The Burnden Park Disaster: Examining The Sense Making Process of Football's Forgotten Tragedy...

IntroductionFootball’s forgotten tragedy.

On the 9th March 1946 one of the saddest tragedies in

football history surged upon the Lancashire town of

Bolton. Burnden Park, the football ground of Bolton

Wanderers was the venue of a disaster as 33 people lost

their lives in a mass crush at an FA Cup tie between

Bolton Wanderers and Stoke City. The match was the

Quarter final second leg of the FA cup and Bolton held a

2-0 aggregate lead going into the second leg at Burnden

Park. Crowds were believed to be gathering at a much

higher rate than usual as fans would be coming in their

tens of thousands to see the game but also to see Stoke’s

Stanley Matthews, the proverbial David Beckham of the age

– steeped in fame and legend. County pride was also a

main source of pulling power towards the game as Bolton

acted as Lancashire’s sole representative in the

competition. This twinned with the re-found appeal of

football following a 6 year hiatus due to the Second

World War created great anticipation around not only the

FA cup but football as a whole – especially in the north

west of England (Hayes 2013).

1 | T h e B u r n d e n P a r k D i s a s t e r

As anticipation grew on the day, the Bolton fans as usual

marched up Manchester Road from Bolton Railway station

towards Burnden Park. As the entrance gates opened fans

flooded through in their droves, however by 2.40pm the

ground was deemed full and the gates on the Embankment

stand were ordered to be closed. Around 15,000 still on

the outside, on the pre-determined belief that entry

would not be an issue before the game were left

frustrated. With 65,000 people already in Burnden Park,

the fans remaining outside the Embankment stand decided

to climb over the wall and gain entry via unauthorised

means. As the pressure within this stand became too much

to handle and people were beginning to crush, a father

heard his son’s pleas to get him out. This man, deemed

the only necessary option was to pick open a lock leading

to an exit gate. However as this occurred and the man and

his son struggled to safety, hundreds of supporters on

the outside flooded through the opened gate adding to the

crush already withstanding. This caused crush barriers

within the stand to snap and perish thus causing a mass

crush in which 33 people lost their lives. As the bodies

began to mount as well as supporters spilling onto the


pitch, the police deemed it then necessary to open the

previously unused Burnden Stand which was under

occupation from the Ministry of Supply to put supporters

and some of the dead bodies, with the remaining body bags

filling up the touchlines of the pitch. Referee George

Dutton, fully aware of the severity at hand decided to

carry on with the match after a slight break enforced by

the Police. The game finished 0-0.

85,000 people were estimated to have been in the ground

during the game – 20,000 over the official gate of

65,419. An inquiry followed this disaster, fronted by

Honourable Q.C Moelwyn Hughes whom came to the conclusion

that five main issues were accountable for this disaster:

Underestimation of Crowds, Poor Entrance Control, Slow &

Badly Organised Reaction To The Problem, Unauthorised

Entry and Poor Positioning of the Crush Barriers (Cumming

1995, Baker 1998, Marland 1989, 1995 & 2003, Ponting &

Hugman 1994, Lofthouse 1989, Matthews 2000 & Gent 2004).

The discourse regarding blame in this disaster ignores

four of Hughes’ conclusions and has created a

concentration on the issue of unauthorised entry. This


discourse could be seen as heavily problematic and in

turn potentially a contributing factor in future stadium

disasters being allowed to happen. This dissertation will

make obvious a wealth of primary and secondary research

into the area and will investigate and analyse this

discourse and its problematic nature whilst also

examining the broader contextual factors which could have

contributed to this disaster.

In the light of the current truths coming to the

forefront regarding the Hillsborough disaster and the

dawn of the 70th anniversary of the Burnden Park disaster

it seems fitting that the discourse of fan blame

regarding this disaster takes on a contemporary analysis

via a modern lens made available due to the resistance of

Hillsborough. Discourse is powerful and a full analysis,

critical or not must be taken on to fully understand and

conceptualise any discourse which portions blame and

accountability to anyone.

This dissertation is of great emotional investment to

myself due to a relationship to the club so an

investigation into the death of 33 of ‘my own’ so to

speak is of grave importance to me and has been taken

with on an ambient balance of professionalism, emotion


and desire. Hopefully this will be made apparent by this

dissertation on an original idea which weighs both heavy

on my mind as a criminologist but on my heart as a

supporter of Bolton Wanderers Football Club.

Literature Review

This literature review will focus on the disaster

research relevant to the Burnden Park Disaster. The

Burnden park disaster is critical and to critically

theorise the sense making process of this disaster one

must explore and examine around a spectrum of disasters

and responses.

The key arguments I will be working towards within this

dissertation will be the pursuit of justice and to

understand the sense making process of the Burnden Park


disaster which shall examine and analyse the discourse

making process and why Burnden park, even to this day

remains a disaster very much ‘swept under the carpet’.

Academic Disaster Literature

Literature used to gain a further knowledge around the

sense-making and discourse creating process is both

varied and extensive, however a key analysis comes mainly

from Davis (2013) and Gephart (2004). Davis (2013) notes

a high importance into the sense-making process of acute

disasters (such as Burnden Park) and in which way

corporations and organisations escape from their

accountability and blame. A process in which the politics

of a blame game can gain at least some form of

resolution, must start with how the event has been

allowed to happen or the ‘aetiology’ of the disaster.

Davis notes on a clear continuity and shows almost a set

of ‘disaster’ guidelines, stating how the majority of

acute disasters are allowed to exist. Davis notes issues

such as systematic failures combined with state and

corporate symbiotic relationships as paramount to this.


Gerphart (2004, 23) notes the power of organizational

influence in the sense making process, he notes their

ability to shape and frame our mentality and experiences

and how we categorise perceptions such as blame and

guilt. This is a concept which is heavily noted on in my

‘Findings and Analysis’ chapter also. He notes the works

of Perrow (1997, 70) whom indicates the issues with

following organizational trends and claims the true issue

lies with the unequal balance of power and the fact in

which a greater amount of people are placed in situations

of danger and have risk imposed on them just to benefit

the powerful minority, which places the majority in risk.

Even though Gerphart’s works (1984), (1992), (1993 and

primarily 1997) mainly focus on disasters at an

environmental level, his works helps provide a vital

outlook on the sense making process and management of

risk post disaster. The works of Tombs & Whyte (2003)

must also not be ignored when examining the powerful and

the power of exploitation of the voiceless.

Davis (2013) creates a simplification of gathering

knowledge in regard to the accountability to acute

disasters via a measurement of micro, meso and macro. A way

of using this measurement to gain an analysis of the


blame in regard to The Burnden Disaster would be as

follows,

Micro

Naïve preparation and a lack of policy in place for the

chance of a high crowd to arise by both the Police and

Bolton Wanderers. Additionally a lack of enforcement of

procedures in place with regard to crowd safety. This

adding to the severe lack of enforcement in regard to

illegal fan entry. The individual actions of both the

police but mainly club and football league officials

twinned with a small amount of fans whom in fact did put

other fans lives in danger are deemed to be the micro

forms of causation and accountability.

Meso

This would be related to the sheer inability or ignorance

to be able to read threads and obvious indicators of

increasing crowds to both Lancashire football but also to

the FA Cup post World War two. As each round of the cup


passed, getting nearer and nearer to the competitions

climax Wembley final, the gates seemed to significantly

advance and progress. Therefore the ignorance to this

fact should be seen as a meso form of responsibility and

accountability.

Macro

The macro means of responsibility and accountability can

be deemed a causation of much larger factors both within

football but also in society of the era. Certain

discourses around working class and society ‘turning on

their own’ created a much larger potential for a police

or official accountability to gain the masses rather than

society to look on its own facilitators and in turn its

own protectors as a large factor in what happened. One

could say a post war social togetherness and belief in

the state could be seen as a contributing factor in the

belief that this disaster could not have been at the

hands of those in charge. This twinned with a severe

distaste to any form of social betrayal from within this

communal togetherness would be seen as the worst type of


betrayal adding to a desensitisation of death in a post

war era, really helped the dominant discourse of fan

blame gain steam and in turn create a discourse within

not only the footballing world but society in general.

Additionally one could say that a lack of financial and

serious attention to the archaic condition of football

stadiums being neglected was also a large form of macro

accountability.

Davis (2013) really does concentrate on disasters at an

acute level rather than chronic traumas. The

organizationally based acute civilian disasters (OBACDs)

are a high point of focus for Davis whose expertise are

placed highly on work around disasters and their

aftermath. Davis notes the historically non-existent room

for blame in the aftermath of disasters as significant

and the non-existent psyche in which the situation was a

victim of chance. Davis creates an understanding in how

blame to organizations, whether obvious or not gains no

social relevance or validity.


This level of organizational relief from blame and

scapegoating can cause a dominant discourse to arise, a

discourse which is very common within society already and

easy to accept - that of the blameful powerless and the

innocent powerful.

It is vital to fully conceptualise disasters and the

sense making process, one must conceptualise the greater

contexts which underpin the ideologies which creates the

power of discourse. Finance and power are key to

accountable parties often slipping through the fingers of

the fist which should blame and convict for disasters.

This is a key theme in which Davis (2013), Gerphart

(2004), Challenger & Clegg (2011), Cohen (2001) and

Johnes (2004) (whom also notes highly and draws the lack

of lesson-learning in crowd disasters) note on - however

varied and in different techniques and styles. The common

discourse with the majority of disasters, as with Burnden

park is that of corporate and organisational innocence.

It doesn’t take an overly critical mind to see this as

questionable, however the process in which the powerful

and officials in those accountable positions do in fact

turn this perceived nonsense into certain knowledge is


what must be examined. Works around this notion gain

prevalent importance when investigating and analysing the

sense making process and discourse creation around the

Burnden Park disaster.

Disasters: Hillsborough and Aberfan

Aberfan

The importance of a wide conceptual analysis cannot be

overestimated, rather than individualising an

investigation of the literature on solely the Burnden

Park Disaster, one must explore a variety of literature

which share similar themes to the Burnden Park Disaster.

