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Jessica Bockler

The Actor’s Self: A transpersonal exploration of

the actor-character relationship

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Abstract

To what extent does an actor become his art? Is each creation a true becoming?Or is it mere imitation?

This paper endeavours to discern some of thepsychological processes at work in the actor-character relationship. It focuses in particular onthe changes in the actor’s sense of self, which seem tooccur during rehearsal and performance. Examplesfor such changes in the sense of self are drawnfrom a study of ‘play experiences’, which wasconducted with performing arts students from theUniversity of Wales, Aberystwyth (Bockler, 2004).Two major acting styles - involvement (à laStanislavski or Strasberg) and self-expression (à laGrotowski) – are discussed and conceptualised withthe help of Transpersonal Psychology, whichprovides comprehensive models of consciousness, aswell as of the human self and of self-development.Particular emphasis is placed on the theories ofCarl Gustav Jung, Brian Les Lancaster and KenWilber.  

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The Double Consciousness of the Actor

For centuries actors, directors and theatrescholars have explored and analysed the nature ofthe actor’s emotional involvement with the fictivecharacter. Diderot’s famous Paradoxe sur le Comédien,which suggests that the actor who feels nothing atall whilst delivering his performance is likely toevoke the strongest emotion in his audience,greatly fuelled the debate. Diderot proposed that“the talent of a good actor lies in the fact thathe can reproduce the external signs of an emotionprecisely – and in such good measure – that thespectator will be convinced. ‘The actor is,however, not his character; he pretends to be anddoes this so well that you mistake him for hischaracter. The illusion is yours alone’” (Konijn,2000, p. 23).

Today, discussions have shifted to what has becomeknown as ‘the actor’s dilemma’. As Konijn (2000)affirms, “the issue is no longer about the totalpresence or the total absence of feeling, but ratherthe degree of similarity between the emotions of the actorand his character” (p. 21). According to Konijn,the Western performer has three major acting stylesat his disposal, each of which proposes a uniquesolution to the dilemma: these are the styles ofinvolvement, detachment and self-expression.

In line with involvement (e.g. Stanislavski orStrasberg) the actor’s emotions must match the

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character’s emotions; at best the actor transcendshis own will and “lives the part, not noticing howhe feels, not thinking about what he does, and itall moves of its own accord, subconsciously andintuitively" (Stanislavski, 1986, p. 13). Indetachment (e.g. Brecht) on the other hand the actordoes not merge with the emotions of his character,but rather he demonstrates them, so that both actorand character are clearly visible to the audience.As Boysen affirms, “a happy character does not needto be played by a happy actor” (cited in Konijn,2000, p. 39). Finally, in self-expression (e.g.Grotowski) the actor remains true to his ownemotions. He does not live the fictive part, butrather he uses his character to explore and exposethe inner workings of his psyche.

Konijn proposes that all three major acting stylesinvolve a kind of double consciousness on the part ofthe actor. According to the style of involvement,whilst asking his actors to inwardly live theirparts, Stanislavski also demanded that theyremained detached from their characters; this wasto ensure that all actors would remain in controlof the performance process: "Never lose yourself onstage. Always act in your own person, as an artist"(cited in Meyer-Dinkgräfe, 1996, p. 27) and "anactor lives, weeps and laughs on the stage, and allthe while he is watching his own tears and smiles.It is this double function, this balance betweenlife and acting that makes his art" (ibid, pp.31/2).

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In the style of detachment, the doubleconsciousness of the actor is encapsulated in theBrechtian concept of Verfremdung (alienation). Theactor shows the character to his audience, he doesnot involve himself emotionally; as such Konijnproposes that he evokes a state of doubleconsciousness, which is most deliberate andexplicit. The actor presents his character, as wellas himself.

