The Management of Linguistic Diversity through Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy

© Verlag Österreich 2015

Europäisches Journal für Minderheitenfragen

Beiträge

The Management of Linguistic Diversity through Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy

José-María Arraiza

Abstract The principle of nationalism by which the political and the national is to be congruent can have a significant influence on the making of autonomy regimes. Likewise, the devolution of competences over language and education allows for the shaping of identities within such autonomy regimes. The result is an imper-fect circular relation in which language, society and political institutions mutually and continuously shape each other: linguistic diversity influences the design of autonomy arrangements and vice-versa. Territorial and non-territorial autonomy have, however, different consequences. In this article the author reviews through a comparative approach how matters of linguistic diversity – including minority lan-guage education and language standardisation – are managed differently through the various forms of territorial (legislative and administrative) and non-territorial autonomy (national cultural autonomy and functional autonomy). To do so, the au-thor draws on concrete examples involving minority languages in Spain (territorial legislative autonomy) and in Serbia (national cultural autonomy). Furthermore, the potential consequences of territorial and non-territorial models will be explored by imagining two counterfactual scenarios: a non-territorial arrangement in Cata-lonia and a territorial one in Serbia.

José-María Arraiza, PhD Candidate (Åbo Akademi University), L.L.M. in Peace Support Operations (National University of Ireland, Galway), European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation (University of Padua), Plaza de Colón, 1, 3, 12, 28220 Majadahonda, Madrid, SpainE-mail: [email protected]

EJM 8 (2015) 1: 7–33

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A Country is not a mere territory; the particular territory is only its foundation. The Country is the idea which rises upon that foundation; it is the sentiment of love, the sense of fellowship which binds together all the sons of that territory.

Giuseppe Mazzini, Duties of Man, 1860

1. Managing Linguistic Diversity through Autonomy Design

What are the consequences of territorial and non-territorial autonomy for linguis-tic diversity? Which forms of autonomy are most appropriate for the different linguistic groups? These are important questions to answer in order to empower minority groups in a way which improves relations and furthers democratisation processes.1

Politics shape society and society shapes politics.2 Hence, autonomy regimes and linguistic groups have complex, mutually reinforcing relations.3 In this sense, the principle of nationalism by which the political and the national is to be congru-ent has a significant influence on the making of autonomy regimes.4 Likewise, the devolution of competences over language and education (official language recog-nition, language standardisation, language of instruction and related curriculum and syllabi) allows for the shaping of identities within such autonomy regimes. The result is an imperfect circular relation in which language, society and political institutions mutually and continuously shape each other: linguistic diversity influ-ences the design of autonomy and vice versa.

Collective identity claims based on language are often a driving force in the making of autonomy regimes, particularly when the speakers are territorially con-centrated. Conversely, autonomy political structures themselves may drive the consolidation of collective identities through language and education policies. This is particularly evident in cases where the language in question does not have sufficient recognition and support from any other state-like structure. This is the case with the Catalonian language in Spain and the Vlach and Bunjevac languages in Serbia (examples which will be developed later).

Language is rarely the only identity marker of a group but it achieves great prominence as the feature that often makes groups distinguishable, where other cultural traits may be less stable.5 Linguistic differences were at the core of the self-determination movements of 19th and 20th century Europe.6 Indeed, since the in-ception of European nationalism in the 19th century, territory has been imagined by primordial nationalism as representing the body of the nation and the language

1 Gagnon/Keating 2013, 57-58.2 Peters 2012, 1-24. 3 Liu 2011, 125-139, 126. 4 Gellner 2008, 1.5 May 2008, 7-9. 6 Hannum 1996, 458.


9The Management of Linguistic Diversity through Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy

its soul. Constitutional and national identity have been thought of as ideally iden-tical.7 Late 18th and early 19th century German Romantic saw language purity as an essential component of national identity. Fichte saw in the mother tongue the origin of the “fatherland”.8 For Herder, language was a “collective treasure”, and for von Humboldt the “spiritual exhalation” of the nation.9 As Ernest Gellner put it, in the modern world the minimal political unit is not devised through defence or economy, but through language and education: “modern loyalties are centred on political units whose boundaries are defined by the language [...] of an educational system”.10

Nationalism (both at state or sub-state level) homogenises language differ-ences and consolidates group identities (at least in the modern sense) to make such units functional.11 The peripheral variant of nationalism is present when a group within a territory resists its annexation into a state, or tries to secede or achieve self-government (as in Québec, Scotland and Catalonia).12 Indeed, sub-state en-tities may pursue nation building processes. Dialects within minority languages (e.g., the seven varieties of Basque language) are homogenised in the same way as those within majority languages.13 Institutions such as language standardisa-tion bodies and the education system are the tools used in such process. As Eric Hobsbawm suggests, “[a]t all events problems of power, status, politics and ideol-ogy and not of communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language”.14

Multiculturalism, in turn, provides a liberal legitimation for the recognition of the rights of minority cultures and their accommodation within democratic insti-tutions. Hence, liberal multiculturalists such as Will Kymlicka claim that societal cultures (which the author deems to include national linguistic/territorial com-munities) are the primary and most genuine forum for democratic participation.15 Ensuring the participation of national minorities is therefore a goal of democratic governance, as well as a matter of fairness and stability. Territorial and non-terri-torial forms of autonomy are tools to ensure such participation.

From a normative perspective, the main legal policy dilemmas in the making of autonomy regimes and language policy consist first in the choice between the “territoriality principle” (defining rights afforded to all the inhabitants of a defined area within a state or political unit) and the “personality principle” (defining rights which persons belonging to certain groups enjoy throughout the whole of a politi-

7 Anderson 2006, 67-82.8 Martyn 1997, 303-315.9 Pan 2004, 10-20; Kraus 2008, 78-83. 10 Gellner 1964, 158-69; Sahlins 1991. 11 Kraus 2008, 29-32.12 Hechter 2000, 15-17.13 Nimni 2007, 345-364.14 Hobsbawm 2013, 110.15 Kymlicka 1999, 112-166, 120.


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cal unit or a state’s territory).16 The territorial principle rests on the imagination of a physical homeland where certain language rules apply, while the personal-ity principle implies the existence of a community capable of governing itself, in parallel perhaps to the nuanced distinction between the expressions home-rule and self-rule (autonomy deriving from the ancient Greek auto-nomos, αύτόνομος: αύτός meaning self and νόμος law). Hence, the territoriality principle is normally ac-companied by a residence-based identity, while the personality principle relies on self-identification.

