The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa

The Infrastructure of Peace in AfricaAssessing the Peacebuilding Capacity

of African Institutions

International Peace Academy

A Report submitted by the Africa Program of theInternational Peace Academy to the

Ford Foundation

Project Coordinator: Monica JumaProgram Officer: Aida Mengistu

SEPTEMBER 2002

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was put together by Dr. Monica Kathina Juma, a former Associate at the Africa Program of theInternational Peace Academy (IPA), who coordinated the project, and wrote the introduction and conclu-sion, as well as sections on the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authorityon Development (IGAD), and organizations in Kenya and Tanzania. She was ably assisted by Ms. AidaMengistu, Program Officer with IPA’s Africa Program, who conducted research in Ethiopia and was partic-ularly meticulous in the logistics of contracting and coordinating the research team, and in editing andcommenting on field reports as well as the main report.

The report was made possible and enriched by the collective effort and contributions of numerous people.Special thanks go to the consultants who wrote background papers and submitted reports based onfieldwork in Africa. Professor Guy Martin, Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Dr. Adekeye Adebajo and Mr. RaymondKivetu largely wrote the background papers. Fieldwork reports on organizations in West Africa weresubmitted by Mr. Augustine Toure (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea) and Dr. Adekeye Adebajo (Nigeria).Fieldwork in Southern Africa was carried out by Ms. Stella Zacarias (Angola and Mozambique), Dr.Christopher Landsberg (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana) and Ms. Yaliwe Clarke (Zambia). CentralAfrica was covered by Mr. Raymond Kivetu (DR-Congo—Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville) and Mr. JeremiahOwiti (DR-Congo and Rwanda). In the Horn of Africa, fieldwork was undertaken by Ms. Angela NdingaMuvumba (Uganda), Ms. Aida Mengistu (Ethiopia) and Dr. Monica Juma (Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti).

It would have been impossible to collect the amount of material we did within the period of our fieldworkwithout the cooperation of organizations in the eighteen countries covered, for which we remain deeplyindebted. We look forward to continued partnership with each of these organizations.

In putting this report together, Dr. Monica Juma worked with an extraordinary team of colleagues at theInternational Peace Academy. Dr. Adekeye Adebajo supervised the project and edited the draft report. Dr.Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President of IPA, Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, and Mr. Cyrus Samii,Publications Coordinator and Program Assistant, reviewed the report, in whole or in part, while Dr. NeclâTschirgi contributed to the introduction and conclusion. All these people helped to enhance the quality,purpose and richness of this report. Last but not least, we thank the Ford Foundation for proposing andfunding this project. We hope that this report will contribute to the Foundation’s new special initiative onAfrica designed to strengthen the capacity of African organizations to manage conflicts.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part One: Introduction

1.1 Background and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa

2.1 West Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Taylor FactorThe Franco-Nigerian RivalryExploitation of Natural Resources and ConflictsProliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

2.2 Southern Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13The Legacy of ApartheidFragile Democratization

2.3 Central Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Ethnicity and Political GovernanceThe Scramble for Resources in DR-CongoGeopolitical InterestsRegional Responses to Conflicts

2.4 The Horn of Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19The Legacy of the Superpower RivalryProliferation of Small Arms and Light WeaponsForced Displacement

Part Three: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of Regional andSubregional Organizations in Africa

3.1 The Organization of African Unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.2 The Economic Community of West African States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27ECOMOG in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-BissauThe ECOWAS Security Mechanism

THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF PEACE IN AFRICA

Table of contents

Contents


Contents

3.3 The Southern African Development Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and SecuritySouth Africa: The Giant on the LimpopoSADC: A House Balkanized?Challenges for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

3.4 The Economic Community of Central African States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.5 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3.6 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37The Sudan Peace ProcessSeeking Peace and Reconciliation in SomaliaThe IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

3.7 The East African Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Security Cooperation in the EACOperationalizing a Preventive Model

Part Four: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity of SemiformalOrganizations in Africa

4.1 Semiformal Organizations in West Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444.2 Semiformal Organizations in Southern Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464.3 Semiformal Organizations in Central Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484.4 Semiformal Organizations in the Horn of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Part Five: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacity ofCommunity-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Africa

5.1 Southern Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545.2 Central Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545.3 The Horn of Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Part Six: Summary and Recommendations

6.1 Summary of Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 576.2 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

APPENDIX

Appendix I Strategies and Activities of Semiformal and Community-Based Organizations . . 66Appendix II List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90


Foreword

Foreword

It is with great pleasure that we publish this report,commissioned and funded by the Ford Foundation.

We were drawn to the possibility of evaluating thestrengths and limitations (both inherent and imposedby outside actors, not least funders) of civil societyactors in Africa. As the report details, civil societyorganizations in Africa as elsewhere take a variety offorms, and we have attempted, in considering them, toavoid undue generalizations. This report by no meanssurveys more than a sampling of such organizations,merely aiming to cover enough of them to serve as abasis for the analytical sections of the document.

I PA is particularly proud that all authors of the reportare African, drawn from each of the continent's mainregions. We are very grateful to Dr. Monica KathinaJuma for coordinating the report and drafting much ofits analytical thrust. As always, I am personally gratefulto Dr. Ad e keye Adebajo, the Director of IPA´s Africaprogram, for overseeing this demanding project.

Our conclusions make clear that while civil societyactors in Africa as elsewhere must remain responsiblefor their own successes and failures, there is much thatdonors need to do better to ensure a greater ratio ofsuccessful projects and programs. In particular, donorsneed to be more results than process oriented and needto stick with grantees long enough to allow theseorganizations to master both their local and interna-tional administrative, legal and financial requirements.As an NGO of 32 years standing, IPA can attest that this

is no small task even in New York and even after allthese years. The challenges on the ground in Africa aremuch greater and deserve a more consistentlysupportive rather than often reflexively critical,approach by funders and other partners. The FordFoundation has generated a fine track record insupporting its African grantees. Others can learn muchfrom its example.

Since the inception of its Africa program in the early1990s, under my distinguished predecessor OlaraOtunnu, one of the two goals of IPA´s Africa Programhas been to support civil society actors in Africa inpromoting peace and security on the continent. (Theother has aimed to strengthen, wherever possible, thecapacity of African regional and sub-regional organi-zations to address constructively Africa´s securitychallenges.)

Preparation of this report has confirmed us in ourconviction, first articulated by Olara and the then-Director of our Africa Program, Margaret Vogt, thatcivil society organizations hold out a great deal of hopefor Africa. We trust readers will share our admirationfor the achievements of this vital sector of Africa´spolity and for the courage of the individuals involvedin tackling ambitious objectives in often very adverseand frequently dangerous circumstances.

David M. MalonePresident, International Peace Ac a d e m y

Executive Summary

In October 2000, the Ford Foundation requested theInternational Peace Academy’s (IPA) Africa Program

to generate a database of institutions managingconflicts and crises in Africa. After consultations, thescope of this project was expanded to comprise anassessment of capacity, and determination of thepotential of institutions to respond to crises andconflicts in Africa. This report is the outcome of thatexercise and hopes to guide and facilitate the design ofthe Ford Foundation’s funding strategy forpeacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it ishoped that this report will also serve to stimulatefurther discussion by the Ford Foundation and IPAstaff, with the involvement of other relevant donors,about the challenges and opportunities for supportingpeace and development in Africa. To that end, thisreport landscapes the condition of capacity in Africa,provides a diagnostic overview of institutional layoutat the regional, national and local levels and proposesareas of intervention that can bolster and improveperformance. It must be noted from the start that thisreport claims to be neither exhaustive nor comprehen-sive. Many important organizations engaged in usefulpeacebuilding work in Africa have not been includedin this report due to logistical and time constraints. Theorganizations included in the report are merelyillustrative of some of the peacebuilding work beingconducted in Africa, and are mainly concentrated inconflict areas.

I. Methodology

Eleven researchers, five based at IPA and six workingin Africa, were involved in generating backgroundpapers and carrying out interviews with staff of sevensubregional organizations, seventy-eight semiformalorganizations and ten community-based organizations(CBOs), drawn from eighteen countries in sub-SaharanAfrica. The survey covered three main areas. First, itcontextualized the assessment of institutional capacity,the nature and dynamics of conflicts, including theircauses and characteristics, in four subregions: West,Southern, Central and East Africa. Second, the surveyhighlighted the regional characteristics of conflicts,

discussing peculiar features that shape security systemsin each subregion. Third, the survey assessed thepeacebuilding capacity and potential of institutionalactors at the regional, national and community levels.

This report is divided into six parts. Part one outlinesthe background, rationale and methodology as well asthe structure of the report. Part two provides anoverview of the conflict systems in Africa and analyzesfactors that define the security architecture in eachsubregion. Part three addresses the capacities—strengths, weaknesses and potential—of intergovern-mental actors to respond to conflicts and crises inAfrica. Part four focuses on semiformal actors in Africaand assesses their performance in each subregion. Partfive provides broad observations of the characteristicsof Community-Based Organizations from a selectnumber of umbrella bodies. Finally, part six provides aconclusion and general observations crucial forinforming the process of designing a funding strategyfor peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa. This sectionalso offers recommendations on the priority areas towhich the Ford Foundation and other donors shouldconsider investing their efforts and resources in theircurrent and future engagements.

II. Summary of Findings

A. Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has beenembroiled in a plethora of intra- and interstateconflicts. Most of these conflicts have a transnationalcharacter and generate consequences that haveimplications for regions beyond those in which theyoccur. Among the major causes of these conflicts are:the weak democratization process; deep-seatedenvironmental problems; competition for resources;breakdown in the rule of law; and proliferation ofprivate armies, militias, and the attendant problem ofillicit trade in, and use of, illegal arms. In addition, thenature and dynamics of conflicts are shaped by theinterplay of features peculiar to each subregion.

In West Africa, four issues stand out: the Charles Taylorfactor; the Franco-Nigerian rivalry; the link betweenthe exploitation of natural resources and war; and the


Executive Summary 1


proliferation of small arms and light weapons.Southern Africa’s security architecture is defined to alarge extent by the legacy of apartheid and the fear ofSouth Africa’s economic and political dominance inthe post apartheid era, as well as by the fragility ofdemocratization throughout the subregion. In CentralAfrica, three broad factors define conflicts andresponses to them: ethnicity and governance; thescramble for resources in DR-Congo; and the prevalent,sometimes conflicting interests of regional andinternational actors. Finally, in the Horn of Africa, thenature and dynamics of conflicts are determined by thelegacy of superpower rivalry and the weakening,sometimes fragmentation of the state; proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons; and (involuntary)human migration. Any interplay of these factorsgenerates a wide range of consequences, includingpopulation displacement within and beyond borders,fragmentation of societal structures, militarization ofthe civilian population and generalized insecurity.

While the number of interstate conflicts in Africa hasreduced significantly, intrastate conflicts have increasede x p o n e n t i a l l y. Further, most of these conflicts spill overborders through networks and alliances of rebels andother actors. This regional (and sometimes extra-regional) character of conflicts poses peculiarchallenges for African institutions seeking to addressthem. Efforts at resolving conflicts are limited by theirscale and complexity, a perennial shortage of resources,and the debilitating internal political weaknesses withinmost African states. In responding to the differentmanifestations of such conflicts, African institutionshave developed varied tools and approaches.

B. The Institutional Infrastructure

Regional and Subregional Organizations

Regional and subregional organizations are retoolingthemselves in two ways: revising their mandates frombeing purely “developmentalist” to encompass conflictmanagement and where applicable, revamping theirfledgling regional security mechanisms. Evolvingunder circumstances of insecurity, the response ofthese organizations to crises and conflicts isdeveloping in an ad hoc manner.

While all intergovernmental organizations are in needof substantive institutional building in terms of theirhuman and technical capacities, each is responding toparticular challenges within its subregion andemphasizing different aspects of peacebuilding.Intervention, therefore, needs to be designed specifi-cally to suit each subregion and institution. TheOrganization of African Unity (OAU) is keen to developa role in coordinating the early warning systems andsecurity mechanisms of subregional organizationsrather than undertaking large-scale peaceke e p i n gmissions. From the peacekeeping experiences inLiberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) isdeveloping a capacity for peacekeeping and enforce-ment. In Southern Africa, the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC) is struggling tooperationalize its Organ on Politics, Defense andSecurity, even as the Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA) attempts to complementthe work of SADC and other regional actors in conflictmanagement. In the Horn of Africa, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)favors nonmilitary options to deal with conflicts and isworking with civil society partnerships in developing aConflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism(CEWARN). The smaller East African Community (EAC)is moving toward developing a conflict preventionmodel and greater security co-operation. These differ-ences have implications for the types of capacities thatrequire strengthening in each organization.

Regional and subregional actors in Africa play criticalroles in sponsoring discussions, engaging in diplomacyand intervening militarily in conflicts. These organiza-tions are driven, in their interventions, by an internallogic of common interest in economic development,and peace and security. They tend to have more atstake in conflicts within their regions than do externalactors. Unlike foreign actors, they enjoy the advantageof having deep knowledge of their region. But some ofthese regional interventions have also been controver-sial, as local actors have been accused by theirneighbors of pursuing parochial political and economicagendas rather than regional stability. Nigeria andSouth Africa have also been accused of nursinghegemonic ambitions to dominate their subregions.

2 Executive Summary


Semiformal Organizations

In responding to conflicts that manifest themselvesdifferently across regions, semiformal organizationshave developed varying institutional forms. Theserange from research and analysis institutions, to facili-tative bodies, to operational actors and networks.Operating in political environments that may befriendly, indifferent, or hostile, they are often forced tonavigate through the dangers of co-optation, harass-ment, or lack of a policy framework to guide theiroperations. In their work, these actors constantly seekto cultivate and operate within the principles ofimpartiality, neutrality, independence, objectivity, andrelevance to the needs on the ground.

Among the distinctive characteristics of these actors istheir ability to network upwards (with internationalgovernmental and nongovernmental actors),downwards (with national and local actors), andhorizontally (with each other). Increasingly, semiformalorganizations are becoming the intermediaries betweendonors, international nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and governments, on the one hand, and localactors on the other, in terms of disbursing funds, andbuilding or bolstering the capacities of smaller, usuallycommunity-based organizations (CBOs).

Community-Based Organizations

Community-based organizations operate at thefrontline of conflict areas and, despite their chronicshortage of resources and skilled manpower, confrontconflicts directly. Their agenda is localized and pursuedin a reactive and ad hoc manner. Institutionally, CBOsare fragile, often lacking clear operational structures.They are often weak and prone to political manipula-tion. CBOs depend largely on volunteers and drawheavily on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolu-tion and peacebuilding, which are crucial for thedevelopment of early warning and conflict preventionmechanisms.

C. Modalities of Current Support for Peacebuilding

Responding to crises and conflicts has taken on anadded urgency and is increasingly conceived as part of

a larger peacebuilding agenda across Africa. Withinthis context, there are several important developmentsthat merit special attention in any discussion onsupporting peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

Donor Roles and Funding Patterns

Peacebuilding is a new funding area for most donors.Nonetheless, convinced that conflicts impactnegatively on all other program activities, there is ageneral move by donors toward designing fundingstrategies for peacebuilding. For instance, the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID) isfunding an institutional strengthening initiative,code-named Clinton-GHAI, in the Greater Horn ofAfrica. Since 1998, the Dutch government has beensupporting an initiative that seeks to build thecapacity of organizations dealing with the Sudanconflict; the European Union and other donors havesupported the ECOWAS security mechanism; theGerman Technical Cooperation Body, GTZ ( D e u t s c h eGesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) has alsolaunched a small Conflict Management Initiative inAfrica. Since the Ford Foundation already supports arange of programs that are directly affected byconflicts across Africa, this report recommends thedesigning of a comprehensive Ford Foundationstrategy for peacebuilding.

There is a reluctance on the part of donors to fund coreactivities, such as administrative overheads, whichpresents a critical challenge for peacebuilding organi-zations in this new area. Organizations, particularlysemiformal and CBOs, have been forced to drawrunning costs from project funds, reducing the amountof resources available for program activities. Inabilityto secure core activities inhibits the growth of profes-sionalism, leads to high turnover of staff, and apersonnel retention problem, as trained and experi-enced staff leave to join the increasing number ofbetter-paying international NGOs. This situation canalso lead to a heavy dependence on consultants who,while increasing technical expertise, are expensive andreduce the possibilities of organizations developinglocal capacity. A combination of these conditionsaffects program continuity and reduces institutionalcapacity.

Executive Summary 3


4 Executive Summary

To reduce intense competition for resources and theeffects of heavy dependence on single foreign donors,semiformal actors in Africa are seeking independencethrough various means, such as diversifying fundingsources, creating endowment funds and cultivatingsupport from the private sector.

Nature of Ongoing Capacity Building

On the whole, there is an impressive human resourcecapacity in most of the countries surveyed. Most topand mid-level officers in these organizations are wellqualified and have the requisite skills to deal withconflicts. However, their ability to operate optimally islimited by a number of factors. Remuneration packagesare generally low and not reflective of qualifications,while most organizations lack support structures,including technical capacity, to facilitate the optimalutilization of available human resources. Thisdeficiency is partly overcome by a heavy dependenceon key persons who act as catalysts for organizations.Without institutionalized governance structures,organizations are prone to transitional problems aftersuch people leave.

There is a prevalence of workshops and conferences asthe preferred model for capacity building. While thesemeetings can and do contribute to networking, theirvalue in addressing institutional shortcomings is limited.U s u a l l y, they are one-off interventions, run largely byoutside experts and have no follow-up mechanisms.

Networking as a Preferred Operational Model

Consortiums and networks could have greater potentialto undertake peacebuilding. They have the weight ofnumbers, provide a resource pool for members,enhance the capacity of weaker/smaller actors,improve the quality of training, encourage comple-mentary action and, in volatile political situations, actas watchdogs for weaker network members.Networking is more prevalent among semiformalinstitutions and glaringly absent between intergovern-mental organizations and individual civic actors. Thisreduces the opportunities for complementary actionbetween governmental and nongovernmental actors.

However, networking generates challenges relating tocoordination, duplication of activities, and competitionfor scarce resources in the face of divergent agendas,overlapping mandates, mandate gaps, and interferenceby agency head offices, all of which can limit collabo-ration. To promote networking and increase its valuewould require making provisions for effective coordi-nation in each situation.

III. Recommendations

The recommendations of this report are grouped underfour broad categories: institutional capacity building,networking, dissemination and utilization, andcreating an enabling environment.

Institutional Capacity Building

Actors that are fully institutionalized tend to performbetter than weaker ones in peacebuilding activities.Such actors are strong, have clearly articulated visionsand mandates, can raise funds, are better governed,and have credibility and capacity in terms of structuresto implement, execute, and monitor their programactivities. Therefore, investment in organizationaldevelopment is a crucial step in bolstering the capacityof actors involved in peacebuilding.

An institutional building program can take one or anumber of forms depending, on the needs of an organi-zation:

• M a ke institutional strengthening grants tonetworks or individual organizations to help themclarify the relationships between their mandateand vision, and their resources, including humanand technical capabilities. These grants willestablish structures of governance, implementationand monitoring for their program activities.

• Fund core positions within organizations forperiods of three months to two years in order tostabilize and enable the organizations to concen-trate on peacebuilding activities. The Common-wealth expert secondment model could informsuch an intervention.


Executive Summary 5

• Allow for matching of funds from two or more ofthe divisions of a donor or between donors. Such amodel could reflect the interrelatedness of issueson the ground and secure program activities forthe longer term.

• Fund the creation and management of a pool ofexperts composed mainly of Africans to undertakecapacity building for African institutions. Such apool could focus on the specific deficiencies withinorganizations and address these through shortvisits and expert placement schemes. Among thecritical skills cited are grant making and proposalwriting, as well as communication, particularly ininformation technology. Such a pool could drawon the enlarging African diaspora, many of whosemembers are keen to make a positive contributionto the rebirth of the continent.

• Fund activities that support peacebuilding, partic-ularly research, documentation, publication anddissemination of information.

Facilitate Networking

Facilitate consultative meetings between civil societyand subregional organizations; between semiformalorganizations and CBOs; and among semiformal actorswithin and across subregions. This would encouragecross-fertilization of ideas, drawing on lessons andgood practices within the continent.

Dissemination and Utilization

Share this report with interested donors, includingbilateral and multilateral actors involved inpeacebuilding.

Support a consultative meeting between donors toenable them to share lessons and experiences onfunding peacebuilding activities in Africa.

Initiate a dialogue between some of the organizationsevaluated in this report and donors supportingpeacebuilding activities in Africa.

An Enabling Environment

The strengthening of institutions in Africa and theinvestment of resources in them can only be effectiveif a conducive enabling environment exists. The FordFoundation can contribute to this process bysupporting interaction between states, subregionalorganizations and nonstate actors and by fundingconsultative meetings that help forge partnerships andbreak the barrier of distrust between state and nonstatesectors. The OAU–civil society conference held in AddisAbaba in June 2001, funded by Ford Foundation, wasapplauded for facilitating a dialogue that could helpbridge the gap of mutual suspicion between govern-ments and civil society actors on the continent.Support for such initiatives at the subregional level ishighly recommended.

Part One: Introduction

1.1 Background and Rationale

The escalation of conflicts in Africa in the 1990s hasled to the expansion of actors involved inpeacemaking, but has also overwhelmed the capacityof these actors to manage conflicts.1 From Liberia,Sierra Leone and Guinea in West Africa, to Somalia,Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan in the Horn of Africa, toBurundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) in the Great Lakes region, to Angola andLesotho in Southern Africa, civil wars and interstateconflicts persist. These conflicts involve multiple actorsand are often deeply entrenched, complex, andprotracted. Whether intrastate or interstate, conflictsoccur within complex regional dynamics and securitysystems, creating transnational linkages in one orseveral regions and making them more difficult toresolve.2

Often underpinned by economic agendas,3 t h e s econflicts have seen the militarization of the civilianspace, recruitment of children, subversion of humanrights and humanitarian law and massive displace-ments of people. These wars and their attendanthumanitarian consequences pose a major threat topeace and security in Africa. While institutions devotedto the search for peace and security are beingestablished in all of Africa’s subregions, their capacity,including knowledge, skills, level of technology,finance and trained manpower, is often very weak. Notsurprisingly, many Africans actors continue to urgedonors and the international community to enhancethe capacity of African institutions to deal with thesechallenges.4 So far, efforts at building local capacityhave been criticized for being ineffectual. Often such

efforts are inappropriate, inadequate, and usually adhoc, rarely meeting the needs on the ground.

A logical step toward designing an effective interven-tion strategy to resolve the dilemma posed byinadequate capacity in Africa is to assess the institu-tions and organizations that exist on the ground. Thisrequires an analysis of existing capacities, an identifi-cation of gaps and an appraisal of the potential ofAfrican organizations to address crises and conflicts inthe future. Such an assessment is the overridingconcern of this report, which evaluates the strengths,weaknesses and potential of intergovernmental andnongovernmental regional, national, and community-based organizations in Africa to respond to conflicts. Italso offers recommendations to facilitate the design ofa funding strategy by the Ford Foundation and otherdonors in support of peacebuilding activities in sub-Saharan Africa.

1.2 Methodology

This project was undertaken by eleven researchers, sixof whom were based in Africa. The researchers assessedthe capacity of seven intergovernmental organizations,seventy-eight semiformal organizations and tencommunity-based organizations. These were drawnfrom eighteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namelyLiberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Angola,Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe,Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda,Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, andDjibouti.5 In evaluating the capacity of each organiza-tion, the research team examined their mandate,resource capacity, program implementation, potentialto respond to future crises, and relationship to otherplayers including governments, international organi-zations, donors, and the media. In order to refine the


6 Part One: Introduction

1 See, “War, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa,” report based on an IPA/CODESRIA consultation in Senegal, 29 November–1December 1999.2 Conceptualization borrowed from Barnett Rubin’s discussion on Regional Conflict Formation; see IPA/Permanent Mission ofColombia to the UN report on “Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in Africa,” 8 August 2001.3 See for example, Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, and Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2000).4 See for example, Eric Berman and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (UN Institute for DisarmamentResearch, Geneva, Switzerland, and Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 2000).5 See Appendix I for a matrix of organizations surveyed.

project and its scope, three consultative sessions wereheld in New York involving IPA Africa Program staffand Ford Foundation officers.6

Following this brief introduction, the second section ofthis report focuses on the dynamics of conflicts andcontextualizes the assessment of institutional capacity.IPA commissioned four background papers coveringWest Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa and theHorn of Africa. Each of these papers outlines the causesand dynamics of conflicts; their regional interconnect-edness; the role of domestic, regional and extra-regional actors in fueling or managing conflicts; andregional capacities that exist to deal with conflicts. Inaddition, these conflicts highlight idiosyncrasies thatshape the security architecture of each Africansubregion.

Parts three through five of this survey focus on organi-zations responding to conflicts and crises. Theseinstitutions are grouped into three categories. The firstcategory consists of the seven regional and subregionalintergovernmental institutions addressing variousaspects of conflict management in Africa. Theseinclude the Organization of African Unity (OAU), theEconomic Community of West African States( E C OWAS), the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC), the Economic Community ofCentral African States (ECCAS), the Common Marketfor Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), theIntergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),and the East African Community (EAC).

The second category of organizations surveyedcomprises an array of civil society organizations,referred to in this report as semiformal organizations.This conceptualization is adopted to reflect the factthat these organizations are becoming more formal andare sometimes affiliated to the state and sometimesindependent of it. These actors are diverse in theirhistory, size, resource base, capacity to develop andimplement programs, profile and scope of operation.They consist of actors previously confined to develop-ment activities, which now include conflict-related

activities, organizations established to deal exclusivelywith conflicts, research and training institutes, policythink-tanks, human rights, prodemocracy andgovernance organizations, and institutions engaged inemergency relief activities. For comparative purposes,this survey has tried to focus on institutions thatarticulate a clear vision, have organizationalcoherence, and have a minimum level of capacity toundertake basic programming tasks that seek to shapepolicy and practice in the areas of conflict manage-ment and peacebuilding.

Finally, the third category of actors in this reportcomprises community-based organizations (CBOs)involved in activities and projects that promotepeacebuilding, conflict management, resolution,and/or prevention at the community (rather than state)level. It should be stressed that CBOs work with localcommunities in more challenging rural environmentsand, in spite of a chronic shortage of resources andskilled manpower, are directly confronting theproblems of conflict.

Fieldwork for this report was conducted between Apriland August 2001. After identifying at least five organi-zations in each country, researchers carried outextensive interviews with key individuals and playerswithin these organizations. In their work, theresearchers employed a structured questionnaire, madeobservations, and consulted the publications of theseorganizations to gain insights into their innerworkings. The survey could have benefited from deeperengagement with more civil society organizations,especially among community-based organizations, butlimited time and resources rendered this impossible.Most CBOs are located deep in rural areas that weredifficult to access. The report has attempted toovercome this shortcoming by undertaking an in-depthanalysis of some large networks that draw theirmembership from local CBOs. The cross section oforganizations surveyed in this report not only focuseson players in the area of conflict management inAfrica, but also provides findings with wider applica-tion between Africa’s subregions.


Part One: Introduction 7

6 These meetings were held in November 2000, March 2001 and August 2001.

The format of the report adheres faithfully to theoutline provided by the initial project proposal:assessing the capacity and potential of African institu-tions to respond effectively to conflicts and crises as away of guiding donor intervention strategies by theFord Foundation and other donors. The report has fiveadditional parts. Part two provides an overview ofconflict systems in Africa, particularly their causes,nature, and dynamics, and offers a context for assessingthe capacity of various African institutions to respondmeaningfully to conflicts. Parts three through fiveassess the capacity of institutions to deal effectivelywith crises and conflicts in Africa: part three examines

the conflict management capacity of regional andsubregional intergovernmental organizations; part fourfocuses on the peacebuilding experiences and potentialof semiformal organizations (Appendix 1 contains amore detailed description of these organizations); whilepart five assesses the conflict management potential ofcommunity-based organizations. Finally, part sixprovides general observations, draws lessons from theanalyses across the eighteen countries surveyed, andm a kes recommendations about how to strengthen thecapacity of organizations and actors in the field ofconflict management, resolution, and prevention inA f r i c a .


8 Part One: Introduction

Part Two:The Nature and Dynamicsof Conflict in Africa

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new interna-tional spirit of cooperation that raised hopes for

peace and security in Africa. Countries previouslyembroiled in conflict, such as Namibia, Ethiopia,Mozambique, and South Africa adopted moredemocratic systems of government. However, anyillusions of a post–Cold War peace dividend wereshattered as conflicts erupted in virtually all of Africa’ssubregions: Lesotho, Angola, and Zimbabwe inSouthern Africa; Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, andSomalia in the Horn of Africa; Chad, the CentralAfrican Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, DemocraticRepublic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi inCentral Africa and the Great Lakes region. WhileAfrica’s democratization struggles in the early 1990ssought to restore values of democracy and humanrights, in countries like Benin, Niger, Nigeria,Cameroon, and Congo-Brazzaville, resistance to theprocess by ruling political and military elites led to“communal” violence in countries like Togo and Kenya.Political exclusion and inequalities in access toeconomic and social opportunities have combined withissues of identity and citizenship to result in genocidein Rwanda, mass murder in Burundi, and civil wars inLiberia, Somalia, and Central African Republic.

The crises and conflicts in Africa are accentuated bydeep-rooted environmental problems related to accessto, and use of land resources, and competition fornatural resources such as minerals and timber. Asunemployed, disaffected “lumpen” youths in many ofAfrica’s rural areas have been recruited into rebelmovements, law and order has broken down, resultingin the proliferation of private armies, militias, and theillicit trade in arms and drugs in states like Liberia,Sierra Leone, (Northern) Uganda, Sudan, and Somalia.

In addition to these intrastate conflicts, Eritrea andEthiopia waged a more old-fashioned interstateconflict between 1998 and 2000. While some states likeNigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia,and Kenya have taken a leading role in regionalpeacemaking efforts, such initiatives have often beenfrustrated by the scale and complexity of conflicts, lackof resources, the parochial agendas of local actors, andweak subregional mechanisms for managing conflicts.Apart from these general characteristics, eachsubregion exposes particular trends that have shapedthe dynamics of conflicts in its own locality.Understanding these dynamics is critical to anyeffective intervention strategy.

Before assessing the nature and dynamics of Africanconflicts, it is worth briefly defining the term“ p e a c e b u i l d i n g ”. In this report, peacebuilding isconceived as encompassing “all actions undertaken ina conflict continuum to consolidate peace and preventrecurrence of armed confrontation.”7 Such activitiesmay involve “the creation or strengthening of nationalinstitutions, monitoring elections, promoting humanrights, providing reintegration and rehabilitationprograms and creating conditions for resumeddevelopment.” Peacebuilding aims to build on, add toor reorient peacemaking activities in ways designed toreduce the risk of the resumption of conflict and tocontribute to creating conditions conducive toreconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. Based onthis conceptualization, peacebuilding involves long-term investment and requires a conscious link betweenconflict resolution, rehabilitation, reconstruction anddevelopment.

2.1 West Africa

West Africa is one of Africa’s most politically volatileregions. Thirty-five out of seventy-two successfulcoups in Africa between 1960 and 1990 occurred inthis subregion. The fact that the fifteen states thatmake up the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS)8 are among the poorest countries in


Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa 9

7 See Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” (UN,S/1998/318, 13 April 1998), (New York: United Nations, May 1998).8 These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali,Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

the world adds a complex economic dimension to thesubregion’s political and security crises. In the 1990s,conflicts proliferated in the ECOWAS subregion. WhileLiberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau wereembroiled in protracted civil strife, Senegal confronteda separatist war in Casamance. Liberia and Guineahave been locked in intermittent cross-border raids andcounter-raids in a three-way conflict also involvingrebels in Sierra Leone. In Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoireinternal communal violence has occurred during andafter multiparty elections. Conflict in West Africa takeson a subregional dimension, as civil strife in onecountry tends to spill over into neighboring states. Thisis fueled by a complex interplay of personality factors,a quest for regional hegemony by Nigeria and France,competition for natural resources, and the proliferationof small arms and light weapons in West Africa.

The Taylor Factor

The destabilization of the West African subregion owesmuch to one individual: Liberian president and formerwarlord Charles Ta y l o r. Taylor announced his arrival onthe West African scene during the Liberian civil warthat began in December 1989 and (temporarily) endedin 1997 with his presidential victory. During the civilwar and its immediate aftermath, Charles Taylor and hisguerrilla outfit, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia(NPFL), turned Liberia into a breeding ground for rebelsand militias. With Taylor’s dramatic election victoryand rise to power in July 1997, Liberia has continued tosupport several dissident movements from neighboringstates. In Sierra Leone, Taylor has supported theRevolutionary United Front (RUF), an organization withwhich the NPFL received military training in Libya inthe late 1980s. A recent UN report has revealed“unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia

has been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, inproviding training, weapons and related material,logistical support, staging ground for attacks andproviding a safe haven for retreat and recuperation.”9

RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who fought alongsideTaylor’s NPFL during the Liberian civil war, launchedhis bid for power in Sierra Leone in March 1991, when,backed by fighters from Liberia and Burkina Faso, hestruck Bomaru in eastern Sierra Leone. Fueling theTaylor-Sankoh military alliance is the illicit trade inSierra Leonean diamonds. Guinea has also accusedTaylor of sponsoring rebel incursions into its territory.From the September 1999 raid on Macenta, a Guineanborder town, rebels opposed to the government inGuinea have stepped up their armed forays. Taylor, inturn, charges that Guinea has been supporting militiasopposed to his government in Liberia called LiberiansUnited for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Howto contain Taylor’s destabilization activities in WestAfrica remains one of the major dilemmas confrontingpeacemaking efforts in this subregion.10

The Franco-Nigerian Rivalry

Another factor that shapes the security architecture inWest Africa is a drawn-out rivalry between France andNigeria. French dominance in West Africa rested on itsstrong political, cultural, and economic ties with itsformer colonies and injection of military and economicresources into its former colonies in the postcolonialera. France maintained permanent military bases inSenegal and Côte d’Ivoire to ensure the security ofclient regimes in Africa.11 Between 1960 and 1990,France obstructed Nigeria’s hegemonic ambitions inWest Africa.12 France, along with Côte d’Ivoire andGabon, provided arms to Biafra during the Nigerian


10 Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa

9See Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation toSierra Leone, December 2000.10 This view is widely held by many observers of the ongoing conflicts in the subregion.11 See Guy Martin, “Francophone Africa in the Context of Franco-African Relations,” in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.),Africa in World Politics: Post–Cold War Challenges, 2nd ed. (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 163–188; and DouglasYates, The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon (Trenton and Asmara: AfricaWorld Press, 1995).12 See Bola Akinterinwa, Nigeria and France, 1960–1995: The Dilemma of Thirty-Five Years of Relationship (Ibadan: Va n t a g ePublishers, 1999); and Bassey Ate, “The Presence of France in West-Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem for Nigeria,” in Bassey Ateand Bola Akinterinwa (eds.), Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 11 – 3 0 .

civil war (1967–1970) in a bid to reduce the potentialof a strong and united rival.13 At the height of thisrivalry, Nigeria pushed strongly for the creation ofECOWAS by 1975. Regarding the establishment of aNigerian-led subregional organization as an attempt toundercut its influence, France had earlier encouragedCôte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritaniaand Niger to create the exclusively francophoneCommunauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest(CEAO) in 1973.14

In the post–Cold War era, this relationship changeddramatically as France reduced its high-profile militaryinvolvement in West Africa and improved bilateralrelations with Nigeria. Addressing French diplomats in1997, President Jacques Chirac urged them to abstainfrom “all interference of whatever nature, political,military or other” in Africa, adding, “France would notaccept it herself.”15 More than anything else, France’srefusal to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire in the wake of amilitary coup that toppled the friendly regime of HenriKonan Bedie in December 1999 dramatized this policyshift. In place of supporting client regimes, France hassince extended commercial ties with Africa beyond itsformer colonies, becoming the second largest foreigninvestor in Nigeria after Britain. Francophone Africanstates have also sought economic and political tiesbeyond France.16 On the military front, in 1997, Francelaunched its initiative, Renforcement des CapacitésAfricaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), tostrengthen African peacekeeping capacity. Paris hassince invited non-francophone states to participate inthis program. France’s courting of key anglophonecountries like Nigeria and South Africa17 needs to beunderstood in the context of the loss of its sphere ofinfluence in states like Rwanda and Zaire.18 Thisfollowed France’s arming of Rwandese genocidaires

and prolonged support for the autocratic Mobutu SeseSeko in Zaire. In February 1990, Nigeria’s head of state,General Ibrahim Babangida, visited France. A decadel a t e r, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo paidanother visit to Paris. In return, French presidentJacques Chirac visited Nigeria and publicly acknowl-edged Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa.

Meanwhile, Nigeria has increased its role in securityoperations in West Africa. It led military interventionsto restore order in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leonein 1997, both within the framework of the EconomicCommunity of West African States Cease-fireMonitoring Group (ECOMOG). In December 1999,Nigeria played a key role in establishing the ECOWASsecurity mechanism to institutionalize conflictmanagement in West Africa (see part three). Thedeclining military role of external actors in post–ColdWar Africa and the increased role of African actors inmanaging their own conflicts has facilitated Nigeria’speace and security initiatives in West Africa. Thissuggests that efforts to bolster West Africa’s securityinfrastructure will have to take into account Nigeria’shegemonic ambitions, despite its own enormouspolitical, economic, and social problems, which couldyet hamper the fulfillment of such ambitions.

Exploitation of Natural Resources and Conflicts

A third factor that shapes the security landscape inWest Africa is conflict over the control of mineralresources, which fuels war and undermines peaceprocesses as illustrated by the examples of Sierra Leoneand Liberia. Grievances relating to diamond-mining inSierra Leone date back to the colonial era. Using localchiefs, British-administered diamond-rich regions inthe country gave small diamond concessions to private



13 John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).14 On the rivalry between CEAO and ECOWAS, see S.K.B. Asante, “ECOWA S / C E AO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa,” in RalphOnwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.), The Future of Regionalism in Africa (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1985), pp. 74–95; and Daniel Bach,“The Politics of West African Economic Cooperation: CEAO and ECOWAS,” Journal of Modern African Studies 21, no. 4 (1983): 601 – 6 21 .15 Quoted in West Africa, 13–19 October 1997, no. 4170, p. 1664.16 See Adekeye Adebajo, “Folie de Grandeur,” The World Today 53, no. 6 (June 1997): 147–150; and Réal Lavergne (ed.), RegionalIntegration and Cooperation in West Africa (Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press, 1997).17 See Rocklyn Williams, “Beyond Old Borders: Challenges to Franco-South African Security Relations in the New Millennium,”African Security Review 8, no. 4 (1999): 3–19.18 See Gerard Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 281–290.

companies and workers instead of salaries19, creatinggroups and individuals who fell outside the govern-ment’s control.20 Corruption, inadequate tax collectionmeasures and tax evasion enabled individuals andprivate groups to use their private economic power toexert control and to challenge the state. In the 1990s,protagonists in the Sierra Leonean conflict battled forcontrol over diamond mines and the internationaltrade in diamonds. Some shadowy entrepreneurs, benton controlling the diamond industry, have supportedwarlords, particularly RUF rebels who in turn haveused the income from diamonds to finance andprolong Sierra Leone’s civil war.