Finally, in the style of self-expression thedouble consciousness of the actor is more subtleand concealed, and it leaves a challenge to theactor. As discussed, the self-expressive performerdoes not emulate a role, but rather he portrays hisown emotions – and he seeks to make such portrayalas spontaneous and authentic as possible. However,some theatre critics contend that even suchauthentic performers still have to ‘act’ – todifferentiate themselves from their audience. Thedouble consciousness then lies in the “dualexperience of the performer as role and actor”(Konijn, 2000, p. 45). “The ‘performer’ cannotescape making clear in one way or another that heis the actor and is therefore distinct from theaudience” (ibid, pp. 43/44). As such, the performeris forced to be ‘highly artificial’, whilstattempting to be ‘natural’ (Barba & Savarese, 1991,p. 148).

We speak of the double consciousness of the actor– but do we understand what it is and what itimplies? Take the self-expressive actor. In which

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way does his state of mind differ from that of hisaudience? Do we not all seek to be authentic withinthe boundaries of our social roles? I am remindedof Jung’s concept of the persona, which representsour basic outer personality (Jaffé, 1995/ 1961).According to Jung, this personality varies fromcircumstance to circumstance and it can becontrasted with a basic inner personality, whichthe Jungian psychologist Daniels (1992) has come todescribe as the soul. Jung deems the persona as thatwhich we are not, i.e. it is a multitude of masksor roles, which do not reflect our true being. Assuch, I might suggest that the double consciousnessof the self-expressive actor - being oneself whilstbeing in role - is indeed a universal phenomenon,from which none of us are exempt. As for the battlefor authenticity, I propose that the self-expressive actor tries to set a living example forwhat Jung described as individuation, i.e. theprogressive integration of the psyche's manycontrasting elements or archetypes, including thepersona and the soul, under the unifying influenceof the Self1, the overarching archetype, whichstrives to bring the whole of the psyche intoperfect balance and harmony. Put simply, the self-1 Jung’s idea of the Self, uppercase S, is not to beconfused with the self, lowercase s, which represents theindividual ego. To put it into perspective, Jungpostulated that the human psyche consisted of a) personalconsciousness (with the ego or self, lowercase s, as itscentre), b) the personal unconscious and c) thecollective unconscious (with the all-encompassing Self,uppercase S, at its centre).

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expressive actor strives for self-realisation.Admittedly, how successful he can be achieving hisgoal on stage is difficult to judge. As Brook(1987) has noted specifically about Grotowski’sapproach, it leaves “a challenge. But not for afortnight, not for once in a lifetime. Daily” (p.40).

The notion of self-realisation in and throughtheatre is an important one to which we shallreturn in the latter parts of this paper. Sufficeto propose at this stage that self-expressiveactors aim to work on the archetypal level,therefore accessing what Jung called the collectiveunconscious, a universal - possibly transpersonal -level of human existence. The aim of such workwould be to reach beyond the mundane or egoic stateof consciousness to achieve a more unified,encompassing and harmonious state of being.However, before delving more deeply into thenotions of Self and self-realisation, I shall spendsome time exploring the egoic processesunderpinning involvement and self-expression, bydrawing more extensively from other theories in thefield of Transpersonal Psychology.

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Grasping the self

Transpersonal Psychology (TP) is a relatively newbranch of academic psychology, which examinestranspersonal experiences occurring within the humansphere of existence. The term 'transpersonal'simply means 'beyond the personal' and sotranspersonal experiences are those, which involvea sense of expansion or shift beyond or past theordinary self, such as dream states, empathy,mystical experiences, psychedelic experiences,Near-Death experiences (NDEs) and Out-of-Bodyexperiences (OBEs).

Within TP one encounters many different models ofhuman consciousness and of the self (lowercase s),which reflect upon the notion of a higher or moreencompassing Self (uppercase S). Some of thesemodels have metaphysical bases (e.g. Wilber, 2000),whilst others (e.g. Jaffé, 1995/ 1961), aredecisively psychological in nature. Furthermore,many models differentiate between states and stagesof consciousness, the former of which are generallyof a temporary nature, whilst the latter imply thathuman consciousness is an evolving entity, whichmoves through (hierarchical) levels of existence.

