This article was downloaded by: [Texas State University, San Marcos]On: 01 October 2013, At: 16:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of European AreaStudiesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjea19

An Open-Ended Transition:The Effects of ElectoralReform in ItalyOmar SanchezPublished online: 02 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: Omar Sanchez (2002) An Open-Ended Transition: The Effectsof Electoral Reform in Italy, Journal of European Area Studies, 10:2, 259-281, DOI:10.1080/1460846022000040355

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1460846022000040355

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any

form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Journal of European Area Studies, Vol.10, No.2, 2002

ISSN 1460-8464 print/ISSN 1469-946X online/02/020259-23 © 2002 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/146084602200004035 5

An Open-Ended Transition: The Effectsof Electoral Reform in Italy

OMAR SANCHEZ

ABSTRACT: This article evaluates the impact of the 1993 electoral reform inItaly on four political dependent variables: clear winners and concomitant left-right alternation in government; fragmentation of the party system; governmen-tal stability; and party polarization. The reform, under which 75 percent ofparliamentary seats are allocated according to the plurality rule and the remain-ing 25 percent according to proportional representation, had a declared majori-tarian purpose. As a useful benchmark, the attributes associated with a puremajoritarian system are measured against the actual effects that the reform hasbrought about. Analyzing the outcomes of the general elections of 1994, 1996and 2001, it is concluded that the changes the new electoral law has engenderedon the Italian political system have fallen well short of the stated aspirations ofthe reformers.

IntroductionThe casual observer of Italian politics may be forgiven if he or she judges theoften-quoted fact that Italy has had about 58 governments in about as manyyears as the chief problem with Italian politics – that is, governmental instabil-ity. More precisely, Italian governments have lasted an average of no more thaneleven months in office, a figure without parallel in the established democraciesof the world. However, probing a little deeper into the troubles that afflict thecountry’s political system (corruption, lack of circulation of the political classand others) reveals something quite different: it is coalitional stability that hasbeen at the root of the Italian malaise. Every governing coalition has been avariant of the same four or five political parties, always led by the same domi-nant party and propped up by one, two, three, or four satellite parties, dependingon the electoral strength of the dominant one at a given juncture. Since World

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez260

War II and until its recent dissolution, the Christian Democrats had been part ofevery governing party coalition. In short, there has been a lack of alternation inpower giving rise to familiar maladies:

Inadequate turnover in, and thus the ageing of the political class; insufficientcirculation of ideas and programmemes and thus insufficient public policies;and a crystallization of relationships between members of government andinterest groups and hence systemic corruption (Mershon and Pasquino 1995,48).

The article begins by providing a brief theoretical introduction about therelevance of electoral laws in shaping party systems. It then provides somebackground on the politics of the 1993 electoral law – the internal and externalforces that helped bring it about as well as reasons for the lack of further reformimpetus towards a pure majoritarian law. In what constitutes the central part ofthe paper, the effects of the new electoral formula on a few of the most impor-tant characteristics of the party system are analyzed. This article does notprovide a rigorous, quantitative analysis of the effects of the new law, but rathera general account of the extent to which the expectations of the promoters ofelectoral law reform in the 1990s have been realized, also taking into considera-tion factors other than electoral law that may have had an influence upon thedependent variables.

Electoral Law: An Independent Variable?Are electoral systems of any great consequence? It has been common in thepast to assert that they were themselves the result of deeper determinants ofsociety rather than being a causative factor in the development of party systems.However, simple anecdotal experience and the behavior of politicians wheneverthe phrase ‘electoral reform’ is pronounced, already provide hints that electorallaws are very important in shaping political systems. Indeed,

If electoral systems were of little consequence why on earth would politiciansfight so bitterly about them? And why would reformers fight so persistentlyto have them changed? Much ado about nothing? (Sartori 1994, 27).

The obligatory starting point when one turns to the issue of electoral systemsand their impact is Maurice Duverger. His famous first ‘law’ states that plural-ity (majoritarian) systems tend to party dualism (two-party systems); the second‘law’ states that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to multipartism.To be sure, these formulae (stated in 1954) have been largely discredited forsome time now. The reasons are straightforward. First, Duverger misses thedifference between correlation and causation; and second, his laws are crippledby numerous exceptions. Unfortunately, says world-renown political scientist

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 261

Giovanni Sartori, ‘a crushing majority of scholars have been content withshowing that Duverger was mistaken (1994, 27).’ Political science scholarsworthy of their name, Sartori points out, have the duty not to give up in thesearch for consistent relationships, for generalizations with explanatory power(i.e. social science laws). As a matter of fact, Duverger was not entirely mis-taken. He certainly neglected the role of social phenomena as determinants ofparty systems (social cleavages such as state-church, land-industry, owner-worker, or centre-periphery, among others), but the significance of the socio-logical approach should not be overstated. The institutional approach has madea strong comeback in political science in recent years. The result of this debatehas been a settlement resting on a synthesis of the institutional and sociologicalperspectives. Most mainstream political scientists nowadays consider partysystems to be a product of both social forces and institutional structures (Reevesan Ware 1992).

The Politics of Electoral Law ReformThe postwar Italian version of proportional representation was the imperialilargest remainder formula for the House of Deputies and a slightly revisedd’Hondt formula for the Senate. Perhaps for too long, proportional representa-tion in Italy was equated with the democratic system as such, understandably inlight of Italian historical experience, but nonetheless wrongly so (Pasquino1989). As we all know, democracy has long remained strong in other countriesdespite use of majoritarian electoral systems, as in Britain. In Italy, the imperi-ali (PR) formula allowed the fragmentation of the party system and produced aprivileged situation for some parties, preventing alternation in power. Talkabout reforming the electoral system started in earnest in the 1970s but onlygathered momentum in the late 1980s. As one might suspect, the birth of thenew electoral law was not an easy one. At the risk of some simplification, onemay say that the majoritarian electoral system strayed too far from the prevail-ing proportionalist culture in Italy to be given serious consideration. But apartfrom this general consideration, there was – as is always the case when at-tempting this most political of reforms – fierce opposition among all thosepolitical parties that perceived the new law to be detrimental to their politicalprospects. Indeed, in opposing electoral change, many small parties werefighting for their very survival in the Italian parliament. For larger parties, theconsiderations were of a different nature. The Italian Communist Party longopposed any reform towards majoritarianism because it thought that it wouldlose power as an opposition party in government. Given the objective difficul-ties it faced in winning an election and its status as an ‘illegitimate’ party withwhich to construct governmental coalitions (in the context of the Cold War), itstood to lose from such a reform. The Italian socialists, on their part, deemedthat reform would force them to ally in advance with one of the two largest