Similarly, the conflict in Liberia seemed to benefit asmall circle of warlords heading factions such as theNPFL, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the UnitedLiberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia(ULIMO), which controlled vast territories rich innatural resources. These groups exploited ethnicity andmilitary power to dominate a lucrative export trade indiamonds, timber, iron ore, and gold in collaborationwith US, European, and Asian commercial firms.21

When Liberian ports were closed following UN andECOWAS embargoes in 1992, Ivorian and French firmsestablished direct trade links with the NPFL in Liberiaand the RUF in Sierra Leone.22 One of the mainobjectives of Guinean rebel forces fighting the regimeof Lansana Conte could be to gain access to Guinea’smineral reserves of diamonds, bauxite, and gold. In acountry where smuggling of mineral resources isundoubtedly a growing problem, powerful businessinterests lie in wait, ready to exploit the economicgains that are to be derived from a protracted conflict.Thus, political and economic strategies are linked inways that enable corrupt groups to prolong and benefit

from conflicts in West Africa. Any credible search forpeace in this subregion will have to deal squarely withthe link between resources and war.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

A fourth factor that complicates security in We s tAfrica is the widespread availability of small arms andlight weapons (SA LWs), which often intensifyconflicts. While SA LWs were a feature of the Cold Wa rera, distributed both legally and illegally as part ofsuperpower geopolitics, their acquisition and usevastly increased in the 1990s. An estimated 7 millionweapons currently circulate in West Africa, escalatingand prolonging conflicts, making them more deadlyand entrenched. The ensuing culture of violence andlawlessness that is spawned by the use of theseweapons hinders economic, political and socialdevelopment and frustrates efforts to reconstructsocieties afflicted by conflicts.2 3 One study on the civilwar in Sierra Leone estimates that women andchildren account for over 80 percent of firearm-relatedf a t a l i t i e s .2 4

Furthermore, for every one casualty resulting from theuse of these firearms, five people are displaced. Thoseinvolved in small arms trade are often militiassupported by or against the state, criminal gangs,vigilantes, and ordinary civilians who are apprehensiveabout the increasing inability of the state to providethem with security. Aside from gaining access to arms,children and youths in West Africa have also beenrecruited into fighting units. Government and rebelmovements have increased their military stockpiles,recruited mercenaries or “private security companies”and created their own militias to confront their rivals,



19 An example is the Selection Trust (SLST) company, a DeBeers subsidiary that was granted a monopoly over the diamond industryin Kono, Sierra Leone, in 1934.20 John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2001).21 Kwesi Aning and Eboe Hutchful, “The Political Economy of Conflicts in West Africa,” paper presented at the International PeaceAcademy Seminar on Towards a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-Region, in Abuja, Nigeria, 27–29 September2001.22 Ibid.23 For information on the impact of small arms and light weapons, visit the UN Development Program’s Emergency Response Divisionwebsite: http://www.undp.org/erd/small_arms.htm.24 See Eric G. Berman, “Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement,” Occasional Paper No. 1: SmallArms Survey (New York: 2000), p. 13.

gain state power, and control and extract naturalresources. Realizing the harmful effects of SALWs,West Africa led the rest of the continent in initiatingefforts at large-scale disarmament. The most signifi-cant of these efforts was the Mali Flame of Peace,which led to the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Export,Import and Manufacture of Small Arms and LightWeapons of October 1998. However, this declaration ofintent is yet to be translated into concrete action on theground.

2.2 Southern Africa

Southern Africa’s political and security situationremains precarious seven years after the end ofapartheid in South Africa.25 In addition to the twenty-five year civil war in Angola which has recently endedwith the killing of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, bygovernment forces in February 2002, sporadicinstability in Zimbabwe and Lesotho, the ongoing warin the Democratic Republic of Congo, which pits atleast seven African armies and their internal alliesagainst each other, HIV/AIDS has emerged as a securitythreat throughout the region.26 Moreover the region isthreatened by the prospect of water conflicts in thefuture, an unfolding land crisis in the region beyondthe current one in Zimbabwe, transnational organizedcrime and the proliferation of small arms.

While more Southern African states are formaldemocracies, they face challenges that threaten toreverse the gains made in the past few years. Since thehistoric democratic elections in South Africa in 1994,the subregion has been able to turn a weak defensealliance against apartheid, the Southern AfricanDevelopment Coordination Conference (SADCC), into aregional security and development bloc, renamed theSouthern African Development Community (SADC) in1992. SADC seeks to achieve development andeconomic integration; promote common politicalvalues, systems and institutions; and strengthen thelong-standing historical, cultural and social affinities

and links among the peoples of the subregion.27

However, the development of this vision is shaped bythe fear of most SADC countries of South Africa’sdominance, in view of the historical legacy ofapartheid and the lingering memory of its destabiliza-tion policies in the region.

The Legacy of Apartheid

Any understanding of security in Southern Africa mustnecessarily start with the legacy of apartheid and therecognition of the near total dominance of SouthAfrica in the subregion. Established specifically tocounter economic and political dominance byapartheid South Africa, SADC’s creation in 1992signaled a shift from defense against apartheid toregional cooperation. However, the specter of theSouth African economic and military giant continuesto affect security dynamics within SADC. Tensionsbetween South Africa and its neighbors revolve aroundmarket liberalization—the degree to which Pretoria iswilling to drop trade barriers with other subregionalstates—but more critically around democracy andpeacebuilding. South Africa seeks to promotedemocracy in SADC but is vulnerable to charges ofinterference when it does so. Having played an aggres-sive, destabilizing military role in its subregion partic-ularly in the 1980s under the apartheid regime, SouthAfrica is open to charges of bullying when it intervenesin regional disputes, and to complaints of indifferencewhen it does not.

There is also a naïve tendency on the part of manyanalysts to overstate South Africa’s leverage. In thisview, South Africa is economically more powerful thanits weaker neighbors and should be able to translatethis power into political clout and leadership. WhileSouth Africa’s dominance has engendered fear, distrustand jealousy among other SADC member states, itremains a giant with serious limitations. Its govern-ment presides over a deeply divided society with acutepoverty levels, making processes of domestic political



25 Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects, International Peace Academy Seminar Report,Gaborone, December 2000.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.

and economic transformation difficult. Although it isan emerging market and undisputed regional power,South Africa is still largely inexperienced in regionaldiplomacy and has a relatively weak administrativecapacity.

Fragile Democratization

While many SADC states have conducted multipartyelections, pressure for greater freedom often jostleswith ominous signs of growing autocracy and deeppolitical divisions. Elections are often highly contested,and the credibility of electoral outcomes has often beenquestioned by opposition parties and externalmonitors. In some cases, this contestation is a contin-uation of the Cold War–era conflicts between groupssuch as the MPLA and UNITA in Angola and to a lesserextent Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique. Namibiaand South Africa are haunted by a legacy of racialdivision and the reality that major opposition partiesare associated with racial minorities, notably whiteminorities. In other SADC countries, ruling elites havesimply grafted themselves onto multiparty systems thatthey use to consolidate their monopoly on power,creating what Richard Joseph has called “virtualdemocracies.”28

However, the problem of democratization in SADCgoes beyond its governing elites. With the inherentweaknesses of opposition parties who often lack accessto state patronage and the media, the playing field israrely far from level. Often restricted to urban elites,opposition parties lack a social base. There is also acontinuation of the culture of fear and silence, whichdominated the predemocratization era. In Zambia andZimbabwe, for example, the media, which has oftenbeen an effective source of opposition, is underconstant harassment. In other cases, as in Zimbabwe,the judiciary has sought to play a countervailing roleto a powerful executive, supplanting to some extent

the parliamentary opposition. But recently, theexecutive appears to have brought the judiciary underits influence by appointing judges it considers moremalleable.

Botswana’s democracy remains a rarity within theSADC region, having survived for more than threedecades. However, it has yet to survive the test of thedefeat of the governing party at the polls. This leavesMauritius as the only established, consolidateddemocracy in Southern Africa. While its 1998 electionswere marked by accusations that the Labor Party,which won a 41.5 percent plurality, had used statefunds for electoral purposes,2 9 party competitionremains vigorous and electoral politics are markedboth by alternations of power, as governing parties aredefeated at the polls, and by the building of coalitionsbetween different parties to achieve a ruling majority.

But despite these encouraging examples, thehegemonic “party-state” appears to be the majorpolitical trend in Southern Africa. SADC’s statedcommitment to democratization is uneven, as was thecase with the admission of the DRC into the club. Theabsence of democracy and consequent tensions in theDRC and Swaziland and continuing instability inZimbabwe and Lesotho, illustrate the degree to whichformal democratization in the SADC subregion remainsfragile. The weakness of party systems and continuedconflicts are symptomatic of a deeper problem: formaldemocracy is yet to translate into popular participationand good governance. So far, many rulers practice“façades” of democracy, denying their populations civilliberties and democratic freedoms. 30

2.3 Central Africa

The dynamics of conflict in the Great Lakes region—Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Eastern Congo—have,over the last seven years, been painstakingly



28 Virtual democracies tend to transform themselves into permanent one-party systems where leaders turn countries into personalfiefdoms. See for example, Richard Joseph, “Africa, 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (April1998).29 Economist Intelligence Unit, Mauritius Country Report 2nd Quarter 1998 (London: EIU, 1998).30 Steven Friedman, “The False Dawn: Rethinking African Democratisation”, Keynote Paper, Conference Rethinking AfricanDemocratisation, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1998.

documented in a number of studies.31 These conflictsare complex and involve a multiplicity of interlockingregional and international forces that mitigate or fuelconflicts, thus complicating peacemaking efforts.3 2 T h ewar in Burundi and tensions in Rwanda continue inspite of several peacemaking efforts and thetemporary truce under UN supervision in the DRC. Inthis subregion, the epicenter of conflict is constantlyshifting from one country to another. In 1993 it wasBurundi, where more than 200,000 people have sincedied; in 1994 it moved to Rwanda, where a genocideleft an estimated one million dead;3 3 in 1996, it movedto Burundi and the DRC, where an estimated 2.5million people have reportedly died since August1998. The war in the DRC has spawned more than600,000 refugees and two million internally displacedp e r s o n s .

Insecurity in Congo-Brazzaville also continues toaffect security in the DRC. In October 1997, rebel forcesloyal to the former Congolese leader General DenisSassou-Nguesso seized control of Brazzaville,effectively ending a four-month revolt against theelected government of Pascal Lissouba. Sassou-Nguesso, who had ruled the country between 1979 and1992, became its new leader. France and Angola hadreportedly supported Nguesso’s power grab byproviding him with military and logistical assistance.34

The war in Congo-Brazzaville left an estimated 10,000people dead, and spawned 40,000 refugees and500,000 internally displaced persons. Renewedviolence erupted in October 1998 in the Pool regionaround Brazzaville, involving various militias (notablySassou-Nguesso’s “Ninjas” and his military rival

Kolélas’ “Cobras”), resulting in another 1,000 deaths. The ripples of the DRC conflict have reverberatedthroughout Central Africa. As the civil war in Angolaescalated, the government recalled thousands of troopspreviously fighting in the Congo. In Zimbabwe, thepolitical and economic costs of military involvement(estimated at U.S.$1 million a day) aroused a violentantiwar movement by a broad section of civil society(trade unions, human rights organizations andreligious groups). In Congo-Brazzaville, the pro-UNITArebel forces (pro-Lissouba and pro-Koléla militias)stepped up the war against the Nguesso regime, so thatby December 1998 over 25,000 people had died inBrazzaville alone, while about 500,000 were displacedwithin the country.

SADC’s ability to provide a framework for addressingthese conflicts has been constrained by differencesbetween Zimbabwe and South Africa on the DRC.Military clashes between Uganda and Rwanda in theDRC have not only damaged their alliance, but alsothreaten to spark off a wider arms race and greaterregional instability. The security dynamics in CentralAfrica have to be understood within the context of fourmain factors: ethnicity and political governance; theeconomic factors fueling conflicts; the geopoliticalinterests of various actors; and the regional responsesto the conflicts.

Ethnicity and Political Governance

As elsewhere in Africa, bad governance and ethnicpolitics have accentuated conflicts in Central Africa. InRwanda and Burundi, conflict revolves around the



31 See for example, Colette Braeckman, Rwanda: Histoire d’un Génocide (Paris: Fayard, 1994); Rene Lemarchand, Ethnocide asDiscourse and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Rene Lemarchand, “Ethnicity as a Myth: The View fromCentral Africa,” Occasional Paper, Center for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 1999; Filip Reyntjens, “The Proof of thePudding Is in the Eating: The June 1993 Election in Burundi,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 4 (1993): 563–583; GerardPrunier, “Burundi: Descent into Chaos or Manageable Crisis?” Writenet Country Papers, 1995; and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (ed.),The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1986).32 Makumi Mwagiru, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management (Nairobi: Watermark Press, 2000).33 Rather than the generally accepted estimate of 800,000 deaths (or 850,000 according to Gerard Prunier, “Burundi: Descent intoChaos or Manageable Crisis?” Writenet Country Papers, 1995, pp. 261–265), we have retained the figure of 1 million deaths given byPhilippe Gaillard, chief delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross, Rwanda, 1993–1994, confirmed by Charles Petrie, deputycoordinator of the UN Rwanda Emergency Office. See also Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’sGenocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), pp. 222–223.34 Angola was concerned about the alleged support Lissouba was giving to the rebel UNITA movement.

ethnic differences between the Tutsi and Hutu,35 whichtranslates into the politics of inclusion and exclusion.Apart from promoting unequal access to opportunities,ethnicity in the two countries has enabled ethnicminorities to control the state and its resources.36 InRwanda, the failure of the Hutu government toaccommodate members of the Tutsi ethnic groupresulted in the genocide of 1994. In Burundi, the fearof Hutu dominance—interpreted as Tutsi exclusion andpossible annihilation—has often stalled the implemen-tation of peace accords. To remain in power, regimesrely on violence to regulate internal political and otherdifferences and to erect structures that exclude andmarginalize sections of society.37 In Zaire, Mobutu SeseSeko failed to resolve the crisis of citizenship relatingto Congolese of Rwandese descent (Banyamulenge),giving rise to a rebellion that swept Laurent Kabila topower in 1997. In turn, Kabila failed to address thesame question, triggering the rebellion in EasternCongo, which many observers believe contributed tohis assassination in January 2001.38

Democracy has historically been under siege in thissubregion. As the cases of Prince Louis Rwagasore andMelchior Ndadaye in Burundi and Patrice Lumumbaand Laurent Kabila in Congo clearly illustrate,democratically elected leaders have been assassinated

or forcefully removed from power by the military. TheCongolese state has been unable to exert authoritythroughout the entire country largely because of itssheer size (2.3 million square kilometers). Consequently,the concentration of state power in Kinshasa hasreduced the authority of the state in the outlyingprovinces and administrative regions and eroded itsl e g i t i m a c y. This is especially true in Eastern Congo,which has cultural and historical ties with Rwanda andB u r u n d i .3 9 In contrast to the DRC, the small size ofRwanda and Burundi has ensured an excessive presenceof the state and its capacity to suppress its opponents.The narrow economic base of both countries, a fact tiedto their geographical size and landlocked status, hassharpened political and ethnic cleavages. Competitionfor land, resources and government control of the majorcash crops has constantly fueled rural populationdisaffection, a situation accentuated by the introductionof Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the1 9 8 0 s .4 0 Attempts at restoring peace to Central Africawill have to address the question of democratizationand governance. The assassination of Laurent Kabilaand his replacement as Congolese head of state by hisson, Joseph Kabila, in January 2001 has been viewed bymany as the removal of a major stumbling block to theimplementation of the Lusaka accord of 1999. However,p e a c e m a kers must keep in mind that there remain



35 Colonialism institutionalized the identities of the communities of this region by invoking the “Hamitic hypothesis” to create aclassification that pitted the “Hamitic superior race” against a “Bantu inferior race,” in essence making Tutsi and Hutu racially basedidentities. John Hanning Speke, Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile (London: Everyman Edition, 1969), p. 201; andMahmood Mamdani, “From Conquest to Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda,” New Left Review 216(1996): 3–36. See also Pierre Buyoya, Building Peace in Burundi: Mission Possible (Paris: L’Emertan, 1998); Rene Lermachand,Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994); Rene Lermachand, “Ethnicity as a Myth: TheView from Central Africa,” Occasional Paper, Center for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 1999; and Jan Vansina, “ThePolitics of History and the Crisis in the Great Lakes,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (1996): 37–44.36 F. Ngaruku and J.D. Nkurunziza, “An Economic Interpretation of the Conflict in Burundi,” Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3(2000): 370–409; Joseph Gahama, et al., “Burundi,” in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: TheSearch for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance (London and New York: Zed Books and ACDESS, 1999); Chris Allen, “Warfare,Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa,” Review of African Political Economy no. 81 (1999): 367–384; and M. Szeftel,“Clientelism, Corruption and Catastrophe,” Review of African Political Economy no. 85 (2000): 427–441.37 See for example, Thomas Laely, “Peasants, Local Communities and Central Power in Burundi,” Journal of Modern African Studies35, no. 4 (1997): 695–716.38 For a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between ethnicity, political participation and governance in Central Africa, seeMahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2001).39 M. McNulty, “The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?” Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 1(1999): 493–510.40 J.E. Nyaoro, “Middle Level Dialogue in Burundi: An Assessment of Best Practices,” USAID/MSI Greater Horn of AfricaPeacebuilding Project, 2001

factions in the Congo conflict who view the implemen-tation of the accord as threatening their own short-terminterests. The failure to secure a peace agreementfollowing marathon negotiations between the DRC’sfactions in South Africa’s Sun City in March 2002,underlined this point.

The Scramble for Resources in DR-Congo

A second feature defining conflicts in Central Africa isthe myriad interests tied to the DRC’s huge naturalresources that has earned it the French characterizationof scandale géologique. These include minerals likediamonds, gold, silver, iron, zinc, copper, cobalt,columbite-tantalite, cadmium, manganese, bauxite,uranium, radium and timber. These vast resources havebecome even more valuable in the context of thecurrent world financial crisis. Eastern Congo is home tosome of the richest columbite-tantalite (coltan)deposits in the world, a mineral whose price skyrock-eted to U.S.$200 a pound at the end of 2000.

As in West Africa, natural resources in Central Africaare instrumental to the war economy.41 Since thecolonial era, both state and private actors havecompeted for access to the Congo’s mineral wealth.I n t e r n a l l y, both the government and rebel movementsuse income from the sale of gold, diamonds, timberand coffee to acquire weapons, recruit troops, gainmilitary support and finance their war efforts.Regional states involved in the Congo war areextracting resources found in areas under theircontrol. For example, in the first quarter of 2000,Uganda and Rwanda became leading exporters ofdiamond and copper, despite not producing theseresources domestically. A Swiss government secretreport revealed that over the last three years, the salesof world coltan reached a total of U.S.$90 million, asmall portion of which was retained by the Rwandesemilitary and other foreign intermediaries.4 2 In seekingto restore peace to Central Africa and particularly tothe DRC, the issue of access to and exploitation of

mineral resources to fund and promote conflicts willhave to be addressed.

Geopolitical Interests

One of the hallmarks of the conflict in the DRC is itsregional character. In addition to the 55,000-strongForces Armées Congolaises ( FAC), 62,000 foreigntroops from six African countries (Rwanda: 20,000;Burundi: 15,000; Zimbabwe: 11,000; Uganda: 10,000;Angola: 4,000; and Namibia: 2,000) have beeninvolved in this conflict.43 This war is between tworegional alliances: the “Great Lakes” alliance consistingof Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi is pitted against thealliance of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Rwandaclaims that it has intervened in the Congo to confrontthe military threat posed by the Hutu-dominatedInterahamwe militia, which fled into exile in EasternCongo after the 1994 genocide. The evolving détente inthe Congo in 2001 sent a wave of RwandeseI n t e r a h a m w e militiamen fleeing back to Rwanda,accompanied by Mai Mai fighters from the Congo. LikeRwanda, Uganda argues that its presence in the Congois motivated by its security interests, particularly thethreat posed by United Democratic Front (UDF) fighterswho operate out of Eastern Congo. Rwanda andUganda have since fallen out and their troops clashedmilitarily several times in the Congolese town ofKisangani between 1999 and 2001.

Citing similar security interests as Uganda and Rwanda,Angola explained its involvement in the war as part ofits strategy to deny Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA militarybases in the DRC. Angola, Burundi, Uganda, andRwanda complain that their national security wascompromised by the inability of the government inKinshasa to secure its borders. More importantly, theinvolvement of these countries is linked organically tothe rebel groups in the DRC. The Mouvement pour laLibération du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bembaand based in the Équateur province, was supported byUganda; the Congolese Rally for Democracy



41 F. Jean and J. Rufin, Économie des guerres civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996).42 Karl Vick, “Vital Ore Funds Congo’s War,” The Washington Post, 10 March 2001, p. A01; Jean-Philippe Rémy, “Dans l’est du Congo,les belligérants organisent le pillage et le trafic du coltan,” Le Monde, 20 August 2001; see also UN, Report of the Expert Panel onthe Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001.43 International Crisis Group, “Burundi: Neither Peace nor War,” Africa Report 2000 no. 25 (Arusha/Nairobi/Brussels).


(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/RCD) hasbeen supported by Rwanda and Uganda at varioustimes. The RCD split into two factions in March 1999:the RCD-Kisangani (or ML) faction, led by Wamba diaWamba, and the RCD-Goma, based in Eastern Congo,supported by Rwanda, and led by Jean-Pierre Ondekane.A Congolese Liberation Front (Front Congolais deL i b é r a t i o n/FCL) unifying the MLC and RCD-Gomafactions (excluding the RCD-Kisangani) has recentlybeen created.4 4 Uganda is reportedly now backing asplinter group called the RCD-ML.4 5 Thus, strongregional security interests and ambitions often pursuedthrough local rebel movements and regional militiagroups have regionalized the civil conflict in the DRC.

Closely tied to the multiplication of rebel groups inCentral Africa is the flow of small and light arms in thissubregion from diverse sources such as South Africa,France, Eastern Europe, China, North Korea and theUnited States.4 6 Besides the weak regulations of theinternational arms trade and the unwillingness of arms-trading nations to enforce certification regulationss t r i n g e n t l y, the mushrooming of “private” militias hasmade it difficult to control and regulate the proliferationand use of arms in Central Africa.4 7 Another importantissue in Central Africa’s wars is the child soldier ( k a d o g o )phenomenon. In Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and theDRC, children compose a large percentage of rebelarmies and militia groups, generating a whole range ofconcerns related to protection, demobilization, rehabili-tation and retraining, that need to be part of anysuccessful peacebuilding strategy.

Beyond Central Africa, the interests of external powerssuch as France, Belgium, and the United States arecritical in shaping the dynamics of conflicts in CentralAfrica. France was a patron of several regimes likeZaire and Rwanda in the region until the mid-1990s.Its responsibility in the Rwanda genocide of 1994 hasbeen firmly established.4 8 France supplied arms to, andtrained, the Rwandese army during the 1990–1994civil war. It was also instrumental in O p e r a t i o nTo u q o u i s e, which provided safe passage for govern-ment soldiers and I n t e r a h a m w e militia to flee toGoma, Bukavu and Uvira in the DRC. France proppedup the Mobutu regime until it fell in 1997, even afterformer Mobutu backers such as the United States andBelgium had cut off support. More broadly, theinternational community has been widely criticizedfor its failure to prevent or meaningfully address thegenocide in 1994 as well as the escalation of conflictin Burundi.4 9 France, Belgium, and the United Stateswarmed up to Joseph Kabila’s government, andWashington provided $10 million in humanitarian aidto Congo. In 2000, the UN authorized a 5,537-strongp e a c e keeping force to the DRC (later reduced to 3,000),signaling a willingness to engage in limitedp e a c e keeping. However, such a force is unlikely tohave the capacity to restore order to an entity the sizeof Western Europe.

Regional Responses to Conflicts

The Great Lakes region does not have an establishedinstitutionalized framework for dealing with security


44 Ibid.45 “Tea and Talk on the Edge of War,” The Economist, 10 November 2001, p. 43.46 Edward Laurence, “Small Arms, Light Weapons and Conflict Prevention: The New Cold War Logic of Disarmament,” in R. Rubin(ed.), Cases and Strategies for Preventive Ac t i o n (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1998), pp. 135–168; and William Hartung andDena Montague, The Clinton Legacy: Uplifting Rhetoric, Grim Realities, World Po l i c y, http://worldpolicy. o r g / p r o j e c t s / a r m s / i n d e x . h t m l ,2 0 01 .47 Damian Lilly, The Privatization of Security and Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action (London: International Alert, 2000).48 François-Xavier Verschave, Complicité de génocide? La Politique de la France au Rwanda (Paris: Edition la Decouverte, 1994);Jean-Paul Gouteux, Un Genocide Secret d’Etat (Paris: Edition Sociale, 1998); Honoré Ngbanda Nzambo-ku-Atumba, Ainsi sonne leglas! Les derniers jours du maréchal Mobutu (Paris: Editions Gideppe, 1998); and Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of theWest in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000).49 J.C. Williame, L’ONU au Rwanda (1993–1995): La communauté internationale à l’épreuve d’un génocide (Bruxelles: Labor Editions,1996), p. 175; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.–U.N. Saga (New York: Random House, 1999); Wayen Madsen, Genocideand Covert Operations in Africa, 1993–1999 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999); Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role ofthe West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000); and Olivier Lanotte, Claude Roosens and Caty Clément, La Belgique etl’Afrique Centrale: De 1960 à nos jours (Bruxelles: Complexe/GRIP, 2000).


problems.50 Communauté Économique des Pays desGrand Lacs (CEPGL), which brought together Rwanda,Burundi and Zaire, has since become moribund. Thepotential of the DRC playing a lead role in the GreatL a kes has been diminished by the fact that it is itself amajor theater of conflict in the region. After the fall ofMobutu in 1997, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni emerged asone of the heads of states that Washington annointed asamong the “New Breed of African leaders.” Museveniplayed a key role in the revitalization of the EastAfrican Community in 1999. However, he remainsinsecure at home and abroad. Domestic insecurity inNorthern and Western Uganda, as well as the recentspat with Rwandese leader Paul Kagame, has reducedMuseveni’s ambitions to act as the regional strongman.

Amidst these institutional weaknesses and personalityclashes, regional efforts at trying to resolve the DRCconflict have been largely ad hoc. While agreementshave been brokered, namely the Arusha Peace Accordfor Rwanda in 1993, the Lusaka Accord for the DRC in1999 and the Peace and Reconciliation Accord forBurundi in 1999, these agreements have not resolvedany of the three conflicts. Thus, in spite of the 1993Arusha accord, Rwanda descended into genocide in1994. In Burundi, sanctions imposed by regional statesbetween 1996 and 1999 entrenched a small political,business and military elite, and resulted in a hardeningof positions and the stalling of the implementation ofthe peace accord. Likewise, the implementation of theLusaka accord of 1999 remains stalled.

The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 proposed both militaryand political measures to bring peace to the Congo. Inparticular, the accord entrusted the task of policing thedisengagement of forces to the warring parties. This isto be done under the auspices of a Joint MilitaryCommission (JMC), composed of two representativesfrom each party and a neutral OA U - a p p o i n t e dchairman reporting to a Political Committee consisting

of the Foreign and Defense ministers of the warringparties. Lusaka also called for a National Dialogue thatwould set the stage for a new political dispensation inthe Congo. A preparatory meeting held in Botswanabetween 22 and 23 August 2001 agreed that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue would begin on 15 October 2001in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This meeting broughttogether, for the first time, all Congolese political andarmed factions. Although the dialogue was convenedas scheduled, it was adjourned following disputes overprocedures and representation. In a dramatic reversalof the late Laurent Kabila’s demand for the uncondi-tional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congoand refusal to recognize the rebels as equal negotiatingparties, his son, Joseph, agreed to participate in theinter-Congolese peace dialogue before the withdrawalof foreign troops from the Congo.51 As earlier noted,this protracted meeting took place in South Africa inMay 2002, but failed to secure an agreement on power-sharing among all the DRC’s factions. Central Africa’smajor security challenge remains the implementationof the Lusaka accord. Without peace in the DRC, therecan be no peace in the region.

2.4 The Horn of Africa

In defining the security dynamics of the Horn ofAfrica, a subregion comprising Djibouti, Sudan,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia, JohnHaberson observed: “this region is in the process ofredefining the fundamentals that relate to the socialcontract and who should govern. The region reveals anoverlap of differing, sometimes conflicting governancesystems, reinforcing the interdependence of thesecurity system as well as posing critical challenges toregional peace.”5 2 Apart from being embroiledthemselves in intra- and interstate conflicts, themajority of countries on the Horn of Africa lacksubstantive capacity to deal with many of the long-standing conflicts in the subregion.


50 G. Khadiagala, “Prospects for a Division of Labour: African Regional Organizations in Conflict Prevention,” in Klass Van Walraven(ed.), Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities, Nijhoff Law Specials, vol. 39, (The Hague: Kluwer Press,1998), pp. 131–148.51 “Peace Talks in Congo Hit Snag over Troop Withdrawal,” The New York Times, 22 August 2001; and UN Integrated RegionalInformation Network, “Government Agrees to Dialogue Before Withdrawal of Foreign Troops” (30 August 2001), posted onhttp://www.allAfrica.com (29 August 2001).52 Discussions at the meeting on “State Formation and Political Identities in the Horn of Africa” on 6 April 2001.


Compared to Central or West Africa, the Horn of Africahas meager natural resources, though Sudan is increas-ingly becoming a major oil producer in Africa. Lyingon the southern part of the Sahara and dependentlargely on rain-fed agriculture, the subregion is underconstant threat of famine and drought. Thus, conflictover access to limited natural resources—water, landand pasture—has been part of the history of the Horn.53

The context of conflict changed dramatically underc o l o n i a l i s m .5 4 Ethnic communities were eitherarbitrarily split or lumped together with other disparategroups in new states with little regard to their wishes,55

often resulting in states with little sense of nationalidentity or unity.56 To consolidate national unity,governments resorted to strategies of centralizingpolitical and economic power and suppressingpluralism. In the Horn, as elsewhere in Africa, thecentralized state disrupted and marginalized outlyingareas. In the marginal parts of Uganda, Kenya,Somalia, or Ethiopia, people either view the state as analien entity or refer to it in the past tense. Nonetheless,the nature and dynamics of conflicts in this subregionhave changed significantly since the end of the ColdWar. This change revolves around three main factors:the legacy of the superpower rivalry; the proliferationof small arms and light weapons; and the forcedmigration of populations.

The Legacy of the Superpower Rivalry

The Horn of Africa was an arena of superpower rivalrythat buttressed tyranny and dictatorships. Both the

United States and the Soviet Union armed clientregimes in this area without regard to their despotictendencies. Conversely, governments in the Hornswitched masters at will, leading to arms race, thepresence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia and of a U.S. baseand British troops in Kenya, and a proliferation ofarmed conflicts in places like Sudan, Somalia andEthiopia. The end of the Cold War consequently hadserious security implications for the Horn of Africa.Having depended on the support of the superpowers tostay in power, subregional leaders like Somalia’s SiadBarre and Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam facedinternal challenges and regime collapse with the end ofthe Cold War. Moreover, as many donor governmentsused aid to pressure recipient states to democratize,others redirected their aid to states deemed to haveachieved some economic or political success, likeSouth Africa, Botswana, and Ghana. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted: “Without externaleconomic and political support, few African regimescould sustain the economic lifestyles to which they hadbecome accustomed, or maintain the permanent holdon political power which they had come to expect.”57

Prolonged economic crises eroded the resource base ofmany governments in East Africa and diminished theability of several regimes to maintain an administrativepresence in much of their territories.58 Dictatorshipssuch as those of Barre in Somalia and Mengistu inEthiopia collapsed in the early 1990s, precipitatingcivil wars and in Somalia, withering away the state.From 1991, internal tensions rocked Kenya under the


53 Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds.), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: James Currey, 1994).54 Although Ethiopia was not colonized, it nevertheless experienced similar symptoms, as did other African countries, and embraceda Eurocentric way of organizing its state and society. Emperor Haile Selassie consulted with Europeans on how to “modernize” theEthiopian society and economy. This led to the neglect of traditional ways and systems. The Marxist-Leninist ideology introduced bythe Mengistu Haile-Selassie government was not better: it introduced a central state with a foreign agenda, borrowed from outside.This system became autocratic, suffocated traditional systems and transformed Ethiopia into a fertile ground for Cold War superpowerr i v a l r y. As in other African countries, after the Cold Wa r, Ethiopian was in need of reconstruction but without a strong central state,ethnic nationalism and economic needs created instability and crises. For a detailed analysis of these development, see Messay Kebede,Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia’s Enigmatic Present: A Philosophical Discourse (Lawrenceville and Asmara: Red Sea Press, 1999).55 Sudan is the epitome of this tragedy, characterized by the longest ongoing civil war in Africa.56 This was the fate that befell the Somali people, who found themselves dispersed in three countries: Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia.This phenomenon formed the basis of Somali nationalism and irrendentist movements, which pervades the entire Horn of Africa.57 Kofi Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” (UN, S/1998/318,13 April 1998), p. 4.58 For instance, many analysts believe that the Ethiopian famine of 1974 was the main factor in the overthrow of Emperor HaileSelassie’s government and the ensuing violence.



autocratic leadership of Daniel Arap Moi. The ray ofhope that accompanied the settlement of the Eritreanquestion following a successful independencereferendum in 1993 quickly dimmed as an interstatewar broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea five yearslater which lasted for two years. In the Sudan, divisionswithin militias in the South, the reimposition of Sharialaw by Khartoum in 1998 and the simmering conflictover recently discovered oil resources have intensifiedthe civil war between the predominantly Muslim Northand the largely Christian and animist South.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The second main feature in the process of state collapseand the withdrawal of the superpowers from Africa hasbeen the militarization of populations, accompanied bythe proliferation of small arms and light weapons.From Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan toEthiopia, militias and rebel movements fighting centralgovernments are often as well equipped as the state.Even Kenya, which is widely perceived to be a strongstate, has been affected by this phenomenon.59 Inresponse, governments in the Horn of Africa have beenacquiring more arms, ostensibly to deal with securitythreats. Rather than ensuring security and generatingpeace, this arms buildup has instead accelerated theproliferation of arms and increased tensions andconflicts. The ability of states to subdue or hold militiasaccountable for arms proliferation has greatlydiminished. The flow of arms and proliferation ofmilitias have important implications for interstaterelations on the Horn of Africa. As Somalia continuesto be a conduit for arms, the historically close military

ties between Kenya and Ethiopia are under increasingthreat. The presence of the Oromo Liberation Front(OLF) in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia hasalso adversely affected this defense axis. While militiascontinue to accumulate arms, the ability of subregionalstates to expand their arsenals is sometimes curtailedby international pressure to reduce military expendi-tures.60 In contrast, insurgents are able to replenishtheir arms with resources from looted food aid61 andexternal remittances from ethnic diasporas.62

Prolonged insurgency on the Horn of Africa hasinevitably multiplied the number of people skilled inthe use of firearms, destabilized societies, led to thebreakdown of the rule of law, disrupted lives andescalated violence and insecurity in urban and ruralareas. Rural violence takes the form of banditry andcattle rustling in the Rift Valley province of Kenya andthe Karamojong region in Uganda. In sedentarycommunities, insurgent activities affect agriculture, themainstay of most economies in the region. In NorthernUganda, insurgency has rendered production difficult.These developments have resulted in the steadyfragmentation of the institutional basis of state powerin many parts of the Horn of Africa.

Forced Displacement

The Horn of Africa has generated more than a quarterof Africa’s six million registered refugees. 63 In additionto refugees, all countries in the Horn of Africa have alarge number of internally displaced persons. Sudanalone has generated four million internally displacedpersons, the largest in the world. Although accurate

59 This situation is explained in terms of the breakdown of state mechanisms in Somalia, but also in terms of the inability of thegovernment in Kenya to control arm flows. Interview with Professor John J. Okumu, a scholar of governance issues and security inKenya, 11 September 2000.60 By 1988, the Ethiopian government was spending 50 percent of its revenue and 15 percent of its GDP for military purposes. SeeChristopher Clapham, “The Political Economy of Conflict in the Horn of Africa,” Survival 32, no. 5, September/October 1990, p.410–411. In the same vein, one of most difficult areas in Uganda’s relations with external donors is its military expenditure. Since1997, the World Bank and IMF have consistently argued that Uganda’s military expenditure is disproportionate to its resources andaffects allocation to other sectors.61 Principally this takes the form of relief aid, which is increasingly being linked to war economies.62 Remittances come from an increasing number of exiles from conflict-affected states. In addition to remittances, exiles are regularlytaxed by “their” governments. An Eritrean who lives and works in Washington, D.C., noted in April 2000, that when the war brokeout between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritreans met and collected some U.S.$5 million to support the war effort.63 In addition, there is a substantial number of unregistered refugees who fall outside this number.


Part Two: The Nature and Dynamics of Conflict in Africa22

figures are difficult to obtain, the generalized violencewithin these countries has led to large-scale militariza-tion of civilian populations. Indeed the fast-growingproliferation of small arms and light weapons is linkeddirectly to this movement within and across borders.

A large proportion of the populations of IGAD statesare nomadic pastoralists who constantly migrate acrossnational borders. Environmental pressure has intensi-fied competition for access to limited natural resourcessuch as common pasture and watering points amongthese communities. Over time, conflicts over theseresources have generated cycles of violence ascommunities that suffer attack, regroup, and carry outretaliation against their aggressors. To minimizecasualties in what has become part of their copingstrategies, communities engage in large-scalemigration and evacuation operations when tensions

between various groups begin to escalate. Suchmigration often involves crossing internationalborders, and has sometimes sparked off interstatetensions.

For example, the spread of Somali populations acrossthe Horn of Africa has provided sanctuaries to sameclans across borders beyond the reach of the jurispru-dence of national governments. The case of the OromoLiberation Movement (OLM), which is supported bycommunities in both northern Kenya and Ethiopia isanother case in point. These linkages are critical tounderstanding the generalized violence and culture ofimpunity that characterize this subregion. Havingassessed the nature and dynamics of conflicts in fourAfrican suregions, we will now analyze thepeacebuilding capacity of regional and subregionalorganizations in Africa.


