Taking the Shape of the Gods: A Theurgic Reading of Hermetic Rebirth

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi: 10.1163/15700593-01501009

Aries – Journal for the Studyof Western Esotericism 15 (2015) 136–169

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Taking the Shape of the GodsA Theurgic Reading of Hermetic Rebirth*

Gregory ShawDepartment of Religious Studies, Stonehill College

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Abstract

Scholarship in the last few decades has corrected mischaracterizations of the Her-metica and Iamblichean theurgy as examples of the decline of Hellenic thinking, butquestions remain of how to understand them, particularly since Iamblichus claims tofollow the teachings of Hermes. This essay attempts to shed light on hermetic rebirthand the immortalization of the soul described in ch xiii and nh vi.6 by examiningthem according to the principles of Iamblichean theurgy. I argue that hermetic immor-talization and rebirth did not culminate in an escape from the body and the world butwere realized—to the contrary—as a divine and demiurgic descent into the world andone’s body. While this essay owes a great debt to Garth Fowden’s The Egyptian Hermes,my reading of hermetic rebirth does not follow his dualist understanding of hermeticmetaphysics and soteriology. The culmination of both theurgic and hermetic mysta-gogy is non-dual: deification is realized in the world.

Keywords

Hermes – theurgy – Iamblichus – dualism and non-dualism – esoteric – demiurgy

* This is a revised version of a paper read at Hermen<eu>tica: New Approaches to the Textand Interpretation of the Corpus Hermeticum, a conference at Princeton University in May,2012. Thanks to Christian Wildberg for convening the conference and particular thanks toChristian Bull and Anne van den Kerchove for their suggestions concerning the history andtransmission of Hermetic texts. I also wish to thank Dylan Burns for his incisive editorialsuggestions and Janelle Guyot and John Golden for their help on the abstract.

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taking the shape of the gods 137

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western Esotericism 15 (2015) 136–169

…To be immortal is commonplace; except forman, all creatures are immor-tal, for they are ignorant of death; what is divine, terrible, incomprehen-sible, is to know that one is immortal.

jorge luis borges1

…The way of Hermes is the ‘way of immortality’.

garth fowden2

∵

The fourth-century Neoplatonic philosopher and theurgist Iamblichus beginshis defense of theurgy in On the Mysteries by attributing his wisdom to theEgyptian Hermes:

The godHermes, prince of eloquence, has fromancient times rightly beenconsidered common to all priests; hewhopresides over true knowledge ofthe gods is one and the same throughout the world. It was to him indeedthat our ancestors dedicated the fruits of their wisdom, attributing alltheir own writings to Hermes.3

Iamblichus writes under the name of Abamon, an Egyptian priest respondingto questions posed by Porphyry to one of Iamblichus’ students whomPorphyrycalled ‘Anebo the Egyptian’, thus inviting Iamblichus to enter an Egyptian fic-tion and takeuphismask, theEgyptianpriestAbamon.And Iamblichus ismore

1 Borges, Labyrinths, 114.2 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 110–111.3 Iamblichus, On the Mysteries, 1.2–2.3. All references follow the Parthey pagination preceded

by Myst. (De Mysteriis). Translations will be based on the translation of Clarke, Dillon, andHershbell withmodifications and by consulting the recent text and translation by Saffrey andSegonds of Jamblique: Réponse à Porphyre. The attribution of wisdom literature to a scribalgodwas also the practice among Egyptian scribeswho attributed their literature to Thoth, thedeity identified with Hermes. He was reported by Manetho to be the author of 36,500 books;see Jasnow and Zauzich, The Egyptian Book of Thoth, 2.

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than willing, telling Porphyry bluntly that the letter sent to ‘my student Anebo…was sent tome’, and proceeds to respond to his long critique of theurgy.4 Theexchange between Porphyry and Iamblichus was the culmination of increas-ing tension between these two philosophers. Porphyry initiated the exchangewith his pointed questions as well as by setting the tone of its Egyptian for-mat, and Iamblichus’ lengthy reply represents antiquity’s most eloquent andsophisticated apology for the performance of religious ritual. Iamblichus’ Pla-tonic school in Apamea encouraged the practice of theurgic ritual to effect aunionwith the gods, a shift inmethod from the one promoted by Porphyry andPlotinus for whom the true prophet (prophētēs) and priest (hierus) of the godswas the philosopher.5 This was the source of tension between them and Por-phyry’s letter,meant to be a devastating critique of theurgy, allowed Iamblichusto explain his hieratic rites in a way that was consistent with Platonic andPythagorean principles. His response to Porphyry was so successful that subse-quent leaders of thePlatonic school, Syrianus, Proclus andDamascius, followedthe mystagogy of Iamblichus. Platonism became hieratic and Plato became, inProclus’ words, the “hierophant of truemysteries”.6 InOn theMysteries, in addi-tion to acknowledging Hermes explicitly as his patron, Iamblichus reveals amystagogy that is strikingly similar to themystagogy portrayed in theHermeticwritings.7 The way of Hermes, Garth Fowden has succinctly put it, is the way of

4 Myst. 2.5–7. Saffrey and Segonds provide a thorough and convincing description of thisexchange, one that includes Porphyry’s growing irritationwith Iamblichus for diverging fromthe philosophical path of hismaster Plotinus. They suggest that Porphyry’s publication of theEnneads was an implicit critique of Iamblichean theurgy and the Letter to Anebo made thiscritique explicit. The student Anebo was fictional and the most likely Egyptian meaning ofhis name, “Great is mymaster,” was intended to goad Iamblichus into a reply. See Saffrey andSegonds, Porphyre, xix-xxxv1.

5 Saffrey and Segonds in their Porphyre, xxix–xxx; cf. Plotinus, Enneads 6.9 [9] 11.27–45.6 Proclus, Plat. Theo. 1:5.16–6.3 (Saffrey/Westerink).7 We do not know the specific Hermetic texts to which Iamblichus had access (although it

would be safe to assume less than the 20,000 or 36,525 books that he mentions in Myst.261.1–3!). To suggest that theurgic mystagogy is similar to the Hermetic assumes that thecurrent Hermetica, based on the manuscript of Michael Psellus in the 11th century, reflectin significant ways the hermetic texts known to exist in the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Whiledifferent communities emphasized different tractates, evidence suggests that the old Her-metic texts were arranged according to a paideia that was followed by the Byzantine scribes.Yet I am also convinced by Brian Copenhaver, Hermetica, xl–xlv, and Fowden, Egyptian Her-mes, 8–9, that the theological biases of Byzantine scribes caused them to expunge from theHermetic texts obviously pagan or Egyptian elements that were discovered intact in the Her-metic codex of Nag Hammadi v1,6. Psellus did the same with the Chaldean Oracles, twisting



immortality,8 and theurgy, under the aegis ofHermes, is also away of immortal-ity. Hermes insists that rebirth into divinity ‘cannot be taught’, and Iamblichusmaintains that theurgic mystagogy cannot even be thought. For Iamblichus‘contact with the divine is not knowledge (oude gnōsis)’.9 True knowledge ofthe gods, he says, cannot be reached through dialectical discussion, for ‘whatwould prevent theoretical philosophers from achieving theurgic union withthe gods? This’, he states, ‘is simply not possible’.10 The polemic against the“philosopher” Porphyry is plainly evident here and elsewhere in On the Mys-teries.

