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Contents

Typicality in History. Tracing a Basic Definition .................................

Giovanni Ceccarelli, Alberto Grandi, Stefano Magagnoli

PART I

TASTE AND TYPICALITY:CONSTRUCTION AND INVENTION OF TRADITION

Terroir: jalons pour l’histoire d’un mot................................................

Madeleine Ferrières

The Contents of Typical Food Products: Tradition, Myth,Memory. Some Notes on Nostalgia Marketing. ....................................

Maura Franchi

The Avatar: An Economic History Paradigmfor Typical Products................................................................................

Giovanni Ceccarelli, Alberto Grandi, Stefano Magagnoli

The Building of Typicalityas Food Pattern (Italy, XVth-XVIth Centuries)......................................

Laura Prosperi

La construction des “spécialités” culinairesdu Sud-Ouest de la France (XVIIIe-XIXe siècles) .................................

Philippe Meyzie

Imagining Identities.Women’s Magazines and the Inventionof Culinary Traditions in Flanders (1945-1970) ...................................

Anneke Geyzen

Typical Food in Norway.A Developer of History and Tradition ........

Virginie Amilien

The Swiss Milk Chocolate.A Typical Image for an Atypical Product .............................................

Régis Huguenin

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PART II

TYPICALITY AND INSTITUTIONS

Costa Rica Between Trademarks and Geographical Indications.A Case Study in the Development of Typicality ...................................

Fabio Parasecoli

“Walser’s pride”: A Mountain Cheese as Part ofRegional Identity and Regional Development Strategiesin the Biosphere Reserve Großes Walsertal – Austria ..........................

Stefan Kah, Norbert Weixlbaumer

Produits typiques alpins, écomusées et marketing territorial commestratégies de distinction et de survie ......................................................

Cristina Grasseni

Appellations d’origine conseillées.Histoire des conseillers agricoleset des produits typiquement savoyards (1950-1985) ............................

Sylvain Brunier, Hakim Bourfouka

L’Italie, la France et les fromages “typiques” (1950-2009).Aux origines d’une politique étrangère européenne? ..........................

David Burigana

Defining Good and Bad Products. The Building of ScientificConsensus on the Purity of Cider in Spain from the End of theXIXth Century to the First Decade of the XXth Century ......................

Gloria Sanz Lafuente

PART III

TYPICAL PRODUCTS, TERROIR AND TOURISM

The Strategic Building of Typicality.Learning from the Comparative Historyof Three French Sparkling Vineyards ...................................................

Christian Barrère

The Geography of Quality Wine in United Italy.Areas and Producers ...............................................................................

Simone Kovatz

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The Long Struggle for the Chianti Denomination.Quality versus Quantity ..........................................................................

Luca Mocarelli

Des vins de coupage aux étiquettes à succès.Typicité et culture œnologiquedans le développement territorial des Pouilles (Puglie) ..........................

Ezio Ritrovato

Tourism and Typicality in Italy, 1980-2010 ..........................................

Annunziata Berrino

Produits régionaux et développement territorial.Reggio Emilia au XIX

e siècle....................................................................

Marie-Lucie Rossi

PART IV

TYPICAL PRODUCTS: SOME EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCES

Factors Influencing the Sensory Featuresof Parmigiano-Reggiano from the Renaissance to Present Day..........

Mario Zannoni

Beyond Business: “Academia Barilla”and the Defense of the Italian Way of Eating .......................................

Giancarlo Gonizzi, Gianluigi Zenti

Perspectives ..............................................................................................

Jean-Pierre Williot

References ................................................................................................

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The Long Struggle for the Chianti Denomination

Quality versus Quantity*

Luca MOCARELLI

Università di Milano Bicocca

The Marcucci brothers (from left to right Francesco, Ugo, Torello and Piero), thelast of the Chianti coopers, at the entrance of their workshop in S. Casciano Val diPesa (1972).

* This article is a contribution to an important part of my roots. It is dedicated to thememory of my grandmother and her brothers Ugo, Torello, Piero and Francesco – thelast of the Chianti coopers – and of my grandfather Nataliero Mocarelli, all sons ofthat hard yet beautiful land which lies between Florence and Siena.

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This paper explores the chain of events that led to the ChiantiDenomination retracing its contrasted path back to 1924, when aConsortium for the defence of Chianti’s wine distinctive character andits original brand – the “Consorzio per la difesa del vino tipico delChianti e della sua marca di origine” – was established. Then, manyactors were competing: first of all, the newborn Consortium with its willto limit both the Chianti production area and its early promotionalactivity, secondly the Consortium’s rivals (namely, the other Chiantiwine-makers and mostly the wine big business producers) and thirdlyParliament, which dealt with the issue of wine denomination at differentstages. In addition, the Consortium also had to face the Post-SecondWorld War territorial and agricultural significant changes: thesharecropping crisis, the depopulation, the re-planting processes of thevineyards and, not least, a substantial replacement in land ownership.Only in the late 1980s, after a fresh and flourishing season, did theChianti find international recognition, an acknowledgement though, thatregarded only slightly its original blend.

1. The Consortium early years:the struggle for the denomination begins

The history of the contrasted path that led to the Chiantidenomination is related to what may be regarded, from many aspects, asa paradoxical occurrence, considering that it concerns the recognition ofa wine production area renowned since the Middle Ages for the qualityof its products, as Federigo Melis’ work best attests. The Chianti wine isindeed to be rated as one of the main Italian wines for export in the earlymodern age “to the point that in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries itremained almost the sole product in some foreign markets”.1 Aprestigious position confirmed on September 24th, 1716 by the gran-ducal edict On the declaration of the Boundaries of the four regionsChianti, Pomino, Carmignano e Val d’Arno di sopra, issued in fact inorder to delineate the borders of the areas where the above-mentionedwines were produced. The Chianti region extended “from the village ofSpedaluzzo to the village of Greve and Panzano including the whole

1Quoted in Melis, F., “Produzione e commercio dei vini italiani (con particolareriferimento alla Toscana) nei secoli XIII-XVIII”, in Annales Cisalpines d’HistoireSociale, 3, 1972, p. 131. See also Melis, F., “La documentazione medievale sulChianti delle origini”, in Notiziario del Chianti Classico, 2, 1969, p. 2-6. For arecent and precise analysis of Tuscany viticulture see Nanni, P., (a cura di), Storiadella vite e del vino in Italia. Toscana, Firenze, Polistampa, 2007.

