The version of record of this manuscripts is: Morozov, V. and B. Rumelili (2012)‘The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers’ Cooperation and Conflict 47: 1, pp. 28-48.

The External Constitution of EuropeanIdentity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers

Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili1

Abstract. The view of identities as always situated in arelationship with the Other underlies contemporaryconstructivist social theory. Taking a step further, andcombining constructivist approaches to identity withinsights from post-colonial studies, this article arguesthat the Other, far from being a mere presence, often playsan active role in identity politics. By tracing thehistorically varying ways in which Turkey and Russia haveengaged in European identity construction, it demonstratesthat this is an interactive process of negotiation betweenthe European Self and its external Others, in which agencyof the Other is revealed. In particular, Russia and Turkeyexercise agency by challenging, each in its own manner, theEU’s power to define the normative meaning of Europe. WhileTurkey has contributed to a decentring of European identityby challenging the self-perception of Europe as amulticultural space, Russia’s uncompromising stance tendsto consolidate the EU-centred image of Europe as apolitical community based on liberal democratic values.Keywords: Russia, Turkey, identity, othering, agency, post-colonialism

I. INTRODUCTIONConstructivist theories mostly stress that identities aresituated in a relationship with the Other (e.g. Hopf, 2002;Neumann, 1999; Wendt, 1992, 1999). Yet, they have generallyshied away from looking at this relationship from the

1

perspective of the Other and engaging in a systematicinvestigation of the agency of the Other in shapingintersubjective meanings through its representationalpractices. Drawing on insights from post-colonial studies(Bhabha, 2005; Chakrabarty, 2000; Ling 2002) and liminalitytheory (Turner, 1995; Norton 1988), it is contended contendthat the Other, far from being a mere presence thatreproduces the identity discourses of Self, often plays asubversive role by negotiating and contesting identities.This subversive impact, which is often overlooked by ‘Self-centred’ analyses of identity, is particularly manifest inthe case of ‘liminal’ Others that occupy partly-self/partly-Other positions in identity discourses. Thisarticle, by tracing the historically varying ways in whichTurkey and Russia, as Europe’s liminal Others, haveresponded to discourses on European identity through theirown representational practices, seeks to unravel theiragency in the construction of European identity. Inaddition, the comparative analysis reveals that liminalOthers can exercise agency in different ways, and when theydo, as in the case of Russia and Turkey in the currentperiod, they impact European identity differently. WhileTurkey’s representational practices have succeeded ingetting Turkey closer to the EU by accepting the EU’s powerto define the normative meaning of Europe, they have alsocontributed to a decentring of European identity bychallenging the self-perception of Europe as amulticultural space. In contrast, Russia’s representationalpractices have been characterized by a resistance towardEU-defined values, and this resistance has tended toreproduce the boundary between the West and the East ofEurope, thus helping to consolidate the EU-centred image ofEurope as a political community based on liberal democraticvalues.Since the early 1990s, identity has been a focal point ofconstructivist theorizing in international relations;however, certain key questions about the constitution ofidentities are far from settled. One prominent area ofcontention is whether an external/spatial Other isnecessary for the constitution of identity (Wendt, 2004a;

2

Abizadeh 2005). A second debate revolves around whetherOthering is necessarily associated with antagonism andviolence. Our analysis of how Russia and Turkey areshaping and negotiating European identity builds on recentcontributions that have once again stressed therelationality of identity (Epstein, 2011), spatialdimension of identity construction (Prozorov, 2011) and thevarying forms, i.e. positive and negative, of Othering(Rumelili 2007; Berenskoetter 2007; Roe 2008). In the following section, the respective contribution ofthis article is situated within these ongoing debates. Onthe relationality of identity, our analysis of Turkey andRussia as Europe-makers stresses that identity formationprocesses are not and should not ever be studied asentirely endogenous processes. The Self can never be thesole author of its identity, and ‘Self-centred’ analyses ofEuropean identity are simply overlooking the ways in whichexternal/spatial Others, such as Russia and Turkey, areshaping European identity in different ways. On the natureof Othering, it is contended that while identityconstruction does involve some negativity and antagonism,the cases of Russia and Turkey attest to Othering beingoften a hybridizing practice, involving both positive andnegative representations. Thus, both Turkey and Russia areconstituted as ‘liminal’ others, which are partly Europeanand partly not. The main objective of this article is to initiate a newdebate on the agency of Others in the constitution ofpolitical identity. While the argument that the Other has arole to play in identity construction might seem self-evident, as demonstrated below, the existing literature hasreduced this role to a mere presence and not systematicallyexplored the nature and extent of its agency. Thus, thethird section of the article highlights the maintheoretical contribution of the study, which consists inidentifying the various ways in which liminal Others mayexercise agency in the constitution of political identity.Drawing on postcolonial studies literature and liminalitytheory, we discuss how positions of liminality andhybridity enable the subversion of the identities on whose

3

margins they are located. Yet, it is noted that liminalactors may practice and enact their liminality in ways thatare more or less subversive or non-subversive at all,including indifference, self-assimilation, negotiation, andresistance.In the fourth section, this article comparatively analyzesthe ways in which Turkey and Russia have historicallyresponded to the discourses on European identity and theconstruction of their identities as different. Thedifferent ways in which the two countries have practicedtheir Otherness and liminality in different historicalperiods are located and the implications of these practiceson European identity are discussed. Our empirical analysisdoes not aspire to test or measure the extent of theinfluence these two countries have had on Europeanidentity. At this stage, we limit ourselves todemonstrating that more thorough empirical examination ofthe Other’s agency must have a prominent place on theconstructivist research agenda, and thus hope to pave theway to less Euro-centric studies of European identityformation.2

II. RELATIONALITY, SPATIALITY, AND FORMS OF OTHERINGThe symbolic interactionist roots of early constructivistidentity theorizing had made the relationality of identitya fundamental premise (Wendt, 1992). However, relationalityhas taken a back seat in the following mainstreamconstructivist works, which have focused more on how socialstructures of shared norms and meaning constituteidentities, i.e. constitution of self by social (Jepperson,Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996: 58–62; Finnemore and Sikkink,2001), while post-structuralist approaches have continuedto focus on the political constitution of identities in andthrough differentiation, and stressed the close associationof these practices with power and violence (Campbell, 1992;Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989). In her recent article, Charlotte Epstein (2011) hashighlighted how constructivist theorizing has ended upessentialising identity by downplaying the constitutive

