The ethical responsibility of international relations theorists

Ethical Responsibility of Theorists

Because all theories are political and politicized

statements, all theorists have an ethical responsibility

not to themselves, or the academy, but to the world they

seek to investigate.

International Relations as a discipline was established in

1919 in the advent of The Great War – later known as World

War I – with the desire to stop future wars. As stated by

Devetak, ‘more than just the study of the causes and

conditions of war and peace, the study of international

relations was, from the outset, guided by a purpose: to

develop theories aimed at preventing or eliminating war’

(2011:10). With this understanding of the purpose of

International Relations, I argue that all theorists since

1919 have an inherent mandate to produce theories that will

seek to prevent war. Since the majority of international

affairs occur in the political arena, it is reasonable to

presume that theories from this discipline are political

and can be politicized by those practising international

relations. In this essay, I initially provide a background

to the discipline of international relations and explain

the influence scientific rigour has had on its perceived

legitimacy. Subsequently, I present the debate between

rational choice and critical theorists over their level of

ethical responsibility in theory creation. I contend that

objectivity and scientific rigour do not remove a

theorist’s ethical responsibility to the reasonably

foreseeable abuses of their theory. Furthermore, I argue

that although theorists do not hold complete responsibility

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for the political implications arising from their theories,

they hold a “task responsibility” to ensure increased

scientific rigour to the exclusion of values, does not

increase the vulnerability of their theory and enhance the

chance of its political abuse through foreign policy. The

second part of the paper uses Democratic Peace Theory to

buttress the argument that theorists have a responsibility

to ensure that well-intentioned theories are not used to

support political interests that produce adverse outcomes.

Finally, I contrast Morgenthau’s Classical Realism with

Waltz’s Neo-realism to demonstrate that despite relatively

similar content, a theorist’s efforts to maintain ethical

responsibility can greatly influence the world they seek to

investigate. In doing so, I prove that all theories are

indeed political statements, and this infers an ethical

responsibility of the theorist to ensure they are

implemented as they had intended.

Background

International Relations emerged as a discipline in 1919, at

the end of World War I. At a time of disillusionment and

weariness from war, the world turned towards liberal

idealism to escape the status quo and attain peace.

International institutions were established and the League

of Nations instigated. Although issues of international

relations had been debated and discussed since the time of

Thucydides around 400BC, through Machiavelli, Hobbes and

Kant, it was at this time that the first dedicated

Department of International Politics was established at

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Aberystwyth University in Wales. This signalled the

beginning of the discipline – a discipline seeking to gain

a better understanding of the international political

world, and prevent further conflict. When war broke out

again, just twenty years later, scholars like E.H. Carr

were disillusioned and blamed the “utopian” ideals of

liberalism. Still in the early stages of inception, the

discipline was at risk of being undermined by the apparent

failure of liberalism, which did not predict or prevent

World War II. Carr was appointed Professor of International

Politics at Aberystwyth in 1936, representing his time of

leadership within the discipline. He was determined to

establish its legitimacy and set it apart from other

studies such as law, philosophy and economics. In 1939 he

published “The Twenty Years’ Crisis”. In this work he

criticized liberalism and its utopian ideals, pushing the

discipline towards a positivist methodology. ‘It has been

in the initial stage in which wishing prevails over

thinking, generalisation over observation, and in which

little attempt is made at a critical analysis of existing

facts or available means’ (Carr, 1946:8). Carr believed

that legitimacy for the discipline was to be gained if it

could be seen as a science – subjected to rigorous

analysis, with an emphasis on facts and objectivity. This

began a legacy of rational choice theory and positivism.

Later as we move towards the debate on whether theorists

have an ethical responsibility to the world they seek to

investigate, we see this objectivity as a distinguishing

factor between theorists of rational choice and critical

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theory. The two methodologies are in stark contrast and

determine how theorists from each school perceive their

role in the discipline – to explicate or transform the

world – and subsequently their perception of their ethical

responsibility for their theories. I deliberate on the

relevance and necessity of objectivity within the

discipline from these two perspectives and argue that if

International Relations is still about escaping war,

objectivity must not be the first priority of theory if it

undermines our ethical responsibility.

