The argument of experience: Experience predicates and argument structure in Catalan and Mayangna

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Ricard Viñas i de Puig

The argument of experience: Experience predicates and argument structure in Catalanand Mayangna

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Elena Benedicto

Elaine Francis

Robert Hammond

Ronnie Wilbur

Elena Benedicto

Ronnie Wilbur 05/07/09

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The argument of experience: Experience predicates and argument structure in Catalan andMayangna

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


05/07/09

THE ARGUMENT OF EXPERIENCE: EXPERIENCE PREDICATES AND ARGUMENT

STRUCTURE IN CATALAN AND MAYANGNA

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty

of

Purdue University

by


In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2009

Purdue University

West Lafayette, Indiana

ii

Per a la Mariona i en Jordi, per tot el support,

els ànims i les forces que sempre m’han donat.

I per donar-me algú a qui admirar.

Moltes, moltíssimes gràcies!

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Since I started doing research and reading other people’s dissertations, I have always

enjoyed reading the acknowledgments section. And I always thought that it would take

quite some time for me to write mine. Well, here I am.

This work would have not been possible without the help, guidance, and support of

the members of my Advisory Committee, Dr. Elena Benedicto, Dr. Ronnie Wilbur, Dr.

Elaine Francis, and Dr. Robert Hammond. Elena, my advisor and now friend, has always

been there when I needed support or criticism. With her extensive knowledge on

language, languages, syntax, argument structure, or anything that I could prompt her

with, she has helped me become the linguist that I am today; with her view of the

world, with the opportunity she offered me to go to Nicaragua to work with the

members of the Mayangna community, with the many hours of meetings and

conversations, she has helped me become the person that I am today. Moltes gràcies!

A long time ago, in the spring semester of 2001, I took a class with Ronnie Wilbur.

That class strengthened my interest in syntax in general, and on argument structure in

particular. Without it and her teaching, this dissertation wouldn’t have been possible.

Elaine Francis has also been of great support. Always available and always with an

interesting thing to say, Elaine made me think of syntax under another perspective.

Thanks to her I am a better linguist. And finally, none of this would have been possible

without Dr. Hammond. In August 1999 (ten years ago!), he gave me all the good reasons

to pursue my graduate studies in linguistics, and in 2005 he welcomed and supported

me again (even though he knew I had already been converted to syntax and pulled away

from the beauty of phonology). To all, many thanks.

iv

I am also grateful to all the other people involved in linguistics at Purdue. I thank all

the members of faculty, who taught me in or outside the classroom all that I know

about language and linguistics, and who supported me all the way to here. Also, and

specially, I want to acknowledge all my peer students and friends, with a special

mention to the (other) members of the IELLab: Alyson Eggleston, Sunny Park, Jason

Overfelt, Yin Ling Cheung, and Naejong Kim. Jason deserves a special word, for all the

hours spent desk to desk at the lab, for all the comments and remarks, for all the

interesting conversations on phases, operators and circuses, and for all the laughter we

shared (I will miss it!). Outside the lab, I can’t forget all the people directly or indirectly

involved with PLA: Alejandrina Cristià, Engin Arik, Carly Houston, Josh Iddings, Elizabeth

Strong, Beril Tezeller Arik, Ager Gondra, Ellen Osterhaus, Nate Schleuder, George

Wolford, Ayman Yasin, and many others. And special thanks to a dear friend of mine: Dr.

Donny Vigil. Muchas gracias, amigo!

My years as a doctoral student have been some of the most rewarding in my life. And

I owe great part of this to the people I met in Rosita, Nicaragua, who showed to me

other realities of life and language, who contributed to shape me to be the person and

the linguist I am today. I want to expressly thank here the members of the Mayangna

Yulbarangyang Balna, Demetrio Antolín, Modesta Dolores, Tomasa Gómez, Susana

Budier, Gloria Fenly, and Elisa Salomón. I am also very grateful to the people, staff, and

students in URACCAN Rosita, to the different members of the community in Rosita, and

in particular to Doña Inés and Doña Nar. I have a special word for Jacinto Charles and

Mateo Torrez, who allowed me to contribute in their research and who shared with me

a few, very interesting hours, discussing impersonal verbs in Mayangna. Tingkih palni!

I have also learned a great deal at conferences, schools, workshops, and different

talks during these last few years. For having listened to my ideas and my analysis, and

above all, for having provided me with excellent feedback and pointed out flaws, I want

to expressly thank Dr. Luigi Rizzi, Dr. Adriana Belletti, Dr. Kleanthes Grohmann, and Dr.

Marcel den Dikken.

v

As I said before, it’s been ten years since I first started my wondering why languages

work the way they do. All this time away I have not forgotten my friends from home,

who even without their knowing, have helped me go through this. To Will, Carles,

Sandra, Xilú, Pilar, Pollo, David, Trumfu, and, of course, Xivi, moltes gràcies!

I am particularly thankful to Montse Feixas, who in 2004 convinced me to go back to

graduate school. I took her advice, and I can’t thank her enough.

Before I close this section of the dissertation, I want to express my deepest and most

deserved gratitude to Alyson. All through the last few years she has always been there,

being my most patient support, encouraging me when things didn’t go the way I

wanted, reading different versions of different papers, making me laugh, sharing

experiences and experiencers and new places, and making life in Lafayette (and

elsewhere) a wonderful experience. Moltíssimes gràcies, milof!

Finally, a word for my family: Mariona, Jordi, Glòria, and Jaume. During these years,

they supported me in every decision I made, they encouraged me at the times I needed

it most, and they have been close to me despite oceans and time zones. Moltes gràcies;

no ho hauria pogut fer sense vosaltres.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. viii ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. ix

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. x

CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES ............................................................................................... 1

1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

1.2. A long history of experiences (in short) ................................................................... 2

1.3. The goals ................................................................................................................... 9

1.4. The proposal ............................................................................................................. 9

CHAPTER 2. A UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE FOR EXPERIENCE PREDICATES ............................ 18

2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 18

2.1.1. Chapter outline ................................................................................................ 20

2.2. The argument of the EXPERIENCE (EXP-E) .................................................................. 20

2.2.1. The EXPERIENCE (EXP-E) as an independent argument........................................ 21

2.2.2. Incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V ................................................................ 26

2.3. The argument of the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE ............................................................. 28

2.4. The argument of the EXPERIENCER ............................................................................ 34

2.4.1. On the external argument status of EXPERIENCERS in Mayangna....................... 38

2.5. The assignment of Case .......................................................................................... 41

2.5.1. Experience predicates are not unaccusative ................................................... 41

2.5.2. Different arguments, different Case ................................................................ 42

2.6. A word order for the experience ............................................................................ 47

2.7. Summary ................................................................................................................. 56

CHAPTER 3. WHEN THE SOURCE GOES MISSING ............................................................. 58

3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 58

3.1.1. Chapter outline ................................................................................................ 59

3.2. A structure without a SOURCE .................................................................................. 60

3.2.1. The Mayangna option ...................................................................................... 61

3.2.2. The Catalan option ........................................................................................... 65

3.2.3. Accounting for the parameterization............................................................... 71

3.2.4. A Case to solve ................................................................................................. 72

3.3. The need for the EXPERIENCE .................................................................................... 73

3.4. The need for the EXPERIENCER .................................................................................. 80

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Page

3.5. Summary ................................................................................................................. 82

CHAPTER 4. EXPERIENCING EVENTS ................................................................................. 84

4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 84

4.1.1. Chapter outline ................................................................................................ 87

4.2. Stative vs. Eventive experience predicates ............................................................ 87

4.2.1. Reviewing the causes: internal vs. external causation .................................... 92

4.3. Internally caused experiences ................................................................................ 97

4.4. Externally caused experiences ............................................................................. 101

4.5. Summary ............................................................................................................... 105

CHAPTER 5. EXPERIENCE AGENTS ................................................................................... 107

5.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 107

5.1.1. Chapter outline .............................................................................................. 110

5.2. Evidence for an agentive structure ...................................................................... 110

5.2.1. One reason for two structures: UTAH............................................................ 117

5.3. A Case for an agentive experience ....................................................................... 118

5.3.1. An account for the variation of Case on the EXPERIENCER ............................... 122

5.4. Accounting for the agentive-allowing experience predicates ............................. 129

5.5. The interpretation of phases ................................................................................ 134

5.6. Summary ............................................................................................................... 137

CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ..................................... 140

6.1. Summary ............................................................................................................... 140

6.2. Issues for further research ................................................................................... 142

LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 144

VITA ................................................................................................................................. 151

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page Table 1.1 Revised classification of experience predicates (Four classes) ......................... 25 Table 2.1 Revised classification of experience predicates (Four classes) ......................... 64 Table 2.2 Revised classification of experience predicates (Five classes) .......................... 64 Table 2.3 Revised classification of experience predicates (Six classes) ............................ 69 Table 2.4 Revised classification of experience predicates (Seven classes) ...................... 80 Table 5.1 Agentive vs. non-agentive experience predicates ............................................ 13

ix

ABBREVIATIONS

1: 1st person

2: 2nd person

3: 3rd person

ACC: Accusative

ADV: Adverb

AGR: Agreement

APASS: Antipassive

C: Complementizer

D: Determiner

DAT: Dative

DS: Different subject

EXP-E: EXPERIENCE

EXP-ER: EXPERIENCER

f: Feminine

INF: Infinitive

LOC: Locative

m: Masculine

NEG: Negation

NOM: Nominative

ObjExp: Experiencer Object

OBL: Oblique

p.mrkr: Plural marker

p: Plural

PART: Partitive

PIMP: Past Imperfective

PPART: Past Participle

PRES: Present

PRESSUBJ: Present Subjunctive

REFL: Reflexive

s: Singular

Spec: Specifier

SubExp: Experiencer Subject

x

ABSTRACT

Viñas-de-Puig, Ricard. Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2009. The Argument of Experience: Experience Predicates and Argument Structure in Catalan and Mayangna. Major Professor: Dr. Elena Benedicto. In this dissertation I propose a universally available structure for experience predicates.

According to this structure, which is exemplified in two typologically unrelated linguistic

families (Mismumalpan and Romance), the EXPERIENCE merges with a V head and creates

a predication-like structure with the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE. A verbal functional projection

is merged on top of VP, responsible for the introduction of the EXPERIENCER as VP-

external argument. This BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE allows for different levels of

parameterization. The EXPERIENCE can undergo syntactic incorporation on V or surface as

an independent argument, triggering the presence of a light verb.

Some experience predicates are the result of a structure without the introduction of the

SOURCE. This triggers two logical possibilities: a. the EXPERIENCER is assigned inherent

Dative Case, as attested in Mayangna; or b. the EXPERIENCER enters into structural Case

assigning relations, thus receiving Nominative.

The eventive interpretation of (otherwise stative) experience predicates is accounted

for by merging two possible heads selecting vEXPP. Following recent approaches on event

structure and causation, I argue that if an unaccusative vBECOME head selects vEXPP, an

eventive interpretation with no external Causer is obtained (i.e. internally triggered

experiences). The resulting structure is the base for another event layer: if a vCAUSP,

which introduces an external CAUSER, is merged on top of vBECOMEP we obtain an

interpretation of an experience caused by an external CAUSER (i.e. externally triggered

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experiences). The agentive interpretation is the result of the event structure headed by

vCAUS, which introduces an external CAUSER with animate features. This agentive

interpretation, also attested crosslinguistically, is conditioned by a restrictive subset of

EXPERIENCES, which share eventive features.

The analysis of experience predicates that I put forth in this dissertation fills one of the

gaps in the related literature, as it presents a sound basis for the different realizations of

experience predicates, building from a simple argument structure. In addition, the

availability of merging different functional projections accounts for the different

possible interpretations of the predicate. This structure also opens the door to further

related research regarding the possible realization of experiences in other languages

and the interpretation and valuation of phases.

1

CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES

1.1. Introduction

The central point of this dissertation is to propose a general structural representation

for experience predicates. According to the proposal that I put forward here, this

structure, provided by UG, might underline the specific concrete parameterizations

instantiated crosslinguistically. This proposal differs from previous works in the

literature on psych (or experience) predicates as it provides a principled

parameterization account to explain for the wide diversity of surface structures found

crosslinguistically. In particular, it provides an account for two new structures found in

unrelated, non-contact languages, undescribed to this point. The basic, underlying

structure that I propose is shown below.

(1) BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

2

According to this BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, an EXPERIENCE merges with a V head,

allowing for a possible syntactic incorporation, and enters into a predication-like

structure with the SOURCE, merged in at the [Spec, VP] position. The EXPERIENCER is

introduced by the functional projection vEXP, at an external argument position.

In the section that follows I present the basic approaches that lead to the proposal.

Then, I present the goals of the dissertation and the details of the proposal itself.

1.2. A long history of experiences (in short)

As Landau (2005) points out, “experiencers are special” (Landau 2005: 1). In different

languages, experiencer arguments and experience predicates show a special behavior.

This fact has drawn the attention of many scholars, who have devoted most or great

deal of their research in trying to find an account for the different flavors and

representations of experience predicates from different theoretical perspectives

(Pesetsky 1987, 1995; Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Brekke 1988; Martín 1988; Rigau 1990;

Bouchard 1992; Masullo 1992; Croft 1993; Whitley 1995; Torrego 1996; Cabré & Mateu

1998; Arad 1998, 1999a, b; Ausín & Depiante 2000; Haspelmath & Caruana 2000; Parodi

& Luján 2000; McGinnis 2000, 2001; Rosselló 2002; Åfarli 2002; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008;

Bennis 2004; Landau 2005; Adger & Ramchand 2006; Cuervo 2003, 2008; among many

others).

Within generative linguistics, and more precisely under the Principles and Parameters

framework of syntax (with its different development from the older Government and

Binding to the more recent Minimalist Program (cf. Chomsky 1995)), different authors

have presented different accounts for the (interesting) behavior of psych(ological) or

experience(r) predicates. One of the main issues to be noticed (from a purely descriptive

ground) is that experience predicates can be divided into two main categories,

depending on the surface role played by the EXPERIENCER in the predicate: some

experience predicates express the EXPERIENCER as a subject (SubExp); other experience

3

predicates expressed the EXPERIENCER as an object (ObjExp) (cf.Pesetsky 1987, 1995;

Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Martín 1988; Franco 1990; Arad 1998, 1999a; McGinnis 2000,

2001; Åfarli 2002; among others).

(2) a. I fear his untruthful comments. SubExp

b. His untruthful comments scare me. ObjExp

With this distinction in mind, Pesetsky (1987, 1995) (and others) points out that

ObjExp psych verbs allow what has come to be known as a “backward binding”

phenomenon: the (surface) object of an experience predicate can bind an anaphor in

the (surface) subject. Such a phenomenon is exemplified in (3).

(3) a. Pictures of each other annoy the politicians.

b. Stories about herself generally please Mary.

c. Each other’s health worried the students.

d. Each other’s books amazed the men. (Pesetsky 1987: 127, ex. 4a-d)

In an attempt to account for these (and) other facts regarding experience predicates,

Pesetsky (1987) presents a proposal that will be expanded in a later work (Pesetsky

1995). According to this account, psych verbs are raising predicates introducing two

arguments: the EXPERIENCER and an infinitival clause. The infinitival clause includes an NP

which raises to the subject position of the (raising) experience predicate, leaving a gap

in the infinitival clause. In the cases of binding as the ones observed in (3), the NP is

bound by the PRO of the infinitival clause, which is in turn controlled by the EXPERIENCER,

thus obtaining the observed binding interpretation. A schematic representation of this

account is exemplified in (4).

(4) a. [Pictures of each otheri]j annoy the politiciansi [PROi to look at [e]j].

b. [Stories about herselfi]j generally please Maryi [PROi to hear [e]j].

4

c. [Each otheri’s health]j worried the studentsi [PROi to think about [e]j].

d. [Each otheri’s books]j amazed the meni [PROi to read [e]j].

(Pesetsky 1987: 130, ex. 13a-d)

Pesetsky (1987, 1995) makes a crucial observation of this account. The infinitival

clause may or may not be overtly expressed (or deleted): the sentences in (3) above

represent instances of the infinitival clause being deleted; the utterances in (4), on the

other hand, overtly maintain the infinitival clause. Despite this distinction in the overt

representation of the utterance, Pesetsky (1987, 1995) contends that the infinitival

clause is always present in the syntax (although it may not be phonologically expressed),

which accounts for the “backward binding” phenomenon observed.

Pesetsky’s (1987, 1995) account of experience predicates has been used as a base of

subsequent works on psych verbs (Torrego 1996; McGinnis 2000, 2001; Åfarli 2002;

Pylkkänen 2002, 2008; among many others), with slight modifications of the argument

structure of these predicates or the event structure into which these are merged.

The 80’s witnessed another approach to accounting for the realization of experience

predicates. In an already classical work on (Italian) psych verbs, Belletti & Rizzi (1988)

proposed a three-way distinction of experience predicates based on the different Cases

assigned to the EXPERIENCER and the THEME. Such proposal, which has been considered by

different authors in many works since (Rigau 1990; Masullo 1992; Arad 1998; Cabré &

Mateu 1998; Rosselló 2002; Landau 2005; Adger & Ramchand 2006; Cuervo 2003, 2008;

among many others) is shown in (5) below.

(5) a. Class I: Nominative EXPERIENCER; accusative THEME.

John loves Mary.

b. Class II: Nominative THEME; accusative EXPERIENCER.

The show amused Bill.

c. Class III: Nominative THEME; dative EXPERIENCER.

The idea appealed to Julie.

5

Obviously, having different authors means having different views of the same issue,

with trivial (or not so trivial) differences between the various proposals. Belletti & Rizzi

(1988) argue that despite their surface structure and the Case they are assigned,

EXPERIENCERS (and THEMES) are always generated in the same structural position and are

subject to changes in the derivation. According to these authors, Class I is a regular

transitive predicate, with the EXPERIENCER being born as an external argument and the

THEME as an internal argument; Classes II and III, on the other hand are unaccusative:

the THEME, despite appearing as a surface subject, is in fact an underlying internal

argument, which is object of syntactic transformation resulting in it surfacing as

‘subject’.

Rosselló (2002) applies Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) classification to Catalan psych verbs to

claim that experience predicates in both Catalan and Italian psychological predicates can

be divided into three classes depending on the Case assigned to the different arguments

(EXPERIENCER and THEME). This author also argues that those predicates belonging to Class

II (Nominative THEME, Dative EXPERIENCER) can be further distinguished from the other

two classes of psych verbs as only the ones belonging to Class II may express causation.

This author coincides with a previous account of such a phenomenon by Cabré & Mateu

(1998): only those predicates belonging to Class II allow a causative interpretation,

according to which the experience is brought by an external CAUSER. This phenomenon is

actually linked to an alternation on the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER (a phenomenon

discussed later in the dissertation). The experience predicates belonging to the other

two classes are not eventive, and therefore cannot express a causative interpretation

(cf. Franco 1990; Cabré & Mateu 1998; Arad 1998; McGinnis 2000, 2001; Franco &

Huidobro 2003).

In another analysis of (a subset of) Catalan psych verbs, Rigau (1990) argues against

some of the claims put forth by Belletti & Rizzi (1988). According to her analysis, Catalan

psych predicates belonging to Class III, such as agradar ‘to like’, are not unaccusative

(with the THEME being a derived subject and thus displaying agreement with the verb),

since these predicates fail some traditional tests for unaccusativity: i. the ‘subject’ of

6

these predicates cannot be replaced by the Partitive clitic en (6a); ii. these predicates

cannot appear in constructions with participial absolutes (6b); or iii. these predicates do

not allow an arbitrary pro interpretation (when the subject is replaced by a 3rd person

plural pro) (6c).

(6) a. * Te n’ agraden? DAT.2s en like-PRES.3p ‘Do you like some/any?’ (Rigau 1990: 9, ex. 6)

b. *Agradats els colors, en Pere es va posar a pintar. like-PPART.3pm the colors D Pere REFL.3s go-PRES.3s put-INF to paint-INF ‘Once he liked the colors, Pere started to paint.’ (Rigau 1990: 9, ex. 7c)

c. * A Itàlia proarb agraden a tothom. in Italy pro.3p like-PRES.3p to everybody ‘In Italy, everybody likes something.’ (Rigau 1990: 10, ex. 11b)

With all this evidence in hand, Rigau (1990) argues that the psych predicates of the

belonging to the agradar ‘to like’ class constitute a special type of transitive predicates

with two arguments, a SOURCE and a GOAL. These two arguments correspond to Belletti

& Rizzi’s (1988) arguments of THEME and EXPERIENCER, respectively.

In a more recent work, Landau (2005) takes Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) analysis a little bit

further and claims that EXPERIENCERS are actually locative arguments, always introduced

by a preposition which may be overtly or covertly expressed. Adger & Ramchand (2006)

combine different aspects of both Belletti& Rizzi’s (1988) and Landau’s (2005)

approaches and contend that EXPERIENCERS are externally merged in the derivation in two

different positions, depending on the structure of the psych construction: (a) “in

transitive psych constructions, experiencers are added by a higher functional head”,

while (b) “in intransitive psych constructions, the experiencer is exactly like an abstract

locative PP” (Adger & Ramchand 2006: 2; their emphasis).

7

Franco (1990), Franco & Huidobro (2003), in their analysis of Spanish experience

predicates, also propose a tripartite classification of psych verbs. As opposed to Belletti

& Rizzi’s (1988) approach, their classification is not based on the Case assigned to the

EXPERIENCER and the THEME. Rather, these authors claim that Spanish psych verbs can be

divided in three different classes depending on the “kinds of constructions in which

these verbs can appear” (Franco 1990: 58). As a result, a new typology of (Spanish)

experience predicates is proposed. This classification is shown in (7), with corresponding

examples in (8).

(7) TYPOLOGY OF SPANISH EXPERIENCER VERBS (Franco 1990: 58, ex. 48)

Class I amar: [-Antipassive] [-Functional Causative] [+Passive]

Class II divertir: [+Antipassive] [+Functional Causative]

Class III gustar: [-Antipassive] [-Functional Causative] [-Passive]

(8) a. Ana ama los animales. Ana love-PRES.3s the animals ‘Ana loves animals.’

b. A Ana le divierten los comentarios de Juan. to Ana DAT.3s amaze-PRES.3p the comments of Juan ‘Ana is amazed by Juan’s comments.’

b'. Juan divierte a Ana. Juan amaze-PRES.3s to Ana ‘Juan amazes Ana.’

c. A Ana le gustan los animales. to Ana DAT.3s like-PRES.3p the animals ‘Ana likes animals.’

This classification is motivated by an empirical fact. As opposed to the Class II Belletti

& Rizzi (1988) propose for Italian, Franco (1990) and Franco & Huidobro (2003) show

that the Spanish experience predicates belonging to (their) Class II manifest a variation

8

(Accusative vs. Dative) in the assignment of Case to the EXPERIENCER. According to these

authors, such variation in the assignment of Case to the EXPERIENCER is not arbitrary but

subject to the syntactic configuration in which the psych verb enters: in stative readings,

the EXPERIENCER is assigned Dative Case ((8b) above, (9a) below); in constructions with a

causative reading (i.e. in those psych constructions in which the experience is initiated

by an external CAUSER), the EXPERIENCER is assigned Accusative Case ((8b’) above, (9b)

below). Similar views have been held by Fernández-Ordóñez (1999) and Parodi & Luján

(2000), among others, for Spanish experience predicates. For the case of Catalan

experience predicates, Rosselló (2002) proposes a similar analysis, as shown in the

examples in (10) ((10a) for a noncausative (stative) interpretation, (10b) for a causative

(eventive) interpretation).

(9) Spanish

a. Juan le molestó. Juan DAT.3sf bother-PAST.3s ‘Juan bothered her.’

b. Juan la molestó. Juan ACC.3s bother-PAST.3s ‘Juan bothered her.’

(10) Catalan

a. Aquells nens la molesten. those children ACC.3sf bother-PRES.3p ‘Those children bother her.’

b. Li molesten els comentaris racistes. DAT.3s bother-PRES.3p the racist comments ‘Racist comments bother her.’

Despite this very extensive and exhaustive work, to my knowledge none of these

analyses provides a valid account for the realization of other type of experience

predicates. A closer analysis to experience predicates in different languages (like Spanish

9

and Catalan, Romance, or Mayangna1, Misumalpan) reveals variation in the realization

and expression of the different elements in the structure. Such variation and its

unaccountability in previous works lead to the proposal presented in this dissertation.

1.3. The goals

Given that the previous works on experience predicates fail to account for all observed

possibilities of experience predicates, in this dissertation I aim to meet the following

research goals.

(11) i. Provide a UG-based structure accounting for all attested experience

predicates;

ii. Discuss the possible parameterizations this structure allows and the

implications it has on the realizations of the different arguments;

iii. Present a theoretically sound analysis for the different levels of

parameterization observed.

1.4. The proposal

All previous accounts of experience predicates are based on structures that introduce an

EXPERIENCER (EXP-ER) and a THEME (or SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE) as the main arguments of the

predicate. These analyses, however, fail to mention the introduction of the EXPERIENCE

(EXP-E) as an independent argument. Building on ample evidence from the two

(typologically unrelated) languages that are the main object of study in this dissertation,

1 For additional information on the typology and the basic phonological and morpho-syntactic features of

this understudied language, see the works by Hale (1991, 1994), McLean (1996), Norwood (1997),

Benedicto & Hale (2000), and Hale & Salamanca (2002). For information on the behavior of experience

(impersonal) verbs in Mayangna (and additional examples of their realization), see Charles & Torrez

(2008).

