward an understanding of tôrâ that is

33) Many scholars recognize this implication of the passage; see Beyerle, “‘Du bist kein Richter über dem Herrn’,” 326-27. Schnabel (Law and Wisdom, 144) disagrees, arguing that since “the law” in 7:17 (spoken by Ezra) is the “Mosaic Torah,” the same must be true of 7:20 (spoken by Uriel), and therefore “the recipients of the law in vv. 17.20-21 are not mankind in general but Israel.” Th e contrast between the just and the ungodly throughout the third dialogue then refers to “groups within (!) Israel” (exclamation point his). 34) Th e author has reinterpreted the Deuteronomic promise of “life” to refer to “personal immortality” rather than the survival of the nation, as Burkes (“‘Life’ Redefined,” 58-60) demonstrates. 35) Th at for Uriel, observing the law means at least striving to keep it perfectly becomes clear in Uriel’s later speech concerning what happens to the souls of the righteous and wicked immediately after death. Th ere he says concerning the righteous, “During the time that they lived in [their mortal body], they laboriously served the Most High, and with-stood danger every hour so that they might keep the law of the Lawgiver perfectly” (7:89).



more exalted, abstract and universal than the Mosaic law, and divorced from God’s covenant with Israel. For example, following Ezra’s lament over the human mind, which makes people more unhappy than animals because they are aware of their own mortality and sinfulness (7:62-69), Uriel responds (7:70-73):

(70) When the Most High made the world and Adam and all who have come from him, he first prepared the judgment and the things that pertain to the judgment. (71) But now, understand from your own words—for you have said that the mind grows with us. (72) For this reason, therefore, those who live on earth shall be tormented, because though they had understanding, they committed iniquity; and though they received the commandments, they did not keep them; and though they obtained the law, they dealt unfaithfully with what they received. (73) What, then, will they have to say in the judg-ment, or how will they answer in the last times?

Th e parallelism of “understanding” with “commandments” and “law” in 7:72, combined with the emphasis on a universal judgment in this passage, suggests that in Uriel’s view the tôrâ corresponds in some way to an unwrit-ten moral code that is common to all people.36 He is frustratingly vague, however, about the nature of the correspondence. In a later passage, it becomes clear that the Most High demands that all people “acknowledge” the tôrâ, which is tantamount to acknowledging God himself (9:10-12):

(10) For as many as did not acknowledge me in their lifetime, though they received my benefits, (11) and as many as scorned my law while they still had freedom, and did not understand but despised it while an opportunity of repentance was still open to them, (12) these must in torment acknowledge it after death.

One might expect a clearer understanding of what it means to “acknowl-edge the law” to emerge from Uriel’s lengthy description of the mourning and rejoicing of the ungodly and the righteous, respectively, after death (7:78-99). Instead, although Uriel mentions the law a number of times in

36) A striking parallel to this passage is found in 2 Bar. 15:5-6: “It is true that man would not have understood my judgment if he had not received the law and if he were not instructed with understanding. But now, because he trespassed, having understanding, he will be punished.” For a list of passages in which law is correlated with understanding and/or wisdom in 2 Baruch, see Desjardins, “Law in 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra,” 30-31.



this passage (7:79, 81, 89, 94) it remains an ill-defined entity, more or less synonymous with the equally vague “way(s) of the Most High” (7:79, 88; cf. 8:56, 9:9-11, 13:54). Significantly, those who have dedicated them-selves to serving the Most High, “so that they might keep the law of the Lawgiver perfectly” (7:89; cf. 7:94) are also said to have “striven with great effort to overcome the evil thought that was formed with them, so that it might not lead them from life into death” (7:92). Again, Uriel specifically corrects Ezra’s belief that the tôrâ is an inadequate check to the “evil heart” (3:20-22).37

Uriel’s understanding of tôrâ also differs from Ezra’s in that it is divorced from the theological concepts of covenant, the election of Israel and salva-tion history. For the most part, Uriel’s speeches in the dialogues eschew those themes.38 Th ere is one important exception, a passage in which Uriel refers to the struggle to overcome the “evil heart” as “the contest that all who are born on earth shall wage” (7:127), and goes on to say that this contest is what Moses was talking about when he “spoke to the people, saying, ‘Choose life for yourself, so that you may live!’” (7:129; cf. Deut 30:15-20). On the one occasion that Uriel explicitly cites Scripture, he radically reinterprets Deut 30:19, claiming that Moses’ words pertain (potentially) to every human person individually, not to the chosen people.39

