The Congress since 1947 - Economic and Political Weekly |

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November 7, 1959 Politics in Orissa—IX The Congress since 1947 ON May 8, 1959 the Amrita Bazar Patrika reported an interview with Dr H K Mahtab, the Chief Minister and leader of the Congress Party in Orissa. 'As far as I can judge, the Orissa Congress will be strength- ened and its influence extended to all parts of Orissa, if it accepts the offer of the Ganatantra Pari- shad to work the Congress policy and programme . . . (but if pre- sent conditions were allowed to continue, in the next general elec- tion the Congress party) is likely to be entirely crushed.' The same newspaper, on May 24, 1959 reported an interview with the (now) President of the Ganatantra Parishad. 'Just after the new Ministry's swearing-in ceremony was over the Maharaja of Kalahandi, Sri Pratapkesari Deo, MP ( G P ) said, at a press statement, that it should be quite a great relief to the people of Orissa that the Con- gress regime had come to an end, and that, he hoped, for all time to come. He once came to the Rajbhavan in Cuttack at the time of the liquidation of the Princely States and for the second time to-day to see the liquidation of the Congress regime in Orissa, the Maharaja added.' In the same issue the newspaper reported a statement by Sri Suren- dranath Dwivedy, MP, leader of the Praja Socialists in Orissa, '(The) only motive behind this unusual coalition (Congress-Gana- tantra Parishad) in Orissa is to share power together. It is wrong to think that it has any other significance at all ........ But I feel that after this coalition the Oppo- sition in Orissa will emerge as a a force with definite principles and objectives'. Period of Triumph The 1946 elections were held on a limited franchise, and the Orissa in which these elections took place consisted of the four coastal dis- tricts, together with Sambalpur and Koraput. This electorate, in these districts, returned 45 Congressmen in a house of 60, and as many as 37 of the 45 seats were uncontested. It was a clear and overwhelming victory for the Congress. The reasons for this victory are clear. Congress was virtually the only party in the field. Its candi- dates consisted largely of 'martyrs', men who had a few months before been released from the security pri- sons. Independence was just around the corner, and the credit for this seemed to lie with the Gandhian wing of the Congress. Again, since Congress was clearly about to be- come the 'Raj', all those factors which I have discussed earlier as 'a vote for the Raj,' operated in its favour. This is clearly seen in the 37 uncontested seats: few people could be found who would risk branding themselves as the impla- cable opponents of the party that was about to assume power. The same fact testifies to party disci- pline: at that time those Congress- men who were not given a ticket could be persuaded not to try their luck as Independents, in opposition to the Congress. After the merger of the Feuda- tory States, 31 people were nomi- nated by the Government to form an Orissa States Assembly. A year later this was dissolved and mem- bers were nominated to sit in the regular Legislative Assembly which then used to meet at Cuttack. Since these members were nominated by the Congress Government, their pre- sence made no difference to the Con, gress hold upon the Legislative Assembly All Exemplary 'Freedom-Fighters' There was a cabinet, initially of six members. Four of these came from the two northern districts of the coast, one from Puri, and one from Koraput. All six cabinet members were exemplary 'freedom fighters' and at least five of them had been security prisoners. Later three persons were nominated from the ex-State areas and given cabinet rank: all three were leaders of the Prajamandal Movement, In 1948 two of the original mem- bers, of the cabinet resigned. One, who sat for a Koraput constituency, was replaced by another man from Koraput. The portfolios were re- shuffled and one was given to a member (since dead) who was both a Raja and a member of a Sche- duled Tribe. This gentleman's suc- cess in giving the Jharkhand Move- ment of Orissa a go-by' has been mentioned in a quotation in an earlier article. He came from Sam- balpur, and it may be presumed that he was taken into the cabinet both in order to give that area some representation and because he was especially qualified, as a tribal chief, to counter the growing menace of the Jharkhand Movement in the northern hills of Orissa. He, alone in the cabinet, did not have a record as a 'freedom fighter'. Some Swarajists, who had taken the lead In forming" the wartime Coalition Ministry, had applied to rejoin the Congress, but while Con- gress clemency extended to letting them return, it did not extend to letting them stand for election on a Congress ticket. They remained outside the Congress. Period of Uncertainty The 1952 election covered the whole of the State and was held on a universal adult franchise. There were 140 seats in the new house. Of these Congress won 67: In the coastal districts 41 out of a possible 68, and in the hills 26 out of a possible 72, I shall analyse the Congress membership in the 1952 House and the 1957 House and in some of the cabinets, and in order to do this I shall use three categories. The first are the 'freedom fighters' (FF), whom I define as those people who gained an Orissa-wide reputation for their part in the Independence Movement, and I take as a criterion of this the mention of their names, as leaders, in Vols III, IV, or V of the History of the Freedom Move- ment in Orissa. The second cate- gory consists of Congress workers and sympathisers (W&S), people who are not mentioned in the His- tory, but who were active or passive sympathisers of the Move- ment and certainly who never op- 1603 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY P G Bailey

Transcript of The Congress since 1947 - Economic and Political Weekly |

November 7, 1959

Politics in Orissa—IX

The Congress since 1947 ON M a y 8, 1959 the A m r i t a Bazar

P a t r i k a reported an in terv iew w i t h Dr H K M a h t a b , the Chief Min is te r and leader of the Congress Pa r t y in Orissa.

