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The development of democracy -focused on inter war Europe / the takeover of Fascism and National...
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Transcript of The development of democracy -focused on inter war Europe / the takeover of Fascism and National...
Contents
1. Introduction 3
2. Democracy in inter war Europe
4
2.1. Economic factor 5
2.2. Social factor 5
2.3. Ideological factor
6
2.4. Why did fascism/ national socialism replace
democracy 6
3. The spread of democracy
7
3.1. Which factors foster the spread of democracy
7
3.2. Which factors obstruct democratic development
8
4. The measurement of democracy
9
4.1. How could/should democracy be measured?
9
4.2. How the measurement influences our
perceptions 10
Introduction
In this assignment I will present an analysis on the topic -
the development of democracy -focused on inter war Europe. I
will try to reveal the great importance of economic, social
and ideological factors during this period which are related
to historical conditions such as the takeover of fascism or
National Socialism in Germany and Italy. Additionally I will
study the factors which are connected with the spread of
democracy by presenting the factors which foster but also
obstruct democratic development. Following that I will try to
present how could or should democracy be measured which is a
thorny and burning issue because the measurement of democracy
influences our perceptions of how it spreads according to
many researchers. Finally I will complete my analysis on
democratic development presenting the three distinct waves of
democratization reassesing previous theories and presenting
the new.
Democracy in inter war Europe
The decade that ran from the stock market crash in October of
1929 to the outbreak of war in September of 1939 has as main
features the unemployment, political disintegration in the
democratic West and the establishment of concentration camps
in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
(http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/3/2_1.html-
05.11.2013).
Studying this period it could be said that there was
decomposition of liberalism of nineteenth century as a
different set of values and purposes was established.
Ideologically, the primary importance was removed from
individuals to the state. Politically, dictatorship from
above, not consent from below, was imposed and
institutionally, repression of the rights of the citizen was
practiced without respecting them.
(http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/3/2_2.html -
05.11.2013)
Barrington Moore outlined three major routes which took place
during the inter war Europe and in each case “the particular
transition from feudalism to modernity during which time a
specific alliance of class forces emerged, shaped later
events – the bourgeois democratic route – the authoritarian
reactionary route ( which later culminated in fascism) – the
peasant based communist route. The first route was
characterized by the domination of the emerging urban
industrial bourgeoisie, a broad commercializtion of
agriculture and a gradual incorporation of the working
classes. The second route in contrast maintained the
domination of the landed aristocracy in a strictly
centralized system controlled by the bureaucracy and
military. The authoritarian and later fascist cases are Moore
s main examples in this regard. The third route culminated in
a successful peasant revolution, as in Russia and
China”(Schlosser, 1994 =260).
More recently John Stephens has attempted to extend and
differentiate Moore s argument and apply it to a larger
number of cases, icluding many of those which we have
considered. “Stephen lists four major factors which in his
view permit a differentiated analysis of the social
structural patterns leading to authoritarianism or democracy
in Europe s pre World War II political development, These
factors are the existence of a politically significant landed
upper class engaged in labor repressive agriculture, a strong
bourgeoisie which however is less powerful than the landed
class and thus remains a dependent partner in this coalition,
a strong state and the occurance or absence of a
revolutionary break with the past” (Schlosser, 1994 =261).
Following that if we want to give a final explanation for the
weakness of interwar democracy we will take into account that
“it points to a lack of co operation among democrats,
engendered by acture polarization. However polarization did
not so much cause specific outcomes as reflect the inability
to find any stable solution.” “Where democrats failed it was
not because their societies had become polarized rather the
societies bacame polarized because democrats had failed”
(Luebbert, 1987 = 478).
More specifically I will study democracy in inter war Europe
in relation to the importance of economic, social and
inteological factors.
Economic factor
“The form the inter war state ultimately assumed in the
crises of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be understood apart from
the manner in whch workers became organized in the labor
market. For both state and labor market institutions took
shape simultaneously as two halves of the same response to
working class mobilization. Trade unions could be organized
along corpotalist or pluralist lines or they could simply be
repressed by the state. Corporatism between the wars denoted
a system in which economic interests in a private economy
were becoming functionally organized in groups that were
centralized, comprehensive and authoritative. In this
authoritarian variant - fascism - corporatist organizations
were mainly mechanisms through which the state controlled and
mobilized workers and capitalists” (Luebbert, 1987 = 450).
