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Jahrbiicher fíir Geschichte und kulturSíidosteuropa

JGKs

History and Culture of outh Eastern EuropeAnAnnual Journa|

Herausgegeben von

WolfgangH pkenMichael por nannGerhard seewann

lt-12

Redaktion:

Michael Portmann

SLAVICAVerlagDr. Anton KovaMiinchen 2012

Andreas Gottsmann (Wien)

Die Entstehung der rumánischen Konfessionsnationalitát war in der Donaumon-archie kein Einzelfall, im Gegenteil: fast k<innte man von einem Regelfall sprechen,Voraussetzungen flir derartige Entwicklungen walen ein die Suprematie austibenderanderskonfessioneller Nachbar, von dem man sich abgrenzen wollte, sowie eineunabhángige Kirchenorganisation, also eine Landeskirche. Das fehlte etwa denoberungarischen Ruthenen, deren Konfessionsnationalitát in den Ansátzen steckenblieb, denn die beiden griechisch-katholischen Dicizesen Oberungarns unterstandendem ungarischen Primas und durch die Ernennung magyarischer Bisch<ife und dienationale sondersituation zwischen Ruthenen und slowaken wurde das Entsteheneiner Konfessionsnationalitát unterbunden. In HajdLldorog wurde dagegen von derObrigkeit eine ,ungarisch griechisch-katholische' Konfessionsnationalitát verord-net: Kaum gegriindet, schrieb der provisorische Administrator die Herausgabe allerKundmachungen ausschlieí3lich in ungarischer Sprache vor,

konfessionsnationalitáten waren kulturelle Identifikationsmerkmale, die meisterst aufgrund kirchlicher und staatlicher Untersttitzung und F<irderung politischesGewicht erhielten. Standen schon seinerzeit hinter den Unionsvertrágen nichtreligicise, sondern politische Motive, so wurde diese Politik im 19. Jahrhundertfortgesetzt und perfektioniert: Der habsburgische Staat ftirderte die ruthenisch-galizische und die rumiinische Konfessionsnationalitát als Gegengewicht zu denpolitisch dominanten Polen bzw. Magyaren. Auch in Bosnien-Herzegowina ent-sprang die Bildung der Nationalitáten entlang konfessioneller Linien staatlichernwollen und in Dalmatien war die konfessionelle Definition - orthodoxe serbenauf der einen und katholische kroaten auf der anderen seite - von der staatsver-waltung ebenialls erwíinscht. Die habsburgische Politik hatte friih die Bedeutungkonfessioneller Identifikationsmerkmale erkannt und sie als herrschaftsloyalesInstrument gegen die kaum zu kontrollierende sprachlich-nationale Eigendynamikeingesetá. Diese Politik war allerdings nur in einer ersten Phase erfolgreich, denndie Bindung der Konfessionsnationalitáten an die konservativen Slnnbole Kaiserund Papst war zugleich auch die Schwáche dieses Konzepts: Der modeme Nationa-lismus bediente sich zwar konfessioneller Grundlagen und religidser Sujets, dochdurch die Ltisung des Nationsbegriffs aus dem konfessionellen Rahmen wurde imgleichen MaíJe auch wieder die Bedeutung der Kirche(n) als national-politischerOrganisationsraum verringert. Spátestens nach der Jahrhundertwende hatten dieKonfessionsnationalitáten damit ifue eigentliche politische Bedeutung verloren,wirkten aber als kulfurhistorisches phánomen noch weit in das 20. Jahrhunderthinein.

The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Tirrn of the TiventiethCentury to the First Balkan War

Árpád Homyak (Pécs)

l. Introduction

In order to be able to understand the policy ofBelgrade at the fum ofthe twentieth

century we have to bear in mind that from the early nineteenth century onwards

the most important aims regarding the foreign affairs of the Serbian leadership

were the liberation from under the Turkish rule and the creation of Serbian unity.

Actually, down to the Great War this purpose was basically identical with Serbianforeign policy, even ifwith a little exaggeration, after all, in l 878 the independence

of Serbia was acknowledged. At the tum of the twentieth century this was modifiedin the sense that next to the desire of Serbian unity the dream of seizing access to

the sea was more and more emphatically strengthened.

In the Serbian territories that were integrated in the Ottoman Empire (as well as

in the Serbian circles of especially clerical leaders living in parts of the HabsburgMonarchy), concepts were born to re-establish the Serbian statehood as early as

the eighteenth century, what is more, from the l680s on. Nonetheless, a detaileddescription of these does not flt into the framework of this sfudy, However, it isindispensable at least to delineate the Na ertanije that was completed inlate 1844and was linked to the name of the contemporary Serbian minister of interior, IlijaGara anin. The reason for this need is to enable readers to comprehend the modi-fications of the later aims to create the Serbian unity, the phases of development ofthese just as much as their recurring retums to the starting point. The Na ertanijeor sketch to Serbia's foreign policy is down to this day the best knou,n and, at thesame time, most detailed and contested Serbian doctrine related to foreign affairs.'Its essence can be undelstood by the fact that this concept tried to revive the goldenera of the mediaeval Serbian state, i.e. the empire of Tsar Du an. It would haveliked to make Serbia the leading power of the Balkans. In this state it would haveunited first the Serbian inhabitants of the Balkans, i.e. the people living under therule of the Porte, then other Serbs living in other regions.

Bythe 1860s this ideahadundergone cerbinmodifications. Whereas earliertheppípo-se was to uniff the Serbs in the Serbian state resurrecting on the ruins ofthe Ottrcman Em-pire unaided (taking nevertheless France and England into account as foreigrr assistants),

in Belgrade in the 3d third of the nineteenth century more extended frameworks were

I Ilija Gara anin's work was first published in Hungarian by József Thim, A magyarországi1848-49-iki évi szerb felkelés tiirténete [History ofthe Serbian Insurrection in Hungary of1848/49]. Vol.i, Budapest 1930. Lately, it appeared in the publication oftheHistory Studerrts'

Circle of the University Óf Szeged, Documenta Historica vol. 46, edited by Éva Szajcsrán,

,,Na ertanije". A szerb nemzeti és kiilpolitika titkos dokumeatuma, 1844) [Thó Secret Docu-ment of Serbian National and Foreign Policy] Szeged 2000. In my study I made use oftlrelater publication.

54 55

Árpád Hornyák (Péc$

discussed in order to achieve the aim (at least Gara anin and prince Michael Obrenovióas well as circles close to the prince). They were ready to accept the establishment of a

Serbian union within a wider union - Yugoslavia or the Balkarr federation.

The fundamental aim, however, did not change: the liberation from under the

Twkish rule and the unification of Serbs in one state. Nonetheless, while the liberationof the territories populated by Serbs from under the Ottoman Empire did not look likea hopeless project, the second pulpos.e, i.e. the unification of Serbian lands and the

entirety of Serbian population in one state seemed to be a much more difficult task.

This was namelyhindered by a greatpower, Austria-Hungary which was considerablymore viable than the Porte, Moreover, with the occupation of Bosnia by the Monarchyin 1878 it closed the way for Serbia in the westem directions. This as a matter ofcourse rendered it impossible for Serbia to unite the Serbs living outside the OttomanEmpire within remarkably extended borders in the foreseeable future. At the BerlinCongress not only the closure of this way in westward direction was sanctioned by the

great poweís by allowing Austria-Hungary to occupy the provinces, but Serbia wasunequivocally ranked among the zone ofinfluence ofthe Monarchy. Serbia, takinginto account the realities, altered its foreign policy. With the secret agleement conclu-ded with the Monarchy in 1881, Belgrade accepted the occupation of the provinces,thereby basically giving up Bosnia arrd Herzegovina. Furthermore, it agíeed to forbidthe hansition ofirregular troops to the aforementioned provinces, and it also renouncedthe propagation ofnational propaganda towards the Trans-Drina regions,2 [n retum forall these, Serbia gained the support of the Monarchy for its foreign activity predestined

by the occupation ofthe provinces in southem and south-eastem direction.Nevertheless, even in this direction hindrances had to be overcome in order to realize

Serbian foreigr policy targets, The political desi,res of the nations awaking late, i.e. ofthe Albanians and especially the national endeavours ofthe Bulgarians thwarted the re-

alization of Serbian foreigrr policy aims.3 In l870 the Bulgarian exarchate was formed,which exercised a significant cultural propaganda to bulgarize the population oftheMacedonian territories, thus jeopardizing the annexation of some parts of Old Serbia towould-be Serbia, which held true of certain Macedonian regions, tÓ, conceived of as

ancient Serbian lands. As fortheAlbanians, afterthe resolutions ofthe Berlin Congress,fighting against some of its measures started to become conscious. They founded the

League of Prizren to defend the lands populated by Albanians but given to Montenegro.Although it is a direct consequence of all these that in Seóia that had drifted into the

sphere of interest ofMenna and Budapes| a policy looking south ánd south-east becamedominant at the h-rm of the century and Belgrade tried again and again to quit the unila-teral pro-Monarchy policy having an eye on Russia as well. Examples are provided bythe time following the coming to power of the radicals in 1886-88 or strictly at the tum

The secret agíeement is published by Momir Stojkovió (Ed.), Balkanski ugovorni odnosi1876-1996 [Balkan Treaty Relations l8ó7-1996], Knj L Beograd 1998,177-179-Mihailo Vojvodió, Nacionalne teznje i zahtevi Srbije u Balkanskim ratovima fNational Ambi-tions and Claims of Serbia in the Balkan Wars]. In: Srbija i Balkansko pitanje (1875-19l4).Novi Sad l995,385.