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez262

parties, forsaking their longstanding status as a king-maker party and all of theattendant benefits (Castiglioni 1994). In sum, electoral reform would not beborn out of the wheeling and dealing of political parties alone. The crisis of theItalian political system – in particular the structural maladies of non-representation, ungovernability and immorality – was there for all Italians to seeand despise. But in the battle to effect electoral change, pure partisan politicalconsiderations proved stronger than the general climate of political decadence.It is the view of many analysts that, given this well-entrenched political dy-namic, only an exogenous shock to the system could have pushed electoral lawreform onto centre-stage. And the earthquake did come. The fall of the BerlinWall was the primary catalyst of change. While this momentous event left nocountry’s political system untouched, it is difficult to think of another Westerndemocracy where it had more profound party system implications than in Italy.The end of the East-West confrontation and the attendant partial reconversion ofthe Italian Communist party into a social-democratic identity suddenly meantthat it was now habilitated to govern.1 The prospect of rising to power was nolonger hypothetical, removing their old rationale for opposing electoral reform.In fact, a new majoritarian-minded law that would increase the parliamentaryshare of seats of the largest vote-gathering parties carried potentially incalcula-ble benefits for the old Communists.A second immediate catalyst that engendered change in the electoral law wasItaly’s largest ever judicial operation, known as Mani Pulite (Clean Hands).The operation showed in detailed and comprehensive fashion the web ofcorruption permeating the Italian political establishment and led to the rapiddemise of the central pillar of the decadent post-war political system, theChristian Democratic Party. The sprawling judicial investigation also dealt adeath blow to other satellite parties.Some scholars have conjectured about the deeper, unstated motivations of thereformers. One has stated that the ‘true purposes of the reform were to rescueChristian Democracy and its smaller parties (Morlino 1997, 126).’ While thisand other objectives may well have been pursued, it is difficult to verify themconclusively. This article will proceed by evaluating the effects of the new lawagainst the standard of the stated majoritarian objectives. Following this crite-rion, the reformers, led by then-Christian Democrat Mario Segni aimed toaggregate small parties into larger parties and bring about more stable govern-ments backed by more secure parliamentary majorities; strengthen the personalresposibility of representatives to their electorsThe new electoral law 1993 was forced through by means of a national referen-dum. It was approved overwhelmingly. Parliament introduced a system ofsingle-member districts where candidates need only a simple majority to be

1 Besides refashioning itself along social-democratic lines, the party changed its name to PartitoDemocratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left) and adopted a new logo. The unrecon-structed Communists formed a much smaller splinter party, the Rifondazione Comunista.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 263

elected for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. To ensure somerepresentation of the smaller parties, proportional representation continues to bethe means of electing one quarter of the members of each chamber (75% M=1;25% PR). But only those parties receiving at least 4 percent of the vote are ableto win seats through proportional representation. In short, in the Chamber ofDeputies (total of 630 districts), there are now 475 single-member districtsallocated by FPTP and 155 seats distributed through proportional representation(PR); in the Senate, there are 232 single-member districts plus 83 allocated viaPR.The Italian media labeled the change in electoral law an ‘Italian Revolution.’Although such characterization is admittedly simplistic and overstated, it is atestament to the high expectations that the new law raised among supporters ofpolitical change. Almost ten years and three general elections after, it may notbe too soon to try to answer the inevitable question2: how much of a revolutionwill it prove to be? In other words, to what extent has the new law ushered inhoped-for political outputs? So as to avoid misinterpretation or confusion, onemust be clear and specific as to what is the reformers’ desired political outcome.In short, ‘a system of moderate pluralism, characterized by bipolar competitionbetween alternative coalitions, each of which stands a reasonable chance ofwinning the elections (i.e. obtaining a majority of seats in both chambers) andthus of governing (Bartolini & D’Alimonte 1998: 163).’ Although such an end-state may have represented wishful thinking from the start on the part of reform-mongers, it is nevertheless a useful benchmark against which to measure theactual effects of the new electoral formula.The seeming inability of the new law to ensure stable governments and a bipolarstructure, together with parliamentary inaction on the issue provided the impetusto attempt further reform via a referendum. There was a pervasive sense thatoutcomes were unsatisfactory because the 1993 reform was unsatisfactory itself– insofar as it was partial. It is in this spirit that the Italian electorate wassummoned to the polling booths on April 18th 1999 to vote on a referendum toabrogate the proportional quota of the electoral system. Referendums require theparticipation of at least 50 percent of the eligible electorate in other to be valid.Only 49.6 percent of Italian voters showed up that Sunday and the referendumwas ruled invalid. Thus, the electoral formula remains unchanged, even thoughsome 90 percent of those who did vote demanded further reform.3 Convinced

2 To be sure, our number of observations (or data points) since the electoral law of 1993 is limited.So far, only the elections of 1994, 1996 and 2001 can be used to derive conclusions about the so-called Second Republic. However, these three electoral contests can already shed light onincipient trends and unfulfilled hopes.3 In the aftermath of the results The Economist was quick to point out that ‘most Italians who careabout their system of government want a new electoral law... But most Italians do not seem tocare about their system of government (Economist, 52).’ This opinion contradicts claims made bymany scholars that Italian society has recently become more demanding of the political establish-ment and have higher expectations of their institutions. More likely, apathy and the distraction of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez264

that securing reform was only a matter of trying again, in June of that year theelectoral reformers once more began to collect signatures to be able to put thequestion to the electorate in a second referendum. This took place in May 2000.Only one-third of eligible Italians voted this time around, reflecting the in-creasing tiredness of a populace whose political system was assigning themresponsibility to make decisions that should be resolved in parliament andreflecting also the effective campaign in favour of abstention orchestrated by anumber of political parties. The confrontation between supporters and oppo-nents of the referendum was fierce on both occasions. Forza Italia took adecisive role in opposing reform. Its active campaign urging voters to abstainand not participate proved a death blow to the hopes of electoral reformers,which immediately begs the question: why would the principal party of theCentre-Right, created on the wave of the referendum movement, and whoseparty had explicitly called for a pure first-past-the-post system in its 1994institutional programme, now change its views? Two answers have been given(Fabrini 2001). One highlights the short-term context. Berlusconi and his circlehad polling information reflecting declining public interest in the referendum asa political tool, and riding the wave of public opinion would allow the party toclaim a political victory of sorts ahead of the 2001 elections. The second, morelong-term interpretation, highlights the political project to move Forza Italiatowards the centre of the political spectrum to try and capture that substantialsector of the Italian electoral that free-floats with the disappearance of theChristian Democrats. If, as it seems, this interpretation is correct, the referen-dums were thus an obstacle to the formation of a new Centre in Italian politics.The momentum that began in 1991 in favor of overall institutional change onceseemed unstoppable. Things now are not so clear. The array of forces againstfurther reform is formidable, and reformers are no longer aided by the atmos-phere of crisis and decay that gripped Italy during the Mani Pulite period.