It has been suggested that the view of tôrâ espoused by Uriel reflects the influence of the Stoic concept of “natural law” on late Jewish wisdom.40 Th e obvious objection to this suggestion is that the author of 4 Ezra exhib-its none of the knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy that enabled Philo of Alexandria to conceptualize the Law of Moses as “the perfect copy of the

37) Th is passage supports Knowles’ contention that the law in 4 Ezra “functions as a good yetzer” (“Moses, the Law, and the Unity of 4 Ezra,” 270). Uriel’s ideal of overcoming the “evil thought” (probably another translation of [rh rxy) by “acknowledging” the tôrâ antic-ipates the development of the rabbinic notion of the good inclination; compare especially the depiction of the emergence of the good rxy at age 13 as “an internal voice that quotes Torah” in ʾAbot R. Nat. A 16, 62-63, discussed by Schofer in Making of a Sage, 86-88. 38) Uriel does once refer to “those who trusted the covenants of the Most High” (7:83), apparently as a synonym for “those who have kept the ways of the Most High” (7:88). 39) As Burkes puts it (“‘Life’ Redefined,” 59), “Th e deuteronomic command had been directed to a national audience and promised national survival; now it urges the rare indi-vidual to acquire immortality.” 40) Beyerle, “‘Du bist kein Richter über dem Herrn’” 322-25, 335-37. Beyerle assumes, following Brandenburger, that Uriel’s understanding of the law is that of the author of 4 Ezra.



universal law of nature.”41 On the other hand, Uriel’s habitual manner of instructing Ezra about the “way of the Most High” by means of analogies to natural phenomena implies that God is the source of the rules or laws governing the natural order.42 One rather amusing example of Uriel’s man-ner of instructing Ezra by analogy is the following. In response to Ezra’s question, “Could you [i.e., God] not have created at one time those who have been and those who are and those who will be, so that you might show your judgment the sooner?” (5:43), Uriel tells Ezra to “Ask a woman’s womb, and say to it, ‘If you bear ten children, why one after another? Request it therefore to produce ten at one time” (5:46). Uriel then spells out the analogy: “Even so I have given the womb of the earth to those who from time to time are sown in it. For as an infant does not bring forth, and a woman who has become old does not bring forth any longer, so I have made the same rule for the world that I created” (5:48-9).

Since Uriel has recourse to the rules of the natural order in many of his arguments, and at the same time holds the “law of the Most High” in such high regard (7:20), it is quite possible that his understanding of “the law of the Most High” (i.e., tôrâ) encompasses what we would call the laws of nature. Despite the fact that Hebrew has no word for “nature,” the orderly course of creation (often contrasted with the disorderly conduct of human

41) Najman, Seconding Sinai, 70-107 (here 76); idem, “A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?,” SPhilo 15 (2003): 54-63. Other Hellenized Jewish authors, such as Josephus and Pseudo-Phocylides, appear to have been influenced by the Stoic concept of natural law; see Gregory Sterling, “Universalizing the Particular: Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish Ethics,” SPhilo 15 (2003): 64-80. By contrast, Markus Bock-muehl (“Natural Law in Second Temple Judaism,” VT 45 [1995]: 17-44) finds very little evidence of natural law thought in what he calls “Palestinian scribal circles” (44), including Ben Sira, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the early rabbinic literature, or in the apocalyptic lit-erature, even though he uses a fairly broad definition of natural law.