The practical consequences of territorial and non-territorial autonomy are, however, different. In this article, the characteristics of different forms of territo-rial and non-territorial forms of autonomy and the consequences they have on lin-guistic diversity will be reviewed and analysed. In sections 2 and 3, Catalonian in Catalonia and neighbouring Valencia and Aragon (territorial autonomies in Spain) and the Bunjevac and Vlach17 languages in Serbia and their respective non-territo-rial national cultural autonomy bodies (national councils) will serve as examples. In section 4, the comparison will be further explored through a counterfactual scenario (a territorial legislative autonomy regime in Serbia and a national cultural autonomy arrangement in Spain).

2. Non-Territorial Autonomy and Linguistic Diversity

2.1 The Personality Principle

Non-territorial autonomy aims at reconciling the protection and the promotion of a particular culture without touching the territorial set up of the polity. Non-territorial autonomy has gained increased attention due to the existing “autonomy-phobia” in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, as well as other areas in the world due to fears of secession.18 The recent strengthening of secessionist claims in Catalonia, Scotland or Flanders in Belgium has in this sense increased such fears and thus given non-territorial autonomy some attraction for policy makers.

States have normally accommodated cultural diversity through individual, and not group rights. The “personality” principle has been usually given primacy over the “territoriality” principle.19 Non-territorial autonomy and cultural rights are based on the personality principle. Non-territorial autonomy is defined in direct

16 Patten 2003, 297.17 The example cases of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia (in Spain) and Serbia were chosen for a

comparison because they contain clear examples of territorial and non-territorial autonomy regimes in which minority language standardisation, minority language education and other language policies are pursued by sub-state entities. The author is familiar with both cases due to his advisory work in the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and other bodies. The Serbian term “Bunjevac” refers to the language, while “Bunjevci” refers to the group and its members.

18 Palermo 2013, 81-97 19 Réaume 2003, 271-295; Patten 2003, 296-321.



opposition to territorial autonomy and by reference to the substantive “nation-al” character of its competences (i.e., culture, including language, education and traditions).20 Non-territorial autonomy is, however, always “territorial” in some sense, as the cultural rights afforded to the members of a group are sometimes attached to a particular territory (conditioned to demographic thresholds, tradi-tional inhabitation or other criteria). Conversely, territorial autonomy does not ex-clude non-territorial autonomy and many territorial autonomy regimes recognise personality-based cultural rights and/or non-territorial autonomy bodies within their territory (e.g., Aranese in Catalonia21, national minority councils in the Au-tonomous Province of Vojvodina in Serbia22). Territorial and non-territorial forms of autonomy can indeed be complementary.

2.2 Non-Territorial Autonomy and Linguistic Minorities

Non-territorial autonomy and cultural rights require the legal recognition of a particular group, where only the members of such group benefit from certain en-titlements.23 In the strict sense, non-territorial autonomy arrangements refer to those specific arrangements which allow a group to determine and implement the policies over matters of culture affecting them, such as national cultural autonomy institutions. This understanding is reflected in the work of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-tional Minorities (FCNM).24

Through non-territorial autonomy and cultural rights, entitlements such as education in the mother tongue are recognised to certain individuals due to their belonging to a group. Unlike personal autonomy, non-territorial autonomy and cultural rights in all its forms (functional, national cultural autonomy and others) lead to the recognition, development and consolidation of collective (including

20 Hertz 1944, 15-151; Sahlins 1991, 3.21 Article 36(2) of the 2006 Autonomy Statute of Catalonia recognises the rights of the citizens of

Arán to use Aranese before the autonomous institutions. This is not a strictly personality based definition of the Aranese group, but the Aranese citizens acquire a personal status which entitles them to certain linguistic rights throughout the territory of Catalonia (Organic Law 6/2006 on the Reform of the Autonomy Statute of Catalonia, Official Gazette of Spain No. 172, 20 July 2006; henceforward Autonomy Statute of Catalonia).

22 Act on the Autonomy Statute of Vojvodina, Official Gazette of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina No. 20/2014, 22 May 2014 (henceforward Autonomy Statute of Vojvodina).

23 Non-territorial autonomy is thus different from personal autonomy in the sense it is used here. Personal autonomy, from an institutional perspective, refers to situations in which persons belonging to minorities associate privately to protect their interests without the state necessarily recognising their existence (i.e., through special rights). Hence, personal autonomy includes using the freedom to associate in absence of special arrangements such as separate administrative structures, territorially defined rights or special recognition of groups. For example, associations that wish to provide a platform for the exercise of some facet of the group identity of a minority have the right to be registered as legal persons. Suksi 2008, 196-197.

24 Council of Europe 2012, para. 135; Council of Europe 2008a, para. 90.


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linguistic) identities. In this sense, non-territorial autonomy moulds and reinforces group identities.

Establishing non-territorial autonomy is a legitimate possibility in those cases in which historically and/or by sheer numbers there is a sufficiently strong claim for its existence. In practice, linguistic diversity leads to the establishment of non-territorial autonomy arrangements and cultural rights when such objective is suc-cessfully pursued by political actors demanding such mechanisms. Linguistic di-versity is both a condition and an argument for political mobilisation.

In all, the personality principle seems adequate in cases where linguistic mi-norities are dispersed. As Alan Patten points out,

where it is reasonable to expect members of the minority to use the majority language in public settings, the territorial principle is acceptable. Where it is not, the personality principle should be preferred.25

The personality principle may promote bilingualism if it is implemented without prejudice to the effective learning of the state or majority language.26 The territo-rial principle in turn requires a degree of bilingualism on the side of the (relative) minority in order to function, as its members will need to use the majority lan-guage outside the territory of the autonomous regime.

