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The Journal of Legislative Studies

ISSN: 1357-2334 (Print) 1743-9337 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjls20

The executive on the battlefield: governmentamendments and cartel theory in the ChileanCongress

Sergio Toro-Maureira & Nicolás Hurtado

To cite this article: Sergio Toro-Maureira & Nicolás Hurtado (2016) The executive on thebattlefield: government amendments and cartel theory in the Chilean Congress, The Journal ofLegislative Studies, 22:2, 196-215, DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2016.1163881

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2016.1163881

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The executive on the battlefield: governmentamendments and cartel theory in the ChileanCongressSergio Toro-Maureira and Nicolás Hurtado

ABSTRACTThis article argues that cartelised coordination inside Chilean congressionalcommittees is important for understanding the success rates of presidentialinitiatives. By way of an analysis of the amendment process undertaken bothin the Chamber and Senate committees in the Chilean Congress during 2006–10, the authors review the approval patterns of legislative amendments. Theanalysis suggests two chief findings: coordination between governmentparties and the executive is crucial for the success of amendment; and theopposition’s success in generating legal transformations depends on theconstruction of inter-coalition alliances. It is hoped that the perspectiveoffered here will contribute to the current literature on cartel party theory inLatin America.

KEYWORDS Congress; committees; amendments; Chile; cartel theory

Introduction

Over the last two decades, notable progress has been made in the study of leg-islative bodies in Latin America. Ignited by the debate that arose in Brazilregarding the capacity of legislatures in the context of presidential systems(Ames, 1995; Amorin Neto, Cox, & McCubbins, 2003; Figueiredo &Limongi, 1999), a series of authors have contributed both comparativestudies (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Morgenstern & Nacif, 2002; Saiegh, 2010)and case study reviews (Alemán, 2008; Alemán & Navia, 2009; Alemán &Pachón, 2008; Carey, 2003; Jones & Hwang, 2005; Siavelis, 2000) of thedynamics of cooperation and coordination between executive and legislativeinstitutions.

Despite this interest, few works have considered intermediate discussionmechanisms (committees) in understanding the drivers of successful policiesin presidential systems. With certain exceptions (Alemań & Pachón, 2008;Calvo & Sagarzazu, 2011; Londregan, 2002), the lack of systematic researchwith regard to the impact of the executive and legislative branches on thetransformation of bills, on the dynamics of amendment approvals in

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Sergio Toro-Maureira sergiotoro@udec.cl

THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES, 2016VOL. 22, NO. 2, 196–215http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2016.1163881

committees, as well as on legislator-government coordination, raises manyquestions regarding the factors that affect the success or failure of legislationitself.

What are the factors that determine the success of a bill in Congress? Whatare the roles of the legislative and executive powers in this process? What toolsare used, and how do they condition the behaviours of legislators? The objec-tive of this investigation is to advance the debate by analysing another dimen-sion that may help to explain the success of the executive in passing bills.Through an analysis of committee debates, we show that strong, cartelisedcoordination exists between the executive and government legislators topass modifications proposed by the executive, thus ensuring some degree ofcontrol over changes proposed by the opposition and contributing to the gov-ernment’s legislative successes. To do so, we propose two principal hypoth-eses: (a) coordination between government parties and the executive poweris crucial for the success of amendments; and (b) the opposition’s successin generating legal transformations depends on the construction of inter-coa-lition alliances.

This article will therefore be divided as follows. The next section offers atheoretical approach to the characteristics of party coordination in legislaturesand their applicability in the Latin American and Chilean contexts. Then, weemphasise the importance of analysing the intermediate processes of legaltransformation to test legislator–party–executive relationships as well as todescribe the organisation and activity of committees within the Chilean Con-gress. Subsequently, the principal hypotheses are contrasted and a multi-levelcausal model is generated that allows for inferences about the logic of thepassing of amendments. The article concludes with a brief discussion of thefindings and possible future steps for institutionalist research in LatinAmerica.

Party coordination, legislative processes and presidentialism

Party coordination constitutes a good mechanism for resolving the dilemmasof collective action within a legislature. Subject to the axiom that re-election isthe principal source of benefits for the agents (Mayhew, 1974), a large propor-tion of the research on this subject has sought to predict the behaviour of leg-islators by distinguishing between the institutional dynamics that stimulatethe aggregation of interests through reduced transaction costs. Most ofthese coordination theories have been based on four fundamental tenets:(1) the main objective of a legislature is to form national policies; (2) alogic focused on private interests involves high costs to achieve the policyobjective; (3) the way to reduce these costs is to structure rules, attributions,penalties and incentives that will constrain private interests in the legislature;

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and (4) the best method to achieve an effective structure is for political partiesto function as distributors of political resources (cartel parties).