Part Three:As s e s sing the Pe a c e b u i l d i n gCapacity of Regional andS u b regional Org a n i z a t i o ns in Africa

During the 1990s, Africa’s regional and subregionalorganizations were forced to create security

mechanisms in a bid to manage local conflicts. Theirefforts took on particular urgency following thegrowing lack of interest by external actors, particularlyby the powerful members of the UN Security Council,to contribute to peacekeeping missions in Africa afterthe debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994).While regional cooperation is not new in Africa, asexemplified by the Organization of African Unity,which was created in 1963, its focus is shifting in thepost–Cold War era from politics and economics tosecurity. Most regional intergovernmental organiza-tions in Africa were established to address economicand social issues. Many of these organizations have,however, revised their mandates to incorporate one ofthe most pervasive challenges facing Africa: conflictmanagement. This trend became prevalent in the 1990sas regional and subregional organizations embarked onexpanding and restructuring their capacity, member-ship and mandate to accommodate new functions inthe field of conflict management, resolution andprevention.

This section assesses the performance of seven ofAfrica’s intergovernmental organizations, namely theOrganization of African Unity (OAU), the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS), theSouthern African Development Community (SADC),the Economic Community of Central African States(ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA), the IntergovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD) and the East AfricanCommunity (EAC). These institutions have all sought toplay a role in preventing conflicts, and sometimes inmaking, keeping, and enforcing peace. Their operationscarry a certain amount of political weight and legiti-macy, critical in managing or resolving conflicts.Unlike external actors, these organizations are made upof countries from the same subregion that share much

in common, in terms of development, economic needs,peace and security, they, therefore, tend to have moreat stake in managing conflicts. Regional politicalinstitutions also enjoy the advantage of having deepknowledge of their region, a useful attribute whenmanaging conflicts of a regional character.

But regional and subregional mechanisms have alsorevealed political divisions, and there have beenaccusations that subregional actors have used thesemechanisms to launch military interventions in pursuitof their parochial national interests. These mechanismsare being established on an ad hoc basis and revealprofound institutional weaknesses. Reflecting thisr e a l i t y, subregional organizations have differentstructures and stress different issues in line with thespecific security needs of each subregion. In view oftheir unique experiences and regional differences, itwould be erroneous to presume that there is a singlemodel or linear pattern of institutional developmentthat each African regional and subregional organiza-tion should follow. These security mechanisms are intheir formative stages and still need to develop a widerange of capacities to deal with the ever changingdynamics of conflicts and crises in their respectivesubregions. All of Africa’s subregional organizationslack the financial, logistical and military resources toundertake effective military interventions. In West andSouthern Africa, where potential hegemons likeNigeria and South Africa might have compensated forthese constraints, military interventions by these twostates have been questioned and their leadership claimschallenged by other states in their subregions. Further,both Nigeria and South Africa must themselves tackleserious domestic socioeconomic problems. We nextturn to the peacebuilding role of the OAU andsubregional organizations in Africa.

3.1 The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

In a 1990 Declaration, the OAU Heads of State andGovernment recognized that the prevalence of conflictsin Africa was seriously impeding their collective andindividual efforts to deal with the continent’s economicproblems. Consequently, they resolved to worktogether toward the peaceful and rapid resolution ofconflicts. During the OAU summit held in Cairo in

Part Three: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacityof Regional and Subregional Organizations in Africa

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1993, African leaders established a Mechanism forConflict Prevention, Management and Resolution(MCPMR).64 In doing so, they recognized that thepresence of peace and stability is a necessary precon-dition for social and economic development.

From the outset, the issue of peacekeeping, upon whichthe Mechanism was predicated, was controversial. Itwas widely felt within the OAU political leadership thatpeace and security were the preserve of the UnitedNations, which is mandated to keep peace globally andpossesses more resources than the OAU. The OAUnarrowly defined its objective as that of primarilyanticipating and preventing conflicts; it left large-scalepeacekeeping to the UN and Africa’s subregionalorganizations. Specifically, the continental bodyidentified three aims: first, to anticipate and preventsituations of potential conflict from developing intofull-blown wars; second, to undertake peacemakingand peacebuilding efforts if full-blown conflicts shouldarise; and third, to carry out peacemaking andpeacebuilding activities in postconflict situations.While this initiative thrust the OAU into the center ofconflict management efforts in Africa, the reality isthat the pan-African organization has yet to become aprincipal player in peace processes in Africa.

The OAU Mechanism has yet to overcome severalfinancial, organizational and mandate-related limita-tions that have dogged its operation since its inception.A Peace Fund was created to serve as a financialreserve for its peacemaking efforts, raising hopes thatthe OAU Mechanism would overcome the financialwoes that had plagued the organization in the firstthree decades of its existence. Between 1996 and 2001,the Peace Fund was able to mobilize an average ofU.S.$1 million per annum from African and externalsources. However, three factors have hampered theeffectiveness of the Mechanism. First, the conflictmanagement needs of the continent by far outweighthe resources of the OAU Peace Fund. Second, thefailure of member states to meet their financial obliga-

tions to the OAU has adversely affected the work of theMechanism. Third, there is a growing realization that ifthe OAU Mechanism is to be successful, the Peace Fundmust be revamped and financed on a regular basis.

The OAU Conflict Management Center has three units:the Early Warning Systems Unit, Regional DeskOfficers, and the Field Operations Unit, manned by fourprofessional staff and seventeen consultants. While thisstaff is expected to undertake political analysis, monitordevelopments across the continent and write reportsdrawing lessons from different subregions, they are notrequired to have specific training in conflict manage-ment and resolution. Their qualifications range frominternational relations, social work and politicale c o n o m y, to psychology and urban planning. Staff atthe OAU Center acquire specialized skills throughattending different training programs, conferences andworkshops. However, this staff is overstretched due totwo factors. First, the Center lacks a strategy for optimalutilization of available human resources; and second,the Center has been experiencing a steady reduction ofstaff as part of the OAU’s ongoing restructuringp r o g r a m .6 5 Although the UN Development Program(UNDP) had been contracted to help build its capacity,the Center remains heavily reliant on consultants.

The operational arm of the OAU Conflict ManagementCenter is its Early Warning System, which has aresearch database that is supposed to contain basicinformation on the history, politics, society, economicsand potential sources of conflicts of every country inAfrica. Because this information is neither up-to-datenor complete, it is not always useful for making speedydecisions. The Center also lacks sufficient computers,trained personnel and experts to collect and analyzeearly warning information. Compared to similarsystems that the UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) has developed, the OAU’s EarlyWarning System remains underdeveloped. Its situationroom, where most data is collected, relies heavily onWestern media sources such as CNN, Reuters, and the


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64 For a comprehensive analysis of the history, general overview and assessment of the OAU Mechanism, see Margaret Vogt andMonde Muyanga, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993–2000, (NewYork: International Peace Academy, 2000).65 In March 2000, 140 OAU staff were laid off as part of the program. See “The Reporter,” Ethiopian Weekly, March 7, 2000,http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/docs/oau.htm.

BBC. Yet, it is clear that these sources are not alwaysup-to-date, credible, or insightful on African conflictsin Africa. While the OAU does organize workshops onthe role of the media in conflict management, it has yetto embrace African media as a valuable tool in its earlywarning mechanism.

Despite these deficiencies, the OAU has the potential tocoordinate the evolving early warning systems inAfrica’s various subregions. It can act as an informa-tion bank with subregional desks or other alternativesystems where information about the activities of eachsubregion and its organizations can be coordinated.This would facilitate information exchange, and couldpotentially enhance intervention strategies and resultin early warning innovations within Africa. TheUNDP’s capacity-building project with the OA UConflict Management Center has identified threeurgent needs for its Early Warning System. The first isan information system capable of analyzing conflictindicators on a continuous basis. To enhance thissystem, the OAU could set up regional desks linking itswork with those of subregional organizations and civilsociety actors. Second, the OAU Center needs personnelwith sufficient skills and experience to analyzeinformation and data collected. The Center, at the endof 2001, had two information analysts, both of whomwere consultants. But the OAU estimates that itrequires seven information analysts in addition to tworesearch analysts and two computer analysts. The needto hire and retain permanent staff is crucial to thecenter’s effectiveness. So far, the Center does not havea single permanent member of staff. One option forremedying this shortcoming could be to create tenuredrather than contractual positions to insulate staff frompolitical manipulation.

The third pressing need of the OAU Center involvesadvocacy and reaching out to civil society, universities,subregional organizations and governments. The ideawould involve the organization setting up a localnetwork linking all its offices, embassies and memberstates, so that they too could share information easily.After this goal has been achieved, the OAU could linkup with subregional institutions and use their informa-

tion sources as part of its own Early Warning System.The OAU could then develop links with African civilsociety actors in order to benefit from their informa-tion sources.

Another constraint to the OAU’s conflict managementwork is poor communication and publicity. Telephonelines frequently do not work and internet access is verylimited. There has not been much publicity about theOAU’s conflict management efforts because the organi-zation lacks the means of publicize its work effectively.Interviewees at the OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababaalso noted that there is little cooperation within OAUdepartments and between its different divisions. TheOAU could potentially serve as a focal point for puttingpressure on African states and the internationalcommunity to give more weight to conflict manage-ment efforts on the continent. The OAU office in NewYork could potentially serve as a link between theorganization, the UN, and international organizationsworking in the field of conflict management. The OAUcould also organize a website to popularize its activi-ties and to overcome the difficulty of publicizing itswork, especially the activities of its ConflictManagement Mechanism.

But despite these problems, the OAU Mechanism is notwithout achievements. Since its creation in 1993, theMechanism has been able to intervene in matters thatpreviously would have been considered as purely“internal.” In its work, the OAU Conflict ManagementCenter has used a range of preventive tools includingapplying political pressure, issuing regular statements,endorsing sanctions against military regimes andundertaking direct mediation between parties. To itscredit, the OAU has dispatched special envoys to areasrecently ravaged by conflict, such as Burundi andComoros, while its former Secretary-General, SalimAhmed Salim, worked with his UN counterpart, KofiAnnan, to mediate the Eritrea/Ethiopia and DRCconflicts. The OAU has also deployed fact-findingmissions to Rwanda and the DRC and observermissions to Rwanda, Burundi, and Comoros.66 Most ofthese missions have had mixed results. While theobserver missions were inadequate for the tasks


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66 Margaret Vogt and Monde Muyanga, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,1993-2000, (New York, International Peace Academy, 2000).

required, they nonetheless enabled the OAU to beginestablishing a credible presence in the area of conflictmanagement in Africa. Furthermore, the OAU set up anInternational Panel of Eminent Personalities to investi-gate the events surrounding the 1994 genocide inRwanda, which published a detailed report that offeredlessons for avoiding the failures of Rwanda in thefuture.67

However, key provisions of the OAU Charter continueto hamper its actions. Specifically, some member statescontinue to view sovereignty as sacrosanct, placingsevere constraints on the OAU’s scope of action androom for maneuver. If the OAU Mechanism is tobecome effective, it must urgently address this issue.Furthermore, owing to its limited capacity to mountfull-scale peacekeeping operations, the OAU shouldseriously consider participating in UN peacekeepingactivities. One proposal that has often been made to theOAU is that it should take up the responsibility ofcoordinating and supporting African participation inUN peacekeeping initiatives.68 Such responsibility couldentail creating and maintaining a roster of Africantroops available for UN peacekeeping operations inAfrica and organizing regular meetings of AfricanChiefs of Staff to improve the coordination of UNpeacekeeping operations in Africa.

The OAU could also coordinate the development ofcommon standards of operations among Africanarmies, facilitate the joint training of African forces forp e a c e keeping, and develop a common pool oflogistical, communication and transportationequipment to be used in peacekeeping operations inAfrica.69 To enhance its capacity to defuse and resolve

conflicts, the OAU needs to explore ways of workingwith other conflict management institutions withinand beyond Africa. Some peacekeeping cooperationcurrently exists between the OAU, the UN and Africa’ssubregional organizations. The OAU and UN workedtogether in Rwanda following the Arusha accord in1993. In the DRC, the OAU deployed observersthroughout the country, even in areas where the UNwas reluctant to deploy.

The joint deployment of UN and OAU peacekeepers inthe Ethiopia/Eritrea mission could provide a model ofsuccessful cooperation between these two organiza-tions. In 2001, the UN and OAU jointly deployedp e a c e keepers who have been cooperating inmonitoring the cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea.The UN deployed a mission of 4,200 soldiers, while theOAU sent a contingent of eleven soldiers. To ensurecoherence of action between the OAU and the UN,coordination meetings are held weekly in Addis Ababaand Asmara. In Asmara, these meetings are conductedwithin the framework of the Commission for theCoordination of UN Peacekeeping, a focal point createdto deal with all matters related to the peaceagreement.70 A critical lesson of this mission is theimportance of establishing a clear division of laborbetween the UN, the OAU and Africa’s subregionalorganizations.71

On 9 July 2001, the OAU took the decision to transformitself into a continental African Union (AU), followingthe signing and ratification by fifty Heads of State andGovernment, of the constitutive act of the Africa Unionin Lusaka, Zambia.72 However, it remains to be seenwhether the AU will build on the capacity of its


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67 Organization of African Unity, The International Panel of Eminent Persons to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and theSurrounding Events, July 2000.68 See for example, Report of the Joint OAU/IPA Task Force on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Africa, International PeaceAcademy, March 1998.69 Margaret Vogt and Monde Muyanga, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,1993-2000, (New York, International Peace Academy, 2000), p. 17.70 Within this framework, a military coordination commission has been created to implement the agreement. See Festus Aboagye,“Towards New Peacekeeping Partnerships in Africa? The OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea,” African Security Review 10, no. 2(2001): 19–33.71 See ibid.72 The process did not actively involve regional organizations and African civil society actors, reminiscent of the OAU’s old habit ofexcluding nonstate actors from its deliberations.

predecessor in the area of conflict management,resolution and prevention. Unlike the OAU Charter, theconstitutive act of the AU allows for interference in theinternal affairs of member states in cases of unconsti-tutional changes of governments, genocide andconflicts that threaten regional stability. The act alsoprovides for the participation of ordinary Africans inthe activities of the organization, calls for a Pan-African Parliament and provides for an Economic andCultural Commission. Revitalizing the OAU/AU willrequire political will and commitment to addressconflicts in Africa. A strong institutional structure andmore financial and logistical resources will also beneeded to facilitate decisionmaking.

3.2 The Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS)

Conceived as an organization for promoting economicdevelopment, ECOWAS was untested in the 1970s whenWest Africa experienced relative calm akin to a PaxWest Africana.73 Guinea-Bissau’s war of liberationended in 1974, while brief border clashes betweenBurkina Faso and Mali in 1975 and 1985 weremanaged through local mediation efforts. However,insecurity began to loom large with the outbreak of theLiberian civil war in December 1989. In July 1990,invoking the Protocol on Mutual Assistance onDefense (1981), Liberian autocrat Samuel Doerequested ECOWAS to send a peacekeeping force toLiberia to end a civil war that had led to mass killings

and massive refugee flows.74 ECOMOG’s interventionwould profoundly change the security landscape inWest Africa.

ECOMOG in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau

Liberia and Sierra Leone both endured almost a decadeof civil wars that resulted in over 250,000 deaths andover 1 million refugees. Liberia’s civil war lasted fromDecember 1989 to early 1997 and was mainly foughtby eight factions.75 The Sierra Leone war lasted fromMarch 1991 until a cease-fire in July 1999,76 and wasfought between successive civilian and militarygovernments in Freetown, in alliance with civil defensegroups including local hunters, the Kamajors, againstthe RUF. It took eighteen peace agreements (fourteen inLiberia and four in Sierra Leone) to end—at leasttemporarily—both conflicts. ECOMOG’s involvement inSierra Leone’s civil war was inextricably linked to itseight-year peacekeeping effort in Liberia’s civil war.

In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)invaded Sierra Leone with the assistance of CharlesTaylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).Several hundred Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Guineantroops were sent to Sierra Leone to defend the govern-ment. A second ECOMOG mission was established inSierra Leone after Nigerian leader, General SaniAbacha, diverted peacekeepers from the successfulLiberia mission to Sierra Leone in an attempt to crusha military coup by the Sierra Leonean army in


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73 Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Keynote Address at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Towards a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in aTroubled Subregion, Abuja, 27–29 September 2001.74 Ibid., p. 33.75 For accounts of the Liberian civil war, see Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in WestAfrica (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Abiodun Alao, The Burden of Collective Goodwill: The InternationalInvolvement in the Liberian Civil War (Brookfield and Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1998); Stephen Ellis, The Masks of Anarchy(London: Hurst, 1999); Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia (Hampshire, Londonand New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Klaas Van Walraven, The Pretence of Peace-keeping: ECOMOG, West Africaand Liberia (1990–1998) (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1999); and Margaret Vogt (ed.), The LiberianCrisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping (Lagos: Gabumo Press, 1992).76 For accounts of the Sierra Leone conflict, see Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, “The Revolutionary United Frontof Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat,” in Christopher Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas (Oxford, Kampala andBloomington: James Currey, Fountain Publishers and Indiana University Press, 1998); African Development 22, nos. 2–3 (1997),special issue on “Youth Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War”; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in SierraLeone (Oxford and New Hampshire: James Currey and Heinemann, 1996); and A.B. Zack-Williams and Steve Riley, “Sierra Leone: TheCoup and Its Consequences,” Review of African Political Economy no. 56 (1993).


Freetown in May 1997. They were later joined bycontingents from Ghana, Guinea and Mali. Themilitary junta invited the RUF to join its administra-tion. Nigerian troops reversed the coup in February1998 and restored President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah topower. However, the unsuccessful but devastating rebelinvasion of Freetown in January 1999 showed thatECOMOG has been unable to eliminate the RUF as amilitary threat. In both cases, an ill-equipped andpoorly funded ECOMOG77 has been unable to defeat therebels in guerrilla warfare or prevent violationsincluding rapes, killings, kidnappings and disarming ofUN peacekeepers.

ECOMOG launched a third intervention into Guinea-Bissau between December 1998 and June 1999 to endthe civil conflict between President João Vieira,b a c ked by Senegalese and Guinean military forces,and his former army chief, General Ansumane Mane.The ECOMOG intervention involving troops fromBenin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo, and funded entirelyby the French government, failed to achieve itsp e a c e keeping objectives and had to be withdrawnp r e m a t u r e l y. The difficulties of peacemaking inGuinea-Bissau can be explained by three main factors.First, Guinea-Bissau’s two main protagonists, Vieiraand Mane, were unwilling to settle their differencesthrough peaceful means and sought to manipulate thesupport of external forces. Second, Senegal andGuinea were compromised as neutral peaceke e p e r sand had to be replaced by troops from other We s tAfrican states with no prior involvement in thefighting. But the size of ECOMOG’s contingent—71 2men—was insufficient to protect the capital fromattack and to disarm the combatants, a situationexacerbated by its logistical weaknesses. Finally,though external actors like the UN, the World Bank,the EU and several bilateral donors supported somepeacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau, continuinginstability in the country has made donors reluctant todeliver on most of the pledges made at a conference inGeneva in May 1999.

The ECOWAS Security Mechanism

The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,Management Resolution, Pe a c e keeping and Securitywas adopted at the ECOWAS summit in Lomé inDecember 1999. The Mechanism expanded twoprevious subregional security initiatives: a Protocol onNon-Aggression signed in 1978, and a ProtocolRelating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (MAD) in1 9 81. The first Protocol called on members to resolvetheir conflicts peacefully through ECOWAS. Thesecond promised mutual assistance for externallyinstigated or sponsored aggression and called for thecreation of an Allied Armed Force of the Community,consisting of standby forces from ECOWAS states. TheMechanism of 1999 was also shaped by ECOMOG’sexperiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. This Mechanism evolved out of the activitiesof ECOWAS’ Standing Mediation Committee (SMC)established in 1990 following the outbreak of the civilwar in Liberia.

The ECOWAS Mechanism of 1999 comprises sixdistinct bodies, designed to help contain and defuseimpending conflicts. The first is the Mediation andSecurity Council, the main decisionmaking body on allmatters concerning conflict prevention, peacekeeping,security and other areas of operation. It is made up often members who are elected to two-year terms. Thesecond important body of the new Mechanism is theDefense and Security Commission, which examines alltechnical and administrative issues and assesseslogistical requirements for peacekeeping operations.The Commission consists of military technocrats andadvises the Mediation and Security Council onmandates, terms of reference and the appointment ofForce Commanders for military missions. One pressingneed of the ECOWAS Secretariat is to appoint morestaff to oversee its Mechanism. Until recently, thisresponsibility fell largely on three overworked LegalAffairs officers. General Cheikh Diarra was appointedDeputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs,

77 See Herbert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peace-keeping,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/1997);Cyril Iweze, “Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG,” in M.A. Vogt and A.E. Ekoko (eds.), Nigeria in InternationalPeacekeeping, 1960–1992 (Lagos and Oxford: Malthouse Press, 1993); and Robert Mortimer, “From ECOMOG to ECOMOG II:Intervention in Sierra Leone,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics: The African State Systemin Flux, 3rd ed. (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 2000).


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Defense and Security in early 2001 and is in theprocess of increasing his staff.

The third body of the Mechanism is the Council ofElders, a group of eminent persons mandated to usetheir good offices in the prevention, management andresolution of conflicts. The Council of Elders is toconsist of eminent persons from Africa and outside thecontinent, including women, traditional, religious, andpolitical leaders appointed on an ad hoc b a s i s .Seventeen of its thirty-two members met for the firsttime in Niamey, Niger, from 2 to 4 July 2001. Thefourth body of the mechanism is the Exe c u t i v eSecretariat and particularly the Executive Secretary,who coordinates the activities of the various bodies ofthe Mechanism and the implementation of itsdecisions. The fifth body of the new Mechanism is theEarly Warning Observation System, which collects andtransmits data to the ECOWAS Secretariat onimpending signs of conflict. Finally, ECOMOG, a bodythat will consist of standby forces from member states,is to be the peacekeeping and monitoring arm of theMechanism. ECOWAS’ new Mechanism also calls forimproved cooperation among its members in the areasof early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeepingoperations, cross-border crime, and the trafficking ofsmall arms and narcotics. Many of these ideas werebased on ECOMOG’s experiences in Liberia, SierraLeone, and Guinea-Bissau.

Since it has already undertaken three military missions,it is important to discuss ECOWAS’ military arm inmore detail. The ECOWAS Mechanism calls for theestablishment of a brigade-size standby force,consisting of specially trained and equipped units ofnational armies, ready for deployment at short notice.The force’s main tasks involve observation andmonitoring, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention,enforcement of sanctions and embargoes, preventivedeployment, peacebuilding operations, disarmamentand demobilization, and policing activities includinganti-smuggling and anti-criminal activities. These weremany of the tasks that ECOMOG performed in Liberiaand Sierra Leone. The proposed subregional force isexpected to embark on periodic training exercises toenhance the cohesion of the troops and the compati-bility of equipment. It will undertake exc h a n g e

programs in West African military training institutions,as well as external training involving the UN and OAU.Four thousand troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad,Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Togo and Ghana took part in wargames in the Burkinabè town of Kompienga andnorthern Togo in May 1998, with Nigeria involved inthe military planning for these exercises.

The ECOMOG force is mandated to intervene in fourcases: first, a situation of internal armed conflictwithin a member state; second, conflicts between twoor more member states; third, internal conflicts thatthreaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or pose aserious threat to subregional peace and security, andsituations that result from the overthrow or threat to ademocratically elected government; and fourth anyother situation that the council deems “appropriate”.While the first two scenarios were included in theECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance onDefense of 1981, the third scenario was a consciouseffort to provide legal cover for future interventions,again, based on the Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau experiences. In Liberia and Guinea-Bissau,ECOMOG intervened by arguing that the situationposed a humanitarian disaster and a threat tosubregional peace and security. In Sierra Leone,ECOMOG restored a democratically elected governmentto power after its overthrow by soldiers. The interven-tions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were controversialand questioned on legal grounds, even by someECOWAS members.

The ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone,and Guinea-Bissau exposed the logistical weaknessesof West Africa’s armies. For the foreseeable future,such logistical support will have to come from externaldonors until the subregion develops its own capabili-ties. The issue of financing is particularly important tothe building of ECOMOG’s standby force. The ECOWASsecurity mechanism foresees troop-contributingcountries bearing financial costs for the first threemonths of military operations, before ECOWAS takesover the costs. The initial agreement for the ECOMOGmission in Liberia was for each contingent to fund itsown troops for the first month of the mission, afterwhich time the full ECOWAS would assume responsi-bility for ECOMOG. But Nigeria ended up footing about


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90 percent of the costs (over U.S.$1.2 billion) whilefrancophone countries opposed to ECOMOG wereunwilling to contribute to a mission they did notsupport. France entirely financed the ECOMOG missionto Guinea-Bissau. Under the ECOWAS securitymechanism, a Special Peace Fund is to be establishedto raise revenue. Funding will be raised from memberstates, corporate bodies, the UN, multinational organi-zations, the OAU and the rest of the internationalcommunity.

The three ECOMOG missions demonstrated theimportance of securing financial support beforeembarking on an intervention. Such costs can prove adisincentive to future interventions in a subregionsaddled with a crippling debt burden. OA Upeacekeepers from Tanzania and Uganda withdrewfrom ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia in 1995 in largepart because their financial and logistical needs werenot being met. Other ECOWAS states, like Togo,declined to contribute troops to ECOMOG due to thecosts of maintaining peacekeepers in Liberia. TheNigerian-led OAU intervention force in Chad between1979 and 1981 was forced to withdraw largely becauseit lacked the funding and logistical support to sustainit. All these experiences underscore the significance offinancial and logistical support for future subregionalefforts at conflict management.

The ECOWAS security mechanism has so far receivedfunding from the AU and several donor governments.The OAU gave ECOWAS $300,000 for its deploymentsin Sierra Leone and Liberia. The European Union (EU)(2 million euros), the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) ($250,000) and the governmentsof the United Kingdom, Japan (U.S.$100,000) andGermany have also made contributions in support ofthe ECOWAS security mechanism. Canada hascontributed $300,000 for the establishment of anECOWAS Child Protection Unit. The government of the

Netherlands has also expressed an interest in fundingthe mechanism.

Beside ECOWAS, the Mano River Union (MRU),comprised of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone alsoworks to resolve conflict in the region, through theJoint Security Committee (JSC), which was created atthe Summit of MRU Head of State in Conakry in April2000. The JSC Committee was born out of the need toaddress the deteriorating security situation along theborders of the three MRU states. The JSC consists of aTechnical Committee and a Border Security, andConfidence-Building Unit, with a mandate to addressand monitor joint security and border issues. One ofthe first tasks undertaken by the JSC was to investigatethe persistent cross-border incursions between Guineaand Liberia. However, since the conclusion of thisinvestigation, the MRU states have not been able toimplement the recommendations made by the JSC, 78 asthe security situation along the borders betweenLiberia and Guinea has deteriorated and tensionsbetween the two countries have increased.

A further factor complicating the resolution of theLiberia/Guinea conflict is the fact that members of theJSC are parties to the dispute. More fundamentally,political differences among ECOWAS member states,relating to disagreements over conflict managementstrategies, continue to test the capacity and resolve ofE C OWAS to address conflicts in the subregion.ECOWAS leaders have often not spoken in unison onthese issues. Although ECOWAS appeared at first tosupport a plan by the international community toimpose sanctions on Liberia in 2001 in order to deterits support for Sierra Leonean RUF rebels, it later calledfor a two-month moratorium before such sanctionscould be imposed. Following the imposition ofsanctions on Liberia by the UN Security Council inMay 2001, some ECOWAS leaders have publiclyquestioned the wisdom of punishing Charles Taylor

78 Among these recommendations are: the end to the endemic problems of dissidents, armed groups and other paramilitary forcesinvolved in the destabilization of states in the subregion; the implementation of the deployment of Joint Border Security andConfidence Building Units along the common borders of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea; the facilitation of the repatriation ofrefugees to their respective countries of origin; the reestablishment of the free movement of goods and people; and the creation ofan effective program on information education and communication on the culture of peace and the objectives of subregional integra-tion. See the Mano River Union, Press Release, Mano River Union Joint Security Committee Meeting, 23 August 2001,http://www.sierra-leone.org/mru082301.html.



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while seeking his cooperation for the disarmament ofRUF rebels in Sierra Leone. We next turn to the role ofSADC in managing regional conflicts.

3.3 The Southern African Development Community(SADC)

An understanding of the role of the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community in responding to conflictsand crises is impossible without recognizing a keyfeature of security in this subregion: the overwhelmingmilitary and financial preponderance of South Africa.79

SADC’s predecessor, the Southern AfricanDevelopment Coordination Conference (SADCC), wasestablished in 1980 specifically to counter theeconomic, military and political dominance of SouthAfrica. While its creation symbolically signaled a shiftfrom defense against apartheid to regional cooperation,the specter of South African economic and militarypower continues to affect the dynamics within SADC.

SADC set itself an ambitious regional developmentagenda:80 working toward creating a free trade area;establishing frameworks to ensure macroeconomicstability; facilitating financial and capital markets;encouraging public-private partnerships (PPPs); andbuilding regional infrastructure. Thus far, this commit-ment has remained largely rhetorical. While someprogress has been made on bilateral (and in rare casesmultilateral) cooperation on specific issues (such asaspects of cross-border policing), progress towardregional integration remains minimal.

The entire SADC Secretariat currently stands at onlyfifty persons—this includes professional and supportstaff. SADC is therefore clearly both understaffed andoverstretched. Only about five officers are directlyinvolved in SADC’s security work. The organizationenvisaged that, after the completion of an ongoingrestructuring process, its staff would be increased totwo hundred people. But this is more a medium- to

long-term goal. In the short term, SADC is aiming toincrease its staff to sixty people. On the issue offunding, SADC member states, through the SADC Fundand other regional funds, are responsible for theoperational costs of its Secretariat. As with otherregional organizations in Africa, however, SA D Cmembers do not always pay their dues on time or infull, and eighty percent of SADC funding comes fromexternal donors, largely from the European Union (EU).

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security81

Since its creation in 1996, the SADC Organ on Politics,Defense and Security (OPDS) has not achieved much interms of promoting collective security in the region. Itsstrategic vision on how to address the insecurity facingsouthern Africa is still undefined, and it has beenwrecked by divisions among its members. The organremains captive to the political rivalry between SouthAfrica and Zimbabwe, countries which represented thetwo opposing conceptions of the functioning of theorgan. Zimbabwe felt that incorporating securitywithin the SADC Secretariat in Botswana, rather thanleaving it as a specialized task for the chair in Harare,would divert the organization’s attention from its mainobjective of economic development and integration. Incontrast, South Africa argued that the organ should beplaced within the structure of the SADC and run by theSADC chair.

These differences have paralyzed the operation of theOPDS. At the SADC summit in August 1997, PresidentNelson Mandela of South Africa, then acting Chairmanof the organization, threatened to resign from theSADC chairmanship if the OPDS was not broughtunder the central SADC chair. This dispute betweenMandela and Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe,who had held the chair of the SADC organ since itscreation, led the SADC summit to suspend the organ.SADC leaders then appointed a committee composed ofa “troika” of Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia to

79 See, Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects, (New York: International Peace Academy,Gaborone, December 2000).80 Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa, Draft discussion document on a framework for co-operation with the countries in thesouthern African region (Pretoria, 1997).81 This section is based partly on Agostinho Zacarias, “The New Security Thinking Six Years Post-Apartheid: Where Are We?” paperprepared for the conference on Southern Africa’s Evolving Architecture: Prospects and Problems, Gaborone, December 2000.



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identify a suitable solution to this problem. The SADCTreaty provides little direction in resolving thisproblem since it does not contain any details about thenature and functioning of a security organ. Since 1997SADC has struggled to find a solution to this impasse.Two main proposals emerged: first, to transform theorgan into separate committees and work on an ad hocbasis to integrate the organ into the SADC frameworkunder a deputy chairperson from one of the troikacountries; and second, to operate the organ on thebasis of specific protocols signed by member states.The SADC summit held in 2001 finally rotated thechairmanship of the organ from Zimbabwe toMozambique.

With the paralysis of the organ, SADC’s InterstateDefense and Security Committee (IDSC), established inthe mid-1980s, often coordinated SADC’s securityefforts. SADC leaders proposed the establishment of abrigade-level standby force to which member stateswould contribute with units and Headquarters staff tointervene in regional conflicts. But progress on thisissue has remained stalled. SADC states did, however,undertake joint military exercises called “OperationBlue Crane,” funded by EU states. SADC has alsoundertaken police operations involving Mozambique,South Africa, and Zambia.

The SADC organ needs to be operationalized andstrengthened if the organization is to play an effectiverole in conflict management. Dealing with securityrequires addressing three main issues. First, a commonvision of security must be nurtured and strengthenedwithin SADC. This can be facilitated through thesigning of defense and non-aggression pacts,promoting the protection of human rights, having amoratorium to limit arms smuggling, and creatingpacts for environmental protection and the protectionof vulnerable groups during conflicts. Second, theregion needs to embark on institutional development at

both national and subregional levels to implement andmonitor the various accords established by SADC.Finally, SADC must set priorities, establish a programof action in security matters, and draw up a calendarto be ratified by national governments.82

South Africa: The Giant on the Limpopo

South Africa has the largest, most diversified andadvanced economy in the region with a GDP threetimes that of Nigeria and Egypt.83 It possesses a modernfinancial and industrial sector with exc e l l e n tinfrastructure and accounts for some eighty percent ofthe region’s economic output.84 Trade flows between itand the rest of Southern Africa are disproportionatelyin Pretoria’s favor at a ratio of four to one. SouthAfrica possesses the fourth largest electricity utility inthe world, ESKOM, and accounts for sixty percent ofAfrica’s electricity generation. Its military is larger andbetter equipped than that of any of its neighbors,although military sophistication should not beconfused with military readiness, as South Africa’sintervention in Lesotho in 1998 clearly demonstrated.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), whichsupplies some of its members with almost fifty percentof their government’s revenues, will be undermined bythe newly negotiated Free Trade Pact between SouthAfrica and the EU. Notably, Botswana, Lesotho,Namibia and Swaziland will lose 3.5 billion Rand ayear.85 The South Africa/EU pact could also have afundamental bearing on SADC, forcing states to makesubstantial adjustments to cope with the new traderegime. Some analysts argue that the likely negativeeconomic spin-offs of the agreement for SouthernAfrica may make it more difficult to negotiateequitable SACU and SADC economic relations.86 Thissituation has generated tension between South Africaand its neighbors, most of whose economies dependoverwhelmingly on Pretoria. SADC states are vulner-

82 Ibid.83 Editors Incorporated, South Africa 1997–1998, South Africa at a Glance: History, Politics, Economy, Trade, Tourism, Statistics,1998.84 Ibid.85 Business Day, 22 April 1999.86 Balefi Tsie, Paul Goodison and Steve Kibble, Trading Blows: Southern Africa, South Africa and Europe: The Post-Apartheid Era(Powa Park: CIIR Briefing, 1998), pp. 3–5.



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able to the penetration of South African capital, partic-ularly since its democratic transition between 1990 and1994.

This economic dominance tends to undermine a spiritof subregional cooperation within SADC, with otherstates expressing skepticism about Pretoria’s profes-sions of not wanting to bully or dominate itsneighbors. In the case of relations between SouthAfrica and Zimbabwe, SADC’s second largest economy,tensions emanating from the failure of NelsonMandela’s government between 1994 and 1999 torenew an existing bilateral preferential tradeagreement contributed to an atmosphere of tensionthat spilled over into disputes over the chairmanship ofSADC. It remains to be seen if the SADC TradeProtocol, establishing an asymmetrical Free Trade Areawithin the region, can help reverse the economicimbalances feeding such tensions.

The resulting tensions between South Africa and itsneighbors87 have complicated the attempt by thissubregion to cooperate in managing and resolvingconflicts that have affected its member states in placeslike Angola, DRC and Lesotho. SADC continues toconfront problems in its efforts at extendingd e m o c r a c y, maintaining peace, and strengtheningweak states. In recent times, attempts to address thesechallenges have tended to highlight divisions andrivalries among SADC members. South Africa has alsoexperienced challenges from regional rivals likeZimbabwe and Angola.

SADC: A House Balkanized?

Southern Africa is a deeply divided subregion, asituation that threatens stability in the SA D Csubregion. These tensions and threats have forcedSADC to prioritize political cooperation and conflictresolution over economic integration. The moststriking example is the war in the DRC, following itsadmission to SADC in 1997, which has polarizedSADC. Although SADC states remain theoreticallycommitted to cooperation, their solidarity andcohesion is frayed and may be beyond repair, at least

in the short term. The conflict in the DRC has splitSADC into at least three groupings.

The first group consists of countries seen as theproponents of democracy in SADC: South Africa,Botswana, and Mozambique. Apart from theirdemocratic credentials, these states are bound by closeeconomic relationships. While this group of states hasas its objective the promotion of democracy, respect forhuman rights and the political settlement of disputes,their pursuit of these goals is inhibited by fear ofdominance by South Africa and the failure to build aneffective regional coalition. These states declined tosupport military engagement in the Congo, arguingthat only an inclusive political settlement could resolvethe conflict, a theme often repeated by Pretoria in itsresponse to African conflicts. However, South Africaand Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho in 1998,reviving, despite Botswana’s participation in theexercise, fears of South Africa’s “giantism” and accusa-tions of “double standards” from rival SADC camps,given Pretoria’s refusal to intervene militarily inCongo.

The second group of countries consists of Zimbabwe,Namibia, and Angola—states that intervened militarilyin the DRC to prevent the toppling of Laurent Kabila byUgandan- and Rwandan-backed rebels in 1998. Thesethree countries seem to be united by what theyperceive to be the continuation of South Africa’sapartheid policies. This is illustrated by Zimbabwe’sclaim that after ten years of fighting in Mozambiquealongside Frelimo against the apartheid regime, SouthAfrica is reaping the benefits of peace by securinglarge investments in that country. Mugabe has alsoattempted to maintain his subregional influence, whichhe felt was threatened by the emergence of a black-ledgovernment in South Africa in 1994. Even after theassassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001, Mugabeembraced Joseph Kabila and continued to exercisesignificant influence in the DRC.

As further evidence of the balance-of-power politicsthat continues to play itself out in the southern andcentral African subregions, Angola has a strong

87 Chris Landsberg and Claude Kabemba, South Africa Diplomacy: Ten Lessons from Africa, CPS policy brief, 2 May 1998.



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security interest in opposing South Africa’s foreignpolicy. Despite the strong ties between the AfricanNational Congress (ANC) and Angola’s ruling MPLA,built up during the years of struggle against apartheid,bilateral relations between Pretoria and Luanda sinceSouth Africa’s 1994 elections have been less cordialthan expected. The Movimento Popular de Libertasãode Angola (MPLA) saw the continuation of the supplyof arms from South Africa to territory held by UniãoNacional pela Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)as a betrayal, and this has been a source of tensionbetween the two governments.8 8 Contrary to thewidespread belief that Angola’s concern in the DRCrelated exclusively to its security, there are clearindications that economic interests are high on theagenda: Angola, whose troops occupy the oil towns onthe DRC’s coast, has formed a joint oil-explorationcompany with the Kinshasa government calledSonangol-Congo. Namibia’s involvement in the DRCwar is based on its close security and political relation-ship with Angola and Zimbabwe forged during thestruggle for independence in all three countries.