An example of the personality principle concerning language rights exists in Kosovo, where both Albanian and Serbian are official throughout its territory and therefore – in theory – any Serb speaker may use his or her language before any public institution regardless of where he or she is. Kosovo is indeed a mixed terri-torial and personal model depending on the language in question. It also contains a mixed personal and territorial-based mechanism whereby Bosniac and Turkish languages may be considered official if a certain demographic threshold is met at the municipal level.27

In this regard, demographic thresholds constitute the nexus between the terri-toriality and personality principles. Language rights are in this way territorialised: they are made conditional to a particular demographic threshold at the local level, thereby establishing a link with territory. Such is the situation also in the Slovak Republic, where a 20 per cent threshold activates a right to use a minority language (e.g., Hungarian) before public authorities (the threshold will be lowered to 15, but this will only apply after two consecutive censuses).28 The establishment of a threshold can be problematic both if it is set up too high (not meeting demands) or too low (due to the unavailability of resources).29 The variety of thresholds reflects

25 Patten 2003, 304. 26 Article 14(3) FCNM. 27 Republic of Kosovo Assembly Law 02-L/37 on the Use of Languages (henceforward Kosovo Law

on Languages).28 Article 2 Slovak Republic Act 184/1999 on the Use of Minority Languages, as amended.29 Council of Europe 2012, para. 57.



the diversity of contexts and approaches taken on this issue (e.g., eight per cent in Finland, five per cent in Kosovo, 15 per cent in Serbia).30

2.3 The Linguistic Dimension of Functional Autonomy

Functional autonomy relates, as its name indicates, to the exercise of self-govern-ment over a concrete function of governance. It is a form of autonomy based on the personality principle through which the state devolves a function related to the culture of a group to its representatives at all relevant levels of public administra-tion. This type of arrangement is most often specifically aimed at accommodating the educational rights of national minorities. In this sense, language diversity is the primary subject of functional autonomy. It consists in the provision of adequate linguistic services to a minority population through special administrative units within the regular administration.31

Functional autonomy in the education system is possible where linguistic mi-norities are sufficiently concentrated to establish minority language (and/or bilin-gual) schools. Implementation requires a certain degree of separation according to language within the administration as well as in the education system (students are separated in different classrooms or buildings on a linguistic basis). This is the case with German and Italian schools in South Tyrol and with Swedish and Finnish schools in Finland. Such separation on a language basis should in principle not be considered discriminatory unless the conditions referred to above concerning dis-crimination are met (i.e., forcefulness, unequal quality).32 However, the separation of students according to language (and implicitly by ethnicity) may create concerns in post-conflict divided societies in need of reconciliation and stronger social cohe-sion. In Macedonia, schooling is provided in Albanian wherever there is a demand and a special office within the Ministry of Education deals with minority language matters.33 In this case, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has voiced concerns that Albanian students do not effectively learn Mac-edonian or regularly interact with ethnic Macedonian students and subsequently proposed an integration strategy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, most schools teach in one language and one curriculum only (Croat or Bosnian in the Federation entity and Serbian in the Republika Srpska) while some schools in the Federation entity offer two languages and types of curriculums within the same building, producing

30 Finland Language Act (423/2003); Kosovo Law on Languages; Law on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia Nos. 45/91, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 101/2005 and 30/2010 (henceforward Serbia Law on Languages).

31 Suksi 2008, 195-225.32 Article 2(b) UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 14 December 1960. Cf.

Arraiza 2014, 10-12.33 Law on the Use of Languages Spoken by 20 per Cent of the Population of the Republic of

Macedonia and in the Units of Local Self-Government, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 101/08.


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the phenomenon known as “two schools under one roof”.34 The UN Commit-tee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has condemned such practice as perpetuating non-integration, mistrust and fear of the “other” and the Federation Supreme Court has judged the practice discriminatory on an ethnic basis.35

2.4 National Cultural Autonomy Reinforcing Linguistic Diversity

National cultural autonomy (that is, self-governance based on culture) may be de-scribed as the institutionalisation of self-government rights pertaining to a national minority through ad hoc bodies representing a particular national minority group. It implies the definition and recognition of certain groups which are given limited powers over cultural matters within the territory of the state. Naturally, apart from benefiting larger groups, it specially serves well the needs of smaller, dispersed national minorities. National cultural autonomy is often defended as a model less prone to support secession claims than territorial autonomy. For this reason, it has been revisited recently as an alternative to territorial autonomy, avoiding overlaps and competition between groups for territorial control and detaching citizenship from nationality.

Historically, the essence of national cultural autonomy has precedents in vari-ous cultures throughout the world. In Western cultures, its closest predecessor may be the Ottoman Millet system. National cultural autonomy as a model was first theorised in the context of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, who proposed a model where nation and state were decoupled, organising national groups into non-territorial public corporations (with the power to levy taxes amongst its members) accompanied with certain rights as well as power sharing mechanisms at the central level.36 These would operate within a de-nationalised territorial state, which would be competent to address more “nationally neutral” political matters.37

The model offered by Renner and Bauer challenged the notion that sovereignty is unitary and indivisible, that self-determination requires territorial arrangements and that nation states are the only recognised players. Moreover, it advocated inte-gration into multi-national states, focusing on people, not territory.38 On its down side it contains, as Rainer Bauböck has pointed out, a primordialist and somewhat old-fashioned understanding of nationhood where communities are understood as homogeneous units of will and destiny.39 (Similarly, Kymlicka considered in effect

34 Magill 2010.35 The Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled that there was discrimination

on access to education in Mostar (Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment 58 0 Ps 085653 13 Rev, 29 August 2014); United Nations 2010, para. 11.

36 McGarry/Moore 2005, 74-95. 37 Nimni 1999, 289-314, 292; Smith 2013, 25-55, 29. 38 Nimni 2007, 345-364, 348, 360. 39 Bauböck 2005, 98-101, 106.



a “federation of theocracies” due to its lack of internal protections of individual’s freedom.40) Such an understanding does not correspond to a reality of multiple identities and fluidity and may privilege conservative forces within cultural groups. As Michael Keating points out, social realities in an increasingly globalised world show highly complex patterns of identities where neither territory nor personality give straightforward answers as to which are the most adequate policies.41 In this context, the essentialist definition of group belonging found in national cultural autonomy is rather conservative. Indeed, international policies on minorities in-creasingly recognise the inherent multiplicity and fluidity of identities.

From a technical standpoint, national cultural autonomy bodies are non-terri-torial and their jurisdiction concerning certain subject matters normally covers the territory of the whole state. An example of these are the national councils (named differently in each country) with regulatory and administrative powers limited to the maintenance and reproduction of the groups’ culture existing in Central, East and South-Eastern European countries. The powers granted to national self-governments cover linguistic diversity from a variety of angles: these include the establishment of education institutions, participation in their management, the de-velopment of teaching syllabi and other material as well as the creation and main-tenance of minority language media.42 In this sense, cultural autonomy institutions are a tool for the consolidation of linguistically differentiated groups. Indeed, the majority of national cultural groups benefiting from this type of arrangement are the traditional national groups linked to the transformation of modern European states in the 19th and 20th centuries, where language was prominent.