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territory of Radda, that is the villages of Radda, Gajole and Castellinaup to the boundary with the State of Siena”.2

Thus, the Chianti has an ancient tradition that entered a new phasewhen, at the end of the XIXth century – on April 14th, 1891 – the MadridAgreement set, at British request, the rules of the internationalregistration of marks and trademarks, which obviously also affectedwine sector regulation, as was soon realized by French quality wine-makers.3 This was the beginning of a long-lasting battle to obtain thedenomination of Chianti and the geographical boundaries of itsproduction area.4 The aim was the valorisation of a wine whose idealrecipe had been suggested by Baron Ricasoli back in the XIXth century,proposing a masterly blend made of red wine grapes (Sangiovese andCanaiolo) and white wine grapes (Malvasia and later Trebbiano).5

2See Casabianca, A., I confini storici del Chianti, Firenze 1905; Chianti, storia eorigine di un nome, monographic issue of Chianti. Storia, arte, cultura e territorio,9, 1988; Il Chianti nel tempo dei Lorena, monographic issue of Chianti. Storia, arte,cultura e territorio, 7, 1987.

3The 1883 Paris Convention started an important season of international negotiationsdrawing the judicial framework of the industrial property protection. It was followedin 1891 by the Madrid Agreement on the International registration of marks, laterrevised at different stages (in Washington on June 2nd, 1911, at The Hague onNovember 6th, 1925, in London on June 2nd, 1934, in Lisbon on October 31st, 1958,in Stockholm on July 14th, 1967). Later – on June 27th, 1989 – another protocol wassigned in order to introduce some further innovations on international markregistration, this was fundamental to remove the obstacles that prevented manycountries – among which some EU member states, to adhere to the Madrid agreementof 1891. Regarding the notable differences between Italian and French wineoperators in the XIXth century see Loubére, L.A., The Red and the White: the Historyof Wine in France and Italy in the Nineteenth Century, Albany, State University ofNew York, 1978.

4The bibliography on Chianti wine and territory is extensive as attested by Mugnaini,G., Il Chianti: contributo ad una bibliografia sulla Toscana, Firenze, All’Insegnadel Giglio, 1991 that collects more than 1,300 titles. For our purpose is sufficient torecall only a few fundamental texts such as: Repetti, E., Dizionario geografico efisico della Toscana contenente la descrizione di tutti i luoghi del Granducato,Ducato di Lucca, Garfagnana e Lunigiana, published in six volume between 1833and 1846 and consulted in the anastatic copy published in 1977 by the Cassa diRisparmio di Firenze; Casabianca, A., Guida storica del Chianti, Roma,Multigrafica, s.d.; Rombai, L., Stopani, R., Il Chianti, Firenze, Sansoni, 1981. For aninteresting account of Chianti wine in the past century, see especially Saltini, A.,Vino, conti e contadini. Cinquant’anni di scontri per la denominazione del Chianti,Firenze, Nuova Terra Antica, 2009.

5“The wine gets its profume mainly from Sangiovese […], from the Canajolo itsamability [...], then the Malvasia tends to dilute its blend […]” from a famousRicasoli’s letter that signed the origin of Chianti Modern History and that isextensively commented by Ciuffoletti, Z., Alla ricerca del “vino perfetto”. Il Chiantidel Barone di Brolio. Ricasoli e il Risorgimento vitivinicolo italiano. Con il

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At the beginning of the XXth century, after some inconclusiveskirmishes, the promulgation of the Law Decree on March 7th, 1924,marked a fundamental turning point as it dissolved the link betweenwine denomination and geographical origin. In particular, the Decreeestablished that the character of a particular wine was not to come fromits specific geographical connotations but from those precise andconstant characteristics that a wine had at the moment of its sale,consequent also to cellar treatments.6 As result, when this law enteredinto force, the advocates of Piedmont and Tuscany’s prestigiousdenominations were aspirationally frustrated.7 Actually this decision wasnot totally unexpected in a country such as Italy, where the mostimportant factors were the profits and interests of the blending wineexport producers, acknowledged widely as vital representatives of thenational wine business.8

The Chianti producers judged this legal measure not only asinadequate, but also as extremely detrimental to their interests; thus, onMay 14th, 1924, they decided, in response, to establish the Consortiumfor the defence of the distinctive Chianti wine and of its original brand.At that point all the main players were on stage to begin a battle thatwould become a no holds barred decennial fight, pitting the Consortiummembers, who chose the Gallo Nero of the Chianti Medieval League astheir emblem, against the crowded group of their numerous andpowerful enemies, which included big export producers and blendingwine-makers, along with many producers from Chianti land’s adjoining

carteggio fra Bettino Ricasoli e Cesare Studiati (1859-1876), Firenze, Olschki,2009. On Ricasoli as entrepreneur and land owner see especially Biagioli, G., Ilmodello del proprietario imprenditore nella Toscana dell’Ottocento: BettinoRicasoli. Il patrimonio, le fattorie, Firenze, Olschki, 2000. See also: Biagioli, G., Lebaron Bettino Ricasoli et la naissance du Chianti classico, in Les vins desHistoriens, Actes du 1er symposium Vin et Histoire, Suze-la Rousse, Université duvin, 1990; Satto, C., (a cura di), Bettino Ricasoli imprenditore agricolo e pionieredel Risorgimento vitivinicolo italiano, Firenze, Aska Edizioni, 2010.