Nevertheless, Philo and other Hellenistic Jewish authors addressed a problem that the author of 4 Ezra and other Palestinian sages shared: how to reconcile a universal God with the particularism of the Mosaic tôrâ. Philo associates the Law of Nature, which for him is identical with the “pre-Sinaitic law” established at the time of creation, with “right reason” (Prob. 46-47, discussed by Najman in Seconding Sinai, 83-84). Th e implication is that it is possible to conform one’s life to the Law of Nature through the exercise of reason; or more pointedly, that “it is possible to lead a virtuous life even if one does not have access to the written Law of Moses” (Najman, Seconding Sinai, 87). 42) See Michael E. Stone, “Th e Parabolic Use of the Natural Order in Judaism of the Sec-ond Temple Age,” in Selected Studies in Pseudepigrapha and Apocrypha: With Special Refer-ence to the Armenian Tradition (SVTP 9; Leiden: Brill, 1991), 457-67 (especially 463-66 on 4 Ezra).



beings) is a fairly common theme in Second Temple-period texts; examples include 1 En. 2-5, Sir 16:24-30, and T. Naph. 3:2-4:1.43 It has recently been argued that 4QInstruction opened with “a description of the orderly courses of nature in accordance with God’s commands,” although the beginning of 4Q416 1 is so fragmentary that it is impossible to be certain about this.44 In any case, it is possible that some notion of the laws of nature underlies Uriel’s understanding of tôrâ, but it is unlikely that the author of 4 Ezra was familiar with the more specific notion of natural law found in the works of Philo of Alexandria.

With respect to its isolation from the covenant context, Uriel’s under-standing of tôrâ recalls that of Ps 119. Jon Levenson has observed that despite the prevalence of Deuteronomic language in that Psalm, there is no trace of covenant theology anywhere in it, or any mention of salvation his-tory, or even of Moses, the great teacher of tôrâ to Israel, according to Deuteronomy.45 More recently, David Noel Freedman has gone a step fur-ther, claiming that in Ps 119, tôrâ “has virtually the status of a divine hypostasis, like Wisdom in Proverbs 8” and is “the perfect expression of Yahweh’s nature and character, divorced from Israel’s history, without Moses as mediator.”46 Similarly, in Ps 1 and 19, tôrâ is closely associated with wisdom and not at all with the covenant traditions of Israel. By con-trast, in 11QPsa 154 (which parallels Ps 154 in the Syriac Psalter) the explicit identification of Wisdom with tôrâ is found alongside assertions of the election of Israel and Jerusalem, as in Sir 24 and in the wisdom poem in Baruch. To clarify, whereas Ezra’s statements about the tôrâ reflect the “covenantalized wisdom” of Sirach (especially ch. 24), the wisdom poem in Bar 3:9-4:4, and the Qumran tôrâ Psalm, 11QPsa 154, Uriel’s view of

43) Th ose examples are discussed by Stone, “Parabolic Use of the Natural Order” and Bock-muehl, “Natural Law,” but the most complete catalogue of such passages is in George W.E. Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch 1: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1-36; 81-108 (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 152-55. 44) Eibert J.C. Tigchelaar, To Increase Learning for the Understanding Ones: Reading and Reconstructing the Fragmentary Early Jewish Sapiential Text 4QInstruction (STDJ 44; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 179. 45) Jon D. Levenson, “Th e Sources of Tôrâ: Psalm 119 and the Modes of Revelation in Second Temple Judaism, in Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor of Frank Moore Cross (ed. P.D. Miller, P.D. Hanson and S.D. McBride; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 559-74. 46) David Noel Freedman and Andrew Welch, Psalm 119: Th e Exaltation of Tôrâ (BJSUCSD 6; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 89-91.



tôrâ in the dialogues resembles that of the canonical tôrâ Psalms, which, like Proverbs, Job and Qoheleth, eschew explicit references to covenant traditions.

3. Ezra’s Lament Concerning the tôrâ (9:29-37)

Th e pivotal fourth episode opens with another lament from Ezra (9:29-37), which is the most explicit meditation on tôrâ in the book. Ezra begins by recalling the exodus and the Sinai covenant, using the same sowing imagery in 9:31 to describe the giving of the law that he had used in 3:20 (and cf. 8:6). Th is opening sets up the expectation that Ezra has not been influenced at all by Uriel’s understanding of the tôrâ. Th e remainder of the speech, however, reveals that Ezra has accepted many of Uriel’s statements about the tôrâ, although without giving up his belief that the tôrâ was given exclusively to Israel (as is clear from 9:29-31). Th e first part of 9:32, “But though our ancestors received the law, they did not keep it and did not observe the statutes,” echoes Uriel’s statement that “. . . though they received the commandments, they did not keep them, and though they obtained the law, they dealt unfaithfully with what they received” (7:72; cf. 7:21-4, 8:56). Ezra continues, “yet the law did not perish—for it could not, because it was yours. Yet those who received it perished, because they did not keep what had been sown in them” (9:32b-33). Th ese words are clearly meant to recall Uriel’s exclamation in 7:20, “Let many perish who are now living rather than that the law of God which is set before them be disregarded!” Th e final statement of Ezra’s lament (9:36-37) appears to endorse the notion that the law “survives in its glory” only at the expense of many human lives.