The third group of states in SADC comprises “neutral”SADC members: Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius,Seychelles, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi. Mauritiusand Seychelles do not feel the direct impact of theconflicts in the subregion. Malawi, Lesotho, andSwaziland are too small militarily, financially, and interms of human resources to be able to play an influen-tial “balance-of-power” role in SADC. Zambia andTanzania share borders with the DRC and are directlyaffected by the conflicts. Though Zambia was reportedto have provided free passage to pro-Kabila rebels,enabling them to attack areas in southern Congoduring the first rebellion that ousted Mobutu in 1997,Lusaka has since refused to take sides in the conflict.Former Zambian leader Frederick Chiluba emerged as akey mediator in the conflict. Three reasons best explainthis situation. First, Chiluba was constrained fromsupporting Kabila, as his domestic political opponentscould have linked such support to his perceivedCongolese origins. Second, the Chiluba governmentwas keen to maintain Zambia’s international prestige

built up during Kenneth Kaunda’s twenty-seven-yearleadership. Third, Chiluba recognized that the DRC warwould be long, costly and unsustainable. WithAngolan president Eduardo Dos Santos accusingZambia of aiding late UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi inAngola’s civil conflict, the relationship betweenLuanda and Lusaka was another weak link in SADC’ssecurity chain.

The interventions by SADC states in the DRC andLesotho and their nonintervention in Angola haverevealed fundamental differences of perception andconduct in the security arena within SADC. Intervenersin Congo and Lesotho have claimed that their interven-tions were legitimized by SADC. But in both cases,there were disputes over SADC legitimization of theinterventions. The two military interventions highlightSADC’s weakness as a guarantor of peace and securityin the subregion. For many observers, this confirms thefear that SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defense andSecurity can be used as a political tool by subregionalleaders to pursue their own narrowly defined interests.

Several SADC states portrayed the Angolan conflict asa clash between “good” and “evil,” between an electedMPLA government committed to peace and UNITA, arecalcitrant guerrilla movement. In reality, the conflictwas one between two elites, one of which (the MPLA)has a near monopoly on oil, while the other (UNITA)had a seemingly unlimited supply of diamonds. Theepicenter of this conflict repeatedly spilled overAngola’s borders. SADC’s inability to contain orresolve the conflict until Savimbi’s death in February2002 had threatened subregional stability.

Challenges for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

Conflict over water resources in Southern Africaremains a potential source of future conflicts becausewater is in short supply even as the subregion isexperiencing increasing population growth.89 AlreadyNamibia and Botswana are engaged in serious disputesover shared water sources. South Africa uses someeighty percent of water consumed in Southern Africa.

88 Sunday Independent, 20 September 1999.89 African Development Bank, Economic Integration in Southern Africa, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 189–181.



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Pretoria also shares many rivers with neighboringcountries, thereby increasing the potential for futurec o n f l i c t s .9 0 A further source of conflict—overgemstones—might emerge in SADC. Diamonds crossthe Angola-Zambia border with impunity and are, forsome informal dealers, a key source of income. Here,and perhaps in other areas of economic activity, effortsat more effective control could lead to conflictsbetween states and could also involve diamond traders.

The security environment in Southern Africa remainsfluid, and the DRC conflict remains the greatestchallenges confronting SADC and its embryonicsecurity architecture. Joseph Kabila’s succession to theleadership of the Kinshasa government following hisfather’s assassination in January 2001 has presentedthe greatest challenge to the subregion. Althoughwithdrawals of foreign troops from areas in the DRChave begun and UN peacekeepers have been deployed,there remains uncertainty about the commitment of thegovernment in Kinshasa and other parties toimplement the Lusaka accord of 1999. Without thebacking of Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibiantroops the balance of military power in Congo wouldshift to the Rwandan-backed faction of the RCD and tothe Ugandan-backed faction of Jean Pierre Bemba’sCongolese Liberation Front (FCL). The UN reportdetailing the plundering of the DRC’s resources byRwanda and Uganda,91 and Ugandan leader YoweriMuseveni’s threat to opt out of the Lusaka peaceprocess, further complicated the peace process in theDRC. The FCL appears to have strengthened its positionwith its reported pact with the Mai Mai aimed atpolicing and pacifying the DRC’s northeastern borderwith Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

Ironically, the improving prospects for peace in theCongo are not a guarantee of regional stability. This isparticularly true in the case of the Congo’s neighbors,Rwanda and Burundi. If peace breaks out in the Congo,rebels from both countries fighting in the DRC are

likely to take their wars back home so that “anyCongolese deal could spell trouble for Congo’s smallerneighbors.”92 This carries the unsettling possibility ofdestabilizing both countries and leading to a regionalconflagration. This situation would seem to require aneed to link the Lusaka peace process to that of theCentral Africa and Great Lakes regions.

An accelerated peace process in the DRC should enableZimbabwe to undertake an honorable exit from acommitment that has exacerbated that country’seconomic decline. But it is not clear whether bringingthe troops back home would contribute to or detractfrom Zimbabwe’s internal tensions. The genuine landissue in Zimbabwe has been manipulated by the rulingZANU-PF as a way of remaining in power at all costs93.It does appear though that SADC is graduallydisengaging from Mugabe’s leadership by its decisionin 2001 to rotate the chairmanship of the SADC Organon Politics, Defense and Security and to replaceZimbabwe with Mozambique. Continuing instability inZimbabwe following controversial elections in March2002, which saw Mugabe retain power, are a contin-uing source of concern.

3.4 The Economic Community of Central AfricanStates (ECCAS)

Recognizing the need to cooperate to solve commonproblems within a wider subregional grouping, themember states of the Central African Customs andEconomic Union created in 1981, and of the defunctEconomic Community of the Great Lakes States(CEPGL), combined to establish the EconomicCommunity of Central African States in 1983.Conceived as a tool to pursue economic development,promote regional cooperation and establish a CentralAfrican Common Market, ECCAS brought togethereleven countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CentralAfrican Republic, Chad, Congo, Brazaville, DemocraticRepublic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,

90 The Star, 13 February 1999, 25 February 1999, 7 March 1999; Beeld, 22 February 1999; Center for Policy Studies, South Africa,Quarterly Trends, April 1999.91 UN, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001.92 “Burundi: Talking Peace and Waging War,” The Economist, 24–30 March 2001, p. 53.93 See, “Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe” (New York: International Peace Academy, 25 February, 2002).



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Rwanda, and São Tomé and Principe. In an attempt toaddress the perennial conflicts in Central Africa,ECCAS leaders decided to create an Early Wa r n i n gMechanism in 1996. At a meeting in Libreville in1997, called to discuss the political crisis in what wasthen Zaire, ECCAS leaders proposed the idea of aninterstate security cooperation mechanism for theprevention and management of conflicts in thesubregion. The aim of the mechanism was to establisha legal and institutional framework to promote andstrengthen peace and security in central Africa.Thereafter the Conseil de Paix et de Securité del ’Afrique Centrale ( C O PAX) was established under theauspices of the UN standing committee for SecurityQuestions in Central Africa. COPAX had a dualmandate: to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts inCentral Africa; to undertake any necessary action todeal effectively with political conflicts; and topromote, preserve and consolidate peace and securityin the subregion9 4.

Over the years, however, technical problems associ-ated with creating ECCAS’s structures, coupled withthe pursuit of narrow national interests, have blocke dthe effective operation of the security mechanism.ECCAS members, for instance, do not agree on therelationship between ECCAS, COPAX and its EarlyWarning Mechanism. Some states argue that sinceECCAS is a weak organization, the securitymechanism should be an independent body, whileothers advocate that the mechanism work withinexisting institutions. This suggests a general lack ofpolitical will among countries in a region afflicted byconflicts. The political and security environment inCentral Africa has made it difficult for ECCAS tobecome institutionalized as a regional organization.States in the subregion have responded to this failureby seeking membership in alternative subregionalorganizations. For instance, the DRC is a member ofSADC, while Burundi and Rwanda have applied tojoin the East African Community. Any revitalization

of ECCAS would have to resolve how to deal success-fully with multiple memberships of regional organi-zations, a phenomenon that is not peculiar to thiss u b r e g i o n .

3.5 The Common Market for Eastern and SouthernAfrica (COMESA)

Established in 1994, the Common Market for Easternand Southern Africa was the successor organization tothe Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and SouthernAfrica. COMESA is currently Africa’s largest intergov-ernmental organization, with twenty members:Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt,Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan,Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.9 5

COMESA seeks to create a fully integrated and compet-itive region where goods, services, capital and peoplemove freely. But the organization has increasinglyacknowledged the importance of peace and security ascritical components in regional integration. COMESA iscurrently developing a peace and security policy toenhance its overall objectives.96 At its fourth summit inAugust 1999, COMESA decided to deal with the manydevastating conflicts among its member states withoutcompromising its agenda of economic developmentand subregional integration or duplicating the work ofother organizations.

The COMESA summit in 2000 linked the issue ofsustainable development to peace and security. Thismeeting discussed the resources needed to address thecauses of conflicts, and sought to draw lessons fromother subregional organizations in Africa engaged invarious aspects of conflict management. Beforedesigning their strategy, COMESA leaders requested itssecretariat to develop a coordination mechanism withthe OAU and Africa’s subregional organizations and torecommend a division of labor and responsibilitiesbetween different subregional institutions in order to

94 See Musifiky Mwanasali, “Politics and Security in Central Africa”, African Journal of Political Science, Vol.4 No.2, 1999.95 Tanzania withdrew from COMESA in 2000, citing various reasons including the challenge of meeting its financial obligations tomultiple organizations with similar objectives.96 Stephen Karangizi and Mwansa J Musonda, “The Institutional Framework of COMESA,” in Victor Murinde (ed.), The Free TradeArea of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Bodmin, Cornwall: MPG Books, 2001). COMESA’s role in the mainte-nance of peace and security is derived from Article 163 of its Treaty.



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avoid duplication of tasks.97 COMESA leaders insistedduring its 2000 summit that other stake h o l d e r s ,including NGOs, civil society, the business community,and parliamentarians, be involved in the developmentof a viable security policy in East and Southern Africa.This initiative led to the first COMESA Workshop on“The Role of the Private Sector, the NGOs and the CivilSociety in the Promotion of Peace and Security in theC O M E SA Subregion.” Recommendations from thisworkshop form an integral part of the COMESA policyon peace and security.

In order to execute its policy, COMESA developed athree-tier structure9 8 consisting firstly of the Bureau,made up of Heads of State and Government, as thesupreme policy organ responsible for peace and securityissues. The second body, the Bureau of Ministers ofForeign Affairs on Peace and Security, meets once ayear to consider ways of promoting peace and securityin the COMESA region. Under the rules and procedureof the Authority, the Bureau of Ministers is to carry outthe function of conflict prevention and resolution. Itperforms these tasks taking into account the need toconsult the Central Organ of the OAU/AU Mechanismfor Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolutionand other African subregional organizations. COMESA’ sCouncil of Ministers is its second highest policy organand makes policy decisions on its programs and activi-ties, including monitoring and reviewing its financialand administrative management. The third body, theCommittee of Officials on Peace and Security,comprising high-level officials of regional Ministries ofForeign Affairs, meets regularly to ensure the effectivedischarge of COMESA’s security responsibilities.

The COMESA secretariat initiates actions, convenesmeetings and utilizes information from nongovern-mental sources in its security work. The secretariatu n d e r t a kes research and studies as a basis forimplementing the decisions adopted by its policyorgans. COMESA’s Secretary-General, assisted by twoAssistant Secretaries-General, directs its security

operations. The Office of the Secretary-Generalincludes the Legal and Institutional Affairs Division, aStrategic Planning and Research Section, a PublicRelations Unit, and an Audit Section. A consultant hasbeen hired to undertake the COMESA Peace andSecurity Study with the assistance of a legal adviser. Asthe policy on peace and security is fairly new and stillawaiting further input from other actors such asparliamentarians, there is no staff in the COMESAsecretariat responsible solely for peace and securityissues. A major challenge for COMESA is to begin tooperationalize its peace and security policy. It will needurgently to increase its staff to achieve this goal. Theorganization’s security mechanism is still very much awork in progress.

3.6 The Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopment (IGAD)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought andDesertification (IGADD), comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia,Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, was established in1986. Eritrea joined after its independence in 1993.Initially IGADD was established to act as an earlywarning mechanism for alerting the internationalcommunity of impending humanitarian emergenciesand to coordinate resources in responding to crises onthe Horn of Africa. Cooperation was thus confined toissues of drought, desertification and food security.IGADD avoided addressing issues related to militarysecurity, then conceived as a prerogative of individualstates and, therefore, as falling outside the arena ofcollective action.99 However, as insecurity continued tocurtail economic, social and political developments,IGADD member states started to confront theseproblems collectively. Out of these efforts emerged adecision to begin to transform the security architecturein the subregion. In March 1996, subregional leaderssigned an agreement transforming IGADD into theIntergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).The organization’s mandate was expanded to includeconflict management, prevention and resolution.

97 This study was supported by funds from USAID/REDSO/ESA, the EU, JICA, GTZ and UNHCR.98 COMESA, Report of the First Meeting of the COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 27–28 April 2000, Lusaka, Zambia.99 Security cooperation remained at a bilateral level with signing of military alliances and pacts. However, these arrangementsremained fluid and often were violated.



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Under the new agreement, IGAD prioritized the pursuit ofpeace and security, and had as its principal aim themaintenance of peace, security and stability on the Hornof Africa. Specifically, the agreement provided for: thecreation of a subregional mechanism for the prevention,management and resolution of inter- and intrastateconflicts through dialogue;10 0 and collective action topreserve peace, security and stability, defined as anessential prerequisite for economic development andsocial progress. The agreement proposed dealing withconflicts by eliminating threats to security; called for theestablishment of a mechanism for consultation andcooperation for the pacific settlement of disputes; andagreed to deal with disputes among member states withinthe subregion before referring them to other regional orinternational organizations. Demonstrating unprece-dented political commitment, IGAD states pledgedthemselves to resolving outstanding security problemsand conflicts, and to preserving subregional stability.

In seeking security and peace, IGAD pursued a dual-track approach. To deal with conflicts likely to polarizethe organization, IGAD often creates semiautonomousad hoc mechanisms, outside of its Secretariat, whichare then mandated to deal with a particular issue. Thesecretariat on the Sudan Peace Process, based inNairobi, is one such mechanism. The process that led tothe restoration of a transitional government in Somaliain 1999 was another such mechanism. IGAD’s secondpeacemaking track revolves around its secretariat inDjibouti, which addresses issues on which its membershave forged a consensus, such as the establishment ofa Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism(CEWARN) (discussed below), a campaign against smallarms, and a diverse range of humanitarian issues.

The Sudan Peace Process

In 1993, IGAD leaders established a StandingCommittee of Foreign Ministers of Eritrea, Ethiopia,Kenya and Uganda to draw up an agenda and programof work for a negotiated peace settlement in Sudan.The following year, Kenya was mandated to chair thiscommittee and led the drafting of the Declaration of

Principles (DOP), adopted by the parties as a basis fornegotiations.101 However, the effective working of thiscommittee was stalled by disputes over the question ofthe separation of state and religion and the right toself-determination of the South. This stalematecontinued until 1997 when IGAD convened an extraor-dinary summit to revive the peace process. Thismeeting led to several positive developments, four ofwhich are particularly significant. First, the IGADPartners Forum (IPF), composed of Norway, the UnitedStates, Canada and the EU, agreed to fund the peaceprocess. Second, the parties to the conflict committedthemselves to the self-determination of the Southwithin an (unspecified) interim period, supervised byinternational observers. Third, both sides agreed tofacilitate the free and unimpeded flow of humanitarianassistance to areas affected by famine. Fourth, it wasagreed that the boundaries of southern Sudan would beset at those existing on 1 January 1956. However, theparties in Sudan disagreed over the interpretation ofthe Declaration of Principles, stalling the implementa-tion of the peace accord.

To ensure continued engagement with the parties tothe conflict, IGAD leaders established a secretariat forthe Sudan peace process, otherwise referred to as theNairobi secretariat, in 1999. Seeking to engage at bothpolitical and technical levels, the secretariat createdtwo committees: a political committee that seeks toreach a political settlement, and a transitionalcommittee to deal with interim arrangements prior tothe exercise of self-determination by southern Sudan.

In spite of these initial steps, the ability of the NairobiSecretariat to resolve the Sudan conflict is limited byseveral constraints. Among the greatest challenges is thelack of expertise within the committees to interpret thetechnical details of areas of agreement and points ofdifference in the Declaration of Principles. Pa r t i c u l a r l yproblematic are issues related to the relationshipbetween the state and religion; the delineation ofborders; self-administration; and the sharing of wealthand power. For instance, in the first meeting thatexplored the question of wealth-sharing, agreement was

100 Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, 21 March1996.101 The SPLA/M signed on the DOPs in 1994, while the government of Sudan withheld its signatory until 1997.



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reached about an equitable distribution of resourcesbetween North and South Sudan. However, this plan wasnever fully elaborated and led to two contradictoryinterpretations by both sides. The position of the SudanPeoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) is thatthere should be a halt to the drilling of oil. The govern-ment of Sudan, which refuses to cease oil drilling,prefers to share the proceeds from oil exploration withthe SPLA, an offer the latter rejects. Any further negoti-ations will require assisting the parties to reach acommon interpretation and understanding of this issue.

The Nairobi secretariat receives limited support fromDjibouti and relies on third-party support, in particularthe IGAD Partners Forum. However, resources havebeen insufficient, averaging $1 million between 1999and 2000. This lack of funding has greatly limited thesecretariat’s activities. Although the IGAD PartnersForum reiterated its support for the Sudan peaceprocess in June 2000 (Oslo) and March 2001 (Rome), itfailed until April 2002 to provide substantial funds tothe process. Responding to this constraint, IGADleaders have agreed to allow the secretariat toundertake its own fundraising.

In addition to being cash-strapped, the Nairobisecretariat has to contend with an inflexible structurein using its available funds. IPF funds are earmarkedfor costs related to facilitating meetings and cannot beused for any activities. These funds cannot pay forresource persons, consultations, and gathering ofinformation, all necessary for IGAD’s preparatorywork. Nor can such funds be used for diplomacy or fornegotiations before and after meetings. This type offunding limits the operations of the secretariat which,owing to its limited capacity, must depend oncontracted resource persons. Furthermore, thissituation denies the secretariat the flexibility it needsto take advantage of opportunities in the Sudan peaceprocess. The short-term disbursement of funds, inperiods of between three to six months, furtheraccentuates the effects of limited resources.

Institutionally, the Nairobi secretariat lacks structuresto support negotiations. It comprises three core staff:the special envoy and two rapporteurs. While IGAD

ambassadors in Nairobi and advisers from thecountries designated to guide the peace process alsosupport the core staff, their input is small. Further,coordination is poor between the IGAD secretariat inDjibouti, and the Nairobi secretariat. IGAD proceduresrequire that the Special Envoy report to IGAD ForeignAffairs ministers, who then report to the IGAD Counciland Summit, leaving the secretariat out of the chain ofcommand. The disbursement of funds for the NairobiSecretariat also comes through Djibouti, creating majortensions between the two institutions.

The secretariat needs to have funds for core expendi-ture, in particular to pay the salaries of its main staff.In June 2001, staff had not received salaries for fivemonths and their morale was very low. Resources arealso required to enable the Special Envoy to travel andmobilize support for the peace process. Currently, theSecretariat is in need of experts to advise on borders,on models of governance such as federalism or confed-eracy, and on the sharing of resources. Such a pool ofexperts would make it possible for the secretariat to puttogether a variety of consultants who can, at shortnotice, undertake studies and in-depth analyses ofissues.

Seeking Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia

Following the failed international effort to restorepeace to Somalia in the early 1990s, responsibility forending the Somali civil war increasingly came to reston subregional actors. Compared to the Sudan peaceprocess, the Somali process was fluid and lessstructured. However, this process did reveal thepotential of state and civil society actors playingcomplementary peacebuilding roles. Between 1991 and1998, a dozen failed attempts were made to restorepeace to Somalia. Finally, in October 1998, in cooper-ation with the IGAD Forum Partners Liaison Group,IGAD member states created a Standing Committee onthe Somali peace process, chaired by Ethiopia. Basedon the format of the Sudan peace process, thiscommittee was mandated to organize a peace processin Somalia by providing a consultative forum fornegotiations aimed at reconciliation and restoration ofa government in Somalia. 102

102 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, United Nations, (S/1992/882 ,16, August, 1992) Section II, A, para. 6.



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The ensuing process involved initial consultationsamong state and intergovernmental actors, namelyIGAD, the Arab League, the OAU and the UN, as wellas a broad spectrum of Somalis including clanleaders, Muslim clerics, warlords and members of civils o c i e t y. From March through to May 2000, a series ofconsultations with Somali intellectuals, professionals,former politicians and representatives from thebusiness community was organized in Djibouti byIGAD. The last of these meetings involved 200 Somalitraditional leaders and 100 women delegates. TheSomali National Peace Conference took place on 4June 2000, in Arta, Djibouti. This meeting identifiedarms control, disarmament of militias, restoration oflooted property, and determining the status ofMogadishu as priority issues. Special committees werecreated to address each issue.10 3 By the time thenational peace conference ended on 13 August 2000,a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), composed of245 members, had been established.10 4 A week later,members of the TNA elected Mr. Abdul-Kassim SalatHassan as president of Somalia. After his inaugura-tion in Djibouti, Salat moved his government toMogadishu. Shortly thereafter, a new legislativeassembly and a cabinet were formally established.10 5

The government continues to face serious difficulties,including the challenging of its authority by warlordscontrolling different areas in Mogadishu and thenonparticipation of representatives from Somalilandand Puntland. Despite these problems, Somalia was

readmitted to IGAD during its November 2000s u m m i t .

The IGAD Conflict Early Warning and ResponseMechanism (CEWARN)

The IGAD secretariat’s work in the peace and securityfield is located in two divisions, namely the ConflictPrevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR)division and the Humanitarian Affairs division.10 6 F o u rcritical projects have emerged within the CPMR since1996. The first, focusing on the strengthening of capacitywithin the IGAD secretariat and of key actors withinmember states, is funded by the EU and the governmentof Sweden.107 The second project deals with demobiliza-tion and post-conflict reconstruction, including thecontrol of illicit trafficking in small arms and lightweapons. Conducted in partnership with Saferworld, thisactivity is funded by the UK’s Department forInternational Development (DFID) to the tune of 300,000pounds sterling. The third project seeks to promote aculture of peace and tolerance on the Horn of Africa. Thefourth, and by far the most developed project, is thedevelopment of IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning andResponse Mechanism, which requires closer scrutiny.

Keen to address crises before they erupt into full-blownconflicts, IGAD Heads of State mandated the secretariatin Djibouti to establish a Conflict Early Warning andResponse Mechanism in 1998.10 8 Following this

103 In one such situation where disputes over political representation threatened to derail the process, President Guelleh intervenedpersonally. See for example, Mohamed-Siad Doualeh, The Djibouti-Led Process: A People-Led Experiment: Towards the Making of aNew Somalia, Concept Paper for the CEWARN II Meeting in Kampala, 11–12 September 2000.104 Mohamed-Siad Doualeh, The Djibouti-Led Process: A People-Led Experiment: Towards the Making of a New Somalia, ConceptPaper for the CEWARN II Meeting (Kampala, Uganda, 11–12 September 2000) p. 10.105 While some Somalis support the new government, several warlords are opposed to what they see as a “foreign-installed” govern-ment, which they dismiss as a sham.106 These are housed in the Department of Political and Humanitarian Affairs, one of the three priority areas identified by the 1996Treaty. The other two are Economic Development and Agriculture, Food Policy and Environmental Protection.107 This phase was led by Professor Lionel Cliffe, and Professor John Markakis (Conflict Analyst Specialist), both of the Conflict,Disasters and Development Group, Center for Development Studies, University of Leeds. For details of this assessment, see InceptionReport of the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study to IGAD, March 2001.108 This initiative, based on the partnership between a subregional organization and nongovernmental actors in creating a securitymechanism, is a first on the continent. In an edited volume titled Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa:Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 2001), Cirû Mwaûra and Susanne Schmeidl (eds.),who were members of the FEWER team involved in the process, document the issues, processes and principles that influenced thedesign of the CEWARN initiative.



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decision, the secretariat contracted the Forum on EarlyWarning and Early Response (FEWER)109 as its partnerin March 2000 to establish the mechanism. Thisprocess led to three CEWARN workshops. The first, heldin July 2000, drew participants from a wide range ofstate and nonstate actors and discussed conceptualissues related to developing the early warning system.A decision was reached to contract consultants from allIGAD states to reflect on the recommendations fromthe workshop. The consultants were mandated to:identify national systems of early warning and conflictmanagement; assess their strengths and weaknesses;and examine the possibility of linking such systems tosimilar mechanisms at the subregional, regional, andinternational levels.

The findings from the country-based studies werediscussed at the second CEWARN workshop held inSeptember 2000. Among the significant outputs of thismeeting was the identification of four entry focus areasfor IGAD’s early warning work: pastoral communitiesand cattle rustling; small arms and environmentalsecurity; peace processes; and civil society. The meetingagreed to locate national early warning systems in eachcountry’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An examination ofthe agreement establishing IGAD revealed two principalproblems: first, the treaty does not link CEWARN to otherregional and early warning systems; and second, there isno clear decision making process within both the IGADsecretariat and the CEWARN mechanism itself. TheSeptember 2000 meeting recommended engaging a teamof legal experts to examine and draw lessons from otherearly warning mechanisms, and to inform IGAD govern-ments about the legal and institutional issues related tothe establishment of CEWARN. The meeting alsorecommended the drafting of a Declaration of GeneralPrinciples on the establishment of CEWARN and aprotocol on early warning.

The third IGAD workshop on this issue was held inOctober 2000 and discussed both the Draft Declarationof Principles as well as the Draft Protocol on CEWARN.The meeting established a Bureau110 to facilitate theadoption of the CEWARN program and a DraftDeclaration and Protocol on CEWARN. The proposedCEWARN protocol was discussed by IGAD’s Council ofMinisters and signed at its summit in January 2002.Still in its infancy, the IGAD early warning systemfaces two critical challenges: shaky political will andlack of technical capacity. Given that a CEWARNsystem will be based on the availability of information,some of which is sensitive, there is no provision fordealing with a state that is unwilling to facilitate thecollection of relevant information. The chances of themechanism succeeding depend almost entirely on thepolitical cooperation of member states. Aside from theissue of political cooperation, IGAD’s early warningsystem also lacks much of the infrastuctural supportand technical capacity needed to collect and analyzerelevant information and disseminate such informationto its members. The CEWARN process has been fundedby the U.S. and German governments to the amount of$700,000.

3.7 The East African Community (EAC)

In November 1999, the Heads of State of Kenya,Uganda and Tanzania signed the treaty that reestab-lished the East African Community, which entered intoforce in July 2000. The three East African countrieshave a long history of regional cooperation datingback to the colonial period. Most significant amongthese organizations was the East African Community,which collapsed in 1977.111 The new treaty of 2000 wasdriven largely by the economic imperative to “improvethe standard of living of the population by facilitatingan adequate and economically, socially and ecologi-

109 This is a consortium of NGOs, research centers and international agencies that work in the conflict prevention field. FEWER hasas its objectives the facilitation of institutional frameworks to enhance cooperation and synergy among the providers and users ofcountry- and region-specific early warning information and analyses, as well as the development of regional capacities forcontributing to early warning and early intervention strategies.110 Mr. Alier Deng Ruai of Sudan and Mr. Teumezghi of Eritrea were unanimously elected to the positions of chairperson and rappor-teur, respectively.111 For a historical perspective of the cooperation among these countries, see Sam Tulya-Muhika, “Revival of the East African Co-operation and its Institutional Framework,” in Perspectives on Regional Integration and Cooperation in East Africa, Proceedings ofthe First Ministerial Seminar on East African Cooperation, Arusha, 25–26 March 1999, pp. 17–43.



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cally sustainable development process . . . that allowsan optimal utilization of the available resources.” Butthe EAC also recognized that security and politicalstability are a prerequisite for sustainable development.Cooperation was partly conceived by EAC leaders as astrategy for conflict prevention. In their view, regionalintegration is a vehicle for regional peace.112 Theultimate aim of EAC cooperation is the establishmentof a political federation to ensure “a peaceful neighbor-hood.”113 Underpinning the EAC treaty is the notionthat economic prosperity and regional integration willhave the multiplier effect of reducing the possibility ofconflict and enhancing security. Hence, a number ofprovisions in the treaty cast the EAC as an instrumentof regional peace and security.

Security Cooperation in the EAC

A Memorandum of Understanding on CommonDefense and Security issues was drafted by EACleaders in April 1998. At the time, it was thought thatthis memorandum could develop into a military pact.H o w e v e r, citing constraints relating to commandstructures and procedural irregularities, the Heads ofState suggested that defense matters were best leftfor the last phase of cooperation. Nonetheless theE AC secretariat in Arusha, Tanzania has engaged ina range of confidence-building measures in thesecurity sectors of its three members. While theHeads of State were reluctant to undertake commondefense initiatives, they allowed the creation of aDefense Liaison unit within the secretariat, mannedby three military defense attachés from each country.In 2000, EAC leaders signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding on Interstate Security, calling for theestablishment of border committees betweencountries that experience cross-border clashes.11 4 E ACleaders have also called for harmonizing policies onthe treatment of refugees.

The EAC secretariat has facilitated regular visits bymilitary personnel and has undertaken joint militarytraining and exercises between its members. Together,these activities have introduced minimal elements ofcommon procedure among armies with differenthistories. For instance, a series of joint natural firestraining sessions organized in 1999, 2000 and 2001enhanced the sharing of experiences and generatedcase studies to guide responses to disasters and toimprove civil-military relations. The Defense College inKaren, Kenya, which trains senior officers from anumber of countries in East, Central and SouthernAfrica, has introduced peacekeeping into itscurriculum. For students from EAC countries, suchtraining is useful for common operations and createsthe possibility of the subregion contributing a regionalforce for future peacekeeping operations.

Operationalizing a Preventive Model

The EAC secretariat is confining itself to facilitatingmeetings, selecting experts, and hosting deliberationsbetween technical personnel from the three EACcountries on issues of mutual security concern. Thismethod has two major advantages: first, it does notoverwork the lean secretariat allowing to develop,design and implement its programs; second, it ensuresthat ownership of the process remains with partnerstates. Networking between the EAC and othersubregional organizations in Africa has been limited andhas so far been confined largely to economic matters.11 5

In conflict-related issues, the EAC is attempting to learnfrom more experienced organizations such as ECOWA Sand SADC. In March 2001, EAC officials visited Abuja toconsult with their ECOWAS counterparts. The EACsecretariat has had more frequent exchanges of viewswith IGAD on a range of common security issues. Thetwo organizations have produced a draft joint protocolon Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA LW ) .

112 Interview with Francis Muthaura in August 2000.113 See East African Community, East African Community: Challenges and Opportunities: Selected Benefits and Expectations (Arusha:EAC, 2001), p. 6.114 The Kenya-Uganda border clashes involving the Pokot, Sebei, Turkana and Karamanjong communities have created generalizedinsecurity.115 For instance, interaction with SADC aims to draw lessons from the Southern African Customs Union for the EAC. The EAC is alsolooking to Caribbean countries as a model to creating an African bloc consisting of COMESA, SADC and IGAD. There are also plansto send a team to francophone West Africa to study the CFA Franc monetary zone.



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The EAC’s emphasis on conflict prevention means thatit can concentrate on a diplomatic approach toconflicts and avoid becoming embroiled in militaryconflicts. This is as much out of choice as necessity: theEAC, in any case, lacks the mechanism for dealing witharmed conflicts. The organization, however, providesan opportunity for NGOs to seek observer status inorder to enhance their participation in its work.116 Thechallenge for the EAC’s preventive model of conflictmanagement is how to change negative state attitudestoward NGOs, some of which have the potential tocomplement government efforts in the area of conflictprevention. This task will require establishing adivision of labor between the EAC secretariat, partnerstates and other actors. The EAC treaty provides forpartnerships with civil society and observer status forNGOs interested in working with the secretariat.117 TheEAC could also establish an NGO liaison office to

mediate the relationship between governments andcivil society. Currently, the EAC public relations officeis expected to coordinate NGO-related activities. Butthis office is clearly too overburdened to perform thistask effectively. There is also limited networkingbetween the EAC’s information unit and the defenseliaison unit. Furthermore, there is an urgent need tostrengthen the EAC’s outreach program, possiblythrough the hiring of an information officer whofocuses solely on NGO activities, collects informationon conflict management, and disseminates suchinformation to member states and officials.

Having assessed the seven main regional andsubregional organizations engaged in conflict manage-ment in Africa, we will now turn our attention toassessing the security capacity of semiformal organiza-tions in Africa.

116 To qualify for observer status, NGOs have to be operating regionally, have three years experience and be registered in at leasttwo of the three East African countries.117 East African Community Treaty, signed 30 November 1999, Arusha, Tanzania.



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Part Four:As s e s sing the Pe a c e b u i l d i n gCapacity of SemiformalOrganizations in Africa

This section examines the institutional capacity ofseventy-eight semiformal organizations dealing

specifically or in part with conflict management andpeacebuilding in West, Southern, Central, and the Hornof Africa. In evaluating these organizations, this sectionadheres, as much as possible, to the following criteria:the relationship between the vision and mission oforganizations and their actual performance; the extentto which the structure of organizations support theirstated objectives and activities; and the correlationbetween the perception of each organization’s needsand reality. More detailed information about theseorganizations could be found in Appendix 1.

The discussion is split into four sections correspondingto each subregion. The size, scope, and mandate ofsemiformal organizations among the four subregionsvary greatly. Thus, while the researchers haveattempted to capture and present these organizationswithin a certain framework, there are variances in thenumber of organizations covered in each subregion,and in the form of analysis used to highlight theiractivities, strategies and institutional challenges.

4.1 Semiformal Organizations in West Africa

This section on West Africa covers semiformal organi-zations in what has come to be called the Mano RiverUnion (MRU) countries (Guinea, Liberia, and SierraLeone) and Nigeria. We examined fourteen semiformalorganizations in the Mano River Union countries, fourin Guinea, four in Liberia, and five in Sierra Leone, inaddition to one subregional network. In the MRUcountries, the relationship between organizations andtheir governments varies from state to state. Oneinterviewee observed that civil society is “vibrant inSierra Leone, cohesive in Liberia, and almost insepa-rable from government in Guinea.”118 In spite of the

challenges such relations present, these organizationsare seeking to cultivate and operate within the princi-ples of impartiality, neutrality, independence andobjectivity. In Nigeria, we examined five organizations.These organizations are primarily engaged in policyresearch and consultancy, providing the intellectualinfrastructure for West Africa and to a lesser extent forother conflict spots in Africa.

These institutions, as elsewhere in Africa, areconfronted with major obstacles. The survey assessedorganizational activities, capacities and challenges. Ingeneral, we observed that the size, scale, andcomplexity of conflicts, the small core staff of theseinstitutions, and their reliance on largely unremuner-ated volunteers as well as their high turnover rate ofstaff, all severely constrain institutional capacity. Poorcommunication resulting from the dilapidated roadnetworks, telephones and other services makes itdifficult for these organizations to reach and serve awidely dispersed population. These organizations areengaged in too many activities and fail to specialize,thus accentuating their endemic financial problems.

a) Institutional Challenges for West Africa’sSemiformal Organizations

The organizations covered in West Africa share severalinstitutional challenges in implementing their conflictmanagement activities. These organizations arebuilding cohesive partnerships across borders andsectors of civil society. Several of them have broadenedtheir mandates in order to address the dynamics ofconflicts in West Africa, requiring a strengthening oftheir institutional resource base. An example of thistrend is the work of the Interfaith Council of Liberia(IFCL) which is increasingly involved in promotingdialogue, facilitating meetings among regional Headsof State, and searching for a peaceful resolution to theongoing conflicts in the Mano River basin. However,despite some innovative conflict management activi-ties in the subregion, most organizations continue tostruggle with the need for more autonomy, resourcesfor bolstering communication and in-housetechnology, and staff capacity-building.

118 Interview with David Kiazolu, Inter-Faith Council of Liberia.


Part Four: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacityof Semiformal Organizations in Africa

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Civil society actors, particularly in Guinea, continue tooperate while linked to the state. While such actorsmay be able to utilize their access to government toengage the state in conflict resolution, their limitedability to operate outside of sanctioned areas hinderstheir ability to advance the democratic and goodgovernance agenda. Another challenge of state-civilsociety relations is the ambivalence of governmentstoward externally-funded NGOs and civil societyorganizations. Organizations such as Connect Synergyin Nigeria, have had difficulties working with the OAUand ECOWAS, partly because of government distrust ofnon-state actors. To some extent, as a response to thesechallenges, several organizations have opted to createbroad horizontal linkages across various civil societysectors. The National Committee for Action andReflection for Peace in the MRU States (CORAPEM)membership has expanded to include about fiftynational civil society groups. This coping strategyhelps to increase the capacity for actors to addressbroader, perhaps more contentious issues from withincoalitions.

Among the organizations surveyed in West Africa,Nigeria’s semiformal organizations represent thecounty’s tremendous potential for policy formation.These organizations however, despite their impressiveobjectives and potential, face obstacles to producingand disseminating policy relevant research success-fully. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs(NIIA) has about 13 Research fellows and a hugelydisproportionate administrative support staff estimatedat about 150, including drivers, secretaries and guards.While the research staff has acquired new computersand now receives their salaries on time, NIIA still hasto overcome financial and technological problems,including better access to the World Wide Web. Moststaff at NIIA lack access to adequate research facilities.The institute’s library, despite being one of the best inthe country in its field, does not meet the researchneeds of its staff and more books and academicjournals are needed. In addition, NIIA staff needopportunities for further training in conflict manage-ment, resolution and prevention.

The Nigeria-based African Center for Developmentand Strategic Studies (ACDESS) is a multidisciplinarycenter comprising about fifty scholars conductingresearch on diverse policy issues affecting the Africancontinent. Notably, ACDESS is headed by Nigeria’sprominent political scientist and former ExecutiveSecretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa(ECA), Adebayo Adedeji. Presently, Professor AdebayoAdedeji works on policy and practical issues relating toconflict prevention. In particular, this research focuseson security and development issues in Africa. Recentpublications include country studies on Nigeria andSouth Africa. ACDESS’ research capacity, politicalclout, and international connections are impressive.However, its far-reaching research agenda requiresenormous resources to conduct, publicize, ands u b s e q u e n t l y, affect policy. ACDESS is furtherconstrained in its ability to influence policymakers byits remote location in the southwestern town of Ijebu-Ode. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, concerns exist about AC D E S S ’institutionalization once Professor Adebayo Adedejiretires.