Authors such as Weingast and Marshall (1988), Weingast (1979), Kiewietand McCubbins (1991), and Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) have indicatedthat the answer to problems of collective action, which originate in the desireto be re-elected, is the formation of institutions to create temporary majoritiesand increase the future probability of passing legislation by connecting indi-vidual conduct to the (formal and informal) structures that surround legisla-tive decisions (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2005; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991;Weingast, 1979; Weingast & Marshall, 1988). Weingast and Marshall(1988), for example, perceive committees as scenarios that favour lasting com-mitments through the institutionalisation of exchange and a break with theposture of individual transactions on votes (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962;Maxey, 1919). Based on the assumption of approximation taken from the eco-nomic theory of companies, the authors find that legislative activity, far fromfunctioning similarly to a market, responds to an organisational logic thatmaintains the stability of coalition agreements. Thus, institutions become anecessary condition of legislative organisation, the delegation of their func-tions to other levels, such as committees, congressional leaders or the execu-tive, does not correspond to an abdication or cost–benefit negotiation by eachlegislator (Fiorina, 1974, 1989; Fiorina & Noll, 1978) but is rather a functionalelement of a legislature that allows it to complement other institutions.

Nevertheless, the theory that best fits the coordination of individual inter-ests (re-election) and collective (political) interests is one that considers thatthe parties function as cartelised institutions. This focus allows the structure ofa party to be analysed in light of its capacity to coordinate majority interests,appropriate rules and coordinate agreements between legislators. The theory’smain contribution is related to the re-floating of parties as a mechanism forresolving the dilemmas of collective action. Thus, party cartel understandsdelegation – to one or a small group of political agents – as a leadershipmechanism and as the ability to coordinate members, provide selective incen-tives for cooperation and reduce transaction costs between like-minded legis-lators. It is these acts of leadership that set agendas and that are capable oforganising discussion on particular projects. More specifically, they create amechanism to guarantee the agenda of a small group that is capable of gen-erating the expression of authority and organising legislative debate, both inplenary sessions and in committees. Thus, a cartel is identified by thepower of veto behind a coalition, which is a power that, by definition, willinvariably be successful in opposing the approval of any bill.

The importance of agenda-setting for policy formulation and decision-making quickly proceeded beyond the academic context to be applied in par-liamentary systems (Cox, Masuyama, & McCubbins, 2000) and presidentialsystems (Jones & Hwang, 2005). In Latin America, its application was

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enriched by the organisation of the political system and the roles of presidentsin the legislative process. Various cartelised relationships can be found, forexample, legislator–party–executive (Brazil), provincial party boss–majorityparty leadership–executive (Argentina) and legislator–factions–executive(Uruguay). In Brazil, for example, Amorin Neto et al. (2003) analysed theCartel Agenda model by considering the formation of ministerial portfoliosbased on the presence and relative weight of the parties that make up a coali-tion in addition to the use of legislative and non-legislative prerogatives. Theauthors’ main strategy is to complement Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) andto discuss the analysis presented by Ames (1995) by demonstrating the impor-tance of party cartels to the success of projects presented by the executive andconcurrently to break the debate of a political system that is condemned toprocedural blocking and the presence of individual objections that carrylittle collective weight. As stated by Amorin Neto et al. (2003), ‘Althoughthey do not use our terminology, Figueiredo and Limongi’s work suggeststhe existence of agenda cartels, while Ames’s suggests their absence’ (p. 551).

In contrast, Jones and Hwang (2005) provide another assessment of thetheory of party cartels. These authors find that, in contrast to the UnitedStates, political relations in Argentina are based on provincial party chiefswho exercise strong influence on legislators’ behaviour, particularly becausethey are able to control the destiny of legislators in terms of their access toposts and their chances for re-election. Here, the differentiating element is leg-islators’ loss of autonomy. If, in Cox and McCubbins’ (1993, 2005) originaldescriptions, this element refers to the coordination of legislators to thespeaker, in Argentina, it is an act that originates in the provinces that influ-ences the party leaders in parliament. The paradox arises in the ability of alegislature to ensure that these domains do not influence the approval ofnational policies. Finally, Jones and Hwang (2005) assign an important roleto executive power, particularly regarding its character as a hinge betweenparty and provincial leaders. Specifically, the executive is a clearing housefor information between the requirements of the provincial governmentsand the government’s preferred programmes. Thus, it is this cartel relation-ship, involving party leaders, the executive, provincial leaders and legislators,which explains why, despite the dominance of provincial governments, thereis no provincial bias in votes within the Argentinean Congress.

Uruguay is another example that provides insight into the capacity of thecartel theory to navigate the waters of different types of institution. Accordingto Chasquetti (2011), faction-based politics, added to the legislative role that iscommon to all governments, constitutes a novel cartel structure in which leg-islators delegate power to the leaders of factions. The author portrays thefaction heads of Uruguayan parties as leaders who make decisions in coordi-nation with the executive, which, although it is not considered to be the headof the cartel, plays an important role in its formation and administration.