One of the most comprehensive models of the selfhas been developed by the American writer KenWilber who has to date published more than 30 bookson the subject matter. On the most rudimentarylevel Wilber (2000) proposes that the self is madeof two parts: the proximate self (the observing self or

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that, which we experience as 'I') and the distal self(the observed self or that, which we experience as'me' or 'mine'). Wilber elucidates that "duringpsychological development, the 'I' of one stage becomes a'me' at the next. That is, what you are identified withat one stage of development tends to becometranscended […] at the next, so you can see it moreobjectively, with some distance and detachment" (p.34).

We can relate this well to the style ofinvolvement, for Stanislavski depicts a dichotomybetween living and watching, which is not unlikeWilber’s differentiation between the proximate andthe distal self. I would like to suggest that whenan actor practices involvement, he embodies andplays with a fictive distal self, whilst his owntrue proximate self looks on. One might enquire asto what happens to the actor’s real distal selfduring such performance. To that, I suggest thatwhen the actor is totally engrossed in hischaracter and his portrayal seems effortless andnatural, his real distal self has merged and hasbecome congruent with that of his fictivecharacter, in which case he will experience adouble consciousness, which is much like to hisordinary state of being.

All too often, however, actors struggle to connectto their characters on stage. I myself haveexperienced not a neutral proximate self, but ajudgemental and critical one. I would like tosuggest that this kind of judgemental witnessing is

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due to insufficient congruence between the real andthe fictive distal self, i.e. when I am criticallyaware, the two distal selves are competing for myproximate self’s attention.

Such deep struggles actors face within theirpractice – I take comfort in the fact that I am notalone. In my own research for my Masters thesis(Bockler, 2004) a group of performing arts studentsfrom the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, affirmedthat ‘acting’ can easily turn into obsessive self-examination: “I am observing myself and then I'mthinking what that shows to others and then I'mthinking what they think they see and if they thinkI'm over-acting or if I'm doing it right” (Adrianein Bockler, 2004, p. 53). Interestingly, when askedmore generally about their ‘sense of self’ duringplayful activity the students differentiatedbetween ‘acting’ and ‘performing’, the former ofwhich I would equate with the style of involvement,whilst the latter appears to resemble the style ofself-expression:

“Play as 'acting' […] is 'putting on a mask' and itis 'slipping into fake Personas'. The co-researchersliken 'acting' to social role play […]. Overall,'acting' is masked play, which is not necessarilytrue to the player” (ibid, p. 52).

“Play as 'performing' is authentic and it comes fromwithin. […] Some of the co-researchers even see itas an expression of a world 'beyond within'. […] Itconnects the player to 'something else', anotherlayer of reality” (ibid).

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Connecting back to Wilber’s (2000) theory of theproximate and the distal self, I suggest that incontrast to the involved actor, the self-expressiveactor is not concerned with the construction of afictive distal self – but rather with the de-construction of his OWN distal self, so that in hisperformance the ‘me’ disappears and the ‘I’ takesover. As the students in my research affirm, during‘performance’ “their sense of self 'becomes less'or is even lost” (Bockler, 2004, p. 54).Furthermore, the students describe “a state offlow, in which they are not critically aware, butrather comfortably selfless” (ibid). Suchdepictions strongly remind of Csikszentmihalyi’s(1988) research on peak experiences, which he hascome to describe as ‘being in flow’ and which seemto entail a "merging of activity and awareness" (p.32), a heightened sense of control over action, atemporary loss of ordinary self-awareness whilstthe self is still fully functioning and at timeseven a transcendence of self when "the climberfeels at one with the mountain" (p. 33). Itcertainly seems that flow was just what Grotowski(1991) aimed to achieve within his actors in thetheatre laboratory:

“The education of an actor in our theatre is not amatter of teaching him something; we attempt toeliminate his organism’s resistance to this psychicprocess. The result is freedom from the time-lapsebetween inner impulse and outer reaction in such away that the impulse is already an outer reaction”(p. 16).