The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Tum of the Twentieth Century

, to the First Balkan War

ofthe century between 1 900 and 1 902.a By the end ofthe l 800s a number ofoutstandingflgwes of serbian political thinking saw again the possibility of reaching serbian aims,among themthat ofthe most important one, the realization of serbianunity inthe Balkanalliance. ln the 90s ofthe cenfury bourgeois politicians, publicists and thinkers more andmore came up with the claim to alienate serbia from the Monarchy and replace the linksto this empire with the co-operation with the Balkan states, fust of a]l with Bulgaria.Basically, they retumed to the fundaments laid in the Naöertanije and refined to an extentin the 60s.5 some blamed and condemned the serbian policy of the previous decades forhaving left the road leading to the Balkan federation.ó others attempted to find an excusefor the serbiarr foreign policy which had become passive in the 70s, saying that Belgradewas forced to retire due to the military occupation ofthe provinces, also, because Russiawas preoccupied with its own problems arrd, not unimportantly, Bulgaria sfoengthenedits positions through the exarchate in Macedonia.7 All of them shared the view, however,that instead of the close ties to the Monarchy serbia had to look for new allies andbecome independent of the great powers, primarilyAustria.8

To find a way out it came to a political approach between Belgrade and Sofia in theyear 1897 . The opporhrnity for co-operation with Bulgaria was given by the recrude-scing crisis of the ottoman Empire and the outbreak of the war between Greeks andTurks. In the mid-9Os, namely, the crisis that had weakened the Porte for centuriesre-emerged and the nations of the Balkans had a chance to hope again that the empiresubjugating them for half a millennium would break up once and for a11. All this gavean impehrs to the serbian public opinion and especially the intelligentsia and politici-ans thinking with a sense of responsibility of national matters of fate to prepare for thewould-be collapse and to try to make the most possible use of it. They wanted to settlethe fate oftheir blood-brothers in the most appropriate way, i.e. they aimed at arurexingthese territories to serbia. The most important question was that of the division ofMacedonia, as this was aspired by the most nations, what is more, this region was inthe position to hinder most the co-operation amongst the nations of the Balkans,

More details on the Russian standpoint: Gy rgy Bebesi / Norbert Spannenberger A criri oro-szország balkáni tdrekvései és a pánszláv eszme [The Endeavours ofthe Russiarr in the Balkansand the Panslavism]. In: Ablak a Baklnra.Ed.Baláas Schtlller. Pées 2003, 15-33.Although there were significant differences as to how to create the alliance, stojan Novakovió,one ofthe best known and most influential serbian politicians, a famous historian ofthe tumofthe cenhrry, for instance, deemed it indispensable to consider ihe given power relations incase ofthe contingent conclusion ofan alliance.stojan Novakovió meant shaightforward that the serbian politicians had handed over theleading ofthe slavs ofthe Balkans to the Bulgarians, Mihailo vojvodió, Ideje Gara aninovog,,Na ertanija" i politióka misao u Srbiji kajem XIX. veka [Conceptions of Gara anin's"Na ertanija"andPoliticalThoughtinSerbiaattheEndoftheNineteenthCentrrry].In:Srbijai balkansko pitanje (1875-1914). Novi Sad 2000,249.This idea was shared among others by Milutin Gara anin, the son of the "Great" Gara anin.Vojvodió, Ideje Gara aninovog ,,Na ertanija" 248.There were some who were inclined to accept the Russian or westem'patronage''. Under-standably, they did not think ofthe Monarchy as it was their immediate neighbour. Russiaand the rÁ/estem states, however, were far away. This circumstance significantly contributed totheir attractive force in the eyes of Serbia.

fl1,1u

I

i

I

l

ll

5,1

Árpád Homyák (Pécs,1

Sofia was also compelled to revise its policy by the difficult position of the Porte andespecially the Greco-Turkish war of 1 897. One could namely be afraid that its foítunateoutcome for the Greeks would exercise a definitely negative impact on the position ofMacedonia which was considered by the Bulgarian state as vital. Taking this into con-sideration Sofia tumed to Belgrade with the proposition to harmonize their standpointsand policy regaíding the territory in question and "European Turkey" in general. As aresult of the negotiations early in March 1897 the agreement was sigrred according towhich they did harmonize the policy conceming the above mentioned territories andthey also declared that without the previous concession ofthe other partner neitherwould make any diplomatic or military steps to alter the status quo of the Balkans.Also, they pledged that until they do not agree on the frontiers ofthe areas ofBulgarianand Serbian interests inside the Ottoman Empire, tlrey would not put any obstacles ineach other's way in terms of ecclesiastical, cultural and national questions but wouldmutually assist one another in these activities.9 The agreement itself was not merely asimple evidence ofthe alliance of the two Balkan states but a starting point to which theline of their foreign affairs could be arranged, mainly in Macedonia. The fully-fledgedextension of this policy was accompanied by the signing of furtherpacts.l0

The endeavóur ofBelgrade to obtain the support ofthe other Serbian state, i.e.Montenegro fitted into this revived foreign policy line heading south. From the middleofthe 90s the Serbian govemment aimed at forming mole and more cordial relationswith the ruler of Monteneglo, which efforts could present spectacular successes,too. So e.g. in June 1896 when Prince Nikola visited Belgrade they concluded thatthey would co-operate against all efforts aimed at violating the rights of the Serbiannation, whether they would come from Turkey, Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria. Nikolaalso promised the support of his country for Serbia in the Macedonian question.ll

The support ofthe Serbian movement for Serbian cultural and religious equalityand autonomy developing at the tum of the cenhrry in Bosnia and Herzegovina was inharmony with this policy and foreigrr orientation. Fair enough, exclusively with secretinstruments, after a11, it was inconsistent with what was accepted in the secpt agree-ment of 1881. Just because of the new foreign policy line cau#d to a lmge extent bythe private, family problems of the ruler, Alexander Obrenovió, the recurring rumoursof the preparations of tlre Monarchy for the annexation made the leadership peculiarlyanxious at the tum of the century.12 The Serbian ambassador to St. Petersburg, Stqan

9

l0

Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomi odnosi, 216-2 17.

For example, the contract oftrade signed shortly prior.to the sigrring ofthe agreement, at the

coming into force ofwhich both sides expressed that the two agreements would be the basis ofstíong and friendly co-operation in future Mihailo Vojvodió, Sporazum izmedu Srbije i Bugar-ska l 897 [The Agreement Between Serbia and Bulgaria I897l. In: Srtrija i Ba[<ansko pitanje(18'75-1914), 174. Despite these phrases and intents, at this time the agreement did not becomethe foundation of the tighter co-operation between the two countfies as Bulgaria deciined toaccept the division ofthe Macedonian territories into Serbian and Bulgmian zones ofinffuence,The realization of this promise was aimed at by the successful endeavour of Serbia to ask Mon-tenegro tojoin the pact after extending the Serbian-Bulgarian agreement originally containingthree clauses to four clauses. Vojvodió, Sporazum izmeilu Srbije i Bugarske, 167.

In the background ofthis policy stood the marriage ofthe king to a lady in waiting. Alex-

F|ff||lii|lj,' The Foreign Policy of Serb,i,::J n;rfi,:re

Twentieth Century

Novakovió, did not even conceal from the leading office-holder ofthe Russian Ministryof ForeigrrAffairs, Vladimir Lamzdorf, that the Serbians could not remain indifferent incase of a change in the constitutional position of Bosnia, Novakovió, speaking with anopenness unusual for an official person explained the reasons for the Serbian insistenceon the provinces: Bosnia and Herzegovina are the serbian Tuscany, which he conceivesofas the ethnic cenhe and heart ofthe Serbian nation, therefore it is a matter oflife arrddeath for them that the two provinces should not be separated from the Balkan regionby the annexation and simultaneously integrated into an alien community.I3

The preparedness ofserbia, however, to back the movement ofBosnian serbseven by secret and indirect means, had disappeared by autumn (october - November)1902. I(ing Aiexander obrenovió had to suffer disappointment with hi purpose thathe would be abie to put a more favourable construction on his person in Russia andthereby could reach that he and his wife would be received at the court ofthe Tsar.These circumstances induced Alexander to start looking at vienna and to tum theattention of serbian foreign policy to the south, i.e. to the Balkans again. Thereafter,down to the criminal attempt of May 1903 the idea of interfering with Bosnianaffairs was abandoned at the govemmental level. (what is more, not even after that.The change occuned with the annexation of the two provinces by the Monarchy.)

