Jarosław Macała

Instytut Politologii Uniwersytet Zielonogórski

The Conception of Geopolitical Triangle of Powers – Karl

Haushofer`s Kontinentalblock

The conception of Euro-Asian continental block is among

the greatest achievements for which an eminent German political

thinker is nowadays given credit and which is still widely

discussed by scholars. Haushofer put forward the conception in

question at the turn of 30-ties and 40-ties of the 20th

century, expounding his views first in a pamphlet (50 pages)

written in 1940. Even though it came out in print it was not

distributed. The reasons for holding its distribution remain

unknown. One can only guess that it is the Nazis that had a

hand in it. The second edition probably came into being at the

end of the same year, since it contains a reference to the

treaty of the three powers of 27 September 1940. Including no

serious alterations, it appeared in print in the first weeks of

19411. One can hardly think of any modern handbook of the

history of geopolitics or political geography which does not

discuss Haushofer`s idea of the continental block. Usually,

however, scholars confine themselves to making some brief and

stereotypical remarks concerning the theory under discussion.

1 Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Haushofer`s biographer when discussing thefirst edition of the pamphlet gives only this laconic information /KarlHaushofer: Leben und Werk, vol. 1, Boppard am Rhein 1979, p. 606/. See also DerKontinentalblock. Mitteleuropa-Eurasien-Japan, Sec. Edition, München 1941. Theimportance of this publication is attested to by the fact that it appearedunder the auspices of Zentralverlag der NSDAP, that is, it was approved ofby high-ranking functionaries of the Nazi party.

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Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this rule. In Poland

the theory was given a more extended treatment in works by

Tomasz Klin and Piotr Eberhard2.

What spurred Karl Haushofer to write his work was the

outbreak of war, which made it necessary for Germany to

determine its war objectives, its allies and enemies. He

thought the conclusion of Ribbentrop-Mołotow treaty was the

right path to be followed by Germany, regarding it as the

lasting reorientation of the Third Reich`s foreign policy. In

his opinion the stipulations of the treaty did not clash with

the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in November 1937 by Germany,

Japan and Italy. Following the outbreak of the Second World

War, the anti-comintern pact was transformed into military

alliance connecting the three states, with its ill-concealed

goal being to defeat Western democracies and establish new

spheres of influence3. In refusing to interpret the pact as

directed against the Soviet Union, the scholar of Munich tended

to view it more as an offer of further cooperation with

Stalin`s state. The latter probably understood it the same way

and was prepared - under certain conditions concerning the

delineation of the spheres of influence – to join the pact. The

2 For the interpretation of the problem of the continental block, itsuffices to compare the work by Saul B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System/Lanham 2003/ with the one by Dan Diner, Beyond the Conceivable /Berkley 2000/;T. Klin, Wizje ładu międzynarodowego w niemieckiej i anglosaskiej myśli geopolitycznej w okresieII wojny światowej /The Conception of International Order in German and Anglo-Saxon GeopoliticalThought during the Second World War/ Toruń 2008, p. 136-148; P. Eberhardt,Koncepcje geopolityczne Karla Haushofera, /Karl Haushofer`s Geopolitical Conceptions/,„Przegląd Geograficzny” 2009, No 4, p. 540-543.3 A Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki w Niemczech /Geopolitics in Germany/, Poznań1979, p. 251; Przestrzeń i polityka. Z dziejów niemieckiej myśli politycznej/ Space and Geopolitics.On the History of German Political Thought/ selected and edited by A. Wolff-Powęska,E. Schultz, Poznań 2000, p. 90-91.

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sygnatories to the agreement in question, however, were not

willing to meet these conditions.

This combination of alliances adhered to by Führer was

approved of and supported by K. Haushofer who treated it as a

point of departure for developing all-embracing geopolitical

conception4. The conception was the result of long years of

intellectual effort on the part of German thinker who tried to

determine the role Euro-Asia was supposed to play in the

rivalry of world powers affecting the future of the world and

the future of Germany5. To obtain the status of world power –

an objective which was Haushofer`s lifelong dream - Germany had

to embrace the path of war and expansion. Since the conflict

between great powers could not be avoided and the war had

already started, it became of crucial importance for Germany to

define strategic and geopolitical goals choosing its allies and

enemies. Haushofer made it clear more than once that

geopolitics should aspire to become some sort of applied

science, thus inspiring - at least to a certain extent - state

policy6.