This section will initially work around general

disasters, focusing on the Aberfan disaster in 1966, then

moving onto the Hillsborough stadium disaster in 1989

before conceptualising the works which build the

indicative knowledge and literature around the Burnden

Park Disaster of 1946.


Initially this section will steer away from stadium

disasters and view the works around the Aberfan disaster.

Using the works of Mclean (1997) and Johnes and Mclean

(2000), whom indicate an importance upon justice for the

victims much akin to the psyche surround the Hillsborough

96 and very much of the thinking this dissertation will

attempt to provide for the Burnden 33. Mclean (1997)

indicates high levels of evasive accountability to the

disaster at Aberfan. Mclean voices disconcert to such

notions of false accountability and notes upon the fact

in which the seven coal board employees whom in fact were

identified as vital culprits in the severe negligence

which caused the events at Aberfan, received no

punishment and in fact received promotions within the

Coal Board (p287). Themes of this lack of accountability

towards victims and the causes of disasters, is a key

theme within the discourse created around the Burnden

Park Disaster and will be vital and prominent throughout

both this literature review and also the entire

dissertation.

The events of Aberfan, Wales on the 21st October 1966 are

steeped richly in the notes of history as an

unprecedented tragedy. The small mining village was


partially obliterated by a waste tip of water, rock and

shale as the Merthyr Vale Colliery slid down into the

village, killing 144 victims – 116 of which were children

from the Pantglas Junior School (Mclean 1997, 285).

‘A generation of children has been wiped out’

Minister of State of Wales

(BBC – 21st October 1966)

Akin to the Burnden Park Disaster and Hillsborough,

Aberfan was met with a lack of accountability by both the

media and official organisations and an initial victim

ignorance and insensitivity. Local rescue workers

reported the press imploring children to pose and cry

next to the bodies of their fellow students (Mclean &

Johnes 2000, 4-19). The sense making process of these

tragic events was met with confusion throughout the

locals of Aberfan, whom deemed the dangers of the

mountain to be very much common knowledge and in such a

disaster waiting to happen. These locals with zero

background knowledge of coal and waste tip mechanisms

could see this deemed obvious danger, however this was


over looked and ignored by the apparent experts of the

field – The National Coal Board (p13-14). Mclean (1997)

and Mclean and Johnes (2000) are the pinnacle writers

around Aberfan and their literature creates an almost

personal analysis of the disaster via a wealth of

survivor interviews. The works create a varied analysis

of the disaster by indicating an historical analysis of

the mountain pre and post-disaster whilst investigating

the perceived ‘blame-game’ via a use of public and

official records showing dishonourable behaviour from

those in power whilst investigating the legitimacy in

which a corporate manslaughter could gain validity.

Hillsborough

If one was to explore a football crowd disaster it would

be irresponsible not to explore the events at

Hillsborough in 1989. Like Burnden Park, the spotlight of

the FA cup once again created a back drop to this tragedy

with the Semi-final stage of the competition being played


between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at Sheffield

Wednesday’s home ground of Hillsborough (Eason, 2009 &

BBC NEWS, 2009).

As the kick off approached it became apparent that

tragedy had struck and 95 Liverpool supporters had

crushed to death (one supporter passing away in hospital

days later). Liverpool supporters had been allocated the

Leppings Lane end of the stadium which was only available

via one of seven outdated turnstiles which in turn

created a delay and mass queue outside the ground. To

create some form of ease, South Yorkshire Police Chief

Superintendant Duckenfield fatally ordered for the exit

gate to be opened as an extra means of getting into the

ground, however this exit gate led straight to the

already overly crowded standing pens 3 & 4. As the pens

became packed, tension rose and a crush barrier broke as

people began to fall on top of each other and fans

crushed to their death. This is a vague and un-extensive

analysis of the events but it explains the background

context of that day in a concise manner. These events are

described within the works of Scraton et al (1995),

Scraton (1999), Dalglish (1996), Taylor (1989), the

McGovern drama ‘Hillsborough’ (1996) and the Granada


Television Documentary by Jemphrey, World in Action:

Hillsborough (1998) amongst varied other sources.

For almost a decade the popular discourse was that of

drunken, unruly fans to be at the pinnacle of blame. This

reaction in the aftermath of fan blame very much already

tapped within the social psyche, built upon the view of

not only football fans of the era but also

‘Liverpudlians’ due to the aggressive and potentially

prejudice view of the city from Thatcher’s conservative

government (Collings & Seldon, 2000) and as Black (2013)

states, at that time only the trade unionist or the young

black male were hated more than ‘scousers’ by Thatcher’s

ruling elite. This shows how a transition to relieve

organization blame on this ‘OCABD’ was made easy compared

to the struggle the Hillsborough families had/have to

relieve any blame upon the victims or survivors.

(Scraton, 1995).

Much has been wrote about the discrepancy around the

infamous 3.15pm cut off time, the treatment of the

fatalities by the lacklustre emergency services and the

controversy around the infamous CCTV camera no 5

(McGovern, 1996). However this part of the literature

review has created a focus and concentration around the


events of Hillsborough by using the literature which

outlines the aftermath of the disaster and the discourses

created. In turn this portrays how the sense making

process post Hillsborough and how political ideology and

social significance played their part in this as the

various works by Scraton (1995 & et al 1999) as well as

an examination of official documents (Taylor 1989,

Hillsborough Independent Panel 2012 & Smith 1998).

Scraton, who became a vital figure in the Hillsborough

Independent Panel writes in a critical manner within his

various literature around Hillsborough. The view from

below is a theme not only of Scraton but also of key

criminological issue. Criminology, certainly contemporary

criminology is of a critical birth and Scraton (1999)

follows on this trend by underpinning and examining the

severe dehumanisation of the victims and the inadequacies

performed by South Yorkshire police and the Criminal

Justice system. Scraton also notes upon the high reliance

the police placed upon the media to convey their denial

and of course deceit (Chapter Six). The importance placed

upon a separation of blame between the police and the

atrocities is a vivid part of Scraton’s work adding to


the criminally misleading nature by police spanning over

a decade.

The media accounts noted indicate the media heavily under

police influence. Scraton (1999) names a variety of media

accounts in which Liverpool fans and the dead become

chastised and lambasted (p117 -118). This irresponsible

editing is not only offensive but became a force in the

construction of the discourse. A discourse which aided

society in labelling Liverpool as the ‘self-pity city’

and created a cynical view of Liverpool which to this

present day still exists.

Media outlets also made connections with this disaster

and the Heysel stadium disaster at the 1985 European cup

final in Brussells where the actions of Liveprool

supporters led to the death of 39 Juventus supporters. 14

Liverpool supporters were convicted of manslaughter and

English clubs were banned from European competition for

five years (p118, Darby et al 2005, 77-94 & Nauright

2012, 338-339). This created an anger and tension towards

Liverpool as a club and a city by the rest of the nation

whom became blamed for the actions of this ‘trouble-

causing’ city of Liverpool which was seen to represent


England as a hooligan ridden country (greatly aided by

the lambasting of Liverpool by Margaret Thatcher (Handley

2013)). It does not take a genius to see, in the

contemporary society the works of media accounts such as

The Sun as false. Liverpool as a city and its patrons are

famous for their great sense of community and as noted by

Spaaij (2006), football supporters share an almost

unparalleled togetherness. This notion of the fans

turning on their own should be seen as propaganda built

upon politics and police (Scraton, 1999, 119). Scraton,

as eluded to earlier is a key figure in the fight for

justice for the Hillsborough victims as well as being a

key academic on the issue so for the purpose of this

dissertation the value of a thorough insight into his

works cannot be overestimated, therefore the use of his

literature builds a highly academic and concise analysis

of Hillsborough.

One should persist the idea that when examining the

Burnden Park disaster, Hillsborough is the perfect

reference point and especially the aftermath and its


works. The literature around Hillsborough far exceeds

that of the Burnden Park disaster, the reason for this is

hard to pin point though. Is it based on the fact of

modern society has a more news based society? The fact

the Liverpool as a club are a bigger and more successful

club than Bolton Wanderers? The fact more people died?

The fact that the Hillsborough literature outweighs the

Burnden texts is something which must be investigated,

however this next section of the Literature review will

solely investigate the works around the Burnden Park

disaster and its value to this dissertation’s main aims.

Burnden Park Disaster

This part of the literature review shall analyse the key

literature used for this dissertation. The Burnden park

disaster is a largely un-touched area of academia so for

the different facets of this dissertation an historical


examination must be used to initially conceptualise the

disaster. To help illustrate a clearer knowledge and also

a more vivid understanding of this knowledge, this

section will be split into three sections – Historical

Literature, First Hand Literature and Critical Academic

Literature.

Historical Literature

Historical texts around the football club create the

initial explanation of events, they stand at a mainstream

stand point but this is not necessarily a negative point

as the texts help create an historical analysis lacking

within criminological texts.

Marland (1989, 1995 & 2003) is the main author on these

historical texts. Marland, club historian, has wrote a

great number of works around the club’s history. Marland

was also subject to a brief informal interview for this

dissertation (see Appendix 4) in which he disclosed his


grandfather attended the disaster. Other works of this

historical nature (Gent 2004, Murray & Walker 2008 &

Ponting & Hugman 1994) share similar themes in which the

disaster is described in a very sympathetic, sensitive

manner. The question should be asked, why is this so?

Hillsborough is seen as a moment at the forefront in

Liverpool’s history as opposed to a half page insert as

it is represented in Bolton Wanderers history literature.

The explanatory sources such as these stick very much to

the lines upon which the disaster was of a fan fault

leaving no room to challenge this discourse. The common

belief around the disaster is one very much kept to

within all these historical pieces in that more fans

arrived than were initially expected and that these fans

created a crush which in turn killed 33 of their own.

Ponting and Hugman (1994) create an air of popularity

consequence and indicate more of a sympathetic view than

critical and make small reference and similarity to the

events of Hillsborough as well as Ibrox in Glasgow where

66 fans were crushed in 1971. The analysis of the

disaster is brief to say the least, as less literature

space is left for the death of 33 fans than for the


club’s 1958 FA Cup triumph. This potentially portrays a

lack of knowledge but also a lack of access to knowledge

as this is not an isolated piece of literature in which

the coverage of Bolton’s darkest day is minimalist at

best. This is a concept perhaps compounded in former

Bolton player Tommy Banks’ book (2012) whom mentions

Manchester United’s tragic Munich air disaster countless

times more than the Burnden disaster, thus despite being

born in the town and having a 14 year association with

the club.