The Lagos-based African Strategic and Pe a c eResearch Group (AFSTRAG ), established in 1992, is aresearch NGO concerned with strategic and humansecurity problems in Africa. The scope of AFSTRAG ’ sresearch is wide-ranging, including disarmament,defense studies, demilitarization, conflict studies,gender issues, governance, security, development andcross-border crime. AFSTRAG, in conjunction with aforum of twenty-six West African NGOs,11 9 h a se m b a r ked on a project aimed at assisting ECOWAS todevelop an early warning system. Related to this,A F S T R AG has plans to coordinate the activities ofcivil society groups to participate in the four observa-tion zones of ECOWAS’ early warning system (see partt h r e e ) .1 2 0 It plans to use satellite networks for thiswork, after establishing two coordinating offices inFreetown and Dakar. AFSTRAG is also working withE C OWAS and the Accord de Non-Aggression etd ’Assistance en Matière de Défense (ANAD) to developa common security mechanism system. In April 2000,A F S T R AG met with staff of the ANAD secretariat to

119 The forum is a West African Network for Peacebuilding which met in Abuja from 24 to 27 March 2001.120 These zones are Banjul, Cotonou, Monrovia and Ouagadougou.



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discuss plans to integrate ANAD into ECOWA S ’security mechanism. Within this framework,A F S T R AG aims to provide the ECOWAS Mediation andSecurity Council with policy options for managingsubregional conflicts.

4.2 Semiformal Organizations in Southern Africa

Semiformal organizations in Southern Africa share onecritical feature: a majority of them work very closelywith different departments and agencies of govern-ments. In some cases, particularly in South Africa, thegovernment is their sole client. This feature emanatesfrom the specific history of these countries. In SouthAfrica as in Mozambique, the current government ismade up of individuals coming from the civic sectorwho fought for political independence. The gap in thecapacity and potential of various national actors isanother critical feature. In South Africa and Namibia,and to a lesser extent in Zimbabwe, this has taken aracial form, while in Angola and Mozambique it hastaken the form of foreign versus local actors. As SouthAfrica and Mozambique entered their democratictransitions, most of the organizations in thesecountries moved to embrace broader approaches toconflict resolution beyond the race question (SouthAfrica) or the conflict management issue(Mozambique). Southern Africa is also characterized bya visible effort by national organizations to createsubregional networks and to adopt a more subregionalapproach in their outlook, often attempting to reachout and work with subregional organizations, in thiscase SADC, and related institutions in addressingconflict-related issues.

a) Institutional Challenges for Southern AfricanSemiformal Organizations

In terms of capacity, Southern Africa’s semiformalinstitutions have multiple needs. The funding sourcesfor most of these organizations are limited. Onedilemma is an over-dependence on governmentsources for funding. A limited source of funding inSouth Africa coincides with difficulty in retainingtrained staff, particularly black research talent.Generally, organizations are struggling to maintaindiversified staff (the leadership of many of the best-

endowed organizations are non-blacks) and they havealso struggled to establish a diversified funding base.Several organizations in South Africa, the mostdeveloped and best-endowed conflict managementNGO sector in Africa, have, however begun to developalternative sources of funding.

A secondary, but equally important problem inSouthern Africa is related to retaining qualified trainedstaff. In part, because of limited resources, organiza-tions have not been able to secure and retain staff atall levels. This applies to research, programmatic andadministrative staff. In addition, many organizationsshare a common trait of having a dominant executiveor senior staff, which is problematic in terms of long-term sustainability of programmatic goals andrecruiting new indigenous or black talent.

Diversifying Funding, Building Capacity

The Africa Institute of South Africa’s (AISA) depend-ence on government funding has implications both forits independence and its relations with government.AISA is closely associated with the government, whichgives it an annual grant of some 3.5 million Rands(U.S.$500,000). The critical dilemma is how to find aproper balance between proximity to the governmentand independence from it. One way of getting thisbalance right is for AISA to diversify its funding base,but recent attempts to do so have not been verysuccessful. Second, while AISA has, probably morethan any other think-tank in South Africa, recruitedblack staff to reflect more adequately the demographicsof the country, it has found it difficult to retain suchtrained staff because of its inability to pay themsalaries commensurate with government or private-sector levels.

Most peacebuilding NGOs in South Africa dependlargely on program funding. Over the past three yearsthe full-time staff of the Center for Conflict Resolution(CCR) in Cape Town, has grown from about twenty-four to thirty, and it is estimated that it will reachthirty-nine by the end of 2001. CCR’s annual budgethas more than doubled since 1994: from approximately6.5 million Rands to nearly 15 million Rands in 2001.However, 90 percent of the funding is for core activi-



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ties for conflict management, resolution andpeacebuilding activities. A three-year grant providedby the Hewlett Foundation for “core” administrativecosts is vital to ensuring sustained growth.

The Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR), whileextraordinarily active has some problems that mayw e a ken its capacity. Possible “burnout” of staffmembers and attracting core funding for administra-tion are the two main internal obstacles identified byCCR staff. CCR’s leadership, like several other organi-zations in South Africa, is seen as white-dominated.Outside South Africa, political volatility has sometimesimpacted on planned activities, and some projects havehad to be abandoned. This was the case with a projectin Zimbabwe in 2001.

In terms of funding, the Durban-based African Centerfor the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)is the first conflict resolution NGO in South Africa tohave received an endowment grant from the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID), valuedat $5 million. Accord’s funding base is also securedthrough core and program funding from the FordFoundation, the Swedish International DevelopmentAuthority (SIDA), CIDA (Canada), the SwissDevelopment Agency and The UK Department forInternational Development (DFID). One of ACCORD’smajor constraints is too heavy reliance on its leader-ship and lack of mid-level capacity.

ACCORD needs adequate training capacity, which isstill lacking internally, so that the organization canrely less on its senior leadership. There are seriouscapacity constraints at the middle management level.This impacts negatively on the organization’s ability toconduct effective training and carries with it thepotential for difficulties related to leadership transition.Furthermore, as with many South African NGOs, theracial dimension is relevant, as there is a view thatmore could be done to build desperately needed blackcapacity.

The South Africa-based Quaker Peace Center (QPC)receives international funding from internationalorganizations as well as governments, but has alsobeen able to attract a great deal of its funds from local

corporate-sector entities. One of the main reasons whyQPC has been able to diversify its funding base isbecause it typically does not ask for large sums ofmoney. Currently QPC allocates fifty percent of itsfunding to salaries and overheads, forty percent toprograms and ten percent to administration. Localdonors include the City of Cape Town, the Departmentof Health, the Department of Social Service, theIndependent Electoral Commission, the ProvincialAdministration of the Western Cape, and the WesternCape Education Department.

Some alternative funding strategies may negativelyimpact retention of fulltime staff. The Cape town-basedMediation and Transformation Practice (MTP)outsources work to consultants on a standby basis. Itsbudget was 560,000 Rands in 2001. MTP covers itsoverhead through contracting out its services to payingclients. MTP currently spends ninety percent of itsfunds on conflict resolution and only ten percent onadministration. Less than thirty percent of funds arefrom donors and seventy percent is self-generatedmainly through government contracts. A seriousdrawback for MTP is that it relies too heavily onconsultancies to be able to pay its staff. MTP arguesthat its flexibility allows its employees to offer servicein communities free of charge, thereby strengtheningrelationships with local communities.

Finally, the South Africa-based Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS), enjoys diversified financial support frombilateral government donors, and is also trying todiversify its staff. ISS works through and with national,subregional, and regional organizations, most notablythe OAU in its conflict management work, and haspublished widely on African security issues. ISSprograms are undertaken by a team of about twenty-five researchers. Some of these researchers haverecently left ISS to form SAFER Africa.

Negotiating funding in a fluid environment

Like all Southern Africa–based NGOs, the concerns ofthe Zimbabwe-based Southern African RegionalInstitute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) include itsdependence on external funding. Even though theorganization is well endowed compared to other



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organizations in the subregion, its fear is that due torecent instability in Zimbabwe its funding could bebadly affected. SARIPS is therefore consideringestablishing an endowment that might secure itsfinancial future. Some of its chief obstacles includedonor conditionality and maintaining an autonomousagenda. SARIPS’s major short-term needs are tostrengthen subregional ties, to consolidate networks,and to gain overall control over its agenda.Furthermore, the organization is concerned about itshigh rate of staff turnover. SARIPS believes that itcannot compete with the lures of the private sector,though it pays its staff international salaries.

Until 2001, the government of Denmark had been themain funder of the Zimbabwe-based R e g i o n a lPe a c e keeping Training Center (RPTC) s i n c eestablished in 1996. Through Danish InternationalDevelopment Assistance (DANIDA) was provided 46.1million Danish Kroners, as well as technical assistancein the form of a senior military peacekeeping adviser.Clearly RPTC was heavily dependent on DANIDAfunding. Due to the termination of Danish funding in2001, the future of RPTC will require financial contri-butions from other external donors and SADC memberstates. There is also a need for secondment of officialsfrom SADC states to work at the Center. However, it islikely that problems will be experienced in this regard,as some states will find it difficult to provide the fundsto support their officials unless donors supplementsuch assistance. The main obstacles facing RPTCinclude the uncertainty and fragility of the subregionalsecurity environment, the vulnerability of many ofSADC’s member states, and the poor economicsituation in Southern Africa. Officials at RPTC say thata key challenge is to consolidate South African supportfor its activities and mission because of its status androle in the region. This, they believe, will go a long wayin debunking the idea that RPTC is a Zimbabwe-dominated organization.

Often lauded internationally as a peacebuildingsuccess, Mozambique is one of the few countries inAfrica that enjoys substantial international support.However, most of its peacebuilding NGOs are not

rooted in the communities for which they profess towork. Institutionally, most local institutions are weak,depending on a few committed individuals to operate.They lack comprehensive skills to help them definetheir goals and strategies. Assistance provided to thenascent conflict management organizations inMozambique should not only be in funds but shouldalso be centered in knowledge and exchange of experi-ence between actors in Southern Africa and beyond. Amajor obstacle facing these organizations is the lack ofcapacity to develop internal mechanisms to engage inconflict resolution as well as the lack of qualifiedpersonnel. To overcome these problems, some organi-zations, such as the Movement for Peace andCitizenship (MPPC), have adopted informal structuresthat would provide them flexibility and the benefit oftapping into the capabilities of their members withoutcompromising their mandates and objectives.

In both Angola and Mozambique, semiformal organi-zations are heavily dependent on donors for fundingand program implementation. This raises a series ofproblems of financial sustainability and the challengeof how to become self-financing. Related to thisproblem is the issue of a crisis of identity faced bythese actors: the question is whether these organiza-tions can develop their own identity and vision, and beaccountable to their own members while remainingdependent on foreign donor funding. Unlike otherAfrican countries, the participation of Mozambicanand Angolan NGOs in international fora organized bythe UN and the OAU is very limited. These actors couldbenefit immensely from interacting with actors fromother parts of the continent.

4.3 Semiformal Organizations in Central Africa

Eighteen organizations were examined in Rwanda, theEastern and Western parts of the Democratic Republicof the Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville.121 Threereasons necessitated the treatment of eastern andwestern Congo separately. First, in terms of adminis-trative authority, eastern Congo is largely under rebeladministrations that are backed by Rwanda andUganda, while the West is under the Kinshasa-based

121 Burundi was left out of this survey because the safety of the evaluation team could not be guaranteed in view of the escalatingviolence in the country, at the time of the field research.



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government of Joseph Kabila. Second, eastern Congo ismore closely linked socially, economically andinfrastructurally, with Uganda and Rwanda than withKinshasa. Third, civil society organizations operatingin the western and eastern parts of the DRC oftendemonstrate a marked difference in orientation. Inspite of these differences, a common feature of thissubregion is networking among organizations withinand beyond administrative boundaries. This subregionhas three distinct types of semiformal organizations:networks and umbrella bodies; nationally-basedactors; and intermediate organizations. Suffice to saythat, in spite of their differences in size, capacity andscope of operation, these organizations are largelyintertwined, their relationship is becoming increasinglysymbiotic, and their capacities mutually reinforcing.

a) Institutional Challenges for Central Africa’sSemiformal Organizations

National and intermediate semiformal actors in theGreat Lakes region appear to be increasingly innova-tive in undertaking their peacebuilding work, despitethe high degree of insecurity, human rights abuses, andviolence in this area. For instance, these actors havedevised means of circumventing scrutiny by govern-ments and rebel authorities by setting up liaison officesoutside their countries, which enables them tohighlight and disseminate sensitive issues that theywould otherwise be unable to disseminate domestically.Association Africaine de Défense de Droit del’Homme (ASADHO), for instance, has opened liaisonoffices in Washington and Geneva to facilitate itsdissemination of sensitive reports on the state ofhuman rights in the DRC. Heritiers de la Justice hasbuilt an extensive network of like-minded organiza-tions which lobby and sensitize the internationalcommunity whenever the authorities harass thenetwork’s staff.

According to the views expressed by peacebuildingNGOs in the Great Lakes during interviews, donorsneed to strengthen the capacity of nationally-basedactors to be able to engage with governments on issuessuch as accountability, transparency and broaderquestions of governance. This is important because ifthe groups concentrate only on peacemaking, the

benefits of their work can potentially be destroyedovernight by the unchecked violation of rightsperpetrated by authorities or groups associated withthem. Donors should also consider providing moreplatforms for the discussion of subregional questionsby nonstate actors and enabling them to conceive andimplement peace activities. Subregional discussions onpeace and conflict resolution need to be supported as away of holding governments accountable and openingup space for political participation. In this case,support for nationally based actors to participatemeaningfully in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue wouldbe key to unlocking the stalemate in the DRC. Anumber of actors, such as Conseil National des ONGde Development du Congo (CNONGD) in the DRC,have generated sufficient confidence among their localcommunities and have been invited to provide arbitra-tion between various warring communities. Suchactors need support in the form of training for theirstaff to improve their skills in mediation, arbitration,and conciliation. Donors should also considerproviding logistical support to dynamic civil societyorganizations (CSOs) to lobby governments. CSOsshould also be assisted in sustaining negotiationsbetween warring communities.

Most actors in the Great Lakes region have carefullycultivated networks at national, subregional, andinternational levels, an effort that has enhanced theirprofile and made their work more effective. Actors arecollaborating at the local, national and subregionallevels in a host of activities aimed at supportingpeacebuilding efforts. For example, NGOs in Burundi,the DRC, Rwanda and Congo-Brazzaville collaborateand exchange information and expertise on conflictprevention and management through training,observance of human rights violations and monitoring,poverty eradication and gender development.Nonetheless, networks, national and intermediateactors alike, have enormous institutional weaknesses.Most of these organizations became involved inpeacebuilding partly by chance, and partly out ofnecessity. Their programs are implemented in an ad hocand reactive manner, rather than systematically andproactively. They lack capacity for strategic planning,budgeting, monitoring and conflict analysis. Programactivities are rarely tied to broad objectives or desired



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outputs. Planning is based on project cycles rather thanon methodical and systematic long-term institutionalplanning, which is needed for coherent delivery andrealization of desired outputs. Part of the problem is anover dependence of these NGOs on donors for theiroperations.

According to many of those interviewed for thissurvey, donors need to commit funds for capacitybuilding in areas of strategic planning, budgeting,project management, report writing, fundraising,advocacy, conflict analysis, and general expert trainingin conflict resolution techniques. Of particular urgency,donors should invest in equipment such as computersto increase technological capacity. So far, no donorshave committed any substantial funds to institutionalcapacity building to these organizations. Relationswith the media are for the most part cordial, thoughpublic-owned media largely give wider coverage tosemiformal organizations tied to governments. Privatemedia are often more willing to provide voice andaudience to other actors.

4.4 Semiformal Organizations in the Horn of Africa

This section examines a wide range of semiformalorganizations in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania,Sudan, and Somalia. A number of pressing issuesdominate the Horn of Africa, where inter and intra-state conflicts continue to present challenges forsustainable peacebuilding. As discussed in part two ofthis report, security dynamics in the Horn have beeninfluenced by prolonged insurgencies, resulting in, orexacerbated by, large refugee flows, state capacitycrises, and political conflicts. This section highlightssome of the strategies employed by civil societyorganizations in addressing these issues.

Similar to their sister organizations in West, Southernand Central Africa, organizations in the Horn of Africaengage in conflict management and peacebuildingwork through training and research, advocacy andcollaborative networks. However, an examination ofthe organizations covered in this survey highlightsimportant distinctions.

First, organizations in the horn of Africa have differentrelationships with their governments: in Uganda, civil

society organizations that have been engaged inrehabilitation and reconstruction continue to viewgovernment as a partner in conflict transformation;Kenya’s well-established, semiformal organizationshave interfaced with the government in addressing thecountry’s political conflicts and tensions; and twoEthiopian policy focused institutions are working topromote dialogue between civil society and thegovernment and to train and improve the capacity ofpublic officials to foster bilateral and multilateraldialogue on peace, security, democracy and economicdevelopment. Second, there is a great need to supportSudanese and Somali semiformal organizations, whichdue to insecurity continuing in their countries, requireexternal support and are often based outside theircountries. This survey discusses three Sudanesesemiformal actors, two based in Nairobi, and one basedin, and operating out of, Khartoum. Related to this,NGOs in this subregion often work well beyondnational borders: the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation inTanzania, along with other actors in Kenya andUganda have actively worked on the Great Lakes crisis,particularly the conflict in the DRC. Finally, throughoutthe Horn of Africa, organizations are strongly in favorof employing African conflict management traditions,a trend also evident in other subregions.

a) Institutional Challenges for Semiformal organi-zations in the Horn of Africa

Institutions in the Horn of Africa are encountering arange of challenges related to institutional planningfor long-term programmatic objectives, humancapacity, resource mobilization, and outreach anddissemination of their material. These challenges arereminiscent of the issues limiting the potential ofsemiformal organizations throughout Africa. The finalsection that follows summarizes some of the institu-tional challenges facing semiformal organizations inthe Horn of Africa.

Funding strategies and their relevance tosustainability

Fundraising presents a critical challenge for SudaneseWomen Voice for Peace (SWVP). In October 2001,while awaiting news on a three-year grant proposal,the organization only had about $60,000 to cover the



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next six months. Donor interest, grant requirementsand reporting mechanisms generate significantdifficulties. Among SWVP’S donors are Pa x iChristi/Cordaid (Netherlands) and NORVIB (OxfamNetherlands), which support community voices andpoverty eradication, and Life and Peace Institute andUNIFEM, which fund programs for building networks.

Some organizations rely on a more ad hoc fundings t r a t e g y. In Uganda, the Center for ConflictResolution’s (CECORE) founder raised the organiza-tion’s start-up costs, establishing a pattern of resourcemobilization outside of traditional donor circles. Thus,CECORE’s funding is ad hoc, but the organization relieson a number of donors, which allows it to diversify itsdependence. So far, CECORE seems to be receivingmore funding than most of the other organizations inthis area. A deeper institutional analysis is necessary toestablish whether it is able to translate this fundinginto sustainable and effective programs.

New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) organized aseries of peace campaigns (a Dinka-Nuer reconciliationmeeting; an Eastern Nile meeting of six warringgroups; a conference between chiefs at Uulu; and astakeholder meeting in Kisumu, Kenya). In spite of thepotential of this project to lead to a multiplication ofpeace initiatives at the community level, NSCC has nobudget line and depends on opportunistic funding. Theorganization seeks funding for each individual activity.For instance, the cost of the Kisumu meeting wasestimated at 350,000 Kenyan shillings. Most fundingcomes from church partners that have a long relation-ship with Southern Sudan, in particular NorwegianChurch Aid, World Council of Churches (WCC) andchurches in Europe. NSCC also receives funding fromgovernment agencies like USAID, which channels itsresources through U.S.-based church-related NGOssuch as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Theavailability of consistent funding for these activitieswould go a long way in sustaining what is becoming acommunity-grown peace initiative. Lack of dependablefunding means that activities are project-based andNSCC depends on contracted personnel to execute itsactivities.

The Ethiopian International Institute for Peace andDevelopment (EIIPD) is well funded by, among others,

the government of Norway, the European Union andthe Ethiopian Government Trust Fund. Between 1997and 1999, its annual budget averaged $1 million. Lackof avenues for advertising and disseminating its workgreatly impedes the impact of EIIPD. The organizationalso requires skilled personnel to manage its resourcecenter and financial resources and to facilitate theprocessing, production and acquisition of materials.

Kenya’s African Peace Forum (APFO) has secured atotal of $250,000 for a period of two years, in the formof an institution strengthening grant for developinghuman resources, securing equipment and/or training.Through this initiative, three workshops took place in2001 on information sharing, strategic planning andresource mobilization/fundraising. The potential valueof such a network was demonstrated in 1998 during anAPFO-facilitated Inter-Congolese Dialogue in easternCongo. At this meeting, a warning was sounded aboutthe second war in the DRC. This information waspassed on to the UN information network, IRIN.

APFO confronts critical capacity gaps. It is conductinglimited research, does not publish much, has poordocumentation, and lacks Internet access and a strongoutreach program. APFO has faced difficultiesfundraising for its activities. Dependence on donorsinhibits any prospects for self-sufficiency. Most ofAPFO’s funds are project specific and disbursement isoften tailored to donor demand. According to APFOmembers interviewed, donors need to support the mainprogram areas, namely the Sudan peace process andthe Great Lakes Early Warning Network (GLEWN)initiative.

With funding from German churches and the WorldCouncil of Churches, the Kenya-based All AfricaConference of Churches (AACC) has developed apeace-training manual to guide youth meetings andworkshops. Centered on local peace projects in 35countries, and dealing with 172 churches, the youthprogram promotes inclusiveness and is an interfaithinitiative. The Canadian government is the main funderof this program. The project had an annual budget of$200,000 for 2001. The AACC plans to expandlobbying for the inclusion of peace education inschools, develop resource mobilization to support localinitiatives for peace, and develop a capacity to analyze



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the impact of its programs. A second area identified forexpansion is publishing and dissemination of informa-tion. The AACC information desk currently assists inthe publication of the Tamtam News and some youthmagazines, but their circulation is limited. The youthprogram is run by three officers, an exe c u t i v esecretary, administrative assistance and an intern. It iscurrently in dire need of expansion. A shortage ofmanpower is responsible for the lack of evaluation ofthe youth program.

Filling Critical Human Capacity and Planning Gaps

Several organizations in the Horn of Africa haveidentified their critical gaps in institutional planning,implementation and human capacity. Key elements forimprovement include peacebuilding training andmanagement training for staff as well as support forcore technology and program staff. Many of these gapswill require additional funding for core capacity-building. For example, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa) is a small organization that hasfound itself overstretched. In an attempt to address thisproblem, it has engaged a full-time program adviser, incharge of research and documentation. The adviser isfacilitating the production of discussion papers andmonographs in an effort to contribute to discussionson issues of conflict and peacebuilding.

Gaps in human capacity include lack of training inpeacebuilding and conflict management as well asminimal preparation for human resource management.The Kenya-based All Africa Conference of Churches( A AC C ) noted that church leaders, who comprise itscore actors, are trained in theology and divinity and notin management. AACC workers require training inspecific aspects of management. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, as part ofits long-term strategy for enhancing its peacebuildingactivities, the organization needs to find ways ofharnessing traditional methods of conflict resolutionand peacebuilding. AACC is also seeking funding forthe support of its work in reconciliation using Africantraditional methods. According to several interviewees,many donors are skeptical of this concept of “A f r i c a ntraditional methods” and unwilling to support it.

The Tanzania-based Mwalimu Nyerere Foundationhas struggled with its own transition following JuliusNyerere’s death in 1999. From a powerful organizationenjoying a high status, one interviewee described thefoundation as “lacking both a messenger and amessage.” In this view, after Nyerere, the Foundationlost much of the initiative in the Burundi peace processand has no capacity to reclaim its central role, partic-ularly now that most of the preparation onimplementing the peace accord in Burundi is beingundertaken outside the country (Nelson Mandela and ateam of South African lawyers have led this process).I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y, the Foundation needs to createstructures to facilitate the transition from the Burundiprocess to the smaller programs it has proposed.

The appointment of the long-serving OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, as the chairman of theFoundation in 2001, provides an opportunity for therevival of the Foundation. Donors could facilitate thisrevival by encouraging the establishment of anaccountable monitoring system. They can also supportinstitution building to ensure continuity. In an attemptto build this capacity, members of the organizationhave visited the Ford Foundation’s offices in New Yorkand Nairobi, and proposed three specific ways in whichthe Ford Foundation could strengthen the NyerereFoundation. First, by funding the position of a programofficer to help the Foundation develop a strategy foraction. In particular, the Nyerere Foundation is keen todevelop the capacity to design grant proposals thatenable it to raise core funds. Second, by funding atechnical person to help in archiving the material in itspossession. Third, by contributing to the establishmentof an endowment fund.122 Such a fund would sustainfour professional staff, support staff and administrativecosts, and assist in the development of projectguidelines.

The Tanzania-based African Dialogue Center (ADC) isworking on establishing a website to stimulate debate,complement its conferences, provide a resourcedatabase and minimize duplication of efforts amongAfrican civil society organizations. The organizationdepends on consultants with high-level expertise on

122 So far the foundation has some $800,000 which it hopes to increase to $4.15 million. Such an amount can potentially generatean annual profit of $300,000 that can be used to run the foundation with its programs.



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short-term contracts. It is fully funded by the FordFoundation and has an annual budget of $300,000. Amajor challenge confronting ADC is sustainability. Aswith other actors, it is yet to succeed in building upsufficient African interest, and to support programswithin the civil society sector. Collaboration with thelocal government has seen the Resident Commander(RC) donate a piece of land (three acres) for ADC toconstruct its offices and an institute that can help itgenerate capital. The idea is to convert the ADC intothe equivalent of the U.S.-based Council on ForeignRelations. ADC is also exploring the possibility ofestablishing an endowment fund as a means ofensuring its financial survival.

While the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)staff based in Nairobi are well trained, most peace“mobilizers” at the field level have not receivedtraining in peacebuilding. As its programs expand, theneed for some standardized training will be vital inbolstering the capacity of trainers. The NSCC hasforged partnerships with donors and more experiencedsemiformal organizations including People for Peace(PPA), the National Council of Churches of Kenya(NCCK) and Catholic Churches in Kenya and SouthernSudan. Finally, NSCC urgently needs a documenter, afundraiser and staff to help the organization developstructures for dealing with its expanding programs.

The Kenya-based Sudanese Women Voice for Peace(SWVP) has a small staff with three full-time officers

and one expert dealing with financial accountingmatters. Other than being overstretched, most of thestaff lacks critical skills required for peacebuilding,such as negotiation and mediation. As a step towardfurther institutional development, SWVP has restruc-tured its administrative system. However, to run itsprograms optimally, it would still require a full-timeprogram administrator who will concentrate onmanaging part-time consultants who are consideredessential for activity implementation. The organizationalso needs to build a capacity to develop a database.SWVP was forced, due to shortages of funds, tosuspend the publication of New Voice and Images (itsnewsletter and magazine), but there is a strong desireto revive both publications. SWVP networks withwomen and NGOs operating in Southern Sudan; theNew Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), whichprovides the framework for its program implementa-tion; and the Network of Sudanese Women NGOsdealing with human rights issues. From its base inNairobi, SWVP has been able to tap into a large groupof NGOs, which helped build its capacity and assistedthe organization in undertaking its training activitiesin Southern Sudan. NGOs which were vital to theseimportant efforts include PFP, NPI-Africa, and APFO.

Having assessed the institutional capacity ofsemiformal organizations in West, Southern, Centraland the Horn of Africa, we now turn our attention toassessing the peacebuilding capacity of community-based organizations in Africa.



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Part Five:As s e s sing the Pe a c e b u i l d i n gCapacity of Community-BasedOrganizations (CBOs) in Africa

Amajority of community-based organizations inAfrica work in peri-urban areas or rural environ-

ments and may be hosted by, or affiliated to, nationalor subregional organizations or networks. Their agendais localized, and usually pursued in a reactive and adhoc manner. They depend heavily on volunteers andprofessionals drawn from members of the communitiesthat they serve. In this survey we focused on tenexamples of CBOs that draw their members from localcommunities. These organizations are located in thefollowing subregions: two in Southern Africa, six inCentral Africa and two in the Horn of Africa.

5.1 Institutional Challenges in Southern Africa

The two organizations assessed in Southern Africawere from Zambia: the Catholic Commission forJustice and Peace (CCJP) and the Jesuit RefugeeService (JRS). Catholic church structures, in particularthe dioceses, parishes and the small Christiancommunities, form the core of both JRS’s and CCJP’sprograms. They provide the entry points and theframework for implementing activities at thecommunity level. These institutions share an affinitywith other faith-based organizations in Africa: theyhave a level of moral authority, which may beleveraged at the local as well as national level.

JRS’s full-time staff comprises five project directors,eight policy program officers, fifty teachers and twentycommunity workers. Most of these workers are basedin the refugee camps and communities along Zambia’sborder areas, particularly the teachers and communityworkers. JRS has the problem of high staff turnoverbecause it employs expatriates who stay for shortperiods because of low pay and family commitments intheir home countries. There is currently an effort toemploy Zambian staff and refugees to run theseprograms. This will hopefully increase staff retentionand build project management capacities.

CCJP’s advocacy work appears to complement JRS’scapacity-building and training work. CCJP is limited inthe level of skills it is able to transmit, and once a crisisin a community erupts into violence, CCJP does nothave the skills or procedures for dealing with it. Further,members are committed to their full-time jobs or simplycannot afford to devote much time to the organization’swork. CCJP members are advised to refer such cases toother institutions such as the police, or village headmenor chiefs. Only 20–30 (out of 3,000) members haveundergone formal training in conflict management. Allwere trained at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation. Thereis also a high turnover of members who leave theinstitution to work for other organizations that offer asmall allowance for voluntary work. With high povertylevels in Zambia, a number of members are undernour-ished, unwell and/or victims of HIV/AIDS. The CCJPnational office is currently undergoing an organiza-tional development program facilitated by the Institutefor Democracy in South Africa. The program seeks toprovide training workshops, tutoring and exposure tocore staff with the objective of building and strength-ening their ability to respond, in an effective way, tosocial, economic and political problems.

5.2 Institutional Challenges in Central Africa

Central Africa has a large numbers of CBOs, attribut-able in part to the current state of insecurity in theregion. Aware of the inability of government and otherstructures to provide services, communities havemobilized to provide safety nets for their members.Like the semiformal organizations in this subregion,CBOs have tended toward operating within largernetworks. The observations presented in this sectionare drawn from the examination of six networks ofCBOs. Three of these, Association for the Promotion ofWomen Like the Sunrise (SERUKA), SolitaireBenirugwiro (Those Who Have Solidarity), and SaveOur Souls and Rescue the Vulnerable (S.O. S .RAMIRA), are based in Rwanda. Three others, namelyAgir en Faveur des Droits de l’Homme (AFDHO),Organization des Volontaires pour l’AutopromotionDurable (OVAD) and Initiatives et Actions Pour leDéveloppement Locale (IADL), are based in the DRC,while the Association Pan-Africaine Thomas Sankara(APTS) is based in Congo-Brazzaville.


Part Five: Assessing the Peacebuilding Capacityof Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Africa

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These CBOs need to be assisted to procure capitalequipment such as computers, fax machines, copiersand office furniture. Since they often operate in toughrural terrain, donors should consider assisting theirmobility within their target communities by providingmotorcycles and bicycles. These organizations alsoneed help in paying volunteers allowances so that theycan be engaged for longer periods of time. Finally,CBOs in Central Africa need to be assisted indeveloping skills on proposal writing, report writing,fundraising and documentation.

5.3 Institutional Challenges in The Horn of Africa

The survey focused on two CBOs in the Horn of Africa:the Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative for Peace( A R L I P ), a local initiative for peacebuilding innorthern Uganda, and Peace and DevelopmentNetwork (Peace Net), a national network of CBOs inKenya dealing with issues of peacebuilding, conflictresolution and development.

The greatest challenge to ARLIP’s work lies in the scaleand complexity of the conflict in northern Uganda.While ARLIP’s structures have grown remarkably, thedynamics of a conflict that is at once local, national,and international poses great challenges to thisfledgling organization. Having emerged out ofnecessity, ARLIP now depends on the goodwill ofclerics guided by religious convictions rather thanexpertise in conflict management. Funding for organi-zational development and institutional strengtheningis necessary if ARLIP is to meet its growing role and tobuild a competent, transparent and professionalorganization to oversee work already in progress.Second, the multiplication of donors has the potentialof overwhelming the initiative and/or inhibiting itfrom growing naturally. Compounding its practicaldifficulties, every donor has been interested in some,but not all, aspects of its program. For instance, theBelgian government has funded the revival of Acholitraditional leaders through assistance for the appoint-

ment of Chiefs, while the Mennonite CentralCommittee (MCC) funds training, travel and apermanent member of staff. ARLIP faces the challengeof managing and coordinating its varying interests andprograms. In dealing with the challenge of dependingon Western donors, an issue of major concern acrossthe continent, ARLIP has sought support from theprivate sector in Uganda, and from Acholis in thediaspora.

Since its creation, Peace Net has undergone ametamorphosis. In 1997, the NGO Peace Net organizeda retreat after which the Secretariat was mandated togenerate programs and to raise funds. Consultationswith several donors led to the first substantivecontract, amounting to $25,000 in 1997. In 2001 ,U SAID awarded Peace Net a two-year contract worth$75,000. However, USAID claims that Peace Net lacksan identity of its own because it operates within theframework of the national NGO Council, establishedby the Kenyan government to regulate the activities ofall NGOs. According to Peace Net, it is this structurethat gives it flexibility to deal with a whole range ofactors beyond the narrow definition that wouldcharacterize a registered NGO. A further challenge tothis sector of peacebuilding is the possibility of theKenyan government co-opting civil society initiatives.But, while several former government figures haveplayed prominent roles in donor-led CSO initiatives,Peace Net also needs to build a capacity to protect itsmembers from government harassment at the locall e v e l .1 2 3

While a lot has been achieved by Peace Net in terms ofcreating local peacebuilding structures, most zonalpeace committees remain fragile and in need ofstrengthening. In particular, the ability to shareinformation, exchange experiences and facilitatemeetings between the various actors at the local levelas well as with national actors, is very weak. The scopeof Peace Net is vast and difficult to sustain for a five-person staff, only two of whom are directly engaged in

123 Mr. Sam Korna, the current head of the Oxfam project responsible for peace work, came from the Office of the Kenyan President.The OCHA-led national steering committee on disaster response is led by government figures. Major Cheruyoit, from the Office of theKenyan President, who is heading this structure, held the same position during the UNDP-led intervention, which led to the destruc-tion of local capacity in the relief sector, in the 1990s.



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program activities. The other glaring capacitydeficiency for Peace Net is in the area of research anddocumentation. Due to limited resources and in orderto benefit from complementarity, Peace Net networkswith a range of international, national and localorganizations. However, the value of networking,particularly among members of the network, would beincreased markedly by the development of a website on

which members can post information on various issuesof concern, including their program activities.

Having briefly assessed ten community-based organi-zations in three African subregions, we will continuethis survey with a summary of the Key issues and somerecommendations for donors on how to strengthen thepeacebuilding capacity of African organizations.



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Part Six:Summary and Recommendations

This report has assessed the capacity of Africaninstitutions to respond to conflicts and crises.

Focusing on three categories of actors, namelyregional and subregional intergovernmental actors,semiformal organizations, and community-basedorganizations, this report has determined existingcapacities, identified gaps and anticipated thepotential of various organizations and actors in Africato address crises and conflicts in the future. Thissurvey was undertaken through an assessment of thestrengths, weaknesses and potential of seven intergov-ernmental actors, seventy-eight semiformal civilsociety actors, and ten community-based organiza-tions. These cases were drawn from eighteen countriesin sub-Saharan Africa, namely Liberia, Guinea, SierraLeone, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa,Botswana, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo,Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan,Ethiopia, and Djibouti. In evaluating the capacity ofeach of these organizations, this report has assessedtheir mandate, resource capacity, program implemen-tation, potential to respond to future crises, andrelationship with other players including the govern-ment, international organizations, donors and them e d i a .

6.1 Summary of Findings

From the 1990s Africa has witnessed an escalation ofcivil wars and interstate conflicts that continue toundermine peace and security: Liberia, Sierra Leone,and Guinea in West Africa; Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia,and Sudan in the Horn of Africa; Burundi, Rwanda,and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in theGreat Lakes region; Angola and Lesotho in SouthernAfrica. These conflicts involve multiple actors and aredeeply entrenched, complex, and intractable. Oftenunderpinned by economic agendas, they have led tothe militarization of the civilian space, recruitment ofchildren, subversion of human rights and humani-tarian law and massive displacements of largenumbers of people. In an attempt to address theinsecurity and humanitarian crises brought about by

these conflicts, there has been a multiplication ofinstitutions devoted to the search for peace andsecurity throughout the continent. However, thecapacity of such actors is often very weak. So far,efforts at building local capacity have often beeninappropriate, inadequate and ad hoc; and rarely metthe needs on the ground. Desiring an effectiveintervention strategy to resolve this problem requiresassessing the institutions and organizations that existon the ground.

a) Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts

An effective funding strategy needs to be informedand shaped by an understanding of the nature anddynamics of conflicts. Given the scale of conflicts andtheir complexity, efforts must focus at the local,national and regional levels. Donors need to make astrategic decision about whether to design country-specific programs, regional programs or complemen-tary programs targeted at both levels. Clearly, giventhe transnational character and regional consequencesof conflicts, there are advantages to focusing on theregional level. Several ongoing donor-sponsoredinitiatives that could provide useful lessons includethe ECOWAS security mechanism and the civil society-led IGAD early warning system. In addition to thisregional focus, the complexity and protracted natureof conflicts requires substantial investment ofresources. While there is a growing realization thatsustainable peace is a prerequisite to the successfulpursuit of most activities, this is not reflected in thescale of funding made available to peacebuildingactors. For instance a majority of semiformal organi-zations in Africa operate on annual budgets of lessthan $20,000. If breaking the cycle of conflict requiresa focus on reconstruction, governance and the rule ofl a w, women’s issues, socioeconomic rights, amongothers, then donors need to invest beyond the short-term activities that include provision of emergencyrelief, facilitation of negotiations, and training forpeace workers. Clearly, intervention in issues ofcitizenship and political participation, access and useof resources, public management and accountability,human rights protection, and the rule of law needs tobe part of the long-term strategy for peacebuilding inA f r i c a .