It is one thing to appreciate the polemical nuances between Porphyry andIamblichus, quite another to try to understand a mystagogy that cannot betaught or thought about. This is the crux of the problem we face in trying tounderstand esoteric disciplines whose practitioners say they cannot be discur-sively understood. I will address this problem by exploring Iamblichus’ use ofthe terms “esoteric” and “gnōsis,” and then apply his understanding to the Her-metic texts.

1 Theurgy, Scholarship, and the Challenge of the Veil

Iamblichus is largely responsible for introducing this mystagogic language tous. In his Pythagorean writings he distinguishes exoteric teachings for the pub-lic from the esoteric disciplines for initiates of themysteries. The Pythagoreans,he says, recognized differences among students; thus beginners were given‘exoteric’ (exōterica) teachings while the more advanced were taught the ‘eso-teric’ (esōterica).11 As represented by Iamblichus, the Pythagoreans distin-guished students who merely heard the master (akousmatikoi) from thosewho heard and saw the master’s mathematical demonstrations (mathemati-koi). Iamblichus’ designation is unambiguous: those “within the veil” (eisō sin-

their meaning ‘to meet the dogmatic requirements of Christianity’ (Athanassiadi, ‘Psellosand Plethon’, 246).

8 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 110–111.9 Myst. 8.2.10 Ibid., 96.13–97.1. One can clearly see Iamblichus’ polemical edge against the “philosopher”

Porphyry here and elsewhere in On the Mysteries.11 Iamb.Comm.Math. 62.28–63.5, tr. Brisson, ‘Chapter 18’, 46.While these termswere already

associated with Pythagoreans before Iamblichus, he brought the distinction to promi-nence in his Syrian school which was focused as much on Pythagorean mystagogy as itwas on Egyptian/Chaldean theurgy.

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donos) are mathematikoi and those “outside the veil” (exō sindonos) are akous-matikoi.12

Drawn from Iamblichean Pythagoreanism, the term “esoteric” thus refers tothose who are privy to inner (eisō) teachings. But our attempts to understandthe significance of these teachings have not been particularly successful, andthis, I would argue, is because we do not recognize what is at stake. Again,Iamblichus is unambiguous. Describing Pythagoreanaskēsishe says: ‘If wewishto practice mathematics in a Pythagorean way, we should zealously pursue itsgod-inspired, anagogic, cathartic, and initiatory process’.13 Esoteric Pythagore-anism was a mystagogic process that led to a transformed state of conscious-ness, hardly mathematics as we understand it today. And this is the problem.We can scarcely imagine what mystagogy to a transformed state is supposed tobe. In his work on Neoplatonic Pythagoreans, Dominic O’Meara accounts forthis, explaining that ‘the hierarchical transcendent metaphysics of Neoplaton-ism [and of Pythagoreanism] is antithetical to the flat reductionist physicalismof today’.14 In our flat worldview there can be no “higher” states, so when ourtexts speak of them most scholars simply assume these passages are a kind ofrhetorical strategy used by authors to elevate their status in a social or reli-gious context. As regards esoteric and exoteric, we tend either to imagine thedistinction socially, establishing an inner group from an outer, or we imagineit in terms of discursive complexity, with the exoteric as simpler and the eso-teric more complex. In effect, we apply our own cultural standards and think-ing to the ancient texts and, as a result, see only ourselves mirrored in them.Iamblichus maintained that the ‘entire system of Pythagorean mystagogy wasenshrined in symbols… [but] like theoracles of thePythian god they arehard tounderstandor follow for thosewho consult the oracle in a superficialmanner’.15Sara Rappe has pointed out that Iamblichus reacted against the discursivehabits of his contemporaries by emphasizing that wisdom is non-discursive,and thus his Pythagorean Exhortation to Philosophy is ‘an esoteric handbookthat invokes symbols rather than [discursive] tenets’.16 Iamblichus’ critique ofthe instability and discursive shallowness of Greek intellectualsmay equally beapplied to scholars today who reduce Neoplatonic and Hermetic mystagogy torhetorical strategies, politics, or some other form of status-seeking:

12 Iamb. Vit. Pyth. ch. 89; cf. 72.13 Idem, Comm.Math. 69.26–29.14 O’Meara, Platonopolis, 205.15 Iamblichus, vp 247.16 Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 14 (my emphasis).



For the Greeks by nature are followers of the latest trends and are eager tobe carried off in any direction, possessing no stability themselves. What-ever they receive from other traditions they do not preserve; even thisthey immediately reject and change everything through their unstablehabit of seeking the latest terms.17

Myst. 259.4–10

An outstanding exception to this scholarly habit is a recent article by WouterJ. Hanegraaff that examines gnōsis in the Hermetica.18 Hanegraaff, faced withthe difficulty of trying to do justice to texts that speak of a knowledge that ‘can-not be taught,’ surveys the approaches of scholars who live in O’Meara’s ‘flatreductionist physicalist’ world. According to Hanegraaff, such scholars denythe possibility of going beyond the discursive and so interpret mystagogic lan-guage as simply another discursive strategy. As he puts it: ‘Rather than tryingto take the sources seriously … scholars who choose this perspective end up“correcting” the sources’ point of view by replacing them with agendas of theirown’.19 Hanegraaff explains that in studies of the Hermetica today ‘the ortho-dox position in the field’ is ‘descriptivist’. In this approach scholars are allowedto repeat the statements of the texts and put them into their philological andcultural contexts but must abstain from engaging in the deeper hermeneu-tics of what these texts state as their goal: ‘a salvational and noetic experience(often referred to as “gnōsis”) that cannot be verbalized, and which is consid-ered to be wholly superior to rational philosophical discussion’.20 Hanegraaff ’shermeneutic enters the mystagogy of these authors by imagining with them a“hierarchy of knowledge” that is demonstrated through a careful reading of thetexts.21 Hanegraaff allows the texts to come alive andhe reveals an internal con-

17 A similar criticism of the Greeks in contrast to the Egyptians is found in the Hermetica:‘For the Greeks, O King, who make logical demonstrations, use words emptied of power,and this very activity is what constitutes their philosophy, a mere noise of words. Butwe [Egyptians] do not [so much] use words (logoi) but sounds (phōnai) which are fullof effects’ Corp. Herm. xvi.2, Nock and Festugière, 232. Dylan Burns argues that not alluses of such ‘syllables of power’ are understood in a theurgic sense. The Sethian use ofsuch “sounds” relied on ‘different conceptions of what it means to become divine’ thanthose shared by theurgists and, I would argue, Hermetists; Burns, Apocalypse, 117–118;138–139.

18 Hanegraaff, ‘Altered States’, 128–163.19 Ibid., 130.20 Ibid., 133.21 Ibid., 136.

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sistency that has escaped purely descriptivist approaches.22 There are risks inHanegraaff ’smethod, of course, but to presume a kind of objectivist knowledgeofmystagogic texts requires that one engage everything but themystagogy. Andto engage it requires that one enter into it. And it is this, Hanegraaff astutelyobserves, that frightens scholars because we are afraid of being seen as ‘notobjective enough’.23 This remains a neuralgic point for all scholars of religion,but it is an especially sensitive one for those who work with esoteric teachingsthat claim to lead to gnōsis understood as non-discursive awareness.