A lack of acknowledgment is incredibly apparent within

the historical sources of this disaster from outside the

club literature especially. Another key example of this

is the documentary of Burnden Park at the time of its

closure in 1997, the disaster got a 16 second mention in

a two hour feature on the final game to be played at the

ground before the club’s move to the Reebok (now Macron)

Stadium (Sky Sports, 1997).

Murray and Walker (2008) whom also tend to the ‘script’

around the disaster add an air of doubt around this as

they lend considerable space to the doubt around fan

expectation in which they indicate local news believed a

greater crowd than ‘officially’ expected. They mention


the noted attraction of Stanley Matthews and the FA Cup

in the same breath as the crowd and county of

Lancashire’s excitement, whilst also noting upon the

subsequent inquiry in depth. Walker and Murray (2008)

seem to portray more of a liberal view in which the

results of the Hughes inquiry are noted in which the

fan’s passing over the turnstiles was a factor in the

disaster yet ‘not a major one’. Hugman and Ponting (1994)

however claim that the inquiry resulted that the disaster

was the fault of the fans. Walker & Murray (2008)

conclude with a critical outlook on the legacy of the

Burnden park disaster as a lack of lessons learned and

notes upon the events of Ibrox and Hillsbrough. They deem

to be critical of the lack of execution on Hughes’

recommendations.

Marland’s (1989, 1995 & 2003) work around Bolton

Wanderers’ history is the most extensive and published,

his literature shows extensive knowledge around the

history of the club and its favoured moments in history.

The Burnden Park disaster however only is permitted a few

pages in each book compared to cup wins and league

successes. This is not a criticism of Marland as this is

a theme in most of the literature around the club as the


disaster seems to be a moment the club does not like to

be reminded of. Marland applies an extended breakdown of

the day and how the disaster escalated between the times

of 2.35 pm and 3.25 pm, thus showing a key impetus on the

causation of the disaster rather than the determining

contexts and wider framework of the disaster which one

could say was as much a participant to the disaster as

illegal entry was.

Although Marland does mention the intense attraction of

Stanley Matthews within the town in the days prior to the

match as well as a slight criticism of the police in

their reluctance to deploy extra resources whom were

guarding food supplies, there is a non-existent criticism

of the fact in which the Burnden stand which housed the

food supplies wasn’t used for its ability to house the

fans and sacrificed 2,000 seats for the protection of

food supplies. This, one could see as a main issue that

should be highlighted specially and not swept under the

proverbial carpet. Marland’s view and works around the

disaster are obviously intended to be a view of the club

therefore one cannot blame this literature for staying

strictly to facts and not opinion, a revolutionary

critical stance gains no relevance within historical


literature. This literature has gained prevalent

relevance in this dissertation as one cannot explore any

historical event without analysing the key texts around

the area, especially from within the inner sanctum of the

main organisation and location the disaster occurred.

First Hand Literature

The accounts of first hand literature are vital to the

research for this dissertation. First hand ‘witness’

accounts often provide the most concise and honest

accounts. Anyone can analyse an article on perceptions of

events and create an article built upon statistics and

historical literature but only the people at the stadium

on that day will be able to provide a truly individual

and independent account. Two of the accounts to be

reviewed are from two players of that day, Bolton’s Nat

Lofthouse OBE (1989) and the famed Stoke City and

Blackpool player Sir Stanley Matthews (2000).


Lofthouse is lauded as Bolton’s best ever player and the

local lad come good so his emotional attachment to the

club is also another obvious factor in his analysis of

the disaster as well as being a first-hand witness.

Lofthouse (1989) notes upon the similarities between this

disaster and Hillsborough, a theme he is not alone in

stating and indicates an obvious anger and distaste that

a lack of learning had occurred within British football

since Burnden Park. Lofthouse, like others sets a scene

of the disaster and of course, indicates the euphoria

around the town about the chance of seeing Stanley

Matthews in action as well as the FA Cup appeal in which

a larger than usual crowd was surely expected. His

analysis of the disaster is deeply entrenched with sorrow

and grief as he shows obvious indicators to the loss of

the 33 being like the loss of a family member and shows

great emotional investment in the supporters of ‘his

club’. He notes upon the grief suffered within the town

and the lack of help offered to those grieving as

obvious, and notes an almost secondary pain for the

victims, many of whom had dealt with the pains of war and

then the pains of this disaster. Lofthouse’s account is


obviously entrenched with emotion and anger towards this

disaster and notes upon his lack of acknowledgment around

fatalities until after the disaster had actually occurred

when the referee in fact informed the players, this is a

view also apparent in Matthews’ (2000) account.

Matthews’ (2000) account is a vivid and meticulous

overview of the disaster and like Lofthouse, entrenched

with emotion. Matthews states his disbelief that the game

was allowed to go on after the disaster and recalls the

view being shared amongst his fellow players as well as

supporters surrounding the pitch – ‘tis a crime to carry on!’

Matthews shows obvious disgust to the game being allowed

to carry on more so than the actual disaster, he notes

upon seeing body bags next to the side line and the

horrific nature of this and obvious disgust in the police

and referee’s symbiotic decision to carry on with the

match with fatalities still occupying the pitch. He notes

a grieving effect upon himself post disaster and how he

couldn’t bring himself to train, eat or sleep. Also

apparent is a refusal to accept a lack of accountability

for this disaster and also a refusal to accept how this


could be classed as a one-off which was swept under the

carpet. Matthews believes that the ignorance of the

Burnden Park disaster is as much a catalyst for

Hillsborough and Ibrox as anything else. The lack of

lessons learned is a vivid notion with Matthews. This

creates an air of questionability as to how the discourse

of a fan fault comes to exist, both the first- accounts

of Matthews and Lofthouse add no blame to fans but blame

in some way the institution of the game whether it be the

referee or the footballing bodies. The severe lack of

lessons learned seems to be a prevalent theme within

these articles and an amount of accountability for future

disasters is placed upon the Burnden Park disaster.

Matthews past away shortly after his publication and

notes upon how the events of that day lived with him

forever and the horror became an entrenched part of his

psyche.

‘ In my mind I kept seeing body bags and was too distressed to even think

about football…………..horror scenes still remain vivid in the mind’s eye, the

fog is in the throat and the pen wavers’

Matthews, S. (2000, 223).


Critical Academic Literature

The two key academic sources come from Cumming (1995) and

Baker (1998), these two are the only sources around the

disaster which originate from academia. To be frank, the

work of Baker (1998) is what inspired this dissertation,

twinned with Cumming, Baker is the only piece of

literature to challenge the common discourse around this

disaster and in fact leaves accountability at the feet of

the powerful as opposed to the fans. Both articles

examine a wide variety of factors post disaster as

potential causes for the disaster, this in essence is a

perfect example of criminology in which the discipline

examines the wider context and determining factors around

deviance/event/crime rather than the actual event.

Baker’s (1998) account is the most important piece of

literature concerning this dissertation and as eluded to

previously, is the initial inspiration for this

dissertation. Baker’s article provides a detailed


historical analysis of both the disaster but also the

build-up and the wider context of the day as well as a

contextual analysis of the Hughes inquiry which followed

the disaster. Baker obviously writes from a revisionist

stance and writes critically around the discourse

creating and sense making process. He writes heavily

around the time between the disaster and the inquiry and

deems this to be of high importance. Baker creates a

picture in which the demonization and blame upon the fans

in placed onto them before any form of legal or official

confirmation is set. Baker sets upon reel after reel of

media articles from the time in which the fans are highly

demonized and fully blamed for the disaster, his work

notes the high influence of media and common discourse in

shaping the belief around the Burnden park disaster.

Baker believes the speed of the sense making process post

disaster is vital in a method of social control and the

creation of the football supporter as a folk devil.

This indicates an obvious class division as lower class

‘unruly fans’ gained blame without any form of

consideration for wider contexts in which the powerful

have control. The press of the time, Baker states were

potentially the most vital component in this discourse


creation – just as with Hillsborough in 1989. Baker notes

the press’ calls for a stricter control over supporters

and in turn the lower classes and in this Baker notes

upon the higher potential for social control over the

lower classes, even post war – at time of union and

community, the powerful were still holding their belt

over the lower class. The negativity created around the

Bolton supporters shaped the common and ‘official’

discourse and by the start of the inquiry there really

was no second guessing whom the primary target of blame

had become. This analysis is created similarly to

Scraton’s analysis of the media post Hillsborough and

notes upon various damning reports from the media around

the supporters.

Baker states other indicators in how he may challenge the

discourse around the Burnden park disaster, he notes

highly upon the Hughes inquiry and longingly refers back

to Hughes’ conclusion in which illegal entry by fans is

deemed a factor in the disaster but by no means a major

one or the ultimate factor. He states the discourse

created by both the media and official sources creates a

social irrelevance around Hughes’ conclusion, as well as

a deep critical analysis of the deemed ‘reasonable’


expectation around the attendance. Baker conducts an

obvious research and statistical analysis of Burnden park

crowds and states an obvious ever increasing up-rise of

attendances in every ascending cup round. As well as

this, Baker takes into account several factors

surrounding the problem of the expected crowd including

the media’s expectation vs the club’s, Stanley Matthews,

The FA Cup, Lancashire pride and of course the

overwhelming demand for football after a six year

absence. Baker’s critical analysis of these factors

simply compounds his argument which much akin to this

dissertation, challenges the discourse around the Burnden

park disaster.

Baker’s analysis although highly revisionist is from an

historical background and explores the disaster with an

historical as well as a critical analysis, this theme is

also within Cumming’s (1995) article as this work is a

published dissertation from within the University of

Leeds’ History department.

Cumming’s work was found, almost luckily from within the

archives of Bolton museum, this published dissertation


really is unique and with Baker (1998) is an individual

piece on the Burnden park disaster in its academic rather

than ‘official’ analysis. Cumming gives a critical

analysis of the disaster and the beauty of this being a

dissertation rather than an article is that there are no

punches held back and that a perfect symbiosis of emotion

and academia is portrayed via a balanced analysis.