Social factor
During the period of study it was the growth of the working
class and its capacity for self organization that were most
critical for the final breakthrough of democracy. “The rapid
industrialization experienced by Western Europe in the five
decades before World War I increased the size and with
varying time lags, the degree of organization of the working
class and thus changed the balance of class power in the
civil society to the advantage of democratic forces.” In
Therbon s words where the working class had few allies
democracy was fragile and did not survive the inter war
period. “But there is also almost the reverse of Therbon s
thesis whch supports the view that where the working class
was well organized and commited to a moderate to radical
socialist party, it hindered the development of
democracy”(Stephens, 1989 = 1064 – 1065). “Moreover the
middle classes and the peasantry played quite fifferent roles
in different countries. In some such as the Scandinavian
countries they supported suffrage extension and allied with
the working class, In others such as Germany and Austria they
formed the mass base for authoritarian movements that ended
democracy” (Stephens, 1989 = 1066).
Ideological factor
Ideologiacally two ways of life were represented in national
ideologies as a conflict started between socialism and
capitalism, economic autarky and free trade, state planning
and private enterprise. Following many in the U.S. saw the
Soviet system as a threat and the “ Red Scare” had as a
result both British and U.S. policymakers commonly assumed
the communist Soviet Union to be a much greater threat than
Germany and focused most of their intelligence efforts
against Moscow losing valuable time against the threat of
fascism which exploited the above situations and it
increased its power
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origins_of_the_Cold_War -
05.11.2013) .
Why did fascism / national socialism and authoritarian
government replace democracy?
“George Hallgarten for example pointed out that the Nazi
takeover was made possible by the agreement between certain
parts of the upper classes and Hitler s movement. Similarly
Arthur Schweitzer argued that the Great Depression and the
nazification of the middle class were necessary but not
sufficient causes for the rise of the Nazi system. Three
further conditions enabled the Nazis to come tro power. The
first was the unification of the upper class into a single
power bloc dedicated the depression by promoting a political
dictatorship. Of equal importance were the alliances with the
generals, big business and the landowners had used their
influence to restore between the two parties the NSDAP and
the DNVP and the tie in between these parties and the upper
class. Finally as parliament lost its power because of a Nazi
majority the subsequent presidential government came under
the effective control of the various segments of the upper
class” (Schlosser, 1994 =259).
Both Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), duce (leader) of Italy,
and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), fuhrer (leader) of Germany,
boasted that they would provide strength where weakness had
before prevailed. Mussolini offered this definition: “The
Fascist state is will to power and domination.”
From this brief review, the major elements of appeal that
were gathered around the swastika or the fasces can be seen.
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany presented themselves as
upholders of sacred national purpose and they offered an
alternative against the economic insecurity, the threat of an
impending bolshevism and ineffectiveness of parliamentary
democracy. That the alternative would prove to be both false
and horrendous was not anticipated by many of those who
followed the flags of these new systems
(http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/3/2_2.html -
05.11.2013) .
“In many analyses of Europe in the 1930s contemporaries
employed two metaphors, cancer and twilight, to describe the
state of European civilization. Cancer was used in reference
to totalitarianism. Fascism and Nazism were seen as malignant
outgrowths of modern society, slowly consuming it. The
metaphor twilight, most frequently applied to the state of
affairs in France, suggested the end of an era. The high noon
of liberal democracy was past, and now Europe was basking in
the last light of a glorious day before the night of fascism
would fall.Neither metaphor was neither new nor particularly
subtle in nuance. But each clearly conveyed the sense of
despair, of tragic conclusion that so many observers foresaw
for the European civilization that had been part of their
prewar youth.The Depression of the 1930s was, therefore, not
just economic but also psychological. European society had
lost its confidence”
(http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/3/2_2.html -
05.11.2013) .
The spread of democracy
Which factors foster the spread of democracy?
Few questions in political science have been studied as
extensively as the relation between socio economic
development and democracy. According to Lipset
(modernization theory) all the various aspects of economic
development - industrialization, urbanization, wealth and
education are the conditions for the spread of democracy
(Stephens, 1989 = 1064).
Lipset’s account of democratization was strongly informed by
Lerner (1958), who had identified urbanization, education and
communication (media) to be core factors in the process of
individual modernization and political participation. Lerner
had pointed out that with widespread education the ruling
elite’s fear of a country ruled by an unruly mass, incapable
of informed decision. “In sum, economic development — like
urbanization, wealth and education — in Lipset’s account
works as a mediating variable that is part of a larger
syndrome of conditions favorable to democratization.
Kitschelt (2003) has called this a deep explanation in which
economic development works through the syndrome of
conditions”
(http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/vie
warticle/lrd-2009-4/13 - 05.11.2013).
Which factors obstruct democratic development?