Now, this tension between the discursive and non-discursive was alreadyplayed out between Iamblichus and Porphyry. Iamblichus explains to Porphyrythat discursive knowing is divided, but prior to this division the soul possessesan innate gnōsis of the gods. He says:

For an innate gnōsis (emphutos gnōsis) of the gods co-exists with our verynature and is superior to all judgment and choice, reasoning and proof.This gnōsis is joined from the beginning with its cause and is interwovenwith the soul’s essential yearning for the Good. Indeed, to tell the truth,the contact we have with the divine is not to be taken as knowledge(gnōsis). For knowledge, after all, is separated (from its object) by somedegree of otherness. But prior to the knowledge that knows another asbeing, itself, other,wepossess a spontaneous andunitary connectionwiththe gods.

Myst. 7.11–8.5

Iamblichus’ use of gnōsis must be understood in context. As ordinary knowl-edge, gnōsis is divided anddiscursive, but there is a kindof “knowing” that is notdiscursive, an undivided gnōsis that is innate and tied to our “essential yearn-ing” for the Good. I believe this exemplifies Hanegraaff ’s hierarchy of knowing.Gnōsis is often used in a monolithic way to designate a trans-rational state, butwe must be careful to distinguish the ordinary gnōsis of discursive knowingfrom non-discursive gnōsis. The latter, for us, is not “knowing” at all; for Her-metists and Neoplatonists, however, it indicates a state anterior to knowing, astate that is not capable of being rationally grasped but realized, nevertheless,through symbolic transmission.

22 See, for example, Hanegraaff ’s explanation of the erasure of separation between subjectand object seen in the ecstatic encounter of the visionary and Poimandres, a criticalgnostic experience overlooked by previous scholars; ibid., 140–141.

23 Ibid., 132.



Iamblichus says Pythagoreans did not conceive of esoteric teachings asmorediscursively complex; they were not interested in the ‘subtlety and acuity ofdemonstrations’,24 but in what opened their students to reality.25 Iamblichusprovides quite a few directions about how this opening happens, but it is easyto misunderstand what he says. As scholars we are far more the heirs of Por-phyry than of Iamblichus, and to grasp what Iamblichus means by theurgic ormathematic initiation we naturally look for discursive explanations. Porphyrydid just that. He asked Iamblichus, a reputed master of theurgic divination, fora ‘precise articulation’ (diarthōthein) of divining the future—a request whichseems reasonable to us—but Iamblichus chastises Porphyry for assuming thatdivination could be understood as if it were a natural phenomenon or a tech-nique capable of objective analysis.26 He says:

From the tone of your question, you believe something like this aboutforeknowledge: ‘that it can come into being’ and that it is among ‘thethings existing in nature’. But it is not something that comes into exis-tence, and it does not at all behave like a natural change, nor is it anartifact invented for use in daily life, nor is it, generally, a human achieve-ment at all.

Myst. 100.2–5

Iamblichus reproves Porphyry, telling him—and by extension all who thinkas he does—not merely that his assumptions about theurgic divination aremistaken but that his very way of thinking is mistaken and keeps him fromunderstanding the phenomenon. For those of us who sift evidence and pro-vide rational accounts of ancient philosophy, Iamblichus’ rebuke is sobering.Even to begin to understand the mystagogy and esoteric teaching of later Pla-tonists andHermetists, we need to recognize the profound challenge they poseto our accustomed habits of thought. Plotinus says discursive thinking is a kindof sorcery that puts us under the spell of our thoughts,27 and Iamblichus tellsPorphyry he needs a talisman to protect him from the habit of trying to under-stand theurgy in discursive categories.28 Yet as scholars we think and write

24 Iamb. Comm.Math. 62.11–12, tr. Brisson, ‘Chapter 18’, 45.25 Iamb. Comm.Math. 62.12–15, tr. Brisson, ‘Chapter 18’, 45.26 Myst. 99.10–100.6; diarthrōthein at 99.9.27 Plot. Enn. 4.4 [28] 43.16. Cited by Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 104.28 The term Iamblichus uses is ‘greatest talisman/counter-spell’, (megiston alexipharma-

kon—Myst. 100.8–101.2). Plato uses alexipharmakon in a similar way to indicate an anti-dote to mistaken views. Those who would be lawgivers must possess the writings of the

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discursively. Perhaps we need to recognize that our discursive brilliance—our‘subtlety and acuity’—is of little help for understanding the esoteric dimensionof later Platonism and Hermetism. As Iamblichus says to Porphyry: ‘[W]hatyou are trying to learn is impossible’ because Porphyry—like us—wants tounderstand theurgic divination in rational terms.29 The challenge of the laterPlatonists is that they use discursive language as a glyph, leading not to ratio-nal conclusions, but to a non-semantic awareness that, in Iamblichus’ terms, isactivated in theurgy.30

Following Hanegraaff, I want to explore the immortalization and rebirth ofthe soul as described in Corpus Hermeticum 13 (On Rebirth) and Nag Ham-madi Codex vi,6 (On the Eighth and Ninth) by entering the hermeneutics ofthese texts and their assumed hierarchy of knowing. I will employ Iamblicheanprinciples to guide my interpretation and assume that the Hermetic teachingsmay be read as esoteric in a Pythagorean sense. That is, they are teachingsfor insiders that aim to lead them beyond the confines of discursive thinkingand to recover the innate gnōsis described by Iamblichus. Further, I will arguethat Hermetic rebirth is better understood in a non-dualist framework than inthe dualist metaphysics and soteriology suggested by Fowden and J.-P. Mahé.Finally, I will argue thatHermetic immortalization and rebirth aims—in theur-gic terms—to initiate the soul into demiurgy. In the non-dualist Platonism ofIamblichus the material cosmos is not opposed to the divine but is, rather,the living manifestation of the Creator. The natural world, so conceived, istheophanic activity, and to enter this “divine action” (theourgia) the soul mustenter the rhythm of its pulse. In the esoteric mystagogy of Iamblichus materialobjects and the complexities of embodied life are transformed from obstacles

divine lawgiver and use these as a talisman (alexipharmakon) against all other speeches(Leg. xii 957d).

29 ho epicheireis mathein estin adunaton (Myst. 99.10–100.1). And, of course, for scholars it isassumedwithout question thatNeoplatonic divination is a product ofhuman culture.Oneof themost brilliant scholars of late antiquemagic and religion puts it this way: ‘whateverour ancient sources may claim about the greater powers that enabled it to work—gods,demons, the cosmos itself—divination is an utterly human art…’ (S. Johnston,Mantikē, 10,my italics).

30 Iamblichus says that while henōsis does not take place ‘without knowledge’, such knowl-edge is only useful if it takes us beyond knowing, for ‘divine union and purification gobeyond knowledge’ (Myst. 98.7–10). Sara Rappe highlights this non-semantic aspect ofNeoplatonism. She writes: ‘… it had already become a standard topos for Plotinus thathis designation for the absolute principle, ‘the One’, was not semantically significant …for Damascius, the ineffability of the One engulfs themetaphysical enterprise, infecting itwith non-sense, with in-significance’ (Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 209).



into iconsof demiurgic activity. Theopacity of embodied life becomes transpar-ent, transfigured theurgically into symbols of the gods. Thus, Hermetic rebirthis not an escape from the material world as imagined in dualist metaphysics.Hermetic rebirth and the immortalization of the soul are realized when theinitiate experiences him/herself as giving birth to the cosmos.