4

relation between Self and the Other. For Epstein (2011:340), however, ‘Other’ refers to the ‘generalized other’,the symbolic order that comprises the meanings within whichidentities are constituted, and not necessarily to specificothers, i.e. other identities (or subject-positions) thatare constituted within the same symbolic order. We stressthat relationality of identity presupposes the presence ofboth the generalized Other and a multitude of specificOthers, which constitute the identity of Self, and whichare, in turn, taken as reference points by Self indefining, validating, and performing its identity.Identities are multifaceted and result from numerous, andhighly contested, instances of othering. In principle, anydifference can be politicized and elevated into a marker ofidentity (Barth, 1969; Neumann, 1999: 1–37). As a result,identities are constituted at any given time, in relationto multiple others, including internal and external othersas well as the generalized Other. While our focus on Russiaand Turkey as Europe’s specific Others is justified interms of their salience (Neumann, 1999), it is recognizedthat the European identity is also simultaneously beingconstituted in relation to the social structures ofinternational politics (Wendt, 1999) as well as to othersignificant Others, such as the US (Joenniemi, 2010),Europe’s own past (Wæver, 1998), and migrants within Europe(Huysmans, 2000).Given this multiplicity of Others, a key question iswhether identities can be constituted solely throughtemporal othering, that is by taking a past state of Selfas the reference point (Wendt, 2003: 527–8; Abizadeh, 2005:58). Most notably, Ole Wæver has argued that in theEuropean context, instead of ‘the EU and the West“othering” various neighbors, the dominant trend … is thatthe other is Europe’s own past (fragmentation)’ (Wæver,1998: 100; see also Wæver, 1995: 71–75). Also, Thomas Diezargues that the European Union ‘has opened up thepossibility of the construction of a political identitythrough a less exclusionary practice of temporaldifference’ although he observes, contrary to Wæver, a

5

trend toward the exclusionary geopolitical forms ofothering (Diez, 2004).Such arguments on the constitution of identities mainly, ifnot solely, through temporal othering cast identityformation as a purely endogenous process, and thus pave analternative route to essentialism. Yet they have beenrecently challenged on both empirical and theoreticalgrounds. Studies analysing the EU’s identity discourseamply demonstrate the presence as well as the growingdominance of external referents (Browning, 2003; Diez,2004; Rumelili, 2004). Similarly, as demonstrated by TedHopf (2002: 153–210), in Russia’s case the role of theSoviet historical Other in national identity constructionis mutually conditioned by the presence of the externalOthers. In a recent article, Sergei Prozorov contends thatthe opposition between temporal and spatial othering is nottheoretically sustainable, as ‘any historical action mustnegate a section of actually existing Space, therebytransforming this present existence into the past’, andtherefore ‘it is impossible to negate only temporally oronly spatially’ (Prozorov, 2011: 1282). Thus, while thewar-torn past is an important referent, Europe, as anyother identity, remains dependent on external Others, suchas Russia and Turkey, and practices of spatial othering. Concerning the debate on the nature of Othering, recentcontributions have stressed that the association ofSelf/Other relations exclusively with enemy roles is basedon the misinterpretation as a necessity of something thatthe earlier post-structuralist literature (Campbell 1992)had identified as just a potentiality. Identityconstruction through differentiation does involve theexertion of symbolic power by the Self over the Other, andperhaps an antagonisation of the generalized Other (Epstein2011) located outside in political space (Prozorov, 2011).In particular, contemporary poststructuralistinterpretations of Carl Schmitt, such as the one developedby Chantal Mouffe (2005), have emphasized the point thatthe inside-outside antagonism is the only way to conceiveof unity in a world that lacks any pre-given metaphysicalhierarchies. This does not entail, however, the definition

6

of the Other as an identity which is antithetical to Self, aspecific Other which would be in the same category as theSelf (e.g. a state against another state). Thus, it wouldbe wrong to associate othering solely with practices ofdiscrimination, denigration, exclusion and violence.Empirical analyses in different contexts have shown thatSelf/Other relations are constituted along multipledimensions, and hence practices of Othering take variousforms (Diez, 2005; Hansen, 2006; Rumelili, 2007). Positiveand negative representations of the Other can coexist andbe projected upon different aspects of the Other’sidentity. Thus, Othering often turns out to be ahybridizing practice that situates its referents inliminal, partly self/partly other subject positions. Consequently, when Turkey and Russia are posited asEurope’s Others, it is meant that discourses on Europeanidentity routinely differentiate the European Self fromcertain aspects of Turkish and Russian identities. Thisdifferentiation, on which the constitution of Europeanidentity depends, often imposes a normative hierarchy ofsuperiority/ inferiority. Yet this does not mean thatrepresentations of Russia and Turkey are solely cast innegative terms, and justify a foreign policy ofdissociation and violence. And conversely, when Europeaninstitutions closely associate with Russia or Turkey, itdoes not mean Russia and Turkey are no longer Others ofEuropean identity. Discourses on European identity oftendifferentiate between the ‘European’ and ‘non-European’elements of Turkish and Russian identities. References toTurkey are more prominently employed when the culturalborders of the EU-Europe are at stake, while the RussianOther dominates discourses on Europe’s political identity.In short, the comparative analysis undertaken in thisarticle stresses that identities are constituted inrelation to multiple Others, which differ as to theirimpact on the identity of the Self, instead of a singulararchetypal Other, which represents an anti-Self. Inparticular, our analysis shows that the contemporaryEuropean identity discourse is in many ways a hybridizingdiscourse that situates its external Others, such as Russia

7

and Turkey, not in directly oppositional, but in liminalpartly-Self/partly-Other positions.

III. LIMINALITY, HYBRIDITY, AND THE OTHER’S AGENCYThe primary input of this article, however, lies beyond acomparison of the Turkish and Russian Others in Europeanidentity construction. Combining constructivist approachesto identity with insights from postcolonial studies, it isargued that in addition to their constitutive roles asOthers in European identity construction, Russia and Turkeyalso negotiate, contest and re-make European identitythrough their own representational practices. So far,constructivists have been mostly concerned with the ‘usesof the Other’ by the Self in identity construction(Neumann, 1999), which implies a simultaneous constructionof both the Self and the Other in one discursive space –that of the Self (e.g. Hopf, 2002: 169–195). There isrecent interest in how those constituted as Others respondto the identity discourses of the Self (e.g. Zarakol,2011), but those works again focus solely on the ways inwhich the Others assimilate into the hegemonic discursivespace of the Self. It is suggested in this article that itis time to expand our horizon by looking at identityconstruction as a process that is profoundly conditioned bythe mutual constitution of the inside and the outside,where both the Self and its Others enjoy agency. Postcolonial theory is a good complement to constructivismin the analysis of identity constitution; whileconstructivism focuses on exposing contingency ofidentities and norms and their embeddedness in socialinteraction (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Kratochwil, 1989;Neumann, 1999; Wendt, 1999), postcolonialism emphasizes therelations of power and inequality inherent in any Self-Other relationship (Ghandi, 1998; Krishna, 2009). Facingthe normative power of the EU and the overwhelming economicand military supremacy of the West as a whole, both Russiaand Turkey currently find themselves in a quasi-postcolonial setting.3 At the same time, application ofpostcolonial theory does not necessitate that we