10

Catalan and Mayangna, the structure that I propose introduces the EXPERIENCE as an

argument merged to V.


vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

Chapter 2 discusses the basic properties of the different elements in this BASIC

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE. According to this proposal, the EXPERIENCE merges with a V head

creating a structure onto which the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE (or THEME, a term extensively

used in the literature) is merged. This creates a predication-like structure with the

EXPERIENCE and V, with the interpretation of an experience being predicated about the

SOURCE. All these arguments are VP internal, despite the fact that in some languages the

SOURCE shows a surface behavior that may incorrectly hint to the contrary (cf. verbal

agreement pattern in Romance experience predicates). The EXPERIENCER, on the other

hand, is an argument external to the VP, which shows different properties shared by

canonical external arguments. Following recent approaches in the literature on the

nature of verbal functional projections and the introduction of external arguments, I

argue that the EXPERIENCER is introduced by the functional verbal projection vEXP.

As part of this proposal, in this dissertation I focus on some of the possible surface

outputs this structure makes available. According to the representation in (12), the

relationship between the V-head and the EXPERIENCE argument allows for two logical

11

possibilities of representation: a. the EXPERIENCE surfaces as an independent argument,

which in turn triggers the overt presence of a light verb; or b. the EXPERIENCE

incorporates on V, creating a construction with a lexical verb (and, consequently, with

no overt light verb). These two parametrical options are attested: Catalan shows

evidence for preference for the option with light verb constructions; Mayangna, on the

other hand, presents a large collection of experience predicates resulting from the

incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V.

The structure in (13) below shows the resulting structure for Catalan.

(13) Option a: Light verb construction

vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

(light verb)

As I already mentioned, the output of the light verb shows crosslinguistic variation. In

the Catalan examples in (14), the light verb is expressed as fer ‘to do’. The other

arguments in the structure are the EXPERIENCE (mal ‘pain’ in (14a); por ‘fear’ in (14b);

fàstic ‘disgust’ in (14c); ràbia ‘annoyance’ in (14d)), the SOURCE (la mà ‘the hand’ in (14a);

la foscor ‘darkness’ in (14b); les rates ‘the rats’ in (14c); les preguntes estúpides ‘the

stupid questions’ in (14d)), and the EXPERIENCER (em ‘to me’ in (14a-d)).

12

(14) Catalan light verb constructions

a. Em fa mal la mà. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the hand ‘My hand hurts.’

b.Em fa por la foscor. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s fear the darkness ‘Darkness scares me.’

c. Em fan fàstic les rates. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p disgust the rats ‘Rats disgust me.’

d.Em fan ràbia les preguntes estúpides. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p annoyance the stupid questions ‘Stupid questions annoy me.’

The structure in (15) shows the output resulting from the incorporation of the

EXPERIENCE on V. In the corresponding examples in (16), the EXPERIENCE (buih- ‘tremble’ in

(16a); bur- ‘blister’) appears incorporated on V, while the other two arguments, the

SOURCE and EXPERIENCER, are externally merged in the structure as independent

arguments.

(15) Option b: Incorporation of EXPERIENCE on V

vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

VP vEXP

SOURCE V’

EXP-E V

13

(16) Mayangna incorporation constructions

a. Pedro kul kau sak kat, minikpa yak kal buihna. Pedro school in be-PRES.3s C eye-AGR.3s at DAT.3s tremble-PRES.3s ‘When Pedro is in class, his eye trembles.’

b. Abil kidi uba lapakwa kat, kal burwi. Abil D Adv walk-DS.3s C DAT.3s blister.3s ‘When Abil walks a lot, he gets blisters.’

This second option allowed by the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE I propose here, with

incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V, also yields as a possible output the “classical” cases

that were object of study in the previous literature (cf. Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988)

classification of psych verbs). The only (important) difference is that this incorporation

option has a consequence a variation in the Case assigned to the different arguments,

since it allows the possibility of having an experience predicate with no NOMINATIVE

argument but with a Dative EXPERIENCER (4b).

In Chapter 3, I discuss some of the attested outputs that this basic structure allows,

and their implications in the realization of the other elements in the structure. Evidence

from the languages of study shows that some experience predicates are the result of the

non-introduction of A SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE in the structure. This creates a construction

that has consequences in the representation and assignment of Case to the other

arguments, as well as the phonological expression of the light verb, if applicable.

Other possible outputs that the proposed structure triggers are presented in Chapter

4. In this chapter, I discuss other possible variations in the interpretation of the

experience predicate in light verb constructions in both Catalan and Spanish. Inchoative

or causative interpretations trigger a different phonological output of the light verb in

Spanish, whereas in Catalan that interpretation may result in the introduction of

another light verb. In Mayangna, such interpretations are obtained with no change in

the overt expression of the experience predicate. Assuming that ‘bare’ experience

predicates (i.e. vEXPP) are stative in nature (cf. Arad 1998; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008), I argue

that the inchoative and causative interpretations are the result of merging different

14

functional projections on top of the vEXPP. If a vBECOME head (a projection that does not

introduce an external argument) selects (a stative) vEXPP as its complement, the result is

an inchoative interpretation with no external causer, as shown in the structure in (17)

and exemplified in (18) and (19).

(17) INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE (WITH NO EXTERNAL ARGUMENT)

vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

(18) Catalan

Em surten grans (quan menjo xocolata). DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples when eat-PRES.1s chocolate ‘I get pimples whenever I eat chocolate.’

(19) Spanish

Me salen granos (cuando como chocolate). DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples when eat-PRES.1s chocolate ‘I get pimples whenever I eat chocolate.’

On the other hand, if a vCAUS head, which introduces an (external argument) CAUSER, is

merged on top of the eventive vBECOMEP, the result is a causative interpretation with an

external causer, as shown in (20) and exemplified in (21) and (22).

15

(20) INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE WITH EXTERNAL ARGUMENT

vCAUSP

CAUSER vCAUS’

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

(21) Catalan

a. Aquesta música em fa mal de cap. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

b. Aquesta música em fa venir mal de cap. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come-INF pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

(22) Spanish

Esta música me da dolor de cabeza. this music DAT.1s give-PRES.3s pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

An addition to the structure is presented in Chapter 5. I argue that this basic, UG-

available, structure serves as the base structure for those experience predicates that

allow an agentive interpretation. A very restricted number of experience predicates, but

16

common crosslinguistically, allow an agentive reading. Stemming from the proposed

causative structure headed by vCAUSP, and since the thematic and structural relationships

of all the other arguments are maintained, I propose that this structure is the result of

the introduction of an animate CAUSER (i.e. an AGENT) as the external argument of vCAUSP.

The resulting structure (23) has consequences in the representation of the arguments,

the Case they are assigned, and, if applicable, in the phonological expression of the light

verb, as exemplified in (24), (25), and (26).

(23) AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

vCAUSP

AGENT vCAUS’

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

(24) Catalan


b. Aquells nens em fan mal a la mà. those children DAT.1s do-PRES.3p pain to the hand ‘Those children hurt my hand.’

17

(25) Spanish

a.Me molestan los comentarios racistas. DAT.1s bother-PRES.3p the comments racist.p ‘Racist comments bother me.’

b. Juan me molesta a propósito. Juan ACC.1s bother-PRES.3s on purpose ‘Juan bothers me on purpose.’

(26) Mayangna

a. Tingki balna dalâ yâwi. hand-AGR.1s p.mrkr pain DAT.1s-PRES.3s ‘My hands hurt.’ (lit. ‘My hands give me pain.’)

b.Manna dalâni yâtamana. NOM:2p pain-AGR3s DAT.1s-PRES.2p ‘You (p.) are hurting me.’ (lit. ‘You (p.) are giving me pain.’)

Finally, a summary of the main points of the dissertation and an introduction to the

issues for further research are the object Chapter 6.

18

CHAPTER 2. A UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE FOR EXPERIENCE PREDICATES

2.1. Introduction

Experiences, more than experiencers, are special. Experience predicates, object of many

studies within the framework of generative linguistics (Pesetsky 1987, 1995; Belletti &

Rizzi 1988; Masullo 1992; Arad 1998, 1999a, b; Martín 1998; McGinnis 2000, 2001;

Landau 2005; Adger & Ramchand 2006; Cuervo 2003, 2008; among many others),

present very interesting properties. However, despite all this attention in the field, a gap

in the literature is observed: EXPERIENCES, not EXPERIENCERS, are at the core of experience

predicates. Similar to some previous ideas on the incorporation of arguments in psych

constructions (Bouchard 1992), in this dissertation in general, and in this chapter in

particular, I argue that the EXPERIENCE is the core argument of all experience predicates,

and therefore, it should receive the deserved attention of an argument.

Most of the previous work on experience (or psych(ological)) predicates stems from a

very well established classification (first put forth by Belletti & Rizzi 1988), which is

based on the Case assigned to (some of) the different arguments. This classification is

summarized in (1).

(1) a. Class I: Nominative EXPERIENCER; accusative THEME.

John loves Mary.

b. Class II: Nominative THEME; accusative EXPERIENCER.

The show amused Bill.

c. Class III: Nominative THEME; dative EXPERIENCER.

The idea appealed to Julie.

19

Although all these works present interesting facts about the behavior and

representation of experience predicates in different languages, none seems to fully

account for all the possible realizations of experience predicates. As stated in Chapter 1,

in this dissertation I propose a UG-available structure that presents a plausible account

for the different realizations of experience predicates crosslinguistically. The basic shape

of this structure is presented in (2).


vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

In comparison to the previous accounts of experience predicates, the main

innovation that the arboreal structure in (2) presents is the introduction of the

EXPERIENCE (EXP-E)2 as an independent argument. In this chapter I provide syntactic

evidence (in different languages) in support of the consideration of the EXPERIENCE as an

independent argument, which first merges with a V head. The resulting structure later

merges with the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE3, creating a predication-like structure, with the

2 This notion of the EXPERIENCE as an independent argument resembles that of Bouchard’s (1992) notion of

psy-chose. According to Bouchard (1992), the psy-chose, the argument that turns any given construction into a psych construction, may be incorporated on the verb, in a process that presents some common traits with the one that I propose. However, contrary to his views, in the analysis that I put forward here, the result of this structure is always stative in nature. 3 Throughout this dissertation I use the term SOURCE (OF EXPERIENCE) to refer to the THEME (used extensively

in the literature) as it better describes the (thematic) role played by this argument.

20

interpretation of an experience being predicated about the SOURCE. Further evidence

shows that these arguments are VP-internal, although in some languages (i.e. Catalan,

Spanish) the SOURCE is the argument showing agreement in Person and Number with the

verbal inflection. The EXPERIENCER, on the other hand, is an argument external to the VP,

which shows different properties shared by external arguments. Following (recent)

approaches in the literature on the nature of verbal functional projections and the

introduction of external arguments (Marantz 1984; Kratzer 1996; Arad 1999a; McGinnis

2000; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008; Cuervo 2008; among others), I argue that the EXPERIENCER

(EXP-ER) is introduced by the functional verbal projection vEXP.

2.1.1. Chapter outline

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2. I discuss the two logical possibilities

for the realization of the EXPERIENCE, surfacing as either an independent syntactic phrase

or as having undergone incorporation on the V head. Section 2.3. provides evidence

mostly drawn from Romance languages for the VP-internal status of the SOURCE, while

the structural position of the EXPERIENCER is analyzed in Section 2.4. The Case assigned to

the different arguments and a discussion on the word order and surface realization of

this experience structure is the object of Sections 2.5. and 2.6. Finally, in Section 2.7. I

summarize the main points of this chapter.

2.2. The argument of the EXPERIENCE (EXP-E)

The structure proposed in Chapter 1 and Section 2.1. allows for two logical possibilities

regarding the expression of the EXPERIENCE. In the first option, widely attested in

Catalan, but also observed in Spanish and Mayangna, which is discussed in Section

2.2.1., the EXPERIENCE is expressed as an independent argument, which results in a

construction with an overt light verb. In the second option, the EXPERIENCE undergoes

21

incorporation on the V-head, creating a single syntactic unit. This option is also attested,

with numerous examples in Mayangna, is discussed in Section 2.2.2.

2.2.1. The EXPERIENCE (EXP-E) as an independent argument

According to the proposal I put forward in this dissertation, experience predicates share

a common structure. Since this is a principled (UG-available) structure, some levels of

parameterization are expected. The first observed parametrical variation has to do with

the expression of the EXPERIENCE. The first logical possibility is the surfacing of the

EXPERIENCE as an independent, syntactic argument, as shown in (3).

(3) vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

In this structure, the EXPERIENCE surfaces independently from the V head (i.e. the

EXPERIENCE does not incorporate on V); this results in an experience predicate with a light

verb construction, an interesting construction. Light verb constructions are common

crosslinguistically, but in most cases these constructions yield unergative predicates, as

Laka (1993) shows for Basque (4), or as in the English, Catalan, and Spanish examples in

(5), (6), and (7), respectively (see Rosselló 2002 for further Catalan and Spanish

examples).

22

(4) Basque

Nik eztul egin dut. ERG.1s cough do AUX ‘I (have) coughed.’

(5) English

I do the dishes every day.

(6) Catalan

Em va fer un petó. DAT.1s go-PRES.3s do-INF a kiss ‘He gave me a kiss.’

(7) Spanish

Me dio un beso. DAT.1s give-PAST.3s a kiss ‘He gave me a kiss.’

The option that the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE allows, with the merging of the

EXPERIENCE on V, results in a light verb construction with an obvious experience

interpretation. Such an option structure is attested in Romance (Catalan, Spanish) and in

Mayangna. Consider the examples in (8), (9), and (10).

(8) Catalan




d.Em fan ràbia les preguntes estúpides. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p annoyance the stupid questions

‘Stupid questions annoy me.’

23

(9) Spanish

a. Me da miedo la oscuridad. DAT.1s give-PRES.3s fear the darkness ‘Darkness scares me.’

b. Me dan asco las ratas. DAT.1s give-PRES.3p disgust the rats ‘Rats disgust me.’

(10) Mayangna

a.Yuh kalawi. hunger DAT.3s-[give]-PRES.3s ‘She is hungry.’ (lit. ‘It gives hunger to me.’)

b. Alasna yâwi. happiness DAT.1s-[give]-PRES.3s ‘I am happy.’ (lit. ‘It gives happiness to me.’)

Apart from the surface, linear order in which each element appears, different pieces

of evidence confirm the hypothesis according to which the EXPERIENCE is an independent

syntactic argument.

Using Catalan data as relevant evidence, I claim that the EXPERIENCE constitutes an

experience phrase by itself. This experience phrase is semantically incorporated4 on the

(dummy) verb fer, which together provide the semantic information of the whole

predicate. Despite this semantic incorporation, the experience phrase is syntactically

independent (cf. Hale & Keyser 1993, 2002; McGinnis 2000), as it can be quantified (11a)

and/or replaced by a partitive clitic en (11b).

(11) a. Em fan molt mal els ulls. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p much pain the eyes ‘My eyes hurt very much.’

b. No me’ ni fan gens ___i els ulls, (de mal). NEG DAT.1s en do-PRES.3s at all the eyes (of pain) ‘My eyes don’t hurt at all.’

4 For further information on semantic incorporation, see the works of Van Geenhoven (1998) and Dayal

(2003), among others.

24

A further property of the EXPERIENCE phrase is that it is not a full DP; rather, it displays

properties of a QP. As seen in the examples in (12), a definite determiner (i.e. a D head)

cannot select the EXPERIENCE as its complement.

(12) a. Em fan un mal increïble els ulls. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p a pain incredible the eyes ‘My eyes are really hurting.’

b.* Em fan el mal increïble els ulls. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p the pain incredible the eyes ‘My eyes are really hurting.’

In the grammatical sentence in (12a), the noun mal ‘pain’, which is additionally

modified by the adjective increïble ‘incredible’, is preceded by the indefinite un ‘a/one’.

In the ungrammatical sentence in (12b), however, we observe how the EXPERIENCE

cannot be preceded by a definite article, heading a DP.

This fact is combined by something already observed: as the example in (11b)

shows, the EXPERIENCE must be replaced by a Partitive clitic. Thus, the impossibility of

having a definite article preceding the EXPERIENCE and the replacement of the EXPERIENCE

by a partitive clitic confirms the hypothesis that the EXPERIENCE phrase is a Quantifier

Phrase. This is shown in the partial tree in (13).

25

(13) TP

T VP

V’

V QPEXPERIENCE

fer

‘do’ Q NP

mal

‘pain’

It is worth noting that this parametrical option in the representation of the EXPERIENCE

forces us to revise the classification of experience predicates proposed by Belletti & Rizzi

(1988), outlined in (1) above. In their classification (adopted by many other scholars),

the EXPERIENCE is not considered as an independent argument. However, the data

presented and analyzed in this section provides evidence for a new subclass of

experience predicates, which should be added to the previously noted classes. This

revised classification is outlined in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Revised classification of experience predicates (Four classes)

EXPERIENCER (EXP-ER) SOURCE (THEME) EXPERIENCE (EXP-E)

Class I Nominative Accusative Incorporated on V

Class II Accusative Nominative Incorporated on V

Class III Dative Nominative Incorporated on V

Class IV Dative Nominative Partitive (QP)

26

After analyzing the behavior of the EXPERIENCE as an independent argument, in the

following subsection I present the second parametric option allowed for the proposed

structure: the EXPERIENCE undergoing incorporation on V.

2.2.2. Incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V

As stated above, the structure that I propose allows two different options for the

expression of the EXPERIENCE. In this section I present attesting evidence that confirms

the prediction: the EXPERIENCE can be expressed as an incorporated element on V, as

represented in the structure in (14)5.

(14) vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

VP vEXP

SOURCE V’

EXP-E V

A close analysis of the work on impersonal verbs by Charles & Torrez (2008) shows

that Mayangna presents an extensive number of experience predicates in which the

EXPERIENCE has undergone incorporation on V (15). This option, although it might be less

frequent, is also noted in languages belonging to the Romance (Spanish (16), Catalan

(17)) and Germanic (English (18)) families.

5 The tree in (14) corresponds to a structure showing incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V in a head-final

language, as this is the case of Mayangna. For those head-initial varieties which allow this parameter in the representation of the EXPERIENCE (attested in Romance and Germanic languages), the headedness of the arboreal structure should be reversed.

27

(15) Mayangna

a. Pedro kul kau sak kat, minikpa yak kal buihna. Pedro school in be-PRES.3s C eye-AGR.3s at DAT.3s tremble-PRES.3s ‘When Pedro is in class, his eye trembles.’ (lit. ‘When Pedro is in class, (it) trembles to him in his eyes.’)

b. Abil kidi uba lapakwa kat, kal burwi. Abil D Adv walk-PRES.3s C DAT.3s blister.3s ‘When Abil walks a lot, he gets blisters.’ (lit. ‘When Abil walks a lot, (it) blisters to him.’)

(16) Spanish

Me duelen los brazos. DAT.1s hurt-PRES.3p the arms ‘My arms hurt.’

(17) Catalan

Em molesten aquests comentaris. DAT.1s bother-PRES.3p these comments ‘These comments bother me.’

(18) English

a. My arms hurt. b. These comments bother me.

In the examples (15) to (18), the EXPERIENCE is manifested as an integral part of the

verbal projection. This can be explained if we assume that the EXPERIENCE incorporates

on the V head, leaving us with a structure with no overt light verb and without the

EXPERIENCE behaving as an independent syntactic argument. Note that this pattern is the

one that conforms to the three classes of experience predicates put forth by Belletti &

Rizzi (1988) and to most of the psych verbs analyzed by many other authors.

The following two sections focus on the analysis of the two other arguments of the

structure: the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE and the EXPERIENCER.

28

2.3. The argument of the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE

The underlying structure proposed in this dissertation (see Chapter 1, Section 2.1.)

introduces a SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE which, when surfacing, merges in [Spec, VP]. The

expectation is then that the SOURCE behaves as a VP internal argument. In this section,

building on attested Catalan evidence, I support this hypothesis. Let us consider again

the Catalan examples presented in (8), repeated below in (19).

(19) a. Em fa mal la mà. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the hand ‘My hand hurts.’





Note that, in these examples, the SOURCE (la mà ‘the hand’ in (19a); la foscor

‘darkness’ in (19b); les rates ‘the rats’ in (19c); les preguntes estúpides ‘the stupid

questions’ in (19d)), shows agreement with the verb (cf. (19c, d)), which may mistakenly

lead to the conclusion that it is an external argument. Yet, different pieces of evidence

confirm that it is indeed a VP-internal argument. Let us consider these.

First, in Catalan, as well as in Italian, the 3rd person plural pro “allows a kind of

arbitrary interpretation in which the plural specification does not imply semantic

plurality” (Belletti &Rizzi 1988: 299) (cf. Rigau 1990). Observe the example in (20).

(20) pro Truquen a la porta. pro.3p call-PRES.3p to the door ‘They are calling at the door.’ or ‘Somebody is calling at the door.’

29

However, not all verbs allow this arb(itrary) pro: according to Belletti & Rizzi, the

arbitrary interpretation can only be obtained when arb pro refers to “deep subjects”

(1988: 300); that is, it is not possible with surface ‘subjects’ generated at the internal

object position (i.e., unaccusatives, among other type of constructions), as seen in (21).

(21) # pro Han caigut. pro.3p have-PRES.3p fall-PPART ‘Somebody has fallen.’ (only possible as ‘They have fallen.’)

In the case of Catalan experience verbs discussed here, we notice that the arb pro

reading is not possible (22); that is, a plural SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE cannot be replaced by

a 3rd person plural pro to obtain a semantically singular interpretation of the experience

verb6.

(22) # Li fan mal pro. DAT.3s do-PRES.3p pain pro ‘Something is hurting him.’

The ungrammaticality of (22) (i.e. the impossibility of obtaining an arb pro reading

with these experience predicates) confirms the hypothesis that the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE

is not an external argument, but an internal one (despite the agreement facts observed

in (19c, d)). This is the same pattern observed with regular unaccusative verbs.

A second piece of evidence supporting the claim that the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE is

generated at the internal argument position comes from Possessor Datives. By adapting

the claim by Landau (1999), Kempchinsky (1992), Borer and Grodzinsky (1986) according

to which Possessor Datives can only refer to internal arguments, I argue that the SOURCE

can be bound by the EXPERIENCER dative, which behaves as a ‘parasitic’ possessor. Since

such binding relationship is only possible if the possessee is generated within the c-

6 It should be noted that this arb pro interpretation is indeed possible, but in a totally different argument

structure: in the eventive structure (see Chapters 4 and 5), in which there is an external agent and two internal arguments, we may obtain the reading ‘Somebody is hurting him/her.’. In that case, pro would the expected agentive/causative role.

30

command domain of the possessor (that is, at an internal argument position), I

demonstrate (Viñas-de-Puig 2008a, b) the internal argumenthood status of the SOURCE.

Such phenomenon is illustrated in (23).

(23) Emi fan mal elsi ulls. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p pain the eyes ‘My eyes hurt.’

In his work on Hebrew possessor raising, Landau (1999) bases the claim that

Possessor Datives (PDs) can only refer to internal arguments on purely syntactic

grounds. The possessor-possessee interpretation observed in (23) is only possible if we

assume PDs as playing the role of the subject of the DP or, in more precise syntactic

terms, as being generated at the [Spec, DP] position. On the other hand, PDs, along with

the other dative arguments, always according to Landau (1999) “are generated below

[Spec, VP] and [Spec, IP+” from where “they cannot c-command into any position

occupied by external arguments” (Landau 1999: 7). This second feature is the

consequence of the proposed syntactic structure: PDs have to c-command the

possessed DP (Landau 1999: 9), which is generated in an internal argument position.

This basic structure is shown in (24), following the raising analysis suggested by Landau

(1999). (The syntactic tree in (24) is a simplified version of Landau’s (1999) using Hale

and Keyser’s (2002) argument structure.)

31

(24) vP

DP v’

Ext. arg. v VP

DP V’

Possessor DP V

tPD D’ V R

D NP

Possessee (Int. arg.)

Yet, a more in-depth analysis of the Catalan data seems to present evidence against

the possessor raising analysis for this language. Consider the examples in (25).

(25) a. Em fa mal el braç. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the arm ‘My arm hurts.’

b.Em fan mal les teves paraules. DAT.1s do- PRES.3p pain your words ‘Your words hurt me.’

c. Em fa mal l’aire contaminat. DAT.1s do- PRES.3s pain the polluted air ‘The polluted air hurts/bothers me.’

d.Em fa mal en Jordi. DAT.1s do- PRES.3s pain D Jordi ‘Jordi hurts me.’