6For additional considerations on the Decree see Pagani, P., “In regime di ‘vino tipo’tutelato”, in Rivista di diritto agrario, 3, 1924, p. 480-511.

7On the DOC (Denominazione d’Origine Controllata – Controlled Denomination ofOrigin) and DOCG (Denominazione d’Origine Controllata e Garantita – Controlledand Guaranteed Denomination of Origin) wines of Piemonte see Segre, G., “DOC,exit e innovazione. Property rights nel distretto culturale del vino nelle Langhe”, inSviluppo Locale, 10, 2003, p. 24-48.

8On the importance of wine for Italian Exports see Federico, G., Oltre frontiera:l’agricoltura italiana e il mercato internazionale fra Otto e Novecento, in Storiadell’agricoltura italiana in età contemporanea, 3, Padova, Marsilio, 1992, p. 189-222.

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areas. Parliament was supposed to act as referee, but from the beginningshowed little consideration for the interests of the Chianti producers.

Notably, Professor Alberto Oliva’s speech, made in Radda duringthe Consortium open ceremony, proves that from the beginning, theassociates had a clear consciousness of their opponents’ strength:“Without a doubt, we will have to fight a long, difficult and potentiallyruinous battle, but, if we stay united in our purpose, we will succeed.We are going to face strong, clever and fearful enemies; we are going toface adversaries even capable of having a Royal Decree withdrawn bythe Ministry. In Tuscany, besides, there is a tenacious propaganda topush the government to indefinitely defer the resolution of the debate. Itdoesn’t make any difference, though; we must establish theConsortium”.9

Certainly, for the newborn institution, the best way to enter the fightwas a rapid and functional start-up, hence from the beginning, Italo DeLucchi, followed by Gino Sarrocchi10 succeeded in giving to theConsortium the structure of an efficient and well-organised association,which saw its members grow from 33 to 189 in less than six months.11

Taken into account the adverse decree, they strategically decided touse the industrial trademarks legislation to foster the denomination oftheir wine, maintaining the importance of limiting its production area;thus, to give this strategy a chance, the delimitation of the Chiantiproduction area was so fundamental as to become, at this early stage, thefirst priority of the associates.

Opting for a trademark required a considerable economiccommitment because it entailed a lot of work such as the registration ofthe trademark, its judicial defence, the distributions of countermarks tothe members and a particular care in keeping the associate wine cellarsunder control. Moreover, in the absence of a particular set of normsrelated to the denominations, it was not possible to impose on each local

9See Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 6.

10The former was for a long time Major of Greve and then the Consortium Presidentuntil 1926. He was one of the most prominent representatives of the Chianti Wine-producers Union and from 1906 the owner of the famous Greve wine cellar built in1893 by Ernesto Leproni. He is widely considered one of the central figures inChianti modern history. The latter succeeded him as president in January 1927. Hewas a distinguished lawyer and he wrote extensively for the Consortium cause, seeSarrocchi, G., Per il Chianti del Chianti: critica e polemica, Firenze, TipografiaNiccolai, 1942, (republished in 1989 in anastatic edition by the Polistampa diFirenze).

11Detailed information are available on the Consortium’s website:http://www.chianticlassico.com/consorzio/storia/ (accessed, January 15th, 2012).

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produce what was basically a collective trademark, thus the success ofthe initiative depended mainly on the promoters’ ability of persuasion.

Unquestionably in their favour was Luigi Ricasoli’s adhesion to theGallo Nero Consortium; not only was he the most popular andprominent Chianti producer but, from January 1927, he also became theinfluential secretary of the Fascist Provincial Federation.12

However, considering that a specific legislation on denominationswas still missing (on March 18th, 1926, Parliament turned the 1924Decree into law without modifying it) the situation called for a newapproach, namely that of focusing on commercial advertisement in orderto induce the consumer to closely associate the Chianti wine and itsvineyards to the Consortium. The greatest supporter of this new ideawas without a doubt Italo De Lucchi. At the 1926 Consortium Assemblyhe declared: “The very nature of réclame is indeed that of beingrepeated, the audience must be able to identify a particular product justby associating instinctually its name with its producer’s”.13

De Lucchi’s strategy was undeniably a winning one as Chianti’ssuccessful participation in the 1925 Milan Fair and the fast growth ofthe price differential between Gallo Nero products and other Chiantisattest. Moreover, in 1927, another Consortium, the Chianti Putto, wascreated, with the purpose of hindering the monopolistic and so farsuccessful schemes of the Radda associates: it proposed replacing theGallo Nero territory with a wider area established by commercialpractice.14 With this move, the Chianti Putto would become one of GalloNero’s most fearful and tenacious adversaries.

2. The birth of Chianti Classico

As the 1920s were passing by, a stage of new challenges began, inparticular when the denomination issue once again drew Parliament’sattention and rumours began circulating about Fascism’s intent tocontrol all of the Tuscany wine producers through a new singleconsortium. Hence in 1929, as a preventive move, the Gallo Nero

12Luigi Ricasoli not only was renowned for his political activity (see Snowden, F.M.,The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany 1919-1922, Cambridge, Cambridge University,Press, 1989, p. 58 and ff.) but he was also famous for his wine-making successes –as a matter of fact in 1952 he was awarded with the Italian title of Cavaliere dellavoro.

13Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 15.

14An accurate account of the Consortium history is available athttp://www.consorziovinochianti.it/it/consorzio-storia.aspx (accessed, January 15th,2012).

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associates chose to create a cooperative society to transfer the propertyof the Consortium emblem to.15 On July 10th, 1930, the Law n. 1164confirmed their fears – through devolving the fundamental executivepower, namely the vineyards’ delimitation, to technical commissions tobe agreed upon by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry ofCorporations.16

The commission appointed to resolve the thorny Chianti questionwas led by Giovanni Dalmasso, a major Italian scholar of Viticulture.17

Its work had a huge impact in shaping the Consortium’s historyparticularly when, after scrupulous examinations and surveys, on August13th, 1932, the commission issued its response, confirming theassociates’ worst fears.18

The commission, after having underlined how the Chianti area wasan arbitrary space bound to be modified from time to time depending ontemporary parameters, put the associates’ aspirations off, declaring that“if the Chianti was a superior table wine, its name should be exclusivelyrelated to the above-mentioned area (Gallo Nero’s including, since1928, S. Casciano). Conversely, being the Chianti an highly notoriousnational and international table wine, the market commercial needs havejustified the proliferation and constant research of similar wines –outside its original area – that in time were acknowledged as Chianti”.19

15This point has been highlighted by Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 26.