The most commonly referred cases of national cultural autonomy have a clear linguistic component in its foundations. For example, the thirteen groups recog-nised in Hungary as entitled to form nationality self-governments (Bulgarians, Greeks, Croatians, Poles, Germans, Armenians, Roma, Romanians, Carpatho-Rusyns, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Ukrainians) are also distinct linguistic groups. Hungarian nationality self-governments have competences in the areas of culture, media and education. Moreover, they have a consultative function con-cerning legislation affecting minorities.43

The Serbian Constitution also enshrines a collective right of self-government for minorities. Thirteen out of the twenty groups forming Serbia’s national mi-nority councils are to a large extent defined by language. These are the Albanian, Bosniac, Bulgarian, Bunjevci, Greek, Hungarian, Macedonian, Roma, Romanian,

40 Kymlicka 1996, 155-158, 157. 41 Keating 2005, 181-190.42 Articles 11-15 Law on National Councils of National Minorities, Official Gazette of the Republic

of Serbia No. 72/2009 (henceforward Serbia Law on National Councils); Chapter V Hungary Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities (henceforward Hungary Act on the Rights of Nationalities).

43 Article 19, 24(1) Hungary Act on the Rights of Nationalities.


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Ruthenian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Vlach national minorities.44 National minority councils are elected through a special electoral register.45 They are competent to establish associations in the field of the use of language and script and to propose legislation in this area.46 They are also entitled to advise central and local self-gov-ernments on minority issues. Moreover, they have a considerable role in education.

In Serbia, teaching in minority languages is available in Albanian, Croatian, Hungarian, Romanian and Slovak at pre-school, primary and secondary levels, and in Bulgarian and Ruthenian at primary and secondary levels.47 Where education is offered in their own language, then national councils have a say on the appoint-ment and/or dismissal of the schools’ management boards.48

2.5 Example: Language Standardisation in the Vlach and the Bunjevci National Councils

The situation of the Bunjevci and the Vlach in Serbia is a particular example of the management of linguistic diversity through non-territorial autonomy. They are also examples of political communities which may either choose to affiliate with national groups attached to a kin-State (as ethnic Croats with Croatia and ethnic Romanians with Romania) or pursue the recognition of their own identity. Both Romania and Croatia have had negative stands towards the recognition of Vlachs and Bunjevci in Serbia.49 Vlach communities in Eastern Serbia oscillate between Romanian, Serbian and Vlach denominations, and Bunjevci communi-ties in northern Vojvodina may define themselves as Croats, Bunjevci or Serbs.50 Officially, the recognition policy by Serbia follows the principle of self-identifica-tion reflected in Article 3 of the FCNM.51 Serbia has also included the Vlach and Bunjevac languages under the protection of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML).52 In this sense, the Committee of Experts of the ECRML (CE ECRML) has recommended Serbia to further their official use, including education in both languages.53

44 Council of Europe 2008b, para. 364.45 The law foresees the establishment of special electoral lists for national councils, Chapter VI Serbia

Law on National Councils. 46 Article 75(2) Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No.

98/2006.47 Article 5(2) Law on Preschool Education, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 18/2010;

Article 5 Law on Primary Education, as amended in 2009, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 72/09; Article 5 Law on Secondary Education, as amended in 2009, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 72/09. Council of Europe 2013a, para. 42.

48 Articles 10-12 Serbia Law on National Councils. 49 According to Dejan Stepanović, self-identifying as Bunjevci after 2000 was considered a reason for

rejection of application for Croatian citizenship, Stepanović 2013, 21.50 Bugarski 2012, 219-235, 221.51 Council of Europe 2009, para. 35.52 Council of Europe 2013b, paras. 12-16. 53 Council of Europe 2013b, paras. 52-52.



The Bunjevci minority was first officially named as such in the Austro-Hun-garian census of 1869.54 During the Yugoslav period, it was considered a compo-nent of the Croat nationality or as part of “others”, but then was recognised again as a group in the 1991 census and in the Autonomy Statute of Vojvodina.55 It is composed of Catholic Serbs who inhabit mainly the Serbian province of Vojvo-dina and Southern Hungary. While the community identifies itself ethnologically as Bunjevci, many of them identify themselves as Croats for census and other of-ficial purposes. Hence, a portion of them claim to speak the Bunjevac language, whereas others claim this is a dialect of the Serbo-Croatian language. There con-tinue to be shifts in identification amongst these persons.

Map 1. Timok geographic region in Central Serbia (Bor and Zaječar districts). Source: Panonian, public domain

In the 2011 census, 35,330 persons identified as Vlachs, and 43,095 persons identi-fied Vlach as their mother tongue.56 The Vlach mainly live in the Timok region of Serbia. They may be generally divided between those who consider themselves only Vlach (and claim to speak such a language) and those who consider that Vlach and Romanian are synonyms (where Vlach is a Romanian dialect) and see Romania as a kin-State.57 The first sub-group is in favour of standardising the Vlach language. The will of such a group to assert their identity and distance themselves from a likely kin-State (Romania), particularly concerning the use of

54 Weaver 2011, 77-115. 55 Article 6 Autonomy Statute of Vojvodina. 56 Council of Europe 2014, para. 33; Council of Europe 2013a, para. 32. The Bunjevci national council

was dissolved together with the Slovenian and the Ashkali ones shortly after being constituted in 2010 because they did not comply with the legal requirements (regular meetings, adopting a statute). Kujundžić Ostojić/Raič 2012. Article 11 Serbia Law on Languages.

57 Council of Europe 2009, para. 39.


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languages during Orthodox liturgy, led to a diplomatic conflict between Romania and Serbia (Romania threatened to block Serbia’s EU accession).

National councils in Serbia may

[e]stablish institutions, associations, funds and business organisations in the field of culture, edu-cation, information and official use of language and script as well as in other areas of importance for the preservation of a national minority’s identity.58 [Emphasis added].

Accordingly, both the Bunjevci and the Vlach national councils initiated work to-wards standardising their languages.59 In 2012, the Vlach national council adopted an official Vlach script and announced plans to request the official use of such language in Bor municipality (the requirement for official use is based on a de-mographic threshold of 15 per cent). There is still, however, no minority language education available yet in Vlach.