'As f a r as I can judge, the Orissa Congress w i l l be s t reng th ­ened and i ts influence extended to a l l par ts of Orissa, i f i t accepts the offer of the G a n a t a n t r a Par i -shad to w o r k the Congress pol icy and p rogramme . . . (bu t if pre­sent condi t ions were a l lowed to cont inue, in the next general elec­t ion the Congress pa r t y ) is l ike ly to be en t i re ly crushed. '

The same newspaper, on May 24, 1959 reported an in te rv iew w i t h the (now) President of the Gana tan t ra Par ishad.

'Just a f te r the new Min i s t r y ' s swear ing- in ceremony was over the M a h a r a j a o f Ka lahand i , Sr i P ra tapkesar i Deo, M P ( G P ) said, at a press statement , t h a t i t should be quite a great re l ief to the people of Orissa t h a t the Con-gress regime had come to an end, and tha t , he hoped, f o r a l l t ime to come. He once came to the R a j b h a v a n in Cu t tack a t the t ime of the l iqu idat ion of the Pr incely States and f o r the second t ime to-day to see the l iqu idat ion of the Congress regime in Orissa, the M a h a r a j a added.'

In the same issue the newspaper reported a s tatement by Sr i Suren-d rana th Dwivedy , M P , leader o f the P r a j a Social ists in Orissa,

' (The ) on ly mo t i ve behind th is unusual coa l i t ion (Congress-Gana-t a n t r a Par ishad) in Orissa is to share power together. I t i s w r o n g to t h i n k t h a t i t has a n y other signif icance at all........But I feel t h a t a f t e r th is coa l i t ion the Oppo­s i t ion in Orissa w i l l emerge as a a force w i t h def ini te pr inciples and object ives' .

Period of Triumph T h e 1946 elections were held on a

l im i t ed f ranchise, a n d the Orissa in w h i c h these elections took place consisted o f the f o u r coasta l d is­t r i c ts , together w i t h Sambalpur and Ko rapu t . Th i s electorate, in these d is t r ic ts , re tu rned 45 Congressmen

in a house of 60, and as m a n y as 37 of the 45 seats were uncontested. I t was a clear and overwhe lming v ic to ry fo r the Congress.

The reasons fo r th is v i c to ry are clear. Congress was v i r t u a l l y the only pa r t y in the f ield. I t s candi­dates consisted large ly of 'mar ty rs ' , men who had a few months before been released f r o m the secur i ty pr i ­sons. Independence was jus t a round the corner, and the credi t f o r th is seemed to lie w i t h the Gandh ian w i n g of the Congress. Aga in , since Congress was clear ly about to be­come the 'Ra j ' , a l l those factors wh ich I have discussed ear l ier as 'a vote for the R a j , ' operated in i ts favour . Th is is c lear ly seen in the 37 uncontested seats: few people could be found who wou ld r i sk b rand ing themselves as the imp la­cable opponents of the pa r t y t h a t was about to assume power. The same fac t testifies to pa r t y disci­p l ine: at t h a t t ime those Congress­men who were not g iven a t icket could be persuaded no t to t r y the i r luck as Independents, in opposit ion to the Congress.

A f t e r the merger of the Feuda­tory States, 31 people were nomi­nated by the Government to f o r m an Orissa States Assembly. A year la ter this was dissolved and mem­bers were nomina ted to sit in the regular Legis la t ive Assembly wh ich then used to meet at Cu t tack . Since these members were nominated by the Congress Government , the i r pre­sence made no dif ference to the Con , gress hold upon the Legis la t ive Assembly

All Exemplary 'Freedom-Fighters'

There was a cabinet, i n i t i a l l y of six members. Four of these came f r o m the two nor thern d is t r ic ts o f the coast, one f r o m P u r i , and one f r o m Korapu t . A l l six cabinet members were exemplary ' f reedom f ighters ' and at least f ive o f t hem had been secur i ty pr isoners. La te r three persons were nomina ted f r o m the ex-State areas and g iven cabinet r a n k : a l l three were leaders o f the P r a j a m a n d a l Movement ,

In 1948 t w o o f the o r ig ina l mem­bers, of the cabinet resigned. One,

who sat for a Korapu t const i tuency, was replaced by another m a n f r o m Koraput . The port fo l ios were re­shuff led a n d one was given to a member (since dead) who was bo th a R a j a and a member of a Sche­duled Tr ibe . Th is gent leman's suc­cess in g i v i ng the J h a r k h a n d Move­ment of Orissa a go-by' has been ment ioned in a quota t ion in an earl ier ar t ic le . He came f r o m Sam­balpur, and i t m a y be presumed t h a t he was taken in to the cabinet bo th in order to g ive t ha t area some representat ion and because he was especially qual i f ied, as a t r i ba l chief, to counter the g row ing menace of the J h a r k h a n d Movement in the nor thern hi l ls of Orissa. He, alone in the cabinet, d i d not have a record as a ' f reedom f ighter ' .