32

In the examples above, only (25a) presents a case of possession relationship between

the dative and the SOURCE, which seems to support the possessor raising analysis. Yet,

such an analysis is not possible for the sentences in (25b-d). In those cases, the

possession interpretation cannot be obtained: in (25b), the NP paraules ‘words’ is the

possessee of the possessive determiner teves and, therefore, it cannot be bound in a

possessive relationship with the EXPERIENCER dative; in (25c), the referential NP aire

contaminat ‘polluted air’ cannot be (semantically) possessed, thus, it cannot be bound

by the EXPERIENCER dative; and similarly in (25d), there is no possessive reading since the

personal name Jordi cannot be bound in a possessive relationship by the EXPERIENCER

dative. The latter examples provide evidence against Possessor Dative raising analysis,

as the possessor ‘slot’ is already occupied. If we assume this account, the possessor

relationship observed in (25a) can be accounted for as follows: the EXPERIENCER dative is

generated above VP, from where it c-commands an internal argument; if this internal

argument presents ‘bindable’ possessing features, we obtain a ‘parasitic’ possessor

interpretation. One possibility would be to consider that these ‘bindable’ features

correspond to the nature of the N in the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE phrase. According to this

idea, alienable nouns would lack these ‘possessee’ features, and therefore would not

allow the possessive interpretation; on the other hand, inalienable nouns (body parts,

kinship terms) would have these ‘possessee’ features, favoring the possessive reading7.

According to this idea, alienable possession nominals, which lack these ‘possessee’

features, would not be able to be bound by the EXPERIENCER dative, resulting in a

construction with no parasitic possession interpretation. This dual possibility for the

possessive interpretation is represented in the arboreal structures below: in (26), the

feature matching between the EXPERIENCER and the nominal in the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE

yields a possessive interpretation; such an interpretation cannot be obtained out of the

structure in (27), since there is no ‘possessee’ feature matching between the SOURCE OF

EXPERIENCE and the EXPERIENCER.

7 Further information on different classes of nominals can be found in Mühlbauer (2007) and the

references cited in his work.

33

(26) vEXPP

DPEXPERIENCERi vEXP’

vEXP VP

DPSOURCE V’

-Ni-

V QPEXPERIENCE

(27) vEXPP

DPEXPERIENCERi vEXP’

vEXP VP

DPSOURCE V’

-Nk-

V QPEXPERIENCE

A possible output of the structure in (27) is the example shown in (28).

(28) Em fan nosa els edificis. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p bother the buildings ‘The buildings bother me.’

In (28), the NP edificis is headed by an alienable possession nominal, lacking bindable

possession features. Therefore, head of the projected DP cannot be bound by the

EXPERIENCER dative, resulting in a non-possessive interpretation. This is indeed the

34

reading obtained in (28) (the buildings cannot belong to the referent denoted by the

EXPERIENCER dative).

All the empirical evidence provided in this section provides support for the (partial)

structure in (29), according to which the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE as an internal argument.

Following this structure, the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE enters into a predicative, small clause-

like structure with the V and EXPERIENCE; i.e. something, the EXPERIENCE, is being

predicated about the SOURCE.

(29) VP

DPSOURCE V’

el braç

‘the arm’ V QPEXPERIENCE

fer

‘do’ Q NP

mal

‘pain’

2.4. The argument of the EXPERIENCER

Following the proposal I present here, the EXPERIENCER is a VP-external argument, as

already suggested by different authors (Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Masullo 1992; Arad 1998;

Haspelmath & Caruna 2000; McGinnis 2000; Rosselló 2002; Cuervo 2003, 2008; Adger &

Ramchand 2006; among others). In this section I provide further evidence supporting

such a claim.

Against the ideas by Landau (2005), who argues that dative EXPERIENCERS of Class III

experience predicates are locatives that undergo inversion, and along the lines of what

has been observed in a subset of Spanish light verb constructions with dar ‘to give’

35

(Masullo 1992; Cuervo 2003, 2008), I argue that the EXPERIENCER dative in this type of

Catalan experiencer verbs is indeed an external argument.

This claim is backed by empirical facts. As is well known, in non-finite clauses, PRO is

controlled by an external argument. This is shown in the example in (30), in which the

external argument of the main clause controls PRO in the subordinate clause.

(30) En Joani practica el tango per PROi guanyar el concurs. D Joan practice-PRES.3s the tango to PRO win-INF the contest ‘Joan practices the tango to win the contest.’

Since this is a phenomenon restricted to external arguments (cf. Sigurdsson 1991;

Masullo 1992; Cuervo 2008; among many others), dative arguments that are originated

at an internal argument position, as in double-object constructions, cannot control PRO.

Consider the example in (31).

(31) En Joani donava diners a l’esglésiaj per PROi/*j evadir impostos. D Joan give-IMP.3s money to the church to PRO evade-INF taxes ‘Joan gave money to the church to evade taxes.’

In the example above, the argument being assigned Dative Case (l’església ‘the

church’) cannot control PRO in the subordinate non-finite clause (the only possible

element that can control PRO is the external argument En Joan ‘Joan’), since it is

generated at an internal argument position.

However, in experience predicates, the Dative can indeed control PRO when the

SOURCE is an infinitival clause. Note the example in (32), in which the Dative argument

em ‘to me’ controls PRO in the non-finite clause. This piece of evidence confirms the

hypothesis that the EXPERIENCER is generated at an external argument position.

(32) Emi fa fàstic [PROi veure rates al carrer]. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s disgust PRO see-INF rats on the street ‘Seeing rats on the streets disgusts me.’

36

A second piece of evidence for the external argumenthood of the EXPERIENCER comes

from the PD analysis presented in the previous subsection. Again, if we assume the

claims by Landau (1999), Borer & Grodzinsky (1986), and Kempchinsky (1992) on PDs,

we can conclude that the EXPERIENCER Dative has to be generated outside VP since the

possessor relationship can only be obtained if the PD c-commands the possessee; that

is, if it occupies a structurally higher position (i.e. the position of an external argument).

The external argumenthood of the EXPERIENCER is further supported by additional

binding facts. Quantified EXPERIENCER datives also show a binding relationship with the

SOURCE. Consider the sentence in (33).

(33) A cadai estudiant lii fa por la sevai nota de l’examen. to each student Dat-3s do-PRES-3s D Poss-3f grade of the exam. ‘Each student fears their own exam grade.’

In (33), the quantifier in the EXPERIENCER dative (which in this case is expressed

overtly) binds the possessive determiner in the SOURCE phrase. This fact, which again

implies a c-commanding relationship between both arguments, provides additional

evidence for the higher structural position in which the EXPERIENCER is externally merged.

Furthermore, only in canonical interpretations, the EXPERIENCER dative provides the

notion of ‘aboutness’ to the predicate, which is considered to be a feature most

commonly associated to argument external to the VP (Masullo 1992)8. Note, however,

that Masullo’s (1992) ‘aboutness’ argument is just circumstantial evidence, as any other

element can be topicalized and, thus, provide the notion of ‘aboutness’ to the predicate.

Consider the example in (34).

8 Masullo (1992) actually claims the notion of ‘aboutness’ is an indication of the EXPERIENCER being an

external argument. Though it is true that Experiencer Datives provide in certain cases the ‘aboutness’ interpretation of the predicate, the basis of the tests is doubtful, since other elements can provide such an interpretation.

37

(34) Les rates, em fan por des de petit. the rats DAT.1s do-PRES.3p fear since little ‘I have been afraid of rats since I was little.’

In this example, the SOURCE les rates ‘the rats’ appears at a topic position in the left

periphery of the structure. From this position, it provides the ‘aboutness’ interpretation

to the sentence.

Nevertheless, all these previous facts combined further contribute to the claim

already presented by Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Masullo (1992), and Cuervo (2003, 2008)

that the EXPERIENCER is merged in the structure at an external argument position (contra

Landau 2005)9.

But, how is this external argument introduced? Here I follow the works of many

scholars (Marantz 1984; Kratzer 1996; Arad 1988, 1999a; McGinnis 2000; Chomsky

2001; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008; among many others) regarding the notion of external

arguments and their introduction in the derivation. The main idea behind all of their

proposals is that the external argument is introduced by a functional projection above

VP, which receives different labels (with slightly different properties) according to each

author (Voice, v, v*…). For the case of experience predicates, I propose that the external

argument, the EXPERIENCER, is introduced by a type of v head, vEXP, following the notion of

different ‘flavors’ of v (Arad 1999a; McGinnis 2000; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008; among

others). This vEXP head is then responsible for the introduction of the EXPERIENCER and to

give the experience ‘flavor’ (or interpretation) to the structure.

With all these data in mind, we provide support for the proposed (partial) structure

shown in (35)10.

9 For this type of predicates, Adger & Ramchand (2006) argue that the EXPERIENCER is introduced as a high

applicative. Yet, their analysis would not differ much from what I propose here: in both cases, the EXPERIENCER is merged at a VP-external position, from which it c-commands the VP-internal arguments. 10

Following Roberts (2008), I assume that clitic are heads and therefore cannot be merged at a specifier position. In the structure in (35) and following, I consider that in those cases in which only an EXPERIENCER clitic is present, it will occupy vEXP, while [Spec, vEXPP] will be occupied by a co-indexed pro.

38

(35) TP

T vEXPP

DPEXPERIENCER vEXP’

pro

vEXP VP

em

‘to me’ DPSOURCE V’

el braç

‘the arm’ V QPEXPERIENCE

fer

‘do’ Q NP

mal

‘pain’

The empirical evidence from Catalan clearly supports the proposed structure, with

two internal arguments, the EXPERIENCE and the SOURCE, and one external argument, the

EXPERIENCER. In the next section I discuss some facts from Mayangna which pose in

question the proposed external argument for the EXPERIENCER.

2.4.1. On the external argument status of EXPERIENCERS in Mayangna

In the previous section, using Catalan data as evidence, I argued for the case of the

EXPERIENCER being generated at an external argument position. Since the proposal in this

dissertation is that there is a universal, UG-available structure for experience predicates,

we would expect that EXPERIENCERS are external arguments crosslinguistically. Let us

consider now some relevant Mayangna data.

39

(36) Triminah kal sibakwi di kaswak. Triminah DAT.3s hiccup-PRES.3s something eat-DS.3s ‘Triminah has the hiccups whenever she eats.’ (lit. ‘(It) hiccups to Triminah whenever she eats.’)

Before analyzing this example in detail, it should be noted that Mayangna displays a

switch-reference marking. PROXimate (or same subject, SS) and OBViative (or different

subject, DS) markers are used in different contexts: “(t)he subject of the PROX clause is

necessarily coreferential with the subject of the matrix, while the subject of the OBV

clause is necessarily distinct from that of the matrix” (Hale & Salamanca 2002: 39; cf.

Hale 1991).

As observed in the example in (33), there is a DS marker in the subordinate clause,

indicating that its subject must differ from that of the matrix clause. However, the

referent should be the same: Triminah is the one experiencing the hiccups and

performing the action of eating. We could account for this fact if we assumed that

EXPERIENCERS, at least in Mayangna, and against the proposal I put forth in this

dissertation, are not external arguments (and, hence, not a subject), but rather they are

generated at a VP-internal position.

However, there is another plausible explanation that, not only accounts for this fact,

but it is also consistent with the proposal of a universal structure of experience

predicates in which EXPERIENCERS are external arguments. As I discuss in the section that

follows, the EXPERIENCER is assigned inherent Dative Case (i.e. its Case is not structurally

assigned). Therefore, this argument is invisible to the derivation for Case purposes and it

does not participate in any AGREE relation with the T head. As a consequence, the

specifier of TP must be filled with an expletive pro. And it is precisely this position,

[Spec, TP], that is responsible for the assignment of switch reference marking. Now

there are different referential indexes in both matrix and subordinate clauses, which

triggers the observed OBViative (DS) marking. This structural relationship is schematized

in the tree in (37).

40

(37)

TPi TPj

pro-expli T’i XPj T’j

vEXPP Ti vP Tj

EXP-ERj vEXP’ v’

VP vEXP VP v

SOURCE V

EXP-E V

Note that in the structure above, the elements occupying the subject position ([Spec,

TP]) have indeed different referents. Ti takes its index from (expletive) proi and the

maximal projection TPi inherits it from the head. On the other hand, Tj has its value from

XPj. This motivates different subject (OBViative) marking, despite the fact that the

EXPERIENCER of the experience predicate shares the same referent with the subject of the

subordinate clause.

In the previous three sections I have provided ample evidence in support of the

structural position of the different arguments present in this structure. Yet, I have not

discussed the implications this structural configuration has for the assignment and

representation of Case. In the following section, I present an account for the realization

and assignment of Case in experience predicates.

41

2.5. The assignment of Case

Although I mentioned briefly in the previous sections the notion of Case assignment to

the different arguments, the issue of Case so far remains unaccounted for. In this

section, I aim at filling this gap, by arguing that the experience predicates have full

argument structure and that structural Case is assigned to all the arguments, with the

exception of the EXPERIENCER.

2.5.1. Experience predicates are not unaccusative

The Catalan non-incorporating experience predicates that have constituted the bulk of

the data that provided evidence in favor of the proposed structure seem to correspond

very closely to the Class III type of experience predicate proposed by Belletti & Rizzi

(1988): Dative EXPERIENCER; Nominative THEME.

(38) Italian

A Gianni piace questo. to Gianni please-PRES.3s this ‘This pleases Gianni.’ (Belletti & Rizzi 1988: 291, ex. 3a)

(39) Catalan

Em fa mal el braç. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the arm ‘My arm hurts.’

Many (Landau 2005; Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Masullo 1992; Cuervo 2008; among others)

have argued that Class III experience predicates are unaccusative verbs, since they

“assign dative case to the experiencer and select the auxiliary essere” (Landau 2005: 19).

However, in this section I argue against such a proposal (for different reasons from the

ones claimed by Rigau 1990).

Recall from Section 2.4. that the EXPERIENCER is an external argument, introduced by a

v head (of a special ‘flavor’). Therefore, this constitutes a full argument structure, since

the functional projection proposed here, vEXP, is of v*-type (Chomsky 2001); i.e. a v that

42

introduces an external argument of a transitive predicate or an EXPERIENCER (Chomsky

2001: 43, n. 8).

A closer look at the actual behavior, in terms of Case, of the different arguments will

confirm the notion that these experience predicates are not unaccusative (despite the

fact that the Nominative-bearing argument is indeed internal).

2.5.2. Different arguments, different Case

Let’s now analyze in more detail the Case each of the arguments is assigned. In this

section I pay special attention to the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER, which displays a

Nominative/Dative alternation, as well as to the Case manifested by the EXPERIENCE.

Belletti & Rizzi (1988), following Hermon (1985), claimed that EXPERIENCERS bear

inherent case. According to this idea, which has been widely followed in the literature

(Belletti 1988; Masullo 1992; Arad 1999b; Cuervo 2003, 2008; Landau 2005; Adger &

Ramchand 2006), the Dative case of the EXPERIENCER is inherent because it “is assigned in

the lexicon and it is tied to a specific θ-role” (Landau 2005: 20). Actually, Landau (2005)

goes further and makes the generalization in (35).

(40) Universally, non-nominative experiencers bear inherent case.

(Landau 2005: 19, ex. 40)

In Section 2.4., I argued for the external position (and, orthogonally, for the

subjecthood) of the EXPERIENCER (binding of PRO, binding of variables, binding of SOURCE).

This external position, and as claimed in the recent literature (Arad 1999b, Cuervo 2008,

Platzack 2008, Ramchand 2008; see their work for earlier references), is related to the

EXPERIENCER theta-role.

Before going on, let’s go back to the 80’s, and have a second look at Baker’s

Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) (1988: 46).

43

(41) The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)

Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical

structural relationships between those items at the level of the D-structure.

According to a strong version of UTAH, all arguments receiving the same theta role

must be generated at identical structural positions. In other words, if EXPERIENCERS are

external arguments (as demonstrated above), all EXPERIENCERS must be external

arguments. This leaves us with an external argument receiving Dative Case.

With all these theoretical assumptions in hand, following the analysis by Cuervo

(2008) on Spanish light verb constructions with dar ‘to give’, I argue that this external

argument is assigned inherent (Dative) Case, which is related to the theta-role assigning

verbal projection, vEXP. In other words, for the set of experience predicates discussed in

this chapter, the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER phrase is not structural Case, i.e. not

dependent on any structural relationship between any Case assigning Probe and a Case

assignee Goal (following Chomsky’s (2001, 2005) Case assignment by AGREE).

However, not all EXPERIENCERS are assigned Dative Case. As the different classifications

of experience predicates found in the literature make evident11, the EXPERIENCER in some

experience predicates might be assigned Accusative or Nominative Case (cf. Chapter 3,

Chapter 5). If the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE that I propose here is on the right track, it

raises the question of how inherent Case is assigned. If inherent Case is linked to a

specific thematic role (Belletti & Rizzi 1988; among others), it is only natural to wonder

why in some cases an argument with a specific thematic role (i.e. EXPERIENCER) is

expressed through inherent Case, while in other circumstances that same argument is

assigned structural Case. This points out to a restriction on inherent Case, which seems

to be a last resort operation, summarized in (42) below.

11

Stemming from the earlier works within generative linguistics on psych verbs, such as Pesetsky (1987, 1995), Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Croft (1993), Cabré & Mateu (1998), Landau (2005), Adger & Ramchand (2006), among many others, different classifications have been proposed to distinguish the different types of psych or experience predicates. These classifications have in many cases been based on the Case assigned to the different arguments, paying special attention to the Case variation attested on the EXPERIENCER.

44

(42) Inherent Case Constraint (ICC)

An argument associated to a theta role is assigned inherent Case iff:

i. all the other arguments in the structure are present;

and ii. these arguments enter into structural Case relations.

According to the ICC above, then, an EXPERIENCER will be assigned inherent Case if the

other arguments are present in the structure and need to enter in structural Case

assigning relations, leaving no other possible Case to be assigned structurally. Again, if

this analysis is correct, it predicts a hierarchy of both the Cases assigned (defined by the

structure) and of the different arguments present (defined in what structural position

they are externally (or first) merged).

The other two arguments, the EXPERIENCE and the SOURCE, on the other hand, do

receive structural Case. Recall that experience predicates (regardless of incorporation)

are structurally non-unaccusative, as the EXPERIENCER is introduced by a v*-type

functional head (vEXP). Therefore, these predicates should allow the assignment of

Accusative Case. So, the resulting question is: are the EXPERIENCE or the SOURCE assigned

Accusative Case? Or, more generally: what Case are these arguments assigned?

Let’s begin with the structurally lowermost of these two arguments, the EXPERIENCE

phrase. According to the analysis I propose in this dissertation, the EXPERIENCE may be

represented in two ways: a. as an independent argument, triggering the overt presence

of a light verb (see Section 2.2.1.); or b. as having undergone incorporation on V (see

Section 2.2.2.). In the second case, the EXPERIENCE is not an independent (nominal)

phrase with lexical content (it belongs to the verbal node), and therefore it cannot be

assigned Case.

In the first case, however, the EXPERIENCE phrase, despite being semantically

incorporated onto the verbal head, behaves as a syntactic phrase with lexical content.

Therefore, it needs Case. Yet, since the EXPERIENCE argument is a QP and not a full DP

(see Section 2.2.1.), it cannot receive (full) Case, and as a result it receives Partitive Case,

45

assigned by vEXP (recall that this is v*-type head, and therefore able to assign Accusative

case). Evidence in favor of this analysis is shown in examples (43) and (44) below.

(43) - Et fa mal la mà? DAT.2s do-PRES.3s pain the hand

-*No, no me’ l fa pro. no NEG DAT.1s ACC.3s do-PRES.3s pro ‘Does your hand hurt? No, it doesn’t.’

(44) - Et fa mal la mà? DAT.2s do-PRES.3s pain the hand

- No, no me’ n fa gens. no NEG DAT.1s PART.3s do-PRES.3s at all ‘Does your hand hurt? No, it doesn’t hurt at all.’

In the previous examples, the replacement of the EXPERIENCE phrase by an Accusative

clitic renders an ungrammatical sentence, which indicates that the EXPERIENCE is not

assigned Accusative Case. However, the proposal is backed with the example in (44). In

this example, the derivation does not crash, since the EXPERIENCE is replaced by a

Partitive clitic12. This fact indicates that two things: i. the EXPERIENCE is not a full DP (as

observed earlier); and ii. the EXPERIENCE is assigned structural Case by the closest Goal

(i.e. vEXP).

The other internal argument of this type of Catalan experiencer verbs is the SOURCE.

Recall that according to the argument structure argued for in the previous sections of

this chapter, this phrase is generated at [Spec,VP], above the EXPERIENCE phrase. Again, if

we assume Case to be assigned via AGREE (Chomsky 2001, 2005), the SOURCE will be the

first available goal (a DP) of a Nominative assigning probe (T) and will consequently

receive Nominative Case. Note that this operation is only possible assuming that the

12

Among the languages of study, this fact is only observable in Catalan, since both Mayangna and Spanish lack a Partitive clitic.

46

EXPERIENCER phrase bears inherent Case and, therefore, is ‘invisible’ to a structural case

assigning operation such as AGREE.

The tree in (45) summarizes how Case is assigned in the Catalan experience

predicates of the type fer X ‘to experience X’.

(45) TP

Spec T’

T vEXPP

[CASE]

DPEXP-E vEXP’

[Dat]

vEXP VP

[CASE]

DPSOURCE V’

[Nom]

V QPEXP-ER

[Part]

The structure in (45), although explanatory insofar as it shows probe and goals

relationships, makes one wonder when derivations occur. If, as argued, the functional

head vEXP is a Case assigner (i.e. a Probe), it would be logical to assume that the SOURCE

intervenes between the (Accusative) Case assigning Probe and the EXPERIENCE: the SOURCE

would be the closest available Goal and therefore it should receive Accusative Case (this

argument is a full DP), leaving the EXPERIENCE (i.e. a potential Goal) without being

assigned case. This issue, as part of a more general account for the surface word

ordering is the object of the following section.

47

2.6. A word order for the experience

The tree structures presented so far predict a word order in which the SOURCE intervenes

between the EXPERIENCER and the EXPERIENCE (in non-incorporating predicates). However,

as observed in the different examples analyzed in the different sections, this is not the

surface word order that arises, as shown in the example in (46).

(46) Em fa mal el braç. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the arm ‘My arm hurts.’

In (46), the SOURCE appears clause-finally, while the (phonological output of the) light

verb appears between the EXPERIENCER and the EXPERIENCE. In this section I propose a

plausible analysis that accounts for the observed word order while maintaining the

argument structure proposed. This proposal has the added benefit of providing an

explanation for the assignment of Case to the different arguments.

Recall that the general structure for experience predicates that I propose in this

dissertation section accounts for all the syntactic facts, since it defines the structural

properties of each of the arguments present in the predicate. Additionally, the structure

also provides a clear explanation of the predication-like relationship between the SOURCE

and the EXPERIENCE (something, the EXPERIENCE, is predicated about something else, the

SOURCE).

If the structure is the right one, how can we then account for the word order

observed in (46)? A possible explanation for the change in word ordering may be found

in the focus reading of the sentence. Belletti (2004; see additional references there)

argues for the existence of two focus positions: a new information focus position,

located in the vP periphery, providing the interpretation of the introduction of

information previously absent in the discourse; and a contrastive information focus

position located in the (higher) CP periphery, which contrasts an element with another.

The basic distribution of these two focus positions is shown in (47).

48

(47) FocusCONTP

FocusCONT CP

C TP

T FocusNEWP

FocusNEW vP

In a similar fashion to what Belletti (2004) claims for Italian, I claim that experience

predicates show the same contrast in focus positions. Consider the examples of Catalan

experience predicates in (48), in which the phrase la mà ‘the hand’ is the element

portraying new information.

(48) - Què et fa mal? ‘What is hurting you?’

- Em fa mal la mà. ‘My hand hurts.’

- #La mà em fa mal. ‘My hand hurts.’

According to Belletti (2004), a question like the one in (48) triggers a new information

interpretation. That is, the only possible answer to the question is if some element

occupies the specifier position of this new focus projection. Following the analysis by

Belletti (2008), we can argue that the Focus head has an EPP feature, which requires its

specifier position to be filled. A syntactic element with matching features (i.e. new

information ‘features’) moves to this position; in other words, in this interpretation the

SOURCE (la mà ‘the hand’ in (48)), which carries new information ‘features’, moves to

[Spec, FocusNEWP]. This derivation is shown in (49).

49

(49) FocusNEWP

DP FocusNEW’

la mà

‘the hand’ FocusNEW[EPP] vEXPP

DPEXP-ER vEXP’

pro

vEXP VP

em

‘to me’ DPSOURCE V’

[la mà]

‘the hand’ V QPEXP-E

fer

‘do’ Q NP

mal

‘pain’

The presence of the EPP feature in FocusNEW, as mentioned above, triggers movement

of the SOURCE phrase to [Spec, FocusNEWP]. Note, however, that in the sentence in (48)

the SOURCE actually appears at a surface postverbal position, contrary to what this

movement depicted in (49) suggests. This fact can be accounted for assuming remnant

movement to the whole vP to higher positions to meet other requirements of the syntax

(Rizzi, p.c.).

50

(50) TP

vEXPP T’

T FocusNEWP

DP FocusNEW’

la mà

‘the hand’ FocusNEW[EPP] vEXPP

DPEXP-ER vEXP’

pro

vEXP VP

em + fer

DPSOURCE V’

[la mà]

V QPEXP-E

Q NP

mal

‘pain’

The second added benefit of this analysis of movement due to focus interpretation

has to do with Case assignment. Recall from Section 2.5. that the structure proposed

could not clearly explain why the EXPERIENCE and not the SOURCE received the Case

assigned by vEXP. Before going into the details of this analysis, let me propose the

following three theoretical assumptions: i. a phase is not interpreted until the next

phase head is merged (in an adaptation of Chomsky’s claim that “Ph1 is

51

interpreted/evaluated at Ph2” (Chomsky 2001: 14, ex. 10)13; ii. vEXP and C are phase

heads (cf. Chomsky 2001, 2005; among others); and iii. Case is assigned when a phase is

interpreted (as also suggested in Brattico 2008).