Do theorists have an ethical responsibility?Piki Ish-Shalom identifies two types of responsibility that

can be considered when observing the implementation of

theory in international political arenas: “blame

responsibility” and “task responsibility” (Ish-Shalom,

2009:303). I agree with Ish-Shalom’s proposal that

responsibility be borne into these two separate categories.

What we often witness in the world – when one country

invades another, or defends another, or sanctions another –

‘is the public and political representation’ of a theory

(Ish-Shalom, 2009:303). When then-US president George W.

Bush was garnering support to enter Iraq in 2003, some of

his language suggested he was invoking the Responsibility

to Protect (R2P) norm and appealing to a humanitarian

imperative for intervention. Despite the best intentions of

the theorists behind R2P and cosmopolitanism, the

manipulative actions of George W. Bush and the Coalition of

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the Willing1 could not be foreseen at theoretical

inception, nor was there any reasonable action available to

prevent such misuse. In this case, Piki Ish-Shalom would

argue that they bear no moral responsibility or “blame

responsibility” for the ramifications of their theories. It

would be unreasonable, and essentially undesirable to hold

academic theorists to blame for the often-unpredictable

politicization of their work. If unreasonable

responsibility is thrust upon theorists, trepidation could

cause a paralysis within the discipline. However, I am

apprehensive to deny theorist responsibility in all

political manipulations of their work, as there is a

mutable line in the sand between the context of Iraq, and

for example, the consistent and repeated abuse of Liberal

Democracy through the Democratic Peace Theory. Although

both scenarios represent political distortion of a theory

for legitimization of state interests, the latter has

transpired despite many opportunities for scholarly

interjection on the misuse. In such a case, Ish-Shalom

would argue that a theorist, although not blamed for the

ramifications of their theories, does hold a “task

responsibility” to mitigate political abuse.

Do we have a Task Responsibility? Rational-choice

versus critical theoryTask Responsibility recognises that ‘it is perfectly

sensible to ask theorists to determine whether theorization1 Coalition of the Willing is a term used to describe participants in military interventions that fall outside of UN peace-keeping operations

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and theory in fact have any intrinsic features that render

them susceptible to public misinterpretation and political

abuse’ (Ish-Shalom, 2009:304). Ish-Shalom disputes the

relevance of objectivity within theory. Objectivity, as

discussed earlier, has been generally universal –

particularly in rational choice theory – since the

legitimization of the discipline under E.H. Carr in the

1940s. Objectivity was a tool to create a science of

politics and distinguish realism, in particular, in contra

to the utopian liberalist ideology. In a section titled

“Ethics and Politics” in “The Twenty Years’ Crisis”, he

states:

The antithesis between the world of value and the

world of nature, already implicit in the dichotomy of

purpose and fact, is deeply embedded in the human

consciousness and in political thought. The utopian

sets up an ethical standard which purports to be

independent of politics, and seeks to make politics

conform to it. The realist cannot logically accept any

standard value save that of fact. (Carr, 1946:21)

Carr’s work, positioned in response to the failed Liberal

interwar era, is scathing on values, ethics and purpose. He

demands that theories ought to be rooted in fact evidenced

in the world we see and experience. For Carr, objectivity

is the cornerstone, and scientific rigour the foundation,

on which to build the discipline. Despite trying to create

the perception that the perfect theory is rich in a

combination of realism and utopianism, therefore declaring

that ‘political science must be based on a recognition of

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the interdependence of theory and practise…’ (1946:13), it

is clear that Carr leans more heavily towards the realist,

positivist perspective.