STATUS OF WOMEN: Women perform important functions in and
outside home. They have achieved high positions in all walks
of political and social life as the women representatives’
percentages in the parliaments have been increased the last
years .However, inspite of all these achievements there are a
number of prejudices against their abilities being
disregarded, maltreated and debarred from doing the same
things with men But where there is not equality between the
two genders and women do not enjoy full freedom it is against
the spirit of democracy. Where there is not universal
liberty, democracy is hindered.
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: Economic inequality also hampers
democracy. This breeds rivalry and hatred among people. It
leads to the exploit of one class by one other.It is a
negation of democracy as poor cannot contribute in the
functioning of democracy.
ILLITERACY: Absence of literacy is the greatest impediment to
social and economic progress. Illiterate person can not
understand the problems of the country. He or She can not
take a correct decision about his or her future. For example
he / she is not in a position to make the best use of his/
her rights or he/she does not know for whom to vote.
Therefore an illiterate man cannot contribute much to the
success of democracy.
TERRORISM IN DEMOCRACY: is faced with this challenge in many
states where people have resorted to terror tactics hambering
the smooth functioning of democracy.
RELIGIOUS COMMUNALISM: It leads to jealously and hatred
between various religious sects which results in riots and
violence. Religious communalism creates intolerance and
disrespect among various communities which hinder the
functioning of democracy.
(http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/16206/
Leffler_Global%282010%29.PDF?sequence=1 /05.11.2013).
The measurement of democracy
How could or should democracy be measured?
It has been easier for researchers to agree on the general
characteristics of democracy than on how to measure it.
Various operational measures of democracy have been
formulated and used in empirical studies (Vanhanen, 2000 =
252).
Democracy has been measured in various ways and two of the
most basic dimensions of democracy are competition and
participation in Vanhanen s words. “They can yield a
theoretically satisfactory measurement of democracy that
employs three measures: degree of electoral competition,
degree of electoral participation and a combined index of
democratization. The value of the Competition variable is
calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the
largest party from 100. If data on the distribution of votes
are not available, the value of this variable is calculated
on the basis of distribution of seats in parliament. The
value of the Participation variable is calculated from the
total population, not from the adult or enfranchized
population” (Vanhanen, 2000 = 251 & 253).
However there are some problems with these two variables.
“Differences in electoral systems account for some of the
variation in the smaller parties’ share of the vote.
Proportional electoral systems are assumed to promote the
multiplication of political parties but this factor has
significantly affected the share of the smaller parties in
relatively few countries, The competition indicator is biased
to produce somewhat higher values for countries with
proportional electoral systems that for those with plurality
or majority electoral systems. A disadvantage of
Participation is that it daes not take into account the
variation in age structure. The percentage of the adult
population is significantly higher in developed countries
than in poor countries in which people die younger and in
which therefore the relative number of children is higher.
This factor exaggerates differences in the degree of
electoral participation between developed and developing
countries. Another shortcoming is that Participation does not
take into account tha variation in the nature and importance
of elections. This intensivity to the significance of
elections weakens the validity of this variable. For these
reasons some researchers have excluded the degree of
electoral participation from their measures of democracy
because they feel that it does not represent a significant
differentiating aspect of democracy” (Vanhanen, 2000 = 255).
“The Freedom House Comparative Survey of Freedom established
by Raymond D. Gastil in the 1970s has rated countries in
terms of political rights and civil liberties since 1972-73.
These ratings have also been used as indirect measures of the
degree of democracy. The Polity Project initiated by Ted
Robert Gurr in the 1970s developed a different method for
measuring authority characteristics of all the largest
countries from 1800. One of the Polity authority
characteristics concerns institutionalized democracy where
democracy is measured by an additive ten point scale derived
from codings of the competitiveness of political
participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment,
the openness of executive recruitment and constraints on the
chief executive. It should also be noted that democracy
scores have not been coded for the periods of transition,
interregnum and interruption” (Vanhanen, 2000 = 252).
How the measurement of democracy influences our perceptions
of how it spreads?
In addition to the various checklists (self-surveys and
expert surveys), people’s beliefs are also measured to
determine the saturation level of democratic values. For
example The World Values Survey uses the following
questionsin order to dig deeper into the extent to which
democratic culture has developed or may develop in the
future:
Do you agree with the following statement, “Democracy
may have its problems, but it’s better than any other
form of government?”
Do you endorse the idea of a “Strong leader who does not
have to bother with parliament and elections?”
Do you agree that “Greater respect for authority would
be a good thing?”