Not even with the refum to the throne of the karadordvió dynasty did a radicalchange happen in the definition of serbian national aims. Despite the fact that afterthe tum in May serbia was determinate to search for new ways. The serbian bour-geoisie with íe pect to their economic power considered Austria-Hungary theirmost dangerous opponent. At the same time, not without good reason, they thoughtofvienna as the gravest hindrance for the development ofthe countfy. Thus theyset the furthering of serbia's economic and political independence as their aim.|aunder these circumstances the foreign policy programme was coined which brokewith the one-sided pro-Monarchy politics and as a kind of opposite approach putthe joining of forces with Russia and the Balkan states into the foreground.ls

Amongst the targets to reach of serbia's foreign policy old-serbia remained in thefirst place. This had a clear priority over national political plans. In the'vork pro-gramme" accepted by the serbian govemment the determinate support of reforms to

ander's marriage to Draga Ma in proved to be unsuccbssful. The problem with Draga wasnot only that she was a widow arrd some years older than the king but also, her infertilitywas commonly known what made the succession questionable. Rado Lju ió, Ljubavi srpskihvladara i politióara [The Love Lives of Serbian Rulers and Politicians]. Belgrade 2001: 1gg-203. All this provokod the resentment ofsome circles ofthe govemment, To counterbalancethis, the king tried to seek the support ofthe opposition, ofthe radicals. This made the shift inthe foreign policy necessary as well.

13 Mihailo Vojvodió, Srbija i Bosansko-Hercegova ko pitanje po etkom XX, veka [Serbia andíhe Bosnian-Herzegovin Question at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century], In: Srbija iBalkansko pitanje. Novi Sad, 276.

la It is not by chance that the claim to the access to the ea became more and more definite at thenrm of the century.

15 Mihailo Vojvodió, Uo i rata i914 [on the Eve of War 1914]. In: Srbija i Balkansko pitanje.Novi Sad 2000. 4t8.

Árpaa Homyák (Pécs)

be introduced in ottoman areas populated by Serbians occupied the very fust place.i6

Following the revolt of the Macedonian llinden of summer 1903 Belgrade tried

to gain the suppofi of Russia, for the annexation of all Macedonia to S9rbia. ltgma_tional conditions, howeve1 did not facilitate this. Althougb in Belgrade the Serbian

dynasty came to power which was more favoured by petersburg than its rival, Russia

was occupied *ith th. Far East and it was not in its interest to meddle in the affairs

on the Balkans.t7 The great empires sti1l represented the standpoint of the status quo

fixed in the agreement of 1 897 in St. Petersburg; they merely demanded that the Porte

introduce some reforms on the Balkan Peninsula.l8 When in October 1903 Francis

Joseph and Nicholas II met in Mtirzsteg, the ruiers of the two empires accepted the

plans elaborated by their ministers of foreign affairs on the reforms to be introduced

in Macedonia.'g This plan essentially coincided with 1he proposition elaborated by

the English; what is more, it enjoyed the approval of Germany as well. The latter

empire admonished the porte that the future of its European territorie depended on

to what extent the sultan was able to master the situation on the Balkans.20

Seeing the coírmon understanding and persistence ofthe great powers not to inter_

fere with the given sifuation, Serbia unwillingly joined this position, This is wibressed

by the answei to the parliamentary interpellation given by the Serbian Prime Minister

Nikolu Pu ió in March 1904 when t}re interpellation demanded from him as a minister

of foreign affairs a more active Balkan policy. ín his repty the prime minister only

consideód the improvement of the fate of the christians in Turkey a real possibility.

He, howeveq did not deem the solution of the eastem question timely. For serbia, the

Serbian prime minister estimated the following of the line marked by the great empire

in order not to cause greater upheavals on the Balkans while trying to improve the

situation of their brethren.21

After the coup d'état of May 1903 the attention of Ser,bian public opinion tumed

ló with rcspect to ihe urging of reforms to be intoduced in the parts populated by setbians, Belgrade

agreedwith Monterregfo on a coínmonpolicy earlier, in the coune offhe negotiations of1896, Later,

oih* th.y."n.*"d their negotiations in 1901 and 1902 they aseed a,n that itras necessary to

harmonize their activities of this kind. Mihailo vojvodió, Nastojanje srbije na zbliiafu sa cmom

Gorom (1900_1902) [The Etrorts by Serbia approaching Montenegro (1900_1902) In: Srbija i

Balkansko pitanje. Novi Sad 2000, 262.17 Cf. Bebesi Gy rgy, orosz gyarmatosítás a19. századbal [Russian Coionisation in the 19tl,

Century], In: iPF Tarrszéki K zlemények. Szeksz rd2002,48,18 The pact sigrred between Russia and Austro-Hungary in 1897 fixed the status quo and although

vio.a worid harr" preferred it, this agreement did not start negotiating the Balkan situation in

case of a possible trrmover of the status quo. on the history of thB formation of the agreement

and the rjevant Russian and Austro_Htmgarian interests cf. Palot& Emil, A Balkín_kérdés. Az

osztrák-magyar és az orosz diplomácia a )ilX, széuad végen [The Balkan Question. The Austrian_

Hrurgarian ád me Russian Diplomacy on the Ende of 1 9 Cer rry] , Budapest i 972,

19Thedocumenlispublishedin:Stojkovió,Balkanskiugovomiodnosi240-24l'il lbid.2l He had the opinion that it was in the inúerest of serbia to abstain from voicing questions of foreign

policy at a time when the circumstances for liberating the Serbians in the Ottoman EmPire were

disÁaotageous. lnstead, they should rather tum their attention to the settlement of intemal matteíS

on th" agdda. The speech delivered by pa ié on 24 March 1 904. Nikola pa ió u Narodnoj skupstini

[Nikola Pa ió in the National Assembly] , Ifuj. 3. Prired. Dubravka Stojanovió. Bengad 1997,45,

60

The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Tum of the Twentieth Centuryto the First Balkan War

more iritensively to the territories standing under the official administration ofAustria-Hungary too. However, as we have seen the seóian govemment saw the intemationalsituation distinctly and both with relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina the governfirentrvamed the society to be patient, reasoning that the eventual fate of the provincesdepended on those great powers which had put them under the adminisration of theneighbouring Monarchy.22 pa ió meant that serbia had no other choice than "to aspireto gain the sympathy ofthe great empires, in spite ofthe fact that Belgrade shared theprinciple that the Balkans belonged to the Balkan nations. pa ió wanted to persuadethe great powers that Serbia wa a state of law with relevant culfure, a worthy mem-ber of the European community and worthy of assistance to be able to develop andexpand".23 He did not change this standpoint of his even while the skuggle over hogwith his huge neighbour was under way. At the same time, Pa ió was convinced thatSerbia needed peace, peaceful development in order to stand up and strengthen. Thisway events would not happen with the country without a proper state of military force,in fact events that might occur unexpectedly or even against the will of Serbia.2a

The surprisingly rapid annexation ofthe two provinces in October 1908 gives proofthat pa ió was very much right wherr he was afraid of unexpected events against the willof his country. Just a few a months after the serbian prime Minister uttered his abovequoted speech summarising the tasks of Serbia in Skupstina in Belgrade tlre Monarchylegally arrnexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, these two provinces to the dual monarchy.

The Serbian society felt a severe shock because ofthe annexation. The fountain ofthis was partly the already mentioned affection, adherence to the two provinces in theserbian political thinking, partly the also mentioned fact that the serbian governmentaccepted the Balkan status quo as itwas expected by the great empires. The reflectionto the annexation was the establishment of secret and semi-official organizations inserbia and in the areas of the Monarchy where serbians lived, certainly overwhelín-ingly in the Balkan regions of the empire. The most important one proved to bewithout any doubt lhe "Narodna odbrana", which was forrrrded on the inspiration ofthe excellent Serbian man of letters and playwrigh| Branislav Nu ié.25 The originalpurpose of the establisbment was to recruit voluntaries and to provide help in case of apossible national war. Nevertheless, it soon turned into the means ofthe expression ofnational unity. After a month it had as many as 223 sub organizations.26 :

At the outbreak of the annexation crisis, which almost t}reatened with a miliiaryconflict the Serbian diplomacy tried to gain information in the European capitals.2?

23

24

25

26

27

The parliamentary speech delivered by Pa ió on 9 November 1904 is published in: NikolaPa ió u Narodnoj skup tini, 54,

ibid.Ibid,.347 ,

similarly to most ofhis contemporaries, Nu ió entered state service, too and occupied variousdiplomatic positions in the 90s, for example, he was vice consul in Pristina.Milorad Ekmeöió, Stvmanje Jugoslavije [The Creation ofYugoslavia]. Ifuj. 2. Beograd 1989,495,The Serbian gov mment addressed a memorandum to the powers that had signed the BerlinContíact. The Montenegrin govemment joined this note as well. In this document the Serbsasked for the immediate.reconsiruction ofthe sihration described by it. Should this prove tobe impossible, they demanded compensation to an extent which could safeguard Serbia's

61

Árpád Homyák (Pécs)

This, however, rather served to soothe public opinion and did not mean that the Ser-

bian govemment earnestly hoped for the backing by any great empire, At the outset,

a group of Serbian politicians and scientists (Milan Milovanovió, Jovarr Cvijó, StojanNovakovió) stili hoped for a territorial compensation, indeed, in the southem and east-

em parts of the provinces, in the Drina valley and the Trebinje area.28 All the same, they

soon gave up this project. On the one hand, there was not much reality in believing that

the Monarchy would concede territorial compensations, on the other, they would have

caused incurable damages to Serbia itselfand the Serbian national ideology by givingup the whole of Bosnia and being contended with some parts of it.29

Since Germany fully arrd evidently backed Austria, finally even Russia abandoned

Serbia.3o On 24 March it acknowledged the Annexation and called up Serbia to do the

same as well. On 30 March Russia, England, France, and lta]y demanded in a commonnote that Serbia acknowledge the Annexation, Also, they gave a proposition for the text

of the Serbian answer to the Monarchy. On the folIowing day, the Serbian ambassador

to Vienna unwillingly declared that the rights of his counbry were not violated by theJilitaccompli made by Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina.3l This virtually put an end

to the annexation crisis. In the course of March and April the greater and smaller powers

that were affected issued declarations in which they accepted the complete abolishment

independence as a state and the Seíbian nation could have the oppofiunity for its national sur-vival at least to the degree made possible by the Berlin Contract. Vladimir Stojan evió, Srpskinau nici o aneksiji Bosne i Hercegovine [Serbiarr Scholars on the Annexation of Bosnia andHerzegovina], In: Srbija 1908-1918. Beograd 1995,25-26.