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Thus, it is this coordination between the executive and the factions thatenables legislative bases to participate in collective agreements and obtainbetter personal results, particularly when electoral success does not dependon a personalised vote but on the performance of a faction and/or party(Chasquetti, 2011).

Overall, the cartel theory is a good lens through which to observe thedynamics of the Chilean Congress. Similar to Brazil and the USA, but unlikeUruguay and Argentina, the vote for candidates in Chile is personal. Neverthe-less, unlike Brazil and the USA, this personal quality does not allow for similarlevels of autonomy among legislators due to the nomination mechanisms inthe electoral system, according to Morgenstern and Siavelis (2008), whichforces intra-coalition negotiation due to the centralised control of these nomi-nations within parties. Furthermore, in contrast to Uruguay and particularlythe USA, the legislative powers of the president are far greater, as reportedby Alemán and Navia (2009), particularly regarding the president’s power toset the agenda, propose exclusive initiatives and amend projects.

Important contributions have been written about the Chilean Congress in apresidentialist context. Siavelis (2000), for example, provides important cluesabout the paradox of an institutional design that features multiple barriers toreaching agreements and the capacity of post-dictatorship governments tomaintain efficient presidentialism. The author’s contribution represents anobservation of the transactional logics within Chile’s Congress over itsentire history as well as of the contextual elements of the transition periodthat play an important role in stability. Carey (2002) analyses the degree ofunity in political parties through roll call voting and shows that there is ahigh degree of unity in government parties and a lower, but still considerable,degree in opposition parties, particularly Renovación Nacional (RN). Carey’swork helps to explain the idea that political parties are coordinated prior tovoting, which has been corroborated in studies such as that by Morgenstern(2004) on the discipline and cohesion of members of congress and their ideo-logical positioning (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007). More recently, other works haveconcentrated on examining the efficiency of legislative work by both the gov-ernment (Alemán & Navia, 2009) and Congress (Saiegh, 2010; Visconti,2011), thus showing that legislative success depends on both presidential pre-rogatives and the capacities of Congress in discussing the law.

However, no articles have directly addressed the structure and formation ofcartels in Chile. This gap is related to the difficulty of assessing coordinationprocesses in supplementary analyses, particularly due to the predominanceand powerful prerogatives of the executive in passing laws. Although themost recent works on the Chilean Congress have found, directly or indirectly,the existence of a relationship (executive–parties–legislator) it is still not pos-sible to resolve this relationship through the presence of a cartel that providesimpetus and success to the initiatives of the executive.

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As we have noted, cartel theory relies on the collusive efforts of cartelmembers aimed at producing or maintaining some common good. In thiscase, the common good is the electoral fate of the coalition government,parties and legislators. In Chile, electoral competition encourages a personalistvote in the districts (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, & Siavelis, 2014). Thus,it is imperative that the government maintain a collusive effort and harmo-nious coordination with its parties and legislators.

Indeed, the Chilean president plays an important co-legislator role thatrequires that his legislators vote for his proposals. To do so, the governmentcoordinates a structure of incentives for parties and legislators by using its dis-tribution capacity. In the case of parties, for example, such coordinationoccurs at regular meetings with party leaders. These meetings allow topleaders to reach agreement about the scope of the presidential agenda(Toro, 2007; Visconti, 2011). Additionally, the meetings serve to establishthe collective and individual requirements of the legislators of each party.The emerging literature on representation strategies in Chile (Luna, 2014;Morgenstern et al., 2014; Toro, 2007) notes that the constituency serviceundertaken by the parties and legislators is only possible because of the gov-ernmental distribution of political and economic resources. Therefore,addressing the parties and the executive equally allows legislators to reapdirect and indirect benefits to maintain their votes and win re-election.

For this reason, a perspective based on the intermediate processes, such ascommittee activities, is attractive. It is in this type of context that presidentialprerogatives can best be isolated due to the agenda-setting powers of the pre-sident of each committee and the opportunities for legislators to introduceamendments. Alemán (2009), for example, argues that legislators imbuedwith agenda-setting power can become strong process controllers and canuse this tool to maintain unity within a coalition and particularly within aparty (Alemán, 2009).

In brief, if an executive–party–legislator cartel is found to exist for govern-ment initiatives, proposals should also prove successful in contexts in whichagenda-setting power is taken out of the hands of the president and ishanded to leading party members, such as committee presidents. Such a sce-nario is particularly the case because, according to previous studies, commit-tees are where the true preferences of legislators become apparent(Londregan, 2002).

Amendments, cartels and legislative success

Why study committees and amendments?

According to cartel theory, a legislative cartel exists when the actions ofcertain members are not blocked by other members, and when actions and

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organisational forms transcend all levels of decision-making. The coordina-tion dynamics of amendments and discussions in committees can be observedin this context. It is in committees that the positions of each legislative agentare revealed and the principal interests of the parties and legislators arediscussed.