16The law did not provide for a complete discipline however it offered for the first timea clear definition of “typical wine”. According to article n. 2: “wines are to beconsidered typical when they have a real quality […] when their local origin can becertified along with their constant and organoleptic peculiarities, which have to granta particular delicacy and good flavor”. Then, the regulation approved by the RoyalDecree n. 1836 of November 10th, 1930, was even more specific: according to articlen. 1 “typical wines can be divided in: special wines, superior wines and fine wines[…]. Superior wines are those that keep a constant character and that acquire specialand prestigious features after natural aging […]. Fine wines do not reach the qualityof the superior wines but since they have constant features, are nonetheless worth ofprotection”.

17In 1911 Dalmasso became Professor of Viticulture and Oenology, later he taught atthe Conegliano prestigious oenological school and in 1925 he was appointed directorof the Experimental local center for viticulture and oenology becoming full directorin 1931. In this period he directed, with Arturo Marescalchi, the remarkable Storiadella vite e del vino in Italia published in Milan in three volumes by Gualdonibetween 1931 and 1937. It includes one of its major contribution: Le vicendetecniche ed economiche della viticoltura e dell’enologia italiana, vol. III, p. 165-612.

18Per la tutela del vino Chianti e degli altri vini tipici toscani. Relazione dellaCommissione interministeriale per la delimitazione del territorio del vino Chianti,Bologna, A. Brunelli, 1932.

19Per la tutela del vino Chianti e degli altri vini tipici toscani, p. 25.

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In this manner the decision of the commission underlined the need torestrict the Chianti production area, excluding many unjustifiableextensions in Central and Northern Italy, but at the same time, itbroadened the Chianti lands to include seven districts and five provinces– basically the whole of wine-growing Tuscany; the sole distinctiveright granted to the Gallo Nero producers was the consent to use the“Classic” adjective after the “Chianti” appellation.

The commission also suggested the establishment of a newadministrative body, designed to apply common politics and guidelinesfor every accredited Chianti producer family. To elude this risk, theGallo Nero assembly on September 25th, 1932, met in Radda anddecided to transform the Consortium into a private association, intendedto become the sole owner of the Gallo Nero trademark so as to avoid theregional consortium proposed by the commission taking possession ofit.20 Actually the new regional consortium, formally established in 1934,was never actually in operation because it was soon abolished by theLaw of June 10th, 1937.21

Italo De Lucchi once again succeeded in turning an apparentlyseriously compromised situation to the benefit of Gallo Nero; herealized that the commission itself had given the Consortium a powerfulweapon with which to defend the interests of the associates and thequality of their Chianti: the certification of Classic. In fact, since theChianti denomination had been granted to an extensive area of about 1.5million hectolitres of wine, there was only one way to react: investing inthe valorisation of the “Chianti Classico” caption, in order to render itan actual geographical denomination, with the ultimate aim of relegatingthe other Chianti wines to a sort of anonymous and generic space,impossible for the consumer to refer to a specific territorial area.

3. A complex period: from the Italian reconstructionto the Chianti DOC discipline (1967)

De Lucchi’s intuition was not totally understood until after theSecond World War, when the Consortium, showing a notable capacityfor renovation, resumed its battle in the context of Republican Italy. Infact, when on April 15th, 1947, Sarrocchi resigned and Luigi Ricasoli,

20Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 31.

21As rightly noted “when this regulation was in force (the law of 1930), manyconsortia for the protection of prestigious wines were established, though soonsuppressed by the law n. 1266 of June 10th, 1937” (Nicoletti, G., L’intervento dellegislatore nel settore vitivinicolo. Tre casi a confronto: Toscana, Veneto e Sicilia,Palermo, Industria Grafica Editoriale, 2007, p. 187).

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the most intransigent among the supporters of the Chianti cause, wasappointed as president, a new season of renovations began. Many newprominent figures joined the cause, first of all Carlo Andrea Bertolli,leader of the oil and wine sectors, who was admitted to the council, thenRaffaele Mattioli, President of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, the bigland owner Giulio Straccali and the wine retailer Lorenzo Cappelli.22

Nonetheless, the new council had to face a very difficult periodbecause its long struggle toward Chianti denomination – restarted in theearly 1950s and first concluded with the Law Decree of July 15th, 1963and the following DOC (Denominazione d’Origine Controllata –Controlled Denomination of Origin) discipline of August 1967 –overlapped with a time of social and economic change which thoroughlytransformed the Chianti character.

Among the most notable changes, it worth noting first of all that the“fattoria” with its numerous family homesteads, which before was thefundamental unit of Chianti socio-economic structure, ceased to exist.Secondly, many vineyards, destroyed by phylloxera, were substitutedand organized through specialized ones.

The Chianti territory had always rested with the “fattorie” that hadbecome its historical and peculiar element, mainly because its steeplands, difficult to cultivate, had over time called for economies of scale,leading to the proliferation of large-size farms of about 300 hectareseach. Those farms were best employed by offering increasingly smallerunits to the sharecropper families. Later, this tactic became even morecommon because the enlargement of the farms was not proportional tothe costs of control, in fact just one farmer and two assistants wereperfectly able to run tens of holdings and their respective colonialfamilies.23

The decision to adopt labour-intensive ways of production entailed,from the XIXth century onwards, a notable demographic increment, as inthe cases of Radda and Greve: in the XIXth century their populationamounted respectively to 2,500 and 8,400 and in 1911 their inhabitantsgrew to 3,424 and 14,555, before a slow downturn resulted in theirdecrease by 1951 to 2,932 and 13,233 residents. Later, much of theagricultural population left for the “promised lands”, namely theindustrial centres, cores of the economic miracle that was reshaping

22The new associates’ heterogeneous profile is outlined accurately by Saltini, Vino,conti e contadini, p. 44-47.