28 Next to the tenitorial compensations they also 1aid claim to economic advantages. These

would have provided several concessions for Serbia in the transitional trade and the country

would have been given a sea harbour for foreign trade reasons, Stojan evió, Srpski nau nici o

aneksiji Bosne i Hercegovine, 25-26.29 The govemment of Serbia and that ofthe other aífected southern Slavonic principality, Monte-

negro shared the opinion thatAustro-Hungary supervised the resolutions ofthe Berlin Congress,

it altered them, therefore they also have the legal ground to ask for the modification ofthe abovementioned resolutions as well as to receive territorial gains from the corpus ofthe two proyinces.

The main target remained to be the creation of the coínmon border betwee\ Montenegro andSerbia. Although it was primarily the Monarchy a. a power that seized these tenitories at the

expense ofwhich they demanded the realization oftheir claims, the Serbian govemment headed

by Stojan Novakovió tumed to the Porte as well with the plan, according to which they wouldhave obtained compensations from the territory ofthe Sandzak, thereby forming the commonfrontier and cutting the Potte from Vienna, thus securing Constantinople from the pushing

forward of the Monarchy towards Thessaloniki. Yet this project remained futile, Ibid. 26-27.]0 In his letter dispatched on 21 March Chancellor Biilow asked for a definite ye or no ans\iler

from Izvolsky to receive information whether Russia allowed for clause 25 of the BeílinContract to be repealed. In case ofan answer of"no", it hold out the prospect ofneglectingthe future course of events which would have made Russia answerable for a possible war,

Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomi odnosl, 265-261.]' Fulilling the call of the gíeat powers Serbia accepted to give up its anti-annexation policy, to

change his attitude towards Austro-Hungary and follow a corrrse of good neighbourhood rela-

tions with the Empire. In 1ine with these declarations and in the hope that the Monarchy wouldnot attáck it (as Belgrade was assured ofthis on the previous they by the great powers) Serbia

was ready to rcstore its military force according to the state of spring 1908, both in terms of the

placement and number oftroops and in terms ofthe organizational structure ofits army.

62

The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Tum of the Twentieth Cenfury, to the First Balkan War

ofarticle 25 and the partial abolishment ofarticle 29 ofthe Berlin congress, thereby theyaccepted the adminishative integration of the two provinces into the Monarchy.32

serbia and Russia were gnashing their teeth and gave their concessions, too, ac--quiescing in the change of the status of the provinces as well as of that of the Balkanpower relations proforma. yet both slavonic powers were deeply offended. The dif-ference was that Russia had "only" to cope with the offerrce of its self-estimation as agreat empire, whereas Serbia experienced a evere violation ofits national interests. ?3

, Due to the lack ofa support by greatpowers, as mentioned before, Belgrade had to takenotice of the altered legal stafus of the provinces. This, however, did not mean that erbiamade no move in the future. The serbian policy after the annexation of Bosnia and Her-zegovina was characterized by the preparation md the aspiration to exploit the peacefulperiod as appropriately as possible,3a The general intemational sifuation was favourablefor gaining strength and the govemment furthered militarization with all its strength.

As the annexation ofthe provinces was, rightly, considered in serbia as a fact that theMonarchy had made a new step to realize its plans on the Balkans, probably followed byfirrther steps against serbia, after the crisis the serbian general staffdecided to strengthenthe intelligence service, the chief task of which was the following with attention of theAusho-Hungarian military activities,3s To serve this purpose in 1911 the dispatch ofborder-guard officers was ordered alongside the entire fiontier. Even before this decisiona group of ofrcers formed the secret organization becoming infamous as Black Hand(with its official name ujedinjenje ili smrt - unification or death). This conceived theoutbreak of the revolt on the terri ory of the Monarchy as one of its primary aims, sincethe Narodna odbrana had practically given up any revolutionary organizing, this newand secret organization of officers desired to fill the empty fiameworks of the former.From the Narodna odbrana it basically took overthe orgarrization ofthe nationa| affairs.The same held true of the links with the Serbian population across the borders.

The relations ofthe serbian kingdom and vienna had been burdened by tensionseven prior to the annexation crisis. In l 906 the war over customs broke out betweenthe Monarchy and serbia, which should have ended with the defeat,of the latteraccording to all rational expectations. ("serbia will get drowned into its own fat"

32 The question was setded in a separate agíeement siped with the porte earlier on 26 Eebruary1909. In compliance with the agreement Austro-Hungary renounced all its rights conceming theSandzak ofNovi Pazar, rights which it had obtained at the Berlin Congr"ss. The porte aclrnowl-edged the newly fonned situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in refirm, however, tlre sim,ing ofa commercial agreement within two yeani wa.s promised. Furthermore, the Monarchy paid 2.5million Turkish gold liras to the Porte for the lands possessed by it. Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomicd-nosi,2624.64, In historical literature there is a tendenry to consider this as the price for theacknowledgement ofthe annexation by the Porte.

]] Cf BebesiGy rgy,Ananzetk zikapc olatokttjíténetea19.sz.másodikfelébenakdmiháborutólaz els világháboruig. (1856-1914) fHistory ofthe ]ntemational Relations in the Second Halfofthe 19 Century]. In: A hossá 19, szazad r vid t rlénete. Ed. by Gy rgy Bebesi. Pécs 2005, 88.

3a Stojan Novakovió, goveming at the time of the crisis, set the main purpose: next to the culturaldevelopment and the creation ofits political rmity the shongest possible preparation for the payingoffold scores with armed forces. stojan evió, srpski nau lici o aneksiji Bosne i Hercegovine, 28.

35 vladimir Óorovió, odnosi izrneiíu srbije i Austro-ugarske u xx veku [Relations betweenSerbia andAustria-Hungary in the Twentieth Century]. Belgrade 1992,586.

63

Árpád Hornyák (Pécs)

- was hoped in the capitals of the Monarchy.) Instead of this, in 1911 the Balkankingdom came out of the war over customs in a fortifled state and, remarkably,achieving a fair extent ofeconomic independence. In fact, this independence wasrather fragile; after all, the country still did not have an access to the ea,

As ear$ as the 90s of the nineteenth century there were attempts to arrange ttre export

via the port of The saioniki, this road, however, proved to be expensive and instable as itdopended on the goodwill ofthe Turks. It became clear later during the war over customs

when the Turks actually made the export of Serbian goods possible. Still it was evident

that in case Turkey and Serbia should severe relations, even this line would be closed forSerbia.]6 Indeed, after the Young Turks seized power, and especially following the end

of the war over customs these relations rapidly worsened, mainly due to the atrocities

committed against the Serbians living in the vilajet ofKosovo.3?At the same time, it must be added that Serbia, partly because it was in need of the

support ofthe Pofie for the successful arrangement ofits foreign trade and partly to

safeguard the defence of the Serbians living in the Empire, tried to fild the modus vi-

vendi with Constantinople as well. Therefore Belgrade, as the Turkish parliamentary

elections were approaching, encouraged Serbians who lived in the Ottoman Empireto co-operate with the Young Turks and conclude a pact of election with them.38 This

, howeveq put fuel on the fire as, on the basis of the election pact, the Albaniansopposing the Young Turks rightly looked upon the Serbians as the allies of the formerand virtually did all they could to make them change their decision. As a consequence

of this the number of Serbian refugees drastically rose in spring 1912.

The arurexation crisis and the victory ofthe Young Turks contributed considerably to

the crystallization of Serbian foreign policy. Belgrade knew very well that the more itsinffuence grows onthe Balkans, the more it istlrreatenedby the Monarchy. Nevertheless,

this did not prevent Serbia from its propaganda activity among the Serbian population

in Turkish areas and it continued to pay attention to the realization ofits national aims,it merely became more carefirl than it used to be before. Al1 its moves against the Porte

were accompanied by a set of other moves to clear away the possibility of an attack bythe Monarchy.39 These two sets were identical as in Serbia th honger ties with the

Balkan states, especially with Bulgaria were considered as a means of securing their

cotmtry against the Monarchy. The encouragement that came from Russia was in line

with this and proposed the creation of a Balkan alliance.ao

3ó Mihailo Vojvodió, Srbija i rat 1912. Politióki i diplomatski aspekti [Serbia and the War 1912.

Political and Diplomatical Aspects]. In: Srbija i Balkansko pitanje. Beograd 1998, 352.