Cumming shares similar themes with Baker in his critical

deconstruction of the discourse created but also slightly

criticises the famous Burnden stand’s lack of use.

Cumming states obvious state hypocrisy around this issue,

he notes the ministry of supply deeming the stand not yet

available or assessable to house supporters yet – one

year on from the war. Cumming ignores the discourse of

full fan blame and opens up analysis into which he

believes were the genuine reasons for this disaster. The

reasons noted often deflect the accountability onto the

powerful and lists the high amount of poor planning post

disaster by ALL organisations involved in the lead up to

the game as the main reason for the disaster. Cumming

lists unreasonable expectations around the crowd as vital

as well as poor communication systems put in place,

lacklustre crowd control and monitoring, insufficient


crush barriers, slow reactions and a non-existent

emergency plan.

Much like Baker, Cumming notes upon various media

outlets’ reactions and their power in the creation of

discourse within the sense making process and also notes

upon the story of a story within the Bolton Evening News

(15/03/1946) in which a survivor so depressed from the

trauma and horror of the disaster, killed himself four

days after the disaster. Robert Jones deemed the horror

of the disaster so deep that suicide was the only option

– a tragedy one could name Burnden Park’s 34th victim.

Cumming’s most poignant and concluding statement notes

the lack of lessons learned post Burnden Park and makes

obvious both Hillsborough and Ibrox as perfect examples

of this. Cumming notes on the endless improvement to the

game of football, television rights and profit margins

but deems the improvements put into football stadiums

incomparable. He eludes on a ‘profit over morality’

mentality within not only football but society where a

larger impetus is placed upon profit, gate receipts,

winning trophies and sponsorship deals than the actual

fans of the game and the safety of thy neighbour.


Findings and Analysis

This chapter will bring the dissertation together and

culminate my research whilst exposing the findings

gathered after months of research. This section shall be

split up into four key research questions – these 37 | T h e B u r n d e n P a r k D i s a s t e r

questions have been assembled with great deliberation in

an expectation to create a clear explanation to the

Burnden Park disaster and the discourse around it. The

chapter will critically analyse the findings of months of

research in a hope to answer these key research

questions.

What was the Post Disaster discourse? : How was it created?

This question is a vital string to this dissertation’s

bow as this notion is scarcely mentioned in previous

academic work around the disaster. A deep analysis within

newspaper articles of the era has helped shape and

investigate the findings to this question as they are the

clear arbiters of what is deemed as social ‘truth’ and

are the key players in the creation of discourse within

society. The main discourse post the Burnden Park

disaster is that the only causal factor is of illegal fan

entry to the ground via climbing over the turnstiles.

There has been a key ignorance to any contextual factors


in the organisation pre disaster, this must be analysed

and has been within the findings of my research.

An analysis of the media of the era has given me two main

themes of media discourse to comment on – A clear and

rapid symbiosis with the Police in the amplification of

Police and organisational innocence and a clear and

constant emphasis on supporter blame. The fatalities of

the Burnden Park disaster have been left accountable to

the supporters whom have gained illegal entry, this

discourse can be seen in many obvious forms via an

analysis of the media at that time. Key examples of this

are obvious in media from the era, a research initially

within the archives of the Guardian, Bolton Evening News (Now

Bolton News) and the Pictorial (Now the Mirror) show constant

examples of both the themes brought forward. The

Guardian, a media outlet one would class as a more

liberal thinking newspaper was also key in the creation

of this discourse (see Appendix 10).

The Guardian show an obvious emphasis upon police

innocence and extra impetus on fan blame, on March 29th

1946 The Guardian’s ‘Special correspondent’ noted on and

backed Chief Constable Howard’s rationale of the disaster

as ‘obvious that this was caused by supporters climbing over the fence at


the back of the embankment’. In this piece the media’s attempt

to create a subconscious societal backing of the police

and organisation is obvious, heavy attention is paid to

the innocence of the police and the inequivalent fan

blame is seemingly obvious throughout. This view of fan

blame is also obvious in an FA account in the piece in

which fan blame is further compounded and also a high

ignorance towards the Ministry of Supply’s occupation of

the Burnden Stand. This shows an obvious symbiosis of not

only media and police/organisation but also media and

government and potentially a tri-relationship between

media, police/organisation and government. This view is

apparent throughout media in the weeks and month

following the disaster, this symbiosis seems to have

acted rapidly in creating a discourse and absence from

accountability – ‘Police took all Necessary Steps’ & ‘No one anticipated

that it would be marred by the tragedy’ (Bolton Evening News 11th March

1946), ‘the police prevented an even worse disaster’ (The Guardian, 11th

March 1946), ‘People very awkward at the time’ (The Guardian 2nd

April 1946) and ‘How the situation became dangerous’ (Bolton Evening

News 30th March 1946).

The media’s speed noted upon earlier, is made obvious I

believe in the Guardian on 12th March 1946 which reports


on Home Secretary Chuter Ede’s damnation of the fans. Ede

highly contributed to a symbiotic demonization of the

fans via media and the House of Commons in which Ede

lauded the police as heroic and claimed that ‘One would

have hoped that spectators who found themselves debarred from the ground

would exercise the same sense of sportsmanship that they expected from the

players’.

This analysis of the media of the era via extensive

research has shown in my eyes, an attempt to rapidly

create a ‘knowledge’ regarding the causation of this

disaster. This discourse created continues to ignore

wider factors pre disaster which one could say have

greater significance in investigating the cause of the

Burnden Park disaster. Baker (1998) examines this theory

in depth and creates an avenue of research for this

dissertation whilst also adding an academic backing to

compound the research conducted by myself. Baker also

notes upon the ruthless statement by Ede as well as

various newspaper and government symbiotic statements

promoting fan blame. He heavily notes Sir Jocelyn Lucas

as a key factor in this discourse to gain steam whom

questioned Ede at the House Commons. Lucas lambasted the

supporters whom gained illegal entry and asked ‘what efforts


are being made to discover the ringleaders… thereby causing death and

injury to numerous spectators; and if prosecutions for manslaughter are

being considered’.

Baker’s chapter ‘Officialdom Interprets’ lends itself to the

whole idea in which this research question has based the

majority of its research, the discourse creation and the

ease in which this was created. Baker notes the

importance in which the persistence of a view point

especially in regard to Burnden Park, shapes a

significant response to disasters and how the media and

initial official response refused to analyse the broader

context and showed an obvious ignorance to larger factors

in relation to the cause.

Another form of research undertaken to this question is

within the ‘Fatal Casualties at Football Association Cup

Tie Burnden Park Football Ground, Bolton’ report (1946)

by Chief Constable Howard of Bolton Police Force (now

Greater Manchester Police) in which a variety of witness

statements consist from both civilians but a greater

number from Police officers including Howard himself (see

Appendix 9). The report is very much from within the

police and initially explains plans laid down for the

match. This is surprising as one could say this places


the police in somewhat of a position of voluntary

scrutiny by explaining their plans for officer

deployment. Preceding the witness statements a full list

of medical assessments of the thirty three fatalities is

explained with all of the accounts concluding into causes

of Asphyxia and suffocation. Additionally there is a

statement by club secretary Rowley ‘justifying’ the lack

of use for the Burnden Stand. The witness statements are

uncannily similar, especially the police officer’s. The

nature of them is a potentially another vivid form

twinned with the newspapers, of organisational innocence.

Howard promotes the discourse in which the tragedy was

born via no organisational blame – along with PCs

McDougal, Jones, Rushton and Inspectors Taylor and Lever.

One must be stopped from bordering upon a conspiracy

theory around this however it must be noted the almost

scripted nature of these statements is somewhat unusual.

However I must adhere to the nature of copious reports

whom also report at the accident and blameless nature of

the disaster, stating upon no innocence for any party but

also no blame and strictly adhere to the timeline of the

disaster. A key example of this can also be found by

Mayor Dumaine of Bolton’s reaction to the disaster – ‘it is


dreadful to contemplate the agony suffered by the victims and heart-breaking

to think of those loved ones waiting at home – waiting in vain’ (Cumming,

1995).

In my eyes, the research gathered is a potent form of

police innocence amplification, the report is a

subconscious way of separating any blame from the Bolton

police. The nature of these statements have consequence

upon the supporters, the obvious influence of chief

constable Howard in regard to police innocence as well as

a promotion of organisational innocence by Club secretary

Rowley is undeniable. This eradication of officials in

the blame leaves the accountability at the feet of only

one party, the supporters.

This research within both the media and archives shows

countless examples which promote the discourse created

around the Burnden park disaster. I believe after

analysis this is a discourse created out of social

belief. The pure uniformity and authority of a symbiosis

of police and organisation created an unquestionable

discourse in 1946. The state and society was post war and

a great deal of faith and belief was placed within the

state which created a lack of social rationale in blaming

the powerful in society such as the police and


organisation in this case. The social disbelief in state

fault could have been a high value in the social psyche

however it can now be seen questionable in contemporary

view via the legacy of Hillsborough and the higher

impetus of social revolt and resistance.

Also this societal lack of rationale in blaming the

powerful also created a greater ease to blame the lower

class supporters. Of course the discourse under

examination could not exist without the discourse

creation via organisation and media, this research has

also analysed the society as a main part in this. Lower

class degradation is not a phenomenon exclusive to 1946

or now, it has hallmarks throughout history. The ease in

which the supporters gained accountability is a

reflection of societal issue thus showing the obvious

nature in which a rationality of blaming the ‘enemy

within’ is created. The post war society lauded the

powerful yes, but also created a heightened sense of

togetherness and community and this enemy within and

inner betrayal creates a greater anger than usual

potentially. Thus impacting on the discourse created

around the supporters along with official responses

earlier eluded to and creates the potentiality for the


construction of a folk devil and in turn the promotion of

a future moral panic around football supporters which

would live on to this present day.

To what extent does the discourse reflect the politics of a post disaster

sense making process?

To analyse this issue I think points earlier eluded to

are vital. The use of the media sources stated before are

key arbiters of the post disaster sense making process.