Some Swara j is ts , who had taken the lead In forming" the wa r t ime Coal i t ion M in i s t r y , had appl ied to re jo in the Congress, bu t whi le Con­gress clemency extended to l e t t i ng t hem re tu rn , i t d id no t extend to l e t t i ng them s tand f o r elect ion on a Congress t icket . They remained outside the Congress.

Period of Uncertainty

The 1952 elect ion covered the whole of the State and was held on a un iversa l adu l t f ranchise. There were 140 seats in the new house. Of these Congress w o n 67: In the coasta l d is t r ic ts 41 out of a possible 68, and in the h i l ls 26 out of a possible 72,

I sha l l analyse the Congress membersh ip in the 1952 House and the 1957 House and in some of the cabinets, and in order to do th is I shal l use three categories. The f irst are the ' f reedom f igh ters ' ( F F ) , w h o m I define as those people who ga ined an Orissa-wide reputat ion fo r the i r pa r t i n the Independence Movement , and I take as a cr i ter ion of th is the men t i on of the i r names, as leaders, in Vo ls I I I , I V , or V of the H i s t o r y o f the Freedom Move­men t in Or issa. The second cate­go ry consists of Congress workers and sympath isers ( W & S ) , people who are n o t ment ioned in the His­t o r y , b u t w h o were active or passive sympathisers of the Move­men t and cer ta in ly who never op-

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THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY November 7, 1959

posed i t , Th is category includes a few men who have come to the Congress since 1947, and who were too young to have played any ser i­ous p a r t in the Independence Movement . The t h i r d category are the opponents of the Congress, and this includes those who act ive ly op­posed i t in the per iod bofore Inde­pendence, those who at some t ime le f t the Congress and opposed i t (eg, the Swara j i s t s ) , those who have been w o n over f r o m Opposit ion part ies since 1947, and finally those who, wh i le no t themselves act ive opponents of the Congress, belon­ged to groups or categories w h i c h were ranged aga ins t the Congress (eg, some Zemindars and Ra jas ) .

These three categories of F F , W & S , and Opponen s are not ent i re­ly sa t is fac to ry . The H i s t o r y o f the Freedom Movement in Or issa cer­t a in l y overwr i tes the w o r k o f some ind iv idua ls and probab ly under­wr i tes the s ign i f icant pa r t played by others, and i t is possible t ha t some persons in the W & S category deserve to be considered as F F . Also the W & S category is a very broad one and probab ly includes persons whose Congress sympathies on ly became apparent a f te r 1946: bandwaggoners, ' in other words, or,

to recal l an ear l ier quo ta t ion , 'new types of persons, who . . . h a d sty led themselves po l i t i ca l workers . ' There is, in short , a cer ta in a r b i t r a ­riness in the three categories, but they are the best t ha t could be con-s t ructed on the i n f o r m a t i o n ava i l ­able, and , crude though they are. they meet the present purpose, wh i ch is to t race the progressive d i lu t ion o f Congress 'pu r i t y ' in Orissa.

Progressive Dilution

Accord ing to these categories the Congress members of the 1952 house are analysed as fo l lows :

Of the 26 members f r o m the h i l l d is t r ic ts

4 were FF ( t w o coming f r o m B r i t i s h d i s t r i c t s ) ,

20 were W & S and 2 were Opponents, b o t h R a j

f a m i l y , one be ing the ex-M in i s te r ;

Of the 41 members f r o m the f o u r coastal d is t r i c ts

18 were F F , 21 were W & S , a n d 2 were Opponents, bo th f r o m

R a j fami l ies . The cabinet in 1952 inc luded 13

Min is te rs . Of these

5 were F F , 3 being Min is te rs and 2 Deputy Min is te rs ,

0 were W & S , 2 being Min is te rs and 3 Deputy Min is te rs , and

3 were Opponents, a l l R a j f am i l y , one Min is te r and two Deputy Min is ters .

In the 1946 House bo th the Govern­ment and the Congress P a r t y were s t i l l n a r r o w l y based on 'o r thodox ' Congressmen, and had a dominan t number o f F F . E i g h t o f the n ine members of the 1949 cabinet were in t h a t category. Bu t in the 1952 House there are clear signs t h a t the cleavage between the FF a n d the i r ers twhi le opponents was beg inn ing to close. The Congress Assembly P a r t y included four mem-bers f r o m R a j fami l ies , three in the 1952 cabinet and one who had pre­v iously held a por t fo l io . One other member of a R a j f a m i l y had been g iven the Congress t icket , but was not elected. The 1946 cabinet i n ­cluded 11 per cent (one person ) f r o m the Opponent category: the 1952 cabinet included 23 per cent ( three persons) f r o m tha t category.

F ive of the 1952 Congressmen in the cabinet were in the W & S cate­gory . Th is pa r t l y reflects the pass­ing of t ime and the p romot ion of ear l ier leaders to the h igher rea lms of pol i t ics. Bu t i t also, perhaps, i n ­dicates tha t some of those who had not the g i f t s to lead an ag i ta t i on d id have the sk i l l s required f o r order ly government , and t h a t i t was becoming clear t ha t the FF badge alone was not a suff icient qua l i f i ca t ion fo r po l i t i ca l leader­ship a f te r 1947.