23For a probing examination of the Tuscany and Chianti rural reality see Pazzagli, C.,Per la storia dell’agricoltura toscana nei secoli XIX e XX. Dal catasto particellarelorenese al catasto agrario del 1929, Torino, Einaudi, 1979.

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Italy. In 1964 the inhabitants of Radda and Greve were reducedcorrespondingly to 1,702 and 10,816, those of Gaiole from 5,437 in1951, to 3,557. This decrease would have been even more drastic if ithad not been compensated by migration fluxes. As a matter of fact,while between 1951 and 1964 about 3,039 Radda inhabitants – morethan half of them – were leaving, approximately 1,621 were arriving.24

The process of social and economic disintegration that invested theChianti area is best exemplified on the micro scale by the case ofPaneretta, the Strozzi farm that lay on the San Casciano hills; itencompassed 17 homesteads and 300 hectares of land. In 1946, 121people lived and worked on its territory, almost the same number as in1787, when there were 132 people. Then, at the beginning of the 1950s,some of the pedologically less efficient homesteads were abandoned andthe big sharecropper families began to scale down. In 1960 the holdingsunder cultivation numbered just 11 with no more than 49 inhabitants.25

This impressive drop could not be prevented by hiring wage earnersbecause, speaking in economic terms, the local soil and its ruralcharacteristics did not make this solution feasible.

This social and demographic revolution entwined with anotherepochal transformation: the substitution of the traditional “promiscuouscrop” vineyards, increasingly ruined by phylloxera, with specializedcrop vineyards. This process involved more than 100 hectares per yearin 1964, and then in 1970, thanks partly to government funding, itreached its maximum peak of 633 hectares, interesting in the whole1960s about 2,000 hectares of land.26

Hence, the Consortium of Gallo Nero had to fight its battle in thiscontext of rapid and deep change, having to confront differentadversaries, all interested in turning to their benefit the no longerpostponable, discipline of wine denominations. Among the most hostileadversaries were the industrial companies, cleverly represented by NinoFolonari, confident that in the Italian major wine export market, namelythe United States, “much of the imported Italian wine…was thin, acidic,

24For an accurate account of these events see Camaiti, R., La popolazione e la realtàstatistico-economia del Chianti, Milano, Giuffré, 1965. With reference to the case ofRadda the following is of great interest: Cianferoni, R., Saltini, A., Radda in Chianti:più emigrati che abitanti, in Barberis, C., Dell’Angelo, G.C., (a cura di), L’Italiarurale, Bari, Laterza, 1988, p. 148-174.

25This information is taken from the degree thesis, Paolo Cortini, La fattoria diPaneretta nel Chianti fiorentino nel passaggio dalla mezzadria alla conduzionediretta quoted in Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 51-52.

26Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 53.

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less-than-top-quality Chianti”.27 The South of Italy blending wineproducers were also against the expected prohibition of wine cellarmanipulation, that for them would have been equivalent to an economicdisaster. Indeed, their joined opposition made any efforts, attempted bySegni, Fanfani and Medici to find an agreement among the contenders,go by the board.

Moreover the former enemies of the Consortium, namely the otherChianti wine-makers, had grown from four (the Consortia: Chiantiputto, Senese, Arentino and Pisano) to eight (after the creation of thetwo Consortia of Val d’Elsa, the one of Montalbano and the one of SanMiniato), without counting the major California wine producer JohnGallo, who filed a lawsuit in order to have the Chianti denominationprohibited for the Consortium,28 and also some agents of theConsortium, who for a period, did not hand over the revenue fromcountermarks’ distribution, causing an unexpected internal conflict.

This adverse situation drove Luigi Ricasoli to resign on April 17th,1953; the Council, though, accepted his resignation only in May 1958when his son Bettino became President. This was indeed a very criticalperiod for the Consortium, as was confirmed by the big Conference heldin Florence at the Georgofili Academy in May 1957.29 This occasionoffered another chance for Giovanni Dalmasso and Luigi Ricasoli toconfront each other. On one side Dalmasso fostered both thedelimitations he had created in 1932 and the idea that the Chianti was anexcellent table wine though not a proper quality wine; on the other side,Ricasoli maintained the historical strategy of the Consortium, that ofproducing expensive quality wine to sustain the high costs and efforts ofits tough pedological area.

Finally, after further skirmishes, on July 2nd, 1963, the Law Decreeon wine denominations was issued; it drew up the fundamentalguidelines, while delegating to some then uncreated bodies, theirconcrete enforcement.30

27As it was highlighted by Pellecchia, T., Wine. The 8,000-Year-Old Story of the WineTrade, London-Philadelphia, Running Press, 2006, p. 189.

28At this stage the big Californian wine producer failed in his attempt but at thebeginning of the 1990s in San Francisco the Gallos obtained a striking verdict thatrestrained the Gallo Nero producers from using the word “gallo” on the US market(Vagheggi, P., “Gallo nero fuori legge”, in La Repubblica, November 19th, 1991, p.23 e Vagheggi, P., “Il Gallo nero cambia nome”, in La Repubblica, December 3rd,1991, p. 23).

29Convegno del Chianti, Firenze, Accademia Economico Agraria dei Georgofili, 1957.

30The Presidential Decree n. 930 of July 12th, 1963 titled “Norme per la tutela delledenominazioni di origine dei mosti e dei vini” introduced an important novelty,

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At this stage, the main worries of the Gallo Nero associates wererelated to the implementation of the executive norms that would regulatethe denomination, in particular, which type of protection was about to beadopted – either DOC or DOCG (Denominazione d’Origine Controllatae Garantita – Controlled and Guaranteed Denomination of Origin) – andwhich prerequisites the new bodies in charge of denomination controlwould have to hold. Hence, the fight entered a further stage of quarrelsand negotiations that, this time, did not affected the whole country butonly the Consortium wine-producers.