4 K. Haushofer, Weltpolitik von Heute, Berlin 1940, p. 288-289; Idem,Geograficzne spełnienie trójkąta, [w:] Przestrzeń i poltyka... /Geographical Fulfilment of theTriangle, [w:] Space and Politics..., p. 494; H. A Jacobsen, op. Cit., p. 372-374,393-394; B. Hipler, Hitlers Lehrmeister. Karl Haushofer als Vater der NS-Ideologie, St.Ottilien 1996, p. 216; H. H. Helvig, Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum, w:Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, ed. By C. S. Gray, G. R. Sloan, London 1999,p. 235; J. Wojtkowiak, Stosunki radziecko-japońskie 1931-1941 /The Soviet-Japan Relations193-1941/, Poznań 2000, p. 209; M. Kamiński, Polityka zagraniczna Związku Sowieckiegow przededniu wojny z Niemcami 1938-1941 /The Soviet Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Second WorldWar 1938-1941/, w: Droga ku wojnie. Polityka europejska i amerykańska w przededniu II wojnyświatowej /the European and the American Policy on the Eve of the Second World War/ ed. by T.Kisielewski, Bydgoszcz 1999, p. 51.5 D. Diner, Beyond the Conceivable, Berkley 2000, p. 36.6 A. Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki..., p. 133

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German thinker thought Germany were too weak to dominate

the world. Hence, the country needed allies. In 1940, after

defeating France and gaining ascendancy in Europe, the Third

Reich found itself confronted with the necessity to make some

new strategic choices. In Haushofer`s judgment Germany were

left with two options: either to reach an agreement with the

sea power, that is to say, Great Britain and invade the

Communist East or to form Euro-Asian block including the Soviet

Union and Japan and try to defeat the main sea powers - Albion

and United States7. In Hitler`s eyes it all came down to a

choice between territorial and trade overseas expansion. But

the leader of NSDAP, even though just like Haushofer in favor

of territorial expansion designed to obtain Lebensraum, was,

unlike Haushofer, more willing to form an alliance with Great

Britain, never taking that with the Soviet Union seriously8.

According to Haushofer, the alliance with the British was

likely to result in the deterioration of Germany`s position as

a great power, since it precluded German expansion in Europe

and seemed to benefit Britain to a much greater degree than it

did Germany. There are some monographs on Haushofer indicating

that around the middle of 1940 he tried to initiate some talks

with that part of the British elite that remained pro-German.

In his calculations, England, already enfeebled by German

triumphs, was expected to recognize German hegemony in Europe

and become willing to protect the Western flank of the Third7 R. Sprengler, Kritik der Geopolitik: ein deutscher Diskurs, Berlin 1996, p. 101;F. Ebeling, Geopolitik. Karl Hashofer und seine Ramwissenschaft 1919-1945, Berlin 1994,p. 207-209.8 Such dillema were not also foreign to Hitler both before his rise topower as well as after 1933: E. Jäckel, Hitlera pogląd na świat /Hitler`s view of theworld/, Warszawa 1973, p. 41-43, 56.

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Reich in the event of the latter`s invasion of the Soviet

Union. There is no doubt that Haushofer realized it was a sheer

folly for Germany to embroil itself in a war on two fronts. It

seems, however, that it was his son who was more active in the

attempts to prevent Germany from pursuing the kind of war just

mentioned. It is in this connection that he tried to exert some

influence upon Rudolf Hess, a friend of the family, which ended

up in Hess` famous but ineffective air escapade into England in

May 19419.

It seems that the line of action opted for by Haushofer was

the anti-British axis Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo which was likely to

prove powerful enough to defeat Britain, prevent the USA from

entering into war on Britain`s side, and, consequently, force

London into agreement on German terms. In the first place it

was the leaders of the Third Reich whom he tried to bring round

to his way of thinking. He found his ally (except for R. Hess

who did not seem to be clever enough to follow his line of

reasoning) in the person of the head of Auswärtiges Amt,

Joachim von Ribbentrop, who - due to his unsuccessful episode

as a German ambassador to London - truly hated the English and

favored the forming of alliance with Japan and the Soviet

Union10. Ribbentrop sent Stalin a message 13 October 1940 in

which he wrote that “it is a historical mission to be

undertaken by the four powers - the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan

and Germany – the essence of which is to elaborate a common and

9 K. Pätzold, M. Weissbrecker, Rudolf Hess. Ciekawa historia /Rudolf Hess.Interesting Story/, Warszawa 2001, p. 187-189; H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 402-403.10 H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 344; W. Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Politik, München 1980, p. 14.

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far-reaching policy defining their respective interests and

determining the future of all other nations. In the fall of

1940 Hitler, inspired probably by Ribbentrop and realizing to a

certain extent Haushofer`s plans, set out to visit foreign

capitals (he met with the leaders of Vichy Petain and Laval and

with the Spanish dictator gen. Franco), trying to encourage

other countries to establish closer cooperation with Germany.

It was to be directed against Britain, with its final goal

being the creation in Europe of “Neue Ordnung”. The continental

block Hitler had in mind would stretch over a huge area from

Gibraltar to Yocohama11.