As a pivotal figure in the development of the discipline,

it is not surprising that Carr’s legacy for scientific

rigour and objectivity would permeate the rational choice

theories of the 20th century. Ish-Shalom contends that in

order for theories not to become “rhetorical capital” for

politicians and to ‘discharge the task responsibility…

theorists need to renounce the principle of objectivity,

and to adopt instead a normative ethic’ (Ish-Shalom,

2009:304). Given the background just mentioned, this is a

contentious recommendation. Rational choice theorists such

as neo-realists and neo-liberalists argue that the purpose

of theory is to best represent the real world, as it

exists. This requires objectivity and a positivist

detachment from their theorizing. They are not here to

change the world, and in fact, do not believe their

theories have that power or influence. In an interview with

Kenneth Waltz (Conversations with History 2003) – the founder of

neo-realism – when asked what the purpose of a theory was,

he answered that it was a tool used to be able to

understand and explain what is going on in the real world.

‘Prediction is nice, but the emphasis is on explanation. If

a theory can’t do that, then it is a worthless theory; it

is not a theory at all’. Furthermore, he doesn’t even

mention that theory should consider an emancipatory

element. There is no consideration that a theory should

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provide a vision of how the world could be better, and it

is easily inferred that an ethical responsibility to the

world, would seem absurd.

‘At the other end of the spectrum’ from the ‘neorealist

theorists who deny that theories have influence and power

or that theorists have responsibility for world problems’

(Ish-Shalom, 2009:305) are the critical theorists. Critical

theorists are those that believe a theory has the practical

purpose of seeking human emancipation: ‘to liberate human

beings from the circumstances that enslave them’

(Horkheimer, 1982:244). They believe in social

transformation, such as that achieved through feminism and

critical race theory. The two fundamentally different

epistemologies affect the methodologies and consequently,

the theorist’s beliefs of ethical responsibility within

theory. Immanuel Wallerstein, an American social scientist,

argues that ‘the intellectual tasks before us are important

ones, that our intellectual responsibilities are moral

responsibilities’ (in Ish-Shalom, 2009:304). If a critical

theorist is trying to change the world through their

theory, it can be argued that their responsibility – or at

the very least, their interest – in how the theory is

implemented in political practice will be greater than the

rational choice theorist who is only interested in

explaining the world as it is today. In summary, both

groups have divergent and extreme positions on their

ethical responsibility to the world outside the academy.

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Value and ethics have been seen for too long to undermine

the discipline. The legacy of the interwar period failure

of liberalism, and Carr’s leadership towards realism and

positivism for legitimacy sake, has seen the terms ‘“value-

laden” or “normative” as the ultimate academic put-down’

(Smith, 2004:500). Ethics and rigour have erroneously

become considered dichotomous: ‘the dominant view was that

academic work should eschew statements about values and

should instead concentrate on the “facts”’ (Smith,

2004:501). Robert Keohane presented this most clearly with

his debate between rationalism and reflectivism2. He

questioned that if reflectivist scholars could not develop

falsifiable theories based on detailed empirical studies,

they could not be considered a legitimate social science.

On the contrary, I argue firstly, that an emancipatory

theory can be based on rigorous analysis and not simply be

based on utopian wishes that prevail over thinking, as Carr

described. Secondly, I contend that the purpose of

International Relations, as recognised in the creation of

the discipline after World War I, was to seek an escape

from war. It was intended as a study of the world, not just

to understand how different states and actors interact, but

also to use this information to redirect us away from

future war and conflict. Attempting to emulate the physical

sciences, in the way that Waltz has done in neo-realism, I

contend is pointless in a “social” science. International

relations do not consist of repeatable and incessant

2 Reflectivism is a term used within International Relations Theory todescribe theoretical approaches that contrast with rational-choice andpositivism.

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interactions. Our world is not comparable to a science lab.

It consists of changing actors, alliances, interests and

norms. To simplify and reduce through theory, to simply

explain the status quo – no matter how scientific and

falsifiable it is – forgoes an opportunity and

responsibility to the world outside academia.