With these assumptions in hand, the explanation of Case assignment is

straightforward. Once the whole first phase (vEXPP) is merged in the structure, its Case

assignment does not yet take place, since the phase is not interpreted. The next step in

the derivation is the merging of FocusNEW, a head with an EPP feature that requires the

movement of the SOURCE to its specifier. T, another Case assigning head, is merged, but

it cannot assign Case until the phase is interpreted. Once C is merged and closes the

phase, both phases are ‘closed’ and can be interpreted14, i.e. Case can be assigned.

Therefore, the source of experience receives the (Nominative) Case assigned by T (it is

the closest Goal to the Probe), while the EXPERIENCE phrase receives the Case assigned by

vEXP (it is the closest Goal to the Probe). These Case assignment relations are

schematized in the tree in (51).

13

See Chapter 5 for a revised version of phase interpretability. 14

CP can be closed and interpreted provided that no higher phase is merged in the structure.

52

(51) TP

T’

T FocusNEWP

[CASE]

DP FocusNEW’

la mà

[Nom] FocusNEW[EPP] vEXPP

DPEXP-ER vEXP’

pro

[Dat] vEXP VP

em + fer

[CASE] DPSOURCE V’

[la mà]

V QPEXP-E

mal

[Part]

However, the analysis of Catalan experience predicates presented in this section does

not present a comprehensive account for all the Catalan data. I have claimed above that

the SOURCE moves to the specifier of FocusNEWP providing a specific focus interpretation;

i.e. only the SOURCE receives a focus reading. However, there exist other possible

interpretations, namely thetic interpretations (cf. Sasse 1987), in which the whole clause

is considered to receive a new information focus. Such an interpretation carries another

intonation pattern and cannot be derived by the previous (FocusNEW) analysis.

Consider the examples in (52) below.

53

(52) - Què et passa? ‘What’s wrong?’


- *Em fa la mà mal. ‘My hand hurts.’

In (52) above, the only possible grammatical answer (with a thetic interpretation) to

the question posed is the one in which the SOURCE appears clause finally. Again, this

surface position does not correspond to the structural position for the SOURCE proposed

in the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, in which the SOURCE, introduced in the [Spec, VP]

position, should surface between the EXPERIENCER and the EXPERIENCE (or the output of

the light verb plus the EXPERIENCE), and which corresponds to the second answer.

However, this answer is not grammatical.

The ungrammaticality of the second answer in (52) can be accounted for by assuming

first a lack of movement of the SOURCE: since the SOURCE does not receive a new

information focus, it is not attracted by the EPP feature of FocusNEW and thus does not

move to the specifier of FocusNEWP. Consequently, the SOURCE remains in situ. This lack of

movement of the SOURCE alone, however, does not provide a full account for the

observed surface structure, since, as stated above, it does not explain why the SOURCE

appears at clause final position. The observed surface word order can be explained

considering an additional assumption: I argue that in thetic interpretations in Catalan,

the EXPERIENCE undergoes syntactic incorporation on the V head, forming a complex

head. A schematic representation of this phenomenon is shown in (53).

54

(53) vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

pro

vEXP VP

em

‘to me’ SOURCE V’

la mà

‘the hand’ V EXP-E

[mal]

V mal

fer ‘pain’

‘to do’

As represented in the arboreal structure in (53), the result of the incorporation of the

EXPERIENCE root on V is a complex head. This complex head is the element that moves

later in the derivation to higher positions in the structure (i.e. T) to satisfy the other

requirements of the syntax (after merging with the EXPERIENCER Dative clitic in vEXP,

creating a yet further complex head).

The result of this operation is the one observed in the first answer in (52), in which

the SOURCE appears at the end of the predicate (with no movement to [Spec, FocusNEWP]),

while the EXPERIENCE moves along with the V head (and the EXPERIENCER Dative clitic) to

higher structural positions. Consequently, the output of the light verb and the EXPERIENCE

appear before the SOURCE in surface structure. A schematic representation of this

process is shown in (54).

55

(54) TP

T’

T vEXPP

em + fer + mal

EXP-ER vEXP’

pro

vEXP VP

[em]

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

[mal]

V [mal]

[fer]

If the analysis of the incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on the V head in Catalan

experience predicates under a thetic interpretation is correct, we are then predicting

that the EXPERIENCE is not an independent argument. If that is the case, the EXPERIENCE

cannot be modified. Consider the examples in (55).

(55) - Què et passa? ‘What’s wrong?’


- ??Em fa molt mal la mà. ‘My hand hurts very much.’

Similarly to what was observed in the examples in (52), the second answer yields an

ungrammatical (or disfavored) structure. The second answer in (55 is not possible

56

because, under the thetic interpretation (the only possible interpretation as an answer

to the question posed), the EXPERIENCE merges with the V head. In other words, the

EXPERIENCE in this interpretation is not an independent argument and, consequently, we

don’t expect it to be modified by quantification. In the second answer in (54), the

EXPERIENCE is modified by the quantifier molt ‘much’, resulting in a pragmatically

inadequate utterance. The grammaticality judgment of this utterance supports the idea

that, under this interpretation, the EXPERIENCE is not an independent, modifiable,

argument; on the contrary, the EXPERIENCE has undergone incorporation, creating a

complex head with V.

2.7. Summary

In this chapter I have presented the universal structure proposed for experience

predicates, which consist of three basic elements: an EXPERIENCE, a SOURCE, and an

EXPERIENCER. In Section 2.2., I provided evidence from different languages of the two

possibilities the structure allows for the representation of the EXPERIENCE. I showed that

the EXPERIENCE may surface as an independent QP, since it can be quantified or replaced

by a clitic, or as incorporated on the V head. In Section 2.3. I provided evidence

regarding the position of the SOURCE. This argument is merged at [Spec, VP], creating a

predication-like reading with the V and the EXPERIENCE. Additionally, in Section 2.4., I

provided evidence that the EXPERIENCER is a VP-external argument, and is able to bind the

SOURCE, providing a possessive interpretation or controlling PRO.

In Section 2.5. I discussed the assignment of Case to the different arguments. After

claiming that this structure, contrary to what has been proposed in the literature, does

not create unaccusative predicates, I showed that the SOURCE is assigned Nominative

Case by T, while the EXPERIENCE is assigned Partitive Case. The EXPERIENCER, on the other

hand, does not receive structural Case, as it bears inherent (Dative) Case. The issue of

Case assignment is related to that of word order, which was the object of Section 2.6. In

this section I argued that the observed word order, which is not predicted by the

57

original structure, can be accounted by movement of the SOURCE to higher positions

outside VP, motivated by focus interpretation. In Catalan thetic readings, the word

order is accounted assuming always incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V. This complex

head then moves to T, resulting in the observed reading. It is after all movement that

Case is assigned, being the last operation taking place before the phase closes.

58

CHAPTER 3. WHEN THE SOURCE GOES MISSING

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I provided empirical evidence from both Catalan and Mayangna

for the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE presented in Chapter 1. Recall that, according to this

structure, the EXPERIENCE is merged with an initial V head and this node creates a small-

clause-like predication with the SOURCE. The EXPERIENCER is an external argument,

introduced by the functional projection vEXP. This structure is repeated below in (1).


vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

So far, I have shown that the structure above allows for a limited level of

parameterization, reduced to the possibility of incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on the

verb root. In this chapter I explore the option of having further parameterization in the

structure. I examine the possibility of not merging the SOURCE as an independent

59

argument in the structure, and how this change in the structure is expressed

crosslinguistically. This new structure is outlined in (2).

(2) SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

Similarly to what I discussed in Chapter 2 with the expression of the EXPERIENCE, the

structure without a SOURCE allows for two possible outputs: a. the EXPERIENCER receives

(inherent) Dative Case; or b. the EXPERIENCER receives (structural) Nominative Case. As I

show below, both options are expressed in different languages.

The chapter also discusses the possibility of the non-realization of the other two

arguments: the EXPERIENCE and the EXPERIENCER. Different theoretical arguments and

empirical evidence support the claim that an experience predicate cannot surface

without any of these two arguments.


This chapter is divided as follows. Section 3.2. discusses the experience structure in

which no SOURCE is merged at [Spec, VP]. In this section, I explore the two possibilities

the structure allows, and show that both options (expression of the EXPERIENCER being

assigned (the default) Dative or Nominative Case) are observed in different languages.

In Section 3.3., I discuss the option of not merging the EXPERIENCE in the derivation, to

conclude that such option is not possible for experience predicates, as data from

60

Catalan support. Similarly, Section 4.4. argues for the impossibility of having an

experience predicate without an EXPERIENCER, building on theoretical evidence. Finally, in

Section 3.5. I present a summary of the main aspects of the chapter.

3.2. A structure without a SOURCE

As I have widely discussed so far, the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE presented in Chapter 1

introduces three arguments: the EXPERIENCE, the SOURCE, and the EXPERIENCER. In this

section, I discuss the possibility of not merging the SOURCE in the derivation, as a result

of the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, repeated below in (3).

(3) SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

The structural relationships the structure in (3) are the same discussed in the BASIC

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE presented in Chapter 1. The only difference between these two

structures lies on the (obvious) lack of the SOURCE in the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE,

while the SOURCE is present in the full BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE. Assuming that the

structural relationships are maintained, we can predict two possible outputs of the

structure: a. the output is the same as the one discussed in Chapter 1, with a Dative

EXPERIENCER; b. the output is different from the one discussed in Chapter 1, with a non-

Dative EXPERIENCER.

61

3.2.1. The Mayangna option

In Chapter 2, I presented an account of the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed as a

working hypothesis in Chapter 1. In such structure, the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE is merged as

an independent argument, and the EXPERIENCER is assigned (inherent) Dative Case. Yet,

according to the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE that I propose here, some experience

predicates are the result of an experience predicate structure without the merging of a

SOURCE.

The first logical possibility of this SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE is that the other

structural relationships are maintained, including the Case assignment relations. If all

Cases are assigned in the same way, we expect the EXPERIENCER to be assigned (inherent)

Dative Case. Mayangna offers evidence for such phenomenon: in their analysis of

Mayangna impersonal verbs, Charles & Torrez (2008) present an extensive subset of

experience predicates that do not express a SOURCE with a Dative EXPERIENCER. A short list

of these verbs is shown in (4); some fully-fledged examples are represented in (5).

(Examples taken from Charles & Torrez (2008).)

(4) a. kal sibaknin ‘to have the hiccups’ f. kal burnin ‘to blister’ b. kal buihnin ‘to tremble, shake’ g. kal isamhnin ‘to sneeze’ c. kal bukutnin ‘to cough’ h. kal isnin ‘to suffer epilepsies’ d. kal murnin ‘to stretch’ i. kal suhnin ‘to be tired’ e. kal pulihnin ‘to be angry’

(5) a. Abil kidi uba lapakwa kat, kal burwi. Abil D Adv walk-PRES.3s C DAT.3s blister.3s ‘When Abil walks a lot, he gets blisters.’

b. Piwat kami yaklauwa bani kal murdawi. Piwat sleep wake_up-PRES.3s much DAT.3s stretch-PRES:3s ‘Whenever Piwat wakes up, he stretches.’

These examples present a very similar structure than the one discussed in the

previous chapters. Mayangna, as opposed to Catalan, presents evidence for syntactic

62

incorporation of the EXPERIENCE into the V head, which has consequences in lack of a light

verb. This phenomenon is the consequence of the structure outlined in (6), which is

based on the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed at the beginning of this chapter.

(6) vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

VP vEXP

EXP-E V

As observed, the tree structure in (6) does not introduce a SOURCE. The output of this

structure is exemplified in the Mayangna examples in (4) and (5), which include an

EXPERIENCE, but with no SOURCE. Also, the structure in (6), and the corresponding output

observed in Mayangna in (4) and (5), seem to provide evidence for the existence of a

new subclass of experience predicates, as in previous literature (Belletti & Rizzi 1988;

Landau 2005; among others) there was no mention of the possibility of having an

experience predicate without a SOURCE (or a THEME, in their terms).

A closer analysis of the Mayangna output of the structure reveals another interesting

fact. The surface representation of this type of experience predicates with no overt

SOURCE shows evidence for further parametrical difference between Catalan and

Mayangna: in Catalan, the EXPERIENCER is assigned Nominative Case (see Section 3.2.2.);

in Mayangna, however, the EXPERIENCER receives Dative Case (as expressed overtly in (5b,

c)), maintaining the Case assignment pattern discussed in Chapter 2, repeated in the

tree in (7).

63

(7) TP

pro T’

vEXPP T

[Nom]

DPEXP-ER vEXP’

[Dat]

VP vEXP

EXP-E V

Following the analysis presented in Chapter 2, in the Mayangna experience without a

SOURCE, the EXPERIENCER is assigned (inherent) Dative Case. Such assignment is not

structurally-based (the SOURCE would be the first available Goal of a (Nominative) Case

assigning Probe, T); rather, the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER is tied to its thematic

role (Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Belletti 1988; Landau 2005; among others).

Both these facts, the lack of a SOURCE and the assignment of (inherent) Dative Case to

the EXPERIENCER, have an additional consequence in the classification of experience

predicates. Let us review the classification first postulated by Belletti & Rizzi (1988),

introduced in the previous chapter, repeated below in the Table 2.1.

64

Table 2.1 Revised classification of experience predicates (Four classes)






Note that the pattern discussed in this section falls beyond the scope of any of the

classes Belletti & Rizzi (1988) originally proposed for experience predicates: the Dative

receiving EXPERIENCER would seem to correspond to Class III of experience predicates;

yet, the lack of a (non-incorporated) EXPERIENCE to be assigned Case makes such

classification inapplicable. Therefore, we can postulate an extension to the classification

of experience predicates discussed above. This is shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Revised classification of experience predicates (Five classes)






Class V Dative N/A Incorporated on V

As observed, Mayangna presents evidence in favor of the first option allowed by the

SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, in which the EXPERIENCER maintains its inherent Case. In

the following section I discuss the possibility of having an experience structure without a

SOURCE in which the EXPERIENCER is assigned a different Case.

65

3.2.2. The Catalan option

As the Mayangna data presented in Section 3.2.1. provides evidence for, the SOURCE-LESS

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE that I discuss in this chapter can surface with no other change in the

argument structure or the Case assigned to the different arguments. Yet, in this section I

examine the possibility of having an experience structure without a SOURCE, but with a

change in the Case assignment pattern.

Catalan provides evidence of a different output based on the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE

STRUCTURE I propose. According to this option, and contrary to what is observed in

Mayangna, the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER is based on structural relations. In other

words, the EXPERIENCER does not receive inherent Case. These Case assignment

relationships are outlined in the tree structure in (8) (recall from Chapter 2 that Catalan

does not favor syntactic incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V, resulting in a structure

with an overt light verb and an independent EXPERIENCE (QP)).

(8) Structural Case assignment relations without a SOURCE

TP

Spec T’

T vEXPP

[CASE]


[Nom]

vEXP VP

[CASE]

V QPEXPERIENCE

[Part]

66

The existence of this second option is observed in a subset of Romance experience

predicates. A list of Catalan experience predicates that do not express the SOURCE is

presented in (9); some full-fledged examples are shown in (10).

(9) a. tenir por ‘to fear’ f. tenir son ‘to be tired, sleepy’ b. tenir mal ‘to hurt’ g. tenir fred ‘to be cold’ c. tenir ràbia ‘to be frustrated’ h. tenir calor ‘to be hot’ d. tenir mandra ‘to not feel like’ i. tenir set ‘to be thirsty’ e. tenir gana ‘to be hungry’ j. tenir singlot ‘to have the hiccups’

(10) a. En Jordi té gana. D Jordi have-PRES.3s hunger ‘Jordi is hungry.’

b. Aquells nens tenien set. those children have-PIMP.3p thirst ‘Those children were thirsty.’

c. Elles en tenen molta, de son. they-f en have-PRES.3p much of sleepiness ‘They are very sleepy.’

Spanish also presents a subset of experience predicates without a SOURCE, as

observed in (11).

(11) a. Juan tiene hambre.

Juan have-PRES.3s hunger ‘Juan is hungry.’

b. Esos niños tenían sed. those children have-PIMP.3p thirst ‘Those children were thirsty.’

c. Ellas tienen mucho sueño. they-f have-PRES.3p much sleepiness ‘They are very sleepy.’

A few observations can be made from the examples above. Note first of all that this

set of experience predicates does not introduce a SOURCE: the EXPERIENCE is merged with

the verb, while the EXPERIENCER phrase is introduced by the functional projection vEXP.

I argue that the introduction of a SOURCE would yield an ungrammatical structure: a

closer analysis of the data shows that the SOURCE is not syntactically present. If we

67

compare one of the examples discussed in Chapter 2, shown below in (12), with a

sentence belonging to this subtype of experience predicates, we will see that the

presence of a SOURCE in the latter renders an ungrammatical reading (13).

(12) Em fa por la foscor. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s fear D darkness ‘Darkness scares me.’

(13) * pro Tinc por la foscor pro have-PRES.1s fear D darkness ‘Darkness scares me.’

However, the phrase la foscor ‘the darkness’ can be introduced in the structure as an

element within the QP EXPERIENCE, denoting a subtype of EXPERIENCE. Contrast the

different grammaticality value of (12) and (13), and the grammaticality of all the

examples in (14), (15), and (16).

(14) pro Tinc por de la foscor. pro have-PRES.1s fear of D darkness ‘Darkness scares me.’

(15) a. pro Tinc fred. pro have-PRES.1s cold ‘I am cold.’

b.pro Tinc fred de peus. pro have-PRES.1s cold of feet ‘My feet are cold.’

(16) a. Catalan

pro Tinc mal de cap. pro have-PRES.1s pain of head ‘I have a headache.’

b. Spanish

pro Tengo dolor de cabeza. pro have-PRES.1s pain of head ‘I have a headache.’

68

In the sentences in (14), (15b), and (16a, b) above, the experience phrase consists of

an EXPERIENCE nominal (por ‘fear’ in (14); fred ‘cold’ in (15b); mal ‘pain’ in (16a); dolor

‘pain’ in (16b)) modified by a PP (de la foscor ‘of the darkness’ in (14); de peus ‘of feet’ in

(15b); de cap ‘of head’ in (16a); de cabeza ‘of head’ in (16b)), resulting in a single

EXPERIENCE phrase, but of complex structure. In these examples, the PP’s act as modifiers

of the EXPERIENCE nominals; in other words, the EXPERIENCE in the examples above is por

de la foscor (in (14)), fred de peus (in (15b), mal de cap (in (16a), and dolor de cabeza (in

(16b); the EXPERIENCE is not por, fred, mal, or dolor by themselves.

The idea of having a (structurally) complex EXPERIENCE is supported with empirical

data. Recall from Chapter 2 that Catalan allows the option of replacing the EXPERIENCE

phrase with a Partitive clitic (this option is not available in Spanish). Consider the

contrast in grammaticality of the examples in (17).

(17) a. No en tinc gens, (de mal de cap). NEG en have-PRES.1s at all (of pain of head) ‘I don’t have a headache.’

b.* No en tinc gens de cap, (de mal). *NEG en have-PRES.1s at all of head, (of pain) ‘I don’t have a headache.’

The contrast in grammaticality of the examples in (17) shows that mal de cap behaves

as a single constituent; the Partitive clitic en cannot replace just mal as an independent

EXPERIENCE argument, leaving the PP as an independent constituent (17b).

As mentioned above, this subset of Romance experience predicates without a SOURCE

presents a significant difference with the subset of Mayangna experience predicates

without a SOURCE discussed in Section 3.2.1. In Mayangna, the EXPERIENCER maintains the

(inherent) Dative Case assignment related to the theta role it is assigned by the lexical

projection. However, data from both Catalan and Spanish show that in Romance this

subset of SOURCE-less experience predicates the EXPERIENCER is subject to structural Case

assigning relations. Following the structure in (8), the EXPERIENCER becomes the first

69

available Goal of the Case assigning Probe T. The EXPERIENCE, as discussed in Chapter 2,

also enters into structural Case assigning relations, being the first available Goal of the

Case assigning Probe vEXP. As a result, we obtain a derivation with a Nominative

EXPERIENCER, a Partitive EXPERIENCE (cf. examples in (10c) and (17a) above; recall that the

EXPERIENCE is not a full DP and therefore it cannot be assigned (full) Accusative Case),

and, of course, no SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE.

This argument structure, and the subsequent Case relations that it triggers, makes us

reconsider again the classification of experience predicates proposed by Belletti & Rizzi

(1988). This revised, extended classification is outlined in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Revised classification of experience predicates (Six classes)







Class VI Nominative N/A Partitive (QP)

With this Case assignment pattern in hand, and the corresponding argument

structure, we can now account for the change of light verb observed in the contrast in

examples (12) and (14). The example in (12) expresses an experience predicate with a

SOURCE, belonging to the type of experience predicates discussed in Chapter 2; the

example in (14) expresses an experience predicate without a SOURCE. The output of the

light verb in both instances is different: fer ‘to do’ for the example with a full argument

structure; tenir ‘to have’ for the example with a SOURCE-less argument structure. I argue

that the choice of a light verb is a consequence of the structural and Case assignment

properties of the structure: in the cases in which the EXPERIENCER receives inherent

70

Dative Case, the spell-out of the light verb is fer ‘to do’ in Catalan and dar ‘to give’ in

Spanish (cf. Chapter 2); however, when the EXPERIENCER receives structural (Nominative)

Case, the spell-out of the light verb is tenir ‘to have’ in Catalan and tener ‘to have’ in

Spanish.

The fact that the structure discussed in this section does not introduce a SOURCE as an

argument does not invalidate the possibility of having other elements in the structure.

Consider the examples in (18).

(18) a. Tinc fred als peus. have-PRES.1s cold to+D feet ‘My feet are cold.’

b. Tinc mal al braç. have-PRES.1s cold to+D arm ‘My arm hurts.’

In both examples in (18), we observe an EXPERIENCE without a SOURCE, but experienced

at a specific location (als peus ‘to the feet’ in (18a); al braç ‘to the arm’ in (18b)). I

contend that this element is not a SOURCE, but a true LOCATIVE (cf. Landau (2005)),

introduced by the Case assigning locative P a ‘to’. The structural and Case relations

accounting for such examples are shown in (19).

71

(19) Case assignment relations with a LOCATIVE

TP

Spec T’

T vEXPP

[CASE]

DPEXP-ER vEXP’

[Nom]

pro vEXP VP

[CASE]

PPLOC V’

P DPSOURCE V QPEXP-E

[CASE] [Obl] tinc [Part]

braç ‘have’ mal

‘arm’ ‘pain’

3.2.3. Accounting for the parameterization

The previous two subsections in this chapter provide evidence of different levels of

parameterization of the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed in Chapter 1, exemplified by

the different structural options ‘chosen’ by Catalan and Mayangna.

The first parametric difference observed between the two languages has to do with

the presence of an overt light verb in Romance, not present in Mayangna (contrast the

Mayangna examples in (4) with the Catalan examples in (9)). As argued in Chapter 2, this

phenomenon is directly and obviously related to the availability of incorporation of the

EXPERIENCE nominal on the V head. This availability is in turn related with the possibility

of having bare roots (i.e. roots that are underspecified for category) in the language, as

72

only a bare root can undergo incorporation. Since bare (EXPERIENCE) roots are possible in

Mayangna, Mayangna allows incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on V; since bare

(EXPERIENCE) roots are not favored in Catalan, Catalan does not favor incorporation. This

has apparent consequences in the realization of an overt light verb. While Catalan, not

being able to incorporate the EXPERIENCE on V, needs an overt light verb to head the

verbal projection, in Mayangna the verbal information is already expressed through the

fully-fledged verb resulting from the incorporation of the EXPERIENCE.

3.2.4. A Case to solve

So far, in this section I have provided an account for the realization of experience

predicates without a SOURCE in both Romance and Mayangna, explaining the different

crosslinguistic variations observed. However, there is an issue that is not fully resolved.

As observed in Sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.2., Mayangna shows evidence of having an

experience structure with no SOURCE without changing the Case assignment

relationships discussed in Chapter 2. However, both Catalan and Spanish present a small

yet important variation: these Romance languages allow experience predicates without

a SOURCE, but the expression of the EXPERIENCER varies, as in this structure, it no longer

receives (inherent) Case. As observed in different examples, in Romance the EXPERIENCER

is assigned structural (Nominative) Case. This change in the Case assignment to the

EXPERIENCER in Romance can be accounted for assuming a strong version of the ICC

(Inherent Case Constraint) presented in Chapter 2. According to the ICC, EXPERIENCERS will

only be assigned inherent Case if the other arguments are present in the structure and

need to enter into structural Case relations. Since the experience predicates discussed in

this chapter present a ‘defective’ argument structure (there is no SOURCE), then one of

the requirements is not met, and the ICC is not applicable. As a result, the EXPERIENCER in

Romance enters into structural Case assignment.