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As the students in my research project suggest,self-expressive performance seems to connect theperformer to another layer of reality - but what isthis other layer? It seems that when we come toexplore performance processes we cannot spend muchtime in the egoic framework – and we are drawntowards the transpersonal realm. We try to graspthe egoic self … but it evades us … itdisintegrates … it vanishes … only to revealsomething much larger and deeper and even lesstangible.

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Beyond the self

Bound up with the quest to grasp the nature of theself is another phenomenon, which appears somundane to us that we do not usually think about it– until it evades us! This is our memory. Memoryappears to anchor our experiences in a clear causalstructure, imbuing our existence with a sense ofcontinuity and consistency. It helps us to buildour personal and cultural narratives and identities– indeed, who would we be if we were withoutmemory? Unavoidably, actors make use of memoryprocesses, no matter which acting style theyemploy. I would like to reflect upon the memoryprocesses involved in either style and by doing so,explore the farther reaches of the human psyche.

Already William James recognised that the selfplays an important role in memory, inducing a senseof ownership of the past: “Memory requires morethan mere dating of a fact in the past. It must bedated in my past. In other words, I must think thatI directly experienced its occurrence” (cited inLancaster, 2004, p. 157). Modern cognitiveneuropsychology, too, recognises the link betweenmundane consciousness and a mental representationof the self (e.g. Kihlstrom, 1993). Lancaster(2004) specifically proposes that “this sense ofownership entails a tagging system in memory.Memories are structured in association with the‘I’-model that was present at the time that theevent was experienced” (p. 163). As such, the ‘I’

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plays a crucial role in the indexing of memoriesand in their subsequent recall; this is whatLancaster calls the ‘I’-tag theory. I likenLancaster’s understanding of the ‘I’ to Wilber’sunderstanding of the distal self – whichcontinuously fluctuates and changes. As Lancastersuggests, the ‘I’ is a “construct, recreated frommoment to moment in the mind” (p. 164) and yet “itis the mind’s most successful manoeuvre forincreasing the sense of meaning. […] The mindsynthesizes a narrative that fits the availableinformation into a story that is structured arounda logic of causation. And central to all the mind’snarratives is the ‘center of narrative gravity’ […]itself, namely ‘I’” (ibid). In other words: themind creates its own reality. Using fragments ofinformation, impressions and perceptions itconstructs a world around an imaginary centre ofself, both of which seem coherent and meaningful.In truth, however, both are really quite deceptiveand illusionary…

The ‘I’-tag theory is particularly useful when wecome to examine performance processes in greaterdepth. Actors, particularly those who utilise thestyle of involvement in text-based productions,rely heavily on their memory. I would suggest thatan actor creates and emulates his role, by re-tagging his own memories onto the fictive distalself of the character, effectively creating a newindexing system. How would such re-indexing work? Ipropose that in rehearsal, the actor lets his realmemories which are tagged onto his real distal self

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and his fictive memories which are connected to thefictive distal self operate side by side and feedof one another (by utilising techniques such asStanislavski’s emotion memory, e.g. Gordon, 1987) –until he manages to shift his real memories fromhis own distal self onto the fictive distal self,albeit not in a pure but adapted form. When thisshift has occurred we can say that the actor’sreality and the fictive performance situation havefused and the character has truly come alive withinin the actor.