On the surface, then, it appears that Ezra has internalized Uriel’s atti-tude concerning the tôrâ.47 Th e analogical argument Ezra introduces in 9:34-7 suggests that the author intended this speech to be ironic, how-ever.48 While imitating the form of Uriel’s arguments from nature, it in fact demonstrates that what occurs in the case of the people who received the tôrâ is the reverse of what everyday experience would lead one to expect:

47) Th is is the reading of Harnisch, Verhängnis, 170-74. 48) As Brandenburger astutely observes (Verborgenheit Gottes, 63-67). Th e point is not that Ezra is being intentionally ironical, but that the analogy points to a different conclusion from the one Ezra draws.



(34) Now this is the general rule that, when the ground has received seed, or the sea a ship, or any dish food or drink, and when it comes about that what was sown or what was launched or what was put in is destroyed, (35) they are destroyed, but the things which held them remain; yet with us it has not been so. (36) For we who have received the law and sinned will perish, as well as our hearts that received it; (37) the law, however, does not perish but survives in its glory.

Brandenburger reads the entire passage as a reductio ad absurdum of Ezra’s skepticism, intended to show the failure of rational discourse to persuade Ezra to accept Uriel’s theology.49 If one recognizes Ezra’s view of the tôrâ as a reflection of covenantalized wisdom, however, then this failed analogy can be read as a demonstration of the incompatibility of Uriel’s under-standing of tôrâ with Ezra’s emphasis on its covenantal context. While Ezra seems to have resigned himself to the notion that the glory of God’s law takes precedence over the survival of the chosen people, he has not given up two of the basic assumptions of his first lament. He explicitly limits the giving of the tôrâ to the nation of Israel (9:29-31), contrary to Uriel’s posi-tion that obedience to God is demanded of every individual (7:21, 127-29) and, consequently, that salvation is available in principle to Jews and Gen-tiles alike. Moreover, Ezra persists in counting himself (and presumably all Israel, since he does not mention that there were any exceptions) among those who have sinned and will therefore perish (9:36), implying that he still does not believe that it is possible to save oneself by tôrâ-observance (cf. 3:22). If the tôrâ was given only to Israel and the members of Israel are all going to perish because they have sinned, in what meaningful sense can the tôrâ be said to “survive in its glory” (9:37)? Only in Uriel’s highly abstract mode of thinking can the tôrâ be imagined to exist apart from Israel.

Th e purpose of this lament is to demonstrate that Ezra’s confusion and despair have only been deepened by the dialogues. Th e intellectual bind in which Ezra finds himself in his fourth lament is the result of his attempt to incorporate some aspects of Uriel’s understanding of tôrâ into his own covenantalized wisdom theology. While the dialogues expose the weak points of covenantalized wisdom, they also show that Uriel’s brand of

49) Ibid. Brandenburger argues that Ezra’s subsequent discussion with a mourning woman, at the end of which she is transformed before his eyes into a vision of the New Jerusalem, succeeds where the dialogues failed in converting Ezra to Uriel’s worldview.



“eschatologized wisdom”50 does not offer satisfactory answers to Ezra’s questions or provide adequate comfort to someone who is mourning Isra-el’s recent losses. Th e fundamental differences between the two theologies emerge in the course of the dialogues, and Ezra’s final lament confirms that an intellectual compromise between the two schools of wisdom is impos-sible. Th e aporia to which Ezra is reduced by the dialogues can be over-come only by the powerful visionary experiences of the fourth, fifth and sixth episodes of the book.