The sense making process does not retract from the ‘norm’

and shares similar themes to the normal ‘script’ which

follows disasters such as Aberfan and Hillsborough,

however the Burnden Park sense making process is probably

more akin to Aberfan than Hillsborough initially as the

response wasn’t as harsh at first like it was post

Hillsborough. Post the research process I have noted the


key issue here is scapegoating – the ‘art’ of singling an

individual or party out as the primary reason for tragedy

or failure. The use of the media is key to this, the

media is used as an agent of the state to help create a

sense making process which creates a lack of potential

for resistance or revolution but creates a social

distaste and resentment for the powerless which shapes a

target for accountability. This is a vital facet in also

relieving one’s self from accountability. The sense-

making process does not deter from the usual rationale in

which the powerful create an air of innocence and protect

themselves within a bubble of purity. This show of blame

shifting has true roots in the desire for social control

– a key staple of post disaster processes. This process

refuses to accept the key contributing factors in which

could be more accountable for the disaster than illegal

entry, the whole basis in which this dissertation has

investigated.

As stated in the first research question, the media and

official symbiosis was vital in this sense making

process. Their power and influence help created a social

ignorance to their accountability and a psyche in which a


blame for the inferior in society was deemed more

acceptable. The powerful create an air of innocence which

is deemed untouchable and in time penetrates the public

sphere and turns an opinion into knowledge or ‘fact’.

This is an issue not exclusive to Burnden Park – as made

apparent by the tragedies of Hillsborough, Aberfan and

Ibrox. As noted in Scraton (1999) the post disaster

discourse created after Hillsborough is that of

demonization and a shift of accountability from the

powerful to the powerless. This shows obvious themes of

the issues brought forward by this dissertation such as

methods like scapegoating. The media lambasting of

football supporters was made apparent by Scraton and the

obvious police/media symbiosis created the discourse more

than any form of accountability could. This social stigma

of Liverpool supporters post Hillsborough carries

similarities with the responses post Burnden Park.

Although the reaction has differences, hence the reaction

post Hillsborough was more vicious and obvious than the

responses to Burnden, however the theme stays the same –

blaming the powerless. The differing styles of reaction

are probably reflections of the era more than anything

else. Hillsborough was in an age and society much more


media reliant than 1946 and also with much more media

outlets, however this does not take anything away from

the media’s influence in 1946 – the reaction was only

restricted by technology not the power of the media.

The reaction reflects perfectly a post disaster discourse

if you examine other disasters post Burnden Park such as

Hillsborough and Aberfan. It must also be noted as well

that the discourse from Burnden Park hasn’t been adjusted

like it has contemporarily around Hillsborough and again,

this is probably a consequence of the era. Although also

to be noted is that maybe it has taken Hillsborough’s

resistance to discourse to happen for a resistance to

Burnden Park to gain potential - seeing Burnden Park

through the glasses of Hillsborough. The politics of a

post disaster discourse are truly reflected within

Burnden Park with the pairing of powerful innocence and

powerless blame – a true staple of official responses and

discourses. A key notice must be paid to the speed in

which these responses are made clear. The Fatal

Casualties report by Bolton Police is a key example of

this, the key piece of literature in which the Police

‘officialise’ their innocence was made apparent well


before the Hughes report’s (1946) findings. This speed

helped create a discourse twinned with the social

‘knowledge’ already in motion, well before any result

could be made by Hughes. Hughes actually noted that he

believed illegal entry was a factor in the disaster but

by no means a major factor – however this result has

become ignored and lost due to the power of the official

responses and discourse created in the immediate

aftermath of the disaster and its power in permeating

society.

Has this discourse been challenged? If so how? If not why?

This discourse has only become under challenge via

academia in the works of Barker (1998) and Cumming (1995)

and their ability to critically analyse the disaster’s

discourse and read between the lines of the responses.

Baker and Cumming heavily challenge the discourse of


unprecedented fan blame in which they analyse wider

contributing factors in the build up to the disaster as

vital to this as the issue of illegal entry. This

dissertation has never implied that the issue of illegal

entry was a factor in the disaster as it obviously was

however my research and analysis very much is of the same

birth of these two academic accounts in stating that it

was merely one of a few factors not the only one – the

idea in which the discourse states. The challenge to this

discourse is simple, how can the issue of illegal entry

be classed as the main factor when so many other factors

could be seen as integral? But also how have these been

managed to be ignored or even hidden?

A main issue in which the two academics state and what I

deem too of high issue, is the lack of challenge or

mention to the lack of use or apparent misuse of the

Burnden Stand for this game. The Burnden Stand was the

only seated area in the stadium at that time and had the

capacity to hold 2,798 people, however this area was

deemed off limits for supporters for the highly

anticipated Stoke City match. This was due to in my eyes

– irrational lack of common sense, the Ministry of Supply


refused to allow the club to use this section as it was

still under their occupation holding food stores, despite

calls from the club to allow them to use it in

preparation for the game (Rowley in Fatal Casualties,

1946). Reasoning for this was given due to contamination

issues – however some action surely could have been made

to house the food stores in light of the biggest post war

crowd. This section remained unused up until the crowd

began to spill onto the pitch – well into the match when

the referee and the police decided that only then it was

necessary to use the Burnden Stand (see Appendix 11).

Only when the integrity of the FA Cup was being disrupted

were people permitted to use the stand. This for me

indicates a profit over morality psyche which shall be

further eluded to in the final question. However this is

something which comes under scrutiny in two pieces of

literature from the 1990’s and I believe this fact – the

age of the literature is a main reason for this not

gaining any perspective in 1946. It is easy to view this

as a reason for the Burnden park disaster after years of

analysis however much like the lack of resistance to the

discourse this is more of a reflection of the era. This

is an area where the ease in blocking the public sphere


from different issues is far easier than contemporary

times. Also this is another example of society refusing

to challenge the state – the same state which had just

won a world war. Society’s unquestionable faith in the

state and its strands such as the Ministry of Supply and

their discourses help create an ignorance to facets such

as this issue with the Burnden Stand. This also creates

this ease in blaming the lower class which creates an

added reluctance to challenge the state which in turn

reaffirms the powerful in their position as society’s

discourse definers. This is certainly a factor in the

disaster in my eyes as who could say that if those 2,798

seats would have been filled instead of 33 people dying

they could have been watching the match from the Burnden

Stand and been able to go home safe to their families.

Another issue open to challenge within academia is the

issue of what was and wasn’t a reasonable expectation in

regard to the crowd – this seems to be the only issue in

which the media and organisation come from different

stand points initially. After deep analysis within the

newspaper archives from the era I came across the Bolton

Evening News’ (6th March 1946) sport pull-out ‘The Olympian’


stating that there would be plenty of availability for

the game and fans would be fine gaining access to the

embankment end on the day and that there would be plenty

of room for ticketless fans, thus playing down any

anticipation to the match which was apparent around

Bolton Wanderers, Lancashire Football, The FA Cup and

Stanley Matthews. However the next day on the 7th March

1946 the Bolton Evening News also stated that there would be

no room available for more than 50,000 supporters –

confusion and hypocrisy at its finest. This is open for

further scrutiny also when you view the crowd for

Bolton’s previous cup round (Vs Middlesbrough, 51,612) a

crowd of just 50,000 evidently naïve and irresponsible

when analysing the rising crowds, Lancashire county pride

and Stanley Matthews.

The sheer ignorance towards these factors however is

still an issue up for debate as Bolton’s FA Cup home

attendances were significantly rising by each round as

the appeal of the cup was rising, especially compared to

Bolton’s league attendances which reached quite low

levels. This additionally with the appeal of Stanley

Matthews’ major celebrity status was completely ignored

pre match. However these issues have never been


challenged outside of academia, the Hughes inquiry

lightly noted upon it yet deemed the 50,000 as a

reasonable estimation despite an announced official gate

of 65,419 with estimated over 85,000 supporters gaining

entry illegal or legitimately. The issues here have

gained challenge by Cumming (1995) and Baker (1998)

however the challenge stopped at academia and refuses to

penetrate the social psyche and official discourse around

the Burnden Park Disaster.

As earlier noted, research has come to a conclusion for a

reason for this lack of challenge or resistance to the

discourse of Burnden Park compared to the challenge and

resistance to the discourse of Hillsborough lies within

the differing faith in the state in the different eras.

The implication of a post war faith in the state and

their agents such as the police twinned and that pure

reluctance to challenge official discourse in an era of

obedience and respect to the superior. The lack of inner

revolution and resistance creates a social psyche which

makes discourse fact and in turn creates a perceived ease

in blaming the lower class and also deeming any ‘enemy


within’ or social betrayal as pure sin such as the social

belief around the illegal entry becomes amplified.

Another issue I have come to note is the lack of

transparency in society of pre match plans around the

match, everyone can see the results and the effects of

the illegal entry however there is a severe lack of

transparency for any of the other factors which could

have caused the disaster. As the Hughes inquiry states,

there are various reasons for the causation –

Underestimation of crowds, Poor entrance control, Slow

and badly organised reaction to the disaster, positioning

of crush barriers and Unauthorised entry. So the

confusion is obvious when the common discourse is that of

purely illegal fan entry is to blame, however I believe

the issues brought forward have somewhat explained why

and why not a challenge has occurred.

In what ways is this discourse problematic?


The discourse is obviously problematic and heavily open

to scrutiny as made apparent by this dissertation so far.

The official discourse and response of definite fan blame

is a notion which is heavily open to criticism, this next

part will indicate how and why this is open to criticism

and scrutiny. The sources made apparent within the

Literature Review have helped this research come to these

conclusions and have also helped make these easier to

explain and rationalise. These sources combined with a

constant research have helped me create a knowledge and

build a case in which the larger contextual factors

within this disaster far outweigh any issue with illegal

entry.