How to implement our Task Responsibility Piki Ish-Shalom declares three stages for implementing task

responsibility. First, is to determine if there are any

inherent aspects of the theory that leave it susceptible to

political abuse. Second, is to find correct measures that

will rectify or minimise those vulnerabilities. Third, is

to implement those correct measures to minimise negative

politicisation (2009:307). The first step relates to a

theory’s accessibility and comprehensibility. If it is

objective, ‘rather than tainted by partisanship and

ideology’, the public will accept it as legitimate (Ish-

Shalom, 2009:308). On the other hand, ‘absent such

accessibility a theory, no matter its real-world

implications and their attractiveness to policy makers,

will remain obscure, secluded in ivory towers’ (Ish-Shalom,

2009:308). In essence, a theory must be understandable,

moderate and “marketable” to the public. This is a positive

aspect to any theory, for without these characteristics, it

will not amount to more than a theoretical debate amongst

pundits. After a theory is found accessible,

vulnerabilities for political abuse are found in the ease

with which politicians and policy makers can strip the

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conditional character of the theory; turn the theory into

an absolute statement; and finally, how easily laws of

logic can be inferred from the theory once its

conditionality has been removed.

To implement or not implement task responsibilityDemocratic Peace Theory

The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) is a classic example of

politicisation and political abuse of a theory. The theory,

which has been largely associated with the rigorous

research of Rudolph J Rummel, and the writings of Michael

Doyle and Bruce Russett in the 1980s and 1990s, originated

in the ideas of Immanuel Kant, from his 1795 essay,

“Perpetual Peace”. ‘Doyle contends that democratic

representation, an ideological commitment to human rights,

and transnational interdependence provide an explanation

for the “peace-prone” tendencies of democratic states’

(Doyle in Baylis, 2011:263). In his original essay, Kant

provides a detailed and structured set of rules/articles

that he argued were required to obtain perpetual peace. His

work was clear, direct and prescriptive. “Perpetual Peace”

was presented as a set of six preliminary and three

definitive articles for a perpetual peace among states. It

was clear that he intended his theory to be easily

understood and ultimately useful. Furthermore, he intended

it to be transformative; as a way to escape war.

As Ish-Shalom explicates, the first step in implementing

task responsibility is to determine if a theory is

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accessible and comprehensible. In producing a prescriptive,

or at least short and palatable theory, Kant’s work was

accessible to both theorists and politicians of the 20th

century. Similarly, DPT is moderate, understandable and

marketable to the public. The corner stone of the theory is

that democracies rarely, if ever, fight one another. One

simplified reason for this is that war equates to increased

costs to citizens – economic costs in higher taxes, and the

loss of life for the families of combatants. If that state

is a democracy, people will not vote in favour of “blood

and taxes”, that is, they will not support leaders who take

them to war. A leader will be less inclined to engage in an

offensive war for fear they will lose the next election.

This argument to support DPT is convincing and

understandable to the public. Although this is a positive

feature of the theory – as it can be utilised and

implemented – it also suggests vulnerability that it can

possibly be simplified and manipulated for political

interests.

Objectivity again plays a role in providing assumed

legitimacy for a theory. In this case, the appearance of

scientific rigour enables politicians to “market” their

ideas to the public. A great deal of research effort has

been made to produce quantitative proof that democracies

are less likely to go to war, or less likely to go to war

with other democracies. Researchers and theorists conducted

this research with mostly noble intentions of providing

convincing evidence of the theory’s relevance. However,

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despite the extremely large amount of hypothesis testing,

this testing has not determined causal mechanisms, but

rather established ‘correlations that can be plausibly

interpreted as causation’ (Geis et al, 2006:4). By

producing a theory that appears to be scientifically

proven, it becomes vulnerable to political manipulation.