8

unambiguously establish either the Russian or the Turkishsituation as strictly speaking postcolonial. Rather,postcolonial theory can be drawn upon as an alternativeapproach to analyze subjectivity and agency ininternational relations (Ling, 2002).The agency of the Other in the construction of the identityof the Self is an issue that has been explored bypostcolonial writers in the imperial and post-imperialcontext (Bhabha, 2005; Chakrabarty, 2000). In fact, thereis significant disagreement in the postcolonial studiesliterature itself about the extent to which the hegemony ofcolonial discourse leaves room for meaningful autonomousresistance by the colonized (Parry, 1995). According toGayatri Spivak, colonialism has eliminated all grounds forresistance that are not in essence reproducing andstrengthening of the colonial hegemony (Spivak, 1995).Homi Bhabha, on the other hand, emphasizes that instead ofa clear-cut exclusion or opposition, the colonial discourseis productive of hybridization, ‘a discrimination betweenthe mother culture and its bastards, the self and itsdoubles’ (Bhabha, 2005: 159). Within this space ofambivalence, the hybridized native deploys a range of formsof subversion and resistance. Having (seemingly) adoptedthe knowledge of the Master, the natives are at oncecomplicit in its reproduction, but are also simultaneouslymisappropriating and perverting its meaning, therebycircumventing, challenging, and refusing colonialauthority.It can be contended that these post-colonial debates on theagency of the Other have relevance beyond studies of empireand would significantly benefit IR identity theorizing. Asboth constructivist and poststructuralist approaches tointernational relations have been duly criticized forlacking a theory of the agent, identity scholars have cometo rely on psychological theories at the price of makingthe problematic assumption of state as person (Wendt,2004b; Wight, 2004; for an alternative application, seeFlockhart, 2006). The postcolonial notion of agency avoidsthese theoretical problems, as it does not stipulate thepro-active agency of a cohesive, purposive, autonomously

9

calculating agent. Rather, it is a structurally conditionedagency that does not conflict with the poststructuralistunderstanding of subjectivity as constituted throughdiscourse (Allen, 2002) and one which emerges as an effectof the discursive interaction between various subjectpositions.Consequently, our analysis stresses that European identityis constructed through discursive practices that exist atvarious levels – global, pan-European, national,(sub)regional and local – not only within Europe but alsoin what is constructed as the outside of Europe. Nationalidentity construction inevitably involves references toEurope as a significant Other, and this happens within theEU and elsewhere, in the countries like Russia and Turkey.Tension that inevitably exists between different discursivespaces produces dislocation on both sides of discursiveboundaries (Diez, 2001) and opens additional spaces formanifestations of agency. In particular, certainrepresentations that might be structurally determined atthe national level, produce discursive effects on thecommunity for whom the first one is a significant Other. Byprojecting their own visions of Europe onto the EU, theoutsiders impel the insiders to articulate the identity ofEurope in a slightly different manner compared to whatwould be possible without this discursive intervention. Theagency of the Other must thus be understood not asindividualist and intentional, but rather as relational anddiscursive.Moreover, in order to be present and to matter, the agencyof the Other does not need to manifest itself inoppositional resistance. Bhabha stresses that the post-colonial agency is one which is constituted by the masterdiscourse, but manifests itself innovatively in episodes ofhybridization and localization (Bhabha, 2005). Ilan Kapoorcharacterizes it as a ‘guerrilla type’ agency, which heargues is indeed more effective than a direct counter-hegemonic discourse, which is more liable to cancellationor even reappropriation by the dominant one (Kapoor, 2003).

10

Recent writings on liminality also underscore theeffectiveness of hybridization in subverting the categoriesimposed by social structure (Malksoo, forthcoming; Rumelili,forthcoming). The concept has been pioneered by theanthropologist Victor Turner (1995: 95), who contended thatliminal entities that are ‘neither here nor there...betwixtand between the positions assigned and arranged by law,custom, convention, and ceremonial’, present thepossibility of existing outside of and beyond the sociallypre-given positions, and thus possess anti-structuralqualities and revolutionary potential. If, as noted above,European identity discourse is productive of liminalOthers, which are partly European and partly not, thoseliminal Others, such as Russia and Turkey, are thusconstituted to enact the possibility of existing outside ofand beyond the categories of European vs. non-European. Therepresentational practices of such partly self/partly othersubject-positions produce tensions and dislocations on thediscursive boundaries of European identity, and invitealternative articulations of Europe. In the following sections, it is shown how the hybridizedagency of the Other has manifested itself in Russia’s andTurkey’s relations with western Europe retrospectively andhow it functions to reproduce the liminal positions of bothcountries in contemporary Europe. Empirical analyses ofdiscursive agency, such as that undertaken in this article,does not need to or seek to establish that representationalpractices under analysis reflect the dominant perceptionsand attitudes in political leadership and society. Ratherit can be stressed that discourse produces effectsindependently of, and sometimes even contrary to thepolitical objectives of the speakers. In every politicalcommunity, competing articulations of identity co-existoften within the same discursive structure. We identify andfocus on certain discursive debates and practices, andanalyze how they enable and constrain the identityarticulations in the communities that are significantOthers.Comparative analysis demonstrates that historically, thediscursive debates and practices in Russia and Turkey have

11

enabled certain articulations of European identity andconstrained others. This agency has not manifested itselfsolely in moments of open resistance to and contestation ofEuropean discourses, but also in the hybridization of theEuropean discourses and standards throughout the so-calledprocess of Europeanization. In the current period, we findthat Russia and Turkey, constituted as different types ofexternal Others, negotiate different aspects of the EUdiscourses on Europe. While Turkey challenges theconstitution of Europe and Islam as mutually exclusive andinherently incompatible identities, Russia advancesalternatives to the dominant western liberal interpretationof European values.

IV. Russia and Turkey as Europe-MakersThe significance of both the Russian and the Turkish Otherfor the emergence of European identity has been thoroughlyexamined in recent decades by a number of scholars. OnRussia, particularly important has been Larry Wolf’s studyof how the ‘invention’ of Eastern Europe in the eighteenthcentury as ‘not quite’ European cemented the idea of the‘European civilization’ as exclusive and self-centred (Wolf1994). Similarly, the Turk has been and continues to serveas a key reference point in the definition, validation, andperformance of European identity (Neumann and Welsh 1991). Neither Russia nor Turkey have ever been passive objectsconstituted solely through European discourses andrepresentations. The mutually constitutive Self/Otherrelationship between Europe and its Others has also beenshaped by the outsiders’ responses to Europeanrepresentations. Through historically varying positions,such as arrogant indifference, active resistance, tactfulnegotiation, and self-assimilation, the Others havecontinuously re-made and re-shaped European identity. Inwhat follows, a historical overview is provided of howRussia and Turkey contributed to the construction ofEuropean identity. Turning to the present moment, thearticle examines the two distinct roles that the twocountries play at present by respectively downplaying and

12

utilising cultural difference to challenge the hegemonicimage of European identity.

Empires on the Margins: the Struggle for Recognition

The image of the Turk first appears in a letter written bythe Byzantine emperor Alexius Commenus to Robert I, theEarl of Flandern (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2003: 23). In thisletter as well as in other sources, the ‘cruel’ and‘barbaric’ Turk was represented as ‘a wrath of God’, apunishment to Christians who have deviated from God’scommands. Following the conquest of Constantinople in 1453,Europe, which was until then only a marginal term, began tobe invoked more frequently as a political referent toreinforce papacy’s calls for Christian unity to counter theTurkish threat (Neumann, 1999: 41, 44). The expansion ofthe Ottoman Empire thus played a crucial part in theconsolidation of the European idea and the normative orderassociated with it by providing extra legitimacy to thedisciplining practices directed at the less loyalEuropeans.In the 16th century, the negative image of the Turk inEurope solidified, but this negative image was not solely aproduct of European representations. The image of abrutal, arrogant, and magnificent enemy was alsodeliberately cultivated and reproduced by the Ottomans as atool of psychological warfare (Kumrular, 2005). As aresult of the fear they were able to successfully instil,the Ottomans could conquer many territorial posts withouthaving to fight. Thus, during the heyday of the OttomanEmpire, the Turkish Other was conscious of but remainedindifferent to its negative image in Europe. Quite thecontrary, it deliberately reproduced and manipulated thenegative perceptions in order to score further gainsagainst its enemy.In contrast to the Ottoman Empire’s arrogant indifferencein this earlier period, Russia, it seems, always tried hardto play as an insider. In particular, this concernedreligious politics and various projects of Christian unityin the face of the Ottoman expansion (Neumann 1996: 5–10).