Indeed, works that have analysed roll call voting have found that a struc-ture exists within cartels that helps to maintain unity in legislative decisions.Such a cartel involves three specific actors – legislators, parties and the gov-ernment – who participate in a game of coordination that allows bills pro-duced by the executive to be passed successfully. However, one of theproblems with roll call analysis is the difficulty of understanding the legislativeprocess as a whole because these studies do not consider the discussions anddecisions in committees, which are the primary forums for legislative workand the places where, according to Londregan (2002), the true preferencesof legislators are displayed.

Does committee work influence the behaviour of legislators? Without adoubt, the decisions adopted in committees produce effects that have notbeen observed by researchers. The presentation of amendments to an origi-nal bill, the need for agreements to advance the process and legislatorsworking together in small groups involve interplays of similarities and dif-ferences that are not perceived when analyses are undertaken independentlyof these considerations because studies have not made the distinction orhave not taken the trouble to observe the micro-processes of decision-making. Thus, research on party discipline (Carey, 2002; Toro, 2007),levels of approval of the initiatives of the executive (Toro, 2007) and ideo-logical positioning (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007) have used different techniquesto obtain the same result, mainly due to their undifferentiated observationsof nominal voting.

Analyses of the decision-making process in committees are thereforeimportant and relevant for understanding the levels of coordination amonglegislative actors. This process can be observed graphically in W-Nominateideological positions (Poole, 2005), which distinguish votes on amended orunamended bills during the period 2006–10. Here, changes in legislator beha-viour can be observed in the process of voting on amendments. For example,in this context, the degree of consistency in opposition when voting (left sideof Figure 1) is much greater than in voting when no amendment is involved(which is similar to what the congress theory in Chile usually shows). In con-trast, it can be observed that government parties present lower – but still con-sistent – unity in votes with amendments than in votes without amendments(Figure 1).

What happens inside committees and specifically in the bill amendmentprocess? What differences can be found compared with what we knowfrom aggregate studies? What is the structure of legislative coordination

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inside committees, and what is the role of the executive? To answer thesequestions, this section will analyse a series of amendments extracted fromdiscussions of bills during the legislative period from 2006 to 2010 inChile. Reverting to the hypothesis proposed above, it is suggested that carte-lised legislator–party–executive coordination in committee debates is veryimportant to achieving high efficiency for the executive’s proposals. Similarly,it is suggested that coordination between government parties and the execu-tive is crucial for the success of amendments and that the success of theopposition in transforming laws depends on the construction of inter-coali-tion alliances.

Amendments as a central part of legislative work

The institutional and regulatory rules governing the composition of theChilean Congress distinguish among five types of committee: permanent,special, joint, mixed and investigative. Special committees are responsiblefor studying unusual issues, and joint committees perform the cooperativework of two or more committees from one chamber. The function ofmixed committees is the reconciliation of disagreements between two cham-bers or simply the achievement of precision, such as in the budget, whileinvestigative committees respond to particular acts of the chamber’s preroga-tive for inspection. The main committees are the permanent committees,which are responsible for preparing and discussing bills, depending on theirarea of specialisation. The Chamber of Deputies has 24 permanent commit-tees, with each consisting of 13 deputies, while the Senate has 20, with fivemembers each. These committees are an important element of party

Figure 1. Roll calls 2006–10 with and without indicaciones.

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coordination because each committee president has discretionary andagenda-setting powers to establish the order in which bills are discussedand to allow time for more detailed and in-depth analyses. Some of the per-manent committees have a special regulatory role regarding the subjects thatare their responsibility, such as the Treasury Committee. A seat on this com-mittee is one of the most sought after in terms of congressional careersbecause the Treasury Committee decides on initiatives regarding the statebudget and finances and is therefore necessarily involved in the processingof most bills. The other committees that have exceptional responsibilitiesare the Internal Rules, Administration and Regulations for the Chamber ofDeputies Committee and the Internal Rules for the Senate Committee. Thefirst consists of the heads of the parliamentary committees and themembers of the chamber board ex officio. Its president is the president ofthe chamber. The second has five members plus the vice-president and pre-sident of the Senate, with the latter presiding.

Current regulatory agreements on the publicity and transparency of parlia-mentary activities require nominal votes to be recorded in the annexes ofreports. As a recent regulatory agreement, this requirement is often not imple-mented, except for in the Chamber Treasury Committee. Nevertheless, theinformation included in committee reports is generally poorly presented. Inthe Chamber of Deputies committees in particular, the data are frequentlyincomplete, not clearly expressed or simply not logically described. Thispoor quality further impedes one intention of Law No. 20.285, Access toPublic Information, that is, that the citizens should know how their represen-tatives vote.