' Ibid. ]'_

38 In his commarrd of 20 February Milovan Milojevió, Serbian prime mini ter díew attention to

the fact that tlre Serbs did not form an irnportant compact mass which would alone, withoutthe assistance ofother forces have been able to secure for themselves at least tfuee seats in the

parliament to be elected. Cited by Vladimir Stojan evió, Srbija i Turska pred rat 1912. godine

[Serbia and Turkey before the War in l912]. In: Srbija 1908-1918. Beograd 1995, 35.39 Vojvodió, Nacionalne teZnje i zahtevi Srbije,389.{ Russia signed a secret military agreenent with MontenegTo in December 1910 in which it

promised Montenegro financial support (600,000 rubels annually) and military equipment.

In retum, Cetinije agreed to receive Russian army instructing officers (with the prohibition

64

The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Turn ofthe Twentieth Centuryto the First Balkan War

2. The establishment of the Balkan alliance

As we could see, it was not at this time, in 1912 thatthe Serbian goverrnnent first

formed the concept of its foreign policy in alliance with the Ba]kan states supporting each

other. As soon as in 19M the actual Serbian policy aimed at strengthening the Balkanlinlrs of the corrrrtry. At that time, in accord with the intemational situation" Belgrade stillofficially emphasized the necessity ofmaintaining the staíus quo onlhe Balkans, Whereasin 1904 ttre head ofthe Serbian govemment, Nikola Pa. ió underlined on several occasionsthat Serbia would accept the grven status on the Balkan Peninsula" Belgrade negotiated

the sigrring of two secret agreements with Sofia and Cetinje. Both agreements, to saythe least, questioned the sanctity ofthe status quo. In the political pact signed with Sofiaon 20 April 1904 the two parties accepted to assist each other in case one ofthe empires

appeaíed on the peninsula and occupied or annexed a part ofit. Moreover, the agreement

envisaged a further militaíy agreement and the customs union of tlre two countries as

well. It was basically this agreement which started the process evenh.rally leading inMmch 1912 to the Serbian-Bulgmian friendship agreement thatwas soon followedbythemilitary agreement of the two countries, i.e. the forrndation of the Balkan alliance.al Backin 1904 Belgrade endeavoured to improve its relations with the other indeperrdent Serbianstate, too. A project assernbled in February envisaged the co-operation ofBelgrade and

Cetinje for the defence of Serbian interests and conceived of mutual help in the case ofany kind of attacks coming from arry direction.a2 The project was made subject to fluthernegotiations in the following year, the discussions, however, were inüemrpted in 1905.43

The decisive tum in the relations betrveen Belgrade and Cetinje came about at the timeof the annexation crisis when on 24 October, on the proposition of Montenegro a secret

agreement declared their flrm stand to be prepared to defend their common interests, i.e.

the ones regarding the Serbians, with joint effort, even by means of arms,4

For the success ofthe policy to form a Bulgarian-Serbiarr co-operation not only Seóiahad to rethink its formerpolicy but it was of primary sigrrificance that Bulgmia give upits dreams ofthe creation of an autonomous, perhaps independent Macedonia and also, ithad to agree to the division ofMacedonian territories.as The new phenomena in the outer

to receive training officers on any other power) and at the first call of the Tsar it deploys allits military power in the Tsar's interest. Also, it accepted not to get involved in any kind ofattacking military operations without a preceding harmonizing with the govemment of theTsar. To go even further, it also bound itselfnot to sign any militar! pacts witbout the approvalof the aforementioned govemment.

The agreemant is published in: Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomi odnosi, 244.

Óorovió, Odnosi izme<lu Srbije i Austro-Ugarske, 63-64,

Due to Russian demand, as Russia was afraid that the negotiations of the two Serbian states

could complicate its relations with Vienna.

Stojkovié, Balkanski ugovomi odnosi,260,

Albeit Pa ió looked upon the annexation ofthe errtire territory to Sobia, as the starting point at the

negotiations that begrrn in 1911 about the esiablishment ofthe Balkan alliance, this was evidentlynot plausible. The beginnings of the Serbo-Bulgarian relations date right immedialely after the

aímexation crisis. Milovan Milovanovió, the prime minister replacing Novakovió rushed to accept

tlre independence of Bulgmia and its reformation to a monarchy (with an emperor as is head!),

saying that it was not the proclamation ofthe independence and the monarchy that they objected

4l

42

43

ó5

Árpád Homyák (Pécs)

circumstances exercised a decisive iníuence in the alteration of the policies of Sofiaarrd Belgrade in 1911 . Fundamentally important was the policy on national minoritiespursued by the govemment of the Young Turks, characterised'by forceful Osmanizationan as such it drastically oppressed the non-Turkish minorities of the Empire. It abolishedthe ecclesiastical and religious privileges formerly enjoyed by the Christians and plan-

ned to settle Moslems into Christians villages. Also, it envisaged the demilitarizationon the inhabitants. This it wanted to carry foough primarily aínongst the Christianspopulation. All this paved a shaight road to the growt}r of willingness to co-operate

among the nations of the Balkan against Constantinople, in the interest of the defence

of the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek population living there,{ ln the case of Serbia to

this joined the refusal of the govemment of the Young Tirrks of the so-called Adriaticrailway line. To the building of this line a great importance was attributed in Belgrade.a?

To further complicate matters, in the vilajets populated by Albanians the dissatisfactionofAlbanians had continuously grown, even reaching the state of revolt. The assumingof govemmental power by Venizelos in Greece also contibuted to the formation of the

alliance, whose cherished plan was the unification of Crete with Greece, and as such hebelonged to the circle ofpolitical "hawks" (although "doves" could hardly be formd onthe tsalkans at this time). Russia, on its part, also actively contributed to the establish-

ment of the alliance and as soon as the end of March it confidentially informed Englandand France about the content of the agreement.a8 Finally what conkibuted mostly to thejoining of forces of the Balkan states was the war in Libya that broke out in September1 91 1 . Actually, the importance of the ltalian-Trrrkish war was not merely that it shookthe foreigrr affairs situation of the Porte but at the same time, arrd this is perhaps an evenrnore sigrriflcant consequence of the war, it awoke the fears of the nations of the Balkansusually emerging at times of the crises of the Empire that the bieaking up of the Empiremight happen without them, and thus they could not seize t}re desired parts of it at the

division.a9 Their fear was justified by the fact that a power began to cut up the Empirewhich had formerly guaranteed its integrity, even if not always honestly. Moreover, thisaction of it enjoyed the silent consent of the two other affected great powers, Austria-

6

but the fact that this was connected to the annexation. The Serbian prime minister straighfor-wardly called in one ofhis telegrams the Bulgarian-Serbian agreement 1he foundation upon whichthe fuhrre of serbia could be built.

Óorovió, Odnosi izmedu Stbije í Austto-Ugarske, 350-35l.After the armexation crisis it was a widely spread view that Serbia had the right for a cerlain

compensation, within the framework of which the Adriatic railway line could be built corrnegting

Mrdar and Sarr Giovanni the company rrnder the name Jonction alonique-Constantinople was ac-

cor,dingly established. This endeavoured to achieve the permissidn ofthe porte for the line by means

of French, Italian and Russian support. At the beginning of September 1 909 the Porte granted the

permission but repealed it in the followrng year claimrrrg that it stood not in its interest to make the

railway line international and put it rmder foreign conaol, after a11, it was in need ofit itselfSavo Skoko, Dnrgi balkanski rat l 9 1 3 [The Second Balkan War 1 9 1 3], I-II. Beograd 1 968, 80.

Taking this into consideration it is at least questionable that the claim can be maintained that

the anti-English aims ofthe Balkan alliance were in clear opposition to the purposes ofRussia.After all, as we could see, St. Petersburg had firslhand information about the targets and wouldhave had a decisive word in the debates ovel the division ofthe territories to be liberated.

This fear was also determining when the Na ertanije was written.

The Foreign Policy ofSerbia at the Turn ofthe Twentieth Centuryto the First Balkan War

Hungary and Russia.so It was feared that tlre dissolution of the Empire could extend fromNorthAfrica to Europe as well, with the intervention of other great powers.sl

The states of'the Balkan starFd to come closer to each other in spring 1911 withthe ,steps made by the head of the new Bulgarian governínent, Gesov. The immediatenegotiations over the solution ofthe eastern question began in October, after the Serbiangovernment, as a result of the above mentioned circumstances, deemed the steps madeby Bulgaria favourable,s2 The negotiations accelerated especially after early n l9I2Italy, despite its promise not to expand the military manoeuwes o the European parts ofthe Ottoman Empire, launched a military action in the eastem basin of the MediterraneanSea, bombing Beyrouth and then in April the Italian fleet appemed at the Greek islarrds.s3

The friendship and alliance agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria was finatly sigrredon 13 March 19l2.The essential clause of the pact declared the duty of military aid ofboth Balkan states, should a third state atlack either ofthem, let it be everr a great power.sa

On the very day a secret amendment, a supplemeniary agreement was a]so signed inSofia, in which they divided the territories they would liberate aom underTtrrkish rule.ss

50 The Monarchy appeased Rome that it would not hinder it territorial gains in Libya whereas Russiasecured Italy ofits support for Italy's Libyan claims in the secret pact signed in Racconiggi exactly1wo years before.

5l Óorovió, Odnosi izmeóu Srbije i Austro-U gatske, 37 2-37 3.52 In order to safeguard the secret natuíe ofthe negotiations and talks between the Bulgarian and

the Serbian prime ministers took place in a railway carriage in the section between Belgíade andLapovo on 11 octobet

53 In April the Italian navy bombed the Dardanelles, t}an on the 4 May it occupied Rhodes andthe Dodecanese. Corovió, Odnosi izmedu Srbije iAustro-Ugarske,374.