However, a logical question follows this account: why doesn’t Mayangna display this

variation of Case on the EXPERIENCER? The answer may lie on the parametric nature of the

73

ICC. I contend that the ICC is active in Romance, which results in the EXPERIENCER being

assigned structural (Nominative) Case in SOURCE-less experience predicates; in

Mayangna, on the other hand, the ICC is not active, which results in the EXPERIENCER

being assigned inherent (Dative) Case, regardless of the presence (or lack) of the SOURCE

in the structure.

Nonetheless, this analysis may need further, future analysis to fully understand the

parametric nature and applicability of the Inherent Case Constraint crosslinguistically.

3.3. The need for the EXPERIENCE

In Section 3.2. I discussed the possibility of having an experience predicate without a

SOURCE. In this section, I discuss the option of having an experience predicate without

the EXPERIENCE, to argue that such an option is not possible.

Recall that, according to the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE presented in Chapter 1, an

experience predicate consists of an EXPERIENCE merging with a V head (with our without

syntactic incorporation), which in turn introduces the SOURCE. The (external) EXPERIENCER

is introduced by vEXP, the functional projection responsible for giving the experience

‘flavor’ to the predicate.

Let us consider a structure with no EXPERIENCE argument, but with the other possible

arguments. Such a structure is outlined in (20).

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(20) EXPERIENCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V

I argue that the structure in (20) is not possible in any language. Following on the idea

that the experience predicate depends on the nature of the EXPERIENCE merged in the

structure (see Chapter 2, Chapter 5), I contend that the type of verbal functional

projection has to match with the type of argument. That is, we cannot merge a vEXP if we

do not have a (matching) EXPERIENCE as an initial element in the derivation.

However, such a claim seems to be contradicted by data. Catalan type-languages

seem to be able to express an experience predicate without an (overt) EXPERIENCE.

Consider the Catalan examples in (21) and the Spanish sentences in (22).

(21) a. Em fa que plourà. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s that rain-FUT.3s ‘I feel it’s going to rain.’

b.Em fa que això no funciona. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s that this NEG work-PRES.3s ‘I feel this doesn’t work.’

(22) a.Me da que va a llover. DAT.1s give-PRES.3s that go-PRES.3s to rain-INF ‘I feel it’s going to rain.’

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b. Me da que eso no va a funcionar. DAT.1s give-PRES.3s that that NEG go-PRES.3s to work-INF ‘I feel this won’t work.’

In the sentences above, notice the predicates express an internal emotion or state. If

we analyze in more detail the different elements in these structures, we will see two

obvious elements discussed in the previous chapter: a light verb (fa in (21a, b); da in

(22a, b)); and an EXPERIENCER dative (em in (21a, b); me in (22a, b)). The main difference

between this subset of experience predicates and those analyzed so far is the presence

of a CP (que plourà ‘that it’s going to rain’ in (21a), que això no funciona ‘that this

doesn’t work’ in (21b); que va a llover ‘that it’s going to rain’ in (22a); que eso no va a

funcionar ‘that this is not going to work’ in (22b)), and the lack of an overt EXPERIENCE

nominal.

As stated above, these structures present a clear interpretation involving a

psychological experience. Recall from Chapter 2 that the different nature of the

experience expressed by the predicate is dependent on the nature of the EXPERIENCE

phrase. Consequently, this clear psychological experience must be associated with an

EXPERIENCE nominal, although not necessarily overtly expressed. The CP, on the other

hand, provides a subtype interpretation to the structure: it indicates the type of

psychological experience. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that this CP modifies the

(phonologically null) EXPERIENCE nominal.

Further evidence supports this idea of a non-overtly expressed EXPERIENCE, modified

by a CP, together responsible for the psych reading of the experience predicate. The

interpretation of the sentences in (21) and (22) corresponds very closely to that of the

sentences in (23) and (24).

(23) a. Em fa l’ efecte que plourà. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s D impression that rain-FUT.3s ‘I feel it’s going to rain.’

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b.Em fa l’ efecte que això no funciona. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s D impression that this NEG work-PRES.3s ‘I believe this doesn’t work.’

(24) a. Tengo la sensación de que va a llover. have-PRES.1s D feeling of that go-PRES.3s to rain-INF ‘I have the feeling it’s going to rain.’

b. Tengo la sensación de que eso no va a funcionar. have-PRES.1s D feeling of that that NEG go-PRES.3s to rain-INF ‘I have the feeling this won’t work.’

In all sets of examples above in (21), (22), (23), and (24), we obtain a psych

experience reading. The only difference between these examples is that the overt

presence of an EXPERIENCE nominal in (23), l’efecte, and (24), la sensación, which

corresponds to a phonologically null nominal EXPERIENCE in (21) and (22). Yet, all these

examples introduce a CP modifying the EXPERIENCE nominal head, which specifies the

type of experience manifested in the predicate.

The Spanish examples in (24) confirm the idea that the CP modifies a phonologically

null nominal, as it is introduced by a preposition (heading the type of phrase that

introduces complements to N’s). I argue that the same happens in Catalan, although

there is no (overt) preposition. This difference is not due to a change in the Catalan

structure, as this phenomenon is observed in other instances: prepositions in Catalan

are dropped before a C, as the examples in (25a, b) exemplify.

(25) a. Escolto la ràdio des de l’ any 97. listen-PRES.1s D radio from D year 97 ‘I listen to the radio since 1997.’

b. Escolto la ràdio des que visc aquí. listen-PRES.1s D radio from that live-PRES.1s here ‘I listen to the radio since I moved here.’

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In (25a) the complex preposition des de appears before a DP. In (25b), on the other

hand, the preposition de is dropped before a CP. This the same phenomenon that takes

place in Catalan experience predicates like the one observed in (23).

Additionally, if the CP was an independent phrase, occupying the structural position

of the SOURCE, it could be assumed that it could be replaced by a full DP. However, if we

replace the CP with a semantically equivalent DP, we obtain a clearly ungrammatical

utterance, as noted in (26). Contrastingly, if we modify an overt (semantically

equivalent) EXPERIENCE with a PP, we obtain a fully grammatical utterance (27).

(26) * Em fa la pluja. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s D rain ‘I feel it’s going to rain.’

(27) Em fa sensació de pluja. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s feeling of rain ‘I feel it’s going to rain.’

Thus, with all this evidence in hand, we can then postulate a structure like the one

exemplified in (28).

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(28) vEXPP

DPEXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V QPEXP-E

Q NP

Ø CP

In the examples in (21) and (22), and the structure in (28), we observe a structure

with no SOURCE, but with a (modified) EXPERIENCE and an EXPERIENCER. In other words, this

structure is a variation of the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE discussed in Section 3.2.

Interestingly, the derivation in (28) confirms the (Mayangna-type) availability of having

in Romance an experience structure with no SOURCE, and with a Dative EXPERIENCER. Note

that in the Catalan and Spanish examples discussed so far in this section, the EXPERIENCER

is an argument receiving inherent Dative, similar to the examples discussed in

Mayangna above, but in contrast with the Catalan and Spanish examples analyzed in the

previous section (in which the EXPERIENCER entered into structural Case relations since

one of the conditions of the ICC was not satisfied).

In the type of predicates discussed in this section, we also notice a ‘defective’

argument structure, since there is no Source. The difference between the type of

(Romance) experience predicates discussed in this section and the ones from Section

3.2.2. is the presence in the former of a phonologically (or zero) EXPERIENCE (despite

being syntactically active). This fact seems to be the only factor that triggers an

EXPERIENCER receiving inherent Case and makes the ICC not applicable. Consequently, the

EXPERIENCER is ‘invisible’ to the structure for the purposes of Case assignment, which then

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leaves us with an EXPERIENCE phrase needing to value Case. Again, as I argued previously,

since this EXPERIENCE phrase is not a full DP, it cannot receive the (full) Accusative Case

that would be obtained according to the Agree relationship with the Case assigning

Probe, vEXP, and the Goal15. The consequence is an EXPERIENCE being assigned Partitive

Case. These Case assignment relations are observed in (29).

(29) TP

Spec T’

T vEXPP

[CASE]


[Dat]

vEXP VP

[CASE]

V QPEXPERIENCE

[Part]

This structure, and the consequent Case relations, makes us postulate yet another

variation to the classification of predicates postulated by Belletti & Rizzi (1988): the data

discussed in this section provides evidence for another type of experience verb, in which

there is, a Dative EXPEREINCER, no SOURCE (or THEME, in their terms) and a (non-

incorporated) Partitive EXPERIENCE. The revised classification of experience predicates is

summarized in Table 2.4.

15

Note that this structure leaves a Case assigning Probe, T, without a Goal. However, this is an orthogonal issue for the purposes of this analysis, as it is the same phenomenon observed in other instances (e.g. weather verbs).

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Table 2.4 Revised classification of experience predicates (Seven classes)







Class VI Nominative N/A Partitive (QP)

Class VII Dative N/A Partitive (QP)

3.4. The need for the EXPERIENCER

In the previous sections I discussed the possibility (or lack thereof) of having an

experience predicate without an Experience or a Source, two of three arguments

present in the structure proposed and explored in Chapters 1 and 2. In this (very short)

section I look at the (im)possibility of having an experience structure without an

EXPERIENCER.

I have argued so far that the interpretation of the experience predicate is dependent

on the EXPERIENCE phrase. In this section I take this claim a little further to argue that an

experience predicate (that is, a predicate in which an EXPERIENCE phrase is merged with a

V head) cannot be instantiated without the presence of the appropriate verbal

functional projection (i.e. vEXP), that introduces the EXPERIENCER. In other words, the

EXPERIENCE requires an EXPERIENCER, even if it is not overtly expressed (cf. Chapter 2 for

arbitrary pro interpretations in Romance).

The impossibility of having an experience predicate without an EXPERIENCER phrase is

structurally based. Recall the basic structure of experience predicates, repeated below

in (30).

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vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

Note that in the tree structure above, the EXPERIENCER is introduced by the verbal

functional projection, vEXP. The EXPERIENCER could only not be introduced in the derivation

if this verbal projection was not present in the structure, leaving a predicate without its

intrinsic verbal properties (this structure is shown in (31)).

(31) TP

T ’

T VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

The resulting derivation would therefore crash, explaining thus the impossibility of

having an experience predicate without an EXPERIENCER.

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3.5. Summary

In this chapter I provided further evidence for the different levels of parameterization

of the structure presented in the hypothesis section of the first chapter of the

dissertation. In Section 3.2. I presented a new possibility permitted by the BASIC

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE outlined in Chapter 1. According to the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE

STRUCTURE, experience predicates can be expressed without a SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE. Both

Romance and Misumalpan languages allow experience predicates without expressing a

SOURCE (or a THEME, in related literature), with different variations within the limits of the

structure. Mayangna presents the ‘default’ version of this structure, as it maintains the

same argumental, structural, and Case assigning relationships observed in the BASIC

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE. Romance languages, on the other hand, express these predicates

with a change in the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER: while in the experience predicates

with full argument structure (i.e. with a Source) the EXPERIENCER receives (inherent)

Dative Case, in the experience predicates without a SOURCE the EXPERIENCER phrase enters

into structural Case relations (thus being assigned Nominative).

When compared to the ‘default’ case of Mayangna, Romance languages present

further variation in the output of these SOURCE-less experience predicates. In Section

3.2.2. I presented an account for the variation in the output of the light verb, which is

the result of the argument structure and the Case assigning relations: when the

EXPERIENCER receives inherent Case, the spell-out of the light verb is fer in Catalan and

dar in Spanish; when the EXPERIENCER receives structural Case, the light verb is spelled

out as the one allowing such Case assignment (i.e. tenir/tener ‘to have’).

A general account for the contrast between the Mayangna and Romance experience

predicates without a SOURCE was the object of Section 3.2.3. I argue that such

dissimilarity is mostly related to two factors: i. the availability (or lack thereof) of

incorporation of the EXPERIENCE on the V head, which has consequences on the overt

expression of a light verb; and ii. the Case (either inherent (Dative) or structural

(Nominative)) assigned to the EXPERIENCER, and consequently, the phonological

representation of the light verb. This second parametric variation is linked to the

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Inherent Case Constraint (ICC) parameter: in Mayangna such a parameter is not active;

in Romance, on the other hand, the ICC is active.

The possibility of having further variation within the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE was

the object of Section 3.3. In this section, I discussed the possibility of having an

experience predicate without an EXPERIENCE. Although a subset of Catalan and Spanish

experience predicates seems to allow such an option, I provided evidence that this is not

the case. In those cases in Romance in which there seems to be no overt EXPERIENCE, a

phonologically null EXPERIENCE nominal is modified by a CP, resulting in a construction

with an EXPERIENCE and an EXPERIENCER but with no overt SOURCE. That is, these experience

predicates bear close resemblance with those introduced in Section 3.2.

Finally, in Section 3.4., I explored the possibility of having an experience structure

without an EXPERIENCER. Similarly to what was contended for Section 3.3., I argue that

such an option is not possible. The explanation lies in the impossibility of having an

experience predicative structure without vEXP, which is the head responsible for the

introduction of the EXPERIENCER.

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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIENCING EVENTS

4.1. Introduction

Recall from the BASIC EXPERIENCE Structure first introduced in Chapter 1, that I argue that

an EXPERIENCE merges with the V head, allowing for possible incorporation, and creating

a predication-like structure with the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE, merged in [Spec, VP]. This

predicative structure is the complement of the functional verbal projection, vEXP,

responsible for the introduction of the EXPERIENCER. The BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE is

repeated in (1).


vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

In the previous chapter I argued for the possibility of having different outputs of the

same structure, depending on whether the SOURCE is merged in the structure at an

argument position. However, all the different outputs of the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

share a common (event) interpretation: all these experience predicates are stative. That

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is, vEXPP yields a stative reading (cf. Arad 1998). In this Chapter, I discuss the introduction

of a higher functional layer on top of vEXPP, resulting in an eventive interpretation of the

predicate, which, depending on the different projections selecting vEXPP, will yield an

inchoative interpretation (or internally caused experience predicates) or a causative

reading (or externally caused experience predicates).

Building on the notion of a functional head introducing the event-related information

(Kratzer 1996; Arad 1998, 1999a, b; Pylkkänen 1999a, b, 2002, 2008; McGinnis 2000,

2001; Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou 2004; Schäfer 2009; among many others) and the

semantic differences between causative and inchoative readings (cf. Jackendoff 1990;

Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1994, 1995; Marín & McNally 2009; among many others), I

argue that both inchoative and causative interpretation involve the merging in the

structure of an eventive head, vBECOME, modifying vEXPP. The difference between the two

readings is found in the later merging of another projection, vCAUS16, which is responsible

for the introduction of an external argument: the CAUSER17 of the event. These two

event-related structures are outlined in (2) and (3).

16

This projection may very well correspond to different labels found in the literature (e.g. Kratzer’s (1996) Voice). However, I decide to maintain consistency throughout this dissertation with a single type of a verbal functional projection, v, with different possible ‘flavors’. 17

This argument may also be known under other aliases, depending on the specific details of the proposals by each author (e.g. Ramchand 2008 might argue that this argument is the Initiator of the event, introduced by the head of InitP).

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(2) INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE WITH NO EXTERNAL ARGUMENT

vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

(3) CAUSATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE WITH EXTERNAL ARGUMENT

vCAUSP

(Ext.) CAUSER vCAUS’

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

The eventive interpretation obtained is the result of the introduction of one or two

eventive heads. If a vBECOME head (a projection that does not introduce an external

argument) selects vEXPP as its complement, the result is an inchoative interpretation with

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no external causer. On the contrary, if a vCAUS head is merged in the derivation on top of

vBECOMEP (which in turn selects vEXPP), it introduces an external argument. This new

structure results in a causative interpretation with an external causer. The output of the

first option is an inchoative experience predicate which is internally triggered; the

second option yields an inchoative experience predicate which is externally triggered.


This chapter is divided as follows. In Section 4.2. I present the possibility of having a

contrast between eventive and stative interpretations of experiencer predicates. Using

data from Romance, Section 4.3. deals with those experience predicates which denote

an event but with no external cause In contrast, in Section 4.4. I present evidence for

the existence of eventive experience predicates with an external cause, which are the

result of having a fully fledged eventive structure, with a causative projection, and

introduces the differences in the structure accounting for such a contrast. Finally, in

Section 4.5. I summarize the main points of the chapter.

4.2. Stative vs. Eventive experience predicates

The Romance data discussed in the previous chapter was centered on Catalan and

Spanish, which present a similar behavior with respect to experience predicates. As I

pointed out in Chapter 2, both languages allow light verb constructions, with a different

phonological content in the realization of the light verb.

(4) Catalan


88





(5) Spanish

a. Me da miedo la oscuridad. DAT.1s give-PRES.3s fear the darkness ‘Darkness scares me.’

b. Me dan asco las ratas. DAT.1s give-PRES.3p disgust the rats ‘Rats disgust me.’

In the examples above we observe how in Catalan the light verb is expressed as fer

‘to do’, while the Spanish counterpart is dar ‘to give’. Despite this dissimilarity, these

predicates show the same arguments in the same structural relationship: the EXPERIENCE

merges on V, and establishes a predication-like structure with the SOURCE, while the

EXPERIENCER is introduced in [Spec, vEXPP].

In Chapter 3 I presented further evidence in the similarity of the behavior of

experience predicates in both Romance languages object of study. Both Catalan and

Spanish present a subset of experience predicates that do not express a SOURCE.

(6) Catalan

a. En Jordi té gana. D Jordi have-PRES.3s hunger ‘Jordi is hungry.’

b. Aquells nens tenien set. those children have-PIMP.3p thirst ‘Those children were thirsty.’

c. Elles en tenen molta, de son. they-f en have-PRES.3p much of sleepiness ‘They are very sleepy.’

d.pro Tinc mal de cap. pro have-PRES.1s pain of head ‘I have a headache.’

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(7) Spanish

a. Juan tiene hambre. Juan have-PRES.3s hunger ‘Juan is hungry.’

b. Esos niños tenían sed. those children have-PIMP.3p thirst ‘Those children were thirsty.’

c. Ellas tienen mucho sueño. they-f have-PRES.3p much sleepiness ‘They are very sleepy.’

d.pro Tengo dolor de cabeza. pro .1s have-PRES.1s pain of head ‘I have a headache.’

In the examples in (7) and (8) we observe again a clear similarity in the expression of

these predicates. Both Catalan and Spanish use a light verb to express this type of

experience predicates that is different from the ones observed in examples (2) and (3):

from fer ‘to do’ to tenir ‘to have in Catalan; from dar ‘to give’ to tener ‘to have in

Spanish. As argued in Chapter 3, the change in the phonological expression of the light

verb is a consequence of the structure without the SOURCE and the Case assigned to the

EXPERIENCER.

One issue regarding these predicates in Romance was not duly pinpointed. All the

examples in (4) to (7) indicate a state, without any change in the experience event.

Since, according to the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE that I propose, all experience

predicates are headed by vEXP, we can argue, following different views in the literature

on event nature of psych verbs (cf. Arad 1998; Pylkkänen 1999a, b, 2002, 2008;

McGinnis 2000, 2001; Marín & McNally 2009; among others), that vEXPP denotes a state.

Such a reading is attested when applying some of the different tests to confirm

stativity (cf. Dowty 1979). According to Dowty (1979), stative predicates, as opposed to

predicates expressing an achievement or an accomplishment, cannot be modified by

temporal phrases of the type in X time. Consider the Catalan examples in (8) and (9).

(8) * Em fa mal la mà en cinc minuts. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the hand in five minutes ‘*My hand hurts in five minutes.’

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(9) * En Jordi té gana en cinc minuts. D Jordi have-PRES.3s hunger in five minutes ‘*Jordi is hungry in five minutes.’

In both (8) and (9) the predicate yields an ungrammatical reading when modified by

the temporal phrase en cinc minuts ‘in five minutes’, which indicates that this type of

predicates does not denote an accomplishment or an achievement.

Additional tests confirm the stative nature of the experience predicates analyzed in

the previous chapters. States, as well as activities, allow modification by a temporal

phrase of the type during X time. The examples in (10) and (11) show how the same

Catalan examples that did not allow modification with a phrase of the type in X time are

grammatical when modified by the phrase durant deu minuts ‘during/for ten minutes’.

(10) Em va fer mal la mà durant deu minuts. DAT.1s go-PRES.3s do-INF pain the hand in five minutes ‘My hand hurt for ten minutes.’

(11) En Jordi va tenir gana durant deu minuts. D Jordi go-PRES.3s have-INF hunger in five minutes ‘Jordi was hungry for ten minutes.’

These two tests only confirm that the experience predicates in these examples are

not accomplishments or achievements. However, we can also confirm that these

predicates do not have an activity interpretation. As Dowty points out, “only non-

statives co-occur with the adverbs deliberately, carefully” (1979: 55). Consider the

examples in (12) and (13), constructed with the same experience predicates as the

previous two pairs of examples.

(12) a. * Em fa mal la mà expressament. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the hand deliberately. ‘*My hand hurts deliberately.’

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b. *Em fa mal la mà curosament. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain the hand carefully ‘*My hand hurts carefully.’

(13) a. * En Jordi té gana expressament. D Jordi have-PRES.3s hunger deliberately ‘*Jordi is hungry deliberately.’

b. *En Jordi té gana curosament. D Jordi have-PRES.3s hunger carefully ‘*Jordi is hungry carefully.’

In both (12) and (13), the experience predicates show incompatibility with

deliberately- and carefully-type adverbs. This piece of evidence indicates that these

experience predicates do not express an activity.

The different tests observed in the examples in (8) to (13) provide support for the

claim that the different outputs that the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE allows are not

achievements, accomplishments, or activities; rather, these experience predicates are

states.

However, certain experience predicates do express an event. Consider the examples in

(14) and (15) below.

(14) Catalan

a. Aquesta música em fa venir mal de cap en cinc minuts. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come-INF pain of head in five minutes ‘This music gives me a headache in five minutes.’

b. Em surten grans en cinc minuts. DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples in five minutes ‘I get pimples in five minutes.’

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(15) Spanish

a. Esa música me dio dolor de cabeza en dos minutos. that music DAT.1s give-PAST.3s pain of head in two minutes ‘That music gave me a headache in two minutes.’

b. Me salen granos en cinco minutos. DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples in five minutes ‘I get pimples in five minutes.’

In both sets of examples from Catalan and Spanish above, we can observe how

different experiences can be modified by a temporal phrase of the type in X time. This

fact indicates that these predicates, as opposed to the ones discussed earlier in this

section, are not states, but denote an eventive reading events (in particular, the

examples in (14) and (15) denote an event with an end point).

I argue that this distinction (stative vs. eventive experience predicates) is structurally

motivated. In sections 4.3. and 4.4. I explore two different structures, which introduce

an eventive interpretation on top of the experience interpretation. But before going into

the details of both structures, let us review some of the basic ideas found in the

literature regarding the representation of internal and external causation (which are

crucial for the analysis that I propose), with a focus on experience (or psych) verbs.

4.2.1. Reviewing the causes: internal vs. external causation

Pesetsky (1987, 1995) analyzes psych predicates and their interaction with causative

readings. According to this author, ObjExp predicates (i.e. transitive experience

predicates with the EXPERIENCER displaying an object marking) hide a complex predicate,

with a state experience and a CAUSER, as shown in (16).

(16) annoy: **“BE-ANNOYED”+ “CAUSE”+

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Pesetsky (1995) argues that this bimorphemic analysis is sound, assuming that the

causative interpretation is due to the introduction of a phonologically zero morpheme

CAUS. Since the bimorphemic analysis that Pesetsky (1995) proposes ‘only’ accounts for

the introduction of an external CAUSER, it cannot be applied to an account for an internal

causation reading.

Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1994, 1995) take a more lexical semantics approach to

account for causation and the internal vs. external causation distinction. For external

causation, these authors claim that the causative reading of a predicate comes from the

semantics (i.e. the lexical meaning of the individual item), as observed in (17). In other

words, the CAUSER (or external argument) is a semantic argument (it is s-selected),

instead of being introduced at the syntax (contra many views on the introduction of

external arguments (Marantz 1984; Kratzer 1996; Chomsky 1995; among many others).

(17) break: [[x do-something] cause [y become broken]]

As for internally caused predicates, Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1994, 1995) claim that

this notion is also based on the semantics of the predicate or its argument. “The

eventualities described by such verbs come about as a result of internal physical

characteristics of the argument” (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995: 92). That is, the lexical

meaning of the predicate does not involve an external CAUSER (argument). With this

distinction, Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1992, 1995) argue that only the predicates that

denote an externally caused event allow the so-called causative alternation: only those

that express an external argument can ‘detransitivize’.

The more syntactic approach to causation of experience predicates that Pesetsky

(1987, 1995) proposed is recaptured and adapted later by Pylkkänen (1999a, b, 2002,

2008). This author proposes a unified account to distinguish the different outputs

observed crosslinguistically (with a strong emphasis on causative constructions in

English and Finnish). She argues that languages fall into two possible categories

depending on the expression of a Cause projection and the external argument: a. the

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Cause projection is independent of the introduction of the (thematic) external argument

(e.g. Finnish), which may or may not be there; or b. the Cause proejection and

theexternal argument are introduced in a single bundle (e.g. English). Such a contrast is

expressed respectively in the trees in (18) and (19) below.