There were, however, other Nazi leaders for whom racial and

ideological factors - from which Haushofer tried to distance

himself - were more important than the great powers` rivalry

set on dominating the world. The professor of Munich knew that

the education of the leaders of the Third Reich left much to be

desired. He had high opinion of neither their knowledge of the

world nor their knowledge of geopolitics and was apprehensive

that the Nazi leadership would embrace racial theories as a

basis for their political activity12. This in part may be the

reason why there is some dissonance to be discerned in his work

11 M. Bloch, Ribbentrop, Warszawa 1995, p. 114-116, 153-154, 199-200, 210,226, 258, 260-262; S. Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie1939-1941 /Between Berlin and Moscow. The German-Soviet Relations 1939-9141/, Warszawa2003, p. 425-426; G. Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century,London 1985, p. 89.12 A. Wolff-Powęska, Treść i polityczne funkcje geopolityki w Niemczech 1919-1944 /TheContent and Political Functions of Geopolitics in Germany 1919-1944/, „Studia nad Faszyzmem iZbrodniami Hitlerowskimi” /The Studies of Fascism and The Nazi Crimes/ 1985, Vol. 9, p. 29.For the preference Hitler and other Nazi leaders had for cooperating withBritain see: S. Żerko, Wymarzone przymierze Hitlera. Wielka Brytania w narodowo-socjalistycznych koncepcjach i w polityce III Rzeszy do 1939 /Hiler`s Dream Alliance. Great Britain inthe Nazi Ideology and in the Policy of the Third Reich untill 1939/, Poznań 1995.

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between suggestive and colorful, but fact-ignoring, columnist-

type line of reasoning and insightful analysis carried out by

serious political thinker.

There is no doubt that Haushofer had already for a long

been involved time in elaborating his conception of the Euro-

Asian continental block directed against the sea powers (mainly

against Great Britain). Looking through some of his previous

publications will suffice to find that out. The German scholar

believed that the creation of the block he had in mind was made

necessary by some objective geopolitical factors. Coming to

terms with the Soviet Union was likely to result in the

building of a powerful block in which Germany could enjoy

military and economic advantage13. He also put emphasis upon

the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries truly determined to

maintain their ascendancy in the world posed a threat for all

the great powers of the region he defined as Euro-Asia. The

western countries were looked upon as having upset the balance

of powers and as trying to keep it disturbed, since it

benefitted them both economically and politically, but was

harmful to other countries. Such views were accompanied by

Haushofer`s belief that all states could be divided into two

groups; the first was made up of the states referred to as

static while the second consisted of those defined as dynamic.

The former were doomed to vegetation and collapse while the

latter were expected to increase their living space by means of

expansion. In this context he indicated that dynamic Germany

while having to struggle with high population density and not

13 J. A. Agnew, K. Mitchell, G. O`Tuathail, A Companion to PoliticalGeography, Malden-Blackwell 2003, p. 195.

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having enough room to breathe was bordered by vast areas,

especially in the East, which were characterized by

backwardness and a small number of inhabitants14.

Of course it was not for cultural reasons that Germany and

its Italian ally ( for long ages a part of the Western

civilization) decided to go into this partnership with Japan

and the Soviet Union whose populations - despite some external

trappings – differed so much from those in Europe in lifestyle,

mentality or religion. What made the very idea of the alliance

seem difficult to accept was that it involved the necessity to

- inherent in it - to recognize Germany as part of Euro-Asian

land area and as a state that for geopolitical reasons needed

to turn towards the East in the search of its living space it

was craving so much. Haushofer`s choice of allies was also

affected, it seems, by his conviction that Western civilization

was in state of crisis, the fact which in his opinion left

Germany justified in joining forces with Russia and Japan. This

judgment was also in keeping with his criticism of Western

countries which he regarded as plutocratic and devoid of higher

ideals and values. Haushofer`s opinions were clearly driven by

his growing anti-liberalism, anti-materialism and anti-

capitalism. Liberalism, materialism and capitalism, he argued,

were entirely foreign to the German spirit. In expounding such

views, Haushofer let himself carried away with some sort of

misticism, treating national community and its land as an

14 K. Haushofer, Weltpolitik von heute..., p. 38-46; Idem, Geograficzne zasadypolityki wewnętrznej, w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Geographical Principle of Internal Policy, w: Spaceand Politics/..., p. 31-353, 378-380. For more thorough analysis of the place of GreatBritain in the German Interwar Goepolitics see: F. Ebeling, Geopolitik. Karl Haushofer…, p.107-109.

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organic whole rooted in transcendent, extrasensory sphere. His

stance was anti-modern and anti-occidental. It is no wonder

then that he advocated authoritarian system of government,

which in turn was a clear indication that he put both state and

the nation ahead of individual citizens15. With such views it

was not difficult for him to disregard all the bonds Germany

seemed to have had with the West since time immemorial. The

West dominated by the Anglo-Saxon states refused to acknowledge

Germany`s position as a great power. It is for this reason that

Haushofer thought it was possible to reconcile some ideological

beliefs with the appreciation of a growing role of space in the

world politics.

The political leaders to whom the task of erecting the

block he had in mind was to fall should follow the Roman maxim

“Fas est ab hoste doceri”. Haushofer pointed out that both

politicians and columnists in Great Britain and in the USA were

aware of the threat which the political unification of Euroasia

posed for the world domination their states enjoyed. The

stronger the British empire grew in the 19th century the

greater was its fear of the emergence of the block which would

turn out to be as powerful as to destroy it. Emblematic of this

was the book by Homer Lea in which he expressed the opinion

that “twilight of gods in the English speaking world empire was

likely to come with the political rapprochement of Germany,

Russia and Japan.