5a As, to my knowledgg the agreement has not been published in Hungarian, I deem it practical toexpound its main points in detail, in certain ca es in tlreir firll exúent. ]n the first clause of the contractcomprising altogether seven clauses the signing parties agreed to guarantee the independence andtenitorial integrity ofthe other state. They committed themselves to rush to the aid ofthe other withall theirmilikryforce, ifone ofthemwas attackedby another ormore states. The second clause oftheconbact refined this general defirrition and they agreed on the mutual aid also in case a great empiretried to annex, to occupy ot even tro bnng under a provisional annexation any ofíhe Balkan areas,which though for the time being is under Turkish rule but either ofthem considers essential. Inlerfer-ence by a great power would therefore be a casus belli in their eyes. They agreed to make peace onlytogeiher, following a preliminary agreement. So as to facilitate the rcalization ofwhat is contained inthe agreement they envisaged the signing ofa military agreement. On the one hand" in this tlrey had todefine clearly the military moves made necessary by apossible war, and on the other, í}rey needed toset the steps in caso ofpeace to define the questions ofmilitary stuctwe, the placemenl ofthe toops,

, their mobilizatiorr as well as the methods of commrmication between the commanders-in+hie!, justtó be prepared for dre case ofwar and to be able to win it. They agreed that the military conventionwould constitrrúe an organic part ofthe pact, the preparation ofwhich should be started within fifteendays after sigrring the agreement and it needed to be elaborated within two months at the latest. Thelast, seventh clause ofthe pact declared that the contents ofthe pact carr only be revealed !o thirdcountry by a8íeement ofthe two states, and together, at the very same time, Similarly, a third statecan ortly be allowed tojoin the pact ifboth original sigring states mutually agree.jl The supplementary agreement pronounced that in case any kind ofunrest happened in 1he OttomanEmpire which would threaten the state or national interest of eitheí sigring party or if t}re Balkarrstatus quo became questionable in consequence of the difficulties arising in the Ottoman Empire,whether of in emal or extemal nah]re, so the signing party which would fint consider military opera-tions necessary. would tum to its ally with a ptopositibn completed by an explanation. The addressedally would then be bormd to discu s the matter and provided that it did not agree with the proposition,

6,7

f,lirut,

t

l

n

l

I

66

Árpád Hornyak (Pécs)

On 12 May of the same year a secret military convention was made in accordance withwhat had been prcscribed by the friendship and alliance agreement, This convention,besides setting the number ofBulgarian (200,000) and Serbian (150,000) troops takingpart in the military manoeuvres against the Porte, outlined the steps which might be ne-

cessary in case ofatiacks from any directions.56 Thus the agreement had arr antiAustria-

it would be bound to give the grounds for its refusal. However, provided that there is an agreement

on the military action, this will be revea]ed to Russia. IfRussia finds no objection, military operation

can begin according to ihe agreement. In tlre contrary case, iftlre two parties do not agree on the

necessity ofthe action,lhey ask the opinion ofRussia, the decision ofwhich will be compulsory forthe sigrring parties. In case Russia doos not want to express any opinion in a question and the twotates still carutot arrive at a common eva]uation ofthe situation, thus one party acts on its own against

the Porte, the other party is bound to show a benevolent independence even in this case arrd mobilizeits forces to the extent fixed in the military convention. Should a tlrird party intervene supporting the

Ottoman Empire, so the so far independent ally should give trp its independence and rush,wilh allits military force úo the aid oiis ally. The second clause ofthe supplementary secret pact, the last

paragraph ofwhich declared that the revealing ofany oftlre clauses ofthe pact to arryone and giving

information to any other state ought to happen exclusively on the basis ofmuh-ral agreement and

the perrnission ofRussia, contained decisions about territorial questions. They agreed t}rat all the

tenitories which they conquer withjoint effort according to the first and second clauses oftheir pact,

will get under a common adminisffation (condominium), the position of which should be realizedimmediately after the treaty ofpeace or three morrths after that at the latest, and in fact according tothe following principles: Serbia acknowledges the right ofBrrlgaria for the territories !o the east ofthe Rodope and dre river Strumica and Bulgmia, in retr:rr1 the right ofSerbia for the territories to the

north and the west of the Sár Mountains. At the same time, with regard to the territories encircled bythe Sar Mountains, the Rodope, t}re islands and the l,ake Ochrid, inasmuch both parties are convincedthat lhese areas carmot be orgarrized as a eparate autonomous provincg the general intprests oftheSerbian and Bulgarian population should be taken into account. For this reason arrd other intemalor exúemal reasons the following should be the guidelines: Serbia accepts that it does not lay claimto areas to *le south ofthe line which goes froln the Bulgarian-Turkisb frontier at Krjva Pa]anka irr

south-westem direction to the Lake Ochrid. Bulgaria also bound itselfto accept this line provided that

His Majesty the Tsar ofRussia, who had been asked to be the chiefarbiter in the given question, does

not raise arry objections. It goes without saying that both parties accepted to acknowledge the line as

a final border which the Russian Tsar evaluates to be the best for both b.ountries. The pact declared

as well that in all contested questiorrs related to the debates over the rea zltion ofthe agreement, the

supplementary part ofit and the military pact the Tsar ofRussia had tlre right to say the final word,inasmuch either allied pany claimed to be unable to reach an agreementvia immediate negotiations(and asked forthe Tsar's arbitration Á. H.)

56 In case ofan attack against Bulgmia by Romania Serbia ought to have supported Sofia immediately

by a declaration ofwar arrd rush to its aid with at least 100,000 noops along the river Danube oron the battlefield in Dobrogea. Bulgmia would have backed Serbia with 200,000 troops in case ofan attack by Austro-Hungary whether in defensive or offensive military operations. The same was

the duty of Sofia in case the Monarchy attacked the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, either with or withoutthe permission of Constantinople and consequently Serbia declared war on Ausrro-Hutgary or indefence of its interests it sent its army to tbe Sandjak, therewith provoking amilitary clash with the

Monarchy. If, however, Serbia was attacked by the Porte, Sofia would have to attack the Ottoman

Empirc immediately and send at least 100,000 troops of its mobiiized army to the batt]efield of the

Vardar. If Romania attacked Serbia, Buigaria would be obliged to attack the Romanian a:my as

soon as they cross the river Danube. If in arry of the aforementioned cases it were already at warwith another state, togetirer with Serbia or alone it would be compelled to give immediate help to

Serbia with all the fte troops at Bulgaria's disposal. Should either signing party declaTe war on a

thfud state i,vithout the preliminary harmonization with or contribution from the other sigrriag party,

68

The Foreign Policy of Serb;,ilJf;;ilTrir:;re Twentieth cenfury

Hurrgary, anti-Romania and anti-Turkey nature. The details of the joint steps against theenumerated states were elaborated by the representatives ofthe two genera] staffs at theirmeetingnearvama between 28 June and 3 July 1972.57 Lateríhetwo general stafs madethe military manoeuvres more accurate a number of times.58

Almost simultaneously with the Serbian-Bulgarian talks Bulgarian-Greek nego-tiations were also started. The basis ofthe negotiations was provided by the projecttargeting a defence alliance and elaborated by the Greeks, This was accepted inMay 1912 and its supplementary military pact wa only signed a couple of daysbefore the outbíeak of the First Balkan War,59 The Bulgarian-Greek agreementdid not contain any territorial agíeements. The contrasts between the two partieswere so deep in this respect that they wanted to avoid putting further burdens ontheir relations and jeopardizing the signing of the agreement these two pacts. TheSerbian-Bulgarian and the Bulgarian-Greek ones con tituted the fabric of theBalkan alliance. They in themselves provided a sumcient guarantee for the victoryin a war against the Ottoman Empire. Serbia, however, deemed further guaranteesnecessary; therefore it wanted to make a similar agreement with Greece.

The alliance betweenAthens and Belgrade would have meant several advanta-ges for Serbia. It would really have shengthened Serbia's intemational position.(This was e pecially important becau e of the Monarchy as in ca e they succeededin signing an agíeement similar to that with Bulgaria this would have containedthe duty of mufual assistance against the great powers, too.)60 Furthermore, analliance ofthis kind would have gained the support ofAthens for the keeping oftheterritories to be seized and would have prevented future debates over the questionof where the borders should run in Macedonia andAlbania.6'

Yet Athens wa also preoccupied at that tirne with the negotiations of the ag-reement to be concluded with Bulgaria, the details of which, howeve1 were notrevealed to the Serbian govemment by eitherAthens or Sofia, causing considerable

the latter party is not obliged to assist, it should merely show friendly independence and mobilizeat least 50,000 toops placing them in a vvay to serve best the manoeuwes ofits allies. Wit}out apreviow agreanent neither party is allowed to make a cease-fire ofover 24 hours. Ibid.

57 The details of the armed co-operation in case of a war between Serbia and the Monarchy and' those in case ofa war between Bulgaria and Romania were accepted on the 1 July, whereas theSerbo-Bulgarian co-operation in a war against the Ottoman Empire was agreed upon on 2 July.The documentary is published in: Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomi odnosi, 295-301.