Taking Hanegraaff ’s risk of appearing ‘not objective enough’, I confess thatone of themost challenging and attractive aspects of studying Neoplatonism isto engage in the practice required of any deep reader of their texts, that of con-sciously entering their mystagogy and taking the risk of “not-knowing”: whenone no longer actively knows but passes into unknowing receptivity, a kindof anterior awareness—sheer attention (prosochē), as Damascius describesit—that is present, but hidden, in one’s discursive habits.31 This non-graspingattention, I would argue, is akin to what Iamblichus calls our innate gnōsis, anon-discursive awareness quietly present even in one’s discursive habits, andfurther, that one may discover that our discursive habits can be nurtured, redi-rected, and led back to their noetic root. I would contend that this is preciselythe function of esoteric teachings, and it is a practice that is consistent withNeoplatonic metaphysical and soteriological principles. In Neoplatonic meta-physics the presence of a non-discursive noēsis already dwells in discursivethinking just as, to borrow Plotinus’ imagery, ‘the life sap of a huge plant’ ispresent in all its branches yet remains ‘firmly settled in the root’.32 The undi-vided is present in the divided; the One is in the Many; the noetic is in thediscursive; and esoteric teachings are those which lead initiates to discover thenoetic through the discursive, not by escaping to an eternal noetic realm else-where but finding it already present in the multiplicity and temporality of thisworld. The noetic remains hidden in plain sight, revealed to those who knowhow to see. The mystagogic vision of the Neoplatonists is non-dual. There isno “other” world, no noetic place, no “realm” of Forms, and esoteric teachingsallowed initiates to enter an experience of noēsis that cannot be “objectified”because it is inseparable from the demiurgic activity that gives rise to objectiveexistence: the life-giving sap remains hidden in the tree.

It seems tobe theunspoken agreement of scholars to veil such views as beingtheir “interpretations” of Proclus, Iamblichus, or Plotinus but, in fact, unlessone has some taste of this experientially, we really cannot communicate their

31 On to prosektikon or more simply, prosochē, in Damascius as representing the ‘One of thesoul’, see Damascius, Problems and Solutions, 33; also see Damacius Commentary on thePhaedo, 162; compare also the injunction to attain an ‘empty mind’ (keneon nous) in theChaldean Oracles, infra, n. 130.

32 Plot. Enn. 3.8 [30]10.10–12.

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mystagogy. I understand why many scholars prefer to discuss everything butthe mystagogy: the use of language, the transmission of manuscripts, changesin politics, social power, and economics. It is safer ground and less existentiallychallenging to focus on objective facts, and they are unquestionably important.These contextual data are essential to insure that our understanding of esoterictexts rests on solid historical foundations, but eventually one has to ask whatit is these initiates were trying to communicate.33 For unless we assume—andmany scholars do—that they were simply deceiving themselves and talkingnonsense, then to interpret what they wrote requires more than an objectiveanalysis of contextual data; it requires our participating in theirmystagogy. Andthere is no reason that this cannot be done intelligently and with scholarlydiscipline.34 But this participation requires that we imagine a hierarchy ofknowing that Hermetists and Neoplatonists recognize and describe in theirmystagogic texts. It is in this spirit that I wish to interpret the Hermetic textsthrough the lens of Iamblichean theurgy.

Until recently, theurgic PlatonismandHermetismhavebeenmisunderstoodby scholars who found them lacking in the rational argumentation we valueso highly in the ancient Greeks and our own academic culture. Scholars suchas A.-J. Festugière and E.R. Dodds maintained that the Hermetica and On theMysteries do not measure up to the standards of Hellenic philosophy. In fact,the core elements of theurgic and Hermetic mystagogy were dismissed bythese and other scholars as superstitions and banalities, the product of lesserminds and examples of the sad decline of Greek thought in the late antiqueworld.35

Yet Festugière’s scholarship, despite its ‘excessively rationalistic approach’,36allowedMahé and Fowden to deepen our understanding of the Hermetica and

33 I am reminded of Jean Trouillard’s penetrating remark: ‘Savoir que Parménide a influencéPlaton m’éclaire peu si je ne saisis ni ce que Parménide ni ce que Platon ont voulu dire’.Trouillard, L’un et l’âme, 1.

34 Jeffrey J. Kripal has written on the challenge this presents to the study of religion narrowlyconceived as a discursive enterprise limited to the study of ‘contextual’ data; The Serpent’sGift, 117–120. Kripal’s exploration of the scholar as intellectual and mystic is particularlyilluminating; see Kripal, Roads of Excess, passim.

35 Even the eminent scholar, Pierre Hadot, who wrote brilliantly about philosophy as a ‘wayof life’ and not simply a conceptual discipline, dismissed theurgy as ‘superstitious andpuerile… an unfortunate attempt to competewith Christianity;’ Hadot, The PresentAlone,38. For misreadings of the Hermetica, see Kingsley, ‘Poimandres’, 66–69; see also van denBroek, ‘Religious Practices’, 79–95.

36 The characterization by Mahé, ‘Hermes Trismegistos’, 3943.



to correct earlier mischaracterizations prompted by Festugière’s judgment ofthese texts as entirelyHellenicwith its Egyptian elements an ‘orientalmirage’.37The discovery of Hermetic treatises among the Nag Hammadi codices haverefuted Festugière’s contention that there was no Hermetic community, thatHermetic texts had no roots in Egyptian priestly literature, and thatHermetismwas simply a Greek literary phenomenon.38 Finally, thanks to Mahé, J.G. Grif-fiths, and Fowden, it is clear that the Hermetica are not derivative Hellenicphilosophy cast in Egyptian colors but are close to what Iamblichus had said:

The documents that circulate under the name of Hermes contain Her-metic doctrines, even if they often employ philosophical terminology.This is because they were translated from the Egyptian tongue by mennot unacquainted with [Greek] philosophy.39

David Frankfurter has argued that theHermeticawere likely produced by Egyp-tian scribes translating their practices into the dominant language and philo-sophic concepts of the Hellenic world—very much what Iamblichus claimedin the 4th century.40 That Hermetic manuscripts, technical as well as philo-sophical, reflect the influence of genuine Egyptian prayers, texts, andmodes oftransmission is no longer in question.41 Pre-Hellenic Egyptianmaterials are evi-dent in theHermetica; thequestion is towhat degree.42 The fact that Pythagore-anizing Platonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus turned to Egypt and Chaldea

37 Festugière, La Révélation Vol. 1, 20; cited by Uzdavinys, Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth, 15.38 See van den Broek, ‘Religious Practices’, 80–84.39 Myst. 265.10–266.140 Frankfurter, Religion in Roman Egypt, 217–237; as per Edward Butler’s suggestions in his

Hermetic “tweets”: http://lemon-cupcake.livejournal.colm/36741.html. The figure in dia-logue with Thoth may have received his name: ‘one who seeks knowledge’ from the Hel-lenic influence of the figure of the philosophos; see Jasnow and Zauzich, 13. See also JanAssman’s astute analysis of the effect of social change on Egyptian priests in the Ptole-maic age and how they adapted under Greek influence: ‘In a certain sense the Egyptianmysteries functioned both as a successor institution to the pharaonic state and as a com-pensation for its loss’ (Assman, Religio Duplex, 20–22).