In fact, many Consortium associates were not willing to reach acompromise at all, to the point that in 1965 some maintained thedetermination “of separating our land from all the others […] and let theothers do whatever they want: even mix it all in a sole mishmash”.31 Tomake their position stronger was, paradoxically, the 1963 Law article onfrauds and wine blending prohibition.32 In fact, right after itsenforcement, many Italian regions stopped sending their wine to theblending plants to have it transformed into Chianti. This led to a pricegrowth that particularly favoured the Gallo Nero: the price of its Chiantisurpassed four times the price of other Chiantis. Thus, in August 1967,when, after a hot debate the DOC discipline was approved, the councildecided to comply with its rules, after being assured that Gallo Nerowould hold the inspective powers required by that same policy.33

4. The 1970s and 1980s: the Chianti changes its character

After the promising 1960s and 1970s, new complications arose whensome of the Consortium’s major producers entered into conflict withother associates, resulting in the first producers abandoning theorganization in the early 1970s. Moreover, it’s worth noting that whilethe DOC concession was a great success – it prevented the lack ofcommunication between wine producers and consumers, providing anexperience par excellence34 – at the same time it significantly limited theproducers’ choices, as in the case of the Antinori farm. The Antinorifarm was one of the major Chianti enterprises that, at one stage, in order

namely the pyramidal classification of wine productions. At the pyramid’s base werethe table wines, surmounted by the IGT (Typical Geographic Indication) ones, by theDOC (Denomination of Controlled Origin) ones, while the highest position was heldby the DOCG (Denomination of Controlled and Guaranteed Origin) ones.

31Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 63.

32See the section V of the above cited decree titled “Disposizioni contro le frodi e lasleale concorrenza”.

33The policy was approved by Presidential decree on August 9th, 1967.

34Segre, “DOC, exit e innovazione”, p. 26-27.

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to capture the highest market segment, decided to produce, from the1970s, the Tignanello, a wine that, blending the Sangiovese with theCabernet Sauvignon and Cabernet Franc, did not fall into the ChiantiDOC.35

The Gallo Nero territory then started to produce a more diversifiedoffering, not only because of the progressive disappearance of particulargrapes such as, for instance, the Trebbiano and the Malvasia, but alsobecause during the replanting season, which was coming to an end,some mistakes were made.36 Besides, the planting of thousands ofhectares of new vineyards, more productive than the former ones, madethe Gallo Nero production area range from 117,000 hectolitres in 1967to 178,000 in 1972, 323,000 in 1974 and 450,000 in 1979.37

This situation led to a notable and inevitable price drop, with anactual slump of 50% between 1968 and 1979. Such a collapse is for surerelated to this overproduction but also to a revolution in wineconsumption. In fact beginning in the 1970s, per capita consumptionsuffered a notable reduction: it ranged from about 114 litres in 1970 toabout 40 in 2010. This drop was in part related to a change in the socialfunction attributed to wine: it was previously considered just anutritional basic aliment, but gradually became an optionalcomplementary one to consume during either social or convivial

35The case of the Antinori family proves that Tignanello was for the first timeproduced as a wine in 1970, when it still contained 20% Canaiolo and 5% Trebbianoand Malvasia and was refined in durmast casks. Already in 1971 it had become aTuscany table wine hence it was no longer disciplined by the Chianti Classicoregulation, with the result that from 1975 (between 1972-1974 the Tignanello wasnot produced) white grapes were totally eliminated. Then in 1978 Antinori createdthe Solaia, a wine that at first was 80% Cabernet Sauvignon and 20% CabernetFranc, without any percentage of Sangiovese. Only in the following years was a 20%Sangiovese introduced and some corrections made to the doses of CabernetSauvignon and Cabernet Franc, to arrive at the current composition, which blends75% Cabernet Sauvignon, 20% Sangiovese and 5% Cabernet Franc.

36First of all, “mistakes were made in replanting either not proper or under-qualityvarieties of Sangiovese, secondly in having many vineyards cultivated either in valleyfloor or at bad exposures” (Di Lello, S., “Riprende quota il Chianti classico”, in LaRepubblica, September 25th, 1995, p. 24).

37For a detailed account of this dramatic period see Cianferoni, R., Il Chianti classicotra prosperità e crisi, Bologna, Edagricole, 1979. Interesting considerations aredeveloped also by Pacciani, A., Tendenze delle strutture viticole e della produzionedi uva e di vino nel Chianti classico (1971-1978), Firenze, Cattedra di economia epolitica agraria della Facoltà di economia e commercio, 1972 and more broadly,Fonnesu, I., Poggi, C., Rombai, L., Fattorie e mezzadria in Toscana. Evoluzionerecente di aziende agricole nelle campagne fiorentine, Quaderno dell’Istituto diGeografia dell’Università di Firenze, 7, 1979.

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occasions.38 This remarkable slump in wine consumption was onlyslightly compensated by a significant improvement in the quality of thewine, as the limited percentage of bottled wine sold proves.39

To get a better idea of the crisis, proportion is highly significant inthe case of Ricasoli’s descendants: because of its impact they had to selltheir business to the Canadian Seagram who, after just a few years, soldits majority stake to the Australian Thomas Hardy, who invested all theirassets in mass market attempts, with disastrous results, to produce theBaron’s Chianti in tetra-packs.40

The wine overproduction and the price slump situation were fatal tomany enterprises, as the case of the abovementioned Paneretta tenureattests. In fact, since the 1960s, its management had been investing inspecialized vineyards and wage-labour in a valiant attempt to face theevident sharecropping crisis. However, in doing so, their productioncosts increased enormously compared to those guaranteed by the formersharecropping system; and the slump in wine prices prevented themanagement from writing them off. So after 1974, the last year of actualsurplus, the crash was relentless, ending only in 1985, when the farmwas sold with a financial statement that registered an income of 37.3million out of 81.3 million in wage-labour expenses.41

This same destiny was shared by many farms and led to a significantproperty replacement that affected the whole Chianti territory. In fact, itsaw the triumphant entrance of big stake-holder companies,transnational corporations and Italian and foreign professionals into itslands: their massive spending capacity caused in a short time a real

38From the economic boom years to the mid 1970s the per capita wine consumptionhad always been over a hundred litres (cfr. Rey, G.M., I conti economici dell’Italia,1, Una sintesi delle fonti ufficiali 1890-1970, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1991, p. 222).Since then a persistent descending trend occurred, as it is clearly attested to by theEurostat data available on the website: http://ep.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (accessedJanuary 15 th, 2012).