In terms of a quorum to discuss and vote on bills, the Chamber of Deputies’regulations state that the minimum quorum for a session is four members,while in the Senate, the presence of at least one-third of the committeemembers is required. The average attendance at all chamber committees forthe period 2006–10 was 8.65. This level of attendance is consistent with theattendance of the Treasury Committee, which had an average attendance of9.03 per session. It should be noted that this attendance figure does nottruly reflect active attendance, as is shown by the number of legislators whoactually vote on the details of bills in the committees, and even more, thosewho vote throughout a whole session. For decision-making, both chambersrequire an absolute majority of the members present on a committee forapproval.

With regard to the order of discussion, the regulations place agenda-settingpowers in the hands of the committee president to set the order of voting onarticles and their amendments as well as to declare whether the amendmentscontradict ideas that have already been approved in a bill. Tacitly, Article 281implies the following:

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If there are amendments incompatible with the original proposal, these will bevoted on first, in the order set by the President. Articles or amendments cannotbe voted on which, in the President’s judgement, contradict ideas which havealready been approved in a bill or agreement proposal.

Similarly, the committee presidents have the authority to declare inadmissibleany parliamentary initiatives that are the exclusive initiatives of the presidentbecause the Constitutional Organic Law on Congress states (Article 25)

members of the national Congress may not formulate an amendment which inany way affects matters which are the exclusive initiative of the President of theRepublic, even for the simple purpose of making it known to the President.However, amendments will be admitted, the object of which is to accept,reduce or reject services, jobs, emoluments, loans, benefits, expenses andother initiatives on the matter proposed by the President.

Thus, we see that the executive not only has the authority to legislate exclu-sively on certain matters but that this authority also obtains when legislatorswish to modify these bills. This power represents a serious restriction on par-liamentary action, especially in the case of the opposition.

The majority of the corresponding literature asserts that parliamentarycommittees are a central element in resolving the dilemmas of collectiveaction. In a presidentialist configuration, it might be expected that this typeof structure would become the best mechanism for party empowermentbecause legislators control the agenda and the order of discussion. One ofthe strongest instruments available to parties in the committee process isamendments – known in Chile as indicaciones. Amendments ultimatelytransform the original intention of a bill into the proposal that is voted onand possibly passed.

In Chile, amendments (indicaciones) can be proposed both by the execu-tive and by legislators. On occasion, it might be a committee itself that pro-poses changes to a law. Table 1 shows the distribution by chamber andyear of the bills presented to Congress. To ensure homogeneity in the analysis,only amendments to initiatives entered during the parliamentary and presi-dential period from 2006 to 2010 are considered. The table shows that the

Table 1. Number of amendments per chamber and year of entry of bill.a

2006 2007 2008 2009

Senate Deputies Senate Deputies Senate Deputies Senate Deputies

Executive 460 366 529 308 637 297 329 191% 24.5 34.3 19.5 29.6 36.8 32.9 26.9 40.5Legislative 1414 702 2190 731 1094 606 894 281% 75.5 65.7 80.5 70.4 63.2 67.1 73.1 59.5Total 1874 1068 2719 1039 1731 903 1223 472% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: www.congreso.cl.aAnnual periods from March to March.

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greatest presentation activity occurred in the Senate. In many cases, therewere twice as many presentations in the Senate as in the Chamber of Deputies.Similarly, it can be noted that the number of amendments submitted by theexecutive tended to be lower than that presented by the legislative branch.

The number of indicaciones presented varies with each legal initiative. Only10 per cent of bills received amendments, which is consistent with the totalnumber of bills passed for the period. The number of indicaciones presentedin the period ranged from one to 741. The bill that had the largest number ofindicaciones in the period was the legislation that created the environmentministry, the environmental assessment service and the environment superin-tendency. Table 2 shows the number of bills that had some type of amend-ment by year.

Amendments can be accepted, rejected, withdrawn or declared unconstitu-tional. While acceptance or rejection is decided by nominal voting in commit-tee, withdrawal is an act of discretion of the proposer, while a declaration ofunconstitutionality is in the hands of the committee president. Althoughamendments are very often withdrawn so as not to be declared unconstitu-tional, they often achieve their objective, which is for the executive topresent indicaciones on the subjects proposed by the parliamentary authors.It should be noted that, if there are legislators who oppose a declaration ofinadmissibility of indicaciones in committee, the committee members canvote on the issue. Figure 2 shows the results of indicaciones separated bythe chamber in which they were discussed. It can be observed that theChamber of Deputies presented a greater number of approvals than theSenate. Thus, 61.23 per cent of indicaciones were approved in the Chamberof Deputies, while 43.2 per cent were approved by the Senate. By the sametoken, the number of rejections was higher in the Senate (36.4 per cent)than in the Chamber of Deputies (28.2 per cent). The same relationshipwas true of withdrawals, with 11.7 per cent in the Senate compared withonly 1 per cent in the Chamber of Deputies.