Competition for Candidates

B u t the gap was as yet f a r f r o m being closed. By and large the Congress t ickets were s t i l l being g iven to o ld Congress workers . The Swara j i s ts were s t i l l outside the f o l d . N o r was the Congress leader­ship happy about t a k i n g in m e m ­bers of R a j fami l ies . I have been t o l d t h a t as m a n y as 18 members o f R a j fami l ies wou ld have accepted the Congress t icket , had i t been of fered to them. B u t i t was n o t : the Congress pre fer red the i r o w n men, and the Ra jas t h rew the i r i n ­fluence aga ins t these candidates and most o f t hem were defeated.

The 1952 elections demonst ra ted t h a t the appeal w h i c h the pa r t y seemed to have in 1946 had no t las ted u n t i l 1952, and h a d no t spread outside the coasta l p la in . They h a d been re tu rned in 1952 w i t h a m i n o r i t y . Even on the coas­

t a l p la in out of 68 Congress candi­dates 27 had been defeated. Twelve of these fe l l to other par t ies (one Gana tan t ra , f ive Communis ts , f ive Social ists, and one M a r x i s t F o r w a r d B lock) and no less t h a n f i f teen sea's were t aken by Independents. Seven of these Independents were Ra jas or Zemindars and two were Swara j i s ts : another Swara j i s t was the F o r w a r d B lock member. F i f teen ind iv idua ls showed t h a t they could w i n seats w i t hou t the back ing of any par ty . I f some of these, and some other persons, had been given the Congress t icket , then the pa r t y m i g h t have come in w i t h a majo­r i t y and not in a m ino r i t y . At least i t mus t have occurred to the pa r ty managers then tha t one day they m i g h t be faced w i t h the choice of compromis ing on Congress 'pur i t y ' or of being ent i re ly defeated. The rea l contest, in m a n y consti tuencies, was not to get votes, bu t to w i n over the person who was sure to get the votes : compet i t ion f o r can­didates, not voters.

Period of Realism

A l t h o u g h the 1952 Congress was elected w i t h a m i n o r i t y , i t d id not have such a di f f icul t t ime in the House as one m i g h t have expected. Some Independents jo ined the Con-gress soon a f te r elect ion: others, who were not permi t ted to j o i n the par ty , nevertheless voted consistent­ly w i t h the Government . A g a i n , many of the measures wh ich the Congress int roduced — par t i cu la r l y ag ra r i an re fo rm — had the support of the le f t -w ing part ies, and these bi l ls went t h rough w i t h major i t ies far in excess of the paper m a j o r i t y commanded by the Government .

Bu t by 1956 the Congress was in di f f icul t ies. F o r personal reasons the Min is te r f r o m Korapu t , who had pi loted t h rough the Zemindar i A b o l i ­t i on measure, resigned his por t fo l io . The Chief Min is ter , who was the ma insp r i ng behind the a g r a r i a n re­fo rms and the a t tempt to in t roduce local se l f -government t h rough the A n c h a l Sasan B i l l , and w h o before the w a r had been the leader of the Congress Social ist P a r t y , resigned to j o i n the Bhoodan Movement . A t the same t ime there was the grave embarrassment of the States Re­organ iza t ion Commiss ion Report and the subsequent disorders. W i t h i n the Congress there was a deep cleavage between those who supported the Chief Min is ter , appro­ved o f Zemindar i Abo l i t i on , and admi red his refusal to compromise

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on ideological issues, inc lud ing Congress ' pu r i t y , ' and those who believed t h a t a more real is t ic pol icy must be adopted i f the Congress was to rema in a power w i t h i n the State. These were the people who not iced t h a t Zemindar i A b o l i t i o n was 'not popular ' and who con­sidered i t r i gh t to take in f o rmer opponents of the Congress in order to meet the g r o w i n g th rea t o f the G a n a t a n t r a Par ishad in the h i l ls , and of the l e f t -w ing part ies on the plains.

Membership In the 1957 House

An analys is of the Congress membership of the 1957 House and the cabinet shows quite c lear ly t ha t the real is t ic t h i n k i n g had prevai led in the par ty ' s councils. Congress had 56 members, eleven less than a f te r the 1952 elect ion: 42 of these (out of a possible 66) were in the four coastal d is t r ic ts , and 14 in the h i l l d is t r ic ts . Thus they gained one seat in the coastal d is t r ic ts , and lost 13 in the hi l ls .

Of the 42 members fo r const i ­tuencies in the coastal d is t r ic ts

17 had held Congress seats in the 1952 House, of whom 7 were F F , 8 were W & S , and 2 were Opponents, both R a j

f a m i l y : and

25 were new members, of w h o m 3 were Congressmen who had fa i led to be elected in 1952.

2 being F F , and

1 W & S ,

2 were FF who had not stood in the 1952 election, and 10 were W & S newcomers.

Bu t aga inst th is there were as m a n y as

10 opponents re turned on the Congress t icket , of whom 2 were ex-Swara j , one an Independent in the 1952 House and one who had n a r r o w l y fa i led to be elec­ted to t h a t House on a non-Congress t icket , 1 had been a Communist

in the 1952 House,

4 were R a j f am i l y , three o f w h o m had been I n ­dependents in the 1952 House, two of t hem be­i n g the leaders of the p rs -war rent ier Opposi­t i o n in the Legis lat ive Assembly,

I had been an Indepen­dent MLA in the 1952 House in a reserved

seat, and 2 had been off icials, one

of w h o m was an old enemy of the Congress.