39Concerning the constant prevailing of loose wine see the considerations made byAngelo Gaja, one of the most prominent Piemonte wine producers, in 1992 he notedthat: “out of the twelve million hectolitres of exported wine just the 30% is in bottle”,in Bizzarro, L., Vagheggi, P., “Chi vendemmia soffre 1992 anno di bianchi”, in LaRepubblica, October 18th, 1992, p. 23. Then again in 2005 the renown oenologistNicolò d’Afflitto highlighted how the Castiglioni tenure’s wine cellar was used tosell 10,000 hectolitres of loose wine par year (see Bologni, M., “La cantina dei 200silos”, in La Repubblica, “sezione Firenze” April 15th, 2005, p. 1), while Eurostat in2008 revealed how Italian wine internal consumption, estimated at around 23.6millions of hectolitres, was still equally divided between bottled and loose wine.

40For detailes see in Lattes, W., “Vino Ricasoli torna ‘Barone’”, in Corriere dellaSera, February 17 th, 1996, p. 20.

41See Saltini, Vino, conti e contadini, p. 70.

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estate boom and a notable increase in the local real estate value. As amatter of fact, during the 1970s, the real estate market was veryaffordable but right after the early 1980s the situation changed as aconsequence of the wine sector revitalization and the resultant demandfor tenures.

Concerning the property replacement, it’s worth noting how alreadyin the 1990s, out of the 225 Gallo Nero bottler associates, only 40 hadbeen in the Chianti production for more than eighty years, while 170came from different Italian regions, mainly from Lombardia, and 15from abroad.42

5. The last quarter of the century: the autonomous DOCGand the transfiguration of Chianti

In the mid 1980s the first signs of revival occurred in conjunctionwith the recognition of Chianti as DOCG product, ratified by thePresidential Law Decree of July 2nd, 1984, after a long diplomatic effort.In that year, grape harvest revenues amounted to just 248,000hectolitres, while they had reached 450,000 in 1979; hence finally, adecrease in wine production, in line with the strict norms of the newdiscipline, provided more profitable prices. The most representative signof this new flourishing season was certainly the re-appropriation byBettino Ricasoli’s descendants of the Brolio wine-producing farm,achieved through a notable economic struggle against the Ferraracompetitor Ori, owner of the Moccia Zabov distillery.43

42The data is taken from Vagheggi, P., “Il Chianti si ribella ‘Troppi stranieri nellenostre terre’”, in La Repubblica, September 6th, 1990, p. 19. The increase of sales didnot stop but on the contrary it registered some peaks such as in 1994 the acquisitionof 900 hectares of land by the US Kendall Jackson, intentioned to repeat theexperience of the Marianis who in Montalcino, after having acquired 750 hectares ofvineyard, built Villa Banfi (see Encolpio, N. “Chianti è l’ora degli yankee”, inCorriere della Sera, July 3rd, 1994, p. 17).

43For a detailed account on the causes of the company’s liquidation in 1993, see Lattes,W., “E il Chianti del barone Ricasoli torna italiano”, in Corriere della Sera, March20th, 1993 p. 19, this article highlights the way the Australian Hardy yielded the 60%of its stokeholds to Ferrucio Ori from Ferrara, owner of the distillery Moccia Zabov.See also Spadari, M., “Giallo in casa Ricasoli. Qualcuno conosceva la veradimensione del deficit?”, in Corriere della Sera, May 9th, 1993, p. 21 and Lattes,“Vino. Ricasoli torna ‘barone’”, written when Francesco Ricasoli was appointedPresident of the Bettino Ricasoli company. The company’s rapid revival wasemphasized by a notable wine expert when, during the Vinitaly Fair in 2000,presenting the best products he said: “let’s salute with joy the encounter of twoprestigious Chianti Classico: the 1997 Castello di Fonterutoli and the 1997 Castellodi Brolio which represent the sign of a renewed attention to the Chianti, after the

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Then, from the 1990s, the Chianti land revitalization sped up, thanksto the production of a more and more blazoned wine, internationallyacknowledged from August 5th, 1996, when the dream of its firstproducers was finally fulfilled: the Chianti Classico was awarded anautonomous DOCG and within a particular discipline, was independentfrom the other Chianti producers’ regulations.44 This last development,on one hand, implied a strong stabilization of production, thatsubsequently has ranged between a minimum of 242,000 hectolitres in2003 and a maximum of 300,000 in 1999 and, on the other hand, itrendered the prices of the Gallo Nero wines more and more lucrative.45

In addition, after the terrible frost that had affected the Chianti land in1985, many “Agriturismi” developed, leading to the local olive-growingrevival and the recognition of Chianti Classico oil as DOP46.

However, the long desired goal of the Gallo Nero producers wasachieved only after a substantial change that had affected the Chiantiterritory and that, without dissolving the linkage between the Gallo Neroand its territory, had caused its partial redefinition. In fact, like in the1990s, a new replanting season saw the possibility of producing winesthat differed significantly from the one Ricasoli had created in the XIXth

century.47 This new phase was inaugurated by the Tignanello and laterby the celebrated and criticized supertuscans. In 2003 the Chianti areaproduced 109 supertuscans, which aroused bitter controversy; theRicasoli Chianti producers who, after the 1996 norm on the eliminationof white grapes, were in the minority, blamed the more blazoned

supertuscan fashion imposed by Tuscany over us” (see Vizzari, E., “Impressionantivini d’Italia. Vinitaly un mese dopo”, in Corriere della Sera, May 1st, 2000, p. 19).