The descriptive data help to provide an aggregate picture of how amend-ments are treated in Congress. We have observed that most of the discussionand modification of bills occurs in the upper chamber. Fewer are passed, andmore are withdrawn by their proposers. However, some key questions remain:

Table 2. Number of bills to which amendments were applied.a

Amendments? 2006–7 2007–8 2008–9 2009–10

Yes 68 107 78 57% 9.33 12.27 11.76 10.98No 661 765 585 462% 90.67 87.73 88.24 89.01Total 729 872 663 519% 100 100 100 100

Source: www.congreso.cl. aAnnual periods from March to March.

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What variables determine the success of indicaciones? How do parties andcoalitions behave in such instances? How do agreements made in committeeaffect voting in plenary sessions? In the next section, we seek to answer thesequestions through systematic analyses of amendments and voting in thechambers.

The legislator–party–executive relationship in the success ofamendments

We previously stated that studies on the Chilean Congress have demonstratedthe broad influence of the executive power in the process by which laws areshaped. Very few studies have focused on the instances for intermediate dis-cussion as the scenario in which proposals are decided upon. For this reason, adatabase was precisely designed to allow for information to be gathered oncommittees as the centres of discussion where political decisions are made.This database was constructed on three levels. The first level analyses the par-ticularities of a bill, i.e. the chamber of origin, the stage reached in the processand whether the bill was introduced by the executive or legislative power. Thesecond level is observation at the committee level. Here, we attempt to deter-mine the committee where the bill was discussed, the attendance at these ses-sions, and the process by which the discussion occurred. Finally, at the thirdlevel, the bill is related to its indicaciones, their authors and the results.

Figure 2. Result of amendments per chamber.

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Obviously, progress is made in this type of systematisation of the discussion oflegislation when it allows the causes and political configurations allowing forthe success of an amendment to be definitely known.

Approval of amendments

The first point refers to the factors that influence the success of an amend-ment. Three elements must be noted: the effectiveness of the executive, theprevalence of government parties, and inter-coalition strategies. Withregard to the effectiveness of the government in presenting proposals forchanges, it can be noted that 90.37 per cent of the amendments that comefrom the executive are approved. This information is important because itshows the strength of the executive in legislator–party–government coordina-tion. In fact, such high success rates are a necessary condition for determiningthe presence of a legislative cartel, which is reinforced by the low percentage ofamendments that were rejected or declared unconstitutional.

Conversely, although amendments proposed by legislators have a lowerlikelihood of approval (33.54 per cent), and a majority are either rejected(44 per cent) or declared unconstitutional (12.42 per cent), the participationof the legislative branch in approved initiatives is close to 50 per cent of thetotal (2185 out of a total of 4586). In other words, amendments proposedby legislators represent a relatively effective formula for intervening in the leg-islative decision-making process because half of the changes made to originalprojects correspond to amendments proposed by legislators (Table 3).

The same relationship is shown by the success rate per party. Here, it canbe noted that, during the study period, there was a greater tendency foramendments proposed by legislators from government parties to be approvedand a lower prevalence for the opposition. However, a strategy of generatingagreements between legislators from different coalitions often exists, whichcan help to achieve approval for these modification proposals. Figure 3

Table 3. Condition of amendments by sponsoring power.Legislative Executive Total

Approved 2185 2401 458633.54% 90.37% 50.01%

Unconstitutional 809 5 81412.42% 0.19% 8.88%

Rejected 2874 166 304044.12% 6.25% 33.15%

Withdrawn 621 72 6939.53% 2.71% 7.56%

No vote 25 13 380.38% 0.49% 0.41%

Total 6514 2657 9171100.00 100.00 100.00

Source: www.congreso.cl.

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shows the success by party of amendments initiated by at least one of itsmembers. Here, we can observe that La Alianza por Chile achieves approvalfor barely 33.9 per cent of its indicaciones, which is far less than the figurefor the Concertación parties, while inter-coalition proposals show a successrate of 77.85 per cent.

In light of this information and to perform an exhaustive analysis of thelikelihood of amendments being approved, we use a mixed-effects model.This model allows us to analyse the level of approval using the three levelswith which the database was constructed (amendment, bill and committee).

To do so, a dummy was generated as a dependent variable (DV) thatindicates whether an amendment was approved by the committee. Asstated, approximately 4586 amendments were approved, compared with4547 that were rejected (3040), withdrawn (693) or declared unconstitutional(814). This dummy was crossed with a battery of dichotomous institutionalvariables to allow for observation of strategic levels of coordination. Thefirst (Executive) is constructed based on the distinction of formulation bythe government (‘1’) versus others, such as specific legislators or the commit-tee itself (‘0’). The second refers to the chamber of origin of the amendment(Deputies = 1, Senate = 0). This variable allows us to determine the chamberin which approval is more probable.