(18) a. Cause with no external argument b. Cause with external argument

CAUSEP vP

CAUSE VP Ext. arg. v’

v<θ> CAUSEP

CAUSE VP

(19) Cause-and-external argument bundle

vP

Ext. arg. v’

v<θ, CAUSE> VP

The main idea behind this analysis is that causation is dependent on the syntax, not

on the semantics (cf. Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1994, 1995; among others): it is the

syntax that leads the formation of a particular meaning. Additionally, this analysis

predicts that for the languages of the first group there should exist causative

constructions with no external argument (attested in Finnish, Japanese), while for the

languages of the second group it should not be possible to find causative constructions

with no external argument (no counterexample found yet).

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According to Pylkkänen’s analysis, the CauseP projection is responsible for the

realization/expression of external causation, not for that of internal causation.

“*I+nternal causation is always expressed in v. But in the grammar internal causation is

not expressed as causation, only external causation is” (Pylkkänen 1999a: 14).

Finally, McGinnis (2000, 2001) combines bits and pieces of both Pylkkänen’s (1999a,

b, 2002, 2008) and Pesetsky’s (1987, 1995) approaches. Following some of the claims by

both authors, McGinnis (2000) presents a new distinction on experience predicates

based on the heads that select a root. In SubjExp predicates (i.e. in those experience

predicates in which the EXPERIENCER displays subject marking), a noncausative stative vPERC

selects the root, creating a stative experiencer ‘event’; if we merge a (a root-external)

causative vCAUS on top of this structure, we obtain an (external) causation interpretation

of the stative ‘event’ (Category External Causatives). The representation of these

predicates is shown in (20), with a corresponding example in (21).

(20) Category External Causative

vP

the rumblings v’

vCAUS vP

Bill v’

vPERC √P

√fear another storm

(21) The rumblings made Bill fear another storm.

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However, some other psych predicates, which she calls PsyCaus (which correspond to

ObjExp), are the result of merging a causative stative v selecting the root, creating a

causative stative ‘event’ with no need (or possibility) to merge a higher functional

causative projection (Root External Causatives). The tree in (22) yields such an

interpretation; the example in (23) corresponds to a possible output of this structure.

(22) Root External Causative

vP

the rumblings v’

vCAUS √P

√fright Bill

(23) The rumblings frightened Bill.

Not far from some of the ideas presented by Pesetsky (1987, 1995) and Pylkkänen

(1999a, b, 2002, 2008), McGinnis’ (2000) analysis presents a syntactic account for the

external causation of experience predicates.

However, none of these approaches tackles a very interesting issue: those predicates

that express an internally caused experience. As I mentioned above, Pylkkänen (1999a)

argues that the grammar does not express internal causation as causation: it is ‘only’

expressed in v. This raises a very interesting (and challenging) question: if the v head is

the same for experience predicates that denote a state as for those denoting internal

causation, what distinguishes between those experience predicates that are simply

states with those that express internally caused experiences? In the following two

sections I provide a possible answer to this question by proposing two possible

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structural options that present a plausible account for the distinction of experience

predicates denoting a state, an inchoative event (i.e. internally triggered experiences),

or a causative event (i.e. externally triggered experiences).

The first option, presented in Section 4.3., is the result of having a structure with

vBECOMEP on top of vEXPP (without a projection that introduces an external argument). The

resulting interpretation is that of an inchoative, internally triggered, experience

predicate.

The second option, which is discussed in Section 4.4. and which follows some of the

current ideas on external causation (Pylkkänen 1999a,b, 2002, 2008; McGinnis 2000,

2001; Schäfer 2009; Marín & McNally 2009; among others), is the result of the merging

of a vCAUS head, responsible for the introduction of an external CAUSER, which selects a

vBECOME projection, which turns the experience predicate, vEXPP, into a predicate with

eventive interpretation. The result of this option is a reading according to which an

external causer triggers the experience state.

4.3. Internally caused experiences

As demonstrated in Section 4.2., the predicates presented in the previous chapters (i.e.

those predicates headed by vEXP) denote a stative experience (cf. Arad 1998; Pylkkänen

2002, 2008). However, some experience predicates allow an eventive reading. I argue

that such interpretation is structurally motivated, as represented in the (partial)

eventive structure in (24).

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(24) INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE (WITH NO EXTERNAL ARGUMENT)

vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

In this structure, a head of the functional projection vBECOMEP, selects the stative vEXPP.

This head introduces a causative interpretation which, combined with the stative

experience reading of vEXPP, results in an inchoative interpretation. Following Pylkkänen

(2002, 2008), I argue that the head of vBECOMEP is unaccusative and does not introduce an

external argument. Consequently, the reading obtained is that of an inchoative

experience predicate that is internally triggered (i.e. bodily actions).

Again, the representation of this option is also found in different languages. Consider

the examples in (25) and (26) below.

(25) Catalan

Em surten grans (quan menjo xocolata). DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples when eat-PRES.1s chocolate ‘I get pimples whenever I eat chocolate.’

(26) Spanish

Me salen granos (cuando como chocolate). DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples when eat-PRES.1s chocolate ‘I get pimples whenever I eat chocolate.’

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Note that in these two examples there is no SOURCE (or THEME, or SUBJECT MATTER, in

related literature). Also, the predicates denote an experience that is not triggered by an

external element18. The CP’s that appear in both Catalan and Spanish examples are

optional and, contrary to what happens in some of the experience predicates discussed

in Chapter 2 (and in the following section), are a temporal adjunct (indicating the time in

which the experience event takes place).

Building on the notions of structural contrast between states and eventive (or

causative) predicates (cf. Jackendoff 1990; Pesetsky 1995; Arad 1998; Pylkkänen 1999a,

b, 2002, 2008; McGinnis 2000; Schäfer 2009; Marín & McNally 2009; among others), I

contend that this eventive interpretation results from merging in the structure a

functional projection vBECOMEP, which turns a stative predicate, vEXPP, into an eventive one.

Again, since vBECOMEP is an unaccusative projection (i.e. it does not introduce an external

argument), the resulting structure has a causative interpretation, but with no CAUSER. As

a result the reading obtained is that of an internally triggered experience, as observed in

(25) and (26).

The resulting predicates are eventive (with an endpoint). Consequently, they can be

delimited in time, as shown in the examples in (27) and (28).

(27) Catalan

Em surten grans en cinc minuts. DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples in five minutes ‘I get pimples in five minutes.’

18

The examples in (25) and (26) contrast with the ones below, with an overt CAUSER, indicating an externally triggered experience. I discuss examples like these in more detail in Section 4.4. (i) Catalan La xocolata em fa sortir grans.

D chocolate DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come_out-INF pimples. ‘Chocolate makes me have pimples.’

(ii) Spanish El chocolate me hace salir granos.

D chocolate DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come_out-INF pimples. ‘Chocolate makes me have pimples.’

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(28) Spanish

Me salen granos en cinco minutos. DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples in five minutes ‘I get pimples in five minutes.’

The predicates in both examples (27) and (28) can be modified by a temporal phrase

(en cinc minuts ‘in five minutes’ in (27); en cinco minutos ‘in five minutes’ in (28)),

contrasting with stative experience predicates, which do not allow temporal

modification by a phrase of the type in X time (cf. Section 4.2.) Also, none of these

examples has an external CAUSER, which results in an interpretation according to which

the experience state is internally triggered.

The INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE that I propose has another consequence in the

phonological form of the predicate. Contrast the Catalan stative experience example in

(29) with its eventive counterpart in (30).

(29) pro Tinc grans (a la cara). pro.1s have-PRES.1s pimples in the face minutes ‘I have pimples (on my face).’

(30) Em surten grans (en cinc minuts). DAT.1s come_out-PRES.3p pimples in five minutes ‘I get pimples (in five minutes).’

In the pair of examples above we notice a contrast in the expression of the light verb.

As discussed in Chapter 3, for the Catalan predicates denoting a stative reading without

a SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE, the light verb is tenir ‘to have’. This is shown in (29). However, in

(30) we observe that the light verb appears to be sortir ‘to come out’. In a similar

fashion to what I argued for the output of the light verb in Chapter 3, I contend that in

inchoative interpretations the phonological expression of the light verb is the result of

merging the features in the different verbal projections. In other words, the merging of

the features in V, and vEXP, in Catalan experience predicates with no SOURCE is

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phonologically expressed as tenir ‘to come out’; the merging of the features in V, vEXP,

and vBECOME is phonologically expressed in Catalan as sortir ‘to come out’.

Another possibility is attested in the representation of eventive experience predicates:

the introduction of an external head causing the event. In the following section I discuss

this possibility and its possible output in different languages.

4.4. Externally caused experiences

Eventive experience predicates are not only inchoative (i.e. internally triggered, with no

external CAUSER) in nature. One of the possibilities in the expression of eventive

experience predicates is that of an experience state initiated by an external CAUSER.

Again, I argue that such possibility is structurally motivated, and is the result of the tree

structure in (31).

(31) CAUSATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE (WITH EXTERNAL ARGUMENT)

vCAUSP


vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

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This structure bears some resemblance with the INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE I

discussed in the previous section. In the CAUSATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, the (stative)

experience predicate, vEXPP, merges with an unaccusative vBECOME projection, which

provides the eventive interpretation to the predicate. The difference between the

inchoative and causative interpretation lies in the merging of yet another projection. As

observed in the tree in (31), a vCAUS head is later externally merged, selecting vBECOMEP and

introducing an external (CAUSER) argument.

Consequently, the structure proposed in (31) provides a reading that combines the

experience state, resulting from vEXPP, and the inchoative interpretation, resulting from

vBECOMEP, with an external argument, an (external) CAUSER introduced in [Spec, vCAUSP].

Both Catalan and Spanish provide evidence for such contrast. Consider the following

Catalan examples.

(32) a. Tinc mal de cap. have-PRES.1s pain of head ‘I have a headache.’

b. Tinc ganes de sortir al carrer. have-PRES.1s will of go_out-INF to+D street ‘I feel like going out on the street.’

(33) a. Aquesta música em fa mal de cap. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

a'.Aquesta música em fa venir mal de cap. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come-INF pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

b. Em vénen ganes de sortir al carrer. DAT.1s come-PRES.3p will of go_out-INF to+D street ‘Something makes me feel like going out on the street.’

b'.*M’ entren ganes de sortir al carrer DAT.1s enter-PRES.3p will of go_out-INF to+D street ‘Something makes me feel like going out on the street.’

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Observe that these predicates share some similarities with the ones discussed in

Chapter 3: the EXPERIENCE merges with the V, in a process without incorporation and, as a

result, the EXPERIENCE is overtly expressed as an independent argument, which is

corresponded with the presence of the light verb. Also, similarly to what was observed

in Chapter 2, the EXPERIENCER receives inherent (Dative) Case. We observe an additional

fact (also noted in the examples discussed in Section 4.3.): none of the examples in (32)

and (33) introduce a SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE.

The contrast between the examples in (32) and (33) above resides in the fact that the

experience predicates in (32) are stative, with no cause of any kind, while the

experiences in (33) denote a causative event, with an external CAUSER (aquesta música

‘this music’), which can be overtly or non-overtly expressed19. This interpretation is due

to the change in the event structure of the predicate, assuming that stative predicates

have a defective eventive structure (without vBECOMEP), while eventive predicates may

have a full eventive structure with the inclusion of vCAUSP, which introduces an external

argument (following the ideas on causation proposed by Pylkkänen (1999a, b, 2002,

2008; McGinnis 2000; Schäfer 2009; see their work for additional references)).

This CAUSATIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE has implications in the properties of the predicate.

Since these experience predicates expressed an event that has en endpoint (i.e. the

initiation of the experience state), they are possible with a temporal adjunct of the type

in X time. Observe the grammaticality contrast of the examples in (34) and (35).

(34) * Tinc mal de cap en cinc minuts. have-PRES.1s pain of head in five minutes ‘I have a headache in five minutes.’

(35) Aquesta música em fa venir mal de cap en cinc minuts. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come-INF pain of head in five minutes ‘This music gives me a headache in five minutes.’

19

When the external cause is not overtly expressed, the [Spec, vCAUSP] position is occupied by a 3rd

person plural pro, resulting in an arbitrary pro interpretation.

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In (35) the predicate expresses an event (although not an activity). Thus, when a

temporal adjunct is introduced in the structure, the resulting sentence is grammatical.

The grammaticality of this sentence contrasts with the sentence in (34), a state that

does not resist temporal modification.

A similar contrast is also found in Spanish. Consider the differences in the examples in

(36) and (37) below.

(36) a. Tengo dolor de cabeza. have-PRES.1s pain of head ‘I have a headache.’

b. Tengo ganas de salir a la calle. have-PRES.1s will of go_out-INF to D street ‘I feel like going out on the street.’

(37) a. Esta música me da dolor de cabeza. this music DAT.1s give-PRES.3s pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

a'.* Esta música me hace venir dolor de cabeza. this music DAT.1s do-PRES.3s come-INF pain of head ‘This music gives me a headache.’

b.?? Me vienen ganas de salir a la calle. DAT.1s enter-PRES.3p will of go_out-INF to D street ‘Something makes me feel like going out on the street.’

b'.Me entran ganas de salir a la calle. DAT.1s enter-PRES.3p will of go_out-INF to+D street ‘Something makes me feel like going out on the street.’

As in Catalan, Spanish shows a contrast between stative (36) and causative (37)

experience predicates. Again, this difference in interpretation is due to a change in the

eventive structure of the predicate: causatives are the results of a fully fledged causative

(eventive) structure, with vCAUSP, which introduces the (external) CAUSER, merged on top

of vBECOMEP; states, on the other hand, are obtained when no eventive functional

projection (i.e. vBECOMEP) is introduced on top of (the stative) vEXPP.

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We might wonder now why Catalan and Spanish differ in the spell-out of this

structure (cf. examples (33a’, b, b’) for Catalan; examples (37a, b, b’) for Spanish). Such

difference can be accounted assuming some parametric variation between these two

languages, already attested in this dissertation. Recall from Chapter 2 that the surface

phonological representation of the light verb in Catalan (stative) experience predicates

is fer ‘to do’, while in Spanish is dar ‘to give’. That difference was explained assuming a

different phonological content for the same structure. A similar phenomenon occurs in

the eventive structure, with the expression of the light verb in (33b, b’) and (37b, b’):

the expression of this light verb, which is the result of the combination of features on V,

vEXP, vBECOME, vCAUS and T has the output of venir ‘to come’ in Catalan, while the spell-out in

Spanish is entrar ‘to enter’.

A related explanation might account for the difference observed in examples (33a’)

and (37a’). Note that Catalan allows for the presence of a causative fer, while the

surfacing of this element in Spanish yields an ungrammatical sentence. This difference

can be accounted if we assume yet another level of crosslinguistic parameterization:

similarly to what Pylkkänen (2002, 2008) or McGinnis (2000) argue for English, Catalan

allows the independent spell-out of the vCAUS head; in Spanish, on the other hand, this

possibility is not available (i.e. the features on vCAUS have to be phonologically expressed

in combination with those in V, vEXP, and vBECOME).

4.5. Summary

In this chapter I have discussed the possibility of having another level in the structural

representation which is responsible for the eventive interpretations of the experience

predicate. According to the structures proposed, two possible options are available,

depending on the introduction of a Voice head, which introduces an external argument

and, thus, provides an external CAUSER to the experience predicate, or the introduction

of an unaccusative vBECOME head, with no external argument, which yields as a result an

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inchoative experience interpretation with no external CAUSER (i.e. an internally triggered

inchoative experience).

In Section 4.2. I provided evidence for the existence of a different reading (stative vs.

eventive) for experience predicates. Using Dowty’s (1979) tests to identify the different

types of verbs (states, activities, accomplishments, and achievements), I provided

evidence from Romance languages of the existence of such difference in interpretation,

which is the result of the possibility of merging (for eventive experience predicates) or

not merging (for stative experience predicates) vBECOMEP (and vCAUSP) on top of vEXPP.

In Section 4.4. I discussed the structure resulting from the merging of a vBECOME head

selecting vEXPP. In this structure, vBECOMEP is unaccusative and, therefore, it does not

introduce an external argument. Since no external argument is introduced in the

derivation, we obtain the reading of an eventive, inchoative experiencer predicate with

no external cause, i.e. an internally triggered experience.

Finally, Section 4.3. dealt with the introduction in the structure of yet another

functional projection: vCAUSP. According to this structure, the vCAUS head introduces an

external argument, which is interpreted as the external CAUSER of the experience event.

The result interpretation is causative experiencer event with an external CAUSER.

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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIENCE AGENTS

5.1. Introduction

The (causative) experience predicates analyzed in Chapter 4 present a clear non-

agentive reading. That is, there is no external argument willingly causing the

experiencing event. However, not all experience predicates are exclusively non-

agentive: a subset of the causatives predicates discussed in the previous chapter allow

for an additional agentive interpretation (i.e. with an animate CAUSER). This duality of

interpretation is found crosslinguistically, with examples in languages from different

families.

As noted by Belletti & Rizzi (1988), Franco (1990), Fernández-Ordóñez (1999), Parodi

& Luján (2000), Rosselló (2002), Franco & Huidobro (2003), Landau (2005), Adger &

Ramchand (2006), among others, (some) experience predicates allow a contrast

between agentive and non-agentive readings. Landau (2005) makes a generalization and

claims that only Class II experiencer predicates allow such dichotomy. Yet, in this

chapter, I present enough evidence that experience predicates belonging to a Class III

experience predicate in Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) classification do indeed allow such

agentive readings.

Many languages present a contrast in the interpretation of experience predicates: a

limited subset of experience predicates allow an agentive reading. Consider the

examples in (1) to (4) below, in which the first sentence ((1a), (2a), (3a), (4a)) is

interpreted with a non-agentive reading. However, the second sentence ((1b), (2b), (3b),

(4b)) expresses an agentive experience, with an overt AGENT and an overt EXPERIENCER.

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(1) English

a. My hand bothers me every morning.

b. Kim bothers me every morning.

(2) Catalan


b. Aquells nens em fan mal a la mà. those children DAT.1s do-PRES.3p pain to the hand ‘Those children hurt my hand.’

(3) Spanish

a.Me molestan los comentarios racistas. DAT.1s bother-PRES.3p the comments racist.p ‘Racist comments bother me.’

b. Juan me molesta a propósito. Juan ACC.1s bother-PRES.3s on purpose ‘Juan bothers me on purpose.’

(4) Mayangna

a. Tingki balna dalâ yâwi. hand-AGR.1s p.mrkr pain DAT.1s-PRES.3s ‘My hands hurt.’ (lit. ‘My hands give me pain.’)

b.Manna dalâni yâtamana. NOM:2p pain-AGR3s DAT.1s-PRES.2p ‘You (p.) are hurting me.’ (lit. ‘You (p.) are giving me pain.’)

The availability of having this duality of interpretations is dependent on two factors: i.

merging in the structure an EXPERIENCE phrase with eventive features; and ii. introducing

a higher functional projection, vCAUS, merged on top of the eventive vBECOMEP (providing an

eventive interpretation to the otherwise stative vEXPP), and which is responsible for the

introduction of the AGENT. The result is an AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, outlined in (6),

which is the result of adding the causative functional layer to the BASIC EXPERIENCE

STRUCTURE (5).

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vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E


vCAUSP

AGENT vCAUS’

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

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According to this agentive structure, the EXPERIENCE merges with V (allowing, as

already discussed, the possibility of incorporation; cf. Chapter 2), and creates a

predication-like structure with the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE. Since the experience reading of

the predicate is maintained, I argue that the VP is externally merged with the functional

projection vEXP, which is responsible for the introduction of the EXPERIENCER. The agentive

interpretation ‘conceals’ an eventive one: I argue for the introduction of an eventive

layer consisting of vBECOMEP and a higher vCAUSP. The head of this latter projection, vCAUS, is

responsible for the introduction of the Agent (a Causer with animate features). The

resulting interpretation of this whole structure is an agentive experience predicate.


This chapter is divided as follows. In Section 5.2. I present the evidence corroborating

the existence of an agentive interpretation for experience predicates. Such reading is

the result of the AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed. The second part of Section 5.2.

discusses the importance of UTAH (Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis) for the

proposal, while Section 5.3. deals with an account for the structural and Case assigning

relations between the different elements in the structure. In Section 5.4. I offer an

account for the difference in the types of EXPERIENCE phrases that allow an agentive

interpretation. Finally, in Section 5.5. I discuss the relevance of phases and their

interpretation for the processing of this dual (non-agentive/agentive experience

structure). Section 5.6. summarizes the main aspects of the chapter.

5.2. Evidence for an agentive structure

In Chapter 4 I discussed the possibility of having an experience structure with an

external CAUSER, with the merging on top vEXPP of an eventive vBECOMEP and vCAUSP,

responsible for the introduction of an (additional) external argument. This (causative)

eventive structure is repeated below in (7).

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(7) EVENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

vCAUSP


vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

V EXP-E

The outputs of such a structure, discussed in the previous chapter, display a causative

interpretation, with an external CAUSER being the initiator of the experience event.

However, in none of the examples discussed in Chapter 4 did we observe an external

CAUSER acting willingly.

Yet, and as I mentioned in the Section 5.1., a very limited subset of experience verbs

allows for an agentive reading. In Catalan, the agentive interpretation is (almost

exclusively) only possible with the predicates fer mal ‘to hurt’ and fer por ‘to scare’.

Consider the examples in (8a-b), and (9a-b).

(8) a. Em fa mal el braç. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain D arm ‘My arm hurts.’

b. Aquells nens m’ han fet mal. those chidren DAT:1s have-PRES3p do-PPART pain

‘Those children (have) hurt me.’

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b'. Aquells nens m’ han fet mal al braç. those chidren DAT:1s have-PRES3p do-PPART pain to+D arm

‘Those children (have) hurt me in the arm.’

(9) a. Em fa por el teu germà. DAT.1s do-PRES.3s fear D your brother ‘Your brother scares me.’

b. El teu germà em va fer por per divertir-se. D your brother DAT.1s go-PRES.3p do-INF fear to amuse-INF-REFL.3s ‘Your brother scared me to amuse himself.’

The examples in (8a) and (9a) present a stative experience reading, without any

independent cause for that event. However, in the examples in (8b, b’) and (9b) the

interpretation is that of an AGENT (or external CAUSER) (aquells nens ‘those children’ in

(8b, b’); el teu germà ‘your brother’ in (9b)) causing the experience event.

Such a contrast in interpretation is corroborated with an agentivity test. Recall from

the previous chapter that, as Dowty (1979) points out, deliberately-type adverbs can

only co-occur with eventive predicates and are not possible with stative predicates. This

type of adverbs is also only possible with those predicates denoting an agentive

interpretation. Therefore, if one utterance resists the introduction of an adverb of this

type, such as expressament ‘deliberately’, it will indicate that the predicate is not only

eventive but also agentive. Consider the pair of examples in (10), adapted from the

examples in (8a, b’) above.

(10) a. *Em fa mal el braç expressament. *DAT.1s do-PRES.3s pain D arm deliberately ‘*My arm hurts deliberately.’

b. Aquells nens mi’ han fet mal ali braç expressament. those chidren DAT:1s have-PRES3p do-PPART pain to+D arm deliberately ‘Those children (have) deliberately hurt me in the arm.’

In (10a) the introduction of the adverb expressament ‘deliberately’ results in an

ungrammatical utterance, since the structure is stative in nature (there is no eventive

vBECOMEP merged on top of vEXPP). On the contrary, the sentence in (10b) resists the

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introduction of the adverb, showing that this predicate is not only eventive in nature but

also that it has an agentive interpretation.

Let’s now analyze in greater detail the examples displaying an agentive interpretation

of the experience predicate. Notice that in the examples (8b) and (9) above there is no

SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE (in the same terms that have been discussed so far). However, a

SOURCE may surface in the representation, as already observed in (8b’). This example is

repeated below in (11).

(11) Aquells nens mi’ han fet mal ali braç. those chidren DAT:1s have-PRES3p do-PPART pain to+D arm


In (11) we observe all the arguments discussed in previous chapters (the EXPERIENCE

mal ‘pain’; the SOURCE al braç ‘to the arm’; the EXPERIENCER me ‘to me’), with the addition

of an AGENT (aquells nens ‘those children). This argument structure corresponds to

AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, repeated below in (12) with a schematized outline of the

structural positions of the different arguments.

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vCAUSP

AGENT vCAUS’

aquells nens

‘those children’ vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

pro

vEXP VP

em

‘to me’ SOURCE V’

al braç

‘to the arm’ V EXP-E

fer mal

‘do’ ‘pain’

According to the structure in (12), the AGENT is the external-most argument, but the

EXPERIENCER is still in a c-commanding relation with the SOURCE (and the EXPERIENCE).

Therefore, this AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE predicts that the SOURCE and the EXPERIENCER

may still enter in the same binding relations described in Chapter 2. If we take a second

look to the examples in (11), we can see that the parasitic binding relationship between

the EXPERIENCER Dative (em) and the SOURCE (al braç) is still maintained. In other words,

both the AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed and the empirical data support the idea

that the EXPERIENCER and the SOURCE in agentive interpretations occupy the same

structural position as the EXPERIENCER and the SOURCE in non-agentive interpretations.