15 Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and politics/..., p. 59-60, 64-65; F. Ebeling, Geopolitik. Karl Haushofer..., p. 135-139; R. Sprengel, Kritik der Geopolitik..., p. 99-102; P. Eberhardt, Koncepcje geopolityczne Karla Haushofera /Karl Haushofer`s Geopolitical Conceptions..., p. 534.

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It was Haushofer`s great adversary Halford Mackinder who

advanced the conception of Heartland which can be seen as the

most coherent attempt to elucidate the significance of Euroasia

for the creation of world power capable of dominating the

world. In this well-known theory the force-centre which

controls Heartland also dominates over Euroasia. Domination of

Euroasia was more than likely, argued Mackinder, to translate

itself into domination of the whole world. What, however,

Mackinder regarded as the most serious danger was the

possibility of Russia - which controlled much of the Heartland

- becoming dependent on Germany. This was the reason why

Macinder decided - after the First World War - to support the

idea of creating a chain of independent states separating

Germany and Russia. Haushofer who shared the premises on which

Mackinder`s theory was based thought it was best-advised for

Russia and Germany to forge an alliance and obliterate buffer

states. Mackinder and Haushofer differed in that the former

considered the whole problem on a theoretical basis while the

latter wanted to see these ideas put through16. In his work

Haushofer, one might add, stressed the fact that it was

Mackinder who deserved the credit for making the British

realize the threat which the powers controlling the Heartland

were likely to pose for the British ascendency in the world

politics.

The German thinker believed that the emerging continental

block was not something entirely new in the politics of

16 L. Moczulski, Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni /Geopolitics. Power in Spaceand Time/, Warszawa 1999, p. 12-15, 108-109; P. Eberhardt, Koncepcjegeopolityczne Karla Haushofera /Karl Haushofer`s eopolitical Conceptions/…, p. 540.

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Euroasian powers. Haushofer himself did not think he deserved

to be credited with the invention of the idea of the block

under discussion. He maintained that it was already prior to

the outbreak of the First World War that the need to create

such a block came to be clearly seen, say, in Japan - with

which Haushofer had been well-acquainted. It was just during

his stay in the land of the rising sun that he did much to

persuade his Japanese interlocutors into accepting such a

solution17. In Russia which was supposed to play a key role in

constructing the block in question there was a group of

influential politicians who preferred cooperation with Germany

to that with Ententa. The reason why the block was not put into

effect at that time was the inability of political elites in

Germany to recognize its significance. As determined as it was

to defy the British colonial policy, the Second Reich also

defied geopolitical reality in trying to find allies near its

borders and not - as Haushofer suggested - among some distant

countries that were threatened by the policy just mentioned.

This mistake was followed by a pointless war between Russia and

Germany which ended up in a defeat of both countries. This of

course only played into the hands of the Western states. The

attempts to extinguish mutual distrust and conflicts between

Russia and Japan were also unsuccessful - despite the fact that

there were politicians in both countries who tried to bring

about some form of reconciliation. As far as Japan was

concerned, Haushofer stressed the fact that one of the barriers

which made it difficult for European countries to come to terms

17 T. Klin, op. cit., p. 144.

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with Japan was to be looked for in an ill-concealed contempt

with which some Europeans tended to treat the Asian race.

It was just because of the fear of this block that in

dealing with their rivals the British employed – as Haushofer

called it – the Anaconda tactic. By this he meant the way of

hunting characteristic of a big serpent that keeps on

strangling its victim for as long as to break its bones and

finally leave it unable to breathe. It was just through this

“Anaconda metaphor” that the British policy towards Germany and

Japan was best summed up. The similar opinions were also

expressed in the United States, especially in view of some

difficulties which the US policy encountered in the Far East.

The United States, argued Haushofer, had transformed itself

into an aggressive industrial and financial power that began to

seek new markets for its goods trying to extend the area of its

influence. Haushofer also discerned how destructive an effect

the American mass culture had. There was a growing realization

in the United States that political unification of Euroasian

continent, the development of its economic links and

communication networks was likely to hinder “Anakondapolitik” –

even if the British and the Americans decided to join forces.

The Americans, Haushofer believed, found it hard to resign

themselves to Japan`s growing position in China which they

regarded as part of their sphere of influence. In the

Americans` judgment the best line of action for them to take

was to paralyze the rise of such a block by trying to drive a

wedge between its potential contractors.

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The opinions similar to those expressed in the above are

easily met with in Haushofer`s other publications. Those were

the opinions shared after 1918 by the majority of Germans who

refused to accept the “Versailles diktat” as the foundation of

a new geopolitical order. There reappears in Haushofer the

image of Germany as a victim of the Western powers - the view

which was in keeping with the growing nationalistic and anti-

liberal trends. This also accounts for his criticism of Western

civilization on one hand and his willingness to show some sort

of appreciation for archaic mentality and antiquated social

structure of Japan on the other. Such a way of viewing reality

naturally affected political choices Haushofer was ready to

support18.