Subsequently, we present a series of variables regarding the party and coa-lition origin of the amendments. This step allows for an analysis of the

Figure 3. Percentage approval of amendments by sponsoring party.Source: www.congreso.cl.Note: UDI, Unión Demócrata Independiente; RN, Renovación Nacional; PS, Partido Socialista;PPD, Partido por la Democracia; PRSD, Partido Radical Social Demócrata; PDC, Partido Demó-crata Cristiano; IND, Independent.

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probability of the two main coalitions (Alianza por Chile and Concertación)and the opposition parties (Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and RN)to obtain approval as well as inter-coalition presentations. We also generatean interaction between an amendment presented by the executive (Executive)and the presence of a committee chair from the same coalition at the time theamendment was discussed (Chair). The evaluation of this conditional effectcan provide an understanding of whether executive success can be explainedby the logic of cartel-type effort and coordination between the executive andhis or her party. Table 4 shows the results obtained.

The results of the mixed-effects model provide an answer to the hypothesisproposed in this section. Applying the three-level model, we use two randomeffects for the estimation. The first is a random intercept related to the bill dis-cussed (called boletin). The second is a random intercept related to the com-mittee involved in each bill’s discussion. Using this model can be justified bythe results of a likelihood-ratio test. The test, which compares the mixed-effects logistic model with a standard (marginal) logistic regression, reveals

Table 4. Mixed-effects logit DV = Approval of amendments.

Variables1 2

Approval Approval

Executive(Amendment proposed by)

3.797***(0.166)

3.866***(0.165)

Interaction: Committee chair = ‘Concertación’*Executive 0.638***(0.198)

0.695***(0.198)

Deputies(Discussed in Chamber of)

0.320**(0.135)

0.314**(0.136)

Interaction: Concertación*UDI(Amendment proposed by)

1.507***(0.176)

Interaction: Concertación*UDI(Amendment proposed by)

1.454***(0.193)

UDI(Amendment proposed by)

−0.395***(0.0848)

RN(Amendment proposed by)

−0.226***(0.0824)

Alianza(Amendment proposed by)

−0.463***(0.0781)

Intercoalition (Amendment proposed by) 1.641***(0.134)

Constant −0.545***(0.129)

−0.577***(0.128)

Random intercept at bill level 0.401*(0.226)

0.360(0.227)

Random intercept at committee level 0.809***(0.233)

0.866***(0.240)

Observations 8616 8616Number of groups 276 276

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.***p < 0.01.**p < 0.05.*p < 0.1.

210 S. TORO-MAUREIRA AND N. HURTADO

the capacity of the mixed-effects option versus the other option (with chi2 =723.20 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). The same capacity was reported in theresults for the variance that were presented in Table 4.

The significant result of the probability of approval of the amendmentsproposed by the executive power shows that the government is effectiveeven in instances in which parties and legislators have greater control overthe agenda. The regression table shows at least two important resultsrelated to this argument. The first is the substantive size of the coefficient(3.797 and 3.886) of the amendments presented by the executive. Thesehigh coefficients are complemented by a low standard error (0.166). Thesecond result is the interaction between amendments presented by the execu-tive and the presence of a committee chair from the same coalition at the timethe amendments were discussed. This interaction represents a good proxy fortesting the collusive efforts of the executive with his or her party and coalition.Although the interaction coefficient is lower than that for an executiveamendment (0.638 and 0.695), it nevertheless provides significant weight incorroborating cartel-type efforts and for explaining the real capacity of theexecutive to coordinate with his or her party.1

In contrast, it can be observed that modifications sponsored by oppositionlegislators had a lower probability of being approved. As shown in Figure 3, pro-posals emanating from legislators from the RN and UDI parties showed the twolowest approval rates. The importance of this result is that, unlike votes in thechamber, rejections in committee are generally unanimous among members.

A significant factor in the opposition’s low approval rate is the capacity ofthe executive to present counter-proposals to opposition amendments. Toexemplify this point, it is interesting to note the discussion of a bill tomodify the Health Code (bulletin 5684-11), in which opposition deputiesChahuán, Masferrer, Melero and Sepúlveda presented an amendment toadd a new Article 113. The object of the amendment was to include the fol-lowing paragraph: ‘The professional services of psychologists, nurses, mid-wives, optometrists and others as stated in the regulation are functions ofmedical collaboration’.

As we have described, this amendment – and many others – was unani-mously rejected, largely due to the arguments of the representative of theexecutive power, who explained the minister’s position with regard to theamendment. In this instance, the minutes read:

Nevertheless, the representative of the Executive explained that the proposedspecification would be unnecessary, since in the event of such an occurrence,optometrists would be governed automatically by the terms of paragraph oneof article 112 of the Health Code. The representative also recalled the preferenceexpressed by the Health Minister against creating a new career and in favor ofexplaining and regulating the field of action of medical technologists, includingophthalmologists, who currently practice and who can contribute immediately,

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within a health team, to the solution of problems of visual health and reducingwaiting lists, for which they would be authorized to prescribe dioptric lenses.