In th is way no less t h a n 6 of these 10 Opponents h a d defeated Congress candidates in the 1952 General Elect ions,

Of the 14 members in the h i l l d is t r ic ts

5 had held seats in the 1952 House, of whom 3 were F F , 1 was W & S , and 1 was an Opponent, a mem­

ber of a R a j f a m i l y : and 9 were newcomers, of w h o m

7 were W & S , and 2 were opponents, bo th R a j

fami l y , one of w h o m was unseated by an elect ion t r i buna l and lost the sub­sequent bye-election to a G a n a t a n t r a commoner can­didate, a few weeks before the Coal i t ion came about.

There were thus f i f teen Oppo­nents w i t h i n the ranks of the Con­gress when the elect ion results were announced. Bu t even then the Congress was able to achieve a precarious m a j o r i t y on ly by t a k i n g in Independents and deserters f r o m other part ies, and by re l y ing on the support of the 5 J h a r k h a n d m e m ­bers. Congress support, accord ing to the 'pur is t ' way o f t h i n k i n g , was down to 41 persons, and t h a t must have included a number of 'band-waggoners ' in the W & S c a t e g o r y : th is was in a House of 140 persons.

The Cabinet

Just p r io r to the Coal i t ion in 1959 ( t ha t is. a f te r the scandals o f A p r i l and M a y 1958 and the dismissal of one of the Congress Deputy Min is ­ters) the cabinet numbered 14, 10 being Min is ters and 4 Deputy Ministers. Of these 14

6 had held por t fo l ios in the pre­vious cabinet, o f w h o m

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3 were F F , 2 were W & S , and 1 wan R a j f a m i l y ; and

8 were newcomers, of w h o m 2 were Congressmen, both

members of previous cabinets, 1 being FF, and 1 W & S ; and

6 were Opponents, of whom 1 W & S; and 3 were prominent enemies of

the Congress before 1947, 2 being Ra jas , and 1 an off ic ial , and

2 were people who h a d defea­ted Congress candidates in the 1957 elect ion, 1 R a j fami l y , s tand ing as

Independent, and 1 elected on a Gana tan t ra

t icket . Thus, in the four teen-member

cabinet, seven members came f r o m the Opponent category, fou r were F F , and 3 were W & S .

The broadening of the base of Congress, cu lm ina t ing in the clos­ing of the breach between i t and i ts pre-1947 opponents on the Orissa plains, is summarized in Table 5 and Table 6. F r o m these tables i t is clear that the pre-1947 opposi­t ion to the Congress on the coastal plains now f inds i ts po l i t i ca l repre­sentat ion w i t h the Congress,

Politics Outside the Legislature

F r o m 1946 to 1952 Congress was dominant in the Legis lature, but outside the House there was a vocal and act ive opposit ion, w o r k i n g on the whole not t h rough const i tu t iona l means but by direct act ion. ' In a previous ar t ic le I have out l ined the troubles in the ex-States and the h i l l d is t r ic ts , where the Opposit ion even­tua l l y emerged as the Gana tan t ra Par ishad, and in the extreme nor th ­ern areas of the J h a r k h a n d Par ty , On the plains Opposit ion was ex­pressed- in ag i ta t ions, both ag ra r i an and indus t r ia l , organized by the le f t -

November 7, 1959 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y

w i n g parties. The f o l l o w i n g quota­t ions, t aken f r o m Orissa 1949, pub­lished by the Publ ic Relat ions Depar tment , are a few examples of w h a t was go ing on in the areas where Congress h a d domina ted the 1946 elections.

(1947) In P u r i d i s t r ic t the Communis t - ins t iga ted tenants of M a l i p a r a were prosecuted for for­c ib ly en ter ing upon the l and of a local Zemindar . I n K a k a t p u r and M i n a p a r a areas the a g r a r i a n ag i ­t a t i o n was more wide-spread, and several cases were ins t i tu ted aga ins t the r a iya t s fo r i n d u c i n g in assaults a n d preven t ing land­owners f r o m c u l t i v a t i n g thei r lands.' (p 27)

(1947) T h e a n t i - H i r a k u d agi­t a t ion became more widespread and the ag i ta tors inc i ted the v i l ­lagers in the area l i k e l y to be affected by the d a m to prevent survey operations. ' (p 27)