Clear Winners, Clear MandatesOne of the main problems of the Italian political system has been that it is party-dominated, sometimes referred to as partitocrazia (partitocracy). In essence, thismeans that the formal democratic institutions of government play only secon-dary roles. Historically, the parochial interests of the parties have been sostrong that they determined the creation and the fall of cabinets, and it was thestrength or weakness of political parties which determined the nature of thecoalitions. Traditionally, the Italian electorate has not been offered a clear-cutalternative between potential governments. It could only marginally influence a events in Kosovo combined to dish the reformers. Massimo Cacciari, Venice’s mayor, wastypical of reform-minded politicians in describing the referendum’s outcome as a ‘hard and heavyheart-attack.’ Romano Prodi, a committed reformer himself, lamented the results but found someconsolation in the ‘yes’ percentage of votes: ‘A page has not been turned but there were millionsand millions and millions that wanted change. That isn’t just nothing (Financial Times, 3).’Many similar assessments were echoed by electoral reformers.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 265

possible coalition by strengthening a particular party’s parliamentary represen-tation.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: 1993 Change in Electoral Law (75% M=1;25% PR)

1945-1993 EXPECTED

OUTPUT

ACTUAL OUTPUT

(1994, 1996, 2001)

FRAGMENTATION OF PARTY

SYSTEM (N)

HIGH LOW HIGHER

PARTY POLARIZATION (P) HIGH LOWER HIGH

LEFT-RIGHT ALTERNATION

IN GOVERNMENT

NO YES YES

A. CLEAR MANDATES GIVEN

TO GOVERNMENT?

YES YES YES

B. ARE GOVTS BEING JUDGED

ON PERFORMANCE

NO YES NO

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY

(TIME)

NO YES NO

CIRCULATION OF POLITICAL

CLASS (PARTY LEADERS,

GOVTS)

NO YES HIGHER

One of the main desired effects of the new electoral law is to bridge the gapbetween voters and governing cabinets; in other words, to give the electorate theability to decide with their votes who the winner is. And, as a corollary, to givethem the ability to boot out governments whose performance in office is belowpar. The slogan here is ‘more power to the voters.’ Defenders of majoritariansystems do not tire in pointing out that, unlike proportional formulae, theyproduce clear winners and thus clear mandates. Britain is always mentioned asthe exemplary case: a party is elected to office on a Thursday and in a matter ofdays its leader takes hold of 10 Downing Street. The corollary of clear winnersis the production of clear mandates. By ‘mandate’ what is meant here is that theparty with the most votes leads the process to form the governing cabinet. Inother words, governments are based on electoral choice rather than inter andintra-party negotiations. If Britain is the example par excellence of clear man-dates, at the opposite side of the spectrum lays the Netherlands, where it takesfour months from the time of the election to the time a new government as-sumes its responsibilities. This is the time it takes for alliances to form, with theoutcome being unknown to the electorate. (It has even occurred that the partywith the most votes has not been part of the governing coalition).4

4 Occasionally, in majoritarian systems, the party with the most votes fails to gain most seats, aswas the case in 1951 and February 1974 in the Britain

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez266

Italy lies between these two extremes. From 1945 to the early 1990s, theChristian Democrats always won a plurality of votes and always formed gov-ernment, but there was no telling who their partners in office would be. Social-ists, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals have at different times cometo join in CD-led cabinets. First-past-the-post formulae are meant to strengthenthe link between voters and the composition of governments. In Italy, the jury isstill out concerning the effects of electoral law on producing mandates. The1994 elections did not produce a clear winner or mandate. Furthermore, theBerlusconi government was to fall in December 1994 after only seven monthsin office. A ‘non-partisan’ government led by Lamberto Dini took over inFebruary of 1995, weakening the link between voters and the governmentcoalition. The 1996 and 2001 general elections did produce a winner. That is, aplurality of votes for one coalition did translate into an absolute majority ofseats.In the Italian case, an added requisite for the success of the plurality system isthat the winning coalition is triumphant in both the Chamber of Deputies andthe Senate. In 1996, the victor was the centre-left coalition. The parties ofL’Ulivo (Olive Tree) coalition won the absolute majority of seats in the senate,and had a similar majority in the Chamber of Deputies with the support ofRifondazione Comunista (RC). The electoral system unambiguously helped toproduce a winner. With a share of 44.9 percent of plurality votes (i.e. those wonin single-member constituencies), L’Ulivo-RC won 55.2 percent of pluralityseats – a bonus of more than 10 percent of (plurality) seats. The centre-rightcoalition, Polo Liberta gathered 40.3 percent of plurality votes, but only 35.6percent of plurality seats, a significant penalty. When seats allocated by PRwere added, the picture in 1996 ended up as follows: out of 630 total seats in theChamber of Deputies, 320 went to the centre-left; 264 to the centre-right; and 59to the non-aligned Lega Nord (in addition to four seats to three small independ-ent parties).In 2001, the House of Freedoms coalition obtained 45.4 percent of pluralityvotes but was rewarded by the electoral law with close to 60 percent of pluralityseats – a bonus of about 15 percent of single-member constituency seats.Meanwhile the 44.3 percent of plurality votes obtained by the Olive coalitiontranslated into only about 40 percent of plurality seats. This is understandablewhen one considers that parties standing outside both coalitions, with a total ofover 10 percent of plurality votes, were severely punished by the electoralformula as they won only 1 plurality seat. When seats allocated by proportionalrepresentation were added the result was as follows: out of 630 seats, 368 wentto the Centre-Right Casa della Liberta coalition and 252 to the Centre-LeftUlivo cartel, led by Francesco Rutelli.However, one must not be too sanguine or complacent about the ability of thenew electoral law to produce winners. As a few Italian academics have observedwith a touch of irony, the 1996 election results were maggioritario per caso

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 267

(majoritarian by chance). In other words, there is nothing about the electoral lawthat necessarily and automatically assigns a majority in parliament to an elec-toral coalition. By contrast, a pure majoritarian system like Britain’s normallyproduces winners.Of course, if the aim is to produce clear winners and alternation in power,striving towards a system that is purely majoritarian is not the only option.Scholars Milani and Pasquino had already proposed in the late 1980s, a doubleballot system as superior in accomplishing those goals. Here is how the propo-nents themselves describe it:

In the first round of voting, the voters would choose a certain number of par-liamentary representatives (400) in 40 constituencies, according to thed’Hondt formula. In the second round, one or two weeks later, the voterswould choose between competing coalitions. The winning coalition wouldreceive 75 seats and the losing one 25. In order to get the bonus of seats, acoalition would have to present a programme and a prime minister and receiveat least 40 percent of the national vote. Governments so empowered wouldlast as long as their parliamentary majorities held; otherwise, Parliamentwould be dissolved and new elections called (Pasquino 1989: 287).