5E Tltis way at the negotiations oftlre repíesentatives ofthe general staffs in Belgrade at the beginningof September it was agreed that the Bulgarian military would fight totally on the battlefield alongthe river Marica while the Serbians at the Vardar front, with the participation ofonly one Bulgariandivision. (The original agreement corrnted with a Bulgarian military contingent of 1 00,000 troops.)

59 MihailoVojvodió,Srpsko-grkipregovoriosavezu1912[Serbian-GreekNegotiationsaboutthe Alliance of 1 9 i 2]. In: Srbija i Balkansko pitanje ( 1 875- 1 914). Novi Sad 2000, 323.

60 In Belgrade even official circles shared the opinion that Seóia should first make itself secureagainst the possible attacks, fust of all against the one from Austro-Hungary and only afterthis can get involved into all kinds of"combinations" against the Turkish Empire, Thereby thedanger could seem to be avoidable to get between wind and water.

ól lbid- 323-

69

Árpád Homyrák (Pécs)

anxiety in Belgrade.ó2 As soon as it was informed of the signing of ,the Greco-Bulgarian agleement of defence at the beginning ofAugust, the Serbian minister offoreign affairs, Jovan M. Jovanovió gave the immediate command to the Serbianambassador in Athens to make the proposition for the Greek government to sign aSerbian-Greek agreement. Ó3 Nonetheless, the Greek government had no intention toconclude a mutual agreement with Serbia. Instead, in September 1 912 it proposeda trilateral, Greco=Bulgarian-Serbian pact with the exclusive target to join forcesagainst the Porte.6a The new Serbian govemment, however, coming to power onl2 September under the leadership of Pa ió dismissed the proposition. The refusalwas made easier by the former refusal of the Greek proposition of the trilateralagreement by the Bulgarians claiming that some of its clauses were in contrast withthe Bulgarian-Serbian pact.

Pa ió actually had the view that the Balkan states ought to agree to a four-sideddefensive and offensive contract on the basis of the principle "the Balkan belongsto the nations ofthe Balkans", but only after the respective bilateral agíeementswere made.ós The agreement with the Greeks continued to be vitally significant forPa ió. Belgrade, in fact, did not mean to staít any military moves against the Porteuntil the making of the pact with Greece. Therefore, it sent three plans to the Ser-bian ambassador in Athens, in order to be able to hand over the appropriate one tothe Greek govemment, with respect to the ituation starting from the maximal andgoing to the minimal.Ó6 However, Serbia's aspiration to make a bilateral contractwith Greece before the outbreak of the war proved to be a futile attempt, this couldnot be reached, On 8 October the tiny Montenegro declared war on the Porte. Itdid it in a spite of the fact that on the very same day, joining the note of the Mon-archy, the great empires admonished the Balkan states that they.would not tolerateany territorial changes of íhe status quo of the peninsula, should the animosities

6, lbid.324,63 The Bulgarian-Gíeek agíeement was a purely defensive pact, Both partiE bound themselves to

give mutual aid in case one ofthem was provoked or attacked by the Ottomhn Empire. Neverthe-less, if one of them provoked tbe attack of the Porte or attacked Turkey itself, the ot}rer signingparty has the right to decide whether to help the other or not.

óa To its great credit, the plan ofthe Greek govemrnent contained a declaration in which it wasmade clear that in case of war breaking out between Greece and the Ottomans because of the

situation on the island ofCrete the obligation to assist was not binding. Ibid.328.65 lbid.329.ó6 The project most favourable for Serbia contained the same clause i4corporated into the

Serbian-Bulgarian agreem nt as well, stating that they rush to each other's aid against anygleat power, provided that the latter made steps against their interests on ihe peninsula. Thesecond project omitted this clause, rather concentrating on the Serbs ofthe Ottoman Empireand asking the Greek govemment to help with establishing a separate Serbian church provincein the contested territories the fate of which was not cleared in the Bulgarian-Serbian agree-ment. The third project virtually coincided with the one originally submitted by the Greekswith the difference that the second clause ofthe latter one was omitted. That one dec]ared thatall the thíee states tried to exercise influence on their brethren living in the Ottoman Empireso that they would contribute to the sincere unity ofthe nations living in the Empire, Vojvodió,Srpsko-gr ki pregovori o savezu 1912,328-330.

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The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Tum of the Twentieth Centuryto the First Balkan War

between these states and the Ottoman Empire eventually lead to a war.6? By thistime, however, the political and military pact identical with the serbian-Bulgarianagreement had beeri signed in Belgrade between Serbia and Montenegro. This wasvirhrally a contract ofalliance signed two days before the acfual declaration ofwar.Its military part contained that within a week at the latest war was to be dec]ared onthe Ottoman Empire.68 On the same day, on 6 October a military convention wasadded to the pact ofdefence signed between Greece and Bulgaria in Sofia on 16May. The proces of events could not be halted any more.

On 13 October l9l2 Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria demanded from the Sultan ina common note to carry thlough reforms in the European part of the Empire, by thesurveillance of the great power and the states of the Balkans. This was refused byConstantinople, and then on l5 October it summoned back its representatives fromthe capitals of Balkan states. This was followed by the declarations of war on theTurkish Empire: that of Serbia and Bulgaria on 17 October, that of Greece on 18October. Serbia continued to aim to force an agíeement with Athens, although thecircumstances had changed rapidly and radically. The chief whish of the Serbiansto secure for themselves the assistance of Greece in their po ible war against theMonarchy could still not be plausible as the desire had lost its up-to-dateness aswell, just as much as the idea to use Greek help to found a Serbian church districtin the areas under the ru|e of Constantinople yet populated by Serbians. After all,it looked more and more like there would not be any Turkish territory in Europe.

The matter was still not urgent for Greece. Athens was preoccupied with espe-cially two questions: the possible territorial claim of the Bulgarians, which was notsettled in the formerly concluded Bulgarian-Greek agreement of defence. The othermatter was the concept of Serbia regarding the Albanian territories, Athens namely,probably under pressure from Austria-Hungary or at least with respect to it wasnot enthusiastic about the division ofthe Albanian lands; it rather preferred an au-tonomous Albania.69 However, Serbia and its prime minister, Pa ió was peculiarlyanxious for the drawing of the would-be frontiers. As there agreement made withthe Bulgarians had settled it anyhow, tlre most important part of the border becamethe common frontier line with Greece. Serbia was in need of a pact which regulatedtheir common border at the Adriatic by which, in their estimation, they could havethwarted the endeavours of the Monarchy to create Albania.7o

Athens, however, felt permanently disfurbed by the territorial aspirations of Bu1-garia. They would have liked to settle the future of the territories by non-bilateralnegotiations but by means of a common understanding of the states of the Balkan.

ó7 Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 3 16.68 The pact declared that the frontier between the two allied Selbian principalities shou|d be sub-

ject to order by a committee. Inasmuch this is unable to come to an.agreement, the Greek andBulgarian rulers are entitled to make a decision about the border between the two kingdoms.Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 3 1 l .

69 The Serbian envoy had the impression that in Athens the influence of the Monarchy waspredominant. The report of Bo kovió, Serbian ambassador to Athens. dated on 26 October isquoted in: Vojvodió. Srpsko-gr ki pregovori o savezu l9l2,333.

ro lbid.337.

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Arpád Homyák (Pécs)

Thereby they hoped to avoid the hegemony of Bulgaria over them. At the sametime they wanted to secure the Serbian support for themselves at the negotiations.?r

Since at the conference of the ambassadors in London on the very first day a

decision was made about the establishment of an autonomous, practically inde-pendent Albania, there could be no more word about the division of the Albanianterritories between Greece and Serbia. From this point on, Serbia could not agitate

for the signing ofthe agreement as it could hardly think that the support of one ortwo Balkan allies could effectively counteract a decision based on the agreementof the great Empire. This means that between Greece and Serbia no bilateral pactcould be made in the course of the diplomatic struggles that followed thewar.72

Although in the official Serbian "explanation" of the First Balkan War breakingout in October 1912 it was claimed that they launched the war with the aim tosafeguard the rights and equality of the Slavonic peoples living in the OttomanEmpire as well as to achieve the introduction of reforms, we hardly exaggeiate bymaintaining that the outbreak of the First Balkan War was occasioned by the desireto divide Macedonia,73 The role played in it by the fear of Belgrade of the creationof the independent Albania cannot be neglected either, Although the Monarchy hadcome forth with the idea of establishingAlbania, this became really dangerous froma Serbian point ofview when in August 19 12 Vienna proposed the decentralizationofTurkey,7a Should the proposition have been realized the way would have beenfree for the establishment of an autonomous Albanian state. This would have had

consequences for Serbia similar to the occupation and annexation of Bosnia andHerzegovina; it namely would have closed the way for expansion in yet anotherdirection. Belgrade, act'nlly, could not al|ow it itself,

Before the military activities against the Turks, right after his assuming powerPa ió issued a circular telegram on 2 1 Septemb et 1912 in which he made clear towhich territories he laid claim. In fact, significantAlbanian areas were incorporatedin this.75 The generally spread opinion in Serbia was that ifthe Serbian koops eva-

7l As for Serbia, it was willing to support Athens. ln his proposition ol9 November Pa ió men-tioned the division ofthe Albanian seashore and at the same time, asked for the definition ofthe Greekneeds in Macedonia. Vojvodió, Srpsko-gr ki pregovori o savem1912,338.