41 The dialogue form seen in the Hermetica is found in the Book of Thoth; see Mahé, ‘Prelim-inary Remarks’, 353–363.

42 The name “Poimandres,” for example, is now understood to mean the ‘mind of Ra’ ratherthan the Hellenized ‘shepherd of men;’ see Kingsley, ‘Poimandres’, 46–51; see also Copen-haver,Hermetica, 95. Copenhaver agreeswithKingsley that J.G. Griffiths initially proposedthe Coptic pe eime en re = ‘the knowledge of Re’ as the source for the name ‘Poimandres’,which agrees with the content of Corp. Herm. 1.2.

http://lemon-cupcake.livejournal.colm/36741.html

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to communicate their mystagogy was, I would argue, because they believedthese traditions employed a symbolic mode of expression which they consid-ered superior to discursive thinking and ‘syllogistic reasoning’.43 These Platon-ists were after more than a rational understanding of divinity. They wanted torecover an ‘innate gnōsis of gods … superior to all judgment, choice, reasoning,andproof’.44 To recover this gnōsiswas to recover their divinity, and Iamblichusmaintained that theGreeks had lost touchwith this sacredmystagogy, one thatwas preserved by Egyptians in the writings of Hermes.

Iamblichus’ idealization of Egyptians and Chaldeans undoubtedly exempli-fies the ‘Orientalizing’ habit that was prevalent among late antique Platonists(and Plato too for that matter).45 As historians of religions we recognize thatwhile there are certainly authentic “Egyptian” elements represented in On theMysteries, the “Egypt” of Iamblichus is largely an imaginal construct, an elabo-rate self-conscious fantasy (as his response to Porphyry clearly indicates). ButI believe it would be a mistake to characterize his Egyptian mystagogy as a‘fetishization of Oriental wisdom’, as if he confused his imaginal construct withhistorical fact, as if he didn’t knowhewas pretending to be an Egyptian priest.46Iwould suggest, rather, that suchveils, suchhighly charged imaginal constructs,are evident in virtually all religious discourse, and further, that it is preciselythrough such imaginal constructs that mystagogy is transmitted.47 If histori-

43 On the symbolic mode of Egyptian theology, see Myst. 249.10–250.5; 37.6–11; on the sym-bolic mode of Pythagorean mystagogy, see notes 15 and 16 supra; on the inability of syllo-gistic reasoning to penetrate theurgic mysteries, see ibid., 9.11.

44 Ibid., 7.11–12.45 See Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 7–8. Burns provides a nuanced history of the Orientaliz-

ing and “auto-Orientalizing” tendencies among Platonists; see Burns, Apocalypse, 20–28.He argues that Iamblichus and other Platonists interpret the Chaldeans and Egyptiansaccording to Platonic and Pythagorean principles. The Pythagoreanizing of these tradi-tions made them universally accessible, thus creating a new kind of religiosity in the lateantique world, one that gave Platonic philosophy an Oriental mask.

46 Burns (Apocalypse, 25) characterizes theHellenic turn towardOriental wisdom as ‘fetishi-zation’, by which I assume he means the Platonists’ projection of mystic authority onEgypt, Chaldea, etc., but this, I would argue, calls for an interpretation of this projection,their ‘imagined Egypt’. If, however, “fetishization” is taken pejoratively to mean a kind of“irrational and excessive” interest in Egypt then the term seems inadequate, consideringthe intellectual depth and complexity of later Platonic thinkers. There is far more goingon than self-delusion.

47 In this sense, Iamblichus’ “Egypt” functions as a sunthēma of the intelligibleworld. Proclussays Egypt should be ‘likened to the whole invisible order, the source of visible things’; seeTarrant, Proclus’ Commentary, 190. Scholars need to be attuned to the poetic depth of the



ans are looking for undisputed “facts” regarding revelatory wisdom they willalways come up empty-handed, for the facts of mystagogues are veils or, putmore bluntly, “lies” that conceal and reveal the secrets of their mystagogy.48The transmission of imaginal constructs that simultaneously conceal (literally)and reveal (symbolically) is the very substance of esoteric discourse and I seeno reasonwhy scholars should limit themselves to a “one-dimensional” (literal)view of this discourse.49 ThatOrientalizing shaped the context of Platonicmys-tagogy is indisputable, but recognizing this cultural inflection does not addressthe more difficult challenge of trying to understand the non-discursive gnōsisthat Platonists attribute to the Egyptians. It does not lift the veil.

The theurgy of Iamblichus has gone through a rehabilitation not unlike thatof the Hermetica. Jean Trouillard revealed that far from expressing a deficiencyof rationality, the theurgy of the later Platonists followed Plotinian lines ofreflection to the very roots of thought.50 He argued that theurgy ritually enactsa way to enter mysteries that discursive thinking, necessarily divided, can-not penetrate.51 Recent scholarship, in agreement with Trouillard, has shownIamblichus to be a critically important philosopher who unified the teach-ings of Plato and Aristotle within a Pythagorean framework and integrated thisphilosophic synthesis with the oldest forms of traditional worship.52 His sta-

Neoplatonists, for whom “Egypt” functions as evocative symbol. Perhaps Rumi, in the 13thcentury, best captures this symbolic ambivalence: ‘I keep secret in myself an Egypt thatdoesn’t exist. Is that good or bad? I don’t know’ (Barks, tr., The Essential Rumi, 120).

48 As Sufi scholar William Chittick puts it, ‘The veil conceals the secrets but no secrets canbe grasped without the veil’ (‘The Paradox of the Veil’, 60). This, again, is Pythagoreanmystagogy: ‘with Pythagorean symbols what seems to be made known is really beingconcealed, and what is concealed is revealed to the mind’ (Plutarch, Moralia, frag. 202).

49 Both pious believers and rational materialists engage in this one-dimensional reading.Both are focused on proving or disproving the literal truth of the exorbitant claims ofmystical or religious discourse. I am suggesting that the scholar of religions must engagea third approach, one that enters the hermeneutical depths of this discourse.

50 See Trouillard, ‘La théurgie’, 171–189.51 Myst. 8.2–4: ‘Knowledge, after all, is separated (from its object) by some degree of other-

ness’.52 John Dillon has been the pre-eminent scholar of Iamblichean Platonism since his publi-

cation in 1978: Iamblichus Chalcidensis: In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta;Polymnia Athanassiadi has published numerous articles that address Iamblichus’ influ-ence on his tradition; most recently, La lutte pour l’orthodoxie. Before his untimely deathin 2011, Algis Uzdavinys was a virtual Lithuanianmeteorite who fired through a number ofstudies on Iamblichean theurgy and its comparison to ancient Egyptian religion. Hismostnotable are Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth and Philosophy & Theurgy in Late Antiquity.

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tus among Platonists is reflected in Damascius’ praise of Iamblichus as ‘thebest interpreter of divine realities’.53 There remains some reservation amongscholars as regards theurgy, but on the whole theurgical Platonism is no longerregarded as deficient Hellenic thinking but a legitimate development of lateantique Platonism.