The merit of this system is that the second ballot would encourage the voters toreward or punish the opposition in a clear-cut manner. Other proposals thatcirculated in the 1970s included a French-style run-off majority system withsome modifications. However, these schemes are no longer on anybody’s lips.The 1993 reform has created what institutionalists call ‘path dependence.’ It isunlikely that the Italian political establishment will want to turn the clock backand return to a PR system – although the losers of reform would surely wish todo so. The question now is whether to retain the mixed system or, as would bethe more congruent with the goals of the reformers, move towards a puremajoritarian one.An interesting query related to alternation in government is that of the circula-tion of the political class. One of the ills of Italian politics has been that thesame faces have dotted the political landscape for years and years. Has therebeen any positive change in recent years in this regard? The answer is a quali-fied ‘yes’. But one must define what political class means. The Italian politicalscene displays remarkable continuity in party personnel. Party names are newand they claim innovative approaches or programmes but many of their mem-bers of parliament served earlier as representatives of the old, now defunctparties. For example, the 1996 elections brought back into parliament over 110individuals who had earlier served as Christian Democracy deputies or senators(Wilson 1999: 328). However, as regards party leaders, there are new faces:Gianfranco Fini of the National Alliance, Umberto Bossi of the Lega Nord,Silvio Berlusconi of Forza Italia, etc. This is perhaps inevitable: these parties

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez268

were born out of the rejection of the Italian electorate with the old establish-ment. The AN and the LN are anti-establishment parties while Berlusconi(although not new to politics) clearly markets himself as an outsider. However,it must be emphasized that the birth of these parties and the renovation of thepolitical class dates to 1992 and has little to do with the new electoral law.Again the two political earthquakes mentioned previously (Manu Pulite and thefall of the Berlin Wall) are largely responsible. Even if we take circulation ofthe political class to mean circulation of government figures, there has been animprovement (Verzichelli 1998). The 1996 victory by the Olive Tree coalitionbrought into power figures of the old Communist Party that had not been ingovernment before. Similarly, the 8-month spell of Berlusconi, a media tycoon,also proved to be a break with the past. By contrast, Lamberto Dini, who headeda technocratic government after Berlusconi’s lost support, is a longtime veteranof Italian politics. In any case, it is too soon to evaluate whether alternation ofright-left electoral cartels in government will translate into a healthy rotation ofthe political class. More historical perspective is needed.

Left-Right Alternation in GovernmentAs Gianfranco Pasquino remarks, proportional representation in Italy has beencriticized ‘for making difficult any attempt to create a credible coalition tooppose the long-lasting sequence of more or less centrist governing coalitions(1994b, 143).’ That is, proportional representation has accommodated thespreading out of Italian political groups and provided no incentive to aggrega-tion. The biggest casualty of the disincentive to aggregation that has accompa-nied PR in Italy has been the possibility of rotation at the level of nationalgovernments. This is precisely one of the main defects of the Italian system thatthe new electoral formula was meant to redress. After all, the possibility ofpolitical rotation at the national level is considered to be one of the hallmarks ofdemocracy. Where no rotation takes place, the quality of democracy and theindependence of democratic institutions suffer. Consider the cases of Germany,Britain and Spain, where Christian Democrats (16 years in power), Conserva-tives (18 years), and Socialists (14 years) respectively have caused the vitalityof democratic institutions to atrophy with their long spells in government.Whereas democracy itself was not in crisis in these cases, for many observers itshealth and vitality certainly were.5 The recent alternations in power in thesethree countries come as a much-needed check on the weakening of democracy.In the case of Italy, centrist coalitions (with the Christian Democrats in charge)formed governments in uninterrupted fashion from 1946 until 1992, leading tomany of the ills that afflicted and still afflict politics in Italy. Yet, the lack of

5 Many governing cabinets exercised power in a high-handed manner, and the quality andfrequency of legislative deliberation of issues declined. Further, long spells in governmentcontributed to corrupt practices. Political corruption came to public light in all three countries.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 269

alternation must not be placed solely on the shoulders of the PR electoral law.Among other factors, the political dynamics of the Cold War are partly respon-sible.6

To be sure, the new electoral rule is a simplifying force that is producing twocoalition blocs (electoral cartels), as in France: one on the centre-left and theother on the centre-right. What the elections of 1994, 1996 and 2001 haveshown is that governmental alternation, once an elusive dream, is now a distinctreality. If all three elections were contested by two major and wide-rangingalliances, it was because, to a significant extent, the new law created a newstructure of political incentives. To compete effectively in the single-memberconstituency elections, parties must make alliances. The right’s electoral successin 1994 was greatly dependent on the inclusion of both the Alianza Nationaleand the Lega Nord along with Forza Italia. In 1996, the centre-right coalition(Polo per le Liberta) was diminished by the absence of Bossi’s party, while thecentre-left alliance extended its embrace to include more parties of the centre in1996. Predictably enough, the latter won the contest. In 2001 the moral of thestory repeated itself again. Berlusconi was able to woo back the NorthernLeague as part of the ‘House of Freedom’ coalition. Meanwhile, the centre-leftpresented a narrower coalition than it had done five years earlier, as the unre-constructed communists (Rifundazione Communista) were not part of the Ulivoalliance this time around. Not surprinsingly, the centre-right won. In sum, thepolitical right in 1996 and the political left in 2001 were both heavily penalizedin terms of seats by the absence of one important party within their respectivealliances. The lesson to be learned here is that the more encompassing alliancewon the electoral contest. Indeed, electoral victory went to the coalition whichachieved greatest success in the plurality stage of the competition.What must be made clear is that the alternation from right to left in 1996 andfrom left to right in 2001 is not at all the result of an electoral earthquake. TheItalian electorate did not move in any significant way in any direction; thedistribution of votes has been rather stable from one election to the other. In1996, the main party of the right, Forza Italia, suffered a negligible decline of0.4 percent of votes, the main party of the left, PDS, gained only 0.8 percentadditional votes, Rifondazione Comunista increased its share by 2.6%, LegaNord improved by 1.7% and the AN by 2.2%. On the whole, then, the votedistribution was unchanged. 2001 was no electoral earthquake either. Theoverall left/right distribution of the vote generally followed the same pattern asin 1996. In fact, right-wing parties obtained a lower collective share of voting in2001: 42.5 percent as opposed to 47.7 percent in the previous election. The totaltally for the parties of the left was also a marginal decline, even a smaller

6 Italy was the only American ally where the Communists (albeit of a different sort) enjoyed suchpermanent electoral strength, so as to make it the second strongest party. The ‘unwritten’ Italianconstitution made clear the imperative of excluding the Communists from governing coalitions aspart of the Cold War East-West struggle.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez270