For the self-expressive actor, however, it isquite a different matter. As mentioned previously,in self-expression the actor is trained to diminishhis own distal self, which allows him to enter astate of flow, in which he experiences a temporaryloss of ordinary self-awareness. If we follow thehypothesis of the ‘I’-tag theory, such changes instate would have an intriguing side effect. Theactor who performs in a state of flow should havetrouble recalling his own actions once theperformance has finished and he has returned to hisordinary state of being. I have not come across anycomments by Grotowski on this matter – but anotherpractitioner, Keith Johnstone, who has workedextensively with improvisation and spontaneity andwhose work features self-expressive elements hasmade some revealing remarks in his book Impro –Improvisation and the Theatre: “Improvisers who maintainthat they’re in a normal state of consciousnesswhen they improvise often have unsuspected gaps intheir memories which only emerge when you question

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them closely” (1989, p. 152). Johnstone goes on todescribe these occurrences of memory gaps ingreater detail. His accounts instil within me asense of excitement. If he is right and memory gapsare a regular occurrence amongst improvisers, thenperhaps we have found one tangible way ofresearching, measuring and validating the effectsof self-expressive performance techniques.

One might inquire into the importance andrelevance of memory gaps and why we should pay anyattention to them at all. I propose that we shouldinvestigate them, because they are indicators ofchanges triggered by self-expressive performancetechniques, and as such they may tell us much moreabout the potential of these techniques. The ‘I’-tag theory proposes that memory formation does notcease in altered states of consciousness, butrather that all memory is state-dependent. Thismeans that memory formed in states of no-self orall-Self (depending on what psychological orspiritual perspective we might adopt we might speakof no-self (e.g. Buddhism) or all-Self (e.g.Kabbalah)) is tagged NOT onto a construct of ‘I’ -but that it is connected to other aspects of selfor Self, which are hidden within the deeperrecesses of the human psyche and which areinaccessible to the ‘I’.

To illustrate the potential for practices inducingsuch altered states of consciousness, includingperformance techniques, let us consider state-dependent memory from the perspective of kabbalist

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teachings, which have strongly impacted uponGrotowski’s work (e.g. Schechner, 1997b). I wouldlike to refer to the writings by the thirteenth-century Jewish mystic Abraham Abulafia toilluminate the concept of All-Self. Abulafiacreated a system of language mysticism, the primaryaim of which was “to untie the knots from worldlymatters and to rebind them in relation to theletters of God’s name” (cited in Lancaster, 2004,p. 171). Lancaster elucidates that the purpose ofsuch practice was to push the boundaries of anindividual’s awareness, to achieve a shift in one’sability to access the contents of the psyche, andultimately to grasp the mind of God. “Abulafia’ssystem was directed towards achieving mysticalunion with the Active Intellect [the intermediarybetween the divine and human spheres, JB] throughimitating its mode of operation. The letter-workingand hermeneutic activity that Abulafia taught wasviewed as emulating the linguistic operations ofthe Active Intellect” (ibid, p. 243). Similarly,Grotowski was strongly preoccupied withinterrogating, dissecting and dissolving literaryor dramatic texts, only to re-construct them intextual montages, utilising the bodies of hisactors to create images, gestures and sounds(Schechner, 1997a, p. 27). The intention of suchwork was to “return to the whiteness of the pagebetween each word, which in effect means re-establishing contact with the state prior to allpossible meanings” (Yarrow, 1997, p. 30).

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From a purely psychological perspective we mayliken this process to Jung’s individuation, throughwhich an individual may achieve psychologicalbalance and harmony. Such seems the potential ofsome performance techniques, by utilising themactors may effectively expand their repertoires ofself-memory structures and they may hence achievegreater psychological integration - even self-realisation. We can also relate this back to Wilber(2000) who currently proposes that “proximate-selfdevelopment is […] at the very heart of theevolution of consciousness” (p. 35). Wilber assertsthat the proximate self is an expanding entity,which naturally undergoes fulcrums (milestones oftransformation), which correlate to thedevelopmental stages of consciousness as a whole:

"The point is that in human growth and development,the Witness, or real Self capital S, starts outidentified with the material self, then the bodilyself, then the mental self, then the soul self, andfinally reverts to, or awakens to, its own truenature as spirit. Each stage includes the previousstage, and then adds its own unique aspects in orderto form a larger union, until there is ultimately aunion with the All" (1991, p. 100).