72 An agreement was sigred only in May 1 9 1 3 affer a complete change in intemational circumstances.7] Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903-191,4 [Documents on the Foreign Policy

of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903-1914]. Knj. V Sveska 2. Prired. Mihailo Vojvodió. Beograd1985, 880-881. The same text was given as an explanation by ttre Bulgarian and Greek gov-

emments as well,?a The essence of the proposition was to achieve that the gleat powers move the Porte by means

of a common demand to decentralize the Empire along with certain concessions given to the

nations of the Balkans, especially the Albanians. Th great powers ought to warn togethelthe Balkan states to abstain from actions of any kind that would make the realization of the

decentra]ization difficuit for the Porte. Mihailo Vojvodió, Velike sile i balkanska inicijativaAustro-Ugarske u avgustu 1912 |The Great Powers and the Balkan Initiative of Austria-Hungary inAugust 19l2]. In: Srbija i Balkansko pitanje (l875-19l4). Novi Sad 2000,305. o.

?5 True, in the telegram there were no explicit words about the annexation ofterritories to Serbiabut rather about the conceptions of the Serbian govemment of the refoms to be carried out inthe European parts ofthe Ottoman Empire, and especially in the areas populated by Serbs, The

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The Foreign Policy of Serbia at the Turn ofthe Twentieth Centuryto the First Balkan War

cuated the "liberated" territories, these would come under the influence of viennaand sooner or later Serbia could face a similar fate as well. This is why Serbiadesired the finál settlement ofthe territories to be "liberated" by the Serbian army.This could only be identical with the coming of these territories under the rule ofBelgrade. This meant the,annexation of the conquered areas to the Serbian state

along the lines delineated by Pa ió, including the seizure ofthe access to the sea.

These were actually guaranleed lor Serbia by the agreements made with its allies,especially the Bulgarians,i6 This, however, was not an easy task. It was primarilythe question of the Serbian access to the sea which caused a lot of troubles duringthe Balkan wars.

Namely, on the basis of the experience made in the war ov r customs that had

come to an end, one of the most important aims of Belgrade was, as I have men-tioned, to safeguard the independence for the sake of the economic and politicaldevelopment by means of an indirect link to the outside world. Thus at the negotia-tions ofthe agleements concluded by its allies the securing ofthe access to the sea

was always a key question , a sine qua non of the signing,7? The time for "cashingthe cheque" received in the agreements came after the liberation of Kosovo, Meto-hia and the Sandzak by the Serbian army. The Serbian commandment-in-chief thenordered the troops succeeding in the military manoeuvre to push forward in thedirection ofthe Adriatic Sea, Nevertheless, this proved to be a failure, in fact, thiswas destined to fail. Better to say, the Serbian army reached the coast and was incamp at Drac in the second half ofNovember, still they were incapable of keepingthe territories.

As a matter of fact, it was vital for the Monarchy to prevent Serbia from seizingthe access to the seashore. For this reason this chiefeffort ofvienna was to createan autonomous Albanian administrational unit. This came about very soon, Viennaachieved the establishment of the autonomous Albanian Principality, basically,the independentAlbania on 17 December 1912, i.e. the first day of the LondonConference. This decision ofthe great empires proved to be decisive for the futureevents on the Balkans, The foundation of the Albanian administrational unit cameto be the actual reason for the Second Balkan War. The creation ofAlbania, besidesdepriving Serbia ofone ofthe greatest gains ofthe war, the access to the sea, alsoresulted in the upset ofthe balance ofpower on the Balkan Peninsula.

clarification ofthe territories and the definition ofthe extent ofthe reforros were deemed mostimportant. By the territories i abited by Serbians Pa ió meant Old Serbia that comprised theentire vilajet ofKosovo together with the old Sandzak ofNovi Pazar, the north-western part

ofthe vilajet of Skadar with the coast as well as the northem and eastem parts ofthe vilajet ofBitola. For this area Pa ió intended to have an autonomy safeguarded. In his vision, this wouldhave been headed by a Christian govemor with the assent ofthe gleat empires. Aparliament incharge of the finanoial matters and internal affairs (cultrrre, commeíce, traffic, and economy)would have been established. A national gendarmerie was also envisaged, all this under thecontrol and gualantee of the great empires. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbijel903-19l4,7l8.

7ó Vojvodió, Nacionalne teánje i zahtevi srbije u Balkanskim ratovima, 3g2-3g3., lbid.393.

l5

Árpád Homyák (Pécs)

As we could see, in the course of the negotiations of forming the Balkan allianceSerbia originally took it as its starting-point that as a kind of a compensation forextended Macedonian areas given over to Bulgaria it could seize Albanian ter-ritories at the division but the decision ofthe great empires over the creation oftheAlbanian principality thwarted the purposes of Belgrade. While Sofia annexed theregions to which it cotrld lay claim on the basis of their former agreement, Belgradecould not realize its claims to Albanian territories, as those were allotted by thegreat powefs to Albania. As a consequence of this it seemed that Bulgaria had wonmore than it could keep, especially as it seized territories in Thracia along withEdime of which originally there had been no word whatsoever, This threatened theBalkan power equilibrium. Following this Serbia started to demand a part of theBulgarian prey for itself, which together with the claims of the Balkan states at theexpense of Bulgaria,78 evenfually led to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War,which then brought a victory for Serbia again.79

78 Their tenitorial demands from Bulgaria facilitated the closing ofthe negotiations betweenBelgrade and Athens that had been going on for ovel a year, On 14May 1913 the representa-tives of Serbia and Greece agreed to sign a military convention, and then on 1 June they alsosigned their alliance in Athens. Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomi odnosi, 334-336; 351-353. Themilitary convention of l4 May was sigrred'conditionally, for the case ofa Bulgarian_Serbianor a Bulgarian-Greek wm as well as for the case if Bulgaria launched an unexpected attackagainst the Serbian or Greek troops. The aim ofthe military operations was the firral annihila-tion of the Bulgarian army and the division of the tenitories. It was the right of the Serbianarmy to occupy the territories to the noíth arrd north-east ofthe Gradec-Belasica Mountainwhereas the Bulgarians could occupy the areas to the south and south-east of this line, Ibid.334-336. However, the military convention finalized next to the agreement ofalliance thatwas sigted 1 June was not a meíe pío poct of a military co-opeíation against Bulgaria. Thefirst clause of the convention, namely, gave its assent to the casus foederis in case of ananimosity between the signing parties and "a certain third power". Ibid. 348-35 1. This meansthat for Serbia there was no positive change.

79 The Serbian government suspected as soon as towards the end ofthe First Balkan War thatit would and could not follow the tenitorial measures of the pact ooncluded with Bulgaria.Therefore, the prime minister gave the order to the commissioned Serbian envoy travelljngto the London Conference, tojan Novakovió that in case its access to the ea werejeopard_ized he should ask the assent oftho great empires to the Serbian vision ofa border drawnbetween Serbia and Bulgaria in Macedonia, The border would be drawn in propoíion to thesacrifices brought in the war. The document is cited by Mihailo Vojvodic, Nau nici Srbije iprvi balkanski rat [Scholars in Serbia and the First Balkan War], In: SlPija i Balkaasko pitanje(1875-1914). Novi Sad 2000, 380. A couple ofmonths later, in 1913 the Serbian govemmentasked Bulgaria in a memorandum to revise their agreement on the partitioning of the Macedo-nian territories. In the altered situation the Seíbian government demanded compensation fromthe Bulgarian govemment above the areas unanimously decided in their agreement to comeunder the power ofBelgrade. Indeed, they alluded to the following arguments:- as compensation for all the duties not fulfilled by Bulgaria towards Serbia- a compensation for the sacrifices that Serbia directly brought for Bulgaria- in retum for the tenitodes which Bulgaria received in the East above the regions given

to it in the pact- as compen ation for allthe tefritories in the West which Serbia loses due to the decision

ofthe great powers although originally undoubtedly Promised to Serbia,

74

The Foreign Policy of Serbla at tbe Tum of the Twentieth Cenfuryto the First Balkan War

As a result of re two Balkan wars Serbia capfured Old Serbia (Kosovo andMetohia) and a significant part of the Sandjak (the other part came to Montenegro)and on 20 November 191 3 it could, by means of an order, annex the Macedonianpart along the Vardar to its state. With this the Serbian Balkan policy targeting theunification of the Serbians of t}re Ottoman Empire under the rule of Belgrade cameto a virtual end, a policy first formulated in the Na ertanije.

Thanks to the series of military success s of Serbia in the Balkan wars Bel-grade could re-conquer its respect maltreated by the 1876 Turkish-Serbian war,the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, the Bulgarian-Serbian war of l 885 aswe.ll as the annexation of Bosnia. The next tep was the project of the unification ofSerbians within the frameworks of the central European empire. This seemed to bea tougher task but soon there came a good opportunity for its realization, namelythe outbreak of the Great War. Serbia was very good at exploiting this opportunityalthough there can be, and in fact, there are, debates over the question whether thefinal result, the establishment of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom, wasreally to the taste ofBelgrade.

of the four arguments the last two can be evaluated as serious arguments while withmentioning the first two Belgrade, in lack ofbetter reasons, tried to make the impression ofthe love ofjustice. These, howeve1 were rather inapt attempts and were easily refuted bythe Bulgarians in their response to the Serbián memorandum. Stojkovió, Balkanski ugovomiodnosi, 33ó-3zl4, 357 -359.

75