variation. It is clear that the majoritarian character of the new system was atplay here. Quite simply, under the old imperiali formula it is less likely that theleft would have risen to power in 1996. In 1996, the Polo coalition receivedmore total votes than those of L’Ulivo in the PR stage, and yet lost the election.(Meanwhile, the Lega, this time running on its own, saw its share of seats falleven though it share of votes increased). The election of Berlusconi’s House ofFreedoms in 2001 confirmed that Italy is moving closer to a bipolar model inwhich opposing centre-right and centre-left camps alternate in government. Wehave now seen alternation in government twice (right-left-right). ‘After 50years of stodgy electoral immobilism, [Italian voters] seem to have developed ataste for turfing out the rascals,’ as two analysts put it (Fabrini and Gilbert, 520).A potentially significant element of the 2001 election is that Italians eschewedparties that stood on their own and thus had no chance of being part of govern-ment. The practical vote prevailed. In fact, parties that withdrew from the twolarge coalitions were punished – both by voters and the majoritarian system.With a combined total of 4.7 million votes or over 13 percent of the electorate,the Communist Refoundation, the Bonino List, Italy of Values, and ‘EuropeanDemocracy’ managed only to secure six senate seats. In fact, Giovanni Sartorihas written that the bipolar structure of the political contest is more a product of‘depolarization’ of the party system than a product of the electoral system assuch (Sartori 2001). Indeed, among other things, the 2001 election showed thattwo extreme parties, the Northern League and (to a lesser extent) the NationalAlliance are losing some political appeal. Depolarization here means that partieson the extremes have been steadily losing support. It must be emphasized thatdepolarization is reconcilable with the idea that there have been no importantshifts in left/right voting patterns. The fact that single-issue parties are losingsupport need not imply that the electorate is moving to the left or the right.In all three electoral contests, victory went to the coalition which did better inthe plurality stage of the election. In other words, alliance strategy proveddecisive in all three instances. Insofar as we can speak of political learningamong political parties, this clear lesson bodes well for the prospect of alterna-tion in government in the future, for the incentive of the largest party in thecentre-right and in the centre-left will be to field as strong and broad coalition aspossible. Further, 2001 could herald a trend towards pragmatic voting that couldaccentuate the bipolarization of the Italian political system.What is clear is that, due to the majoritarian character of the 1993 law, smalldifferences of total votes between the two main coalitions in the pluralityportion of the electoral competition have been magnified in parliament to helpthe cause of alternation.The latest national election signified the first time there has been a clear incum-bent government (Olive Tree coalition) and a credible and viable alternativewhere a challenger had played the role of parliamentary opposition during 1996-

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 271

2001. This was a first in Italian politics and must be considered as a positivedevelopment for the health of Italian democracy.

Fragmentation of the Party SystemMany observers have traditionally seen in the highly fragmented nature of theItalian system many of its maladies. The highly proportional Imperiali formulahas rightly been blamed. Italy has always ranked among the most politicallyfragmented countries in Europe. Tabulating by decade, the mean number (not ameasure of effective number) of parties in competition in Italy was 8.5 in the1950s, 8.0 in the 1960s, 8.7 in the 1970s and 10.0 in the 1980s (Gallagher et al.1995: 232). During the 1990s the legislature contained about 15 parties onaverage.Electoral rules have two types of effects on electoral outcomes7: a mechanicaland a strategic effect (or psychological, as Duverger calls it). In principle, thenew electoral rule should work toward the reduction of parties represented in thelegislative. Political science literature tells us that PR electoral laws tend toproduce more plural party systems than First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) laws, andthis is now an empirically established fact. Lijphart is among those findingempirical evidence for this assertion. In his famous study, Democracies, herefines Duverger’s law and states that ‘the more permissive [i.e. more propor-tional] an electoral system is, the larger one can expect the number of parties tobe (quoted in Taagepera and Shuggart 1989, 57).’ Why, then, has not theadoption of a mixed majoritarian-PR system in Italy led to a reduction in theeffective number of represented parties in parliament? In short, because theunderlying societal factors that shape party systems remained much the same asthey were a decade ago, ensuring continuity. These are factors that have little todo with electoral systems. A system of moderate pluralism, as the one reformershoped to introduce, is still yet to appear. This is perhaps the biggest disappoint-ment since 1993. In fact, fragmentation has increased since then. After the 1996elections, no less than 17 parties were represented in parliament, more than at

7 Under formulae of proportional representation (D’Hondt, largest remainders, modified Sainte-Lague, or single transferable vote) the voter knows that his/her single vote will be fairly ade-quately represented in parliament. In Italy, the formula adopted for transforming votes into seatsup to 1993 was very proportional. The Italian voter therefore had an incentive to truly vote forhis/her favorite (i.e. top) candidate, knowing that the system would adequately translate that singlevote into parliamentary representation. In short, honest voting takes place under PR systems.Plurality systems, on the other hand, encourage strategic voting, with voters often voting for theirsecond (or third) most prefered candidate in order to provoke the overall defeat of their leastprefered ‘big’ party. A vote for small parties is often a vote wasted, as in the case of GreatBritain. With 75% of the Italian lower chamber elected on the basis of a majoritarian system, itwas to be expected that the Italian voter would have an incentive to come to terms with the idea of‘useful voting’, that is, favoring either of two big electoral coalitions to the detriment of smallerparties.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez272

the preceding elections in 1994 (when the figure was 14), and certainly morethan in the typical postwar parliament. In 2001, no less than 13 parties snatchedseats in the legislature.Gauging the results of the new law on political fragmentation is not easy for tworeasons. Firstly, it is well known that different methods exist for countingparties. Secondly, in the Italian case the mixed electoral system means that it isdifficult to determine exactly what constitutes a party, the political unit to becounted. With these caveats in mind, this author calculates that the effectivenumber of parties (that is, weighted by their parliamentary share of seats) isaround 7 for the 1990s. Compare this to the 1987, a typical postwar election, inwhich the effective number of parties was 4.1 and the actual number of partiesin parliament was 14 (Gallager 1995, 163). The effective number of parties hasincreased in Italy partly because more medium-sized parties have come onto thescene, whereas the voting share of the two largest parties today (Partito Democ-ratico della Sinistra and Forza Italia, each with about 20-25 percent of the vote)is a far cry from that of the days of the Christian Democrats and Communists,when they accounted for about 60 to 70 percent of total votes. In 2001, ForzaItalia reached 29.4 percentage share of votes, but the main left-centre party,now called Democrats of the Left, came down to 16 percent. The two mostvoted parties in Italy today command the loyalty of no more than 40 to 50percent of the electorate. The high number of party units partly reflects ‘theongoing process of decomposition and recomposition of political forces’ asItaly is undergoing a transition from the First Republic to a Second Republic ofuncertain features.In short, it is clear that Italy is still far from a dual party system; that is, havingan effective number of parties in parliament of approximately two. The relevantquestion is whether it is heading in that direction. It is at this point that Sartori’s‘laws,’ as he sets them out in his Comparative Constitutional Engineering, arepertinent. The overall thrust of his argument with respect to plurality systems isclear: a plurality system cannot produce by itself a two-party format. His secondrule states that a plurality system ‘will produce, in the long run, a two-partyformat ... under two conditions: first, when the party system is structured and,second, if the electorate which is refractory to whatever pressure of the electoralsystem happens to be dispersed in below-plurality proportions throughout theconstituencies (Sartori 1994, 40).’ In other words, the attainment of a dual partysystem will be elusive if ‘racial, linguistic, ideologically alienated, single-issue,or otherwise incoercible minorities’ are concentrated in enough numbers inparticular geographical pockets. Thus, the question becomes: to what extentdoes this description fit present-day Italy? In fact, it fits it rather well. UmbertoBossi’s Lega Nord counts with above-plurality support in many constituenciesin the north. A spatial analysis of the election reveals that Lega 96 obtained awhopping 25.2% of total votes in the north of the country; 5.8% in the centre;and zero in the south (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1998). Regionalism has been