As noted earlier I believe the key argument in showing

the discourse as problematic is its obvious ignorance to

wider factors in the build up to the disaster and the

overzealous concentration on illegal entry. A key facet

of this is the ministry of supply’s occupation of the


Burnden Stand, as noted earlier. The refusal to make this

part of the ground available is a notion very rarely

noted on and as made apparent in this chapter is very

much an issue exclusive to academia. It is obviously

absent from any historical analysis of the disaster and

its very absence creates problematic focus on the illegal

entry issue in which has been labelled as the only cause

creating a great potential for problematic discourse to

ensue. The facts of this including the refusal to use the

stand and then the backtracking in this when fans began

to push onto the pitch have been noted on earlier but I

think a part of this which is very much up for scrutiny

and a true show of the problematic nature of this

discourse is in fact the backtracking on this issue and

the hypocrisy of the Burnden stand. In the days which

preceded the match the Burnden stand was deemed both

unavailable and unusable to house fans, thus despite

calls and pleas from Bolton Wanderers to make it

available for supporters. According to club secretary,

Walter Rowley these pleas were refused by the Manchester

branch of the Ministry of supply and therefore the 2,798

spaces would be left unoccupied and dormant for this game

and the rest of the season whilst housing food rations.


Of course we know what happened at this game and the

disaster which encapsulated the day, however when the

crowds were gathering by the thousands outside of the

Embankment stand and fans began to climb over the

turnstiles, there was still an ignorance to using the

Burnden stand. The crush began and still there was a

reluctance to open the stand and it took for people to

spill onto the pitch before the symbiosis of police and

club decided to house fans into the stand. Of course it

can be argued that those 2,798 spaces being used from the

beginning could have stopped 33 supporters from tragedy

however I think what can be seen as a pivotal certainty

is the obvious ignorance on principles and morality made

apparent by the timing of the opening of this stand. Did

it take mass crowds crushing outside and inside to open

the stand? No. Did it take the obvious injuries and

fatalities occurring to open the stand? No. Did it take

crowds spilling onto the pitch and thus putting the

integrity of the FA cup and football in a state of

jeopardy? Yes.

The obvious profit over morality mentality is on one hand

shocking but also is a reflection on a wider society in


which capitalism and financial importance as vital to

life. The Burnden stand began to become inundated with

supporters but this was only after supporters began to

interrupt the game by spilling onto the pitch, it is

important to realise that people had died by this point.

The touchline of the pitch had become partly occupied by

body bags and yet the match carried on but it took fans

ruining the game for the Burnden stand to be opened? This

is a perfect example of a profit over morality mentality

which carries greater impetus on ticket sales and the

integrity than basic human morality and life. This shows

how problematic the official discourse is and how

ignorant it has been over the wider factors. Baker (1998)

notes on the issue of the Burnden Stand and the Ministry

of Supply however an examination via the lenses of a

profit over morality psyche is something exclusive to

this dissertation.

Another factor Baker (1998) and Cumming (1995) also

analyse which this chapter will also do is a critical

analysis of the Hughes report (1946) and its aftermath.

The Hughes report of the inquiry of the disaster was

compiled over the spring of 1946 and deemed a verdict in


which deemed five key points as accountable for

causality. Four of these can place accountability upon

the organisational structure behind the disaster (Crowd

underestimation, poor entrance control, slow

organisational reaction and positioning of crush barrier)

whilst one factor, the illegal entry was deemed a causal

factor. He also in turn set out a guideline of

recommendations for the future of football grounds which

fell on relatively deaf ears as Ibrox and Hillsborough

has shown. Hughes initially heard evidence in Bolton

from the 28th of March until 16th April 1946 whilst also

watching a match on 30th March to have a first-hand view

on normal match day procedures whilst also inspecting the

ground on a non-match day. The results of these

inspection deemed both the club and the procedures

initially in a positive light – however this could

potentially be likened to the Potemkin village of 17th

Century Crimea in which President Potemkin created a

false village of obedience and harmony to convince

Empress Catherine II into a false sense of security in

Crimea, also likened to the ‘Paradise Ghettos’ shown to

the Red Cross by the Nazi party during the second World

War.


Hughes’ inquiry (see Appendix 8) condemns the actions of

those in organisational power and states the illegal

entry to the ground ‘contributed to the disaster but, as

I find, not a major factor’. However this is totally

ignored in the discourse, absolutely completely. The odds

of organisational to supporter blame outweigh 4:1 if you

take Hughes’ inquiry as golden and this creates an air of

confusion as to why this notion has never been brought to

any Hillsborough-esc forefront as the findings are there

to see and read albeit within the vaults of Bolton museum

archives. It could be noted that the sheer media power

noted on earlier in this chapter already ingrained with

the social psyche could of played a huge part in this as

well as the lack of media alternatives of the era. This

is an area for debate and opens the door for further

research within this subject as to why this official

document has been ignored in regard to the discourse

creation or ‘confirmation’ and requires a further

critical analysis.

The perceived discourse of ultimate blame upon supporters

has been cross examined and had an opposition created

against it within this dissertation via the use of


showing other contexts which could be seen as blameful

factors for the Burnden Park disaster. However where this

dissertation so far and academia hasn’t analysed is the

notion of the illegal entry and its validity as an issue

exclusive to the 9th March 1946. Whether this was really a

one off of whether this was a regular occurrence within

football grounds within the 1940s. The only reachable

survivor of the Burnden Park disaster, Phyllis Robb whom

showed me an image of her in the mass crowd outside the

Embankment stand on that day (see Appendix 6), agreed to

be interviewed on this subject (see Appendix 2). She

explained various feeling around the football club and

sporadic memories around the disaster – understandable

given the time passed since this day. However she did

state something vital, which initially passed under my

radar and has since struck a chord within the themes of

this dissertation and myself as a researcher. I really

regret not following up this area on the day of the

interview and it has only been since collating and

analysing the findings of my research that I have

realised the significance of this. Robb, a seasoned

supporter of Bolton Wanderers recalled on numerous


occasion people, including herself gaining unauthorised

entry to Burnden Park most match days.

‘Oh I used go every week, I used sneak up at the back where’t seats were

(laughing), under the turnstiles, right at back – everyone used to do it though’

As earlier noted, this answer passed under my

researcher’s radar so to speak and only been since this

interview that I have seen the significance of it. If

this was such a normal part of match day activity and if

‘everyone used to do it’ then surely the organisational

parties surrounding the game would of seen this as a part

of the procedures which needed extra attention. Surely if

this was a normal part of match day how could the

surprise and ‘unexpected’ nature of the illegal entry be

placed at the summit of accountability? This notion is up

for critique and as stated earlier there is a deep

feeling of regret that this answer was not pushed further

and that the importance of it only became apparent to

myself post interview. However this is a notion I could


not find in any literature surrounding the disaster

either orthodox or critical. Therefore this notion must

be compounded on further evidence to be taken into the

arena of investigation surrounding this discourse.

Although it certainly asks questions of this discourse

and opens another avenue of criticism surrounding both

the disaster and its discourse.

This notion of the discourse being problematic is the

whole basis of the dissertation and this answer really

encapsulates the whole research and its nature. This can

be representative of my answer to the dissertation as a

whole in which supporters have been used as an

organisational scapegoat and hopefully this has brought

this issue to light where previously it has been seen as

unchallengeable.

Conclusion


Evidently this dissertation has come to a conclusion

which argues against and criticises the discourse around

the Burnden Park disaster. My findings and the analysis

of these has created a view in which the fans should be

relived of the portion of blame which has been socially

and officially bestowed upon them. The main theme in

which this dissertation has focused on is the creation of

this discourse but also the obvious ignorance to any

other factors which caused this disaster. The

misunderstanding over crowd expectations via mass appeal

from football, Lancashire pride, The FA Cup and Stanley

Matthews twinned with the exposure of the normality and

regularity of unauthorised entry are key factors which

oppose the discourse and have been made vital to this

dissertation. This has also been compounded by both the

issues highlighted with the Burnden Stand’s occupation by

the Ministry of Supply as well as the social psyche of a

post war era in which social resistance and anti-state

feeling was null and void twinned with a community

desensitised by death in the wake of a world war.


These issues, compounded by research have highlighted a

justification and rationale behind challenging the

discourse surrounding the Burnden Park and potentially

show a fresh light upon the disaster in the dawn of its

70th anniversary. No doubt the anniversary will bring

stories of the day and garner a media attention around

the disaster and Bolton Wanderers. The club themselves

are intending to mark the occasion with a number of

memorials including a limited edition 3rd kit which will

have the names of the victims embedded onto the shirt

with £10 of each shirt going to a local Bolton charity.

This is twinned with the already instilled memorial

plaque at the club for the disaster which was moved from

Burnden Park in 1997 to the Reebok Stadium (now Macron)

after the club moved grounds. Now in the spot of the

disaster lies an ASDA superstore which itself holds a

memorial to the disaster inside the store with a large

image at the front of the store of the disaster. In 1986,

in financial turmoil the club sold off the Embankment

stand where the disaster occurred to Cooperative business

Normid to build a superstore, this was met with anger by

supporters who claimed it was disrespectful to the 33


fatalities. However as the media age gets stronger the

cries for justice and even recognition to this disaster

grow stronger and on the 69th anniversary (9th March 2015)

social media was inundated by memorials and calls for

recognition – a refreshing change from the usual

forgotten nature of this disaster. As usual flags were

put to half-mast outside the Macron (need Reebok)

Stadium, the club’s stadium and at the nearest match:

away to local rivals Blackburn Rovers, Bolton supporters

conducted a minute applause in the 33rd minute in a show

of respect for the 33 who died on that dark day.

The Burnden park disaster is an awful tragedy and one

that should not be ignored, especially in an era where we

see truth finally coming out in mass amounts in the wake

of Operation Yewtree and Hillsborough. The Burnden Park

disaster requires a deeper investigation that before, a

deeper analysis and a deeper examination of the

discourse. Hopefully this dissertation has brought new

knowledge and examined previously known knowledge to

create the basis for a justification on my opinion in


that the Burnden Park disaster is not as simple and as

black and white as historically constructed via the

discourse bestowed upon them.

‘We make guilty of our disaster the sun, the moon and the stars, as if we

were villains by necessity, knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical

predominance, drunkards, liars and adulterers by an enforced obedience of

planetary influence.’

King Lear, Act 1 Scene 2

William Shakespeare.