But it was geopolitical issues that were Haushofer`s first

concern, which is clearly seen in his little book mentioned at

the beginning of the paper. As a result of the victorious war,

the Western democracies, especially the British, gained the

world ascendancy. The western countries were determined to

maintain and consolidate this dominant position, which required

them to try to weaken their potential enemies. For this reason,

argued Haushofer, the British attempted to thwart all plans for

the unification of Euroasia the largest part of which remained

controlled by Russia. The unification would result in the

creation of a land power too strong to be defeated from the sea

and, consequently, capable of vying with the sea powers for

domination over the whole world. To prevent such a development

18 Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Politics/..., p.65, 80. See also other work by Haushofer that appeared in print at about the same time as “Der Kontinentalblock”: Japan baut sein Reich, Berlin 1941.

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Great Britain and France were doing their best to weaken

Germany and Japan, to rule out their territorial expansion and

to set them at variance with Russia19.

German thinker, however, was convinced that fear and hatred

make a poor adviser. To illustrate this thesis he went so far

as to garble obvious facts suggesting that it was Britain`s

irresponsible policy that led to the outbreak of the Second

World War. Britain`s fault consisted in its inability to

acknowledge Germany`s aspirations to become a world power. A

victim to the Western aggression, Germans had been left with no

other option but to look for new allies to defend themselves.

Hence, Haushofer endorsed the alliance with Russia, trying to

lend credence to his stance by pointing to the example once

given by Otto von Bismarck. In other words, he wanted to employ

the same strategy as that opted for by some conservative

members of the German elite who did not refrain from seeking an

agreement even with the Soviet Russia – once it seemed the only

way in which one could hope to build an anti-British block.

When walking alone, Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan

were too weak to resist the British and their policy. The

alliance of the three states forged in defense of the right to

develop freely was required to not only restore the balance of

power upset after 1918 but also to shake - by means of war and

expansion - the very foundations of the British empire. What

Haushofer meant was not so much a destruction of Great Britain

as the breaking of its imperial monopoly. London was to be

reduced to recognizing Germany`s hegemony in Europe and its

19 See also K. Haushofer, Geopolityczne zasady polityki wewnętrznej /Geopolitical Principles of Internal Policy/ 1927, w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Poitics/…, p. 378-379.

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right to colonies. As far as the United States were concerned,

the best way to go was to support their isolationist policy in

order to divert the Americans` attention away from the European

affairs and to make them stop siding with the British. In this

connection, he also advised carrying out some sabotage action

against the Americans which was to consist in fueling

emancipation tendencies in South America20.

The execution of the plan outlined in the above was to

allow Germany to consolidate its position as a great power and

to extend its area of influence. Haushofer wanted to see the

world divided into three pan-regions each of which was to be

dominated by one of the members of the Euro-Asian block21. The

plan presupposed that Germany, accompanied by Italy, would be

endowed with the hegemony over the Old Continent and

Mitteleuropa. The realization of this scenario should not be

thought of as implying only military victories in the West.

Haushofer was particularly interested in the vast areas in the

East which upon their colonization could serve as an

agriculture and raw material base for Germany, the country

which was much more developed than the Soviet Union22. Thus he

saw the agreement with Russia as a way of obtaining control

over this underdeveloped country. In the trio he envisaged

Germany would have surpassed the two remaining partners in

terms of military, economic and intellectual potential, thereby

fulfilling the aspiration to become Weltmacht. 20 That is the way in which the problem was viewed by Johannes Kühn, O sensie obecnej wojny /The Meaning of the Current War/ 1940, w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and Politics/…, p. 518-544.21 L. Moczulski, op. cit., p. 521522.22 See also: A. Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna geopolityki /Geopolitical Doctrine/…, p. 178.

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The block under discussion depended for its emergence on

the favourable stance of the Soviet Russia which, Haushofer

believed, wished to see the end of the Western Capitalism of

which the Anglo-Saxon powers were the pillar. Similar animus

against the Western “big demo-plutocracies” was declared by the

Fascist states and Japan. Apart from geopolitical reasons it

was also, Haushofer believed, some kind of spiritual affinity -

a sense of deep bond with the land and the nation as well as

ideological hatred of democratic and liberal West - that

brought Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union together,

thus making their alliance natural and desirable23.

Haushofer`s geopolitical diagnosis should above all be

viewed as an offer made mainly to the rulers of Kremlin, since

with Japan Germany had already managed to come to terms. The

offer was designed to make Russians aware of all the benefits

they were likely to reap by throwing in their lot with Japan

and the Third Reich. It was also designed to make them aware of

all the dangers they were likely to face by rejecting it for

the agreement with the West. By the alliance with the Western

countries the Soviet Union was certain to become embroiled in a

war on both flanks. The only problem was whether the Russians

were prepared to believe in the durability of the relationship

with Germany and Japan. A lot indicates that they were not24.

The German thinker assumed, however, that the Soviets - whom he23 P. Chiantera-Stutte, Models of Construction of the Middle-EuropeanIdentity at the Turn of the 20th Century: The Geopolitical and LiberalInterpretations, p. 4,http://www.fondazione-delbianco.org/inglese/insert/News/Europe [the date ofuse 30 April 2009].24 There is also disagreement among historians as to whether Stalin wasgetting ready in the first half of 1941 for a war with Germany: M. K.Kamiński, op. cit., p. 52-54.