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 273

added to the traditional political cleavages of ideology and religion. The lattercleavages have been attenuated with the end of the Cold War and the seculari-zation of Italian society, but they certainly have not died – and they are alsoregionally-bound rather than dispersed evenly across the country. Moreover, theextreme right-wing party (AN), with close to 15 percent of the seats in both the1996 and 2001 elections, has doubled its traditional parliamentary presencefrom 1994. Supporters of Alleanza Nazionale are also (partly) regionally-bound.In sum, ‘concentrated incoercible minorities’ seem to dot the Italian landscape,and as a consequence the new electoral law is not likely to have a strongreductionistic effect upon the fragmented nature of the Italian party system.While the electoral law pushes fragmentation in one direction with feeble force,the evolving dynamics of Italian society, with more single-issue cleavages thanever before, pushes it in the opposite direction with more force. One suggestedway of reducing fragmentation somewhat would be to increase the nationalpercentage at which parties can gain representation in parliament from thecurrent 4 percent. Admittedly, this is not a self-evident formula, for parties canalways field joint lists. In any case, a change along such lines can be expectedto meet ferocious resistance from the small parties that would see their parlia-mentary existence threatened.At the end of the day, any definite assertion as to where the Italian party systemis headed should be met with skepticism. Writing in the aftermath of the 1996elections, scholar Alessandro Chiaramonte introduced a note of uncertainty:

As far as can be seen at present, a bipolar system is not impossible to achieve.Much will depend on the way in which tension between the aggregating andcentripetal logic of a uni-monal system and the disaggregating and centrifugallogic of a proportional one are resolved (Chiaramonte 1997: 48).

But after 2001 one can now more confidently say that the centripetal logic isslowly proving more powerful, and that a bipolar system appears to be slowlyforming.

Governmental StabilityItaly has always been a case of a multi-party system that results in coalitioncabinets that are short-lived. Postwar governing coalitions in Italy have notlasted more than eleven months on average. Back in 1989, broad agreement hadbeen reached across a large sector of the political class that in order tostrengthen Italian governments one also had to strengthen the Italian parliamentand this implied a different electoral system. Perhaps on no other score haveelectoral law reformers been so disappointed: governmental stability remainselusive in Italy. This, despite the fact that the Prodi government was the secondlongest-lasting in the postwar period (almost two years in duration). In the caseof the Romano Prodi’s Ulivo coalition it was the defection of Rifondazione

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez274

Communista that brought the government down. Before that, Silvio Ber-lusconi’s government had been ousted from power after only eight months inoffice by the defection of the Northern League. Prime Minister MassimoD’Alema similarly struggled to keep his not-so-homogeneous governmentcoalition together and was also brought down. While the Olive Tree coalitionhad come to power promising one Prime minister, one government, and oneprogramme, their five-year tenure yielded three Prime Ministers, four govern-ments and a few unfulfilled programmatic agendas. Unfortunately, for as longas small parties are at the heart of Italian politics, governmental stability cannotbe had. Their very existence will mean that they will continue to try to holdgovernments to ransom, for that is how they acquire political clout. At the endof the day, in order to attain more stable majorities the political behaviour ofparties will have to alter, and that can only come through a lengthy period oftrial and error. Changes in coalitional alignments that are today seen as legiti-mate must one day come to be seen as the exception, suitable in only excep-tional situations.Most scholars are agreed that blame for governmental instability in Italy owesmuch to the large number of parties. Just as he was founding his own LegaNorte Umberto Bossi did not refrain from declaring: ‘There are far too manyparties in this country. No one can govern like this (quoted in Wilson 1999,328).’ It is quite intuitive that the larger the number of parties in a given parlia-mentary system, the more parties will be needed to form a government. This, inturn, increases the likelihood of coalitional instability, as small parties can easilybring coalition governments down. Such goes the conventional wisdom. But theoverall link is not entirely self-evident because the larger the number of coali-tion partners the lower the likelihood that any one of them will singly beindispensable for the maintenance of the majority and thus the greater thechance of stability. The relationship between fragmentation and governmentalinstability, therefore, cannot be resolved a priori; it must be resolved empiri-cally. Political scientists Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart have found aninverse square relationship between cabinet durability (C) and effective numberof effective assembly parties (N),8 thus confirming the conventional wisdomlinking high party fragmentation and short-lived governments. Today, theeffective number of assembly parties in Italy is as high as it ever was. Mean-while, the number of political issue dimensions is similarly high – some mayhave faded somewhat (religion), but others have burst onto the political scenewith considerable force (regionalism) – ensuring the continuation of fragmenta-tion.In any case, the effects of fragmentation upon governmental instability must notbe exaggerated. In fact, many other established democracies are successful in

8 The formula they arrive at reads as follows: C(months) = 400/ N2 . Similarly, they have found asimilar inverse relationship between C and the number of issue dimensions that characterize agiven society: C(months)= (I + 1)2 These relationships can help us understand the Italian case.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 275

creating stable governments with just as many parties as in Italy, if not more(Furlong 1994). One must look at other, important factors in explaining theItalian case: lack of internal party cohesion and discipline; ideological differ-ences within coalitions, personality clashes among leaders from the samecoalition and party; and the tactical use of government crisis as a means ofsolving even ordinary problems. Some of these elements are quite unique toItaly.While post-1993 Italian governments barely lasted more than the post-wareleven-month average, there are reasons to think the Berlusconi governmentmay well come to the end of its constitutionally mandated four-year term. Theoutcome of the 2001 increased the likelihood of stability for at least threereasons. First, the prime-ministerial candidate of the winning coalition has beendirectly endorsed by voters and thus his authority strengthened within thecoalition. The election acquired the contours of a presidential election builtaround the personalities and accomplishments of two individuals: FrancescoRutelli and Silvio Berlusconi. Second, in order to maintain the majority inparliament, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia only needs the support of one other party,numerically speaking. Finally, Berlusconi has included many of the partyleaders in government or close to government, strengthening the hand of theexecutive vis-à-vis party ‘backbenchers.’ This points to the scope prime minis-ters have in taking decisions that strengthen their hold on a governing coalition.Insofar as political learning takes place, governmental stability may increase inthe future. In general, though, the effect of on the stability of Italian govern-ments has been decidedly ambiguous, not least because many other interveningvariables confound systematic analysis. More elections need to take place inorder to reach a more definite assessment.