Ish-Shalom states that a theory is vulnerable to political

abuse when it can be easily stripped of its conditional

character and turned into an absolute statement. DPT falls

into this trap as it has been summarised into as few as one

mathematical statement to show that democracies are more

peaceful. Below is an example.

(http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com)

Objectivity, such as this, does not enhance the usefulness

of a theory, but rather exacerbates its vulnerability.

Politicians can manipulate data like this for their

interests, making claims that DPT is based on rigorous

scientific calculation. Jack Levy declared that ‘the

absence of war between democracies comes as close as

anything we have to an empirical law in international

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relations’ (Smith, 2011: 151). The scientific approach to

social science, although traditionally believed to enhance

legitimacy by removing value-laden conditions, has produced

ill effects under the guise of encouraging peace through

DPT.

Typically political scientists want politicians to heed

their advice and implement international relations theory.

George W Bush, arguably more than any other president

before him – excluding Woodrow Wilson – tied his foreign

policies explicitly to the work of social science, as was

seen with the DPT (Owen IV, 2005:1). Yet despite this, and

rather because of this, exhaustive amounts of literature

have been written to express frustration at how the DPT has

been negatively politicized by the United States (US) to

validate wars for coercive democratisation. The reason for

this is that the ‘White House got its science wrong, or at

least not completely right: the democratic peace theory

does not dictate that the US can or should remake Iraq into

a democracy’ (Owen IV, 2005:2). The DPT theorists did not

discharge their “task responsibility” of identifying and

mitigating the vulnerabilities when producing this theory.

Kant had specified that ‘…while agreeing on the benefits

that democracy can bring to the world…emphasized the

difficulties and the dangers of actively seeking its

propagation’ (Waltz, 2000:13). The US easily stripped this

conditional character from the theory when applying it for

its state interests. The vulnerability of the DPT has

enabled the political abuse of the theory, resulting in

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politicians using its scientific legitimacy to justify that

if democracy equates to peace, there is a duty to use any

means possible to create international peace by spreading

democracy (Waltz, 2000:12). Ultimately, declaring war in

the name of peace. Although the “blame responsibility” for

the destruction through coercive democratisation lies with

the politicians, the “task responsibility” for not

mitigating the theory’s vulnerabilities lies with the

theorists.

Ethical Realism: Classical Realism versus Neo-

realism Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz were both realists. I

argue that although they shared a similar view of the world

due to this, they had dichotomous perceptions of their

ethical responsibility. Despite many theoretical

similarities – and some differences – I contend that

Morgenthau provides the best example of a theorist who

discharged “task responsibility” and maintained his ethical

responsibility to the world. In contrast Waltz, believes

that theories are not intended to become foreign policy,

and therefore claims to hold no professional

responsibility. Both theories and theorists were extremely

influential in the discipline, but their understanding and

use of that influence produced very different results.

Morgenthau, a German Jew, although having left Germany

prior to World War II and the holocaust, would have been

deeply affected by the events of this period. His most

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prominent work “Politics Among Nations” was released in

1948, and the classical/political realism that he presented

therein reflected his personal and observed experiences

from this time. Having seen the chaos of war and tyranny

from territorial invasion – which he blamed on human nature

- Morgenthau’s realism was based on the protection of

states. Although believing in morality, he also believed

that state sovereignty and interests were required first

and foremost, to ensure freedom for citizens. International

politics was where the ‘temporary balancing of interests

and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts’ took place

(Morgenthau, 1978:3) – each state driven to secure its own

interests – allowing domestic politics to be the arena for

the provision of human rights and citizen wellbeing.

National security must be the states first priority, for

without protection from external invasion, domestic

freedoms could not be guaranteed. ‘While the individual has

a moral right to sacrifice himself in defence of such a

moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral

disapprobation of the infringement of (that moral

principle) get in the way of successful political action,

itself inspired by the moral principle of national

survival’ (Morgenthau, 1978:166).