13

Nevertheless, as Russia grew stronger, this createdpreconditions for its othering by Europe. Indeed, thecreation of the Russian empire by Peter the Great in thecontext of the Great Northern War (1700–21) changed theentire geopolitical setting: instead of the North-Southaxis which had earlier dominated the European foreignpolicy thinking, the new East-West division was to definethe European foreign policy coordinates from that moment on(Neumann, 1999: 77). Celebrating the victory over Napoleonat the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I brought Russia asclose as it could have ever been to the status of aEuropean great power, but the dividing line between theEast and the West was never completely erased. One of thereasons for that was a typically postcolonial predicament:Peter the Great’s modernizing effort aimed at bringingRussia closer to the civilization defined in west Europeanterms, which inevitably put Russia in the position of abackward country that had to learn from its more advancedneighbours. This produced a rift within Russian society andbecame a defining moment of Russian discursive reality withthe onset in the 1830s of the never-ending debate betweenthe Westernisers and the Slavophiles (Neumann, 1996: 13–39).The significance of this debate was not limited to Russianidentity politics and nation-building. Peggy Hellerconvincingly argued that the very idea of the West as acivilisational community emerged in the course of thisdiscussion and then spread into a wider European publicspace (Heller, 2010). The fixation of Europe as a positiveidentity in the hegemonic discourse, where certain normsand practices were marked as ‘European’ and others as ‘non-European’, also depended on the two-way political dynamicsbetween Europe and Russia. Iver Neumann has maintained thatRussia’s ambition for a great power status has beenmisplaced ever since 1815: while the Russian leaders anddiplomats claimed for Russia a position equal to otherEuropean powers on the basis of its military might andgeopolitical influence, the European definition of greatpower centred on the notion of good governance (Neumann,2008). Yet, reverse dynamics were in operation as well:

14

the European notion of good governance was shaped bycontrasting the west European norms with the ‘exotic’ and‘barbarian’ Russian mores. The relevance of Russia as apolitical Other of Europe became especially pronounced inthe context of the Crimean War, when Russia’s‘backwardness’ in terms of political and legal institutionsand norms was used to justify British and French alliancewith a Muslim empire (Turkey) against a Christian one(Russia). This event was a manifestation of thesecularisation of European politics, but arguably alsocontributed to this process. Thus, in line with ourtheoretical argument, the tension between the twodiscursive spaces created certain societal dynamics on bothsides. Russia’s active involvement in European affairs wasinstrumental in shaping common European identity – eventhough not quite in the way Russia wanted. The defeat of the Ottoman army at the gates of Vienna in1683 constituted a milestone in the history of the image ofthe Turk in Europe. Thereafter, perceptions of horror andfear diminished, and the Turks were associated with theadjectives of ‘ugly’, ‘deceitful’, ‘ridiculous’, and‘sensual’ (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2003: 28). In addition, withthe growing secularization of the European state system,the civilization/ barbarism dichotomy began to replace thereligious differentiation system based on believer/ infidel(Neumann, 1999: 52). Following the defeat at Vienna, afundamental change also occurred in the Ottoman outlooktowards the Europeans, acknowledging for the first timetheir superiority. Thereafter, the Ottomans implementedEuropeanizing reforms in the military, education,administration, dress, political and civil rights, partlyas a survival strategy to withstand European imperialambitions, and partly to compensate for their perceivedlack in civilization which they had come to internalize.6

The parallel with many aspects of Peter the Great’s reformsin Russia, including the timing and the consequences foridentity politics, is really striking. Like in Russia, thisprocess of Europeanization was not a wholesale submissionto the perceived superior. Protests and resistance becamemore vocal among the Ottomans as it became clear that

15

adoption of European norms and institutions could neitherprevent the break-up of the Empire nor stem the territorialambitions of European powers. However, these acts ofresistance began to take the form of reverse Euro-centrism,which accepted the hierarchy of civilization/ barbarity,but questioned the superior positioning of Europe vis-à-visthe Turks within that hierarchy (Berktay, 2005: 192–4).Following the wide-scale political reforms in 1856 and thedefeat of Russia in the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire wasfinally admitted to the Concert of Europe, with the Treatyof Paris, which declared the independence and integrity ofthe Empire. Yet, this admission meant neither that the Turkwas recognized as an equal European power, nor that Russia,despite its wounded feelings, was fully excluded (Neumann,1999: 56, 88–9). Within the Euro-centric worldview thatdistinguished the superior Europeans from the primitivesthey had the duty to colonize, both the Ottomans and theRussians occupied what they perceived to be a threateninglyambiguous, liminal position (Berktay, 2005). Whilecertainly superior to the primitives, they could not fullyrely on international law, as it accorded full protectiononly to the ‘inheritors’ of European civilization (Neumann,1999: 57, 89–93). Reflecting the changed balance of powerin the 19th century, the representation of the Ottomans asthe ‘sick man of Europe’ became prevalent, and the salienceof the Turkish Other diminished (Kuran-Burcoglu, 2003: 30–1). This was happening at the time when the liberalcriticism of Russian backwardness was gaining strength,turning Russia into a key political Other of Europe(Neumann, 1999: 94–9).

Post-Imperial Modernisation as Europeanisation

The collapse of both empires, with all its undeniable worldpolitical significance, could not transform the landscapeof European identity politics. The Soviet communist utopiainitially presented itself as entirely incompatible withthe existing capitalist world order, but as the revolutionwas running out of steam, it became increasingly obviousthat it was conceived of in terms of western modernist

16

discourse. The late Soviet ideology is an even betterillustration of Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, since it wasbased on the image of the Soviet Union as an alternative tothe capitalist West both in modernist and in traditionalistterms. It presented itself as a country where science andsocial reforms had liberated the masses, while at the sametime playing with the notions of ‘spirituality’,authenticity, ‘great Russian culture’ and the like,borrowed from the German romantic tradition in thenineteenth century. This controversial mix remains afeature of post-Soviet Russian identity politics, thoughthe modernist component has become less dominant (Hopf,2002: 39–82, 153–210).Regardless of the internal evolution of Soviet identity,for the rest of Europe the USSR was first and foremost apolitical, rather than a cultural, Other. The communistutopia was taken seriously by west Europeans as a possiblealternative to western modernity. What the Soviet Uniondid, and not just the fact that it was there as enemy,undoubtedly had its impact on social policies, thusdemonstrating one more aspect in which the Other’s agencymanifested itself. However, as both Soviet society and theinternational system entered a period of relativestagnation, the role of the Soviet Other was again reducedto a mere presence.In Turkey, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire afterthe First World War produced an ambivalent attitude, withEurope being perceived simultaneously as a model and athreat (Rumelili, 2004). The ambivalence remains strongdespite the fact that Turkey is often posited to be a modelEuropeaniser. Indeed, with Kemal Ataturk’s reforms, Turksshed away many cultural markers that marked theirdifference from Europe, including the alphabet, dress,calendar, measurement system, and holidays. In addition tobeing a political project, Europeanization thus became ‘aperformance geared for the gaze of the West’ (Ahiska, 2003:355).At the international level, the performance ofEuropeanisation inevitably entailed membership in