The standardisation of the Vlach languages is particularly controversial and has led to a somewhat intractable dispute. The CE ECRML stated on this issue that

[T]he national councils have no competences to establish or proclaim what language is spoken by the members of the national minority they represent. Furthermore, the Committee of Experts ob-serves that the divide between those speakers who consider Vlach to be a variety of Romanian and those who consider it a language in its own right hampers the application of the Charter to Vlach.60

A commonly agreeable solution is still pending. As for Bunjevac language and Bunjevci culture, these are taught as subjects only in some primary schools in the municipalities Sombor and Subotica.61

Map 2. Autonomous Region of Vojvodina in Northern Serbia (© D-Maps.com)

58 Article 10(a) Serbia Law on National Councils. 59 Council of Europe 2013b, paras. 13, 32.60 Council of Europe 2013b, para. 14. 61 Council of Europe 2013a, para. 53.



3. Territorial Autonomy

3.1 A Tool for Diversity Management?

Territorial autonomy as a tool for diversity (and conflict) management has its de-tractors. The argument against autonomy often made by international law special-ists is that it constitutes a slippery slope in the road towards secession. The post-Cold War history of Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe has left a legacy of “autonomy-phobia” in this sense.62 A flat out rejection of autonomy as a tool to address claims of national minorities for self-government is, however, unrealistic, as most solutions to ethnic conflicts involve territorial self-government arrange-ments of one kind or another.

Territorial legislative autonomy (such as the autonomous communities of Spain, the Åland Islands, or the region of South Tyrol) implies a regime within a defined territory which includes the power to legislate over certain enumerated competences (otherwise, autonomy is merely administrative) and where subsidiary powers lie at the central level. It is distinct from federal regimes in the fact that in a federation, the subsidiary powers lie at the federal level and the autonomy is not institutionally represented or directly participates in decision making at the central level.63 In this sense, Markku Suksi cites the Memel Territory in Lithuania between 1924 and 1938 as a classic model of autonomy where the sub-state entity was not institutionally represented at the central level, and was vested with exclu-sive and enumerated competences while the Lithuanian parliament retained any residual powers.64 In turn, a clear form of a federation would be the United States of America.

There is no right of national or ethnic minorities to autonomy in international law save the one recognised for indigenous peoples in non-binding instruments such as the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Peoples.65 Exceptionally, at the domes-tic level Spain and Bolivia recognise a right to autonomy in their constitutions.66 Moreover, the establishment of autonomy does not entail by itself the recognition of minority cultures. However, as Ephraim Nimni notes, without a constitution-ally enshrined recognition of cultural distinctness, territorial autonomy is incom-plete and fails to address minority issues.67 Entrenchment at the constitutional level of such recognition is preferable.

The sub-state entity with legislative powers may establish one or more languag-es as official, may recognise certain groups and the powers of national minority

62 Palermo 2013, 81-97.63 Suksi 2010, 138-139.64 Suksi 2013, 60-77, 70. 65 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution

61/295, New York, 13 September 2007.66 Article 2 Constitution of Spain, Official Gazette of Spain No. 311, 29 December 1978; Article 1

Constitution of Bolivia, 7 February 2009.67 Nimni 2005, 249.


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councils or may even establish certain thresholds at local levels in which language rights are activated. Another option is for the autonomous legislative to determine directly in the legislation which geographic areas are bilingual or monolingual. Recognition of minority cultures should not lead to such groups taking over the autonomous regime. Indeed, a democratic approach to autonomy regimes should understand it both as a tool of good governance as much as of self-governance: a concession to the inhabitants of a territory, and not to a single group amongst them.

3.2 Territorial Legislative Autonomy and Linguistic Related Competences

Territorial autonomy has a different relation with language diversity. While non-territorial autonomy arrangements target specifically cultural traits such as lan-guage, religion or other components of ethnicity, territorial autonomy is not per se an instrument of diversity management, even if it serves such purposes as well. Hence, the power to legislate on language matters gives territorial autonomy re-gimes the capacity to promote minority language use. This is particularly the case through the implementation of education and language standardisation compe-tences.

In Spain, for example, language and education are shared competences be-tween the central and the autonomous level. Thus, while the Spanish parliament legislates over education, the education authorities of the autonomous govern-ments are the ones executing it. Catalonian language matters are regulated by the Catalonian Language Policy Law68 and the Autonomy Statute of Catalonia. The Statute establishes a right of “linguistic choice” by which citizens may relate to any public authority in either Spanish or Catalonian (this applies also to the education system).69 The Statute also establishes the right to education in both Catalonian and Spanish. These provisions have been considered lawful by the Constitutional Court with the condition that authorities abide by the principle that Spanish is also a language of education.70

In Catalonia, an effort is made for relative minority students to integrate through linguistic immersion. Catalonian is the primary language of education in Catalonia in all schools. Indeed, Article 35(3) of the Catalonian Autonomy Statute specifically prohibits separating students according to mother tongue.71 In this sense, Catalonia offers an inclusive and integrative identity model in comparison to the functional autonomy-based education models of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Macedonia described earlier.

68 Law 1/1998 on Language Policy in Catalonia, Official Gazette of Spain No. 36, 11 February 1998 (henceforward Catalonia Language Law).

69 Articles 31(1), 35(5) Autonomy Statute of Catalonia. 70 Constitutional Court of Spain, Legal basis 24, Judgment on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of

Catalonia, Judgment 31/2010, 28 June 2010, Official Gazette No. 172, 16 July 2010.71 Article 35(3) Autonomy Statute of Catalonia.



The Spanish autonomous regions also have in practice the power to create and manage language standardisation bodies. Some of these bodies such as the Basque, Galician and the Catalonian language institutes were already created in the 19th and early 20th centuries as private cultural associations. Others were cre-ated after the transition from Franco’s dictatorship in 1978. The Asturian Acade-my of Language, for example, was created by the autonomous government in 1980.72 Although the Asturian Autonomy Statute merely recognises the language as deserving protection, it is not an official language and its public and private use is very limited.73 The autonomy statutes of the autonomous regions treat them differently in each region. In the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia, they are official consultative bodies.74 Their jurisdiction is in principle not bound by the territory of the autonomous bodies where they operate, but over the languages they aim to standardise. This has led to jurisdictional conflicts of the Institute of Catalonian Studies with neighbouring Aragon and Valencia. As a result, the latter created its own Valencian Academy of Language in 1998 by law as a public institu-tion financed and managed by the autonomous government.75

3.3 Example: The Catalonian language in Valencia and Aragon

The 1998 Catalonia language policy law refers to the imposition during two cen-turies and a half of Castilian Spanish as a justification to protect Catalonian, the region’s llengua pròpia (own language), through a series of positive measures.76 The singularity of Catalonian and the fact that no kin-State uses it as an official lan-guage gives this language a particularly important position. It is indeed a core value of Catalonian autonomy.