Despite its acceptance, the problem of understanding theurgy and laterPlatonism remains. Some scholars continue to interpret theurgy and theurgistsin away that overlooks the radical non-dualismof their tradition. For theurgicalPlatonists, Plato was a ‘leader and hierophant of true mysteries’54 and Platonicphilosophy was mystagogy. But to what end? Many scholars struggle witharticulating the consummation of this mystagogy. Our initial mistake is to readPlatonism as dualism, which leads us to assume that Platonists want to escapefrom the material realm to enter the noetic world of immaterial Forms (as ifthese were separable to begin with!). This, Trouillard argued, is a misreading ofPlato based on a literalizing of his mythical language regarding the Forms.55 Itis certainly a misreading of theurgic Platonism, and it is precisely this kind ofdualism that Iamblichus criticizes in Porphyry who said that because the godsare immaterial they cannot be engaged in material rites. This way of thinking,Iamblichus warned, destroys our intimacy with the gods.

This doctrine [he says] spells the ruin of all holy ritual and theurgic com-munion between gods and men, since it places the presence of superiorbeings outside the earth. It amounts to saying that the divine is at a dis-tance from the earth and cannot mingle with men, and that this lowerregion is a desert, without gods.56

As a Pythagorean non-dualist, Iamblichus believed that the gods, like the arith-moi, are everywhere. Nature is the active manifestation of the supernatural(huperphuēs) and the cosmos is the revelation of gods and numbers. The theur-gic world is theophany, a breathing agalma of the Demiurge,57 and theurgists

53 Princ. 3:119.6–8 (Combès/Westerink).54 Procl. Plat. Theo. 1:5.16–6.3.55 Trouillard, La mystagogie, 135: ‘We constantly run the risk of slipping into a scholarly

Platonism that would double the world of objects by taking for a definitive system themythic presentation of the theory of the Ideas’ (my translation).

56 Myst. 28.6–11, translated by Brown, TheMaking of Late Antiquity, 101, (modified).57 Tim. 37c6, where the cosmos is described as an agalma of the ever-lasting gods: an agalma

is a shrine or cult object through which a god becomes present. Iamblichus refers to thecosmos as a visible agalma of the gods (Myst. 32.7).



enter this activity, this divine breath and theourgia, by performing rites thatalign them with its continual revelation. In sum, the goal of theurgy is noth-ing less than the unification of theurgist with the activity, the energeia, of theDemiurge: In its deepest sense theurgy is demiurgy.58

2 Dualism and Non-dualism in the Hermetica

I begin with a distinction raised by Mahé, who divides the Hermetica ‘accord-ing to two tendencies’ as regards the material cosmos: optimistic and pes-simistic;59 the samedistinction is characterized inmetaphysical terms by BrianCopenhaver as ‘monist or dualist’.60 Some treatises profess an acosmicism (anddualism) that aims to escape from the world while others see immortaliza-tion through our homologization to the cosmos: not escape but transforma-tion. When applied to the Hermetic treatises, this distinction is not entirelystraightforward, and Fowden’s careful reading of the Hermetica shows that themonism and dualism regarding the cosmos are not contradictory themes butreflect differentdegrees of spiritual awakening in aspirants.61According toFow-den, in the earlier stages of Hermetic paideia (for initiation and learning arecombined) the initiate embraces his body, the world, and even his sexuality asexpressions of the divine.62 But in the more advanced degrees of initiation—outlined in Corp. Herm. 13 and nhc vi,6—the initiate leaves his body andmateriality behind. For Fowden, themonismevident in someHermetic texts—affirming the powers of the divine in the world—is superseded by the dualismof escaping from the cosmos in the attainment of gnōsis.63 Copenhaver sum-marizes Fowden’s interpretation as follows:

Scholars have taken pains to analyze and schematize parts of the Corpusas monist or dualist, optimist or pessimist, but Fowden proposes to seesuch variations as sequential rather than contradictory. Thus, a positive

58 As Iamblichus put it, the goal of theurgy is to ‘establish the soul in the demiurgic god in hisentirety’Myst. 292.12–13. The distinction between rites of theurgy and sorcery, accordingto Iamblichus, is that the former are in analogia with divine creation; the latter are not(ibid., 168.12). Theurgy is demiurgy.

59 Mahe, ‘Hermes Trismegistos’, 3940.60 Copenhaver, Hermetica, xxxix.61 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 102.62 Ibid., 107.63 Ibid., 113.

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viewof the cosmos as good andworthunderstandingwould suitanearlierstage of the initiate’s labors and, hence, a treatise focusing on a timewhenthe body’s needs were still great while a negative treatment of the worldas evil and unworthy of thought might befit a farther station in the spiritsjourney … closer to the culmination of gnōsis, which entailed liberationfrom the body.64

Mahé agrees with Fowden and says that dualism also underlies the rebirthtreatise of nhc vi,6, where it is implicit rather than explicit.65 For both thesescholars, Hermetic rebirth and the immortalization of the soul take placewithin a dualist and acosmic framework. I believe they are mistaken, and byreading the Hermetica theurgically I hope to show that the ultimate state forHermetist (and theurgist) is a non-dual embodied state fully united with theact of demiurgy-creation.

I agree with Fowden that the apparent contradictions of monist and dualistthemes in the Corpus reflect sequential stages of progress in initiates but dis-agree with his privileging of the dualist stage.66 Fowden shows how intimatelythe principles of Iamblichean theurgy are tied to the Hermetica, but I believe atheurgical reading of rebirth can demonstrate that the final stage of Hermeticspiritual progress is not dualistic; in fact, the sequences are quite the oppo-site. From a theurgic perspective, dualism and acosmicismmark a preliminarystageof the initiate’s experience followedbyamonist or non-dualist embraceofthe entire cosmos, one thatmarks the culmination of rebirth and immortaliza-tion. The reversal of sequence that I propose reflects a reversal of orientation:when the initiate’s particular and mortal perspective is replaced by the uni-versal perspective of a god. I would argue that this is the goal of both theurgyand Hermetism. To assume that dualism marks the final stage of illuminationor that Hermetic gnōsis is world-denying strikes me as a misreading—even anaborting—of the rebirth desired byHermetists. Nevertheless, pessimism aboutthe body andmaterial world are clearly evident in Corp. Herm. 13, so let us firstexplore the passages that support the dualist interpretation.