Part Six: Summary and Recommendations 57

b) Institutional Infrastructure

Defining Response to Conflicts as Peacebuilding

Many African actors conceive responses to conflictsand crises as a peacebuilding process, distinguishablefrom activities targeting conflict prevention, manage-ment, and/or resolution. Aware of this reality, thisreport encompasses an array of activities directed atconsolidating peaceful coexistence within societies.This conceptualization envisions peacebuilding as theemployment of measures that consolidate peacefulrelations and societal institutions in order to helpcreate an environment that deters the emergence orescalation of tensions that can lead to violent conflicts.Such a conception enables a wide array of actors todeal with conflict management and to incorporatepeace activities into their work. Without exception, allactors surveyed in this report see sustainable peace asa prerequisite for political, social, and economicdevelopment. There should therefore be a consciouseffort to link issues of democratization, human rights,governance, the rule of law, tolerance, and develop-ment to peacebuilding. Most actors interviewed for thesurvey have also stressed that peace is essential to thesuccess of their programs. For instance, all regionaland subregional organizations stressed the existence ofpeace as essential to attaining sustainable developmentand regional integration. Semiformal organizationshave made connections between respect for humanrights, good governance, the rule of law and sustain-able peace. In the same vein, a link has been madebetween levels of poverty and violence, as illustratedby the debate on the role of greed and grievance infueling civil wars. Thus, while the core programs forthe majority of organizations in this report were notinitially concerned with peacebuilding or conflictmanagement, these grew from being appendages oflarger programs to becoming integral parts of theirwork.

This interrelatedness of issues is reinforced in thereport of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General,Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace andSustainable Development in Africa (1998). In thisreport, peacebuilding is conceived as encompassing“all actions undertaken in a conflict continuum to

consolidate peace and prevent recurrence of armedconfrontation.” Such activities may involve “thecreation or strengthening of national institutions,monitoring elections, promoting human rights,providing reintegration and rehabilitation programsand creating conditions for resumed development.”Peacebuilding aims to build on, add to or reorientpeacemaking activities in ways designed to reduce therisk of the resumption of conflict and to contribute tocreating conditions conducive to reconciliation,reconstruction and recovery. Based on this conceptual-ization, peacebuilding involves long-term investmentand requires a conscious link between conflict resolu-tion, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.More importantly, donors have to decide whether toinvest in the entire process, which means buying intoa broad array of activities that have a bearing onpeacebuilding, or whether to target particular activitiesin the process, for instance, those that address partic-ular stages of the conflict cycle.

Evolving a Peacebuilding Capacity

More than two-thirds of organizations in this surveywere learning on the job. They were created to addressissues rather than conflict, and very few were, from thebeginning, devoted to peacebuilding or conflictmanagement. Regional and subregional organizationswere, at their formation, informed by developmen-talism, interpreted as economic growth and integra-tion. Their venture into conflict resolution andpeacebuilding has been plagued by many challenges.Current conflicts, which are at once internal whilespilling across borders, pose peculiar challenges forthese actors. The main protagonists of these wars areoften alliances of rebels operating across nationalborders. Further, the democratization process hastransformed the political terrain in Africa by stirringup forces of ethnicity, regionalism and religiousfundamentalism, all of which threaten state cohesion.More than ever before, the state has become hostage tolocal affinities, and its capacity to hold the mantle forpeace has been considerably reduced. Clearly, statestructures have a limited capacity for dealing with thecurrent conflicts in Africa. An effective peacebuildingstrategy needs to recognize and respond to thisweakness, in terms of complementing national


Part Six: Summary and Recommendations58

programs with strengthened regional responsemechanisms. Like their state counterparts, theseconflicts generate critical challenges for semiformaland community-based organizations, most of whichwere created to address the development needs of theirtarget populations. Nearly all these organizations areill prepared to deal with the entire conflict cycle. Mostof them ventured into conflict-related issues in anattempt to stabilize their development programs.However, as conflicts become ever more intractable,their capacity continues to be strained. Against thebackground of shrinking resources, the operation ofthese actors has been plagued by duplication of activi-ties, and increased competition for performance spaceand resources in this fast-expanding peacebuilding“industry.”

Regional and Subregional Organizations

Conceiving conflicts within a regional framework,regional and subregional organizations are retoolingthemselves in two ways: revising their mandates frombeing purely “developmentalist” to encompass conflictmanagement; and in some cases, revamping theirfledgling regional security mechanisms. Evolvingunder circumstances of insecurity, their response tocrises and conflicts is developing in an ad hoc manner.

While all of Africa’s intergovernmental organizationsare in need of substantive institutional building interms of their human and technical capacities, each isresponding to particular challenges within itssubregion and emphasizing different aspects ofpeacebuilding. Interventions, therefore, need to bedesigned specifically to suit each subregion andinstitution. The OAU is keen to develop a role incoordinating the early warning systems and securitymechanisms of subregional organizations rather thanundertaking large-scale peacekeeping missions. Fromthe peacekeeping experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone,and Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS is developing a capacityfor peacekeeping and enforcement. In Southern Africa,SADC is struggling to operationalize its Organ onPolitics, Defense and Security, even as COMESAattempts to complement the work of SADC and otherregional actors in conflict management. In the Horn ofAfrica, IGAD favors nonmilitary options to deal with

conflicts and is working with civil society partnershipsas well as developing a Conflict Early Warning andResponse Mechanism (CEWARN). The smaller EAC ismoving toward developing a conflict preventionmodel. These various approaches have implications forthe types of capacities that require strengthening ineach organization.

Regional and subregional actors play critical roles insponsoring discussions, engaging in diplomacy andintervening militarily in conflicts. These organizationsare driven, in their interventions, by an internal logicof common interest in economic development, peaceand security, and tend to have more at stake inconflicts within their regions than external actors.Unlike foreign actors, they enjoy the advantage ofhaving deep knowledge of their region. But some ofthese regional interventions have also been controver-sial, when local actors are accused of pursuingparochial political and economic agendas rather thanregional stability. Nigeria and South Africa have alsobeen accused of nursing hegemonic ambitions todominate their subregions. Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia,and Burkina Faso have been accused of pursuingparochial economic agendas from regional conflicts.

Semiformal Organizations

In responding to conflicts that manifest themselvesdifferently across regions, semiformal organizationshave developed varying institutional forms. Theseinclude research and analysis institutions, to facilita-tive bodies, to operational actors and networks.Operating in political environments that range frombeing friendly, to being indifferent, to being hostile,NGOs are often forced to navigate through the dangersof co-optation, harassment or lack of a policyframework to guide their operations. In their work,these actors constantly seek to cultivate and operatewithin the principles of impartiality, neutrality,independence, objectivity and relevance to the needson the ground.

Among the distinctive characteristic of these actors istheir ability to network upwards (with internationalgovernmental and nongovernmental actors),downwards (with national and local actors) and



horizontally (with each other). Increasingly, semiformalorganizations are becoming the intermediaries betweendonors, international NGOs and governments, on theone hand, and local actors on the other, in terms ofdisbursing funds, and building or bolstering thecapacities of smaller, usually community-basedorganizations.

Community-Based Organizations

CBOs operate at the frontline of conflict areas and,despite their chronic shortage of resources and skilledmanpower, confront conflicts directly. Their agenda islocalized and pursued in a reactive and ad hoc manner.Institutionally, CBOs are fragile, often lacking clearoperational structures. They are often weak and proneto political manipulation. CBOs depend largely onvolunteers and draw heavily on traditionalmechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding,which are crucial for the development of any earlywarning and conflict prevention mechanisms.

c) Modalities of Current Support for Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding as a New Funding Area

Apart from church-based donors like the MennoniteCentral Committee (MCC) and the World Council ofChurches (WCC), which have long-standing relationswith their sister organizations in Africa, peacebuildingis a new funding area for many other donors.Nonetheless, as conflicts continue adversely to affectdevelopment activities, there is increasing interest indesigning frameworks of involvement inpeacebuilding. For instance, USAID is currentlydesigning a strategy for conflict prevention, resolutionand management in Eastern and Central Africa. TheDeutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit(GTZ) has launched a small “conflict managementinitiative” known as COMANI. In some cases, donorssuch as the Department for International Development(DFID-UK) and the Danish Church Aid are focusing onpreventive work. The extent to which these strategiescomplement and inform each other will determine thedegree of the effectiveness of donor interventions.

Influence of the Development Arena in FundingPeacebuilding

At the moment, funding for peacebuilding in Africa isinformed largely by practice in other sectors, particu-larly the development arena. For instance, donors areapplying monitoring systems designed for other formsof assistance to peacebuilding activities. Given thatenduring peace can only be measured in the long term,evaluation based on quantifiable indicators is likely toyield tentative, inconclusive judgments on theeffectiveness of such programs. The unpredictablenature of conflicts and their dynamics call for donorsto design monitoring mechanisms that allow flexibilitywhile at the same time ensuring performance. In somecases, desire for results has led to donors imposingunrealistic pressure on actors to produce results. Forinstance, IGAD’s Sudan Peace secretariat has beenunder immense pressure to deliver a peace agreementeven in the face of enormous political, logistical,human and technical obstacles.

Reluctance to Fund Core Areas

While there is consensus that peacebuilding is a newarea that necessitates capacity building, donors areoften unwilling to provide core funding, crucial forfacilitating organizational development. For instance,less than five percent of organizations dealt with inthis survey had secured funds for overhead costs,including salaries. Even then, this was for periods ofless than two years. A majority of actors drew salariesfrom project funds. Other than reducing the moneyavailable for program activities, inability to secure corefunding inhibits professionalism and leads to a highturnover and retention problem, as trained and experi-enced staff leave to join the enlarging number offoreign NGOs that offer better remuneration packages.A combination of these factors has left many organi-zations understaffed and overstretched. This situationalso affects program continuity and reduces institu-tional capacity. Lack of in-house expertise has led toheavy dependence on consultants, especially by amajority of policy think-tanks. While this can providemore expertise, it is costly and affects the ability oforganizations to create internal capacity.



Dependency on Foreign Donors

On the whole, dependence on foreign donors is heavyand manifests in donor preferences often overshad-owing organizational mandates and objectives. Morethan half of the actors in this survey indicated uneasi-ness with the manner in which donors influenceprograms. For instance, there is a tendency to draw upgrant proposal in line with the interest of donorsrather than the needs on the ground. When suchinterests shift, as they often do, this leads to difficul-ties in sustaining programs. Across the continent,actors, particularly semiformal ones, are attempting toattain financial independence. Most are seeking toreduce the influence of dominant donors by diversi-fying their sources of funds, or by seeking long-termdonor commitments. In a few cases, actors areattempting to create endowment funds. One suchorganization, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation inTanzania has made some progress in this regard. Manyother NGOs are becoming involved in activities thatcan generate income, including selling their programs,while some NGOs are reaching out to other sectors forsupport. An example of this is the Quaker Peace Center(QPC) in South Africa, which receives fifty percent ofits budget from private contributions. The Sudan-based Mutanuak covers some of its operational costsfrom membership subscriptions. Akina Mama WaAfrica (AMWA) in Uganda and the African DialogueCenter (APC) in Tanzania are exploring ways oftapping the support of the private sector for theirpeacebuilding work. The latter has moved a stepfurther in engaging entrepreneurs to participate inexamining issues of corruption within the corporates e c t o r.

Changing Donor Requirements

Changing grant-making requirements often make itdifficult for actors to engage in successful proposalwriting. Complicated, time-consuming and heavyreporting procedures have translated into proposalwriting becoming a continuous activity throughout they e a r. To deal with an increasingly competitiveenvironment, against the background of diminishingresources, most executives spend much of their time onpublic relations and fundraising activities. This robs

program activities of the services of their mostqualified personnel.

Human Resource Capacity Building

On the whole, there is an impressive human resourcecapacity in the four subregions in which this surveywas conducted. The vast majority of senior staff andprogram officers in these organizations are wellqualified. There is also marked enthusiasm to addressconflict issues as indicated by the innovations of manyorganizations even in the face of limited resources.However, three factors inhibit the full realization of thepotential of this human capacity. First, remunerationpackages are generally low and not reflective ofqualifications. Second, most organizations have nosupport structures for this human capacity. Glaringlyabsent are internal monitoring mechanisms. With theexception of the Kenya-based NSCC, which initiatedmonitoring meetings to review the growing peacemovement in Southern Sudan, few organizations hadcomprehensive internal monitoring systems. Third, amajority of the organizations surveyed suffer fromlimited technological capacity. In particular, the abilityto communicate is crucial if semiformal organizationsand CBOs are to realize their potential as providers ofinformation essential for early warning to actors thatmay not enjoy similar access to communities.

Support Activities

Although all actors agree that research, analysis anddocumentation are vital for supporting peacebuildingwork, such activities are in short supply. A number oforganizations have stopped the production and distri-bution of their newsletters and magazines. Except for afew organizations, most lack support for their research,analysis and documentation capacities. This situationis often blamed on the unwillingness of donors to fundsupport activities.

Workshops and Conferences

There is a prevalence of workshops and conferences asthe model for capacity building. While these meetingsoften contribute to networking, their value inaddressing institutional shortcomings is limited. Such



events are often expensive to organize (in terms oftime and money), are usually short one-off events thatdeal with a disparate range of subjects, often withoutthe benefit of accumulated knowledge, and there isoften no means to ensure sustained follow-up of theseactivities. Capacity building requires large infusions offunds. However, experience on the ground suggeststhat there is no relationship between funds available toan organization and its performance. Thus, thoughnecessary, money is hardly sufficient for creatingcapacity. What seems critical in building capacity is theabsorptive capacity of an organization to handle largeamounts of money without being overwhelmed.

Networks as a Preferred Peacebuilding Model

On the whole, it would appear that consortiums andnetworks often have greater potential forpeacebuilding than organizations acting alone. Suchnetworks have the weight of numbers, provide aresource pool for members, enhance the capacity ofweaker/smaller actors, improve the quality of training,encourage complementary action and, in volatilepolitical situations, provide protection for memberswho are in danger of government harassment. Thenetwork model of intervention is fast growing, partic-ularly among semiformal organizations and CBOs. Thismodel prevails in Central Africa, parts of West Africa,particularly among the Mano River countries, and israpidly catching on in Southern and East Africa. Thereis also an increasing desire to network at the local,national, regional, and international levels. Throughnetworking, efforts are made to adapt lessons fromelsewhere, broaden and expose African perspectives onpeacebuilding and expand the repertoire of conflicttransformation techniques. This has perhaps developedfurthest in Uganda, where actors have fused foreignand local approaches, creating hybrid models forreconciliation and peacebuilding at the local level. InSouth Africa, ACCORD and ISS have developed amodel for conflict management with continent-wideapplication. Elsewhere in West and East Africa, thereare attempts to produce manuals to guide peace work.One important question, however, is whetherdocumentation of local initiatives will adversely affectthe flexibility that enables peace workers to adapt newtechniques to new circumstances.

Limited Networking Among IntergovernmentalActors

Although the benefits of networking seem self-evident, there is minimal networking amongsubregional actors. This is in spite of states havingmultiple memberships in various intergovernmentalorganizations. This is attributed to a lack of humanand financial resources to facilitate cross-fertilization.Yet all organizations surveyed indicated a greaterdesire to share information on peace and securityissues. Access to, an understanding of, and support forthe OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, manage-ment and resolution, and mechanisms beingdeveloped by ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, EAC, ECCAS,and COMESA, are all crucial to strengthening regionalm e c h a n i s m s .

CBOs as the Weakest Link

Compared to the OAU and subregional organizations,networking was more practiced and had greaterpositive results among semiformal and community-based actors. However, CBOs form the weakest link inthe chain of institutions dealing with peacebuilding inAfrica. They are often severely limited in their capaci-ties and rely more on the support of semiformalinstitutions for their institutional capacity andprogram activities. CBOs, though, tend to be morecohesive, an attribute inspired by a sense of sharedcommunity values. Nonetheless, the practice ofconflict management tends to be deeply rooted amongCBOs, as each community already possesses its ownrich experience and local conflict managementmechanisms. Because local communities are often thetheaters of conflict, the involvement of CBOs inconflict management is crucial. More could be done toaugment the capacities of CBOs, starting with the mostrudimentary of their needs: providing office spacefrom which they can run their activities—a capacitythat most CBOs lack.

Gap Between Civic Actors and IntergovernmentalActors

Critically absent in peacebuilding in Africa isnetworking between intergovernmental organiza-



tions and civic actors. Bridging this gap is critical toenhancing partnerships for peace, as illustrated bythe Djibouti-led Somali reconciliation and peaceprocess. Although this process has failed so far tobring peace to Somalia, it highlighted the potentialof involving both political and civic actors in thesearch for peace. Most civil society actors felt thatgovernments are still uncomfortable with their roleand remain reluctant to give them access to theirdecisionmaking processes. Civil society actors inWest and East Africa are, however, playing a role indeveloping the early warning systems of ECOWA Sand IGAD respectively.

6.2 Recommendations

a) An Enabling Political Environment

Owing to the complex and intricate nature of conflictsin Africa, it is clear that peacebuilding requirespolitical commitment and a willingness on the part ofstates to create an enabling environment within whichother actors can pursue peace. In spite of the difficul-ties facing African governments, they remain criticalentry points for addressing conflicts and crises on thecontinent. Compared to other actors, governmentsoften have more capacity, especially as far as securityis concerned. They can thus support or subvertpeacebuilding work. The role of governments assumesgreater significance given the regional nature ofconflicts. Thus, encouraging states to support regionalinitiatives is critical. At the same time, holdinggovernments accountable for ensuring goodgovernance is a necessary step to opening up politicalspace for other non-state actors. The role of govern-ments in facilitating an enabling environment raisesthe question of how to help create the right partner-ships between states and NGOs. Supporting interactionbetween states, subregional organizations andnonstate actors, in the form of consultative meetings,would go some way in initiating dialogue betweenthese three sectors and forging partnerships amongthem. The OAU–Civil Society conference in Ad d i sAbaba in June 2001, funded by the Ford Foundation,has been applauded as an activity that could helpbridge the gap of mutual suspicion between govern-ments and civil society.

b) Institutional Capacity Building

Organizational Development

In all of the regions surveyed, there is a need to facili-tate the clarification of organizational vision, mandate,and objectives and to link these to available humanand technical resources, create structures that cancarry out stated objectives, and help actors establishmonitoring and evaluation capacities. This can be donethrough institutional strengthening grants.

More specifically, organizations at each level seem tohave their particular needs. At the subregional level,organizations are at different levels of developmentand emphasize different aspects of peacebuilding inaccordance with their mandates and the needs on theground. The need to strengthen the capacity of theconflict management center at the OAU to enable it tocoordinate the activities of subregional organizationsin the security field is paramount. In all cases, thedevelopment of effective early warning and responsemechanisms is critical in supporting peacebuildingactivities in Africa.

CBOs: Institutionalization Versus ProgramFlexibility

At the community level, institutionalization maythreaten the flexibility of CBOs to respond to needs onthe ground. The dilemma that this raises is whetherinstitutionalization can occur without creating inflexi-bility. One way of catering for the varied needs of CBOsis to have a focal point to facilitate their activities andto link them to donors and key decision makers. Thesefunctions can be located within the focal point in thecountry or regional office of the Ford Foundation,which is accessible to CBOs and able to make decisionsthat can facilitate their activities. The MCC-ARLIPmodel in Uganda is a good one which could be adaptedelsewhere.

Support for Existing Program Activities

The Ford Foundation could provide core funding forthe most effective of these organizations, which wouldrelease program money for the implementation of



activities on the ground. Such support could take anyof the following three forms: (i) provide core fundingfor administrative costs, which would stabilize staffand key programs; (ii) match funds with anotherdivision (for instance, grants related to human rightsmonitoring could be matched with grants from thedivision on security and/or development, or by fundsfrom another donor); (iii) support secondment positionswithin organizations, especially technical positionssuch as in grant making. Funding core areas wouldrelease qualified personnel to concentrate on programimplementation.

Fund Support Activities

There is a critical need to facilitate support activities,the most critical of which is research. This is especiallyimportant in view of the state of academia in Africatoday. For a long time, centers of excellence werelocated within academic institutions. However, thecurrent degeneration and political interference in theseinstitutions necessitates looking beyond them. Semi-formal actors, who are increasingly becominginterlocutors between society and the state, andbetween the state and the wider internationalcommunity, are in need of strengthening to performthese tasks. Supporting the creation and consolidationof documentation, analysis and dissemination ofinformation is critical to supporting peacebuilding inAfrica. The creation of a research fund and would go along way in supporting activities relating to generatingreliable and qualitative information.

Creating a Pool of Expertise

The Ford Foundation can help put together orcontract a capable organization to create a pool ofexpertise that can be called upon to offer services toany of the organizations surveyed, on the basis ofcarefully defined criteria related to need andpotential. This can be organized in the form ofvisitorship programs of between three months to twoyears. Such a program would benefit from experts inthe large and expanding Africa diaspora, many ofwhose members are keen to contribute to Africa’sr e c o v e r y. Experts in this pool would include programanalysts and people skilled in negotiation, arbitration,

human rights monitoring, information technologyand grant generation. Such experts would work withorganizations in Africa to help them build theirc a p a c i t y. The Commonwealth model, which involvessending experts, upon request, to organizations forperiods of up to two years, is one that can be adaptedto enhance the peacebuilding capacity of Africanorganizations.

c) Dissemination and Utilization Component

A Concert of Donors

The scale of intervention this report envisages goeswell beyond the capacity of any single donor. Theserecommendations would require a group of donors toimplement. These strategies could be undertaken inconcert with other donors. It is proposed that thisreport be shared with as many interested donors aspossible, including bilateral and multilateral donors.The information and recommendations within thisreport can then benefit other donors working in thisarea. For instance, a number of bilateral and multilat-eral donors, including the World Bank, UNDP, DFID,among others, have formed a consortium to examineways of dealing with the reconstruction of the GreatLakes region.

African Institutions

Another potential audience for this report is Africangovernments, which are critical stakeholders in thesearch for peace on the continent but also key actors infacilitating an enabling environment for the activitiesof other actors. In addition, this report should also beshared with regional and subregional organizations,semiformal actors and CBOs in Africa, particularlythose surveyed in this report. This survey can providea basis for reflecting on their capacities and mayprovide opportunities for their improvement. It shouldalso be made available to scholars in this area, partic-ularly to help advance peace studies in Africa.

Dissemination Strategy

For wider dissemination, this report should be distrib-uted in both print and electronic form. It could also be



presented to other targeted audiences in the form ofbriefing papers.

A Concluding Note

This project generated enormous enthusiasm acrosssub-Saharan Africa, particularly because the FordFoundation has built impressive credibility in Africa asa donor involved in capacity building in various fieldsand at different levels. The general feeling is that acomprehensive Ford Foundation strategy would lead

other donors toward a more systematic approach tosupporting peacebuilding in Africa. Compared tobilateral or multilateral agencies, which areconstrained by governmental procedures, the FordFoundation enjoys the flexibility that can enable it toblaze this trail in both conceptual and practical terms.The hope is that Ford’s special initiative for Africa willbe able to derive some useful insights from this reportin developing its own strategies for building andstrengthening the capacity of African organizations tobring peace to a troubled continent.



Appendix IThe Infra s t r u c t u re of Africa:S t rategies and Activities of Semi-Formal and Community-BasedO rg a n i z a t i o ns

This section is a companion to Part Four of the reportand covers the strategies and activities of 78 semi-formal and community-based organizations in Africa.

Appendix I: Section ISemiformal organizations

a ) Semiformal organizations in West Africa:Strategies and Ac t i v i t i e s

The role of religious leaders and women’s groupsin West Africa

Semi-formal actors in West Africa are building theiractivities within and across core constituencies. In theMano River Union countries, religious leaders andwomen’s groups engaged in peacebuilding haveinstitutionalized their activities by forming structuresto address specific conflict needs. In part, because theseorganizations relate directly to local constituencies,they enjoy a tremendous amount of moral authorityand capacity to frame the needs of populations forconflict resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflictreconstruction.

Religious Leadership

The Interfaith Council of Liberia (IFCL), the CatholicJustice and Peace Commission (JPC), and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) h a v eengaged in conflict management in their respectivecountries and may constitute an untapped subregionalcivil society network for peacebuilding.

In Liberia, the I F C L, created to mediate between thewarring parties in the Liberian civil war in 1990,drafted what became the first ECOWAS peace plan

while the J P C has built up a wealth of experience inproviding human rights education and monitoring,and in peacebuilding and relief activities. The IFCLemploys church-based structures and Islamic centersto facilitate conflict resolution and to empower localcommunities through training in conflict managementskills. The IFCL has cultivated wide appeal andextensive networks in communities across Liberia, aswell as carried out peace education and providedtrauma counseling for victims of conflict. Focusing onhuman rights advocacy, the JPC office in Gbarngaspearheads conflict management and peace educationprograms and trains youths in producing drama withpeace messages for live street performances and radioproduction. Its programs extend to Nimba county and,until 2001, Lofa county, where its program officeswere closed due to fighting between governmentforces and rebels of the group Liberians United forReconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Located strate-gically in rural Liberia and working mainly with ruralcommunities, the Gbarnga Diocese office has played auseful role in conflict management and peaceeducation in Liberia.

The I R C S L is regarded as a highly impartial, neutraland independent mediator in Sierra Leone. Seekingprimarily to promote peace and national reconcilia-tion, it represents the initiative of the Muslim andChristian religious communities to end the civil war.It has facilitated dialogue between the governmentand the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), wasactively involved in peace talks in Lomé in 1999, andhas programs on human rights, democratization,disarmament, and reintegration, especially of childsoldiers and children affected by war. IRCSL is alsopromoting the use of traditional conflict managementt e c h n i q u e s .

Women’s Networks

An interesting development in civil society across thecontinent, is the phenomenon of women’s groupsorganizing around peace. In West Africa, the ManoRiver Women’s Peace Network (MRWPN) asubregional civil society organization, grew out of astrategy meeting of civil society women in MRU


Appendix I The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Strategies andActivities of Semi-Formal and Community-Based Organizations

66

countries held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2000. TheLiberia Women Initiative (LWI)124 was established atthe height of the Liberian civil war in 1994, primarilyto promote women’s participation in the Liberian peaceprocess and to address the welfare of women andchildren during the conflict. Both organizations arebuilding networks; MRWPN at the subregional leveland LWI at the local level.

Liberia Women Initiative’s (LW I ) conflict managementand peacebuilding programs are executed under its“Bridges to Peace” project and operate within tencommunities in Monrovia, and the counties of Sinoe,Maryland, Nimba, Grand Gedeh and lower Lofa. Theproject trains local leaders, drawn from community-based organizations (CBOs), in conflict management andpeacebuilding skills. In turn, the trainees impart theseskills and sensitize their communities. The LWI encour-ages and facilitates the creation and growth of CBOs.

Launched in Monrovia in 2001, MRWPN has attemptedto facilitate a meeting of Heads of State of the MRUcountries and to seek ways of resolving the ongoingconflicts in the subregion. Other objectives of theNetwork include: ensuring effective participation ofwomen from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in theMano River Union and ECOWAS peace processes; anddevising better strategies in prevention, reconciliation,and reconstruction efforts; promoting democratization.Clearly the MRWPN has the potential to become aninfluential player in conflict management and resolu-tion in the MRU.

Peacebuilding through peace education

Activities that facilitate coexistence and peacebuildingin West Africa are critical for reducing conflict andtension. Many of the organizations surveyed employedstrategies for nurturing good governance and democra-tization through peace education. Broadly, these strate-gies leverage conflict management training in order tosensitize populations and to empower local actorstoward effective conflict resolution. Organizations in theMRU are expanding their efforts across borders, partic-ularly on the Sierra Leone and Guinea border, in order

to address the flow of refugees across borders. Theseorganizations are also focused on democratization andgood governance, largely in an advocacy capacity aswell as by forging strong networks and partnerships.

The Freetown-based Campaign for Good Governance( C G G ) was established in July 1996 to promoted e m o c r a c y, empower civil society, redress genderimbalances, and promote human rights in Sierra Leone.The CGG’s approach to conflict management has beenthrough peace education, organizing training workshopsand symposia for various sectors of civil society, andsensitizing and creating public awareness. Its mainstrategy is maintaining and exploring the use of informalcontacts through visits between parties in conflict.

In Liberia, the Center for Democratic Empowerment(CEDE) is developing a trainer’s guide for practitionersto standardize and offer a unified approach to conflictmanagement. Besides building partnerships and facili-tating consultations among civil society groups inGuinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, CEDE has formed acommon front for peace in the Mano River basin. CEDEis currently operating out of Côte d’Ivoire due toattacks on its staff by Liberian security agents.

Two organizations with sophisticated peace trainingmethodologies in Sierra Leone are the N e t w o r kMovement for Justice and Development (NMJD) andConciliation Resources/Sierra Leone (CRSL). NMJDstarted as a development NGO based in Kenema district,before turning to peace education and conflict manage-ment and moving its headquarters to Freetownfollowing the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. Infacilitating peacebuilding, the NMJD uses “e x t e r n a lanimators”—field monitors who provide skills trainingto improve the knowledge base of community represen-tatives to enable them to act as peace monitors. TheNMJD coordinates its activities through Task ForceUnits and emphasizes a multidimensional approach toconflict management, incorporating peace education,trauma-healing and development education. The CRSLis an arm of an international NGO, the London-basedConciliation Resources, but it relies on local staff andaddresses local concerns. The organization’s activities

124 On this and other organizations in Liberia, see Augustine Toure, Peacebuilding and National Reconciliation in Liberia, (New York:International Peace Academy, April 2002).



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are concentrated in the communities most severelyaffected by Sierra Leone’s civil war. A CRSL ProgramOfficer and core training staff provide training inconflict management and peace education for peacemonitors drawn from within local communities. Thepeace monitors then use their newly acquired skills tomediate in local conflicts and undertake peacee d u c a t i o n .

Both of these organizations —NMJD and CRSL— havehad an impact on peace processes beyond theirtraining programs. NMJD held a consultation ondiamonds and the Sierra Leone war. It also launchedthe campaign for “Just Mining” to create publicawareness and to influence policy reform in the miningsector particularly highlighting the role of diamonds infueling the civil war. These efforts were reportedlyimportant in the adoption of a resolution 1306 by theUN Security Council in July 2000, which prohibited theexport of uncertified diamonds from Sierra Leone. TheCRSL has embarked on research, investigation andanalysis of conflicts. It has sought to create linkagesbetween communities and donors; mobilize resources;and provide training to assist community development.

As conflicts in West Africa continue, and the flow ofrefugees increases, particularly in the MRU, efforts toaddress refugee issues are of growing importance.Since 1996, ABC Development (ABC), a Sierra Leone-based organization, has recently been working withrefugee communities on the Guinean side of the border.ABC programs aim to prepare host communities toreceive and assist refugees and to facilitate peacefulcoexistence between the host population and refugees.It runs a literacy and conflict resolution center at oneof its main sites in Forecariah, which hosts the largestrefugee community in Guinea. This center providestrauma-counseling services for refugees, empowersboth refugees and the host community with conflictmanagement skills, and encourages confidence-building through workshops between refugees and hostcommunities. Such meetings are key in the sensitiza-tion and the dissemination of information.

State, society and partnerships

Several Guinean civil society organizations engaged inpeacebuilding and conflict management, are directly

linked with government. This is a reflection of Guinea’sstrong nationalist fervor, inherited from its firstpresident Sékou Touré. A prominent Guinean organi-zation, the Lansana Conté Foundation (named afterGuinea’s current head of state) is concerned withpromoting peace in the MRU states, particularly byfostering harmony among Guinea’s diverse ethnicgroups. The foundation is a private initiative withlinks to Guinean leader, Lansana Conté. This is in linewith a pattern of society-state relations in Guinea,where the distinction between civil society and thegovernment is sometimes blurred, and where anorganization’s survival is almost impossible withoutthe government’s blessing. This has direct implicationsfor the sustainability of civil society in Guinea, perhapsrequiring investment from donors in order tostrengthen the capacity for independent NGOs.

H o w e v e r, despite the interdependence of the state andcivil society in Guinea, several organizations are forgingeffective horizontal partnerships across civil society. TheNational Committee for Action and Reflection forPeace in the MRU States (CORAPEM) emerged out of aseries of roundtable discussions initiated by the LansanaConté Foundation for Peace in March 2001 and attendedby forty-six civil society groups. CORAPEM’S member-ship has expanded to include about fifty civil societygroups, many of which are leading institutions inconflict management and peacebuilding in Guinea. Itsimmediate task is to forge effective partnerships amongcivil society groups to promote peace in the MRU.CORAPEM seeks to achieve this through its twocommissions: the Commission on Sensitization andInformation, and the Commission on Negotiation andMediation and the Settlement of Conflict.

The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights(OGDH) in Guinea has also built useful partnershipswith communities across the country, and establishednetworks with a host of international organizationsdealing with conflict management. The OGDH basicallydocuments human rights violations and conductstraining for civil society groups in human rightseducation and monitoring. Conflict management andpeace education also form part of its core activities.

This pattern of coalition-building extends into otherMRU states. In Sierra Leone, the Civil Society



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Movement (CSM) established in December 1998, is aconsortium of over a dozen organizations. The CSMemerged after January 1999 when it mobilized civilsociety and public opinion against the RUF invasion ofFreetown. In May 2000, in conjunction with membersof the Sierra Leone Parliament, CSM organized a publicdemonstration to protest the slow pace of disarma-ment. Following the protest, RUF leader Foday Sankohwas arrested and charged along with other key RUFlieutenants for the deaths of some nineteen protesters.From a pressure group, the CSM developed into a full-fledged organization with defined structures and amission to promote peace and national reconciliation.The CSM’s organizational outreach is spreadingthroughout Sierra Leone and its activities are carriedout mainly among local communities. The organiza-tion’s main innovation is its experiment with indige-nous practices of conflict management, which itintends to build upon and use as a set of core tools forits peace work.

Nigeria’s Policy-Making Peace Infrastructure

The survey covered five organizations in Nigeria,focusing on policy and research. These organizationsserve as a focal point for developing relevant conflictmanagement policy for West Africa and beyond. Theyare situated in a unique position, often linked to theNigerian government or spearheaded by high-profileindividuals with a subregional or regional perspective.

The African Center for Development and StrategicStudies (AC D E S S ) is a multidisciplinary centercomprising about fifty scholars conducting research ondiverse policy issues affecting the African continent.The organization is headed by a prominent scholar andformer Executive Secretary of the UN EconomicCommission for Africa (ECA), Professor Ad e b a y oAdedeji. ACDESS is currently involved in research onpolicy and practical issues relating to conflict preven-tion. This research focuses on security and develop-

ment issues in Africa and studies on these issues aswell as special country studies on Nigeria and SouthAfrica have been published.

The Lagos-based African Strategic and Pe a c eResearch Group (AFSTRAG), established in 1992, is aresearch NGO concerned with strategic and humansecurity problems in Africa. The scope of AFSTRAG’sresearch is wide-ranging, including disarmament,defense studies, demilitarization, conflict studies,gender issues, governance, security, development, andcross-border crime. AFSTRAG, in conjunction with aforum of twenty-six West African NGOs,1 2 5 h a sembarked on a project aimed at assisting ECOWAS todevelop an early warning system. Related to this,AFSTRAG has plans to coordinate the activities of civilsociety groups to participate in the four observationzones of ECOWAS’ early warning system (see PartThree).126 It plans to use satellite networks for this work,after establishing two coordinating offices in Freetownand Dakar. AFSTRAG is also working with ECOWASand the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance enMatière de Défense (ANAD) to develop a commonsecurity mechanism system. In April 2000, AFSTRAGmet with staff of the ANAD secretariat to discuss plansto integrate ANAD into ECOWAS’ security mechanism.Within this framework, AFSTRAG aims to provide theECOWAS Mediation and Security Council with policyoptions for managing subregional conflicts. To facili-tate these activities, AFSTRAG is planning to establishan office in Abuja, with three staff, to ensure closerproximity to the ECOWAS Secretariat.

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)is one of the oldest institutions on the continent.Established in 1963, it was designed to serve as aforeign policy think-tank and was modeled on Britain’sRoyal Institute of International Affairs and America’sCouncil on Foreign Relations. One of the Institute’s keymandates is to educate the Nigerian public on foreignpolicy issues.127 In 2001, NIIA conducted some training

125 The forum is a West African Network for Peacebuilding which met in Abuja from 24 to 27 March 2001.126 These zones are Banjul, Cotonou, Monrovia and Ouagadougou.127 A prolific foreign policy center, NIIA has published over fifty volumes on a wide range of topics on Nigeria’s foreign, defenseand economic policies, ECOWAS and the OAU, as well as the annual Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. The Ford Foundationfunded a comparative two-volume study on the all-African peacekeeping missions in Chad and Liberia edited by NIIA staff in 1996.The institute edited a volume on the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1991, which was funded by the Nigerian government. Thereare plans under way to revive publication of the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs and to publish new research.



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programs for members of Nigeria’s National Assemblyon governance and foreign policy issues, which werefunded by Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation. NIIAhas also organized practical workshops on boundarydisputes between Nigeria and its neighbors Chad andNiger. NIIA has organized lectures, conferences androundtables on security and other issues.

Formally known as the Sani Abacha Foundation forPeace, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution(IPCR) was founded in June 1999. Funded fully byNigeria’s Ministry of Integration and Cooperation, andhoused within the Office of the President, the IPCR hasa mandate to monitor conflict situations in Africa(Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone,Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda) and togenerate policy prescriptions for managing them. It hasfour departments, which focus on: internationalnegotiation; security; democracy and development;and policy analysis. IPCR pursues its goals through aseries of seminars held on such topics as the AfricanUnion, ethnicity and globalization, and PracticalSolutions for Conflict Resolution in Africa. It organizedone event with Human Rights Africa in September2000. The participants at these events include scholars,government officials, diplomats, the press andmembers of the general public. Since its inception, theinstitute has held about ten seminars.

Connect Synergy (CS) a Nigerian organization thatfocuses exclusively on conflict management, isinvolved in research and training. CS’s unique contri-bution to peacebuilding is that it seeks to strengthenand promote the use of traditional networks of conflictprevention, management and resolution and to createa standardized tool kit to be used by mediators acrossthe region. To that end, CS organizes workshops andseminars on conflict management at the communitylevel, conducts research and publishes its work. In itswork at the community level which includes inNigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta, CS has forged apartnership with the West African Network forPeacebuilding, one of the most dynamic subregionalnetworks of organizations dealing with issues ofconflict management. Out of this partnership hasemerged a project to produce a manual incorporatingtraditional knowledge about conflict management for

community-based practitioners. The pilot survey forthis project seeks to investigate the informalmechanisms used by communities in reconciliation andplans to involve about one hundred Nigeriantraditional leaders. The organization also hopes tocreate a database on conflict areas and tension spotsand to undertake training. As part of its partnershipwith Nigerian government institutions including theMinistry of Justice, Connect Synergy has created amediation center that it hopes will eventually be usedto document traditional understandings of conflictsand their management.

b) Semiformal organizations in Southern Africa:Activities and Strategies

South Africa’s Policy-Making Infrastructure

Three South African organizations that engage inpolicy research and training on issues related toconflict resolution, are the Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS), the African Institute of South Africa(AISA) and the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR).These agencies are all high-profile, have broadmandates, usually beyond South Africa, and networkwith a large number of international donors, perhapsreflecting the hope and generally favorable attitudeassociated with South Africa internationally.