(1948) 'The Communis t s i n ­tensified the i r ac t iv i t ies in the d is t r ic ts o f Cut tack , Pu r i , Gan jam, and parts o f Sambalpur and Balasore. I n C u t t a c k they inci ted the ra iya t s of Pa t i a to under take repair to the D o m u h i n embank­ment in spite of p r o h i b i t o r y or­ders w i t h the result t ha t several arrests had to be made to ma in ­t a in l a w and order. I n P u r i dis­t r i c t p a r t i c u l a r l y in Gop and K a k a t p u r areas, the a g i t a t i o n amongst the ra iya t s led to several instances of forcible c u l t i v a t i o n of lands of Zemindars for w h i c h specific cases were ins t i tu ted . The s i tua t ion deter iorated in Shergada (Gan j am) in M a y when a large m o b a rmed w i t h l a th i s and other weapons a t t acked a Police search pa r ty w i t h the resul t t h a t f i r i ng h a d to be opened resu l t ing in 5 dead and 16 in ju red . In Sambal ­pur d i s t r i c t the Communi s t lead­ers were rounded up and proceed­ed against . The Communis ts established a A r m hold over the sweepers in P u r i and successfully ins t iga ted t h e m to l aunch a s t r ike . The Communis t s also Ins t iga ted the worke r s o f the l b r i ve r col l ie ry who fo rmed an un ­l a w f u l assembly a n d h a d to be dispersed af ter a l a t h i charge, . . . S e c t i o n 144, Cr P C, h a d to be p romulga ted in the T i r t h o l and E r s a m a areas o f C u t t a c k d i s t r i c t a n d M a n g a l p u r o f P u r i d i s t r i c t to check the Social is t-sponsored a g r a r i a n ag i t a t i on . ' (p 29)

(1949) 'In the beginning of the year the Communis ts concentrated on the r a i l w a y employees to b r i n g about a s t r ike w h i c h was aver ted by the arrest and detent ion of the m a i n ins t iga tors . They t u r n ­ed thei r a t t en t ion towards the forcible r emova l of paddy, usur­pat ion o f l a n d and i n t i m i d a t i o n of local landowners and Zemin­

dars at A r d h a u l l a ( C u t t a c k ) , in Shergada area in Gan jam, Chandka , K a k a t p u r , T a n g i a n d Begunia i n P u r i , a n d Rasam and Kande ike la in Sambalpur. ' (P 31)

(1949) 'The Communis t s took to large-scale leafleteering in d i f ­ferent areas of the Province . , . several o f the i r p rominen t w o r k -

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era were arrested and kept under detent ion. The Social ists i ns t i ­gated the ra iya ts to launch satya-g r a h a against e jectment and harves t ing of paddy by land­owners i n D h a r m s a l a and T i r t h o l areas of Cu t tack and at M a n -ga lpur in P u r i . Twen ty - two per­sons were arrested at T i r t h o l . . . and . . . proceedings . . . in­s t i tu ted against the prominent Socialist inst igators, ip 32)

The t roubles cont inued in 1950, as the fo l l ow ing excerpt f r o m Orissa 1950-51 p 5 shows.

T h e Social ists organized two labour s t r ikes one at the Tex­t i le M i l l s at Chowdwar and the other in a col l iery at Ta lcher In Dhenkana l d is t r ic t . The Bhag -chas law also af forded them a wide oppor tun i ty to foment ag ra ­r i a n disputes in m a n y parts o f the State, The scarci ty of essen­t ia l commodit ies and the neces­sary t igh ten ing of cont ro l was taken advantage of by a l l these reac t ionary part ies inc lud ing a few Congress malcontents, in m a k i n g propaganda against the Government . Th is propaganda put a p remium on c r im ina l ten­dencies and led to the unautho­rised demol i t ion of reserved for ­ests in Sundergarh and N i l g i r i , in loo t ing o f r icecarts in G a n j a m and obst ruc t ing movement of rice in Cut tack, where Supply officials were in t im ida ted and ob­st ructed in the discharge of thei r duties. T h a n k s to the v ig i lance of the Police, the troubles were everywhere localized and brought under cont ro l w i th comparat ive ease.' Congress and Agrarian Reform

The 1952 Congress Government , under the leadership of a fo rmer Congress Socialist, had made a serious and determined ef for t to b r i ng about ag ra r i an re fo rm. Zemindar i was abol ished and an a t tempt was made to set up local ins t i tu t ions wh ich would per fo rm the funct ions of the o ld Zemindars. H a d the in tent ions of the legisla­tors been t rans la ted in to act ion, undoubtedly i t wou ld have been more di f f icu l t f o r the le f t -w ing pol i ­t ic ians and the 'Congress ma lcon­tents ' to foment ag ra r i an d is tur­bances. Bu t the Ancha l Sasan A c t was never implemented. And , whi le the w ind was taken out of the So­cial ist and Communis t saits w i t h i n the Legis la t ive Assembly, the dif f i­cult ies, delays, and f r i c t ions of im­

p lementat ion gave them plenty of scope fo r cont inu ing the i r ag i ta t ions outside.

The le f t -w ing pol i t ic ians, bo th out . side and inside the Congress, no doubt fe l t t ha t the ag ra r i an re fo rms were not coming about qu ick ly enough. But there were others who opposed the re forms or thought t ha t they were being in t roduced too precip i tate ly. Some of these people w i t h i n the Congress, w i t h one eye on the 'growing threat of the Gana-t a n t r a in the hi l ls and on the f i f teen Independents who had demonstrated tha t they could ho ld seats against the Congress in the coastal p la in , and w o r k i n g , no doubt, on the m a x i m that 'the r ich w i l l a lways be hav ing the i r power', looked w i t h a a r m on the precipi tate advance of social ism and feared the Chief Min is ter 's ideal ism wou ld al ienate power fu l people both inside and out­side the Congress.