Th e tôrâ is not a major theme in the three episodes that bring about Ezra’s consolation. In fact, it is mentioned only twice, both times in the interpretation portion of the sixth episode. In 13:38, the fire that issues from the mouth of the Messiah-figure and destroys an “innumerable mul-titude” in the vision (13:10-11) is said to symbolize the tôrâ.51 Since this multitude is composed of “all the nations” (13:33-34), the interpretation probably means that the tôrâ will be the standard by which all the nations of the world will be judged, in keeping with Uriel’s statement in 7:20-24 (and cf. 7:37, 9:10-12). Although the message about the tôra is consistent with Uriel’s view of it in the dialogues, the overall message of the vision and its interpretation contrasts with Uriel’s teachings on individual judg-ment, since it is the enemy nations that are destroyed in the judgment, while a remnant of Israel is saved (13:48).

At the conclusion of the same episode, Uriel commends Ezra as follows (13:53-56):

(53) Th is is the interpretation of the dream that you saw. And you alone have been enlightened about this, (54) because you have forsaken your own ways

50) “Eschatologized wisdom” is the term used in the author’s dissertation to describe the background of Uriel’s theology; the primary example of eschatologized wisdom in Second Temple literature is 4QInstruction. See Hogan, Th eologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra, especially 93-119 on 4QInstruction and related texts. 51) Although the “man from the sea” who is the focus of the sixth episode is never referred to as the Messiah, the identification is fairly certain, at least as regards the interpretation of the vision. Th e interpretation three times refers to the man as “my son/servant,” which implies that he is to be identified with “my son/servant the Messiah” in 7:28-9. Th e man’s primary action, judging and destroying the nations, corresponds to the function of the lion in the fifth episode, who is identified as the Messiah (12:32). Th e questions of whether the original vision of the man from the sea portrayed a messianic figure or a divine warrior, and whether the original text referred to him as God’s son or servant, are too complex to be discussed here. Th ey are treated in the author’s dissertation, Th eologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra, 218-21 and 229-34.



and have applied yourself to mine, and have searched out my law, (55) for you have devoted your life to wisdom, and have called understanding your mother. (56) Th erefore I have shown you these things, for there is a reward laid up with the Most High . . .

Th is passage is highly significant in that Uriel (speaking as the mouthpiece of God) for the first time praises Ezra for his pursuit of “understanding” (cf. Ezra’s statement in 5:34, “. . . I strive to understand the way of the Most High and to search out some part of his judgment”), of which he was critical or at least dismissive in the dialogues (e.g., 4:10-11, 5:35-40).52 For present purposes, however, the passage is noteworthy for its correlation of tôrâ with the way(s) of the Most High on the one hand, and wisdom and understanding on the other. Th e historical association of Ezra with the tôrâ (i.e., the tôrâ of Moses) is surely in the background of this transitional pas-sage, but the terminology points toward the broader concept of tôrâ pro-moted by Uriel in the dialogues.

4. Tôrâ in the Epilogue (14:1-50)

Tôrâ is the dominant theme of the final episode, which is generally called an epilogue, despite its central importance to the interpretation of the book. In the epilogue, Ezra’s historical identity as a scribe of the tôrâ comes to the fore, even as he is elevated to the stature of Moses.53 On the pretext that the tôrâ has been burned along with Jerusalem “and so no one knows the things which have been done or will be done by [God]” (14:21), Ezra

52) Brandenburger (Verborgenheit Gottes, 121-24) is right to treat this passage as the culmi-nation of the theme of Ezra’s worthiness to receive revelation that runs through the book. Nevertheless, it does represent a shift in Uriel’s attitude toward Ezra’s desire to understand “the way of the Most High.” 53) On the portrayal of Ezra as a second Moses in the epilogue, see Knowles, “Moses, the Law, and the Unity of 4 Ezra.” As Stone observes in the introduction to his commentary (Fourth Ezra, 37-38), the epilogue leaves little room for doubt that the implied author of 4 Ezra is the biblical scribe Ezra, despite the exilic setting. Th e possibility that a different Ezra, the “prophet Ezra,” is the putative author is raised by Robert A. Kraft, “Ezra Materials in Judaism and Christianity,” in ANRW II.19:1, 119-36 (here 134). Th e distinction between the scribe Ezra and the prophet Ezra comes from 4th-5th century Christian sources which were apparently attempting to resolve the anachronism of 4 Ezra’s placement of Ezra in the Babylonian Exile. In the final verse, 14:50, which is missing from the Latin version, Ezra is given the title “the scribe of the knowledge of the Most High.”



asks to be inspired by the Holy Spirit to write “everything that has hap-pened in the world from the beginning, the things that were written in your law” (14:22). Evidently Ezra uses the term tôrâ here to refer to all of the Hebrew Scriptures, not just the tôrâ of Moses, and his interest appears to be in their narrative and predictive, rather than prescriptive, aspects.