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Following (12), the new argument introduced, the AGENT, is a (structural) external

argument. That is, the AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE predicts that the AGENT in these

interpretations has structural properties of an external argument. An even closer

analysis of the agentive examples supports this additional layer in the structure for this

subset of experience predicates. As observed in Chapter 2 (and in the example repeated

below in (13)), in non-agentive readings, the EXPERIENCER dative controls a non-finite

clause (originated as the SOURCE).

(13) Emi fa fàstic [PROi veure rates al carrer]. Dat-1s do-PRES-3s disgust PRO see-INF rats on the street

‘Seeing rats on the streets disgusts me.’

If, as proposed in (12), the AGENT is structurally higher than the EXPERIENCER, we

predict that it should be able to control PRO in an embedded non-finite clause. Consider

again the sentence in (9b), repeated below as (14).

(14) [El teu germà]i em va fer por per PROi divertir-se. D your brother DAT.1s go-PRES.3p do-INF fear to PRO amuse-INF-REFL.3s ‘Your brother scared me to amuse himself.’

In this sentence, which expresses a clear agentive reading, the agentive phrase, el teu

germà ‘your brother’, may bind the non-finite subordinate clause, per diverter-se ‘to

amuse himself’. In other words, in the agentive interpretation, the AGENT is able to

control PRO, indicating that it occupies an external argument position. Additionally,

since the AGENT co-occurs in the same sentence with the EXPERIENCER, we can conclude

that these two arguments do not occupy the same structural position.

A second piece of evidence supports the claim of the AGENT being an external

argument. In eventive predicates, only the external argument can be replaced by a 2nd

person pro in imperative interpretations. Consider the example in (15).

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(15) pro No li facis mal! pro.2s NEG DAT.3s do-PRESSUBJ.2s pain ‘Don’t hurt her!.’

In the imperative example in (15), pro can only refer to a 2nd person singular entity (as

observed with the agreement expressed in the verb) and thus it cannot be co-indexed

with the (3rd person singular) EXPERIENCER. Therefore, the only possible argument with

which such a co-indexation is possible has to occupy a position higher than the

EXPERIENCER; i.e. the AGENT.

Another fact provides further evidence in favor of a structural difference between the

non-agentive and the agentive readings. As observed in the examples (8b, b’), (9b),

(10b), (11), and (14), in the agentive reading the AGENT DP tends to surface at a

preverbal position, while in non-agentive constructions, the SOURCE is favored at a post-

verbal position. This difference suggests that these two types of DPs are not be

generated at the same initial position.

All this empirical evidence supports the availability of two different experiencer verb

structures. As demonstrated, in the agentive reading, the AGENT is introduced at a

position structurally higher than that of the EXPERIENCER. Since the agentive reading also

displays a causative eventive interpretation (with an external CAUSER), I argue that the

AGENT is externally merged at the same position of the external CAUSER discussed in

Section 4.4. of the previous chapter ([Spec, vCAUSP]). Therefore, the only difference

between the causative experience predicates discussed in Chapter 4 and the agentive

experience predicates analyzed in this chapter is found in the semantic features of the

entities introduced by the head vCAUS: if the entity is inanimate, the interpretation will be

that of an inanimate (external) CAUSER; if, on the other hand, such entity is animate, the

interpretation will be that of an animate (external) CAUSER, i.e. an AGENT. There is no

need then to propose a different functional head to introduce ‘different’ CAUSERS.

The result is a structure that accounts for all the facts discussed in the previous two

sections. From the position in which it is merged in the derivation, the AGENT is able to

bind a non-finite clause, controlling PRO. The EXPERIENCER, on the other hand, still c-

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commands the source of experiencer phrase, resulting in a (potential) parasitic

possession relationship between both arguments.

5.2.1. One reason for two structures: UTAH

The possibility of an agentive/non-agentive reading contrast in the set of experience

predicates analyzed in Chapter 2 is closely related to the position in which the different

arguments are generated.

As argued in the first part of this section, one of the main differences between the

two readings is the introduction in the agentive interpretation of a new argument. In the

agentive reading, an agentive phrase is introduced, which (as demosntrated) controls

PRO when a non-finite clause is present in the structure. But also, the experience

interpretation is maintained. This fact is crucial for the analysis of these experience

predicates if we consider Baker’s Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)

(Baker 1988: 46).

(16) The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)

Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical

structural relationships between those items at the level of the D-structure.

That is, a thematic interpretation is associated to a single structural position.

Therefore, under a strong interpretation of Baker’s (1988) UTAH, different thematic

interpretations must be associated to different structural positions. Since, as discussed,

in the agentive reading both agentive and experiencer interpretations are obtained, we

must postulate that there are two different positions for both arguments: a position for

the EXPERIENCER (which is present in both structures resulting in non-agentive and

agentive interpretations), and another position for the AGENT (only available in the

structure yielding an agentive reading). In (17) below, repeated from (8b) above, the DP

aquells nens ‘those children’ is the AGENT; the Dative em ‘to me’ is the EXPERIENCER.

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(17) Aquells nens m’ han fet mal. those chidren DAT:1s have-PRES3p do-PPART pain

‘Those children (have) hurt me.’

Recall that both these arguments are introduced by different verbal functional head

(vCAUS for the AGENT; vEXP for the EXPERIENCER), which provide the different ‘flavor’ of

interpretation to the whole predicate (cf. Arad 1999; McGinnis 2000). With this

assumption in hand, we can rule out the other logical possibility in the representation of

the EXPERIENCER and the AGENT. If the AGENT was externally merged in the derivation at

the same position that EXPERIENCER is merged in the non-agentive readings (i.e. if the

AGENT was introduced by the vEXP head), there would be no functional projection (i.e.

vCAUS) to provide the (eventive) agentive interpretation to the predicate, resulting in the

impossibility of having an agentive reading.

Therefore, since the interpretation of all the arguments is maintained in the all

different readings, following a strong interpretation of Baker’s (1988) UTAH, all the

arguments must be generated at identical structural positions in both the agentive and

the non-agentive interpretations. Additionally, the duality of the structure, supported

on sound empirical facts, provides additional evidence in support of the idea that AGENTS

occupy structurally higher positions than EXPERIENCERS (as argued by Ramchand 2008,

Platzack 2008, among others).

In the following section I discuss the Case assignment relations that are in place in the

AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed in this chapter

5.3. A Case for an agentive experience

In Chapter 2 I discussed the different structural relations that accounted for the

assignment of structural and inherent Case to the different arguments. According to

such account, when the EXPERIENCE surfaces as an independent argument, it enters into a

structural relationship with the Case assigning probe, vEXP, and it therefore it receives

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Partitive Case (recall that the EXPERIENCE is not a full DP and, consequently, it cannot be

assigned (full) Accusative Case). The SOURCE becomes then the first available Goal for the

Case assigning Probe, thus being assigned Nominative Case.

The EXPERIENCER, on the other hand, receives inherent (Dative) Case, as tied to its

theta-role. In the case of agentive predicates, I contend that the Case relations are

modified, due to addition the AGENT as an extra argument. Taking the AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE

STRUCTURE as the base of representation, in (18) I outline the different Case relations.


TP

Spec T’

T vCAUSP

[CASE]

DPAGENT vCAUS’

[Nom]

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP


[Dat]

vEXP VP

[CASE]

PPSOURCE V’

P DPSOURCE V QPEXPERIENCE

[CASE] [Obl] [Part]

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As it can be observed in the tree structure in (18), the main differences in the

assignment of Case in agentive and non-agentive interpretations is the Case that the

SOURCE and the AGENT, a ‘new’ argument in the structure, are assigned. I claim that the

Case assigned to both these arguments is related, as they compete for the same

structural Case.

Before going into detail in the actual representation of the Case, it should be noted

that the presence of the AGENT does not preclude the SOURCE from surfacing. Consider

the example in (8b’) again, repeated below in (19).

(19) Aquells nens mi’ han fet mal ali braç. those chidren DAT.1s have-PRES.3p do-PPART pain to+D arm


In (19), both the AGENT and the SOURCE surface. However, as opposed to what was

observed in the surfacing of the SOURCE in non-agentive experience predicates (Chapter

2), the SOURCE is introduced by P. If the SOURCE is not introduced by a preposition, the

derivation crashes, indicating that the argument has not received its Case. This is

exemplified in (20).

(20) *Aquells nens m’ han fet mal el braç. those chidren DAT.1s have-PRES.3p do-PPART pain D arm


In (20), the lack of a preposition introducing the SOURCE phrase renders the utterance

ungrammatical. That is, the SOURCE, being a lexical element, needs to be assigned Case.

Since the agent is assigned Nominative Case (being the first available Goal from T), the

SOURCE needs to receive Case from a functional element, i.e. a preposition, as a Last

Resort mechanism. These Case relations are better observed in the tree in (21), with all

the arguments spelled-out.

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(21) TP

Spec T’

T vCAUSP

[CASE]

DPAGENT vCAUS’

aquells nens

[Nom] vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP


pro

[Dat] vEXP VP

em

[CASE] PPSOURCE V’


a el braç fer mal

[CASE] [Obl] [Part]

The structure in (21) presents a plausible account for this Case assignment

phenomenon. As observed in the contrast in grammaticality of the examples in (19) and

(20), in an agentive interpretation, when the SOURCE phrase surfaces, it needs to be

introduced by a preposition. Assuming the Principle of Full Interpretation (Chomsky

1986), the SOURCE, being a nominal expression, needs to be assigned Case. However, the

presence of the AGENT prevents the SOURCE from receiving Nominative Case, since the

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AGENT is the closest Goal to the Nominative assigning Probe (T). This results in the AGENT

being assigned Nominative Case, which leaves the SOURCE with no structural Case left to

be assigned. Therefore, in order to prevent the derivation from crashing, there is a need

for a preposition, a Case assigning element.

Therefore, the tree in (21) above represents the Case assignment relationships

between the different functional and lexical elements in the derivation (assuming

Chomsky’s (2001) Agree). Note that the EXPERIENCER does not enter in any of the Case

assigning relationships. Since, as argued in Chapter 2, the EXPERIENCER bears inherent

Case (cf. Belletti & Rizzi 1988, Masullo 1992, Cuervo 2008, among others); that is, its

Case value comes from its theta-role assigning head, it is invisible for any Case

assignment operation in the syntax.

5.3.1. An account for the variation of Case on the EXPERIENCER

In Chapter 1 I introduced an interesting issue regarding an observed variation of Case

assigned to the EXPERIENCER in Romance languages (cf. Franco 1990; Fernández-Ordóñez

1999; Parodi & Luján 2000; Franco & Huidobro 2003, for Spanish; cf. Rosselló 2002, for

Catalan).

This issue deals with the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER in those experience

predicates belonging to Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) Class II of psych verbs20, which

canonically should be assigned Accusative Case. However, we observe that in certain

cases the EXPERIENCER is assigned Dative Case. Consider the Spanish examples in (22)

(taken from Franco & Huidobro (2003): 139, ex. 4) and the Catalan examples in (23).

20

In this type of predicates, the EXPERIENCE is incorporated on V, which results in a ‘defective’ argument structure. Therefore, one of the conditions of the Inherent Case Constraint (ICC) (see Chapter 2) is violated, resulting in the EXPERIENCER not being assigned inherent (Dative) Case; i.e. the EXPERIENCER enters into structural Case assigning relations and receives Accusative Case.

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(22) Spanish

a. Juan la molestó. Juan ACC.3sf bother-PAST.3s ‘Juan bothered her.’

b. Juan le molestó. Juan DAT.3s bother-PAST.3s ‘Juan bothered her.’

(23) Catalan

a. Aquells nens la molesten. those children ACC.3sf bother-PRES.3p ‘Those children bother her.’

b. Li molesten els comentaris racistes. DAT.3s bother-PRES.3p the racist comments ‘Racist comments bother her.’

Against the idea that this variation of Case is an arbitrary phenomenon (something

already observed by Fernández-Ordóñez (1999) and Rosselló (2002)), and following the

different approaches in the literature attempting to account for this phenomenon, there

is a difference in interpretation between the two sentences of each set of examples. In

those instances in which the EXPERIENCER receives Accusative Case (22a, 23a), the

predicate expresses the presence of an external CAUSER (or AGENT) (Juan in (22a), aquells

nens in (23a)) triggering the experience situation, as argued by Franco (1990),

Fernández-Ordóñez (1999), Rosselló (2002), and Franco & Huidobro (2003), among

others. However, in those examples in which the EXPERIENCER is assigned Dative Case, the

reading obtained is that there is no CAUSER (or AGENT) initiating the experience.

This variation of interpretation suggests the existence of different structures (which

correspond in spirit to the AGENTIVE and BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURES that I propose here).

This is indeed the idea behind most of the accounts of this phenomenon. In a nutshell,

the variation in the interpretation is due to the introduction of a causative-like (Franco

1990; Franco & Huidobro 2003) or an aspectual (Parodi & Luján 2000) functional head

above the verbal projection. This causative or aspectual head (which does not need to

be spelled out (Franco 1990: 56); cf. (22a), (23a)) takes the (antipassive (Franco 1990))

verbal projection and introduces an external CAUSER to the experience predicate (cf.

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Arad 1998; McGinnis 2000, 2001; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008; Franco & Huidobro 2003;

Chapter 4, this dissertation). The presence of this functional head triggers Accusative

Case marking on the EXPERIENCER (which otherwise would be assigned inherent Dative

Case).

This phenomenon resembles other causative-like constructions also found in Spanish.

Observe the similarities between the constructions in (24) and (25).

(24) a. María divierte a Juan. María amuse-PRES.3p to Juan ‘María amuses Juan.’ (Franco 1990: 56, ex. 45)

b. María hace divertirse a Juan. María make-PRES.3s amuse.INF.APASS.3S to Juan ‘María amuses Juan.’

(Franco 1990: 57, ex. 57)

(25) a. El padrino casó a la chica con el gobernador. the godfather marry-PAST.3s to the girl with the governor. ‘The godfather married the girl to the governor.’

b. El padrino hizo casarse a la chica con el gobernador. the godfather make-PAST.3s marry.INF.APASS.3s to the girl with the governor ‘The godfather made the girl marry the governor.’

(Franco 1990: 57, ex. 47a, b)

According to Franco (1990) (and similarly Franco & Huidobro (2003)), the antipassive

psych construction in (24a) corresponds to the same structure as the non-psych

construction in (25a). Following these authors’ claims, the utterances in (24b) and (25b)

are also outputs of the same structure, with the only change being that the causative

head is spelled-out, preventing the movement of the V head to the causative head

position. As I mentioned above, this causative head above VP is the one responsible for

the assignment of Accusative Case to the EXPERIENCER. In those constructions without a

causative interpretation (i.e. without a causative head), there is no functional head

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responsible for the assignment of Accusative Case and, therefore, the EXPERIENCER is

assigned (inherent) Dative (cf. ICC, Chapter 2).

However, these previous analyses on the Case alternation on the EXPERIENCER do not

seem applicable to those experience predicates that are the result of light verb

constructions. As I argued previously in this dissertation (Chapters 1 and 2), light verb

constructions yielding experience predicates are possible crosslinguistically, as examples

from Catalan and Spanish in Romance and Mayangna in Misumalpan demonstrate. In

those types of experience predicates in Romance, we do not observe the alternation of

the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER, contrasting with the examples presented in (22)

and (23) above. Consider contrast of grammaticality in the Catalan and Spanish

sentences below.

(26) Catalan

a. Li fan mal els comentaris de la gent. DAT.3s do-PRES.3p pain the comments of the people ‘People’s comments hurt her.’

b.* La fan mal els comentaris de la gent. ACC.3sf do-PRES.3p pain the comments of the people ‘People’s comments hurt her.’

c. Aquells nens li fan mal. those children DAT.3s do-PRES.3p pain ‘Those children hurt her.’

d.* Aquells nens la fan mal. those children ACC.3sf do-PRES.3p pain ‘Those children hurt her.’

(27) Spanish

a. Le hicieron daño los comentarios de la gente. DAT.3s do-PAST.3p pain the comments of the people ‘People’s comments hurt her.’

b.* La hicieron daño los comentarios de la gente. DAT.3s do-PAST.3p pain the comments of the people ‘People’s comments hurt her.’

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c. Esos niños le hicieron daño. those children DAT.3s do-PAST.3p pain ‘Those children hurt her.’

d.* Esos niños la hicieron daño. those children ACC.3p do-PAST.3p pain ‘Those children hurt her.’

The main difference between the examples in (22) and (23) and those in (26) and (27)

above lies in the fact that in the former sentences the experience predicate is the result

of an incorporating experience, while in the latter sentences the experience predicate is

the result of a light verb or non-incorporated experience. However, in both sets of

sentences, we observe a contrast of interpretation. The examples in (26a, b) and (27a,

b) display a non-agentive interpretation; on the other hand, the examples in (26 c, d)

and (27c, d) are agentive experience predicates. Despite such a variation in the reading

of the same experience, there is no variation in the Case assigned to the EXPERIENCER: the

EXPERIENCER is always assigned (inherent) Dative Case. Even in those structures yielding

an agentive interpretation ((26c, d), (27c, d)), the EXPERIENCER cannot be assigned

Accusative Case, contrasting with the sentences with agentive interpretations in (22)

and (23) above in which the EXPERIENCER was marked with Accusative Case.

The explanation for this lack of Case variation on the EXPERIENCER has to be found in

the overt presence of an EXPERIENCE phrase in (25) and (26). As I argued in Chapter 2, in

those experience predicates resulting from light verb constructions, the EXPERIENCE is an

independent phrase that needs to be valued for Case. Also as I have claimed in other

sections of this dissertation, the (independent) EXPERIENCE phrase is assigned structural

Case, which does not show up as Accusative because the EXPERIENCE phrase is not a full

DP and, consequently, can only express (or be assigned) Partitive Case. This leaves the

EXPERIENCER with the inherent Dative Case associated its theta role. In other words, the

presence in a given structure of the EXPERIENCE as an independent argument blocks the

Case alternation on the EXPERIENCER.

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To better understand the assignment of Case to the different arguments, let’s

consider again the Case assigning relations presented earlier, repeated in the arboreal

structure in (28) below.


TP

Spec T’

T vCAUSP

[CASE]

DPAGENT vCAUS’

[Nom]

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP


[Dat]

vEXP VP

[CASE]

PPSOURCE V’


[CASE] [Obl] [Part]

As mentioned in earlier in this section, the functional head vEXP is a Case assigning

probe which seeks for the first available Goal in the structure, resulting in the

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assignment of (Accusative/Partitive) Case to the EXPERIENCE phrase21. This view is

contrary to the one found in follow previous analyses in the literature (Franco 1990;

Parodi & Luján 2000; Franco & Huidobro 2003; among others), according to which it is

the higher functional (causative or aspectual, depending on the authors) projection the

one responsible for the assignment of Accusative Case. However, those earlier analyses

cannot account for the EXPERIENCE being assigned Partitive (Accusative) Case in light verb

constructions. Consequently, it is plausible to assume that the lower functional head

(vEXP) is responsible (i.e. a Probe) for the assignment of structural Case.

However, these light verb construction data (with no Case alternation) seem to

challenge such Case assigning relations. If it is the lower verbal functional head, vEXP, the

one participating in (structural) Case assignment, why is the EXPERIENCER assigned

Accusative Case in those incorporating experience predicates with an agentive

interpretation (cf. (22a), (23))? In those instances, the Goal (EXPERIENCER) would be not

under the c-commanding domain of the Probe (vEXP), thus violating the Agree relations

that govern Case assignment (Chomsky 2001, 2005).

The answer to this puzzle might be in the nature of the functional heads. As opposed

to previous accounts, I argue that the agentive reading is the result of the merging in the

structure of a functional projection, vCAUS, responsible for the introduction of the AGENT.

This higher functional projection is of the same type as the lower vEXP: both heads are

verbal, functional projections that introduce an external argument (and, consequently,

they are both labeled with the same symbol, v); the only difference between the two

heads is the type of external argument they introduce. Following this assumption, and

as the data discussed in this section suggest, I contend that both heads have the same

properties; i.e. both heads (together) are responsible for the assignment of Accusative

Case. If the EXPERIENCE does not incorporate on V and, thus, is an independent phrase

21

It is worth noting that the SOURCE is not an intervening element in these Case assigning relations. As we observed earlier, the SOURCE competes for Case with the AGENT, not with the EXPERIENCE (although the binding relations observed indicate that it is externally merged as a VP-internal argument). This indicates that the SOURCE moves out of the VP for independent reasons (cf. Chapter 2) and, once the phase is evaluated, it is assigned structural Case.

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requiring Case, it will be the first available Goal of the Case assigning Probe; on the

other hand, if the EXPERIENCE incorporates on V (creating a ‘defective’ argument

structure and, thus, invalidating the ICC), the EXPERIENCER will then be the first available

Goal, as it will too be under the c-commanding domain of a Case assigning Probe (vCAUS).

5.4. Accounting for the agentive-allowing experience predicates

As I indicated in Section 5.1., not all experience predicates allow for an agentive

interpretation. Actually, only a very limited subset of these predicates may have such an

agentive reading. Contrast the Catalan example in (8b’), repeated below as (29), with

the sentences in (30) and (31).

(29) Aquells nens m’ han fet mal al braç. those chidren DAT.1s have-PRES.3p do-PPART pain to+D arm


(30) # Aquells nens m’ han fet fàstic. those chidren DAT.1s have-PRES.3p do-PPART disgust ‘Those children (have) disgusted me.’

(31) # Aquells nens m’ han fet mandra. those chidren DAT.1s have-PRES.3p do-PPART laziness

‘Those children (have) made me feel lazy.’

The examples above provide evidence that the agentive reading is only possible

given a very restricted subset of EXPERIENCES. The only possibility for the examples in (30)

and (31) to be grammatical is under the non-agentive interpretation. A closer look at the

list of the Catalan experience predicates presented in Chapter 1 shows that only two of

these, fer mal ‘to hurt’ and fer por ‘to fear’, are fully grammatical under the intended

agentive interpretation (fer fàstic ‘to disgust’ shows some possible validity in the

agentive reading); all of the predicates listed, however, are possible in the non-agentive

interpretation (as predicted with the layered structure presented in the previous

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section). The availability of the non-agentive and the agentive readings is summarized in

Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Agentive vs. non-agentive experience predicates

EXPERIENCE PREDICATE NON-AGENTIVE READING AGENTIVE READING

fer mal ‘to hurt’

fer por ‘to fear

fer angúnia ‘to give the chills’ *

fer ràbia ‘to annoy’ *

fer fàstic ‘to disgust’ */?

fer nosa ‘to bother’ *

fer mandra ‘to not feel like’ *

fer gràcia ‘to feel tickled’ *

fer pal ‘to not feel like’ *

fer il.lusió ‘to feel thrilled’ *

fer llàstima ‘to feel sorry’ *

Looking at Table 5.1, one (obvious) question comes to mind: if the syntactic structure

(providing the agentive reading) is the same for all predicates, why is it only available

with very few EXPERIENCE phrases? The answer must clearly be in the nature of these

EXPERIENCES.

Landau (2005) briefly addresses the distinction between agentive and non-agentive

experience predicates. Although he claims that the agentive and non-agentive contrast

is only found in those psych predicates belonging to Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) Class II,

contrary to what I claim here (Catalan fer X ‘experience X’ predicates are a Class III

experience predicate), he provides interesting explanatory evidence supporting this

agentive/non-agentive contrast, as shown in (32).

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(32) a. Agentive class II verbs are change-of-state verbs (i.e., accomplishments).

b. Non-agentive class II verbs are states or achievements.

(Landau 2005: 124, ex. 245)

This accomplishment vs. state/achievement distinction seems to account for the

observed variability. Certain predicates, like mal ‘pain’, por ‘fear’ (or even fàstic

‘disgust’), may express a change of state, while other experiences are purely states and,

therefore, unable to subsume an agentive reading.

Landau (2005), following van Voorst (1992), puts forward a couple of tests to

further prove the nature of these predicates. According to their hypothesis, and as

observed in Chapter 4, if a predicate is a state, it will resist a temporal modification test

(i.e. introducing an in X minutes phrase in the structure), while accomplishments will

accept it. When applying this test to Catalan, this prediction holds. Observe the contrast

in the examples (33), (34), and (35) below.

(33) * Em fan mal les mans en cinc minuts. DAT.1s do-PRES.3p pain D hands in five minutes.

‘*My hands hurt in five minutes.’

(34) En Joan va fer mal a la Marta en cinc minuts. D Joan go-PRES.3s do-INF pain to D Marta in five minutes ‘Joan hurt Marta in five minutes.’

(35) * En Joan va fer angúnia a la Marta en cinc minuts. D Joan go-PRES.3s do-INF disgust to D Marta in five minutes

‘Joan gave the chills to Marta in five minutes.’

The sentence in (33) corresponds to a non-agentive experience predicate; i.e. a

predicate resulting of the non-merging in the structure of the vCAUSP. As claimed, this

structure has a stative reading and, consequently, it resists modification by a temporal

adjunct. This example contrasts with the experience predicate in (34), which introduces

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the same EXPERIENCE, mal ‘pain’. In (34), the temporal phrase modifies the experience

predicate, which denotes an achievement (i.e. change of state) experience, rendering a

grammatical utterance. In (35), however, the temporal modifier refers to a predicate

‘headed’ by angúnia ‘disgust’, a state experience; the result is then the opposite. This

supports the idea that some of these predicates differ in their Aktionsart properties,

which are correlated with the possibility of having an agentive interpretation.