Party PolarizationThe post-war Italian party system has traditionally been characterized by veryhigh levels of polarization. Polarization can roughly be defined as the distance(ideological or other) between the most distant relevant parties. A relevant partyis here defined in the Sartorian sense of one with coalition and blackmailpotential. The prominent place occupied by the Partito Comunista Italiano, themost popular Communist party in the West, contributed to high polarizationindexes in Italy.9 At the right end of the political spectrum stood a neo-fascistparty, with a wide array of parties between these two poles catering to almostevery conceivable voter in the ideological spectrum.Indeed, Italy can traditionally be conceived of as a case of polarized multi-partyism. Although there is no straightforward relationship between electoralsystems and polarization indexes, polarization is, nonetheless, reasonablyrelated to fragmentation.Thus, insofar as majoritarian systems reduce fragmen-tation, the new law was also meant to reduce the highly polarized nature of the 9 The Communist party regularly won anywhere between 20 and 30 percent of votes in Italy.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez276

Italian party system. Although hard numbers are not yet available, as eachparty needs to be classified in a left-right spectrum according to their partyprogrammes, a cursory study of the new parties on the political scene indicatesthat the system is more polarized during the Second Republic (post-1993) thanit was during the First Republic. First, there are more parties now than was thecase before. Second, extremist parties have not disappeared from the land-scape. On the left, the Rifondazione Comunista remains committed to Marxist-Leninist tenets. The Partito Democratico della Sinistra, a more moderatesuccessor to the old Communists, is a strong electoral force. Third, newparties have appeared to cater to new (and not-so-new) societal cleavages. Ifin 1996 the system veered towards increased polarization, it was mostlybecause of developments on the right side of the ideological spectrum. TheAllianza Nationale, under moderate leader Gianfranco Fini, gained tremen-dous popularity as an anti-system party. Another anti-system party, Bossi’sLega Nord, is the third largest party in the current Berlusconi government.A proliferation of smaller parties has survived because of the 25 percentof Chamber members that are still elected on the basis of PR. This naturallydoes not help the cause of reduced polarization. In short, Italy’s spreadof parties from one end of the spectrum to the other continues. In a polarizedpolity voters and parties are aliens among themselves; they are distantfrom each other. This implies that it is both difficult and electorally un-rewarding for them to agree on just about anything. Under these conditions,as Sartori has pointed out, coalitions are heterogeneous, ‘and by the sametoken uncooperative, litigious, and stalemate prone.’ By contrast, in a non-polarized polity, voters and parties are unprincipled, relatively close to eachother, and can therefore easily strike bargains and agree on compromises.Coalitions are homogeneous. But Italy has had to live with heterogeneouscoalitions, in which coalition partners have often played a veto game againsteach other.Polarization continues to curse Italian politics, rendering governing coalitionsunstable because cooperation often times brings electoral penalties. Butwhile the post-1993 system is more polarized than the previous one, there is arecent but perceptible trend towards depolarization. 2001 has shakenmany assumptions. Recent research by Pappalardo (2001) shows the Italianelectorate to be more mobile than usually assumed—especially the centristone. He shows that the residual polarization assumed by the previous litera-ture is empirically false. First, the polar extremes lost political terrain.Secondly, the Northern League lost a lot of electoral support which, coupledwith other structural trends, induces Pappalardo to speak of an ‘evaporatingcentre-periphery cleavage.’ The elections of 2001 did represent a movementtowards lesser polarization. If and when electoral politics becomes crystallizedaround two big electoral cartels, polarization will continue to slowly comedown.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 277

ConclusionThe 1993 electoral law has had important effects on Italian politics, if not asprofound as electoral reformers may have hoped for. The standard majoritariansystem used by Italian reformist politicians as a benchmark continues to be oneof moderate (rather than high) pluralism and bipolar competition betweenalternative coalitions (each of which stands a reasonable chance of winning theelections). To be sure, it is unfair and unwarranted to measure the effects of ahybrid electoral law against the standards of a pure system. But perhaps the timeis now ripe, after three general elections since the law has been in place, togauge the extent to which electoral reform has or has not moved Italy awayfrom the pre-1993 political system.Let us first recall what the new law has so far failed to bring about. Italy is stillfar from resembling a full bipolar system. Political learning on the part ofparties and voters shall, in principle, strengthen the trend towards bipolarity.2001 reinforced the steady movement towards bipolarism, as parties soughtalliances and voters demonstrated a high level of pragmatism by punishing go-alone parties. Fragmentation has not been effectively reduced since 1994 andremains perhaps the Achilles’ heel of the Italian political system. The largenumber of political parties undermines the cohesion of the coalitions formed forthe majority vote in the elections. The inability of the mixed electoral law toreduce the number of parties in parliament remains the biggest disappointmentand unfulfilled hope. As a consequence, governmental stability has continued toelude Italy throughout the 1990s. Common wisdom says that until the effectivenumber of parties comes down, governmental stability cannot be had. Thisassertion contains a great deal of truth but it is not carved in stone. Berlusconifaces better prospects than his predecessors to complete his constitutionallymandated term in office, for instance. To be sure, fragmentation cannot only besolely ascribed to electoral law, for political, social and cultural cleavages inItalian society are at play here. Old societal cleavages are fading in Italy butnew ones have burst onto the political arena. Another important variableanalyzed here has been the level of polarization, for ideological distance hasoften been synonymous with coalitional in-fighting. Whereas in the latestregional and national elections polarization has come down somewhat, govern-ing cabinets are often more heterogeneous in ideological make-up than theyneed to be in order to be stable. Enough Prime Ministers have been named sincethe new electoral law took effect in 1994 so as not to alter the average postwarfigure of eleven months in office. Whether the depolarization trend is long-termor not, it is too early to say.On the other hand, the important positive changes ushered in by the newelectoral system are undeniable. The main positive development is this: thethree elections conducted under the present electoral system demonstrate thatgovernmental alternation, absent for so long from Italian politics, is now apossibility--and indeed, a reality. It must be remembered, however, that the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez278

achievement of alternation in 1996 cannot be attributed per force to the newelectoral system. In fact, the outcome was largely ‘majoritarian by chance’ as itwas pointed out. But it is clear that the electoral system has been conducive toproducing alternation. The contest of 2001 produced a clear winner and areasonably strong mandate. Further, what has been learned from the last threeelections is that victory cannot be achieved without parties establishing rather adisciplined and (geographically) encompassing electoral alliance. A predictionis that the more elections are held under the new law, the more coalitionaldiscipline will be achieved.The purpose of majoritarian systems is to serve as a ‘black box’ that magnifiesslight variations in political support (votes) in order to bring about clear winnersin parliament (seats) and thus governability. But the transition of Italy’s politicalsystem to a Second Republic of clearly defined, stable characteristics is stillincomplete. Sartori’s general dictum (plurality systems cannot by themselvesproduce two-party formats) is supported by the Italian case. However, we mustbe more subtle; Italy, after all, does not yet have a pure majoritarian electorallaw. Reformers would defend the deficient effects engendered by electoralchange so far by saying that the transition is incomplete (by the standards of aBritish-style model) because the change is incomplete. Therefore, they contend,Italy must strive towards a pure plurality system where all seats in both cham-bers are allocated by first-past-the-post. This thesis has much to commend it.Professor Sartori himself gives credence to this view by dismissing hybridsystems in general:

I believe these plurality-PR couplings to be a miscarriage, a very unsound andcounterproductive arrangement... The principle is that electoral systemsshould have one logic which conforms to their purpose... Perhaps the advo-cates of plurality-PR hybrids believe that they are bringing together the best ofboth worlds; but they are likely to obtain, instead, a bastard-producing hybridwhich combines their defects (Sartori 1994: 74-75).