In Corp. Herm. 13.1 Tat reminds Hermes that after having asked for theteaching on rebirth, he replied: ‘When you are ready to becomea stranger to the

64 Copenhaver, Hermetica, xxxix; my emphasis.65 Mahé, Hermes en haute Egypte, 1:53.66 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 99–100; 109–110, seems to nuance his judgment, noting that

hermetic deification occurs while one is in the body and in the world; he also addressesthe overlapping monist and dualist strands in the Hermetica (142–148) yet maintains thathermetic gnōsis is dualist.



world I will give it to you’.67 After an exchange in which Hermes tells Tat thatthe experience of rebirth cannot be taught in an ordinary manner, he revealshis divine status:

I have nothing to say but this: seeing within me a formless vision thatcame from the mercy of god, I went out of myself into an immortalbody, and now I am not what I was before. I have been born in Mind(Nous). This thing cannot be taught, nor can it be seen by the physicalbody … Now you see me with your eyes, my child, but by gazing withbodily sight you do not see what I am. I am not seen with such eyes, mychild.68

The immortal body of Hermes is not physical, even if he speaks through aphysical form. Then Hermes tells Tat that the ‘birth of divinity will begin’when he quiets his senses: ‘Cleanse yourself ’, he continues, ‘of the irrationaltorments of matter’,69 which he describes as 12 vices ranging from ignoranceto malice. ‘These’, he says, ‘use the prison of the body to torture the innerperson with the sufferings of the senses’.70 Liberation from the prison of thebody and its 12 tormenters—associated with the 12 zodiacal signs—frees thedivine inner self from its prison and gives the initiate rebirth in an immortalbody.71

In light of these passages, Fowden quite reasonably interprets Hermeticrebirth as an escape from the body and the physical cosmos. To support hisinterpretation, he compares the Hermetica that encourage worship of terres-trial gods to the ‘material’ sacrifices discussed by Iamblichus in On the Myster-ies, and the Hermetic passages that worship the hyper-cosmic god to Iambli-chus’ ‘immaterial’ sacrifices.72 Fowden acknowledges that for theurgist andHermetist the differentiation of material and immaterial sacrifices are ‘gradedrather than absolute’;73 yet he nevertheless asserts that the material cult by

67 Corp. Herm. 13.1; I have used Copenhaver’s translation throughout this essay with occa-sional modifications based on the text of Nock and Festugière.

68 Corp. Herm. 13.3.69 Ibid., 13.7.70 Ibid.71 From Corp. Herm. 1, the archetypal man who falls into embodiment; the 12 signs of the

zodiac are identified as constraining the Hermetist at Corp. Herm. 13.12.72 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 143 n. 2.73 Ibid., 144.

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virtue of its materiality is ‘inferior’.74 Fowden’s dualist approach assumes a kindof oppositionbetweenmaterial and immaterialworlds, as if thepresenceof onewould negate the other. It is precisely this kind of thinking that Iamblichus sayscannot be applied to theurgical matters.75 It is all too easy for us to see a sym-metric shift—from material to immaterial or from multiplicity to unity—as ifthese were distinct and conceptually equivalent categories, but they are not,and to think so overlooks the asymmetry and subtlety of the Pythagorean cos-mos shared by theurgists andHermetists alike. One cannotmove frommaterialto immaterial as if they were separate orders, for the immaterial gods are notseparate from matter; they are, Iamblichus says, already present to it imma-terially, just as simpler numbers are present in their complex derivatives.76The gods are wholes, and as wholes, they cannot be opposed to parts; partsare of a different order entirely: they are in wholes. Thus, although divinebeings may be distinguished from their creations conceptually, in reality theycan never be separated or their creations would not exist. As Iamblichus putit:

It is true of superior beings in the cosmos that, even as they are notcontainedby anything, so they contain everythingwithin themselves; andearthly things [possess] their existence by virtue of the pleroma of thegods … 77

To oppose the divinity of the immaterial realm to the inferiority of the mate-rial realm misses their deeper continuity.78 Metaphysically, this continuity isrooted in the mystery of the One and the Many, and the recognition by Pla-tonists that the One exists only by virtue of the Many. Paradoxically only whenthe One is revealed and simultaneously veiled as the Many does it come intobeing. Put starkly, the One of Plato’s Parmenides is only by becoming not one,but many: to reveal itself it must be disguised and inverted into what it is not.This principle of inversion is fundamental to Pythagorean metaphysics and isreflected at every level of the cosmos. In thismetaphysics of inversion shared bybothHermetists and theurgists, material reality is not deficient but is the organ

74 Ibid., 148.75 Myst. 8.2–5.76 Ibid., 218.10–13.77 Ibid., 28.12–29.1.78 Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 142, acknowledges this but seems to remain fixed on a dualist

interpretation in which the Hermetist and, I assume, theurgist seek to escape frommatterand the body.



throughwhich immaterial powers are revealed even as they are simultaneouslyconcealed.79 Hermetism is well named to transmit this metaphysics of inver-sion.80 The Greek Hermes and the Egyptian Thoth are both gods of paradox,trickery, and deception.81 Hermes, the godwho reveals the divinewill toman, isalso the god who lies: his very revelation is deception. Hermes’ transmission ofdivine will is an enactment of the metaphysics of inversion; he simultaneouslyveils and reveals the One. His speech, Plato says, ‘is twofold: true and false’.82Such is the esoteric transmission that cannot be ‘taught’ discursively. It requiresa living hermeneutics of the kind seen in the encounter between Hermes andTat, where things are not as they appear to be. Tat’s comments make this plain:‘You tell me a riddle, father… Father, what you tell me is impossible… You havedriven me quite mad, father; you have driven me out of my mind so that I nowno longer seemyself ’. TowhichHermes replies: ‘My child, I wish that were so’.83Peter Kingsley captures the painful intimacy of this exchange and the initiativeHermes takes to penetrate appearances. He writes:

The disciple desperately wants to understand: to find consistency, the-oretical understanding. But his intellect is frustrated, flattened, evoked

79 Iamblichus explains the nature of the cosmogony and its metaphysics of inversion byquoting Heraclitus: ‘neither speaking nor concealing but signifying (sēmainontes)’, toexplain both how the gods perform demiurgy and provide the means for divinationthrough their creation (Myst. 136.1–4). In his critique of Porphyry’s dualist conceptionof the gods, believing that their transcendence separates them from the material realm,Iamblichus says: ‘Indeed,what is it that prevents the gods fromproceeding in anydirectionandwhat hinders their power from going further than the vault of heaven?’ (ibid., 27.7–9).As regards Porphyry’s contention that the gods cannot be found in matter Iamblichusreplies: ‘In fact, the truly real, and that which is essentially incorporeal, is everywherethat it wishes to be … As for me, I do not see in what way the things of this realm arefashioned and given form, if the divine creative force and participation in divine formsdoes not extend throughout the whole of the cosmos’ (ibid., 27.10–28.3; tr. Clarke, Dillon,Hershbell, modified slightly).

80 Describing Hermes as an archetypal trickster, Lewis Hyde writes: ‘Trickster is the mythicembodiment of ambiguity and ambivalence, doubleness and duplicity, contradiction andparadox’ (Hyde, Trickster, 7).

81 Fowden discusses the reputation of the Egyptian Thoth andGreekHermes for trickery. Henotes that the Stoics regard Hermes as both logos and Demiurge which Fowden suggestsmay have ‘owed something to the Egyptian understanding of Thoth as creator’ (Fowden,Egyptian Hermes, 23–24).

82 According to Plato, Hermes is the god of speech and father of all things (to pan); hemakesthem circulate and ‘is twofold, true and false’ (Crat. 408c 1–4).