As such, the proximate self has the potential tofully awaken unto its real Self, which also existsin everything right here, right now. I mightpropose that it is this ultimate Witness, whichtruly inspired actors utilise when they perform onstage. And to the extent that actors can push theirboundaries and truly submit themselves to self-

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expressive performance practice, with dedicationand commitment, such practice may guide themtowards profound inner revelation andtransformation.

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Conclusion

I started this paper with the intention to exploreand illuminate the psychological dimensions of theactor’s craft – and I have concluded it withexplorations of spiritual practices and ideas ofpersonal transformation, even self-realisation.This is because transpersonal psychologists, suchas Wilber, Jung or Lancaster, not only offer usdeeper theoretical insights into the actor’s craft- but they open our eyes as to the enormoustransformative potential of the theatre. Wilber(2004) has also highlighted practical opportunitiesfor advances in performance training. He has spokenof an Integral Actors Studio, in which performers mayconsciously work towards psychological integrationand wellbeing, as well as enhance their performanceskills. Much in Grotowski’s tradition, such actortraining would be about enhancing people’s skillsfor living as well as their performance skills.

New developments in actor training and furtherexperimentation, specifically with self-expressiveperformance styles, are very relevant when we cometo reflect on the overall value and status of thetheatre in our culture. If theatre proves to be aneffective tool for transformation within actors(and perhaps even within audiences), then it mustsurely be considered a vital tool for socialdevelopment. Much research needs to be done in thisarea. We need to gather evidence for theeffectiveness of our work. And we need to continueto create theatre, which demonstrates its potential

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for transformation, which ignites the alchemicalprocess within ourselves and which shifts us intohigher states and stages of being. Let us show thattheatre can really make a difference: toindividuals, to communities, and to humanity as awhole.

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Bibliography

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Bockler, J. (2004). Beyond Ambiguity: A heuristic inquiry into the essence of play. Unpublished Masters Thesis: LiverpoolJohn Moores University.

Brook, P. (1987). The Shifting Point. London: Methuen.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Csikszentmihalyi, I. S. (1988). Optimal Experience - psychological studies of flow in consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daniels, M. (1992), Self-Discovery the Jungian Way - The Watchword Technique, London: Routledge.

Gordon, M. (1987). The Stanislavski Technique. New York: Applause Theatre Books.

Grotowski, J. (1991). Towards A Poor Theatre. London: Methuen.

Jaffé, A. (Ed.) (1995/ 1961), Memories, Dreams, Reflections. London: Fontana Press.

Johnstone, K. (1989). Impro - Improvisation And The Theatre.London: Methuen.

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1993). The psychological unconscious and the self. In: Experimental and Theoretical

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Studies of Consciousness. Ciba Foundation Symposium no. 174. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

Konijn, E. A. (2000). Acting Emotions. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Lancaster, B. L. (2004). Approaches to Consciousness: The Marriage of Science and Mysticism. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Meyer-Dinkgräfe, D. (1996). Consciousness and the Actor. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Schechner. R. (1997a). Introduction. In Schechner, R.& Wolford, L. (Eds.). The Grotowski Sourcebook. London: Routledge.

Schechner. R. (1997b). Exoduction. In Schechner, R. &Wolford, L. (Eds.). The Grotowski Sourcebook. London: Routledge.

Stanislavski. K. (1986). An Actor Prepares. London: Methuen.

Wilber, K. (1991). Grace and Grit. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Wilber, K. (2000). Integral Psychology - Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Therapy. Boston: Shambhala Publications.

Wilber, K. (2004). “The Integral Actors Studio: Engaging the Metaphysics of Acting”. Retrieved on 27th December 2004 from www.integralnaked.org

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Yarrow, R. (ed.) (1997). Presence and pre-expressivity. Contemporary Theatre Review. 6 (4) & 7 (1).