It should be noted that these organizations share theresearch and policy terrain with other institutions inSouthern Africa, namely Zimbabwean organizationssuch as the Center for Defense Studies (CDS), theSouthern African Regional Institute for Po l i c yStudies (SA R I P S ), and Botswana’s A f r i c a nRenaissance Institute (ARI). These institutions are partof broader subregional partnerships.

The AISA focuses primarily on political, socioeco-nomic, international and development research inAfrica. AISA’s mission commits it to knowledgeproduction, education, training and the promotion ofawareness of Africa, for Africans and the internationalcommunity. Its method for achieving this is throughpolicy analysis, collection, processing, interpretation,and dissemination of information. AISA’s clientsinclude the government of South Africa; foreign



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missions; the academic and research community; NGOsand civil society; the business community; schools;and subregional organizations such as SADC. AISAdepends on its research fellows, currently about sixty-five in number, to undertake its research activities inthe areas of African studies, political parties, partysystems and governance in Africa; the African renais-sance, regional peace and security, globalization,regional integration, and South Africa’s foreign policyin Africa. AISA has an invaluable reference libraryholding more than sixty thousand volumes. It hasmanaged to recruit new black staff and is led by ablack director.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is anestablished regional think-tank with offices in Pretoria,Cape Town and Maputo. Among its major achieve-ments is its subregional capacity-building work oncivil-military relations in the Southern African regionand its work with South Africa’s Department ofDefense, parliamentarians and academia within SADC.ISS has also worked closely with the OAU and has beenable to publish books and reports based on seminarsinvolving a wide range of actors from across thecontinent.

The Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) was createdin the 1980s and started off as the Center for Inter-Group Studies. Its activities in post-apartheid SouthAfrica have grown to include training, mediation,facilitation and public consultation, and researchpolicy advocacy. Its beneficiaries include SouthernAfrican governments and research and scholarlyconstituencies. It has worked with the Western CapeEducation Department, the Western Cape CorrectionalServices and the South African Police Services in theWestern Cape. At the national level, CCR has workedwith the Department of Defense, the Department ofForeign Affairs, the Department of Intelligence and theMinistry of Water Affairs and Forestry.

Enhancing dialogue through research in SouthernAfrica

To augment ongoing research, Southern Africanorganizations, often working in relation to a networkaffiliation, employ a policy dialogue strategy in order to

influence government and military actors. One of themore prominent institutions engaged in this type ofwork is the Southern African Regional Institute forPolicy Studies (SA R I P S ), based in Zimbabwe. SARIPS isthe research and training arm of the Southern AfricanPolitical Economy Series (SAPES) Trust, whose principalmandate is to nurture and promote indigenous capacityin the social sciences and the enhancement of thepolicymaking capacity of African states. SARIPS’ goalis to promote and deepen the exchange of ideasbetween practitioners and scholars through discourseand building capacity for advocacy activities inSouthern Africa. The policy dialogue strategy is aimedat facilitating intellectual discourse by organizingmeetings, seminars, conferences and workshops fore xchanging ideas and experience and influencing thepolicy framework in Southern Africa. The dialogueactivities provide an essential forum for SA R I P S ’research and training programs and brings togethernetwork members from academia, practitioners, civicand private organizations involved in policy formula-tion, implementation and evaluation. Papers andproceedings from the dialogue sessions are published asmonographs, occasional papers, articles and chapters inbooks that are used as reference material for training,research and further dialogue activities.

National and Subregional Efforts

National

The South African organization, Mediation andTransformation Practice (MTP), established in 1998,considers itself to be an African-oriented conflictresolution and facilitation unit, embracing the valuesof democracy, constructive conflict resolution anddevelopment of people and society. The MTP considersitself to be a community-based organization and worksmostly with various government departments, localgovernmental agencies, local organizations such as theQuaker Peace Center (QPC), and South African univer-sities. MTP has a number of partnerships in NorthAmerica, largely due to cooperation with thePloughshares Conflict Transformation Institute inCanada.

The Quaker Peace Center (QPC) is a small South



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African NGO working locally in the Western Caperegion and focusing on local modules of conflictmanagement, peace education, community develop-ment and youth issues. However, QPC sometimesextends these modules to the national and subregionallevels by working with other provinces in South Africaand other communities in Southern Africa. At thenational level, QPC has participated in the SouthAfrican Defense Review, where it lobbied andadvocated for a reduction in military spending.Through its Youth Program, QPC has been involvedwith the National Youth Commission and the SouthAfrican Youth Clubs Association. QPC also worksclosely with the South African National NGO Coalition(SANGOCO), a coalition of South African NGOs thatwork in a range of areas such as poverty, anti-racism,gender and employment. Regionally, QPC has workedin Burundi and plans in the near future to work inAngola. The organization claims to have increasedcooperation in the area of conflict management withsimilar institutions at the subregional level and hascommitted itself to work with Quakers in Africa todevelop peace initiatives on the continent.

Subregional

The African Center for the Constructive Resolution ofDisputes (ACCORD) is one of the largest and fastest-growing NGOs in South Africa dealing with a range ofconflict-related issues. ACCORD has developed a peacemodel recognized by the United Nations as viable forAfrica. This model focuses based on three key areas:intervention, training, and research. ACCORD’s currentprograms focus on conflict analysis and research;public-sector conflict management training; track-twodiplomacy initiatives in Africa; peacekeeping trainingprograms in all SADC countries; training for women inthe Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa; apreventive action program in SADC; and a program onconstitutional development in Africa.

Established with assistance from the U.S.-basedNational Endowment for Democracy (NED), ACCORDhas undertaken significant activities to transform thepublic sector into a dynamic, needs-based andproactive instrument. ACCORD also runs the PublicSector Conflict Management Program (PSCMP), which

seeks to promote good governance in Africa throughincreasing the capacity to prevent, manage and resolveconflicts within the public sector.

The South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies(ISS) works through and with national, subregional,and regional organizations, most notably the OAU, inengaging debates within Africa. The scope of ISS’sprograms is large and varied. It has nine major projectareas, notably organized crime and corruption inSADC, African peace missions, AIDS as a regionalsecurity challenge, children in conflict, crime andjustice in South Africa, African security analysis,security-sector transformation in SADC, crimeinformation capacity building in Mozambique, andsmall arms management in Africa. On the internationalfront, ISS has cooperation agreements with the Centerfor Strategic and International Studies in WashingtonD.C., the UN Educational Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO), the Southern African RegionalPolice Chiefs Cooperating Organization, andSaferworld. ISS programs are undertaken by a team ofabout twenty-five researchers. Some of theseresearchers have recently left ISS to form SAFER Africa

Created in 2001, the South African ConflictPrevention Network (SACPN) is a loose civic networkthat seeks to share information and expertise as a wayof developing a common understanding andsubregional identity with regard to conflict preventionand peacebuilding. It emerged from the activities of theCitizens Security Council (KATU), a network of FinnishNGOs that seeks to create a broad civic basis forpreventing the outbreak and escalation of violentconflicts. Coordinated from Zambia, SACPN’s membersare drawn from Angola, Bostwana, Lesotho, Namibia,Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland,Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SACPN’s structure involves aRegional Steering Group, consisting of one representa-tive from each member country, as well as NationalConflict Prevention Networks or Reference Groups. TheSteering Group is conceived as a planning andorganizing unit for the activities of the network.

The Center for Defense and Security Management( C D S M ), a South Africa-based organization aims toenhance effective democratic management of military



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and security forces in South and Southern Africa bycoordinating regional network institutions sharing thesame vision of peace and regional security. The SouthernAfrican Defense and Security Management Networkcomprises the Center for Defense Studies at theUniversity of Zimbabwe in Harare, the Center forForeign Relations in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, theInstitute Sonadade e Ad m i n i t r a c ã o at Eduardo MondlaneUniversity in Mozambique, the Department of Po l i t i c a land Administrative Studies at the University of Namibia,and the Department of Politics and Administration at theUniversity of Botswana. All the members of this networkprovide training and education for defense managementand planning civil-military relations, peacebuilding, aswell as management of peace missions, goodgovernance, and transparency. The subregionalinclusivity of CDSM is a factor that greatly enhances itslegitimacy and credibility.

Building capacity for conflict management inSouthern Africa and beyond

Several organizations work simultaneously in producingpolicy relevant research, advocacy and capacitybuilding. While space does not allow for a comprehen-sive report of the full range of these activities, it is worthnoting that these various endeavors positively affectcapacity for conflict management in Southern Africaand beyond. Activities target governmental, civil societyand local constituencies. They range from disseminationof peace and democratization curricula to broad consul-tations at the subregional level. For example, in 1994,ACCORD hosted the first seminar on election violence inthe run-up to South Africa’s democratic elections andbrought civil society leaders together in war-tornSomalia. It also developed a conflict studies curriculumfor undergraduates at the University of the Western Capeand the University of Durban, Westville, as well asproducing a training manual on conflict resolution forparalegals in South Africa.

In Botswana, the African Renaissance Institute (ARI)aims to serve as a vehicle for Africa’s researchers anddevelopment workers to marshal and deploy a criticalmass of able people dedicated to Africa’s political andeconomic recovery. ARI is a product of two years ofconsultations and organizational work with African

governments and civil society organizations topromote the effective mobilization and networking ofAfrica’s human resources and intellectual wealth. ARIseeks to bolster the capacities of Africans to resolvetheir own problems in the areas of poverty anddeprivation; technological backwardness; financial andeconomic dependence; private-sector enterprisedevelopment; and youth and women. To undertake theresearch required in these sectors, ARI has establisheda council of African consultants and developmentworkers. The organization works with African govern-ments, African development institutions and theprivate sector. ARI is currently building a database ofimportant African development endeavors, andestablishing systems for monitoring individualnational economies and providing advance warningsto governments and international financial institutionsabout the economic crises facing African states.

Tomorrow’s Peacekeepers Today: Training inConflict Management

Southern Africa’s semiformal organizations share acommon agenda for ‘homegrown’ solutions to Africanconflicts. The SADC Regional Peacekeeping TrainingCenter (RPTC) in Zimbabwe and ACCORD in SouthAfrica have engaged in full-fledged peacekeeping andelectoral monitoring training. The Zambian NGO,Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation (MEF) runs apeacebuilding and conflict transformation module andthe Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in SouthAfrica has trained police forces in Malawi.

The overall aim of the SADC Regional PeacekeepingTraining Center (RPTC) in Zimbabwe is capacitybuilding, specifically by supporting subregionalcooperation in peace and security in Southern Africaand by building SADC’s capacity in conflict preven-tion, conflict management and peace supportoperations. RPTC seeks to achieve these objectivesthrough training peacekeeping practitioners; facili-tating the participation of all SADC countries in peacesupport operations; and assisting SADC in planningpeacekeeping ventures. The RPTC is widely perceivedamong stakeholders in Southern Africa as having greatpotential to build capacity for conflict managementand peacekeeping. So far it has assisted SADC’s



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Interstate Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) topromote cohesive subregional security policies.Zimbabwe, the host country of RPTC, is responsible forthe implementation of RPTC’s programs through theZimbabwean Ministry of Defense. The rights andobligations of the host country as well as the lines ofcommunications between RPTC and SADC have,however, not always been clear. The termination ofRPTC’s funding by the Danish government in 2001,following instability in Zimbabwe, has put the futureof the organization in question.

In 1995, ACCORD helped train South African electionmonitors and also trained South African ForeignAffairs cadets, establishing a peacekeeping trainingprogram for them. ACCORD’s first seminar on SADCPeacekeeping in Africa was hosted in 1995. By 1996,ACCORD’s training had expanded to Zambia,Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mauritius, Swaziland, Sudan,Ethiopia, Burundi and Mozambique. It is hard to gaugehow effective and successful these programs have beenand they have yet been thoroughly evaluated. Supportfrom both the UN and the OAU has legitimizeACCORD’s involvement beyond South Africa.

The Zambia-based Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation’s( M E F ) peacebuilding and conflict transformationcourses target peace workers at the national,community and family levels. In addition, theFoundation offers a university certificate program onpeacebuilding and conflict resolution. With supportfrom the Eastern Mennonite University in the UnitedStates, MEF is restructuring itself into the Africa PeaceInstitute (API). API seeks to combine the theory andpractice of conflict management within the Africancontinent as a means of creating a critical mass ofactors that can help manage conflicts across thecontinent. The organization draws an average of thirtyparticipants annually from across Africa. In addition toits full-time staff are six part-time lecturers, all ofwhom are holders of at least a master’s degree inconflict resolution. Several of these lecturers have beenpart of teams involved in negotiations in the DRCLusaka Accords of 1999.

The South Africa-based Center for Conflict Resolution(CCR) has helped train police forces in Namibia and

Zimbabwe and worked with Swaziland’s RegionalSecurity and Human Rights committees; ruling andopposition parties in Malawi; the Lesotho governmentand its interim political authority and security services;the SADC secretariat and the OAU.

Formalizing informal institutions in Angola andMozambique

In Angola, twenty-seven years of war, social upheaval,and a persistent climate of fear and suspicion havelimited the development of substantial local capacity todeal with conflicts. However, political openings, inparticular the approval of a new constitutionsafeguarding democratic liberties, encouraged thegrowth of civil society. A number of NGOs, initiallyconcerned with humanitarian and developmentprojects, have expanded programs into civic educationand human rights activities. However, lack of institu-tional capacity to enable organizations to map outstrategies and programs of action, combined with avolatile political environment, have constrained theeffectiveness of these actors. Of all countries in thissurvey, Angola has the least number of semiformalorganizations. Instead, there are movements andworking groups that are advocating for sustainablepeace and collaborating in organizing activities suchas conferences, workshops, and talk shows to raisepopular awareness about the issues. These groups hadurged for a peaceful solution to the Angolan conflictand put pressure on the government and UNITA toresume negotiations before the death of Jonas Savimbiin February 2002. However, these networks are fragileand informal, with little or no chance of long-termsurvival in Angola’s uncertain political environment. Acritical challenge facing them is how to create solidand sustainable structures and organizations.

The church has attempted to mediate between govern-ment forces and UNITA rebels in Angola. However, itscapacity is limited because it has to wait to be invitedby the parties to the conflict before it can mediate. Thismeans it often fails to maintain momentum. Apartfrom the church, there are a number of foreign NGOs,previously confined to development and humanitarianactivities, which have incorporated peace initiativesinto their agendas. Key among these are Accao para o



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Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA), Forumdas ONGs Angolanas (FONGA), Grupo Angolano paraa Promocao da Paz (GAP), Grupo Angolano sobreReflexao para a Paz (GARP), Center for CommonGround (CCG) and Development Workshop. Whilethese actors have the capacity to engage in conflictmanagement, they often lack the legitimacy. Accordingto most Angolans, the peace process should be ownedand managed by local actors. Therefore, the potentialof these organizations to support and strengthen localgroups needs to be explored. The dominance ofinternational NGOs raises the question of the relation-ship between international and local capacity and byextension the more fundamental issue of the extent towhich such organizations are building the capacity oflocal actors. A particular challenge facing civil societyin Angola is the politicization of the civil societysector. In many cases, political leaders are also part ofthe civic movement. In other cases, personnel in thecivil society sector have worked for the government inthe past or continue to do so. While this overlap inroles can create avenues for policy influence andadvocacy, it presents peculiar challenges related tomaintaining neutrality, harmony and unity, as in thecase of Guinea in West Africa. Such a situation alsocarries the potential of creating conflicts of interest.

In Mozambique, conflict management organizationsare, with the exception of the Christian Council ofM o z a m b i q u e, a recent development. They haveemerged in an attempt to engage in the reconstructionof Mozambique after the civil war of 1975-1991 as wellas to address the violence related to the elections of1999. Central to the Mozambique peace movement isthe question of how to support sustainable peace.Semiformal organizations in Mozambique focus on avariety of issues. For instance, the Christian Council ofMozambique (CCM) engages in peacebuilding work. Ithas been promoting dialogue between the rulingFrelimo and the opposition Renamo party. CampanhaTerra addresses issues of land use as a way ofpreventing land-related conflicts. It does this by usingboth informal and formal mechanisms to addressgrievances as they arise. The Institute for Democracy(IPADE), the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, theCenter for Studies and Development, and theMovement for Peace and Citizenship (MPPC) deal

with issues related to citizenship, political participa-tion, civic education, safeguarding democracy, andconstitutional rights during political transition. TheOrganization for Community Conflict Resolution(OREC) and Ethics (ETICA) try to promote integrity inpublic life and also to curb increasing governmentalcorruption.

c) Semiformal organizations in Central Africa:Strategies and Activities

Networks and Umbrella Bodies

Activities of networks and umbrella organizations gobeyond national boundaries. Most of these actors areecumenical organizations such as the All AfricaConference of Churches (AACC), the Fellowship ofChristian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakesand Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA), the Central AfricaConfederation of Churches and NGOs (CONGAC), andthe African Network of Ecumenical Organizations(ANEN). Also falling under this category are women’sorganizations. These include the Eastern AfricaSubregional Support Initiative for the Advancementof Women (EASSIAW), Women Involved in Law andDevelopment in Africa (WILDAF), Women asPartners for Peace in Africa (WOPPA) and the Liguede Défense des Droits de la Personne dans la Régiondes Grands Lacs (LDGL). Ecumenical organizationsoften have greater leverage and impact on conflictresolution and peacebuilding activities than smallerNGOs. They enjoy the goodwill of governmentalauthorities, who are often afraid of the power churcheshave over their followers. In addition, these organiza-tions define themselves as apolitical, which casts themas neutral brokers, and increases their legitimacyamong all actors.

Networking and consorting have become the preferredmodes of operation in Central Africa. This enhancesprogram effectiveness and outreach, and cushionsactors from persecution by government authorities.While these networks are large, cover huge geograph-ical scope and have improved the performance of civilsociety organizations (CSOs), they are relatively fluidand still in a formative stage. These networks face threemajor constraints. First, they lack proper coordination



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and have failed to initiate activities to promote andstrengthen coalitions of CSOs in peacebuilding; theyare also weakened by redundancy and competitionamong affiliated organizations. Second, while thesegroups operate within the same conflict system, eachcountry has a different social, political and economicr e a l i t y, presenting different challenges forpeacebuilding. Language is one such challenge. Amember of the Great Lakes network, Conseil Nationaledes ONG et Développement (CNONGD) from aFrancophone country pointed to difficulties inexchanging information with counterparts in Rwanda.Increasingly, Rwanda is adopting English and Kiswahilias its official languages, while French is still thelanguage used by most NGOs in Burundi and the DRC.

The third constraint facing civil society networks inCentral Africa is the fact that the Kinshasa governmentis uncomfortable with Congolese civil society groupscollaborating or networking with Rwandan andUgandan organizations since the governments of thesecountries are supporting Congolese rebels. Within theDRC, a number of nongovernmental organizationsexpressed a desire to network in order to complementand strengthen their activities in conflict prevention,resolution and management. However, the coordina-tion of organizations is hampered by the continueddivision of the country into zones under differentadministrations. Each of these different administra-tions have put in place stringent requirements fororganizations operating in their areas; CSOs are thusunable to operate to their fullest capacities byinvolving local communities in their activities.

Nationally Based Civil Society Organizations

The second category of semiformal organizations inCentral Africa consists of nationally-based actors.Operating in most parts of the country in which theyare based, these groups often collaborate withsubregional and local organizations. In Rwanda,Programme d’Observatoire des Elections au Rwanda(POER), IBUKA, Collectif des Ligues et Associationsde Defense des Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda(CLADHO), Commission Justice et Paix and Pro-Femmes were some of the national organizationsengaging in peacebuilding work. In DRC, some of the

national organizations included Conseil Nationale desONG de Développement (CNONGD), AssociationAfricaine de Défense de Droit de L’ H o m m e(ASADHO) and Commission Justice et Paix. It isimportant to note that besides the conflict in the DRC,the huge size of the country makes it extremelydifficult for organizations, including those withsufficient capacity, to operate nationally. In Congo-Brazzaville two national organizations, ObservatoireCongolais des Droits de l’Homme (OCDH) andAssociation Congolaise pour la Nonviolence (APN),are working in the area of peacebuilding.

While nationally based semiformal organizations areinvolved in monitoring and challenging human rightsviolations perpetrated by the state and its agents, theycontinue to face intimidation and harassment whiletheir workers face occasional arrest and torture.Although rare, peace workers have been killed bypeople suspected to be acting on behalf of the author-ities. And yet in this difficult environment, most actorshave devised ways of working with the authorities tohelp stem violence and wanton abuses of humanrights. A number of civil society actors in CentralAfrica have developed strategies for working with localauthorities on sensitive issues, and have achieved someresults. These include actors such as Heritiers de laJustice and Commission Justice et Paix in South Kivu,ASADHO and CNONGD in the DRC, OCDH in Congo-Brazzaville and CLADHO in Rwanda.

Some nationally based semiformal actors areproducing useful and informative publications andperiodicals. These include Heritiers de la Justice,Groupe Jeremie, CNONGD, Commission Justice etPaix, Pro-Femmes, CLADHO and POER. Their publica-tions have played an important role in sensitizingpeople about human rights and how defending suchrights can serve as a basis for peacebuilding.

Intermediate Organizations

The third category of peacebuilding organizations inCentral Africa operates at an intermediate level: belownational organizations, but above community actors.Some of these intermediate actors have greater humanand material resource capacity than most of the



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national organizations, and their work is confined to afew local areas or urban centers. But these organiza-tions do not deal with issues broad enough to beconsidered national. Many of them employ profes-sional staff but usually fewer than national organiza-tions. They also experience more problems with staffretention than national organizations. Thoughintermediate organizations were often able to developand implement programs by themselves, they alsoparticipate in a number of programs under theumbrella of some national organizations or a consor-tium. The capacity gap between national organizationsand intermediate organizations is often narrowed aftera few years of collaboration so that a number ofintermediate organizations graduated to becomenational organizations themselves. In cases wherenational organizations designed the programs and onlyinvited intermediate organizations to be involved inimplementation, the capacity gap between the tworemained. In Rwanda some of the intermediate organi-zations were Rwandaise pour la Promotion et laDéfense des Droits de l’Homme (LIPRODHOR),Kanyarwanda, and the Rwanda Association ofFemale Entrepreneurs (AFR) . In the DRC, some of theintermediate organizations include Groupe Jeremieand Initiative de Paix de Femme en Afrique (IPFA-Mama Africa Peace Initiative). In Congo-Brazzavillean example of an intermediate organization is theFONDATION NIOSI.

Intermediate semiformal actors in the Great Lakesregion have faced the challenge of cyclical andfrequent outbreaks of violence at the subregional andlocal levels. Most of them lack sufficient capacity toanticipate outbreaks of conflict or to alert actors withinand outside the subregion of growing tensions. Wheresuch capacity exists, it is limited and often has fragilestructures that are unable to communicate and dissem-inate information effectively. These organizationswould benefit from assistance to facilitate informationgathering and dissemination, through provision oftelephone, fax and access to the Internet and otherinstitutional building efforts.

d) Semiformal organizations in the Horn of Africa:Activities and Strategies

Kenya’s semiformal actors: Peacebuilding across thesubregion

Kenya has a large number of semiformal organizations.This survey focuses on five semiformal actors, basedprimarily in Nairobi, but with program areas in othercountries. Most of these organizations have been inexistence for more than a decade.128 They act as brokersbetween warring parties; support peace initiatives; and,more significantly, help build the capacity ofcommunity-based organizations. Their capacity tomanage conflicts is being strengthened throughincreasingly close links and collaboration with eacho t h e r. In addition, all these organizations havedeveloped programs to deal with the political conflictsand tensions that occurred in parts of Kenya in the1990s. However, the inability of these organizations tosecure core funding, the reluctance of donors to fundsupport activities such as research, and the increasingcompetition for shrinking resources, has limited theperformance of these organizations.

Since its creation in the 1990s, the African PeaceForum (APFO) has become a principal player in thearea of peacebuilding and conflict management in theHorn of Africa. APFO has three main program areas:the conflict in Sudan; disarmament in Somalia; anddeveloping a civil society–led early warning networkfor the Great Lakes region (GLEWN). More recentlyAPFO launched a series of policy fora on issues ofrelevance to Kenya. Organized monthly, these policyfora aim to support peace and good governance anddraw participants from a cross section of nationalactors in Kenya. The first policy forum discussed theongoing constitutional review process in Kenya.Another, requested by the police department, assessedthe relationship between the police, the media and civilsociety. The forum also focused on electoral violence,and was co-hosted with the Kenyan Human RightsCommission. APFO, which has nine professional staff,

128 Kenya has been, for a great part of its postindependence history, the country of choice for such organizations because it enjoyedrelative peace and has remained the gateway to most of the subregion. It is still an attractive location for many international actors,including some of the specialized agencies of the UN such as the UN Environmental Program and Habitat.



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has raised awareness about the complexity of theSudanese conflict, Africa’s longest civil war, leading tothe creation of more than ten organizations dealingwith the Sudan peace process. APFO has variouslyencouraged the parties in the Sudanese war, includingthe government, the SPLA and other rebel factions, toengage in negotiations.

APFO’s training activities have led to capacity creationand enhancement programs for actors operating in theSudan, including the Sudanese Women Voice forPeace (SWVP) and the Sudanese Women Associationin Nairobi (SWAN). From encouraging locals to partic-ipate in de-mining activities in SPLA areas in southernSudan, a local NGO emerged: Operation Save InnocentLives (OSIL). In collaboration with the New SudanCouncil of Churches (NSCC), OSIL encouraged thecreation of a coalition of churches to address theSudan conflict. From this ecumenical coalitionemerged the Fellowship of Christian Councils andChurches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa(FECCLAHA). FECCLAHA pioneered the activities thatled to the Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms and LightWeapons in November 2000. FECCLAHA is nowextending its work to Somalia and incorporatingIslamic imams to expand its ecumenical character.

With regard to Somalia, the APFO program startedduring the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)(1993-1995) to address disarmament and demobiliza-tion issues. With the support of the InternationalResource Group 129 and in collaboration with the BonnInternational Center for Conversion, APFO organized aseries of dialogues between experts and actors in theregion on disarmament and demobilization issues. Outof these consultations the organization was able toinitiate a dialogue on Small Arms and Light Weaponswith governments in the Horn of Africa. APFO foldedup its Somali program due to lack of personnel, but theNairobi-based Life and Peace Institute continues totrain actors on disarmament issues in Somalia. Theseinitiatives influenced the process that led to the

declaration on small arms in Nairobi 2000.130 APFO hassecured funding from the US-based HewlettFoundation to organize an annual conference, over thenext three years, on security issues in the Horn ofAfrica.

APFO’s third program area is the Great Lakes regionand involves periodic situation analyses and trackingevents related to small arms and light weapons. Since1998, the organization has supported a network of civilsociety groups involved in issues of peace and humansecurity drawn from the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania,Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. Out of this collaborationemerged the idea of establishing a civil society GreatLakes Early Warning Network (GLEWN) to increase theunderstanding of the coping mechanisms of localcommunities; identify civil society groups operating inthe region; and improve regional coalition building.Launched in 1999, this civil society–led initiativebrings together members with diverse knowledge,expertise and experience. The network aims tomaximize efficiency and effectiveness. To do this,APFO is trying to facilitate the growth and stability ofat least one NGO in each country to act as the nationalfocal point for early warning in the region. APFO alsoconfirms to be involved in IGAD’s current efforts tocreate an early warning system.

People for Peace in Africa (PPA), the oldest peaceorganization in Kenya, is organized around two desks:a gender desk, with two full-time staff and five associ-ates, and a legal desk with two full-time staff and fourassociates. PPA also relies on a resource base of somefifty professionals and clinical staff to support its work.Besides peacebuilding, PPA also deals with humanrights advocacy and lobbies key individuals andofficials on policy matters. The organization’s work hascentered on three conflict areas. First, it focuses onconflicts within Kenya, where it targets ordinarypeople as agents of conflict transformation andemploys “African traditional approaches” to reconcili-ation and peace. Second, it seeks to strengthen civil

129 The International Resource Group comprised Canada, the United States, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, the UN and someAfrican individuals, including General Emmanuel Erskine, Bethwel Kiplagat and Josephine Odera, who was the regional coordinatorof the group.130 The Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms was signed on 15 March, 2000 by the fifteen member states of the Horn and Great Lakesregions.



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society in the “emerging nations” of southern Sudan,Uganda, Mozambique and Somaliland. The latest insuch activities was a workshop held in 2000 in Tigoni,Kenya, where it focused on practitioners from“emerging societies”. The third level of interventioncenters on the media. PPA has trained fifty Kenyanjournalists to report on conflicts and peace efforts andhas assisted twenty-two refugee journalists fromEthiopia with trauma counseling.

The Nairobi Peace Initiative–Africa (NPI-Africa) wasfirst conceived as the Nairobi Peace Group in 1984, andoperated under the registration of the Mennonite Boardin East Africa for its first seventeen years. In 2001,NPI-Africa was registered as an independent CharitableTrust “for the promotion of peaceful societies in Africathrough peace education, conflict resolution andpeacebuilding.” NPI-Africa has developed capacity inpeacebuilding, strategy development, impact assess-ment, and evaluation. Like AACC, NIP-Africarecognizes the need to explore the world of Africanspirituality and peace traditions and to integrate theminto peacebuilding. The conflicts in the Horn of Africaduring the 1990s challenged the organization to lookmore deeply into African religious cultural resourcesfor the resolution of the continent’s conflicts. NPC hasdiscovered the existence of a broad range of “historicpeace traditions” among various communities acrossthe African continent. The organization aims to serveas a facilitator in the peaceful transformation ofviolent and destructive conflicts. It has developed aninternship program and now hosts three young peoplefor a period of between three to six months.

Kenya’s semiformal actors: Continental Efforts

The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) is acontinent-wide peace organization, the largestumbrella body in this survey. AACC has an expansivemembership that provides it with a dependable

network. It works principally with national councils ofchurches such as the National Council of Churches ofKenya (NCCK). In all, it has one hundred and sixty-four member churches and claims to reach some eightymillion people within Africa. It also collaborates withregional bodies and AACC networks outside Africa.Such networking has facilitated the resettlement ofthousands of African refugees abroad, and mobilizedinternational opinion on issues related to immigration.AACC also relies on a network of sister institutionssuch as the World Council of Churches to reach out togovernments. As church structures, these institutionsare uniquely placed to deal with conflicts because theyare perceived as independent and most importantlyneutral.

The AACC attempts to develop a culture of peace bylinking peace to development. It has three programs: ayouth program, a women’s program and an interna-tional affairs program. Of these three, the youthprogram is the most developed. The AACC establisheda youth desk to facilitate networking and participationof youths in the search for peace through dialogue andpeer education. The international affairs program, theoldest of the AACC programs on peacebuilding, relieson church leaders. It is the program that the AACC usedto facilitate the peace process in Sierra Leone and theDRC.131 AACC has amassed a wealth of experience sincethe 1970s. Long before the IGAD process began, theAACC played a pivotal role in bringing the Sudaneserebels and the government in Khartoum to AddisAbaba to negotiate a cease-fire in 1972.132 The AACChas not only used the media as an instrument of peace,but worked with the media in cases it has identified likeRwanda and Nigeria where the press has been used byvarious parties to fuel conflicts.133 The AACC has amedia program aimed at establishing an early warningsystem. The program seeks to produce regular publica-tions to warn communities and local leaders of likelyconflicts. In August 2001, the AACC held a workshop

131 In the two conflict areas, church groups were involved in mediating with the combatants. In West Africa, the church’s interven-tion culminated in the Lomé meeting of 1999. In the case of the DR-Congo, AACC played a critical role in getting all parties to Lusakain 1999, and in obtaining a commitment from both sides to meet and talk.132 The ensuing peace lasted for some sixteen years before the government of Sudan revoked the accord in 1986.133 The head of this program, Dr. Mitch Odera, is also the chairman of the East African Media Institute and a member of the executiveof the Regional Council of the Media Institute.



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that brought together media editors, police chiefs,peace workers and experts to discuss the role of themedia in conflicts. The workshop, which was funded bythe AACC, the Catholic Church, NCA and USAID,addressed various issues related to conflict, payingparticular attention to small arms and light weapons.AACC plans to extend its work with the media to WestAfrica and to use peace workers to advise journalistson how to cultivate peace. The AACC has forged linkswith nonstate actors and maintains a critical distancefrom governments. This has enabled it to act as a criticwhen necessary and to support regimes when it felt itright to do so.

The Kenya-based ABANTU for Development is theonly organization in this report that is concernedsolely with conflict and gender. The organization seeksto influence institutions to be gender-sensitive in thearticulation and implementation of their programs.ABANTU’s programs center on gender and conflict;gender and peace; gender and information; communi-cation and technology; and gender and poverty. In itsgender and conflict program, ABANTU runs a standardtraining module on conflict management withininstitutions. The quality of training attracts high-levelofficers from both the public and the private sector.Usually the training takes five days and covers a rangeof issues including understanding conflicts, explainingthe characteristics of conflicts, and assessing conflictmanagement tools.

ABANTU also undertakes activities to create awarenesson issues related to conflicts. One such meeting was apolicy seminar on the gender implications ofpeacekeeping and reconstruction in Africa held in2000. The meeting challenged the prevailing thinkingon peacekeeping and reconstruction and emphasizedthe need to involve civilian gender officers inmonitoring human rights and civil administrations.Another public policy forum, attended by more than150 people, discussed the vital role of women’s organi-zations in peacebuilding and conflict transformation.The forum launched a special issue of gender matterson peacekeeping and peacebuilding, funded byUNIFEM, and identified ways of strengtheningwomen’s leadership roles in peacebuilding and conflicttransformation. This meeting also developed a

framework for making peacekeeping and reconstruc-tion more gender-sensitive.

ABANTU has sought to work with African regional andsubregional organizations in assisting them to developtools for integrating a gender perspective into theirwork. The first organization to benefit from thisprogram was IGAD. After consultations, the IGADGender Desk asked ABANTU for help in catalyzingwomen’s participation in the Sudan peace process. Ateam from ABANTU went to Djibouti, the location ofIGAD’s secretariat, to brainstorm ahead of the IGAD-sponsored women’s meeting held in Khartoum inOctober 2001. ABANTU depends on its experiencedassociates to carry out its research and training activi-ties. A majority of these resource persons are local,which ensures local ownership and relevance.

ABANTU’s Nairobi office is one of its three regionaloffices in Africa. The other two are based in Nigeriaand South Africa. ABANTU’s UK office acts as aninterlocutor between its African offices, as well as withdonors and other international organizations,including the United Nations. The organization’sNairobi office has also established extensive networksat the international level with the UN’s Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, UNHCR, UNIFEM, UNESCO,OCHA, and UNICEF, and at the regional level withpolitical and civil society actors such as the OAU,SADC, ECOWAS, ACCORD, ISS, and CECORE. At thenational level, ABANTU networks with actors such asthe Justice and Peace Commission, Peace Net, andNairobi Peace Initiative–Africa.

Sudan: Peacebuilding from Afar

The Sudanese organizations covered in this reportundertake activities at the community level. However,due to insecurity, most are based outside the country.This survey discusses three semiformal actors, twobased in Nairobi, and one based in and operating outof Khartoum.

In December 1997, the embassies of the Netherlands inKhartoum and Nairobi launched an initiative to facili-tate the participation of women in peace processes,particularly in the Sudan peace process. At the first



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workshop of this initiative in the Sudan, the Dutchgovernment sponsored the creation of five blocs ofactors, representing the various interests in theconflict: the national committee representing thegovernment; the national Democratic Alliance, madeup of opposition political parties such as the UMMAParty; the Nuba Mountain Women group; the SouthernWomen group; and the Civil Network for Peace.Located in Khartoum, the Civil Society Network forPeace (Mutanuak Group) is composed of fifty nationalNGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs),academic institutions, research centers and individualactivists working on peace issues. Their initiative aimsat imparting skills to boost their lobbying activitiesand to engage in institution building. The networkbegan with $5,000 seed money from the DutchEmbassy in Khartoum.134 To support its operational andcommunication costs, its members pay a monthlysubscription fee of $10 each. The second phase of theinitiative was discussed in February 2001 and about$12,000 was promised by the Dutch government tocover different types of activities such as training andsymposia. This network seeks to address conflictsacross the whole area of Sudan. Currently, it is collab-orating with the Sudanese Environment Association toorganize a national forum to deal with the issue ofnatural resources.

This network is keen to learn from previously failedpeace agreements, but lacks resources to collect,analyze and document information. There has been anattempt to supplement Dutch funding with that ofother donors such as the EU, UNDP, and Oxfam UK. Toachieve this, the Mutanuak Group is organizing weeklymeetings for its members to discuss proposal writing.While the network would like to be all-inclusive, it hasno contact with groups in the Nuba Mountains andSouthern Sudan. A proposal to find ways of forgingstrategic links with these blocs failed to gatheradequate support. Due to power struggles within thesegroups and their fear of a loss of identity or loss ofaccess to international events and training. Anyengagement with the North is feared as a threat to thefocus on the war in the South.

A second cluster of actors supported by the DutchEmbassy comprises four blocs of actors based in Kenyain Nairobi. These include organizations such as theSudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP), and theSudanese Women Association in Nairobi (SWAN).Activities in this cluster are slow. Tensions and rivalrybetween these two women’s groups have denied themthe benefit of synergy and collaboration. Stringentdonor requirements have also led to a loss ofmomentum. The gap between the first meeting held inJanuary 2000 and the next meeting was nearly a year,making it difficult to follow events on the war front.While the idea of having blocs has been in existencefor the last four years, there has not been any evalua-tion of the validity, necessity, and the nature of theidea. Further, the need to build institutional capacityand to lobby for inclusion in ongoing peace processesis crucial in view of the large numbers of actorsinvolved in this network. The Mutanuak Group is alsokeen to build a capacity that can help it collect,document and store information on peace initiatives inthe Sudan.

The most daunting challenge facing this initiative, andsimilar initiatives in Khartoum, is the negative attitudetoward the participation of women in the peaceprocess. Peacemaking and waging war are perceived tobe the domain of men. There is, therefore, skepticismand a lack of support for initiatives taken by women.The patriarchal system of the society in Khartoum haspresented peculiar challenges. IGAD mechanisms andstructures are also typically male-dominated.

The Sudanese Women Voice for Peace (SWVP),created in 1994, to support peace work at the locallevel, has evolved from an informal organization to afull-fledged registered institution. Its broad objective isto support the peace process in Sudan by facilitatingwomen’s participation in, and maintaining themomentum of, the peace process. Specifically, theorganization seeks to promote dialogue betweencommunities, identify and strengthen communities’coping mechanisms during periods of conflict, andsupport and encourage the use of traditional methods

134 This initiative is an offshoot of the 1999 Hague Peace Conference, which brought together a range of initiatives, citizens andorganizations, to develop substantive global strategies for the reduction of conflicts and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Fordetails of the conference, see http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org//hague.html.