The regression shows that the probability of success is greater when proposalsare presented that cross the coalition spectrum. Model 2, for example, whichincorporates the occurrence of Concertación–UDI and Concertación–RNinteractions, shows a significant increase in the probability of success foropposition parties when amendments are presented jointly with a Concerta-ción member of parliament. This formula for success is correlated with thestrength indicated by joining forces in decision formats involving fewmembers, such as committees. In any event, it is important to establish thatjoint amendments are fairly scarce, representing only 7 per cent of the total.

Other variables were also tested in the regression. For example, the resultsshow that the Chamber of Deputies enjoys a higher probability of approvalthan the Senate. In addition, because fewer amendments are presented incommittees in the lower chamber, the results suggest that powerful reasonsexist for the executive to choose to initiate discussion on bills in theChamber of Deputies rather than in the Senate. Finally, it can be establishedthat the type of committee has no effect on the probability of approval.Although the model only included the Treasury Committee, unused regres-sion analyses show that there is no significant relationship for any type ofcommittee in either chamber.

Nevertheless, this section helps to establish that the logic of a legislativecartel of executive–parties–legislator is very much present at the heart ofthe decision-making process in Chile’s Congress. By analysing amendments,we demonstrate three important points in this discussion. The first is that theexecutive is an active player within the committee debate process. The secondis that, as an active player, the executive assumes leadership and cartelisesdecisions. The third is that, by assuming this leadership role, the executiveis able to propose new transformations efficiently, coordinate with his orher own coalition and make counter-proposals to opposition initiatives.

Discussion

Anyone who has tried to understand Latin American legislatures has observedthe strength of the executive with respect to its role in the control and coor-dination of the agenda and the behaviour of parties in the legislative branch.Although this system is an intention of the design of the institution, thepresent article seeks to observe, from the perspective of intermediate discus-sion, the structures that lead to coordination among the government, partiesand legislators in shaping the law.

Through an analysis of committee discussions, the article shows that,during the period from 2006 to 2010, there was harmonious coordination

212 S. TORO-MAUREIRA AND N. HURTADO

between the government parties and the executive in approving indicaciones.When added to presidentialist prerogatives, this coordination resulted in alower success rate for alternatives proposed by the opposition. Although itis true that the president can intervene effectively in the legislative process,it is also possible to see relatively dynamic, efficient work by legislatorsthrough amendments, in contrast to the substantially lower approval ratefor bills presented by legislators. The results show that work conducted byrepresentatives through amendments represents a less expensive, more acces-sible means to advance the legislative process.

We have also analysed the extent to which the executive was able to act inlegislative decisions. The analysis showed harmonious coordination betweengovernment legislators and the executive in approving indicaciones, whichresulted in significant absolute success for members of the governmentparties. Again, the results of this section demonstrate the leadership of theexecutive both in coordinating like-minded legislators and in stopping propo-sals for change emanating from the opposition.

In general, our work seeks to complement both the view that considers thepresident to be the most important player in the legislative process and theperspective that seeks to favour the legislative power. Of course, the executivehas great powers for agenda-setting and coordination, which makes the posi-tion vital in this dimension. However, this power must not be considered alimitation on opportunities for other levels of coordination, especially in deci-sion-making processes such as those that take place on committees. Theseopportunities can present a new challenge.

Note

1. Once we ran the model, we used the predict command in STATA for the esti-mation of the probabilities of the bills initiated by the executive and tested thedifferences in the probabilities when the chair was a co-partisan member andwhen the chair was an opposition member. We found that the difference inthe predicted probability of passage for bills initiated by the president in com-mitte chaired by the co-partisan and the predicted probability of passage forbills initiated by the president in committe chaired by the oppositionmembers was 0.0345712, statistically different from zero.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This research is framed within the FONDECYT’s Project No. 1140564 and the Mil-lennium Nucleus for the Study of Stateness and Democracy in Latin America, Project(RS130002).

THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 213

Notes on contributors

Sergio Toro-Maureira, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Department of PublicAdministration and Political Science, Universidad de Concepción, Chile. He is inter-ested in the study of political representation and the behaviour of Chilean legislatorstowards their constituencies. Email: sergiotoro@udec.cl

Nicolás Hurtado is Political Scientist at the Institute of Political Science, PontificiaUniversidad Catolica de Chile. He is a research assistant affiliated at FONDECYT1140564, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Universidadde Concepción. Email: nico.hurtado.a@gmail.com

ORCID

Sergio Toro-Maureira http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1129-5441

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