17

international institutions as a European state. Throughpersistent demands of inclusion, Turkey reminded the Euro-centric institutions (Commission on Europe at the League ofNations, the Council of Europe, NATO) of their professedprinciples of universalism and equality (Barlas and Guvenc,2009; Yilmaz and Bilgin, 2005: 53). Turkey’s almostpathological insistence on gaining recognition as aWestern/ European state thus contested the exclusivity ofthe West/Europe.The European Union remains the only Western/Europeaninstitution which has not granted Turkey the membershipthat it has sought with varying degrees of determinationsince 1959. By virtue of this fact, the symbolic encountersbetween the EU and Turkey have been particularly productivenot just of Turkish insecurities, but also of the EU-Europe’s self-understanding. While some representationscast Turkey’s differences from Europe as inherent androoted in geography and religion, others portray Turkey’speculiarity as stemming from deficiencies in human rightsand rule of law.7 Whereas a view of Russia as inherentlyauthoritarian seems to strengthen the identity of Europeopen to all democratic countries, the figure of Turkey asinherently non-European contribute to the essentialisationof Europe’s geography, history and culture. To quote just acouple of the best-known statements, the former DutchCommissioner, Frits Bolkenstein, argued in 2004 that Turkeyentering Europe would mean forgetting 1683, when theOttoman army was defeated for the second time at the gatesof Vienna (Guardian, 2004). Similarly, Herman van Rompuy,the current EU President, declared back in 2004, in hiscapacity as a Belgian MP, that ‘the universal values whichare in force in Europe, and which are also fundamentalvalues of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry ofa large Islamic country such as Turkey’ (EUObserver, 2009).The French President Sarkozy has repeatedly voiced hispreference for a geographically fixed Europe that does notinclude Turkey (Deutsche Welle, 2011). Competing discourses in Europe downplay Turkey’s culturaldifferences and emphasize Turkey’s problems with humanrights and democracy, as the reasons for Turkey’s

18

exclusion. While such criticisms have been a standardstaple of EEC/EC/EU-Turkey relations since 1959, theirspecification and standardization in the form of theCopenhagen criteria solidified the hierarchy of superior/inferior in EU-Turkey relations. At the same time, thisstandardization promised a level playing field in EU’senlargement strategy, where Turkey’s performance could beevaluated in the absence of cultural prejudices. Thus, thearticulation of the Copenhagen criteria was cautiouslywelcomed in Turkey, as it kept open the possibility of‘becoming European’. Yet at the same time, in the Turkishnational imaginary, the Copenhagen criteria have been tooreminiscent of the 19th century Standard of Civilization(cf. Behr 2007), which the Ottoman Empire tried hard toattain, but which nevertheless proved insufficient to deterEuropean territorial ambitions. In particular, therequirements regarding the rights of ethnic and religiousminorities reproduce the dual image of Europe as a modeland as a threat because of the way in which similarEuropean demands have paved the way for the disintegrationof the Ottoman Empire in late 19th and early 20th centuries.While Turkey’s cultural Otherness is more pronounced,Russia’s role in the construction of European identityafter the end of the Cold War and the collapse of (yetanother) empire continued to be predominantly that of apolitical Other. It will be noted that Russia’s exclusionfrom Europe barely ever involves any questioning ofRussia’s belonging to Europe in cultural terms. In spite ofthe not infrequent appeals by romantic nationalists to‘cultural self-determination’, the Russian state remainskeen on insisting that Russia is part of the Europeancivilization (Morozov, 2010), and it seems that the EUlargely accepts this mapping. By simply disappearing from the global political arena, theSoviet Union gave a huge boost to the self-confidence ofwest Europeans. The resulting western expansion was notonly unprecedented in scale, but also took place in anentirely new setting. Throughout the twentieth century,Europe was a discursive arena where differentinterpretations of European legacy clashed and struggled

19

for hegemony. As a result, the integration project as suchwas open not only to different potential members, but alsoto diverging interpretations of its primary objectives. Thearrival of the Copenhagen criteria and the hegemonicstructure which they represented eventually establishedequivalence between the European utopia and the reallyexisting legal and political order embodied in the EU.Russia of the early 1990s was perceived as a disciplerather than a challenge. However, it soon turned out thatthe EU’s influence over Russia was rapidly waning. This hasby no means led to the EU’s reconsidering its self-perception as a model. On the contrary, Russia’sintransigence actually solidifies the EU as a politicalactor and makes its self-understanding more coherent. In aworld where there is only one way of being European,Russia’s otherness ceases to be a difference within animagined community of Europe and is inevitably ousted intothe external domain. The othering of Russia turns intoexclusion, and the latter, as most of the time since themid-nineteenth century, is framed in political, rather thancultural, terms.Within the contemporary EU discourse, the meaning ofEuropeanness is often defined with a negative reference toRussia. One most patent example was the discursive framingof the Ukrainian ‘orange revolution’ of 2004 and theensuing events. Consider, for instance, the followingstatement in an editorial in The Financial Times: theUkrainians had ‘demonstrated beyond doubt that, given thechance, their country could be a genuine Europeandemocracy. It is not condemned by its past and itsgeography to Russian-style authoritarianism’ (The FinancialTimes, 2004). In this statement, Europe (without Russia)figures as the (only) model for democracy, while Russia isunambiguously presented as setting the standard forauthoritarianism. Similar patterns can be discerned in thegeopolitical struggles about ‘the European perspective’ forBelarus, Moldova and, of course, Georgia.One of the most recent and most telling examples of thatlogic is the July 2009 open letter to Barack Obama, in

20

which a group of intellectuals and former political leadersfrom Central and Eastern Europe called on the U.S. to‘reaffirm its vocation as a European power’ in the face ofRussian ‘revisionism’. Russia stands here as a directopposite of Europe:

It challenges our claims to our own historicalexperiences. It asserts a privileged position indetermining our security choices. It uses overt andcovert means of economic warfare, ranging from energyblockades and politically motivated investments tobribery and media manipulation in order to advance itsinterests and to challenge the transatlanticorientation of Central and Eastern Europe. (Adamkus etal. 2009)

In a revealing, although by no means unusual, twist ofpolitical geography, the U.S. becomes a European power,while Russia is unambiguously excluded.As demonstrated by Sergei Prozorov (2009), the exclusionand self-exclusion of Russia is in fact a stable patternthat to a large extent defines its relationship with theEU. The presence of Russia as a non-liberal-democraticalternative to the EU political order thus stronglycontributes to the ‘geopoliticisation’ of European identity(Diez, 2004). The official position of Brussels is thatthinking in terms of geopolitics and the spheres ofinfluence is obsolete, but in effect various surrogates ofmembership that the EU currently offers to its neighbours –the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnershipand so on – all are driven by security concerns (Joenniemi,2007). They originate in a simplified version of thedemocratic peace theory, which classifies the politicalsystems different from western democracy as securitythreats per se. The only way of adequately addressing thesechallenges is to spread the West European model of liberalmarket democracy to the neighbouring countries withoutreally offering them a stake in defining the norms they areexpected to follow. By figuring as ‘the perfect image of“Europe’s past”’, as simultaneously a territorial and atemporal Other (Prozorov, 2009: 156) Russia, in fact,

21

contributes to the constitution of the EU Europe as a newgeopolitical actor.