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disliked and of whom he was afraid - were willing to stick with

the foreign policy traditionally pursued by Russia - especially

in so far as the cooperation with Germany was concerned. It is

interesting to note that his pamphlet includes no criticism of

communism which is just one more indication that Haushofer

considered geopolitical factors as absolutely decisive in

building the block under discussion.

In view of what was said in the above, the treaty of

Rapallo reached in 1922 could be seen as Haushofer`s success

and a bitter failure of Mackinder`s school. The treaty paved

the way for the cooperation between Germany and Russia - the

one which despite ideological differences was directed against

the West. In the pamphlet there is a reference to the

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the text leaves no doubt that

Haushofer endorsed both the Pact and closer cooperation of the

totalitarian powers. Similarly, he supported the alliance with

Japan which was able to hold in check the sea powers in the

Eastern Asia and in the basin of Pacific Ocean. Perhaps it was

because of his conviction that geopolitical factors were more

important than the ideological ones that he was willing to see

in the Anti-Comintern Pact - whose blade was directed against

communism and the Soviet Union - just the first step on the

road to the creation of the continental block. It is more

probable, however, that what Haushofer found crucial about the

Anti-Comintern Pact was the anti-British overtones to be

discerned in it.

The outbreak of War, made possible by the treaty of 23

August 1939, resulted in eliminating Poland which, in

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Haushofer`s opinion, was created and supported by Western

countries to stand in the way of the alliance between Russia

and Germany. The subjugation of the countries that lay between

Russia and Germany and the latter`s domination in this part of

Europe was supposed to strengthen the Reich`s position as

against Russia and open up - according to Mackinder`s view

shared by Haushofer - the way to Heartland25. The bad relations

between the Soviet Union and Japan resulting in border

conflicts in Mongolia in the years 1938-1939 were the hindrance

that prevented the creation of the block26. It was possible,

Haushofer believed, to improve the relations by making both

countries realize that their conflict was of no benefit to them

and played into the hands of the British and the Americans.

Japaneese fighting China which was allied with the West were

forced to keep - just because of the Soviet threat - a big

Kvantun army in the North. If they decided to come to terms

with Russia, this army could be used for defeating China and

seizing control of the territories in the south-eastern Asia -

those that remained dependent on the Western countries.

When Japan and Soviet Russia decided to interrupt the

fight, making cautious attempts to entirely put an end to their

conflict, Haushofer began to think that things were likely to

take the right course. He believed that in both countries the

forces displaying a tendency towards cooperation started to

gain the upper hand. The situation seemed to be unfolding in

accordance with the theses advanced by Haushofer: Moscow came

25 According to Macinder „Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland.Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the WorldIsland commands the World”: L. Moczulski, Geopolityka..., p. 16-17.26 See: J. Wojtkowiak, op. cit., p. 123-163.

18

to pay more attention to European problems, which required

peaceful arrangements in the Far East. With time, the Russian

leaders decided it was better-advised to try to turn the Japan

imperialism more towards the South - to the Western colonial

dominions and the territories dependent on the Western

countries. There were also people in the governmental circles

in Japan who regarded USA and Great Britain - and not Russia -

as Japan`s most serious rival in Asia. That is why the

Japanese, relying on the aid offered by the Germans who after

23 VIII 1939 were welcome guests in Moscow, tried to reach some

agreement with Russians. Japan`s bolder plans presupposed the

agreement with Russia should be extended to the fascists

states, thus realizing the ideas included in Haushofer`s

work27.

Haushofer devoted much of his attention to the question of

colonies which had been left neglected since Germany lost its

own colonial dominions. That is why he carried out a thorough

analysis of military, economic and geopolitical potential of

given colonies, trying to evaluate both their advantages and

disadvantages. Colonies were crucial for the West`s

geopolitical, military and economic power and allowed the

metropolis to get rich by their constant exploitation. As far

as Great Britain was concerned, the colonies were also of

strategic importance. It was through the string of bases

established in the colonial dominions that Great Britain was

able to control some of the key basins, becoming capable of

27 J. Wojtkowiak, op. cit., p. 176, 178-179, 183-187, 203-208, 212-225;K. Tachikawa, La politique de la sphere de coprosperite de la Grande Asie orientale au Japon,http://www.stratisc.org/Strategique 81 10.htm (the website visited on 30June 2009).

19

exerting a certain influence upon the neighboring land areas.

In Haushofer`s judgement it was possible to tear apart the

string by taking advantage of all the problems Great Britain

was facing in the ongoing war. He tried to identify weak points

in the British military bases and strategic disadvantages of

the territories that remained under Great Britain`s control.

For example, he indicated that the British were vulnerable to

attack from the areas controlled by the Euroasian powers

/Gibraltar, Hongkong/. The clash of interests between the

metropolis and those British dominions in which the whites made

up the vast majority of the population /Australia, New Zeland,

Canada/ appeared, Haushofer believed, to be another weak link

in the whole British empire. Since the states of the

Continental Block had no intention of attacking the dominions

just mentioned, these seemed to have no vested interest in

supporting London by force of arms. Considering this, it seems

that Haushofer advocated the idea of building a new colonial

order and did not think that Germany should confine itself to

regaining the colonies lost after the First World War.