In the choice of candidates for election such qual i f icat ions as past services to the par ty , l oya l t y to the par ty and its ideology, and so f o r t h , are desirable. But in the 1952-50 House the real ists among the Con­gress had come to recognize tha t it-is no use pu t t i ng f o r w a r d a loyal par ty "man if the voters w i l l not. have h im . Th ings are easier when the par ty has safe seats and these safe seats are enough to give a ma jo r i t y . Bu t by and large loya l ty to the pa r t y is on ly one, and perhaps even the last, of the loyalt ies wh ich influence the electors in their choice. There are as many seats safe fo r persons as there are for part ies.

Ejection of Left wing Extremists

The result of th is t h i n k i n g was the ejection of the le f t -w ing extre­mists f r o m the Congress in the 1957 House and the i r replacement by moderates. The cleavage between the le f t -w ing part ies and the Con­gress, a l ready apparent outside the Legis lature, now became more m a r k ­ed w i t h i n the Legistature. Those who had a h is tory of r i gh t -w ing t h i nk ­ing and a r i gh t -w ing out look now found the i r representat ion in the Congress, a l though the par ty 's pro­g ramme remained le f t -w ing : those whose h is to ry and act ions demon st rate a radica l out look were out­side the Congress and fo rmed the on ly Opposit ion on the plains,

A change of pol i t ical al legiance is setdom viewed in a good l igh t . But there is a side to it wh ich is per­

fect ly legi t imate, and i t wou ld be wrong to assume t h a t everyone who has jo ined the Congress since 1947 has done so for mercenary mot ives. Even when an ind iv idua l Joins a par ty wh ich unt i l t ha t point he has opposed, it does not necessarily mean tha t he is l ack ing in pr inciple. Cir-cumstances may change, so tha t the pa r ty which he fo rmer ly oppo­sed is now closer to his own point of view, and he may consider tha t he w i l l best serve the cause in wh ich he believes by jo in ing tha t par ty and endeavour ing to influence it f u r the r in wha t he considers the r igh t d i rec t ion: a l te rnat ive ly the in­d iv iduals concerned may have chan­ged the i r out look and may have decided that, the interests which they served are no longer defensible in modern Ind ia .

Effects on the Congress Party

But the Congress pays a price for d i l u t i ng its 'pur i ty ' . By streng­then ing the par ty on one w ing , i t loses members on the other. Most of the leading f igures in the left-w ing part ies had already le f t the Congress before the 1952 elections, and were not there to dispute the evident change of out look and policy in 1956. Bu t the adopt ion of fo rmer Opponents has caused some demoral izat ion in the Congress at d ist r ic t and consti tuency level, The a l locat ion of t ickets is a lways a delicate operat ion and at the best of t imes puts a s t ra in on the un i ty of the local organizat ion. Bu t when the t icket goes to someone who has no record of services to the par ty , but may even have a record of act ive opposit ion, then o ld Con­gressmen who wanted the t icket feel free to t r y their luck as Indepen­dents, But. i f the par ty has Judged correct ly, they do not succeed.

Persons adopted in to the Congress f r o m the Opponent category were in a pecul iar ly s t rong posi t ion, since the Government had a very na r row ma jo r i t y . Thei r s t rength d id not rest on pa r t y back ing : they are per­sons of influence in their own r i gh t : and they are o f ten persons of abi­l i t y . This is one reason w h y 7 members of the 1959 cabinet came f r o m the Opponent category.

This results in a fu r the r demora­l izat ion of the 'pure' Congressmen, when they see that some of those 'at the he lm of the admin is t ra t ion of free Ind ia ' were 'un for tunate ly those who had taken pleasure in suppressing Freedom Movement ' . In

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th is category of dissidents are to be included both those who feel t ha t the prizes of v ic to ry have been g iven to the w r o n g persons, and those more ideal ist ic persons who feel that w i t h such new members the par ty w i l l no longer fo l l ow the poli­cies in approva l of wh ich they gave i t the i r al legiance.

A l l these feelings of f rus t ra t ion and d is t rus t are intensi f ied by the spectacle of people crossing the floor of the House. Of 7 Independents elected to the 1957 House, 6 have joined the Congress, and one of them was made a Deputy Min is ter . One Gana tan t ra member jo ined a f ter the election but before the M in i s t r y was fo rmed : his brother, a lready a Congressman, became a Deputy Min is ter . A f t e r the M in i s t r y was fo rmed one Communis t and seven G a n a t a n t r a members jo ined the Congress. Of the four members elected to represent Phu lban i dis­t r i c t , al l on the Gana tan t ra t icket , three have jo ined the Congress and one of them became a Deputy Min is ter .

The Coalition

The social base of the Congress is ent i re ly changed f r o m what i t was before 1947. The Orissa Con-gress is s t i l l a section of the A l l -Ind ia Pa r t y and its policies are shaped by the A l l - I nd ia Congress but now it cuts across the fo rmer cleavage of Congress and land lord-interest on the plains, and this cleavage has, on the surface at least, disappeared.