In the neighbouring Autonomous Community of Valencia (see map 3), the Autonomy Statute recognises Valencian (valencià) as a co-official language.77 The

72 Official Decree of Asturian Regional Council 33/1980, 15 December 1980, and approved by Decree 9/1981, modified 12 April 1995 (BOPA number 136 of 14 June 1995).

73 Fernández 2005, 169-190. Article 4 Organic Law 7/1981 on an Autonomy Statute for Asturias, 30 December 1981.

74 Article 6(5) Organic Law 3/1979 on an Autonomy Statute for the Basque Country, 18 December 1979, Official Gazette of Spain No. 306, 22 December 1979 (Basque Country Autonomy Statute). Addendum of the Law 3/1983 on Linguistic Normalisation in Galicia, 15 June 1983, Official Gazette of Galicia, 14 July 1983. Law 8/1991 on the Linguistic Authority of the Institute of Catalonian Studies, 3 May 1991, Official Gazette of Spain No. 132, 3 June 1991. Preamble and Article 6 of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia.

75 Law 7/1998 on the Creation of the Valencian Academy of Language, 16 September 1998, Valencia Official Gazette No. 3334, 21 September 1998, Official Gazette of Spain No. 252, 21 October 1998.

76 Catalonia Language Law. David Laitin, Stathis Kalyvas and Carlota Sole argue on the other hand that the interested choice of Castilian by Catalonian elites seeking their own profit had a stronger influence in language shift, Laitin/Kalyvas/Sole 1994, 5-29.

77 Articles 1 and 2 Organic Law 5/1982 on an Autonomy Statute of the Valencian Community, 1 July 1982, as amended in 2006 (Autonomy Statute of Valencia).


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Autonomous Region’s linguistic law divides its territory into predominantly Span-ish-speaking and predominantly Valencian-speaking areas.78 This recognition is politically significative, given the fact that there is a dispute concerning the sta-tus of Valencian as a language. First, there are those who consider it a variety of Catalonian. Second, there are those who regard it as a language. Third, there are linguists who consider that the distinction between language and dialect is an “extra-linguistic” consideration.79

Map 3. Autonomous regions of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia (© D-Maps.com)

The CE ECRML has taken on the second thesis, which claims that when King Jaime I of Aragon conquered Valencia in the 13th century, its inhabitants were already maintaining their own language (Valencian).80 According to the opposite opinion, the Catholic invaders would have found a population which spoke invari-ably Arab. The CE ECRML shares the thesis of the Academy of the Valencian Language (Academia Valenciana de la Llengua), founded in 1998 by the Valencian autonomous parliament as a result of a political compromise, which acknowledges that Valencian is part of the Catalonian “linguistic system”.81 The Academy also does not consider that naming the language Valencian contradicts or excludes

78 Law 4/1983 on the Use and Teaching of the Valencian Language, 23 November 1983, Official Gazette of the Autonomous Community of Valencia No. 133, 1 December 1983. Navarra uses this system with the Basque Language, Navarra Law 18/1986 on the Basque Language, 15 December 1986, Official Gazette of Navarra No. 154, 17 December 1986.

79 Pradilla 2004, 28.80 Council of Europe 2005, paras. 33-38. 81 Article 7 Decision 1/2005 of the Academy of the Valencian Language on the Principles and Criteria

for the Defense of the Denomination and Entity of the Valencian Language, 9 February 2005.



other denominations of the language of the Valencians (i.e., Catalonian).82 The polemics have continued and there were attempts to renaming the language Cata-lonian-Valencian, but they were defeated politically in 2006.

Undoubtedly, as in the case of the Vlach language in Serbia, the recognition of the Valencian language serves to consolidate it politically.83 The proponents of Valencian as a language are considered linguistic secessionists by their opponents. In this sense, Catalonian nationalism has a negative attitude towards Valencian comparable to that of Romanian and Croatian nationalism towards the Vlach and the Bunjevci minorities in Serbia. The supporters of Valencian as a distinct language are usually suspicious of potential territorial claims of their Catalonian neighbours in line with the notion of a Països Catalans (Catalonian Countries, a “Greater” Catalonia).84

In Aragon, neither Aragonese nor Catalonian are used as language of instruc-tion. These are only taught on a voluntary basis based on demand and in certain areas of the region.85 In 2013, to the dismay of linguists and Catalonian users, the Aragon autonomous parliament enacted a law erasing the denomination of Catalonian (as spoken in its territory and recognised in its prior Law on Lan-guages) and furthermore replacing it with the new acronym LAPAO (Aragonese Language Spoken in the Eastern area of Aragon, Lengua Aragonesa Propia del Area Oriental ), referring to the Aragon Strip (Franja de Aragón in Spanish, Franja de Po-nent in Catalonian).86 The justification used by the government of Aragon (widely mocked by Catalonian speakers) was the protection of what it considers to be Aragonese languages (with diverse denominations).87 In addition, the new law merged the existing Academy of Catalonian in Aragon into an Aragonese Acad-emy of Languages.88 The move raised tensions on the linguistic policy arena and the Commission on Language of the Catalonian parliament then demanded that the jurisdiction of the Institute of Catalonian Studies (Institut D’Estudis Catalans) should cover the Eastern part of Aragon as well.89 In principle, the jurisdiction of the Institute of Catalonian Studies is defined territorially. It covers the “lands of

82 Academy of the Valencian Language, Institutional Declaration on the Name and Entity of the Valencian and the Current Legal Framework, 19 December 2003. Teodoro 2008, 125-142.

83 Francés 1985, 35-45.84 Climent-Ferrando 2005. 85 Article 12 Parliament of Aragon Law 3/2013 on the Use, Protection and Promotion of the

Languages and Linguistic Modalities of Aragon, 9 May 2013, Aragon Official Gazette No. 100, 24 May 2013, Official Gazette of Spain No. 138, 10 June 2013 (henceforward 2013 Aragon Language Law).

86 2013 Aragon Language Law.87 Council of Europe 2005, paras. 49-52. 88 Chapter III 2013 Aragon Language Law. Article 15 Parliament of Aragon Law 10/2009 on the

Use, Protection and Promotion of the Languages from Aragon, 22 December 2009, Aragon Official Gazette No. 252, 30 December 2009, Official Gazette of Spain No. 30, 4 February 2010 (henceforward 2009 Aragon Language Law).

89 Parliament of Catalonia, Commission on Culture and Language, 30 January 2014.


24 J.-M. Arraiza

Catalonian language and culture”. However, the law does not define such language areas.90 Political and linguistic considerations are mixed in the debate.