Hence, he also contemplated the plans for the creation of a

big Euroafrica which was supposed to be put in Berlin`s control

and serve as a source of raw materials for Europe also

dominated by Germany. Thus, at one stroke, Germany would have

succeeded in satisfying its colonial aspirations and in

removing the French and English influence from Africa. Italy,

remaining within the German area of influence, would have been

enabled to dominate the Mediterranean, gaining ascendancy along

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its southern coast, traditionally controlled by the Western

countries.

Haushofer devoted as much attention to the Japan plans for

territorial annexations in the Far East, aimed at

reconstruction of geopolitical order in the eastern Asia, the

goal of the reconstruction being to reduce the influence of the

Western countries in favor of the Land of the Rising Sun. The

German thinker acknowledged the Japan predominance in this part

of the world and did not think Germany should try to restore

its rule over these areas which were as difficult to regain as

they were to maintain because of their great distance from

Germany and communication difficulties28.

Apart from geopolitical ideas, Haushofer`s thought came to

be increasingly shaped by the belief that big nations such as

Japanese and German, confined in dense territories, deprived of

natural resources, did not have enough room to breathe. For

this reason, these nations had the right to a larger living

space, colonies being one of its crucial elements. But unlike

the colonial empires, Japan and Germany, argued Haushofer,

reject imperialism, egoism and exploitation of dependent

territories and wish to focus on the civilization mission in

these areas. People living in the colonies possessed by Germany

and Japan are going to be treated definitely better than those

living in the colonies possessed by other countries. Both Japan

28 J. Macała, Nieco zapomniany Karl Haushofer /Somewhat Forgotten Karl Haushofer/,„Geopolityka” 2008, nr 1, p. 77; T. Klin, op. cit., p. 142-143; Scoala degeopolitica germana, http://www.e-scoala.ro/geopolitica/scgermana.html (thewebsite visited on 1 July 2009)

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and Germany wanted to rely for their colonial development on

cooperation and concord29.

The Continental Block made it possible to hit the British

empire where it was most vulnerable. It was by giving an

active support to India`s aspirations to independence that one

could contribute to ousting the British influence from Asia. In

expounding his views Haushofer admitted to having been told

more than once that a large part of Indian elite seems to dream

of nothing but being still protected by Britain and preserving

the status of the British dominion. Nevertheless, he

maintained that these elites have to aim at independence - even

if it was only a long term desire. The independence of India

was also in the interest of Euroasian powers. That is why they

should support India`s struggle for independence, trying to

increase the difficulties encountered by the British in India,

and taking advantage of their involvement in the ongoing war.

India was likely to become a desirable ally of the block,

helping it reinforce its domination over Euroasia.

So, the building of the block stretching from the Baltic

Sea to the Pacific Ocean appeared to be the most important task

these three powers should set themselves. The delineation of

the spheres of influence of the three states should be based on

geopolitical rather than cultural premises. According to

Haushofer “if we take a look at the atlas of the Old World,

we`ll see that the three-man cart encompasses three outermost

29 The conceptions similar to German theory of Lebensraum wereformulated in Japan since 30ties: K. Tachikawa, La politique de la sphere decoprosperite de la Grande Asie orientale au Japon http://www.stratisc.org/Strategique81 10.htm (the website visited on 30 June 2009).

22

seas”. These seas are the Baltic Sea, the Japanese Sea and the

Adriatic Sea. He was convinced it would not be difficult for

Euroasian powers to control those seas and seizing control of

them was important in terms of curbing Britain`s sea

domination. For this reason the alliance would have been able

to protect the Communist Russia against the Western countries`

invasion from sea. At the same time through her allies Russia

was likely to gain open access to the waters which this big

country had often tried to gain by force of arms.

For the Continental Block to withstand all the storms

sweeping across the globe it had to be built of steel. The

steel was supposed to be durable, with flexible joints, but at

the same time firm enough to make sure that every hinge in it

was able to resist the most violent storm”. It can also be

compared to the Russian three horses team in the centre of

which runs a skittish horse while two other horses running on

both sides of the skittish one are not as restless and can be

relied on for curbing it, thus guaranteeing the smooth

movement of the whole cart”.

It was against this background that the German thinker

tried to judge “all powers of Euroasian pact and the pact`s

geopolitical advantages”. He believed all those powers were

complementary to one another not only in strategic but also in

economic and military terms, making up the area of 23 million

square kilometers. The Soviet Union represented the greatest

potential and was also of key importance for the alliance

because of its location. He indicated that this largest country

in the world stretched over the area of 21.352.571 square

23

kilometers, its coast line had 13 thousand kilometers and there

were 182 mln people living in it. Japan occupied the eastern

flank of the Block and stretched over the area of 2 mln square

kilometers, possessing a long coast line and the population of

140 mln people. Because of its location and interests it had to

maintain big fleet and air force. On the other hand the

Japanese army was not as strong as the armies of each of the

two remaining members of the alliance. Germany, supported by

the fascist Italy, was supposed to constitute the western flank

of the Block. Interestingly, Haushofer was of the opinion that

in Europe cultural and economic power was more important than

the space a given country occupied. Germany controlled the

territory of 1 mln square kilometers /he added 3 mln kilometers

in colonies to which, as he believed, Germany had the right/

and its population ranged between 87 and 100 mln people.