These attitudinal measures are helpful in examining the claim
that some cultures or regions are naturally more conducive to
the growth and consolidation of democracy. Countries, where
the citizens answer the above questions positively, are seen
to be potentially fertile, if challenging candidates for
future democratization. Conversely, countries whose citizens
respond negatively to the above questions are considered to
be at risk for de-democratization. Many experts also look at
voter registration to gauge how people feel in the political
system. Low rates may reveal government interference with
voting and/or voter apathy, both of which are highly negative
indicators for the health of a democracy
(http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=183:what-is-
democracy&catid=76:what-is-democracy&Itemid=297/05.11.2013)
The three waves of democracy
According to Huntington, there have been tree distinct waves
of democratization with a wave being defined as a group of
transitions from nndemocratic to democratic regimes that
occurs within a specified period of time and in which those
transitions significantly outnumber transitions in the
opposite direction. “The first long wave flowed
uninterruptedly form 1826 to 1926 marking the emergence of
democratic regimes as a nineteenth century phenomenon.
Following a reverse wave, the end of World War II provided
the impetus for the second short wave of democratization.
Thereafter came an enormous global swing away from democy in
the 1960s and early 1970s which in turn was succeeded by a
third wave of democratization which took off in the years
following the end of the PorTuguese dictatorship in 1974”
( Doorenspleet, 2000 = 384).
Although Huntington’s study has been very influential there
are two problems. “The first is largely conceptual - the
analysis fails to provide a clear and meaningful distinction
between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Moreover, he
also appears to adopt other criteria for 19th century systems
which are classified as having already become democratic when
50 per cent of adult males become eligible to vote. Finally
early 20th century Portugal is also considered democratic,
even though only male citizens had then won the right to
participate. The second problem is empirical. In brief,
Huntington has estimated the incidence of transitions to
democracy in terms of the percentages of world states
involved. Since the dominator in this equation that is the
number of states in the world, is far from constant this
measure can be misleading” (Doorenspleet, 2000 = 385 & 386).
Lastly the Doorespleet’s research notes on whether the wave
metaphor is the most appropriate way to conceptualize the
problem. Since reverse waves are not really apparent it may
be better to think in terms of steps toward democratization.
But many researchers, who believe in the theory of waves,
expect a reverse wave in the near future and are waiting for
it because they think that “each wave is inevitably
followed by a reverse wave”. Are we on the edge of such a
reversal? “It seems then that a period of trendless
fluctuation is empirically more likely than a reverse wave”
(Doorenspleet, 2000 = 400 & 401).
Conclusion
To sum up, if we read the assignment again we will understand
immediately that the development of democracy is an issue
with many aspects as it is connected with different
situations such as the democratic rule and democratic
institutions, the factors which foster or obstruct the spread
of democracy, the measurement of dymocracy and the waves of
democratization.
As for as the main period of study – period of inter war
Europe- is concerned, the decade is characterized of The
Great Depression (the stock market crash in October of 1929)
and the establishment of concentration camps in Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union having the following consequences. For
many individuals who turned to these new authoritarian
parties, personal freedom seemed a burden; democratic
processes seemed inept and ineffective. A new desire for
relief from personal anxiety led to a search for social
order. Here was a call for a new order in the most democratic
of European nations. On the Continent itself, fascism and
Nazism were responses to the confusion of the day.
Finally we should take into account that today we also live
a great economic and social crisis and many fascist
organizations have been emerged. Subsequently is the modern
world safe for democracy or how could we make the
contemporary world safer for democracy?
Bibliography
Doorenspleet, Renske (April 2000): Reassessing the Three
Waves of Democratization.In: World Politics Vol. 52. pp. 384-
406.
Luebbert, Gregory M. (July, 1987): Social Foundations of
Political Order in Interwar Europe.In: World Politics. Vol. 39,
No. 4. pp. 449-478.
Schlosse - Berg, Dirk / Neur, Gisele De (April, 1994):
Conditions of Democracy in Interwar Europe: A Boolean Test of Major
Hypotheses.In: Comparative Politics. Vol. 26, No. 3. pp.
253-279.
Stephens, John D.(March, 1989): Democratic Transition and
Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis.In:
The American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 94, No. 5. pp.
1019-1077.
Vanhanen, Tatu (March, 2000): A New Dataset for Measuring
Democracy, 1810-1998.In: Journal of Peace Research. Vol.
37, No. 2. pp. 251-265.
http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/3/2_1.html-
05.11.2013
(http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/3/2_2.html -
05.11.2013
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origins_of_the_Cold_War -
05.11.2013
http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/
article/viewarticle/lrd-2009-4/13 - 05.11.2013
http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/16206/
Leffler_Global%282010%29.PDF?sequence=1 /05.11.2013
http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=183:what-is-
democracy&catid=76:what-is-
democracy&Itemid=297/05.11.2013