His judgment is impeccable in that electoral systems should have a single logic.Insofar as proportional representation calls for sincere voting (first preferencechoices) and first-past-the-post calls for strategic voting (second best andcalculated choices), voters cannot be asked to make, all in one, majoritarian andsincere kinds of choices.Thus, the question arises: are further institutional changes enough to complete atransition to a Westminster model of sorts, as reformers would have it, or issomething else required? What reformers have not told the Italian public is thateven with a pure plurality electoral system, the quest for a majoritarian systemon the British model may well prove elusive. Duverger was correct in arguingthat plurality voting in single ballot system does tend to frustrate the develop-ment of multipartism. But once multi-partyism is part of the political landscape,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 279

does simple-majority law favour a two-party system? This is much morecontroversial, for the reform approved nine years ago did not take place in apolitical vacuum. Parties are well entrenched in Italy. Even if their names havechanged, their roots are well planted in Italian society. These parties are largelymirrors of Italian social, territorial and ideological cleavages permeatingsociety. In other words, electoral laws will not radically change the nature ofparty systems unless we proceed from tabula rasa. Clearly, after almost fiftyyears of highly stable post-war party politics, the 1993 changes took effectwithin a well entrenched societal, political and cultural environment. If Britainand the United States have long succeeded in establishing an almost perfectlybi-polar party system, it is not the least because their majoritarian electoralsystems were implanted at the founding of their political party systems.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bardi, Luciano. 1996. ‘Anti-party sentiment and party system change in Italy’ European

Journal of Political Research 29: 345-363, April 1996.

Bardi, Luciano and Martin Rhodes (eds.) Italian Politics: Mapping the Future Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1998.

Bartolini, S. and D’Alimonte R. ‘Plurality competition and party realignment in Italy: The 1994

parliamentary elections’ European Journal of Political Research 29: 105-142, January 1996.

Bartolini, Stefano and Roberto D’Alimonte. ‘Majoritarian miracles and the question of party

system change’ European Journal of Political Research 34: 151-169, 1998.

Caciagli, Mario and David Kertzer (eds.) Italian Politics: The Stalled Transition Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1996.

Calise, Mauro. ‘Remaking the Italian Party System: How Lijphard Got It Wrong by Saying it

Right’ West European Politics, Vol. 16, No.4, October 1993.

Cartocci, D. ‘Omens of an early winter: the proportional vote and the changing Italian party

system’ European Journal of Poltical Research 34: 35-61, 1998.

Chiaramonte, A. 1997. ‘L’effeto mancato della riforma maggioritaria: il voto strategico’ in

D’Alimonte and S. Bartoli (eds.) Maggioritario Per Caso Bologna: Il Mul

D’Alimonte , Roberto and David Nelken (eds.) 1997 Italian Politics: The Centre-Left in Power

Colorado: Westview Press.

D’Alimonte, Roberto. 1998 ‘Introduction: The Italian Parliamentary election of 1996-

Competition and transition.’ European Journal of Political Research 34: 1-4, 1998.

Donovan, Mark. 1994. ‘The 1994 Election in Italy: Normalization or Continuing Exceptional-

ism?’ West European Politics, Vol. 17 No.4, October.

Donovan, Mark. 1996. ‘A Turning Point that Turned? The April 1996 General Election in Italy’

West European Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4, October 1996.

Donovan, Mark. 1995. ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy’ International Political

Science Review 16 (January).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

Omar Sanchez280

Donovan, Mark. 2001. Election Report: A New Republic in Italy? The May 2001 Election

West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October).

Di Virgilio, Aldo. ‘Electoral alliances: Party identities and coalition games’ European Journal

of Political Research 34: 5-33, 1998.

The Economist ‘Italy’s Reformers Thwarted’ April 24th, 1999.

Fabrini, Sergio. 2001. Has Italy Rejected the Referendum Path to Change? The Failed Refer-

enda of May 2000 Journal of Modern Italian Studies 6 (1): 38-56

Fabrini, Sergio and Mark Gilbert. 2001. The Italian General Election of 13 May 2001: Demo-

cratic Alternation or False Step? Government and Opposition, October 2001.

Financial Times ‘Italy attempts to salvage reforms’ April 20th, 1999.

Furlong, Paul. Modern Italy: Representation and Reform London: Routledge, 1994.

Gallagher, Michael; Michael Laver and Peter Mair. Representative Government in Modern

Europe New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995.

Gilbert, Mark. The Italian Revolution: The End of Politics, Italian Style? Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1995.

Katz, Richard S and Piero Ignazi. Italian Politics: The year of the Tycoon Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1996.

Katz, Richard S. ‘Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy’ Party

Politics 2, No. 1, 1996.

Leonardi, Robert and Douglas Wertman Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Domi-

nance New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1989.

Lijphart, Arend. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A study of twenty-seven Democracies

1945-90 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

McCarthy, Patrick and Gianfranco Pasquino (eds.) 1993 The End of Post-War Politics in Italy:

The Landmark 1992 Elections Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Mair, Peter (ed.) The West European Party Systems New York: OUP, 1990.

Mershon, Carol and Gianfranco Pasquino(eds.) Italian Politics: Ending the First Republic

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Mignone, Mario B. Italy Today: A Country in Transition New York: Peter Land, 1995.

Newell, James and Martin Bull. ‘The Italian Referenda of April 1993: Real Change at Last?’

West European Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 1993.

Pappalardo, Adriano. ‘The Italian Party System Between Bipolarism and Destructuration’

Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, XXXI, No. 3, Dicembre 2001.

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 1989 ‘That Obscure Object of Desire: A new electoral law for Italy’

West European Politics, October.

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 1994a ‘Italy: The Twilight of the Parties’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5,

No. 1, January.

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 1994b ‘The Birth of the ‘Second Republic’ Journal of Democracy, Vol 5,

No. 3, July.

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 2001a. Berlusconi’s Victory: The Italian General Elections of 2001

South European Politics and Society, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer).

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 2001b. The Italian National Elections of 13 May 2001 Journal of

Modern Italian Studies 6(3): 371-387.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013

The Effects of Electoral Reform in Italy 281

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 2001c. Un’Elezione Non Come le Altre Rivista Italiana Di Scienza

Politica, XXXI, No. 3, December

Reeve, Andrew and Alan Ware. Electoral Systems: A comparative and Theoretica Introduction

London: Routledge, 1992.

Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An inquiry into Structures,

Incentives and Outcomes New York: NY University Press, 1994.

Sartori, Giovanni. 2001. Is Sistema Elettorale Resta Cattivo Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica,

XXXI, No. 3 (December).

Sundquist, James L. Constitutional Reform and Effective Government Washington, DC: The

Brookings Institution, 1992.

Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Shugart. Seats and Votes: the effects and determinants of

Electoral Systems New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

Verzichelli, L. ‘The Parliamentary elite in transition’ European Journal of Political Research 34:

121-150, 1998.

Wilson, Frank L. European Politics Today: The Democratic Experience New Jersey: Simon

and Schuster, 1999.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tex

as S

tate

Uni

vers

ity, S

an M

arco

s] a

t 16:

29 0

1 O

ctob

er 2

013