On the other hand, in his address to “all the people” (14:28-36), Ezra refers to the “law of life” (14:30; cf. Sir 17:11, 45:5) which the generation of the Exodus received and “did not keep, which you also have transgressed after them.” Clearly here Ezra means the tôrâ of Moses, and he initially sounds as pessimistic as ever about the possibility of keeping “the ways that the Most High commanded” (14:31). In keeping with his commission to “reprove” and “comfort” the lowly among the people (14:13), however, Ezra continues, “If you, then, will rule over your minds and discipline your hearts, you shall be kept alive, and after death you shall obtain mercy” (14:34). Here he echoes Uriel’s view that it is possible to overcome the evil inclination and that to do so is to “choose life” (cf. 7:127-29), but at the same time he maintains his belief that God will show mercy at the judg-ment (cf. 7:132-40), which Uriel had firmly denied (7:33-34; cf. 8:38-40).

Th e revelation Ezra receives, however, includes not only the twenty-four books of the Hebrew Scriptures, which he is told to “make public” (14:26, 45), but also an additional seventy books that he is told to “deliver in secret to the wise” (14:26, 46).54 Based on an earlier passage instructing Ezra to write down and keep secret everything he has seen, and to teach those things only to “the wise among your people” (12:37-8), the seventy secret books are generally thought to represent apocalyptic writings, including 4 Ezra itself.55 It is noteworthy that in 14:4-6, God claims to have revealed

54) Th ere is general agreement that the twenty-four books are the Hebrew Scriptures, although Stone notes that this is the earliest attestation of what became the traditional number of books in the Jewish canon (Fourth Ezra, 441). 55) Stone, Fourth Ezra, 439, 441. No generally convincing explanation has been found for the author’s choice of the number 70 to represent apocalyptic texts. Bruce W. Longenecker has suggested that it is a numerical code (gematria) for the word dws, secret, “signifying the character of the eschatological mysteries” (2 Esdras [Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigra-pha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995], 91-92. Th e word dws is a noun, however, not an adjective, and “secret” is an extension of its primary meanings, “council” (intimate circle) or “counsel” in biblical Hebrew and “foundation” or “principle” in rabbinic Hebrew. Moreover, the fact that the content of the books is secret is not itself a secret that would necessitate the use of a numerical code, unlike the identity of the beast in Rev 13:8, which Longenecker cites as a parallel.



“the secrets of the times” to Moses on Mt. Sinai and to have commanded him, “Th ese words you shall publish openly, and these you shall keep secret.” Although the notion that Moses received revelations on Mount Sinai in addition to the canonical tôrâ is by no means unique to 4 Ezra,56 the instruction to Moses to keep the additional revelations secret reflects the author’s preoccupation with limiting access to apocalyptic texts to “the wise.” It provides a precedent for the twofold revelation to Ezra, the greater part of which is to be kept secret.

Th e twenty-four books whose content is public are not to be overlooked by the wise: Ezra is told to “let the worthy and the unworthy read them.” As tôrâ, they contain all the knowledge that the “lowly” need in order to curb their evil inclinations, according to Uriel. After all, Ezra was com-manded to “reprove your people; comfort the lowly among them, and instruct those that are wise” (14:13). Ezra’s speech to the people in 14:28-36, along with the restoration of the twenty-four books of Scripture, fulfills the first part of that command. His instruction for the wise must therefore be contained in the seventy additional books, which are said to contain “the spring of understanding, the fountain of wisdom and the river of knowledge” (14:46). Th is characterization of the seventy secret books recalls Ben Sira’s comparison of the tôrâ to a series of rivers, overflowing with “wisdom,” “understanding,” and “instruction” (Sir 24:25-27). Given the association of tôrâ with wisdom elsewhere in the book (8:12, 13:54-55), the author probably considered those non-canonical revelations also to be tôrâ, since they are “instruction” for the wise. Th e wisdom they contain is revealed wisdom, which (like the instruction Ezra receives in both the dialogues and the visions) exceeds the ordinary limits of human under-standing. Th erefore the seventy additional books are to be revealed only to the few who are already wise, in the sense of having already internalized