4. Extrapolating Territorial and Non-Territorial Models

4.1 A Theoretical Exercise

As described, non-territorial and territorial forms of autonomy offer a variety of options for the accommodation of linguistic diversity. Their emergence usually obeys to long term processes of institutional design (e.g., the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires or the creation of Spain as a State). A comparative analysis of these institutional forms may be enriched by exploring theoretical (counterfactual) extrapolations. That is, would a certain territorial arrangement serve the needs of the beneficiaries of a particular non-territorial mechanism or vice versa? Even though the scenarios are not feasible (obviously, Catalonians would never accept losing their legislative powers and Serbia would hardly pursue any new territorial autonomy regimes within its territory) it is worth exploring the idea in order to understand the models and their consequences.

4.2 Non-Territorial Autonomy for the Catalonians: Wide-Ranging Implications

What would be the consequences of a national cultural autonomy arrangement in the Catalonian case?

First of all, the law would need to define the Catalonians as a group deserving legal protection. In order to shift towards non-territorial autonomy arrangements, the Spanish legal framework would need to define the practical meaning of the term “nationalities” (nacionalidades) contained in Article 2 of the Spanish Constitu-tion (which does not explicitly name any of such nationalities).91 Unlike in the case of Serbia or Hungary, in Spain there is no legal definition of what it means to be-long to a nationality or a national minority. Legally speaking, political identities are defined by place of residence. Thus, the “political condition of Basque” is defined in the Basque Autonomy Statute by the legally registered place of residence (last le-gal place of residence if residing outside Spain).92 The same applies for Catalonian, Valencian and all other identities. The legal framework would therefore need to define what it means to be a Catalonian from a national identity perspective (de-linked from territory and residence). In the current set up, all permanent residents of Catalonia are considered Catalonians for legal purposes, regardless of national self-identification preferences or mother tongue.

90 Article 1 Kingdom of Spain, Royal Decree 1867, 21 January 1977. 91 Article 2 Constitution of Spain, Official Gazette of Spain No. 311, 29 December 1978.92 Article 7(1) Basque Country Autonomy Statute.



Once such a definition on cultural, non-territorial bases was established, it would be necessary to identify the persons belonging to the Catalonian minority through a census or a special electoral register in order to identify the subject of non-territorial rights. This would create a legally based identity cleavage which does not exist in the current territorial autonomy regime. In this sense, the es-sentialist idea of a monolithic compact national linguistic group would perhaps be strengthened.

A Catalonian national council with jurisdiction over the whole territory of Spain would need to be created. Its competences would be limited to regulatory, administrative and consultative functions over matters of culture, education, in-formation, official use of language and script. A legal policy decision would need to be made as to whether a single person could belong to more than one national council. A hypothetical Valencian national council would compete with the Cata-lonian national minority council over membership and language denomination.

The territorial concentration of Catalonian language speakers would mean that the education and official language use policies would mainly be used in the Països Catalans, as well as in large urban areas of Spain proper (i.e., Madrid, Bilbao, etc.) where Catalonian speakers also live. Following the personality principle, a set of language rights would need to be established for Catalonian speakers throughout Spain, perhaps activated through a numerical threshold at the local level. This would require some form of linguistic census.

From a language preservation perspective, establishing non-territorial au-tonomy would perhaps diminish the use of Catalonian, because local adminis-trations in areas with low numbers of Catalonian speakers would cease to be bi-lingual. Moreover, persons whose mother tongue is Castilian Spanish would not be obliged to learn Catalonian within the territories where Catalonian is spoken. Following the functional autonomy model, students would attend separate schools depending on their mother tongue (Catalonian or Spanish). Linguistic immersion would not be possible.

Indeed, linguistic immersion does not marry well with the idea of a homoge-neous group contained in national cultural autonomy institutions. In this sense, the non-territorial model would favour an exclusive version of the Catalonian identity, rather than the current inclusive, integrative one. Currently a considerable portion of Catalonian speakers use the Catalonian language for practical purposes – using the co-official language – and self-identify nationally as Spaniards (or with other autonomies within Spain). Territorial autonomy in this case has the consequence of promoting a wider minority language use (Catalonian) in comparison with non-territorial autonomy, which restricts such use to national minorities.

The linguistic conflict concerning the Catalonian-speaking areas outside Cata-lonia (East Aragon, Valencia) would be transformed. Having no competences con-cerning language and education policy, the governments of Aragon and Valencia (or Madrid at the central level) would maybe see less of an interest in meddling with the development of Catalonian language within their territories.


26 J.-M. Arraiza

The number of persons belonging to minorities would perhaps grow, as per-sons who identify themselves as Basque, Galician or else outside such territories would be able to receive education in their mother tongue and participate in na-tional council elections. On the other hand, non-ethnically affiliated political par-ties (e.g., majority parties) would lose some leverage in the education policies of minorities, because they would not be represented in such councils.

4.3 Territorial Autonomy for Serbia’s National Minorities: The Problem of “Autonomy-Phobia”

Conversely, would a territorial model be useful in the case of national minorities in Serbia? As in the Catalonian case, the proposal would clearly not be realistic from a political standpoint. While most Catalonians would be against the diminishing of their current self-government powers, Serbia would be the one unwilling to es-tablish further territorial autonomy arrangements. As pointed out, the ghost of se-cession has made autonomy an anathema in Central and (South) Eastern Europe.93

Territorial arrangements would be difficult to establish for smaller national minorities. For example, the circa 35,330 self-declared Vlach (who do not reach 0.5 per cent of Serbia’s population) do not constitute the majority in any of Serbia’s municipalities. They are territorially concentrated in the Timok region (Bor and Zaječar districts, map 1) as well as the districts of Braničevo and Pomoravlje.94 In such conditions, a degree of administrative decentralisation concerning culture and languages either through existing demographic thresholds (15 per cent at the local level) – or directly defining the minority language speaking territories as in Navarra and Valencia – would perhaps be more appropriate than territorial autonomy.95

Moving towards a primarily territorial system such as the current autonomy of Catalonia where no “national minority councils” exist would not deprive such bodies from developing cultural, language and education policy by moving such competences to the autonomous government. Indeed, the Autonomous Prov-ince of Vojvodina – the only functioning territorial autonomy regime in Serbia (even though its powers are regulatory, not legislative) – has the constitutionally entrenched power to grant additional rights (and funding) to those nationalities which live in its territory and their national councils.96 The Vojvodina Autonomy Statute explicitly embraces the principles of multilingualism, multiculturalism and multi-confessionalism. The Autonomy Statute foresees co-operation with national minority councils and even incorporates measures of ethnic proportional repre-

93 Palermo 2013. 94 Republic of Serbia 2011 Population Census.95 Article 11 Serbia Law on Languages.96 Article 79(2) Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. Beretka 2013, 213-229. Thirteen out of the

existing twenty national councils have their seats in Vojvodina.



sentation in the autonomous civil service.97 Finally, the existence of six languages “in official use” in Vojvodina (Serbian, Hungarian, Romanian, Croatian, Ruthe-nian and Slovak) makes linguistic immersion education policies such as the one existing in Catalonia not feasible (there are too many languages for that matter).