Further evidence confirms this point. Landau (2005) provides yet another test to

determine the aspectual properties of experience predicates. He writes: ‘the adverb

almost creates an ambiguity in an agentive context but not in a nonagentive one’

(Landau 2005: 125). The Catalan variant of this test, with the Catalan counterpart of

‘almost’ gairebé, is shown in the examples (36) and (37) below.

(36) En Joan gairebé va fer mal a la Marta. D Joan almost go-PRES.3s do-INF pain to D Marta ‘Joan almost hurt Marta.’

(37) # Les rates gairebé van fer fàstic a la Marta. the rats almost go-PRES.3p do-INF disgust to D Marta

‘The rats almost disgust Marta.’

Note that the adverb gairebé ‘almost’ is only possible as indicating that the causing

event almost took place when the predicate denotes a change of state, as in (36). On

the other hand, when the experience denotes a state, like fàstic ‘disgust’ in (37), the

presence of gariebé ‘almost’ renders the utterance ungrammatical under the intended

agentive interpretation. (Note, however, and similarly to what Landau (2005) points out

for his examples, that both examples (36) and (37) are grammatical if we consider

gairebé ‘almost’ to indicate when that experience almost took place, not the causing

event of such experience.)

van Voorst (1992) uses yet another test to target the aspectual properties of

psychological predicates. Using a subject control structure, van Voorst (1992) shows

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that only accomplishment predicates are grammatical under these circumstances; state

or achievement predicates yield an ungrammatical result in the same context. Observe

the following examples.

(38) En Joan va intentar fer mal a la Marta. D Joan go-PRES.3s try-INF do-INF pain to D Marta ‘Joan tried to hurt Marta.’

(39) # En Joan va intentar fer ràbia a la Marta. D Joan go-PRES.3s try-INF do-INF annoyance to D Marta

‘Joan tried to annoy Marta.’

The presence of the control predicate intentar ‘to try’ targets the CAUSER of the event

described in the embedded clause. We predict therefore that it will only render a

grammatical result if the event in the subordinate clause has a volitional causer (i.e. if

such an event has an agentive interpretation). The only contrasting difference between

(38) and (39) is the EXPERIENCE. In (38), the EXPERIENCE mal ‘pain’ is an accomplishment,

thus allowing an agentive interpretation with a CAUSER. In (39), on the other hand, the

EXPERIENCE ràbia ‘annoyance’ is a state/achievement which does not allow a causing

interpretation. Therefore, the presence of a predicate targeting a causer results in a

crashing derivation in (39).

From all this evidence, we can conclude that what allows certain predicates to have a

possible agentive reading depends on the inherent aspectual properties of such

predicates. Most EXPERIENCES denote a state or achievement, which is incompatible with

an agentive interpretation. However, as shown in the examples (33) to (39), a few

EXPERIENCES denote an accomplishment (i.e. a change of state), thus being fully

grammatical in an agentive structure.

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5.5. The interpretation of phases

In the previous chapters I discussed in more or less detail the different Case assigning

relations in which the different arguments in the structure participate. I argued in

Chapter 2, following recent claims (cf. Brattico 2008), that Case assignment only takes

place when a phase is interpreted; i.e. Case is the last operation before a phase is

‘closed’. In this section I discuss the interaction of the different structures that I propose

throughout this dissertation and the interpretation of phases.

The layered structure analysis presented in this chapter raises one very interesting

theoretical question: when are phases evaluated? (This question might also trigger

another, non-trivial one: what constitutes a phase? I will only deal with this second one

tangentially in this section.) Let’s have a second look at the agentive structure presented

above, repeated below in (40).


vCAUSP

AGENT vCAUS’

vCAUS vBECOMEP

vBECOME vEXPP

EXP-ER vEXP’

vEXP VP

SOURCE V’

V EXP-E

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Notice in (40) the presence of different verbal functional projections: vEXP, which

introduces the EXPERIENCER phrase, and vCAUS, which is responsible for the introduction of

the AGENT. In other words, both functional heads introduce an external argument. This is

an important notion, since the presence (or lack) of an external argument has been an

important aspect in the definition of phases.

A broadly accepted view in the recent literature has been to consider both CP and

v*P (in Chomsky’s (2001) terms) as phases, which are determined by a Lexical Subarray,

with propositional content. If we are to look at lower part of the structure, Chomsky

(2001) argues that only those heads that project an external argument, i.e. v*, can be

considered (strong) phases. That is, only those verbal predicates that project an AGENT

(unergatives, transitives) or an EXPERIENCER (Chomsky 2001: 43, n.8) are phases;

unaccusatives and passives are not. If we assume this view to be accurate, we can then

conclude that both vEXPP and vCAUSP are phases. As noted above (Section 5.2.), both

projections introduce an external argument (an AGENT, an EXPERIENCER), and therefore

they can be considered as different ‘flavors’ of v* (cf. Arad 1999a; McGinnis 2000).

However, looking at the structure in (40), we have to wonder whether these are

independent phases or a single (‘multi-layered’) phase. Consider the claim in (41).

(41) Ph1 is interpreted/evaluated at Ph2. (Chomsky 2001: 14, ex. 10)

If both vEXPP and vCAUSP are independent phases, and following the claim in (39) above,

we would expect that the introduction of the higher phase head, vCAUS, forces the

immediately lower phase, vEXPP, to be interpreted (since its Lexical Subarray has been

exhausted). However, there are reasons to believe that this is not the case. Recall from

Chapter 2 that some operations (might) take place that involve arguments within this

phase and higher structural positions (movement of the SOURCE to focus position, head

movement of the verb). If vCAUSP were an independent phase from vEXPP, some of these

operations would not be possible, since they would violate the Phase Impenetrability

Condition, summarized below in (42).

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(42) Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC)

The domain of head H is not accessible to operations outside of phase HP; only H

and its edge are accessible to such operations.

(Chomsky 2001: 13, ex. 7)

Another possibility, which follows the argument presented in Chapter 1, is to

consider vEXPP and vCAUSP not as independent phases but as a single phase (the head of

the phase is of the same ‘type’; i.e. Chomsky’s v*). Based on these data, I argue that a

phase cannot be processed until the head of the following phase is merged in the

derivation, a phase containing lexical/substantive information within its Lexical

Subarray. Following some recent views (Chomsky 2001, 2005; Grohmann, p.c.; among

others), I argue that T is a syntactic element that carries substantive meaning and,

therefore, ‘validates’ the Lexical Subarray of a (higher) CP phase.

This new assumption on what makes us redefine the notion of interpretability of

phases presented in (43).

(43) Ph1, with lexical subarray LA1, is interpreted/evaluated at the next relevant Ph2,

with lexical subarray LA2 containing lexical/substantive information.

Nonetheless, this revised definition of the interpretation of phases is not completely

flawless. Both functional heads vEXP and vCAUS are (potential) phase heads as they are of

v* type (i.e. they introduce an external argument). Moreover, both heads introduce

substantive (semantically relevant) information. Therefore, if the definition in (43) were

valid, we would have to conclude then that vEXPP and vCAUSP constitute different phases,

leaving us with the same problems of violation of the PIC.

The solution to this problem might again be found in the type of heads. In Section

5.3.1. I argued that both vEXP and vCAUS are of the same type and, in consequence, have

the same properties. However, for a Case to be interpreted, I argue that we need to

137

have two phase heads of different types (e.g. v* and C, but not vEXP and vCAUS). This forces

us to revise again the notion of interpretability of phases.

(44) Ph1, with head H1 of type α and lexical subarray LA1, is interpreted/evaluated at

the next relevant Ph2, with head H2 of type β and lexical subarray LA2 containing

lexical/substantive information.

With all these assumptions in hand, we can then conclude that the agentive

experience predicates analyzed in this dissertation result in a two-phase structure: a CP

phase and a vEXPP/vCAUSP (or v*P) phase.

5.6. Summary

In this chapter I have discussed the subset of experience predicates that allow an

agentive reading. As shown in Section 5.2., the agentive interpretation of experience

predicates is the result of a recrusive AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, in which a higher

functional projection, vCAUSP, is merged on top of vBECOMEP, selecting vEXPP. The head of this

projection, vCAUS, is responsible for the introduction of the AGENT and, along with vBECOMEP,

to provide the eventive interpretation to the predicate. Since vCAUSP sits on top of vEXPP

(with an intervening vBECOME), the AGENT shows structural properties of an external

argument, manifested in the binding of PRO in an embedded clause. The other

arguments in the structure occupy are externally merged in the same structural position

in both agentive and non-agentive interpretations. Thus, the EXPERIENCER, being

generated as VP-external argument also displays properties of external arguments, as

exemplified in the binding of the SOURCE to obtain a parasitic relationship between the

two arguments.

The second part of Section 5.2. discussed the correspondence between the AGENTIVE

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE and the thematic roles of the different arguments. Building on a

strong version of Baker’s (1988) UTAH (Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis), I

138

argued that the EXPERIENCE, the SOURCE, and the EXPERIENCER are merged in the structure

in the same position. The AGENT, in turn, must occupy a new position in the derivation, a

position that is linked to its specific thematic role.

In Section 5.3. I presented an account for the Case assigning relations of the different

arguments in the structure. As a consequence of the AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

proposed and as supported by strong empirical evidence, I showed that the AGENT is the

first available Goal of a Case assigning Probe T, which leaves the SOURCE without a

structural Case to be assigned. Consequently, in those instances in which the SOURCE

surfaces, it needs to be introduced by a Case assigner preposition. As for the other

arguments, I argued that their Case relations are maintained, with no observable

difference between agentive and non-agentive structures. This Section also presented

an account for the variation of Case observed on the EXPERIENCER in non-incorporating

experience predicates with an agentive interpretation. Following evidence from both

experience predicates with independent and incorporated EXPERIENCE phrases, I argued

that both vEXP and vCAUS together behave as a Case assigning Probe: if the EXPERIENCE is not

incorporated on V, it becomes the first available Goal and therefore it is assigned

structural (Partitive) Case, leaving the EXPERIENCER with inherent (Dative) Case; if the

EXPERIENCE incorporates on V, the EXPERIENCER is then the first available Goal, as it falls

under c-commanding domain of the Probe, vCAUS.

The agentive interpretation, only possible if vCAUS is merged in the structure, is not

solely dependent on number and type of functional projections available. Section 5.4.

provided evidence that only certain EXPERIENCES allow such interpretations. Building on

different tests observed in the literature, I provided evidence for a distinction between

different types of EXPERIENCES, based on their Aktionsart properties. Only those

EXPERIENCES that present features denoting a change of state may enter into a structure

with an agentive projection; conversely, those EXPERIENCES lacking such properties

denote a state and, consequently, yield an ungrammatical structure when merged with

an agentive projection.

139

Finally, in Section 5.5. I presented a theoretical issue related to the stacking of

different functional projections within the AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE. According to

the analysis presented in this section, a phase can only be validated or evaluated at the

next available phase of different head type and that introduces substantive (or lexical)

information. According to this idea, since T can be considered as an element containing

substantive information and vCAUS and vEXP are of the same type, the validation of the

lower phase (v*) cannot take place when vCAUS is merged in the structure. This leaves as

the only possibility of validation of the lower phase the merging of C.

140

CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

6.1. Summary

In this dissertation I have presented a new account for the realization of experience

predicates crosslinguistically, stemming from a universally available experience

structure. According to this BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, an element previously

unattended in the literature, the EXPERIENCE, behaves as the basic argument of the

structure. The EXPERIENCE merges on a V head and creates a predication structure with

the SOURCE OF EXPERIENCE, merged in [Spec, VP], while the EXPERIENCER is introduced as a

VP-external argument by the functional projection vEXP.

In Chapter 2, I discussed in more detail this BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, providing

evidence for the structural position in which the different arguments are externally

merged. According to the structure proposed, the EXPERIENCE merges with the V,

allowing for two possible options for its realization: a. the EXPERIENCE surfaces as an

independent argument, triggering the presence of a light verb (a very productive option

in Catalan); or b. the EXPERIENCE undergoes incorporation on V, and it is consequently

expressed as a fully fledged verb (a very productive option in Mayangna). The SOURCE is

also a VP-internal argument, since it presents some of the properties of internal

arguments: binding with an external argument to obtain a (parasitic) possessor

interpretation, binding of PRO when the SOURCE is a non-finite clause. Finally, following

previous claims in the literature, I presented evidence of the EXPERIENCER being

generated as an argument external to the VP, introduced by vexp, since it c-commands

the SOURCE and it thus can enter into a binding relationship with it to obtain a (parasitic)

possessor relationship or to bind PRO (if the SOURCE is a non-finite clause).

141

Chapter 3 presented an option allowed by the BASIC EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE. Both

Romance and Misumalpan languages allow the possibility of expressing an experience

predicate without the SOURCE. Mayangna displays the default option of such possibility,

as the Case relations observed in Chapter 2 are maintained. Catalan, on the other hand,

presents an alternative to this SOURCE-less experience structure, as the EXPERIENCER no

longer is assigned inherent Case, but it undergoes structural Case relations, thus being

assigned Nominative Case.

The experience structures presented in Chapters 2 and 3 denote a stative experience.

However, languages show the possibility of expressing eventive experiences. In Chapter

4 I discussed the possibility of expressing an inchoative experience predicate. Building

on similar accounts discussed in recent literature, I argued that such interpretation can

be obtained through to different, but related structures. In the first option, an eventive

projection, vBECOMEP, is introduced in the structure on top of vEXPP. Such projection turns

the stative vEXPP into an event, but with no external CAUSER, resulting in an inchoative

experience predicate (i.e. an internally triggered experience). In the second structure, a

vCAUSP is merged on top of vBECOMEP, introducing an external CAUSER. The resulting reading

of this structure is that of an experience predicate with an external Causer (i.e. an

externally triggered experience).

Another eventive interpretation of experience predicates was the object of the

Chapter 5. In this final chapter, I presented an account of a very widely crosslinguistically

attested fact: a very small subset of experience predicates allow for an agentive

interpretation. Following the same ideas discussed in the previous chapter, according to

THE AGENTIVE EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE proposed, the agentive interpretation is obtained by

merging vCAUSP on top of vBECOMEP. The difference between the structure with an external

CAUSER and the agentive structure lies on the animate properties of the latter. The

introduction of the AGENT in the structure has consequences in the realization of Case

and its assignment to the different arguments, since the SOURCE, when present, needs to

be introduced by a Case assigning preposition as in this structure it is no longer the first

available Goal of the Case assigning Probe T. Finally, the presence of this vCAUS projection

142

forces a reconsideration of the interpretation of phases. According to the proposal I put

forward in the last section of Chapter 5, a phase will only be interpreted when another

phase head of different type is merged in the structure provided that in this higher

phase substantial (or lexical) information is also introduced.

6.2. Issues for further research

The proposals put forward throughout the dissertation present a plausible account for

the realization of experience predicates crosslinguistically, stemming from a UG-

available experience structure. But also, all these proposals, based on the BASIC

EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE, open the door to further research. In this dissertation I have drawn

data mostly from two typologically and geographically unrelated varieties, which

support the claim for a universally available structure. However, the analysis of

experience predicates in other languages will confirm or challenge such a proposal.

Especially interesting will be the analysis of those languages that present do not follow a

Nominative-Accusative alignment or those that show valency modification markers (e.g.

antipassive) not attested in the languages of study in this dissertation. Languages like

Kokota (Palmer 2008) or Halkomelem (Gerdts & Kiyoshawa 2005) are a good starting

point for such a project.

From a more theoretically oriented perspective, this dissertation also puts forward

interesting questions. First of all, the discussion of the SOURCE-LESS EXPERIENCE STRUCTURE

presented an interesting issue regarding inherent Case crosslinguistically. I argue that in

certain languages (i.e. Romance) inherent Case is subject to a parametric constraint

(Inherent Case Constraint or ICC) which restricts the assignment of inherent to certain

structural conditions. This parametric option, however, is not available in Mayangna.

This difference makes us wonder the extent to which the ICC is available in different

languages and language families.

The second theoretical question is related to the notion of phases. As I pointed out in

Chapter 5, the presence of two functional projection introducing external arguments in

143

the lower part of the structure presents a challenge to some current view regarding

Phase Theory. The accounted proposed offers a possible solution to this issue, although

it does not fully answer some non-trivial questions: What is a phase? When is a phase

finally closed or evaluated? What is the relationship between phases, their evaluation,

and the assignment of structural Case? All these questions are relevant not only for the

purposes of the analysis of experience predicates, but the current syntactic theory in

more general terms.

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144

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Philosophy 15, 1. 65-92. Viñas-de-Puig, Ricard. 2008a. Unaccusative Treasure Found in the Depths of VP. Purdue

Linguistics Association Working Papers 1, 1. 43-67.

150

Viñas-de-Puig, Ricard. 2008b. Agentivity and Experiencer Verbs in Catalan and Mayangna and the Roles of Little v. Poster presented at the 18th Colloquium on Generative Grammar, Lisbon, April 18.

Whitley, Stanley M. 1995. Gustar and Other Psych Verbs: A Problem in Transitivity.

Hispania 78, 3. 573-585.

151

VITA

Education

2005-2009 PhD in Linguistics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. Dissertation: The argument of experience. Argument structure and

experiencer verbs in Catalan and Mayangna. Advisory Committee: Dr. Elena Benedicto (Major Professor), Dr. Elaine

Francis, Dr. Ronnie Wilbur, Dr. Robert Hammond.

1999-2001 MA in Spanish Linguistics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. Thesis: An analysis of Catalan pronominal clitics, with special focus

on adverbial pronouns. Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert Hammond (Major Professor),

Dr. Elena Benedicto, Dr. Ronnie Wilbur.

1994-1998 BA in Translation and Interpreting, Universitat de Vic, Vic, Catalonia, Spain.

Additional education and training

August 2008 GLOW Summer Institute, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain. Movement, Locality and Cartography, by Luigi Rizzi (Università degli Studi di Siena); Topics in Morphosyntax: Structures and Strategies, by Adriana Belletti (Università degli Studi di Siena); Understanding Minimalism, by Kleanthes Grohmann (University of Cyprus); Argument Structure from a Syntactic Point of View, by Christer Platzack (University of Lund); Clitics, Movement and Parameters, by Ian Roberts (Cambridge University).

June 2008 Lenguaje espacial y cognición en Mesoamérica. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS) and The University at Buffalo. San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico.

152

Publications

2008 Agentivity and experiencer verbs in Catalan and Mayangna and the roles of ‘little v’. Journal of Portuguese Linguistics, 7, 2.

2008 Unaccusative treasure found in the depths of VP. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Linguistics Association Working Papers, 1, 1. 43-67.

Invited talks

2009 ‘Experiencing a phase: Experiencer predicates, agentivity, and phases in Catalan and Mayangna’. Invited talk given as part of Syntax Supper series, CUNY Graduate Center. April 7th, 2009.

2009 ‘A dual structure for experiencer predicates? Evidence from Catalan and Mayangna’. Invited talk given at Eastern Carolina University. January 22nd, 2009.

Presentations

2009 ‘I see different light verbs; I feel the same experience structure’. Paper to be presented at the 2009 Hispanic Linguistics Symposium. Universidad de Puerto Rico – Río Piedras, San José, PR. October 21st-24th.

2009 ‘A dual structure for Mayangna experiencer predicates’. Paper presented at the 14th Workshop on the Structure and Constituency of the Languages of the Americas. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. April 4th, 2009.

2009 Mayangna Yulbarangyang Balna, Ricard Viñas de Puig. ‘Linguistic and technical training as a community empowerment tool’. Paper presented at the 1st International Conference on Language Documentation and Conservation, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI. March 14th, 2009.

2009 Mayangna Yulbarangyang Balna, Elena Benedicto, Alyson Eggleston, Ricard Viñas de Puig. ‘Participatory documentation: the Mayangna Linguists Team of Nicaragua’. Paper presented at the 1st International Conference on Language Documentation and Conservation, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI. March 14th, 2009.

2009 ‘Catalan and Mayangna experiencer verbs: evidence for a UG experiencer verb structure?’. Poster presented at the 2009 LSA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA. January 9th, 2009.

2008 Elena Benedicto, Ricard Viñas de Puig, Alyson Eggleston. ‘A model of Participatory Action Research: The Activities of the Purdue University IELLab in Nicaragua’. Paper presented at Indigenous Voices, Symposium on Native American Languages, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. November 17th, 2008.

2008 ‘Estructura argumental de los predicados de experiencia en catalán y mayangna’. Paper presented at the X Encuentro Internacional de Lingüística en el Noroeste, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico. November 13th, 2008.

153

Presentations (cont’d.)

2008 ‘Agentivity and experiencer verbs in Catalan and Mayangna and the roles of little v’. Poster presented at the 18th Colloquium on Generative Grammar, Lisbon. April 18th, 2008.

2008 ‘Infixation in Mayangna relational nouns: a morpho-phonological analysis’. Paper presented at the 4th Conference on the Endangered Languages and Cultures of Native America. University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT. March 28th, 2008.

2008 Mayangna Yulbarangyang Balna, Elena Benedicto. ‘At the intersection of linguistic research and community empowerment: The Mayangna Linguists Team of Nicaragua’. Paper edited and presented by Ricard Viñas de Puig at the Workshop in Honor of Ken Hale. University of New Mexico, NM. March 8th, 2008.

2007 ‘The possession of Catalan unaccusativity’. Paper presented at the 15th Annual University of Texas at Arlington Student Conference in Linguistics. University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX. November 1st, 2007.

2007 ‘Sorry, en is not welcome to the “real unaccusativity” party’. Paper presented at the PLA Symposium 2007. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. April 28th, 2007.

2006 ‘Split intransitivity and en-cliticization in Catalan at the syntactic-semantic interface.’ Paper presented at the PLA Symposium 2006. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. April 21st, 2006.

2006 ‘Little v, split intransitivity and en-cliticization in Catalan’. Paper presented at the

8th

Graduate Symposium on Foreign Languages and Literatures. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. March 4th, 2006.

2001 ‘On the roles of the Catalan clitic hi.’ Paper presented at the 9th Annual Charles F. Fraker Conference. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. March, 2001.

2001 ‘On the roles of the Catalan clitic en.’ Paper presented at the 5th Symposium on Foreign Languages and Literatures. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. February, 2001.

Research experience

2006-2009 Member of the Indigenous and Endangered Languages Lab, Purdue University.

Participant at the NSF sponsored project 0723694, ‘Spatial language and cognition in Mesoamerica’, awarded to Dr. J. Bohnemeyer.

Participant at the NSF sponsored project 0345680, ‘Mayangna: a database and study of nominal features on its verbal inflectional domain’, awarded to Dr. E. Benedicto.

Fieldwork experience in Rosita, RAAN, Nicaragua (December 2006, July 2007, December 2007, January 2008, June 2008).

Documentation and annotation of Mayangna stories using ELAN software.

154

Research experience (cont’d.)

Creation of a database for a trilingual (Mayangna-Spanish-English) dictionary using FileMaker software.

Training of Mayangna linguists in the use of ELAN software.

Teaching experience

2008-2009 Linguistics Program, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. Introduction to Linguistics (Instructor) Syntax I (Teaching Assistant; graduate level course) Introduction to Syntax (Instructor; Spring 2009) Structure of Spanish II: Syntax (Teaching Assistant; graduate level course)

2006-2007 Universidad de las Regiones Autónomas de la Costa Caribe Nicaragüense, Rosita, RAAN, Nicaragua.

The Spanish of the Americas (Instructor) History of the Spanish Language (Instructor)

English I and II (Instructor)

2005-2007 Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. Introduction to Spanish Morphology, Syntax and Semantics (Instructor) Introduction to Spanish Phonetics, Phonology and Dialectology (Teaching Assistant) Advanced Spanish (Teaching Assistant)

1999-2001 Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. Intermediate and Advanced Spanish (Teaching Assistant)

Awards

2008-2009 Center for Teaching Excellence Award for excellent in teaching, Purdue University.

Nov. 2007 Yuki Nakamura Prize for most outstanding paper of the 15th Annual University of Texas at Arlington Student Conference in Linguistics. University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX.

March 2006 Best Paper at the 8th Graduate Symposium on Foreign Languages and Literatures. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.

June 1998 Graduated with Honors. BA in Translation and Interpreting, Universitat de Vic, Vic, Spain.

155

Service

2008-2009 President of the Purdue Linguistics Association (PLA).

2007-2008 Vice-president of the Purdue Linguistics Association (PLA).

Since 2006 Member of the Linguistic Society of America (LSA).

References

Dr. Elena Benedicto Associate Professor Department of English Purdue University 500 Oval Drive West Lafayette, IN 47907 [email protected] (765) 494-8118 Dr. Elaine Francis Assistant Professor Department of English Purdue University 500 Oval Drive West Lafayette, IN 47907 [email protected] (765) 496-1652

Dr. Ronnie Wilbur Professor, Chair Linguistics Program Purdue University 500 Oval Drive West Lafayette, IN 47907 [email protected] (765) 494-3822 Dr. Robert Hammond Professor Department of Foreign Languages and

Literatures Purdue University 640 Oval Drive West Lafayette, IN 47907 [email protected] (765) 494-3873

mailto:[email protected]

The argument of experience: Experience predicates and argument structure in Catalan and Mayangna

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