44The Ministerial Decree of August 5th was later modified by the following decrees ofMay 16th, 2002 and of September 15th, 2005, until the recent version of thedisciplinary measures ratified by the Ministry of Agricultural, Alimentary and ForestPolicies’ Decree on June 10th, 2010, issued in the Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 150 on June30th, 2010.

45This data is taken from the Consortium’s website: http://www.chianticlassico.com/vino/le-vendemmie/ (accessed, January 15th, 2012).

46With no doubt the most lucrative activity in the area have always remained the wineproduction with its 360 million Euros in 2011, against the 75 million Euros made bythe “Agriturismi” and the 10 million Euros made by the olive oil production (see “IlGallo nero torna a cantare”, in La Nazione, February 8th, 2011, p. 7).

47Notably the eminent oenologist and creator of the first supertuscan, Giorgio Tachis(see, Amorevoli, M., “L’enologo inventore del Sassicaia e dei ‘supertuscans’ fa ilpunto su mode e prossime frontiere del bere bene”, in La Repubblica, “sezioneFirenze”, February 17th, 2002, p. 12) underlined the fact that the progressiveelimination of Trebbiano and Malvasia from Chianti was due to the inability ofRicasoli wine to match the evolving demand of the international market.

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enterprises for producing what they called ironically “carpenterwines”.48

Actually, this was the price for competing with the highestinternational market segment where, in the wake of Wine Spectator andRobert Parker, the barrique and the “round” wines prevailed and wheremore and more aggressive competitors were rapidly emerging fromCalifornia, Chile, Argentina and Australia.49 These countries werebecoming more and more important for European producers,particularly for Italy and France: in fact, in these years, they werecharacterized by a remarkable decrease in internal consumption (Francefor instance ranged from 80 litres per capita in 1984 to less than 50 in2005) that pushed them to look for new markets.50

The DOCG granted in 1996, even allowed for the deployment ofgrape varieties (such as for instance the Cabernet Sauvignon) thatdiffered from the Sangiovese which could hardly meet the internationalmarket demand for quality wines. The problem did not concern only theChianti Classico area. In Montalcino many producers also began toconsider a single-variety discipline a much too onerous bond, since itforced to produce the renowned Brunello only using Sangiovese vines.Such restrictions were considered as self-defeating because they made“impossible any kind of further improvements beyond those strictlyrelated to Sangiovese”.51

In this regard, the decision of Angelo Gaja, one of the most popularproducers in Piemonte, is emblematic. In 2000, he chose to leave theDOCG Barbaresco for the DOC Langhe Nebbiolo, in order to employ a

48For a related interesting discussion see Zanini, L., Arrigoni, F., “Super o antico: ladisfida del Chianti”, in Corriere della Sera, May 4th, 2003, p. 19. It’s worth notinghow many supertuscan producers employed the table wine category, that did notnecessarily meant scarce quality, just to get autonomy from any kind of disciplinaryregulations.

49The new Millennium began ranking as major world exporters Italy (19%), Franceand Spain (18%) but already in 2005 Australia overcame Spain gaining the thirdplace after France and Italy (see the Rapporto sul settore vitivinicolo 2007, Roma,Retecamere Scrl, 2007).

50Notably in 2006 for the first time the amount of Chianti sold in the United Statessurpassed the one sold in Italy, since 30% of Chianti production was exported against27% internal consumption (Bologni, M., “Chianti il sorpasso dell’America”, in LaRepubblica, “sezione Firenze”, February 18th, 2007, p. 4).

51This point was made by the President of the Chianti Classico Consortium, MarcoPallanti who argued: “if we focus on the terroir the variety will lose importance andif we focus on the territory the regulation should be loosen up” (quoted byAmorevoli, M., in “Vinitaly Toscana in pole position”, in La Repubblica, April 3rd,2008, p. 7, “sezione di Firenze”).

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15% Merlot, Syrah and Cabernet Sauvignon mix, to produce his famouscru. At the same time, he renewed his products in line with internationalmarket demands.52 His choice not only exemplifies the limitations of toostrict regulations but also demonstrates how the international marketwas increasingly giving consideration to singular producers and theirstandings instead of to their affiliation to a particular denomination.

Reputation was indeed a vital factor in a market like that of wine,characterized by deep information asymmetries between producer andconsumer and by high risks of adverse selection and moral hazards.Moreover, the use of a private brand, more easily recognizable than acollective one, represented an incentive to maintain a high qualitystandard, particularly for those producers such as Gaja, who hadformerly invested greatly in their reputation, succeeding also in makethem identifiable for the consumer in economic terms.53

Thus, it is clear that the most recent transformations which are todayinvesting the Chianti production area, are not just a local phenomenonbut should be framed in the broader context of the international debatewhich is interesting all the major European wine-producing regions,pitting the advocates of local wine-cellar traditions and blend specificityagainst the producers who aim to win the more lucrative segments of theincreasingly globalised market through sophisticated techniques andaggressive marketing strategies. The Gallo Nero struggle did begin as abattle to safeguard a particular wine from those producers whoemployed the same name at a lesser quality, but today that struggle hasevolved, to become paradoxically the constant research of a superwine,that even distancing itself from Ricasoli’s, might still be regarded as thetrue bearer of its original soul.

52See Remondino, M., “Gaja rinuncia alla denominazione Barbaresco”, in Corrieredella Sera, April 23rd, 2000, p. 24.

53Just like a private brand, a collective one holds onto the concept of reputation;however, by relating the denomination to a series of rules and economic revenues,opportunistic behaviours are hard to prevent.