There are two ways of l ook ing at th is charge. One a rgument is that th is is an ent i re ly hea l thy develop* ment. I t has removed one of the m a i n cleavages in Orissa society, and has released energies to be devoted to economic and social de­velopment. The other a rgument is t ha t f r o m a progressive point of v iew th is change is bad, because it means t h a t Congress has been captured by react ionary ' elements, who, to pu t i t a t i ts best, w i l l not co-operate whole-hear tedly in the progressive policies l a id down in De lh i . W i t hou t the perspective of h i s to ry one cannot say w h i c h point of v iew w i l l t u r n out to be the cor-rect one.

Seen against this background, the coal i t ion fo rmed th is year (1959) is not a new development; it is a logi ­cal extension of the pol icy a l ready fo l lowed in deal ing w i t h the l and ­

lo rd interest in the p la ins. There is a technical difference in f o rm , in tha t th is is a coal i t ion of two part ies, and is not merely the absorb ing of ind iv iduals f rom the opposing in­terest in to the Congress, But f r o m a s t ruc tu ra l point of v iew the two processes are ident ica l , a new group has been fo rmed by cu t t i ng across groups wh ich previously opposed one another. The same two apprai­sals can be made: on the one hand a deb i l i ta t ing cleavage has been removed, and a step has been taken towards the in tegrat ion ( in a tech­nical sense) of Orissa; f r o m the opposite point of view, the Congress has received a new in fus ion of r igh t -w i n g blood, and, whatever is said about progressive ideologies, the new coal i t ion w i l l be even fu r the r to the r i gh t than was i ts predeces­sor, the Congress Government. Once again we are too close to events to be able to assess which of these views has the more t r u t h in i t .

All Orissa Middle-Class Group

But , whichever of the two h is tory shows to have been the correct view, these events are both a godsend to the propagandists of the Opposit ion part ies, and a source of considerable dissension w i t h i n the two coal i t ion part ies. The le f t -w ing part ies have been presented w i t h t ha t easy and very te l l ing cr i t ic ism t h a t a leopard cannot change its spots, and tha t whatever the Congress or the Coal i­t ion Government m igh t say about its in tent ions, i t is too much to ex­pect t ha t men who were not only born into an ar is tocracy but also fought a long and b i t te r f ight to ma in ta in their way o f l i fe, w i l l overn ight become enthusiast ic pro­ponents of a socialist way of l i fe.

In an earl ier ar t ic le I have said tha t Orissa is not a wel l - integrated whole. In th is ar t ic le I have de­scribed events and changing alle­giances wh ich may make i t possible to eradicate, at least on a pol i t ica l level, two of the ma in cleavages in Orissan society: f i rst ly tha t between the propert ied coastal middle-class and the i r 'progressive' opponents f r o m w i t h i n the same class; second­ly t ha t between the h i l l and the coast. W h a t appears to be emerg ing is an al l -Orissa middle-class group, cer ta in ly w i t h bourgeois roots, a l ­t hough on ly t ime w i l l te l l how fa r they w i l l protect bourgeois interests. As f o r the fu tu re , i f the Coal i t ion is stabi l ized and becomes one pa r t y ra ther than a tempora ry al l iance of

part ies, then one wou ld expect the ma in cleavage to g row between th is new group and one or more of the le f t -w ing part ies, and tha t In t ime the le f t -w ing should g row in numbers and s t rength . I f th is hap­pened, then the cleavage wh ich was based on regional loyalt ies, and the other cleavage wh ich arose in the course of the Independence s t rug­gle, are l i ke ly to be replaced by a cleavage wh ich reflects differences in pol i t ical ideology and u l t imate ly of class.

But th is is mere speculation, fo r many var iables are involved. To name only two, the issue w i l l depend on the g r o w t h of pol i t ical conscious­ness among the lower classes, who up to this point have played a negl i­gible par t in pol i t ics, and i t w i l l de­pend on whether or not the Con­gress succeeds in imp lement ing a socialist p rogramme in Ind ia as a whole.

(Concluded)

Hindustan Aluminium

H I N D U S T A N A l u m i n i u m Corpora­t ion L t d , w i l l enter the cap i ta l

marke t ear ly next mon th . I t has al ready signed an agreement f o r power supply w i t h the U. P, Govern­ment and concluded ar rangements for the supply of bauxi te. The com­pany may go into product ion ear ly in 1962.

The agreement in respect of elec­t r i c i t y , to be obtained f r o m the R ihand Power House, covers a period of 25 years. I t provides for the supply of power up to 55,000 KW f r o m ear ly 1962 at Rs. 175 per KW per year on the basis of the energy consumed. This rate would be operat ive f o r the f i rs t 16 years of the agreement wh ich provides f o r an increase in the charges, not exceed­ing 10 per cent, f o r the remain ing period by mu tua l consent or a r b i ­t r a t i on . The rates f ixed included a l l taxes.

The company wou ld get supplies o f bauxi te f r o m the Loha rdanga mines in B iha r at the ra te of 4,000 tons per m o n t h under an agree­ment w i t h Messrs. Minera ls and Minera ls L t d . The rates, inclusive of royal t ies and taxes, were f ixed at Rs. 16-4 per t on f.o.r. T o r i or R ichu-gu ta s ta t ion . The company was negot ia t ing another lease to obta in m i n i n g r igh ts in respect o f the A m a r k a n t a k baux i te mines.

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