Negotiating Cultural and Political Otherness

While Turkey’s compliance with EU’s conditions formembership was partial and half-hearted until the officialrecognition of its candidacy in 1999, thereafter, Turkishgovernments and societal actors initiated a full-scaledemocratic reform process that explicitly took the Europeannorms and standards as reference. At the same time, Turkeybegan to couple conformity with resistance, and in fact hasbecome more adept at framing its defiance in a way thatresonates within the European public space. The resistance,like before, takes the master narrative as a referencepoint, yet it goes beyond the reserve Euro-centrism, basedon the crude reversal of the categories ofcivilized/barbaric, prevalent in the late Ottoman period.This more sophisticated response has emerged as a productof the increased intimacy and hybridity that has laid bareEuropean as well as Turkish insecurities. The primary way in which Turkey negotiates the constructionof European identity is through accusing Europe ofChristian exclusivism. Turkish politicians of differentpolitical orientations have utilized this criticism sincethe mid-1990s (Rumelili, 2007: 88–91). Most recently,Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan reacted to the mountingopposition to Turkey’s membership in Europe, with the claimthat ‘the Franco-German stance proves that the EU is aChristian club’ (The Economist, 2011). The charges ofChristian exclusivism carry a certain degree of resonancein Europe, and thus the question of Turkey’s belongingeasily becomes embroiled in internal debates onmulticulturalism, xenophobia, and the role of religion inEuropean identity. It frames the question of Turkishaccession into the EU as the question of a Muslim country’sentry into a club dominated by Christian countries, thususing civilisationist discourse to question the moralsuperiority of the EU and placing the burden of proof onthe EU if it wants to continue as a normative power. This

22

hybrid discourse, which accepts the frame of hegemony butsubverts it from the inside, makes it possible foradvocates of Turkish accession to present the issue as anexistential one for Europe as a community and as a foreignpolicy actor.A second way in which Turkey plugs in European identitypolitics is by challenging the construction of Europe/Asia, West/ Islam as mutually exclusive identities. Upuntil the mid-1990s, Turkish officials took pains torepresent Turkey as a European state, on the basis ofhistory, geography, contributions to European culture, etc.Later on, politicians of diverse political orientationsbegan to embrace the image of Turkey as a liminal identity,both European and Asian, Western and Muslim (Rumelili,2007: 91–4). Accordingly, Turkish Foreign Minister AhmetDavutoglu outlines his vision for Turkey in Europe in thefollowing fashion:

It is not a Turkey that turned into a derivative ofEuropean culture. Instead, we would like to see aTurkey that is able to contribute to the culture ofhumanity through integrating with European culture(Davutoglu, 2009).

The representation of Turkey’s hybridity not as a threatbut as an asset for Europe, again, directly enters theintra-EU political terrain by challenging the binaryinterpretations of European identity, which rest upon theconstruction of Europe/Asia, West/ Islam as mutuallyexclusive and inherently incompatible identities. As such,they support the more open and multiculturalist readings ofEurope’s identity, but since this view comes from anoutsider and can be interpreted as interventionist, its endeffect is far from certain. It is not inconceivable thatinstead of de-bordering, they could produce furthersecuritisation.Russia’s attempts to present an alternative universalproject, on the other hand, are compromised by the factthat this alternative is still described in termsexplicitly borrowed from the western liberal democraticdiscourse. Here, one finds a clear example of the

23

postcolonial situation: the challenge to the masterdiscourse comes from within and is legitimized in the termsexplicitly borrowed from the language of hegemonic power.The slogan of ‘sovereign democracy’, which was nearlyelevated to the status of national doctrine during Putin’ssecond presidential term, is perhaps the best illustrationhere. Fully in accordance with the logic of hybridity, itdid not mount a direct offence against the democraticvalues promoted by the West, but rather, by emphasising theprinciple of state sovereignty, insisted on Russia’s rightto develop its own, authentic version of democratic society(Morozov, 2008). The very careful arrangement of the August2008 intervention in Georgia as a ‘peace enforcementoperation’ modelled on NATO’s 1999 war against Yugoslaviais yet another example of the hegemonic power of thewestern discourse and the way in which postcolonial agencycan subvert this power in an indirect way (Morozov, 2010:194–6).Russia’s role as a Europe-maker is presently determined bythe fact that it is unhappy about its exclusion from theEuropean political space, tries to challenge thisexclusion, but this challenge is certainly very far frombeing a radical one. Instead of confronting western/EUhegemony, Russia, in Gramscian terms, prefers to wage a warof position whose main parameters are defined by thehegemonic force. This inevitably leads to a situation wherehegemony is being reproduced and even, precisely due tothis challenge, tends to consolidate. The relative emphasison the temporal dimension of identity construction whichwas a characteristic feature of the pro-European discourseduring the Cold War is replaced with external othering:instead of self-critical reflection about its own past theEU now defines itself as more progressive and morallysuperior to its neighbours. The result is that the strugglefor the spheres of influence, rhetorically dismissed byboth sides as a thing of the past, is back a key form ofEuropean international politics.In political terms, Russia remains an outsider whose activeexternality is crucial for the establishment andconsolidation of the European Union as a sole embodiment of

24

the European idea. The Europeans may quarrel betweenthemselves about the best response to the crisis in theCaucasus or the direction of energy flows, but, as pointedout by Thomas Diez, ‘the representation of Europe as aforce for peace and well-being is nearly consensual’ (Diez,2005: 620). Any outside challenge solidifies the nearlyuniversal adherence to this identity – it is not acoincidence that the Russian attempts to drive a wedgebetween the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europe on such issues asthe significance of the Second World War and the victoryover Nazism remain largely unsuccessful (Onken, 2007), incontrast to various oil and gas deals.