Germany, however, had at its disposal a very strong and modern

army and air force. This, along with the economic potential of

both the Third Reich and Europe of which it was supposed to

seize control, was to ensure that Germany would become the most

powerful member of the Block, making the German dream of

Weltmacht come true. The allied Italy, located on the most

western point of the planned block, in danger of being invaded

from the sea /Italy`s coast line was 25 thousand kilometers/

had to concentrate on developing its air force and the navy.

Italy`s main asset was its population which oscilated between

56-60 mln people30.

30 In another text written at about the same time Haushofer givesslightly different data concerning military potential of Germany, Italy andJapan: K. Haushofer, Geograficzne spełnienie trójkąta /GeograficalFulfillment of the Triangle (1940), w: Przestrzeń i polityka /Space and

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Haushofer was convinced that with the rise of the block its

members would be put at an advantageous geopolitical position

and their total economic and military potential would lead them

to become much more powerful than Great Britain and USA. He

indicated that during the First World War Germany and Austria

were much weaker than Ententa and, notwithstanding, decided to

go to war that ended in a disaster. The continental block gave

a hope that this time it is the enemies of England that were

likely to win a victory. The block also seemed to provide its

contractors with an opportunity of pursuing more global policy.

That is why Haushofer was of the opinion that the block was

something more than just a pure mirage.

In trying to judge the impact Haushofer`s pamphlet had upon

the plans for creating the Continental Block one needs to say

that his enthusiasm did not go hand in hand with what could

actually be achieved. His opinions were outside the mainstream

of the views shaping Germany`s foreign policy. For this reason

during the interrogation taking place in the summer of 1945

Haushofer argued with some exaggeration that his geopolitical

theories “did not affect in the least military and political

activities of the Third Reich and the economic strategy it

employed”31. It is no wonder then that his call for forming the

block was not basically materialized. His pamphlet appeared in

print when Germany had already decided to break with the Soviet

Union – the intention which of course was kept secret. The

assent given by the Nazi authorities to publish Haushofer`s

work may have been just a part of the efforts taken to conceal

Politics/…, p. 495.31 H. A. Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 338.

25

the preparations for the “Fall Barbarossa” of which Haushofer

of course had no knowledge. But his views were known and

discussed in Moscow.

Haushofer lost in spite of the fact that his views were to

a certain extent shared by Hess and Ribbentrop and for a short

time even by the leader of NSDAP. Finally, however, he failed

to win Hitler over to his views. The latter preferred the

“anticommunist crusade”, and decided to drive the country along

the path of war with the Soviet collosus. To Hitler ideological

and racial reasons were more important than cool geopolitical

calculation. Besides, the leader of the Third Reich believed

that routing Moscow would lead to the defeat of Great Britain,

making Albion willing to sign a peace treaty on German terms

and acknowledge German ascendency in Europe32.

22 June 1941 undoubtedly put an end to Haushofer`s hopes

for creating the Continental Block capable of defeating the

Anglo-Saxon sea powers and securing for Germany the position of

Weltmacht. By launching an attack on the Soviet Union Germany

embroiled itself in a war on two fronts. That was the kind of

war which Germany lost in the years 1914-1918. Now during the

Second World War, Haushofer believed, history was going to

repeat itself. He tried to hide his disappointment behind a

verbal acceptance of Hitler`s decision and the recognition of

the fact that the communism posed the most serious threat to

Germany. For this reason achieving Lebensraum was to be made

possible only as a result of destroying the Bolshevik Russia33.

32 E. Jäckel, op. cit., p. 56-57; G. Schreiber, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, München 2007, p. 41-42.33 He also compared the task Hitler was facing after his invasion ofthe Soviet Union with those of Napoleon/ A. Wolff-Powęska, Doktryna

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Haushofer also reacted with a willingness to modify his

geopolitical conceptions concerning the continental block. In a

modified version the block was to be made up of Germany and

Japan - the countries which after defeating Russia were

supposed to share it - along with the rest of Asia - between

their respective areas of influence. This, however, was nothing

but the vestiges of his original ideas.

Quite paradoxically, as a result of the Second World War

the Communist state controlling heartland managed to subjugate

half of Europe and a large part of Asia, thus realizing

Haushofer`s dream of the continental block. The block issued a

challenge to the West and lost. The communism collapsed. It is

no wonder, however, that nowadays the conception of the

continental block is most feverishly debated in Russia34.

geopolityki /Geopolitical Doctrine/..., p. 186.34 See: A. Dugin, The Great War of Continents, http://eurosiberia.wetpoint.com/page/The+Great+War+of+Continents [the website visited on 20 I2011]; N. von Kreitor, Russia and the New World Order. The Geopolitical Project of PaxEurasiatica, http://www.gnosticliberationfront.com/russia and the new worldorder.htm [website visited on 20 I 2011]

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