Catering for the full linguistic needs of a large number of smaller minorities would perhaps be too costly. In this sense, the Catalonia model seems apt only for those territories where a maximum of two major linguistic groups coexist.

In a territorial autonomy regime, a census reflecting ethnic identities or a spe-cial electoral register would not be strictly necessary. Any inhabitant of these re-gions would be able to vote and exercise linguistic and other rights regardless of ethnic self-identification. In this sense, national identity would be somewhat de-fused or at least expressed in different terms. The idea of a compact national group (as represented by national councils) would perhaps be weakened. Possibly, as it happens in Catalonia, most political parties would use a national identity-friendly discourse as well as national minority language and symbols in order to gain the support of the Bunjevci, Vlach or any other group.

The establishment of further territorial arrangements would, however, rise fears of secession elsewhere in the country, particularly concerning the Albanian minority in Southern Serbia (Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja), where a latent conflict is present since 2001. Moreover, the existing tensions between minority and majority groups would likely lead to a multiplicity of “minority within the mi-nority” tensions which would add up to existing difficulties in integration.

5. ConclusionsAutonomy is one form of making the political and the cultural congruent. It can help ensure that minority languages are protected and promoted, following multiculturalism principles. Territorial and non-territorial autonomy provide the political structures necessary to ensure democratic self-governance of minority groups. Moreover, these forms of autonomy can be, as seen in the case of Vojvodi-na, essentially complementary and may benefit from each other. The territoriality principle and its idea of a physical homeland for a minority where its language is a component of home rule for its inhabitants, and the personality principle seeking to empower a language community, are not exclusive but essentially complementa-ry. They constitute two broad institutional design options intimately related to the challenge of cultural (and linguistic) diversity. Equally, territory-based identities may complement personality-based ones.

The consequences of territorial and non-territorial autonomy for linguistic di-versity, however, are different and complex: there is no single legal formula to square the circular relation between linguistically diverse societies and territorial and non-territorial forms of autonomy.

97 Articles 7 and 22-26 Autonomy Statute of Vojvodina.


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Non-territorial autonomy is characterised by the lack of legislative compe-tences and the need to define groups by law. This may, however, be balanced by a high degree of control by non-territorial autonomy bodies over education and language standardisation bodies. Indeed, the power to regulate issues such as language standardisation may give minority representatives considerable influ-ence. The definition of groups by law may promote an essentialist understanding of identity as fixed, exclusive and homogeneous as opposed to the perhaps more inclusive identities produced by territorial autonomy regimes such as Catalonia. Non-territorial autonomy seems in this sense more amenable to include a larger number of smaller identities and even the creation and promotion of relatively new ones. It normally requires a census which allows the state to make concrete poli-cies and sometimes a special electoral register for members of minorities.

Non-territorial models allow speakers to use their language elsewhere within the state; however, they constrain the use of minority languages to a self-contained group, as non-speakers do not have the obligation (or opportunity) to learn such languages. Functional autonomy in the area of education leads in this sense to the separation of students according to language. While this does not necessarily amount to discrimination, it may have negative effects on societal integration in post-conflict societies. Non-territorial autonomy seems most appropriate for con-texts in which persons belonging to linguistic groups are dispersed and bilingual. It guarantees their access to the public administration in their own language as well as the majority language and – in combination with functional autonomy – guarantees education in their mother tongue.

Territorial autonomy linked with the devolution of competences over language policy offers the advantage of a clear set of rules applying equally to all the in-habitants of a given sub-state entity. Legislative autonomy empowers geographi-cally concentrated minorities to make language policy decisions. It may lead to the consolidation of a territory-based identity which is normally of a relatively inclusive character (such as Catalonians in Catalonia). Such consolidation derives from Catalonia’s power to define language and education law and policy, subject to constitutional rules and the demographic concentration of at least one linguistic group. Indeed, territorial autonomies may have at their disposal options similar to those of states: official recognition of languages and the establishment of as-sociated language rights, education policies based on either thresholds, delimita-tion of areas or linguistic immersion as well as the recognition and or creation of language standardisation and/or policy bodies. Given the factual ethnic (and linguistic) heterogeneity of virtually all societies, the risk is replicating the nation-state paradigm at the sub-state level, creating new grievances by minorities within minorities. Hence, it is essential that autonomy institutions encompass internal checks and balances.

Through its linguistic immersion policy (possible when there is one majority and one minority language), the Catalonian autonomy promotes minority language use by all inhabitants of the territory and provides a more ample range of language



rights. In a way, the Catalonian territorial model promotes an inclusive regional identity while the Serbian national cultural autonomy model leads to exclusive separate identities. Paradoxically, although linguistic immersion policies lead to bilingualism and eased integration of newcomers to the Catalonian identity, it may also strengthen claims of secession based on a single territorial Catalonian identity against the broader Spanish identity.

The recognition and homogenisation of minority languages through territorial and non-territorial autonomy helps in any case to mould and consolidate linguistic identities. The power to create and recognise the authority of language stand-ardisation bodies serves to consolidate minority languages which do not have a kin-State.

Disputes over the status and denomination of languages can take different shapes in territorial and non-territorial autonomy regimes. In the examples revised in this article, the disputes over the status and name are similar in nature but differ as to the actors involved. In Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon where language ar-eas and administrative boundaries do not coincide the conflict involves primarily the regional territorial governments and the non-territorial Institute of Catalonian Studies. In Serbia, the disputes over the smaller Vlach and Bunjevac languages is paradoxically of a higher level, involving the national cultural autonomy in-stitutions in Serbia and the governments of Serbia, Croatia and Romania. In all, such conflicts evidence the inherent political sensitivity of minority language is-sues. The variety of solutions contained in territorial and non-territorial autonomy should offer a sufficiently wide tool kit of options to manage them.

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The Management of Linguistic Diversity through Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy

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