Appendices – Burnden Park Disaster

1.Dissertation Methodology2.Phyllis Robb Interview3.Phyllis Robb Consent Form4.Simon Marland Interview5.Simon Marland Consent Form6.Image of Phyllis Robb at Burnden Park

Disaster7.Match Ticket and Programme: Bolton

Wanderers Vs Stoke, 9th March 19468.Hughes Inquiry 1946 Cuttings9.Fatal Casualties Police Report 1946

Cuttings10. Newspaper Cuttings11. Relevant Images


1.Methodology

This section of the dissertation shall focusupon the methods used to conduct research onthe Burnden Park disaster and its attempt toanswer its critical research questions. Theresearch was of a critical discourse andhistorical documentary research examiningmedia and official reports as well as firstperson interviews. Qualitative researchstudies words as data in generating knowledgeand theory. Qualitative research seeks thewhy and how behind behaviour and decisionmaking. The reason this dissertation willonly use qualitative methods is due to thenature of the data and the researchquestions. Quantitative analysis has alreadybeen conducted in Baker’s (1998) workconsidering different research questions and


this data will be used as part of thesecondary research.

Critical Discourse Analysis

First this section will explore and explainthe reason for using methods of thequalitative method critical discourseanalysis. Within academia the term discoursecovers a plethora of modes of communicationand belief structures – not in a religiousmanner but in a social structure and how thisin fact shapes the world.

Much social knowledge is based on commonassumption and popular voice. This process ofconstruction reciprocally shapes the constantflow of commonly accepted knowledge intocommon discourse (Woods, 2006). The sheerpower of discourse can contribute tohistorical ‘knowledge’ and is useful indisseminating knowledge over time throughliterature, politics and official decision(Foucault, 1969). The idea of discourse isvital when examining the aftermath ofdisaster. A critical discourse analysisinvestigates society’s views arounddisasters.

The key advantages of using this method areits explanation of how discourse becomes aninstitutionalised strand of knowledge whichin fact creates a license to exert power and


in turn persecute the voiceless withinsociety (Link, 1983 and Wodak & Meyer, 2001).Language therefore is the focal power inwhich social relations are based and criticaldiscourse analysis creates a bridge intowhich understand and comprehend this.Critical discourse analysis creates aconsciousness of how language createsperceptions and assumption into which societybases power (Fairclough, 1989). This in turncreates societies heroes and villains (Wood &Kroger 2000). This is a vital point whenresearching disasters such as Burnden Park.Language frames and affects people, this is amain reason for this form of analysis to beused in this dissertation.

The key criticism of critical discourseanalysis is that its offers too much focusupon the notion of oppression from above andrefuses to view the wider context of society(Maley 1994). Its entire theoreticalknowledge is based upon the notion andimportance of hegemony and domination byconsent as opposed to coercion. This has beendeemed naïve by various academics with fartoo much of a focus on an ‘anti-powerful’stance which fails to show any focus on thepotential of changing structures (Althusser1971). However for the basis of thisdissertation this notion and theory is vital.


Documentary Analysis- Secondary Research

Probably the most important and most usedform of research used for this dissertationis documentary analysis and researchingsecondary sources. Documentary research isthe fundamental use of documents and widerforms of literature as a main focus. It isused to strongly back up or examinestandpoints and viewpoints within academia.It is used as a main form of research on thesocial world and is highly used in socialscience disciplines such as criminology andsociology due to its high academic valuewithin qualitative research (Nokes & Wincup,2004). Evidently a document is a written textproduced by singular scholars or collectivelywith the main expectation of voicing theirviews upon a facet of society or historicalevent. The analysis of these is the abilityand method in which one must criticallyanalyse certain forms of literature in whichto gain the best possible knowledge on thesubject matter (Grix, 2001).

However within this, one must become awareof the literature’s origins, sole purpose andthe audience intended for it, as certainpolitical and cultural influences and agendascan be carried with literature (Mogalakwe,2006). The key to secondary document researchanalysis is to analyse documents produced bythose whom have failed to gain a first-hand


account of the event, yet who have compliedfirst-hand accounts and other documents onthe research area to create a secondarydocument. To critically analyse these onemust read the document along with a varietyof literature upon the subject matter, bothwidely and critically to decipher a viewpoint in which creates and gains the mostrelevance to the research in hand.Documentary sources vary from a widespectrum, there is no strict limitedallowance for sources.

The key forms analysed within this researchare journal articles, books and mediasources. This form of research has beenchosen as an almost constant method due itits high value to the discipline ofcriminology and also in its high value in theuse of academic pursuit of truth and also fora truly non bias analysis of resources, dueto both the vast amount but also due to itsability to analyse academic, media andofficial resources (McCulloch, 2004). Alsothe key value archives and historical sourcesplace upon investigating an historical eventcannot be overestimated and this is avaluable string to the bow of documentaryanalysis. The key use for journal articlesand books can be justified for thisdissertation due to both their ease ofaccessibility and their substance, theseresources complete the main body of researchundertaken and their influence on this


dissertation cannot be overestimated. A keyadvantage of journal articles around the areaof disasters and especially the Burnden parkdisaster (Baker, 1998) tend to side upon acritical stance yet also a sympathetic,almost refusal of acceptance towards theblame game in which the supporters and thelower voices with society gain blame and arehanded accountability.

This is very much a constant theme withcriminology and the variety of journalarticles within this discipline tend to verymuch lend their selves to this ideology.Criminological research of this form tends tohand any accountability left toward theprimary definers within the event as opposedto the status quo and ease of blame upon thepowerless within society. However as eludedto earlier one must be cautious not to lendtoo much importance upon this stance ascompetent research must stick toward aneutral unbiased view point, if a successfuland vivid piece of research is to gainprevalence. One must not become engulfed andin turn contribute to a political andcultural motive or agenda in which thearticle or book is written with in mind(Noaks & Wincup, 2004). Also one must also bewary upon the validity and quality of thearticle, the researcher must not rely tooheavily on the fact disclosed within this astherefore you are putting sole importance ofyour research upon the ideas of previous


authors whom in fact could have createderrors and mistakes in their works. Some ofthe books used for this dissertation are of anon-academic nature and are in facthistorical books or factual based nonfictionupon events and therefore show no obviouspolitical, social or cultural bias andtherefore one can gain a full analysis ofevents and timelines without a bias beingapparent (Jupp, 1989).

This is an obvious advantage of documentaryresearch if one is attempting to gain aconcise uninfluenced breakdown of events,such as this dissertation needs to if a fullknowledge of the events of Burnden park is togain validity.

Primary Research

The research gathered for this dissertationhas obviously used a varied amount of mixedmethods however, the key analysis must liewithin the primary research. A researcher’spersonal findings and analysis of thesecontribute greatly into the individualproject and creates an undeniable personalstamp upon this. This means that the primaryresearch used is the analysis of non-academicsources and therefore it is the academicresearch which in turn creates the potentialto give it academic justification.


This project used newspaper analysis aroundthe Burnden Park disaster via micro film. Ahigh amount of research in this area has beenundertaken via newspaper articles of the eravia micro film. An extensive research withinboth local and national newspapers was vitalto gauge the dominant view of the era.However I had to be aware of potentialpolitical bias. Power relationships underpinnews production when analysing newspaperaccounts one must also take time to examinewider social issues and beliefs of the era aswell (Richardson, 2007).

The importance of historical archives is amain part of primary research used for thisproject which must not be ignored. Archivalresearch seeks to examine and uncoverevidence via historical and official archiveswhether it be from official buildings or infact museums. The main collection of thisdissertation’s archival research came from avariety of sources housed with the Archivesbuilding within Bolton Museum. A wealth ofofficial articles are referenced within thisdissertation as eluded to earlier theirinfluence and contribution cannot beoverestimated. Also a smaller number ofarchives used where provided for referenceuse by Simon Marland, Club Secretary ofBolton Wanderers. The key advantage of


archives is their historical significance andin some cases are relatively easy to accesswith some negotiation with local and nationalorganisations. Also a key pro of this optionis its unobtrusive nature and moralsoundness. This access was formed via acommunication with both the club’s historicaland promotions departments and variousgatekeepers from within the club. Thearchives used have scaled from newspaperarticles to the Police statement consistinginside the Fatal Casualties Report by ChiefConstable Howard adding to the Hughes inquiryin which a critical analysis is applied.

This form of research removes the danger ofmoral and ethical mistrust and the potentialfor harm or personal upheaval (Gomm, 2004).This is also a key validation of yourresearch and gives the research anunquestionable validity. The research witharchives draws upon a more obvious advantagethan most other research methods, not leastdue to the data examined has already beencollated which in turn shows an obvioussaving and non-exhaustive financial andemotional commitment. In turn, with the dataalready collated the review process of theresearch causes less alarm bells and lesspotential for academic failure (Ramsey et al,2010).


However archival research does pose a numberof questionable issues, the fact that themajority of official archives tend to steeraway from research which examines opinion andattitudes of the era and in turn tends to beof a strict association to organisation andinstitutions and with this in mind a fullidea of the archive may be restricted due tothese limitations (Lee, 2000).

This idea is very much akin to the use ofresearch within newspapers earlier eluded to.This is a dominant form of research similarto archives in the same way in which it mustbe extensively analysed when researching intoan historical event and especially when amain of the research is to explore dominantdiscourses around the event as with thisdissertation. To analyse newspapers one mustview the world as a wide spectrum rather thanan isolated event in which sympathy ‘must’ beadded. Newspapers of differing agendas willoften propose different stand points andthose must be analysed as much as thenewspaper and event in mind (Braun & Clarke,2013). Media analysis has been used withinthis dissertation to uncover discourses andinitial reactions in the immediate aftermathof this disaster, for this reason and othersit shows great significance in research andis a very clear ‘pro’ of this method.


A researcher must attempt to stay modesthowever, I would be lying if I didn’tindicate the level of effort put into theprimary methods conducted. A high amount oftime was spent trolleying through deeparchives such as Police statements within theFatal Casualties Report and the HughesEnquiry within Bolton Museum and at BoltonWanderers Training Ground in Euxton. Equallyas time strenuous was the time spent withinthe micro film centre at Bolton Museumreading pages upon pages of newspaperarticles from the era around the disaster.This hopefully, indicates how much of a timebut also emotional investment has been placedonto this project.