CONCLUSIONA comparative retrospective analysis of the roles played byRussia and Turkey as external Others of the EU-centredEurope demonstrate a number of similarities. Bothrelationships are embedded in a hegemonic situation wherethe meaning of ‘Europe’ is defined by the western core,while the eastern (oriental) periphery normally accepts thevalue of ‘civilization’ and Europeanness as they aredefined by the master. At the same time, both are obviouslyunhappy about their subaltern positions and strive tochallenge legitimacy of the hegemonic power. The nature ofthis challenge is profoundly influenced by the situation ofhybridity in which both marginal players find themselves.In spite of their feeling of distinctiveness in theEuropean cultural and political space and the repeatedappeals to some authentic core which allegedly providesmoral grounds for an independent standing vis-à-vis theWest, their own identity discourses are almost completelyintegrated into the pan-European discursive field. Thisimplies that the discursive resources they have to use whenthey speak about their distinctiveness and authenticity areborrowed from the dominant discourse of European modernity.In practice, this means that both Russia and Turkey can dovery little beyond accepting the key values allegedlypromoted by the European integration project, and both haveto struggle for the right to have a say on how these values

25

are applied in day-to-day political practice. As RichardSakwa puts it, ‘Russia and Turkey do not challenge theexisting world order, but only the place accorded to themin that order’ (2010: 8). This alone makes a formation of an ‘axis of the excluded’(Hill and Taspinar, 2006) an unlikely prospect. Moreover,the two players differ in how radically they want tochallenge the west European hegemony, as well as in thediscursive domains they are ready to open while talking totheir western neighbours. Turkey prefers to assume theposture of a disciplined student who diligently completesall assignments but is discriminated against by theprejudiced master. Russia, on the contrary, wants toposition itself as an equal player whose opinion weighs asmuch as that of the EU or the U.S. At the same time, Russiais much more careful when it comes to highlighting itsdifference from the West. It insists on its unquestionablebelonging to Europe in cultural terms, and on alldifferences of opinion being strictly political andinterest-based. By contrast, Turkey is not afraid ofopening up the discursive domain of culture: it does not(and perhaps cannot) position itself as part of an imaginedhomogenous European cultural space, but chooses instead toaccuse its opponents within the core of defending axenophobic image of Europe as exclusively Christian.Our research seems to demonstrate that Turkey has been moresuccessful in its attempts to influence the process ofEuropean identity construction in the sense of being ableto get accepted by the core. Russia, by playing in thefields of democracy and security, aims its counter-hegemonic strategy at the hard core of the Europeanintegration project. This in itself is a radical approach,and it is even further radicalized by the self-assumedposition of an equal player. The result of the Russianefforts is a further consolidation of the EU as a politicalactor who takes it for granted that ‘normative powerEurope’ is something that it can fully keep for itself.Russia’s agency thus also makes its impact on the EU’score, but the outcome differs from the proclaimed goal. The‘third space’ opened by Russia hardly overlaps with the

26

west-European discursive space: while the criticism ofwestern liberal democracy makes a lot of sense within theRussian context, it is confusing and mostly unacceptablefor west Europeans, which leads to Russia’s exclusion beingexacerbated.Turkey, with its appeals to multiculturalism and diversity,targets the soft underbelly of the west European project.These are the issues which are most politicised in nearlyall EU member states because of the really existing issuesof social and cultural integration. As a result, Turkey cansearch for allies among the political forces active in theintra-EU debate. These attempts to decentre the hegemonicpower are also risky because they question the moralstanding of the EU and might lead to attempts to counterthis criticism by othering Turkey even further turning itagain into a complete outsider of Europe. Yet it seems thaton balance decentring has a better chance of success than afrontal attack.While the postcolonial notion of agency is not embodied ina self-reflective subject, it would be unwise to deny anyself-reflexivity on the part of Russia and Turkey in theirinteraction with the EU. As a matter of fact, there are allreasons to presume a good deal of strategic thinking behindboth Russian and Turkish discourses on the identity andboundaries of Europe. However, one implication that can bedrawn from our comparative analysis is that the Russiancriticisms of liberal democracy have further solidified thedivision between Russia and Western Europe. Turkey might befacing a similar danger of alienating itself even furtherfrom Europe by criticising the EU as a Christian club.Thus, even when actors understand themselves to be actingstrategically, their representational practices may havediscursive effects contrary to their objectives.

Notes

1. A previous version of this article was presented at theCEEISA’s 2009 Convention in St. Petersburg. We thank Pertti

27

Joenniemi, Stefano Guzzini and the anonymous reviewers fortheir insightful comments. Bahar Rumelili thanks theTurkish Academy of Sciences for the generous supportprovided by its Distinguished Young Scientist Program.Viatcheslav Morozov would like to acknowledge support fromthe the European Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies andInternationalisation Programme DoRa and the EstonianScience Foundation.The authors’ names are listed alphabetically.

2. Most critical approaches to international relations inspite of their intent to deconstruct the West and modernityarguably still remain centred on the West. See Hobson(2007).

3. On the possibility, and indeed the need, to apply thepostcolonial perspective to the post-Soviet world, seeChioni Moore (2001) and Waldstein (2010).

References

Abizadeh, A. (2005) ‘Does Collective Identity Presuppose anOther? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity’, American Political Science Review 99(1): 45–60.

Adamkus, V. et al. (2009) ‘An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe’, Gazeta Wyborcza (16 July). Available at: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html.

Allen, A. (2002) ‘Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10(2): 131–49.

Barlas, D. and Guvenc, S. (2009) ‘Turkey and the Idea of a European Union During the Inter-War Years, 1923-39’, Middle Eastern Studies 45(3): 425–46.

28

Barth, F. (1969) ‘Introduction’, in F. Barth (ed.) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference, pp. 9–38. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Behr, H. (2007) ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations 13(2): 239–62.

Berenskoetter, F. (2007) ‘Friends, There Are No Friends? AnIntimate Reframing of the International’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35(3): 647–76.

Berktay, H. (2005). ‘Kume Dusme Korkusuna Osmanli-Turk Reaksiyonu’, in O. Kumrular (ed.) Dunyada Turk Imgesi, pp. 179–204. Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi.

Bhabha H. (2005), The Location of Culture, Routledge Classics ed. London: Routledge.

Browning, C. S. (2003) ‘The Internal/External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic:The Case of Kaliningrad’, Alternatives 28(5): 545–81.

Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Chakrabarty, D. (2000) Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chioni Moore, D. (2001) ‘Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique’, PMLA 116(1): 111–28. Davutoglu, A. (2009) Speech to EU Ambassadors on the Occasion of Europe Day, Ankara, 8 May 2009. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/message-of-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-on-the-occasion-of-europe-day_-9-may-2009.en.mfa.

29

Der Derian, J. and M. Shapiro (1989) International/Intertextual: Postmodern Readings of World Politics. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Deutsche Welle (2011) ‘Turkey not fit for EU Accession’, Deutsche Welle, (26 February)

Diez, T. (2001) ‘Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies’, Cooperation and Conflict 36(1): 5–38.

Diez, T. (2004) ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17(2): 319–35.

Diez, T. (2005) ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others:Reconsidering “Normative power Europe”’, Millennium 33(3): 613–36.

The Economist (2011) ‘Mr Erdogan goes to Germany,’ The Economist (1March)

Epstein, C. (2011) ‘Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject, andthe Study of Identity in International Relations’ European Journal of International Relations 17 (2): 327-350.

The Financial Times (2004) ‘The Real Victor’, The Financial Times (23 November).

Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (2001) ‘Taking stock: The constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics’ Annual Review in Political Science 4: 391–416.

Flockhart, T. (2006) ‘Complex Socialization: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization’ European Journal of International Relations, 12 (1): 89-118.

Gandhi, L. (1998) Postcolonial Theory. A Critical Introduction. New York: Columbia University Press.