Morgenthau engages his ethical responsibility in the

presentation of his theory. Although he is arguing that

state interests are most important, he does not subscribe

to an Offensive Realist view that each state must garner as

much material power to itself and strive for dominance over

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other states. He recommends that his audience (policy

makers and politicians) consider all nations and their

respective interests, and see that justice can be provided

to them all: ‘We are able to judge other nations as we

judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we

are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the

interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting

those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to

reflect the moderation of moral judgement’ (Morgenthau,

1978:11). Although Morgenthau believes in empirical and

pragmatic theory (1978:3), he does not provide one

deficient of ethical and moral value.

Waltz’s neo/structural realism comes from a completely

different background to Morgenthau’s realism. Waltz’s

theory does not result from a personal experience of the

devastation of war – as so many theorists before him – but

rather is motivated by a frustration at the lack of

scientific rigour and “progress” in the discipline.

Although he agrees with the basic premise of realism, he

contends that classical realism is based on assumptions and

intuition, not empirical evidence. In 1959, he published,

“Man the State and War”, where he presents three “images”3

for analysing the causes of war. He argues that classical

realism is based on the first image and makes indeterminate

and irrelevant assumptions. Twenty years later, in 1979,

Waltz publishes “Theory of International Politics” using

3 First image – wars are caused by human nature; second image – wars are caused by the domestic makeup of states; third image – wars are caused by the anarchic structure of the international system

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the third image that posits that the cause of war is found

at the systemic level. Waltz presents a model of structural

realism to represent this system and explain the inevitable

nature of war. He believes that a good theory must be

steeped in scientific rigour: empirical, repeatable and

objective. The best theory makes the least number of

assumptions to explain the most. It should not be

normative. His neo-realism theory makes only three

assumptions. It has no emancipatory qualities and he does

not seek to change the world. Waltz simply provides a tool

to explain how states interact.

Waltz is revered as one of the greatest political

scientists of all time. The inception of his neo-realism

theory was considered a watershed moment within academia;

through its scientific rigour, it boosted the legitimacy of

the discipline. It explained why so many conflicts of the

past have occurred in similar ways, through the balancing

of great powers. Yet, it begs us to ask, what is a theory

required to do? Waltz would pronounce that a useful theory

is one that explains the world as it is – ‘If a theory

can’t do that, then it is a worthless theory; it is not a

theory at all’ (Conversations with History 2003). Yet I argue,

that as understood in 1919, the discipline of International

Relations is expected to find a way to escape war.

Explanation alone is not enough. I also contend that the

reductionist technique of Waltz’s – to remove conditions

and moral-value – leaves it open to vulnerability for

political abuse. Waltz claims he is not intending to

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influence foreign policy; but nonetheless policy has been

made based on neo-realism. I argue that it is not

acceptable for a theorist to make a theory in a discipline

that was constructed to study and influence the world, and

not expect it to be politicized and used. It is similarly

not acceptable for a theorist to assume that the intention

of non-influence equates to the avoidance of ethical

responsibility for the implementation of that theory.

Morgenthau’s view of his role in international relations

comes into stark contrast with Waltz’s. Morgenthau ensured

correct interpretation and implementation of his theory, as

much as is reasonably possible. After writing the first

edition of “Politics Among Nations”, he consciously decided

to make the nearly 500-page book more accessible to the

public and policy makers, by producing the prescriptive

“Six Principles of Political Realism”, to preface his

second and consecutive editions. The six principles proved

that not only did Morgenthau believe theory could influence

politics, but he believed his theory could make positive

changes. He discharged his “task responsibility” by

disseminating his theory to the public through general

publications, and public lectures (Wadlow, 2001:82).