Qualitative Research Interviews

Another key use of primary research used forthis project has been two informal interviewsconducted with Simon Marland, the ClubSecretary of Bolton Wanderers and PhyllisRobb, the only known reaming supporter whomwas present at the disaster. Interviews canhelp gain a thorough analysis of events andhistorical issues, one of the interviewsconducted within this dissertation is that ofa first-hand survivor account. This is aphenomenal source and this form of interviewhelps research gain validity and esteemed81 | T h e B u r n d e n P a r k D i s a s t e r

acknowledgment. Anyone can read literature orwrite upon events from a far but someone whowas actually there adds a certainsignificance to research otherwise impossibleto get. These interviews had an informalstructure, to both create a more relaxedenvironment for both the interviewee but alsothe interviewer. As advised by supervisionthese interviews were very much on theinterviewee’s terms with time, date andlocation up to them. A cooperativerelationship is vital and this must be builtto the interviewers and this symbiosis oftrust and respect must remain intact for theresults to gain relevance (Jupp, 1989). Theadvantages of this approach especially withthe use of open questions, akin to thisresearch give the researcher the ability topotentially uncover great knowledge tofurther gain an answer closer to thepotential hypothesis but also answers whichthe researcher thought unavailablepreviously. The skill of framing a questionin a way which gets an answer without obviousprompt is a skill which cannot beoverestimated. A previously established skillset of basic social skills, common sense,rapport and flexibility are vital to therelaxed interview and these are a set oftechniques either developed or natural (Noaks& Wincup, 2004). The disadvantages can occurdue to the un-readable nature of this method,the purely spontaneous nature of the researchform interviews can sometimes have a negative82 | T h e B u r n d e n P a r k D i s a s t e r

effect as the outcomes can become eitherinvalid or also non-existent as any matter ofsocial life can interrupt the process or theinterviewee can use their right to rejectparticipation at any time.

Success of Methods?

The proof within research methods is verymuch in the pudding as the next chapter whichwill examine and explains the research andfindings and the analysis of those findings,will show. The methods used within did helpgive this research a vital amount of accessand sources vital for this dissertation. Ibelieve the methods used were of the bestmethods needed for this dissertation andexecuted so that the findings were of thebest and most vivid available. The methodsallowed room for the research questions to begiven the best potential for conclusion andthe following chapter will indicate this viathe analysis of both primary and secondaryresearch.


2.Phyllis Robb Interview

3/3/15

Phyllis Robb interview

With assistance from David Kay (nephew)

How many games did you attend at Burnden Park before the second world war?

: ‘Oh I used go every week, I used sneak up at back to where’t seats were (laughing), under the turnstiles – right at back – everyone used do it though’

Do you remember a big build to the Bolton Vs Stoke game in 1946 at all?

: ‘I cant really remember love’

Do you remember what happened on that day at all?

: ‘yeah, erm well I as I know they shut turnstiles down and then we were all out side, you can see that (points to picture of Phyliss at the disaster). And then, then the turnstile collapsed y’know yeah’


Where you in the Embankment stand?

:’No I was on the outside, I hadn’t gone in yet but I waswith my father but he had climbed over the turnstile’

To the best of your knowledge, what would you say was themain reason for this disaster?

:’well I don’t know really, well over crowding with all them people: they were trying to get in and they had to shut it down’

Do you remember a crowd like this being at burnden park before or was this more of an isolated incident?

:‘well I think it was just a one off yeah’


Do you know why? Was it the fa cup appeal?

:‘its cause they were trying to get in you see and all pushing to get in but they couldn’t get in because it wasshut down’

Why did you think there was more people going to that game than usual though?

:’well probably yeah, well you can see on that photo withall those people’

The burden stand was owned by the ministry of food holding 2000 empty seats, yet they refused to open it forthe game despite calls from the club. Do you think these 2000 seats should have been used?


:’yeah, yeah’

Would you place blame onto anyone for this disaster?

:’I cant remember love’

Would you class burnden park a safe ground at that time?

:’well I don’t know really, no no no’ ………… no stewards nocontrol of a crowd though probably not’


Do you remember anything around after the game? A mourning town?

:’ I know they were all going down Manchester road – crowds of them’

Anything around the media at the time?

:‘errrmm no cant remember’

The fans have been placed at the blame for this. Do you agree with this?

:’err the fans got excited so probably a few of them yes’


After the match did you still carry on to attend Burnden park

:’didn’t go in the 90’s probably the 70s when I stopped going – used go with my father’

:’such a long time since I went so I can’t really remember a lot’

David Kay :’ when phyliss was younger they all went as a group, as a family’

Phyliss :’ that game though, I lost my brother – dunno where he went but me dad made off trying to get over the turnstile – he were. That when that photo were took (points at photo again) – it is me that, definitely.


3.Phyllis Robb Consent Form


4.Simon Marland Interview

Interview with Simon Marland – Bolton Wanderers Football Club Secretary

17/2/15

Bolton Wanderers Training Ground – Euxton, Lancashire

Simon, can you tell me in your own words the events leading up to the Burden Disaster to you knowledge?

- ‘’Right okay, yeah. The game against Stoke City was,erm well it wasn’t expected the crowd would turn up as much as did. Obviously, just after the war aroundthat time and crowds were increasing as the war was coming to an end and on that particular day the mainreason a lot more people turned up than probably normally would do was Stan(ley) Matthews. People were obviously there to see him play for Stoke City and of course the winners of this particular game, the two legged game, would progress to the FA cup semi finals. On the actual day itself, certainly from the reports people put in, they don’t see anything out of the ordinary in the early stages leading up to the start of the game. Only when people actually get into the ground do they notice that something actually isn’t quite right in terms of there appeared to be too many people in the Embankment stand of the ground, where as other partsof the ground there were no issues whatsoever. People started becoming worried and a father and hisson wanted to get out of the ground and the way theymanaged to do that, eventually after a few attempts in trying to get out of the ground, they managed to pick the lock and open the gate to actually get out.Unfortunately the gate was open which allowed peopleon the outside to get in. Obviously this compounded the situation, adding to the fact that people were climbing into the ground from the railway line meantthere were a lot more people in that area of the stadium than really should have been and


unfortunately two of the stantions in the stand gaveway and obviously people were crushed and that’s really, in a nutshell, what happened.’’

To whom, if anyone would you place blame on for this disaster?

- ‘’I think it is one of those things, and the reportssays this, its one of those things – a rare occurrence that the actual disaster of the people inthe ground actually inflicting it upon themselves. I.e people getting in when they shouldn’t of been and congregating in the same area. So I think if order had been kept and nobody getting in the groundwhen they shouldn’t of been in, nobody knows for sure but the chances of its happening would of certainly been reduced. So I believe and it has been proved that no one was actually held liable’’

To your knowledge, do you believe the estimated crowd of 50,000 was a reasonable estimation given the appeal of the FA cup at that time and of Stanley Matthews and the up and coming Nat Lofthouse?

- ‘’Yeah, I think it was and the thing is with gates at Bolton around that time you could get fantastic gates for cup ties and poor gates for league games. I think after our biggest league gate on the ground,I think we played four days later and there was only3000 people on the ground so Bolton supporters were fickle. I think as an estimate to say 50,000 people to turn up at an FA cup tie would have been a reasonable estimate, I think it was circumstances which caused the situation.’’

Do you corroborate that illegal entry was the main cause of the disaster?


- Yeah, Yeah.

Do you see any similarities between this disaster and theHillsborough disaster of 1989?

- Erm you say similarities, I think its chalk and cheese really between then and now. I mean communication was totally different – no radios, I mean if technology would have been available back in1946 that was available back when Hillsborough took place, you know you could…would it of happened? Possibly not you know cause I think people back thenwould of communicated much better, wouldn’t of been relying on runners to deal with things, the police would have had communication with themselves and they wold of been able to disperse the crowd. So when you say similarities, yes similarities in termsof what happened and that people were crushed and things like that. And of course the aftermath of thedisaster, obviously were are still talking about Hillsborough now, at least the disaster in 1946, rightly or wrongly at least it was wrapped up relatively quickly compared to Hillsborough. Of course the down side to Hillsborough is that everybody was blaming everybody else, whereas at least with the Bolton one I can say the blame…it wasn’t really anybody’s fault in the end of the day.Slightly different.

Some within Literature on the area place 100% blame on the fans, do you believe there should be a similar pursuit of justice akin to that of the Hillsborough 96 for the Burnden 33?

- I think when you say 100% on the fans, yes alright the man opening the gates, he wasn’t opening it to let people in, he was opening it to get out. The


guys that got in and people climbing over the railway, could the police of done more? Obviously the level of stewarding wasn’t anything like it is these days, so I think to apportion blame for something back in 1946 is very very difficult compared to what happened at Hillsborough and I don’t believe anybody buried their head in the sandin the aftermath which obviously cant be said about Hillsborough.


5. Simon Marland Consent Form


6. Image of Phyllis Robb at Burnden Park Disaster


7. Match day Ticket and Programme: Bolton vs Stoke, 9 th

march 1946


8. Hughes Inquiry 1946 Cuttings

Warrant of Appointment for K.C Hughes toconduct the inquiry.


Hughes stating illegal entry as a factor in the disaster but by no means a major one.


9. Fatal Casualties Report 1946 Cuttings

Front Cover of Report


Various Police Statements within the report


10. Newspaper Cuttings


News of The World – 10th March 1946


The Guardian – 12th March 1946 & 30th March 1946


The Observer – 10th March 1946 & The Guardian

11th March 1946


Bolton Evening News – 29th March 1946


11. Relevant Images

Fans and Officials attempt to bring the dead back to life


Fans spill onto the pitch and the crush becomes unbearable


The aftermath of the crush barriers post disaster.


Flags fly at half-mast at Bolton’s new ground, the Macron Stadium on the 69th Anniversary of the Disaster with a statue of Nat Lofthouse looking on.


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The Burnden Park Disaster: Examining The Sense Making Process of Football's Forgotten Tragedy...

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