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of peacebuilding. SWVP uses workshops to targetcritical actors such as political leaders and womenrepresentatives from southern Sudan. In addition,SWVP encourages women to form peace committeesand peace demonstration centers (PDCs) in each regionafter these training workshops. So far, it has helped tocreate six PDCs that focus on strengthening thecapacity of local communities to make peace, promoteincome-generating activities, and offer traumacounseling to victims of war. Each PDC has fivetrainers (peacebuilders), whose role is to sensitize andeducate local communities on issues of leadership,human rights, peace education, conflict resolution,communication, and trauma counseling. These aresupported in their work by eight part-time trainers.135

As part of its training, SWVP runs a counselingprogram that uses drama as its mode of delivery.

The programs of the New Sudan Council of Churches(NSCC) are organized around six desks, the peace deskbeing the main focus of this survey.136 Created in 1989,the peace desk was initially meant to cater for the reliefneeds of war victims in rebel-controlled areas, thenexcluded from government assistance. This mandateevolved over time following the realization that reliefalone was inadequate in a war situation. In particular,the split within SPLA/M, between Riak Machar andJohn Garang, forced NSCC to focus more attention onpeacebuilding. Aided by the National Council ofChurches of Kenya, NSCC tried in vain to reconcilethese rebel leaders. It then decided to target leadershipat the community level. In 1997, it organized a meetingin Yei, southern Sudan, between SPLA/M and thechurch, out of which emerged an understanding towork together in promoting peace. In the followingyear, with facilitation from People for Peace, NSCCorganized a series of peace campaigns, starting withchiefs from warring groups. This initiative led to theDinka-Nuer reconciliation meeting during which thetwo communities signed a declaration of peace inFebruary 1999. The success of this initiative is attrib-uted to the use of traditional methods of conflictresolution and the participation of local communitiesin the peace process. In 2000, following the same

format, NSCC shifted attention to the Eastern Nile andbrought together representatives from six warringgroups. Again another declaration for peace wassigned, helping to restore calm to the area. InNovember 2000, a conference between chiefs was heldat Uulu to assess the progress that had been made. Asecond meeting was held in June 2001 in Kisumu,Kenya.

Rebels who, based on their dependence on localpopulations to wage war in southern Sudan, are waryof the increasing power of the church as a counterforceto them, threaten the potential of NSCC’s work. Rebelsare also wary of the possible multiplier effect of agrowing peace movement. Besides, these meetingsencourage discussions on issues of human rightsabuses and good governance, invariably criticizing therebel movements. SPLA/M has responded by trying todeter people from attending such meetings. Forinstance, SPLA leader John Garang attempted to stoppeople from attending a Sudan peace meetingorganized in Kisumu in June 2001.

Somalia: The Demand for Conflict Management

The Life and Peace Institute (LPI-Nairobi) is apeculiar type of semiformal organization. It is anecumenical research institute comprising christianchurches and a branch of the Life and Peace Institutein Uppsala, Sweden, and it operates in local communi-ties in East Africa. LPI-Nairobi was established torespond to various conflicts in the Horn of Africa onthe premise that many responses to conflicts lack anunderstanding of their root causes. Traditionalapproaches seemed ad hoc and lacking in anunderstanding of the core issues. Many We s t e r norganizations operating in the region, such asNorwegian Peoples Aid, asked churches to help inresearch aimed at arriving at a holistic understandingof the conflicts in the region. Thus, LPI wasestablished as a peace research institution to generateinformation on the nature of conflicts. Its mandate isto partner with existing church organizations and tofacilitate their work in conflict management.

135 The coordinator of this training program is based in Lokichoggio, on the border between Kenya and Sudan.136 The other desks include the evaluation desk, education desk, medical desk, women’s desk and accounts desk.



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In 1992, the Swedish government was asked by the UNthrough Mohamed Sahnoun, then the SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General inSomalia, to assist in peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.Sahnoun’s approach was to begin at the grassrootslevel, building peace from the bottom rather than fromthe top. The Swedish government, through LPI, startedto support grassroots peace initiatives that targetedcommunity leaders. From Somalia, this projectexpanded to include Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan.

After working in Somalia for nearly a decade, LPI hasbeen looking for a suitable partner in Somalia to takeover its local training. To date the organization workedwith over twenty-five Somalis on the ground, whom ithas encouraged to form a local organization called theForum for Peace and Governance (FORPAG). If thisinitiative succeeds, LPI is seeking to withdraw fromSomalia and leave peacebuilding to local actors. LPIalso works with youth, women’s groups, and churchleaders in undertaking civic education, peacebuilding,discussing the link between resources and conflicts, theimpact of small arms and light weapons on peace,human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and therole of gender in development. LPI has also trainedcivil servants in IGAD countries, in partnership withthe IGAD secretariat’s Political and HumanitarianAffairs division.

Uganda’s Semiformal Actors and ConflictTransformation

Civil society organizations in Uganda actively began toparticipate in conflict management after 1986, whenYoweri Museveni took power and invited them to takepart in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of thecountry. Before then, state repression and civil war inthe 1971–1986 period had virtually destroyed all suchinstitutions. Following the presidential invitation of1986, local actors mushroomed and foreign NGOsthronged the country. Insecurity in parts of Uganda hasintensified in recent years. Such insecurity is linked toconflicts in southern Sudan and the DRC, complicatingthe involvement of NGOs in peace work.

Uganda’s semiformal organizations defined their work interms of conflict transformation, arguing that their work

not only seeks to eradicate conflicts, but also to cultivatea culture of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Thisconcept also serves a distinct strategic purpose: todescribe peace work in a context where the state isfunctional and able to manage peace processes and forgelinks with key decision-makers and members of thediplomatic corps, enabling them to bring the humanrights agenda and peacebuilding into decision-makingcircles. In turn, the government is increasingly relying onthe representatives of CSOs for information aboutpopular reactions to government policies. CSOs have alsotrained civil servants in conflict management techniques.

First, there are a range of actors dealing with a varietyof human rights and governance-related issues. Theseinclude the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative(FHRI) and the Uganda Human Rights Commission(UHRC). In monitoring, documenting, and carrying outadvocacy work on human rights, these organizationssituate the problem of conflict within the context ofthe good governance debate. More recently, they arefocusing attention on the rights of displaced popula-tions in conflict zones, especially in the North. Further,these NGOs seek to hold the government accountablefor human rights violations associated with itssuppression of insurgency in many parts of thecountry. The contention gaining ground among suchgroups is that displacement leads to discrimination.According to them, internally displaced populationsare turned into second-class citizens and left “faceless”under the limited legal structures existing withincamps. Under these circumstances, women andchildren become particularly vulnerable to abuse. Therising incidence of HIV/AIDS and other sexuallytransmitted diseases has engendered family violenceand separation. In the camps, people are targets ofattacks from rebels, Local Defense Units (LDUs) andHome Guards who perpetuate human rights violations.

The second category of Ugandan NGOs working inpeacebuilding comprises actors involved in thehumanitarian arena. Actors in this area are overwhelm-ingly international (foreign) and include Italy’sAssociation of Volunteers in International Service( AVSI) (which has operated in Kitgum district for nearlytwo decades), World Vision in (Gulu), Oxfam–UK andIreland in Arua, Uganda Red Cross Societies and the



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German Development Service (DED) in Koboko – We s tNile. Relief actors increased from about five NGOs(mainly international) in 1996 to more than sixty by theend of 2000. The focus of these organizations hasshifted from meeting immediate survival needs (food,w a t e r, shelter, and immunization) to care and mainte-nance (including provision of agricultural implements,psychosocial support, education, training and incomegeneration). Peace, reconciliation and healing havebecome the main concerns of intervention programs.

The third set of actors in Uganda consists of agenciesthat focus on conflict management and peacebuilding.The leading organization among these is the Center forConflict Resolution (CECORE). Based in Kampala,CECORE seeks to promote a culture of peace andtolerance at the national level. CECORE has twoprogram areas. The first targets the media and seeks touse it to promote a culture of peace by trainingjournalists on how to report on conflicts and toinfluence policy decisions. The second area involvesorganizing training workshops that target peaceworkers or the staff of organizations dealing withconflict transformation and peacebuilding. To facilitateits work and increase the multiplier effect of itstraining, CECORE produced three resource handbooksin 2000.1 3 7 Besides publishing these documents,CECORE supports organizations working at thecommunity-based level through staff training. Thestrongest of such links is with the Acholi ReligiousLeaders Initiative for Peace (ARLIP). CECORE alsotrains local peace workers among communities affectedby conflict. It has built an impressive national,subregional, and international network.

Ethiopia: Enhancing Government’s Capacity forConflict Management

This section focuses on two peacebuilding organiza-tions in Ethiopia: the Ethiopian International Institute

for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and theDevelopment Policy Management Forum (DPMF).

EIIPD seeks to train and improve the capacity of publicofficials to articulate Ethiopia’s policy concerns and tofoster bilateral and multilateral dialogue on issues ofpeace, security, democracy and economic development.C o n s e q u e n t l y, its Foreign Service Training programtrains ambassadors, officers in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and new diplomats in negotiation, mediationand conflict management skills. So far, 690 people,drawn from twenty-four ministries and other organiza-tions, have passed through this program. Further, EIIPDhas organized conferences on various issues includingthe Ethiopian-Eritrea war of 1998-2000, water resourcemanagement, and humanitarian affairs. Aside fromorganizing sessions where experts are invited to givelectures, EIIPD also holds short and intensive classesbased on case studies and simulation exercises in publicand project management. It also publishes trainees’handbooks, reports, books on civic education, humanrights, democratization and regional conflicts, and hasa documentation center on the Horn of Africa region.

Because of EIIPD’s cordial relations with the govern-ment, it has a great impact on policy, especially in theministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Ecology andEconomic Planning. EIIPD has a good workingrelationship with the media, through which itpublicizes its activities, disseminates information andeducates the public. It works closely with multilateralagencies based in Addis Ababa, such as the EuropeanUnion (EU), the UN Economic Commission for Africa(UNECA), and the OAU, as well as research institutionsin other parts of Africa. EIIPD has an impressivehuman resource capacity, including thirty-four staff,thirteen of whom are professionals. It also relies on apool of expert resource persons, including policy-makers and practitioners, university professors, andconsultants.

137 This information was compiled from a workshop on the role of the media in peacebuilding, the first handbook discusses ways inwhich the media can contribute to peacebuilding. The handbook highlights and warns against the pitfalls of “news” reporting andurges responsible, balanced reporting. The second resource handbook, which is the first of its kind in Uganda and perhaps thesubregion, seeks to promote the use of traditional methods to resolve conflicts. Drawing from the material culture of the Pokot andTurkana (Kenya), the Acholi and Karamajong (Uganda), the Agacaca conflict resolution system (Rwanda) and the Wamakua,Wamwera, Wamakonde and Wayao (Tanzania), the book documents traditional methods of conflict resolution, reconciliation andhealing processes. The third handbook documents the experiences and best practices of peacebuilders in Eastern Uganda. The bookis a tool kit for peace workers in the area.



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The Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF)was founded in 1995 to promote dialogue between civilsociety and the government on issues related togovernance and democracy. Hosted by the UNEconomic Commission for Africa (ECA), the organiza-tion aims to provide open and democratic fora todiscuss policy and to promote dialogue among civilservants, politicians and civil society groups. DPMFalso organizes capacity-building workshops and anannual scientific conference.1 3 8 The organizationpromotes dialogue aimed at facilitating post-conflictreconstruction and is currently conducting fifteenresearch projects. These projects focus on the role ofexternal forces in fueling conflict and the role ofAfrican governments in managing them.

DPMF espouses traditional mechanisms of conflictmanagement as alternative methods of resolvingconflicts at the community level. It strongly believes inthe capacity and effectiveness of local initiatives.Although the organization collaborates with a numberof international and regional organizations, some of itsmembers are skeptical about the utility of collaboratingwith the UN, the OAU, subregional organizations, oreven, governments on matters of conflict. Suchmembers view UN policies as too narrow, the OAU astoo bureaucratic and ineffective, and subregionalorganizations as only marginally effective. Thesemembers instead advocate for increased collaborationwith local institutions. The Netherlands DirectorateGeneral for International Cooperation (DGIS), SIDA,the Ford Foundation, UNDP, the InternationalDevelopment Research Center (IDRC), GTZ andUNESCO are some of DPMF’s donors. It is currentlyengaged in negotiations with such international donorsas the Netherlands Organization for InternationalCooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC), the FinishDevelopment Agency (FINIDA), the Norwegian Agencyfor Development Aid (NORAD), DANIDA and theRockefeller Foundation to support the expansion of itsprograms. The organization relies heavily on consult-ants to carry out its work.

Tanzania: Facilitating Peace at Home and in theSubregion

This section examines two Tanzania-based organiza-tions, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, a peace-building think-tank and post-conflict reconstructionf a c i l i t a t o r, and the African Development Center,which focuses on development of subregional policieson peace, security and stability. Both of these organi-zations employ strategies based on a more subregionalrationale, similar to ABANTU in Kenya and CECORE inUganda.

In 1996, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere,founded the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (MNF) asa think-tank to facilitate and participate inpeacebuilding, including postconflict reconstruction.This vision informed the role of the Foundation as acustodian of the Burundi peace process (1996–2000).The Nyerere Foundation provided an administrativeand legal structure and served as the official custodianof resources for the Burundi peace negotiations.139 TheFoundation also established links with state and non-state actors at all levels. In its work on the Burundipeace process, the foundation had a facilitator and asupport team. This core team was in turn supported bya group of international experts organized into fivecommittees in the areas of: nature of the conflict;democracy and good governance; peace and security;economic development; and implementation of thepeace agreement. The Burundi negotiations weredriven by the philosophy that neighbors know eachother better and can solve their problems in an“African” way. Special envoys from the United States,Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, European Unionand Scandinavian countries represented the interests ofthe international community in the peace process.Nyerere reported to regional governments, the OAUand the UN.

Nelson Mandela, who now heads the Burundi peaceprocess, has inherited this peace mechanism. The DRC

138 The conference in the year 2000 centered on the Progress of Democracy and good governance.139 The Foundation is currently seeking assistance to preserve its enormous collection of primary material from the Arusha peaceprocess as well as those on Front Line States and the struggle against apartheid. The government of Sweden has indicated interest inarchiving personal materials. The University of Connecticut has also shown an interest in the materials on the liberation movementsin Mozambique and Angola, as well as the Front Line States.



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is experimenting with a similar model. Sir KetumileMasire, former president of Botswana and Facilitator ofthe DRC Peace Process, visited the Foundation to learnfrom its mediation experience. Following the signingof a peace accord in August 2000, the NyerereFoundation folded up its Burundi program in May2 0 01. Only a two-person implementation andmonitoring team has been left to work with PresidentMandela, who has mainly been assisted by a team ofSouth Africans.

R e c e n t l y, the Nyerere Foundation has facilitatedinterparty negotiations to address tensions between theruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and theCivic United Front (CUF) in Zanzibar followingdisputed elections in October 2000. In its interventionin Zanzibar, the Nyerere Foundation has isolated twogroups of issues. The first group involves issues relatedto election violence between the mainland and theislands resulting from disputes over the last electionand strong feelings of marginalization of the islands bythe Union, expressed by many Zanzibaris. The secondof issues group involves a variety of issues, includingcorruption, “tribalism,” poverty and disparity in theeducation process, that have a high potential ofigniting tension and conflict. So far, the NyerereFoundation has not been able to play a substantive rolein efforts to resolve the conflict in Zanzibar, largelybecause of wranglings within its own leadership.140

The Nyerere Foundation plans to undertake a trainingprogram involving civil society groups and legislatorsin Burundi and a dialogue with government officials,political parties and the judiciary on issues of equityand access to education. The Nyerere Foundation hasplans for a comparative study on mediation andtransition to civil administration, which would drawlessons from other areas in which such developmentssucceeded. The organization is also planning a confer-ence to examine the comparative experiences ofmediators with lessons drawn from Africa and theBalkans. Currently, the Foundation is collecting anddocumenting information on the Burundi peaceprocess with the aim of presenting the conclusions to

a regional summit of Heads of State and solicitingtheir input.

Undoubtedly, the Nyerere Foundation, now under thechairmanship of former OAU Secretary-General, SalimAhmed Salim, continues to enjoy a privileged positionand support from the government of Tanzania, largelydue to Nyerere’s legacy. Whether it can harness thisgoodwill to promote regional peace and securityremains to be seen.

The African Dialogue Center (ADC) is located inArusha, close to the Secretariat of the East AfricanC o m m u n i t y. ADC has played a central role in thedevelopment of subregional policies on peace,security and stability. It pursues two broad objectives.First, it assesses regional conflicts in the Great Lake sregion, taking into account the conditions necessaryto create an enabling environment to resolve them.ADC gathers and analyzes this information andshares it with policymakers and international actors.Second, ADC seeks to bring African institutionstogether to share different perspectives on managingconflicts. Since 1998, the organization has beeninvolved in activities leading to the first OA U – c i v i lsociety conference in June 2001. This project hasattempted to reduce the seeming hostility and mutualsuspicion between African governments and civils o c i e t y. More than 200 NGOs and 35 governmentrepresentatives attended the 2001 meeting. Theconference reinforced the importance of flexibilityand versatility within NGOs, particularly the recogni-tion that issues of good governance and the rule oflaw form the basis for conflict prevention, manage-ment and resolution.

In order to facilitate drawing lessons from past experi-ences, ADC convened a meeting of all the ke ydecisionmakers in the Tanzanian ministries of ForeignAffairs, Economic Planning, the Attorney General’sChamber, and the Office of the President. This meetingsought to highlight the pitfalls and explore ways ofcreating built-in mechanisms for maintaining regionalcooperation. From these meetings and wider consulta-

140 This dispute involved a clash between the Executive Director and the Trustees, with the Trustees accusing the Executive Directorof seeking to control the Foundation. Worse still, the CCM is beginning to show signs of impatience with the Foundation, especiallywith regard to the issue of Zanzibar.



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tions, ADC proposed three memoranda ofunderstanding on foreign policy, good governance,and common security. Although these memorandahave not yet been drafted, there is a desire within theEAC secretariat to draw up a protocol on commonforeign policy, defense, and security. ADC is alsoengaging other sectors of society. The organization hasengaged corporate actors in exploring their potentialcontribution to regional development and stability,especially with regard to the issue of corruption.

Appendix I: Section II: Community-Based Organizations

We conclude this Appendix by assessing the strategiesand activities of community-based organizations onSouthern, Central and Eastern Africa.

a) Strategies and Activities in Southern Africa

Established in 1986, the Zambia-based C a t h o l i cCommission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) instructs itsmembers on issues of social justice. Informed by aChristian philosophy, the CCJP emphasizes preventiveaction before tensions erupt into open conflicts. Itoperates through Justice and Peace structures createdat the national, local, and community levels. CCJPassists the people working on these structures byproviding, at the local level, analyses of events andinstruction on how to advocate and lobby for localaction. All CCJP members work on a voluntary basisexcept for a few staff employed at the NationalSecretariat.

The Zambia-based Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) hasexhibited strength in building the capacities of localcommunities hosting refugees, as well as ensuringrefugee protection. In preparation for refugee influxes,the JRS offers Refugee Emergency Response Trainingto local communities and parishes along Zambia’sborders. This training provides information and skillson the rights, responsibilities and needs of refugees,and the ways in which border communities canorganize effectively to cater for the immediate needs ofrefugees. Further, the JRS helps local communities andrefugees contact and engage with relief institutionssuch as UNHCR and the World Food Program. JRS

conducts peace education and pastoral counselling forrefugees in camps, which are replicated in urbancenters to assist refugees in coexisting peacefully withtheir hosts.

JRS also runs a Refugees Prison project. The generalidea is to try to improve the structural conditions/lawsfor refugees in Zambia. At the moment, Zambian lawseeks to ensure that all refugees remain in refugeecamps and that only few refugees enter urban centers.This has resulted in many refugees in urban centersbeing hunted down by immigration authorities andput in prison to await verification on their refugeestatus or to await relocation to a designated refugeecamp. With the large number of refugees in Zambia,this situation is resulting in much tension amongrefugees, between refugees and Zambians in urbancenters and between immigration officials andrefugees. On a number of occasions, JRS has comeunder attack from immigration officials in search of“illegal” immigrants.

CCJP’s advocacy work appears to complement JesuitRefugee Services’ capacity-building and training work.CCJP is limited in the level of skills it is able totransmit, and once a crisis in a community erupts intoviolence, CCJP does not have skills or procedures fordealing with it. Further, members are committed totheir full-time jobs or simply cannot afford to spend alot of time on the organization’s work. CCJP membersare advised to refer many cases to other institutionssuch as the police, or village headmen or chiefs. Onlytwenty to thirty (out of three thousand) members haveundergone formal training in conflict management. Allwere trained at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation.There is also a high turnover of members who leave theinstitution to work for other organizations that offer asmall allowance for voluntary work. With high povertylevels in Zambia, a number of members are undernour-ished, unwell and/or victims of HIV/AIDS. The CCJPnational office is currently undergoing an organiza-tional development program facilitated by the Institutefor Democracy in South Africa. The program seeks toprovide training workshops, tutoring, and exposure tocore staff with the objective of building and strength-ening their ability to respond effectively to social,economic, and political problems.



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b) Strategies and Activities in Central Africa

Central Africa’s CBO’s operate on a very localized level.They are usually based in the peri-urban areas or ruralenvironments. Some are also hosted by intermediate ornational organization to which they are affiliated.CBOs in Central Africa usually address very localizedissues and often do not employ permanent professionalstaff. Rather, volunteers often use their spare time torun the organizations. Many CSOs in Central Africa,for example the Organization des Volontaires pourl’Autopromotion Durable (OVAD); Agir en Faveur desDroits de l’Homme (AFDHO); Association Pa n -Africaine Thomas Sankara (APTS); and Associationfor the Promotion of Women Like the Sunrise(SERUKA), have been able to engage actively inpeacebuilding despite meager resources and poorfacilities.

c) Strategies and Activities in the Horn of Africa

For most of the 1990s, Northern Uganda was a zoneclosed to many organizations, with a small number ofinternational NGOs concentrated in refugee hostingareas. The absence of humanitarian actors left localcommunities to deal with the insurgency in this areawithout much external assistance. Out of a series ofattempts at reconciliation emerged the Ac h o l iReligious Leaders Initiative for Peace (ARLIP), aninterfaith collaborative framework that seeks topromote dialogue between the government and rebelsof the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This initiativeseeks to enhance local capacity through partnershipsbetween local and international actors. The core actorsof ARLIP are Christian and Islamic religious leadersbased in northern Uganda. These actors have moralauthority, status, and the extensive organizationalanchor of churches, parishes and mosques—perhaps theonly institutions that have been able to survive the warin the North.

ARLIP’s peacebuilding strategy has involved buildinggovernmental, local and international support forforgiveness and reconciliation. In March 1998, the taskforce met and presented Ugandan president Yo w e r i

Museveni with a memorandum: A Call for Peace and anEnd to Bloodshed in Ac h o l i l a n d. Presidential reassur-ance bolstered the position of ARLIP in the eyes of localgovernment actors, in particular the Local Councils andmilitary authorities, who became enthusiastic partnersin the search for peace as well as donors such as theU N D P, which, as part of its bilateral arrangement,started funding ARLIP to run workshops, hold meetingsand make contacts with LRA rebels and their allies.ARLIP has also established contacts with Acholis in thediaspora, and sent a delegation to attend their annualmeeting in London to urge their support for the peaceinitiative. In a visit to the United States in 1999, ARLIPleaders met with government officials, members ofCongress and the UN to discuss issues related to therelease of abducted children; strengthening the amnestylaw; dialogue and reconciliation between Sudan andUganda; and international support for resettlement andreconstruction efforts. At the subregional level, ARLIPleaders have engaged with religious leaders fromsouthern Sudan in an attempt to share experiences,promote dialogue and explore opportunities forbuilding partnerships across the Sudan-Uganda border.These activities have been critical in bolsteringconfidence within the government and helped bringabout the Amnesty Act of November 1999.1 41

ARLIP has emerged as the legitimate mouthpiece forthe Acholi community, a mediator between thegovernment and rebels and a trusted buffer between,on the one hand, the rebels and the government, andon the other hand, children who have fled abductionand forcible conscription. With support from theMennonite Central Committee (MCC), ARLIP hadtrained sixty Voluntary Peace Animators (VPA) by2000. The MCC also funds one program officer positionwithin ARLIP and pays for ad hoc activities such as thenational, regional and international travel of peaceworkers. The flexibility of this funding allows ARLIP toseize opportunities as they arise and to accommodateunanticipated events without the constraint oflaborious grant making and accounting procedures.Another useful supporter of ARLIP’s work is the SouthAfrica-based African Center for ConstructiveResolution of Disputes (ACCORD), which, with

141 The Amnesty Act replaced the decision to use military force in dealing with the LRA, with a blanket amnesty, deemed as the onlymeans of delivering reconciliation, healing and sustainable peace.



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assistance from Christian Aid, has collaborated withARLIP to organize a forum on Peace Research andReconciliation Agenda. This forum brings togetherreligious leaders from conflict-ridden regions inKaramoja, Teso, Lango and West Nile to share experi-ences with those of Acholiland. Under this program,ARLIP clerics recently visited southern Sudan in aneffort to network with their counterparts.

Kenya’s Peace and Development Network (Peace Net)belongs to a category of organizations runningoutreach programs in partnership with community-based organizations across Kenya. It has its genesis inthe tensions and ethnic clashes that occurred in Kenyain the early 1990s, and have now become a recurrentfeature of the country’s politics. Primarily, Peace Net isengaged in organizing community-based solutions tointer- and intra-communal violence and security. Itsprimary objective is to create a critical mass of peaceworkers. Peace Net’s activities involve the rehabilita-tion of local structures weakened or destroyed by theUNDP-led intervention between 1993 and 1995.142 Inaddition, the organization seeks to defuse tension inareas where communal violence has erupted. These

activities are undertaken through a program oncapacity building, in which Peace Net selects and trainslocal focal points such as community workers, individ-uals, or smaller organizations to become peaceworkers. Peace Net has carried out work in nineoperational areas throughout the country: Far East,North Eastern (Garissa, Ijara, Mandera), Nairobi, Coast,North Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western,and Central Kenya. It has trained over five hundredcommunity workers in conflict transformation.

These community-based processes have generated theirown momentum and led to replication at higheradministrative levels such as districts and provinces.For instance, Peace Net’s first engagement withcommunities from Garissa district led to the formationof the Garissa Peace Committee, which was replicatedin the newly created Ijara district and later in Manderadistrict. In May 2001, Peace Net organized a meeting,attended by fifty-six of its members, to review itsprograms. This meeting identified the phenomenon ofelection-related violence as a priority issue in view ofthe upcoming elections in Kenya scheduled forDecember 2002.143”

142 In an effort to lead the intervention to rehabilitate Kenyans displaced in the aftermath of the “land clashes” of the early 1990s,UNDP, through its Office of Projects (UNOPS), created the Displaced Persons Program. However, instead of working and collaboratingwith local actors, this program established parallel structures, intensified competition and undermined local capacity. For a compre-hensive analysis of the project, see CRS, Evaluating the Performance of the estern Province Coordination Committee, Commissionedby UNDP–Kenya to CRS, Moi University, 1995; and Human Rights Watch/Africa, Failing the Internally Displaced: The UNDP DisplacedPersons Program in Kenya (HRW, 1997).143 At the end of this meeting, participants delivered a statement in which they appealed to leaders to “rethink the dangers inherentin a divisive political culture and called upon them to move towards governance based on the intrinsically African values ofconsensus building and inclusion.” quoted in “Appeal to the Nation for Harmonious Co-existence,” Daily Nation, 23 May 2001.



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Appendix IIL ist of Ac ro n y m ns

A AC C All Africa Conference of ChurchesAC C O R D African Center for the Constructive

Resolution of DisputesAC D E S S African Center for Development and

Strategic StudiesAC R I African Conflict Response InitiativeA D C African Dialogue CenterA D R A Accão para o Desenvolvimento Rural

e AmbienteA F D H O Agir en Faveur des Droits de

l ’ H o m m eA F R Association of Female EntrepreneursA F S T R AG African Strategic and Peace Research

G r o u pA I SA African Institute of South AfricaA N A D Accord de Non-Agression et

d ’Assistance en Matière de DéfenseA N C African National CongressA N E N African Network of Ecumenical

O r g a n i z a t i o n sA P F O African Peace ForumA P I Africa Peace InstituteA P N Association Congolaise pour la

N o n v i o l e n c eA P T S Association Pan-Africaine Thomas

S a n k a r aA R I African Renaissance InstituteA R L I P Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative for

Pe a c eA SA D H O Association Africaine de Défense de

Droit de l’HommeAT M African Traditional MethodsA U African UnionB C P Basutoland Congress Pa r t yB N P Basotho National Pa r t yC A R Central African RepublicC B O Community-based organizationC C G Center for Common GroundC C J P Catholic Commission for Justice and

Pe a c eC C M Chama cha MapinduziC C M Christian Council of MozambiqueC C R Center for Conflict Resolution

C D D Center for Democracy andD e v e l o p m e n t

C D S Center for Defense StudiesC D S M Center for Defense and Security

M a n a g e m e n tC E AO Communauté Économique de

l ’Afrique de l’OuestC E C O R E Center for Conflict ResolutionC E D E Center for Democratic EmpowermentC E P G L Communauté Économique des Pa y s

des Grand LacsC E WA R N Conflict Early Warning and Response

M e c h a n i s mC G G Campaign for Good GovernanceC I DA Canadian International Development

A g e n c yC L A D H O Commission Justice et Paix and Pro-

F e m m e sC N D D - F D D Conseil Nationale pour la Défense de

la Démocratie–Forces de Défense dela Démocratie

C N O N G D Conseil Nationale des OrganizationsNon-Gouvermentales deD é v e l o p p e m e n t

C O D Christian Organization forD e v e l o p m e n t

C O M E SA Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa

C O N G AC Central Africa Confederation ofChurches and NGOs

C O PA X Conseil de Paix et de Securité del ’Afrique Centrale

C O R A P E M National Committee for Action andReflection for Peace in the MRUS t a t e s

C P M R Conflict Prevention, Managementand Resolution

C R S Catholic Relief ServicesC R S L Conciliation Resources/Sierra LeoneC S Connect SynergyC S M Civil Society MovementC S O Civil Society OrganizationC U F Civic United FrontDA N I DA Danish International Development

A s s i s t a n c eD E D German Development ServiceD F I D - U K Department for International

Development–United Kingdom


Appendix II List of Acronyms90

D G I S Netherlands Directorate General forInternational Cooperation

D O P Declaration of PrinciplesD P M F Development Policy Management

F o r u mD R C Democratic Republic of CongoE AC East African CommunityE A S S I AW Eastern Africa Subregional Support

Initiative for the Advancement ofWo m e n

E C A Economic Commission for AfricaE C C A S Economic Community of Central

African StatesE C O M O G Economic Community of We s t

African States Cease-fire MonitoringG r o u p

E C OWA S Economic Community of We s tAfrican States

E I I P D Ethiopian International Institute forPeace and Development

E SA Europe–South Africa Business andFinance Forum

E T I C A The EthicsE U European UnionE WS Early Warning SystemFAC Forces Armées CongolaisesF C L Front Congolais de Libération

(Congolese Liberation Front)F E C C L A H A Fellowship of Christian Councils and

Churches in the Great Lakes andHorn of Africa

F E W E R Forum on Early Warning and EarlyR e s p o n s e

F H R I Foundation for Human RightsI n i t i a t i v e

F I N I DA Finish Development AgencyF O N G A Forum das ONGs AngolanasF O R PAG Forum for Peace and GovernanceF r e l i m o Frente de Libertacão de MoçambiqueF R O L I N A Front pour la Libération NationaleG A P Grupo Angolano para a Promocão da

Pa zG A R P Grupo Angolano sobre Reflexao para

a Pa zG D P Gross Domestic ProductG H A Greater Horn of AfricaG H A I Greater Horn of Africa InitiativeG L E W N Great Lakes Early Warning Network

G L R Great Lakes RegionG T Z Deutsche Gesellschaft für Te c h n i s c h e

Zusammenarbeit (German Te c h n i c a lC o o p e r a t i o n )

I A D L Initiatives et Actions Pour leDéveloppement Locale

I B U K A Collectif des Ligues et Associationsde la Défense des Droits de l’Hommeau Rwanda

I C D Inter-Congolese DialogueI C G International Crisis GroupI DA SA Institute for Democratic Alternatives

for South AfricaI D P Internally Displaced Pe r s o nI D R C International Development Research

C e n t e rI D S C Interstate Defense and Security

C o m m i t t e eI E C Independent Electoral CommissionI F C L Interfaith Council of LiberiaI G A D Intergovernmental Authority on

D e v e l o p m e n tI G A D D Intergovernmental Authority on

Drought and DesertificationI J R Institute for Justice and

R e c o n c i l i a t i o nI PA International Peace Ac a d e m yI PA D E Institute for DemocracyI P C R Institute for Peace and Conflict

R e s o l u t i o nI P F IGAD Partners ForumI P FA Initiative de Paix de Femme en

Afrique (Mama Africa Pe a c eI n i t i a t i v e )

I R C S L Inter-Religious Council of SierraL e o n e

I R I N UN information networkI S D S C Interstate Defense and Security

C o m m i t t e eI S G M Institutional Strengthening Grants

M a n a g e m e n tI S S Institute for Security StudiesJ I C A Japan International Cooperation

A g e n c yJ M C Joint Military CommissionJ P C Justice and Peace CommissionJ R S Jesuit Refugee ServiceJ S C Joint Security Committee


Appendix II List of Acronyms 91

K A N U Kenya African National UnionK AT U Citizens Security CouncilL D G L Ligue de Défense des Droits de la

Personne dans la Région des GrandsLacs

L D U Local Defense UnitL P C Liberia Peace CouncilL P I Life and Peace InstituteL R A Lord’s Resistance ArmyLW I Liberia Women InitiativeM A D Mutual Assistance on DefenseM C C Mennonite Central CommitteeM C P M R Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management and ResolutionM D C Movement for Democratic ChangeM E F Mindolo Ecumenical FoundationM F P Marematlou Freedom Pa r t yM L C Mouvement pour la Libération du

CongoM N F Mwalimu Nyerere FoundationM O N U C UN Mission in the Democratic

Republic of CongoM O U Memorudum of UnderstandingM P L A Popular Movement for the Liberation

of AngolaM P P C Movement for Peace and CitizenshipM R U Manu River UnionM R W P N Mano River Women’s Peace NetworkM T P Mediation and Transformation

P r a c t i c eN C A National Convention AssemblyN C C K National Council of Churches of

K e n y aN E D National Endowment for DemocracyN G O Nongovernmental OrganizationN I I A Nigerian Institute of International

A f f a i r sN M J D Network Movement for Justice and

D e v e l o p m e n tN O R A D Norwegian Agency for Development

AidN P F L National Patriotic Front of LiberiaN P I - A f r i c a Nairobi Peace Initiative–AfricaN S C C New Sudan Council of ChurchesN U F F I C Netherlands Organization for

International Cooperation in HigherE d u c a t i o n

OA U Organization of African UnityO C D H Observatoire Congolais des Droits de

l ’ h o m m eO C H A UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian AffairsO DA Official Development AssistanceO G D H Organization for the Defense of

Human RightsO L F Oromo Liberation FrontO L M Oromo Liberation MovementO L M E E Organization of African Unity

Liaison Mission for Ethiopia/EritreaO P D S Organ on Politics, Defense and

S e c u r i t yO R E C Organization for Community Conflict

R e s o l u t i o nO S I L Operation Save Innocent LivesOVA D Organization des Volontaires pour

l ’Autopromotion DurableP D C Peace Demonstration CenterP F P People for Pe a c eP O E R Programme d’Observatoire des

Élections au RwandaP PA People for Peace in AfricaP P P Public-Private Pa r t n e r s h i pP S C M P Public Sector Conflict Management

P r o g r a mQ P C Q u a ker Peace CenterR C Resident CommanderR C D Rassemblement Congolais pour la

Démocratie (Congolese Rally forD e m o c r a c y )

R E C A M P Renforcement des CapacitésAfricaines de Maintiende la Paix

R E D S O Regional Economic DevelopmentServices Office for East and SouthernAfrica

R E N A M O Resistência Nacionalde MoçambiqueR P T C Regional Pe a c e keeping Training

C e n t e rR U F Revolutionary United FrontSA South AfricaSA B South African BreweriesSAC P N Southern African Conflict Prevention

N e t w o r kSAC U Southern African Customs Union


Appendix II List of Acronyms92

SA D C Southern African DevelopmentC o m m u n i t y

SA D C C Southern African DevelopmentCoordination Conference

SA LW s Small Arms and Light We a p o n sSA M P Southern African Migration ProjectSA N G O C O South African National NGO

C o a l i t i o nSA P Structural Adjustment ProgramSA P E S Southern African Political Economy

S e r i e sSA R I P S Southern African Regional Institute

for Policy StudiesS E R U K A Association for the Promotion of

Women Like the SunriseS I DA Swedish International Development

A u t h o r i t yS LS T Selection TrustS M C Standing Mediation CommitteeS . O.S. RAMIRA Save Our Souls and Rescue the

Vulnerable S P L A Sudan Peoples Liberation ArmyS P L A / M Sudan Peoples Liberation

A r m y / M o v e m e n tS WA N Sudanese Women Association in

N a i r o b iS W V P Sudanese Women Voice for Pe a c eT N A Transitional National AssemblyU D F United Democratic FrontU H R C Uganda Human Rights CommissionU K United Kingdom

U L I M O United Liberation Movement forDemocracy in Liberia

U N United NationsU N D P UN Development ProgramU N D P K O UN Department of Pe a c e ke e p i n g

O p e r a t i o n sU N E C A UN Economic Commission for AfricaU N E S C O UN Educational Scientific and

Cultural OrganizationU N H C R United Nations High Commissioner

for RefugeesU N I C E F UN Children FundU N I F E M UN Development Fund for Wo m e nU N I TA National Union for the To t a l

Independence of AngolaU N M E E UN Missions in Ethiopia and EritreaU N O S O M UN Operation in SomaliaU N TAT UN Pe a c e keeping Training Assistance

Te a m sU SA I D U.S. Agency for International

D e v e l o p m e n tV PA Volunteer Peace AnimatorWA N E P West Africa NetworkWC C World Council of ChurchesW I L DA F Women Involved in Law and

Development in AfricaWO P PA Women as Partners for Peace in

A f r i c aW T O World Trade OrganizationZ A N U - P F Zimbabwe African National Union

Patriotic Front


Appendix II List of Acronyms 93

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The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa

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