30

Guardian (2004) ‘In 1683 Turkey was the invader: In 2004 much of Europe sees it that way’ Guardian (22 September).

Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice, Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London, New York: Routledge.

Heller, P. (2010) ‘The Russian Dawn: How Russia Contributedto the Emergence of “the West” as a Concept’, in C.S. Browning and M. Lehti (eds) The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy, pp. 33–52. London, New York: Routledge.

Hill F., Taspinar O. (2006) ‘Turkey and Russia: Axis of theExcluded?’, Survival 48(1): 81–92.

Hobson, J. (2007) ‘Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian Towards a Post-Racist Critical IR’, Review of International Studies33(1): 91–116.

Hopf, T. (2002) Social Origins of International Politics. Identities and the Construction of Foreign Policies at Home. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Huysmans, J. (2000) ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies 38(5): 751–77.

Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A. And P. J. Katzenstein (1996) ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’ in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security, pp. 33–75. New York: Columbia University Press.

Joenniemi, P. (2007) ‘Towards a European Union of Post-Security?’, Cooperation and Conflict 42(1): 127–48.

Joenniemi, P. (2010) ‘Difference Within Similarity: The Puzzle of Transatlantic Relations’, in C.S. Browning and M.Lehti (eds) The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy, pp. 135–60. London, New York: Routledge.

31

Kapoor, I. (2003) ‘Acting in a Tight Spot: Homi Bhabha’s Postcolonial Politics’, New Political Science 25(4): 561–77.

Kratochwil, F. (1989) Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krishna, S. (2009) Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first century. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.

Kumrular, O. (2005) ‘Kopekler ve Domuzlar Savasinda Kanuni’nin Bati Siyaseti’nin Bir Izdusumu Olarak Turk Imaji’, in O. Kumrular (ed.) Dunyada Turk Imgesi, pp. 109–27. Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi.

Kuran-Burcoglu, N. (2003) ‘A Glimpse at Various Stages of the Evolution of the Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th to 21st Centuries’, in M. Soykut (ed.) Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th Century to Present, pp. 15–27. Istanbul: ISIS Press.

Ling, L.H.M. (2002) Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malksoo, M. (forthcoming) ‘The Challenge of Liminality for IR Theory’ Review of International Studies.

Morozov, V. (2008) ‘Sovereignty and Democracy in Contemporary Russia: A Modern Subject Faces the Post-ModernWorld’, Journal of International Relations and Development 11(2): 152–80.

Morozov, V. (2010) ‘Western Hegemony, Global Democracy and the Russian Challenge’, in C. S. Browning and M. Lehti (eds) The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy, pp. 185–200. London, New York: Routledge.

Mouffe, C. (2005) On the Political. London, New York: Routledge.

Neumann, I. B. and J. Welsh (1991) ‘ The Other in European Self-Definition: an Addendum to the Literature on

32

International Society’ Review of International Studies, 17 (4): 327-348.

Neumann, I. B. (1996) Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations. London, New York: Routledge.

Neumann I. B. (1999) Uses of the Other: The ‘East’ in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Neumann, I. B. (2008) ‘Russia as a Great Power, 1815–2007’,Journal of International Relations and Development 11(2): 128–51.

Norton, A. (1988) Reflections on Political Identity. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Onken, E.-C. (2007) ‘The Baltic States and Moscow’s 9 May Commemoration: Analysing Memory Politics in Europe’, Europe-Asia Studies 59(1): 23–46.

Parry, B. (1995) ‘Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse’, in B. Ashcroft , G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin (eds) The Postcolonial Studies Reader, pp. 36–44. London and New York: Routledge.

Prozorov, S. (2009) ‘In and Out of Europe: Identity Politics in Russian-European Relations’, in E. Berg and P. Ehin (eds), Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration, pp. 133–159. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Prozorov, S. (2011) ‘The Other As Past and Present: Beyond the Logic of “Temporal Othering” in IR Theory’, Review of International Studies 37(3): 1273–93.

Roe, P. (2008) ‘The “Value” of Positive Security’ Review of International Studies 34(4): 777–94.

EUObserver (2009) ‘Van Rompuy: Turkey will never be part ofEurope”’, EUObserver, (18 November). Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/29016.

33

Rumelili, B. (2004) ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation’, Review of International Studies 30(1): 27–47.

Rumelili, B. (2007) Constructing Regional community and order in Europe and Southeast Asia. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rumelili, B. (forthcoming) ‘Liminal Identities and Processes of Domestication and Subversion in International Relations’, Review of International Studies.

Sakwa, R. (2010), ‘Russia and Turkey: Rethinking Europe to Contest Outsider Status’, Russie.Nei.Visions 51 (Paris: IFRI).

Spivak, G. (1995) ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin (eds) The Postcolonial Studies Reader, pp. 24–8. London and New York: Routledge.

Turner, V. ([1969] 1995) The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure . New York: Aldine De Gruyter.

Wæver, O. (1995) ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.) OnSecurity, pp. 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wæver, O. (1998) ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community’, in E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds) Security Communities, pp. 69–118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waldstein, M. (2010) ‘Theorizing the Second World: Challenges and Prospects’, Ab Imperio no. 1: 98–117.

Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization 46(2): 391–425.

Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

34

Wendt, A. (2004a) ‘Why a World State Is Inevitable’, European Journal of International Relations 9(4): 491–542.

Wendt, Alexander (2004b) ‘The State as a Person’, Review of International Studies30(2): 289–316.

Wight, Colin (2004) ‘State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity’, Reviewof International Studies 30(2): 269–80.

Wolf, L. (1994) Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Yilmaz, E. and Bilgin, P. (2005) ‘Constructing Turkey’s “Western” Identity During the Cold War’, International Journal 61(1): 39–59.

Zarakol, A. (2011) After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Authors’ BiographiesViatcheslav Morozov is Professor of EU-Russia Studies andChair of the Council of the Centre for EU-Russia Studies atthe University of Tartu, Estonia. Until January 2010, hewas Associate Professor at the School of InternationalRelations and Director of the International Relations andPolitical Science Programme at the Smolny College ofLiberal Arts and Sciences (both – St. Petersburg StateUniversity, Russia). His most recent book, Russia and theOthers: Identity and Boundaries of a Political Community, was publishedin 2009 by the NLO Books in Moscow. His research interestsare in poststructuralist IR theory, Russian nationalidentity and foreign policy. His articles have appeared,inter alia, in Cooperation and Conflict, Global Governance, Journal ofInternational Relations and Development, Russia in Global Affairs. Address:Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu,Tiigi 78, Tartu 50410, Estonia. [e-mail: morozov@ut.ee]Bahar Rumelili is Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chairat the Department of International Relations, Koç

35

University, Istanbul. Her research focuses on internationalrelations theory, processes of European identityconstruction, and EU impact on Turkish domestic reform. Sheis the author of Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europeand Southeast Asia (Palgrave, 2007). Her articles have appearedin the European Journal of International Relations, Review of InternationalStudies, and Journal of Common Market Studies. Address: Department ofInternational Relations, Koç University, Rumelifeneri yolu,Sariyer, Istanbul, 34450 Turkey. [e-mail:brumelili@ku.edu.tr]

36