More likely, seventy is simply a generic large number symbolizing a totality, as frequently in the Bible, e.g., the seventy members of the house of Jacob (Gen 46:27, Exod 1:5), the seventy elders of Israel (Exod 24:1, Num 11:16, and cf. Ezek 8:11), the seventy years of the Babylonian exile (Jer 25:11-12, 29:10, and cf. Dan 9:2, 24), or the seventy nations of the world listed in Genesis 10. If so, the implication of the number 70 may be that there is a whole body of revealed knowledge that lies outside of Scripture (and hence is accessible only to a privileged few). 56) See Najman, Seconding Sinai, especially the chapter “Rewriting Rewritten: Jubilees and 11QTemple as Participants in Mosaic Discourse,” 41-69.



the moral knowledge that can be gained from the twenty-four books of Scripture.

Conclusion

Th e term tôrâ clearly has a broader range of meanings in 4 Ezra than sim-ply “the law,” as it is generally translated, following the extant versions. For the character Ezra in the dialogues, to be sure, tôrâ is first and foremost the law of Moses, which is “approved by all” (5:27) but given to Israel alone in a covenantal context (3:15-19). Although Ezra believes that the “evil heart,” shared with all the descendents of Adam, has hindered Israel from keeping the commandments (3:20-22), he nevertheless maintains that Israel has kept them better than other nations (3:32-36). Ezra focuses on the pre-scriptive aspect of the tôrâ in the dialogues, but at the same time regards it as a divine gift (5:27) intended for the instruction of Israel (8:29) and of all humankind (8:12; cf. 8:15).

Uriel calls into question Ezra’s assumption that tôrâ is Israel’s particular possession when he refers to “statutes” given to Adam (7:11) and to com-manding “those who came into the world” (7:21; cf. 7:72). For Uriel, the tôrâ belongs to God (e.g., 7:20, 7:89) and is closely associated with “the way(s) of the Most High” (7:79, 7:88, 8:56, 9:9-12), which include what we would call the natural order or laws of nature (cf. 5:48-49). Th erefore, although for Uriel tôrâ is an exalted and abstract entity, he insists that it is available to human beings through their “understanding” (7:72).

Th e author of 4 Ezra gives both Ezra’s and Uriel’s views of tôrâ a hearing in the dialogues, but demonstrates their inherent incompatibility in Ezra’s fourth lament (9:29-37). Th e irony of that lament especially undercuts the notion of an abstract tôrâ that “survives in its glory” (9:37) regardless of whether anyone observes it or not (9:32). In the epilogue, which is likely to reflect the author’s own views, tôrâ refers to the concrete Scriptures—all twenty-four books (14:45), not just the law of Moses. Moreover, the nar-rative and predictive aspects of those books (14:21-22) are emphasized along with their prescriptive aspect (14:30-31). Finally, the author implies, but does not state outright, that the wise can find tôrâ (in the sense of divine instruction) in esoteric books—presumably texts that were eventu-ally excluded from the Jewish canon of Scripture.

Th e implication of these conclusions is that as late as the end of the first c. C.E., a Jewish author writing in Hebrew could expect his audience to be



familiar with the original meaning of tôrâ, “instruction,” and not to assume that tôrâ was to be found exclusively in the Five Books of Moses. Although the suggestion in the epilogue that tôrâ can be found in esoteric (presum-ably apocalyptic) texts may be idiosyncratic, the notion that all of Scrip-ture is tôrâ is consistent with later rabbinic usage. Under the influence of the Septuagint and early Christian literature, the translators of the extant versions of 4 Ezra obscured the author’s understanding of tôrâ when they rendered it in every instance as “law.”


The Meanings of tôrâ in 4 Ezra

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