Moreover, he went beyond academic expectations by engaging

in politics and consulting to the US Department of State on

and off during his career. He involved himself in the

political process and ensured his theoretical objectives

were implemented as he had intended. He was considered the

model for intellectual writing on foreign policy

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formulation and his book, “In Defense of the National

Interest”, was often cited as justification. Morgenthau

lived his ethical responsibility: ‘true theoretical

thinking faces up to political reality without

prevarication and confronts it directly in the solitude of

one’s individual limitations’ (Morgenthau in Wadlow,

2001:83). Despite working with both the Kennedy and Johnson

administrations, the political realist was eventually

dismissed when he spoke out against US military involvement

in the Vietnam War. Although the only other voices of

dissent at the time were pacifists and opposed to all

force, Morgenthau stood by his realist convictions that ‘US

interests could not be served by fighting a war that was

“politically aimless, militarily unpromising and morally

dubious”’ (Wadlow, 2001:84). By all accounts, Morgenthau

exemplifies the theorist who discharges “task

responsibility”.

To demonstrate a possible outcome if some level of “task

responsibility” is not undertaken, I consider neo-realism

as a tool for western power manipulation. Waltz claimed

that his theory was not intended for use as foreign policy,

but merely as an explanatory tool for the inescapable

anarchic system in which international relations occurs.

Through the theoretical lens of neo-realism, states

constantly operate in survival mode in an anarchic system.

They are driven by a need to garner internal power to

ensure their security, never fully trusting the intentions

of another state. This “security dilemma” results in states

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prioritising the maximisation of their military or economic

might relative to other states. The neo-realist argues that

the most stable scenario under this system is bi-polarity

(such as the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War).

A number of scholars have questioned the implications of

this theory. Is it just an explanation of the world we find

ourselves, or is it the manipulation by the powerful

hegemons to maintain the status quo. ‘Richard Ashley

asserts that “neorealist structuralism lends itself

wonderfully well to becoming an apologia for the status

quo, an excuse for domination’ (Ish-Shalom, 2009:305). Most

modern theories have been borne from a particular funded

school: the English School (funded partly by the US through

the Rockefeller Foundation); Critical Theory (Frankfurt,

Germany); Liberalism (the UK – Aberystwyth in Wales); and

Classical and Neo-realism (the US). As E.H. Carr argued,

the discipline does not represent a neutral or impartial

purpose but rather it is written with a view from somewhere

for a particular purpose (Smith, 2004:514). Since 1919, it

has held true that the discipline has been dominated by

theories and theorists funded by the most powerful

countries on the planet. Steve Smith, in his article

“Singing our World into Existence”, implores us to question

if rationalist realism serves ‘as a handmaiden to Western

power and interests’ (2004:513). Modern day International

Relations theories have been produced – perhaps unknowingly

– to provide policies better enabling us to manipulate and

succeed in a world where we dominate. They have ignored the

concerns of the world where the rest, and most of the

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global population reside. ‘Their concerns, the violences

that affected them, the inequalities they suffered, were

all invisible to the gaze of the discipline, and in that

very specific way the discipline…was culpable in serving

specific social interests and explaining their agenda’

(Smith, 2004:514). Smith raises these concerns of western

manipulation of theory for exploitative foreign policy as a

possible explanation for the horrors of September 11, and

the escalation of terrorist activities against the West. I

neither support nor contest this specific correlation, but

use it to demonstrate the severity of the implications on

our world when theorists such as Waltz ignore their ethical

responsibility and downplay their involvement in foreign

policy making.

In conclusion, I contend that International Relations

theories are required to be more than explanatory tools;

they are required to help us escape future war. As part of

the professional discipline, it is reasonable to presume

that theories are political and can be politicized by those

practising international relations. I argue that it is

clear that when theorists do not discharge their “task

responsibility” they leave their theories vulnerable to

political abuse and foreign policy manipulation. We have

evidence to prove this as observed through the political

abuse of the Democratic Peace Theory. Finally, it is no

longer reasonable for theorists to believe that their

theories will not be used as tools for policy formulation.

Efforts, as exemplified by Morgenthau, must be made to

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ensure theorists uphold their ethical responsibility to the

world they seek to investigate.

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References

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