83 Corp. Herm. 13.3–4. The translation is from Kingsley, ‘Knowing Beyond Knowing’, 22–23.

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only to be pushed to the edge of extinction—until the understandingstarts to come from an entirely different level. That other level is whatthe disciple was after all along.84

As contemporary interpreters of the Hermetica, we face a similar dilemma. Wetoo want to find consistency, some kind of theoretical understanding of theHermetic treatises. Yet the contradictions we encounter are striking. On theone hand, we read passages where Hermes tells Tat:

Unless you first hate your body you cannot love yourself, but when youhave loved yourself you will possess Divine Mind …My child, it is impos-sible to be engaged in both realms: the mortal and the divine. Since thereare two kinds of entities: corporeal and incorporeal, corresponding tomortal and divine, one is left to choose one or the other … One cannothave both together.85

Yet, on the other hand Hermes tells Asclepius:

God is not without sensation and understanding, though some wouldhave it so, committing blasphemy in an excess of piety. For all thingsthat exist are in god, Asclepius. They have come to be by god’s agency,and they depend on him, some of them acting through bodies, othersmoving through psychic substance … [G]od does not [merely] containthese things. He is all of them … 86

And to Tat’s question: ‘Is god in matter, then, father?’ Hermes replies:

Yes, for if matter is not energized by god, my son, do you think it could beanything but a formless heap? But who energizes it if it is energized? Wehave said that the activities (energeias) are parts of god. By whom, then,are all living things made alive? By whom are immortals made immortal?Things subject to change—by whom are they changed? If you say matteror body or essence, know that these are also activities (energeias) ofgod and materiality is the activity (energeian) of matter, corporeality the

84 Kingsley, ‘Knowing Beyond Knowing’, 22–23. Discursive thinking becomes transparent tothe soul’s innate gnōsis.

85 Corp. Herm. 4.6.86 Ibid., 9.9.



activity (energeian) of bodies and essentiality the activity (energeian) ofessence. And this is god, the All … There is nothing that he is not.87

3 Rebirth as Giving Birth: The Demiurgic Mystery

These contradictions of the Hermetica caused Fowden to develop a psycholog-ically nuanced interpretation: the contradictions are not evidence of incoher-ence among the Hermetic authors, but reflect the progressive stages of initi-ates as they move from a world-affirming monism to a world-denying dualism.Plotinus was faced with a similar dilemma to make sense of Plato’s view ofmatter and embodiment. In his treatise On the Descent of the Soul, he said:‘[Plato] … does not always speak consistently, so that his meaning might easilybe grasped’.88 Dodds pointed out that the task for Platonists was to reconcilethe positive view of matter and embodiment portrayed in the cosmology ofthe Timaeus with the negative view seen in the psychology of the Phaedo andPhaedrus; Dodds notes, rightly, that Plotinus was not successful in his reconcil-iation since he favored the pessimistic view ofmatter seen in the Phaedo.89 It isprecisely in this context that Iamblichus presents a workable reconciliation bydistinguishing more clearly than Plotinus the experience of the universal soulfrom that of the particular soul. It is only for the particular soul, the embodiedmortal person, that matter is an obstacle and detriment. His solution can beapplied to the Hermetic writings as well. Iamblichus explains:

The conflict of views in this issue may easily be solved by demonstratingthe transcendence of wholes with respect to parts and by recalling thetranscendent superiority of gods to men. For example, I mean that theentire body of the cosmos is ruled by the World Soul and celestial bodiesare governed by the celestial gods, and there is no passionate contamina-tion in their receptionnor is there any impediment to their noetic activity;but for the individual soul in communion with a body both these detri-ments are experienced.90

87 Ibid., 12.22–23.1.88 Plot. Enn. 4.8 [6] 2.27–28.89 Dodds, Pagan and Christian, 25.90 Myst. 200.1–7.

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Iamblichus’ understanding of the difference between the human soul,whom he calls ‘the lowest divinity’,91 and the celestial gods, has to do withour respective vehicles. The metaphysics of inversion requires that our vehi-cles both reveal and veil our essence. Drawing largely from the Pythagoreanimagery of the Timaeus, Iamblichus held that all divine beings share in the cre-ation of the cosmos. The souls of the heavenly gods are complete in themselves(autoteleis),92 and their vehicles (ochēmata) reveal their powers immediatelyin the heavenly round. Iamblichus says the Demiurge provides each humansoul with an ochēma ‘produced from the entire ether (pantos tou aitheros) …which has a creative power’,93 but unlike the heavenly gods, in the exercise ofthis power, we become self-alienated (allotriōthen).94 In geometric terms, theexistence of gods is circular: their essence inseparable from their activity, theirbeginning identical with their end. In human souls this circle is broken: havingentered generated life, we fall into rectilinear existence and become creatureswhose beginnings are separated from our end. When we animate bodies welose our original spherical vehicle and become trapped in oppositions: the divi-sions, collisions, impacts, reactions, growths and breakdowns that Iamblichussays are the unavoidable consequences of material life.95

Theurgic divinization and Hermetic rebirth allow initiates to recover theirimmortal bodies and participate in demiurgy. Rebirth is realized as giving birth,not escaping from the world but creating it. To read Hermetic rebirth as anescape from the material world is to miss the demiurgic dimension of thesoul’s immortalization; this is certainly important for theurgists and, I wouldargue, for Hermetists as well. Fowden understandably looks to progressivestages of immortalization to explain the contradictions of the Hermetica, buthis privileging of dualismas the final stage denies to the soul the culmination ofits immortalization: its participation in the creation of the cosmos. Accordingto Iamblichus this mistake is rooted in a misunderstanding of catharsis wherethe cleansing of the soul, the Lesser Mysteries, is taken as an end in itself,rather than as a means to receive the transformative vision received in theGreater Mysteries. The purpose of catharsis is not to escape from the body butto overcome the confusions of embodiment and allow the divine to take its seatin one’s own body. The cleansing of the soul from its bodily fixations ismerely a

91 Ibid., 34.6.92 In Finamore and Dillon, Iamblichus De Anima, 130.93 Comm. Tim. frag. 84 (Dillon).94 Simplicius, De anima, 223.26; he also says that according to Iamblichus the embodied soul

is also ‘made other to itself ’ (heteroiousthai pros heautēn), 223.31.95 These are experiences in the material realm according to Iamblichus (Myst. 217).



preliminary stage to be followed by an active and demiurgic cooperation withthe gods. Iamblichus explains:

[T]he most useful goals of catharsis are withdrawal from foreign ele-ments; restoration of one’s own essence; perfection; fullness; indepen-dence; ascent to the creative cause; conjunction of parts to wholes; andthe contribution of power, life, and activity from thewholes to the parts.96

Iamblichus says this is theancient teaching,whichhe contrastswith the viewofsomePlatonists (Porphyry andPlotinus?)who see catharsis aswithdrawal fromthe body and separation from the material world. These, he maintains, are the‘lesser goals’ (smikra telē) of catharsis,97 and although Iamblichus recognizestheir value, theymerelyprepare the soul for the greater goal of shareddemiurgy.In fact, to give priority to the lesser goals leads to the kind of dualism seen inPorphyry’s desire to escape from the material realm.98 Deified theurgists donot escape from their bodies or from nature; they embrace both from a divineperspective. The deeper goals of catharsis include the demiurgic activity ofuniting with the creative cause, of joining parts to wholes, and of sewing thepower and activity of the gods into all parts of the cosmos.99

It is easy to read Hermes’ injunction to discard the physical body and thesenses as dualist. In Iamblichean theurgy and the Hermetica there is a provi-sional dualism in the initial cleansing of the soul from embodied confusion,but this dualismoccurswithin a largernon-dual context. Consider, for example,Hermes’ hymn of rebirth given at the culmination of Corp. Herm. 13. In typicalhermetic style he says ‘it cannot be taught; it is a secret kept in silence’, and thenhe sings it. It is a hymn of praise directed toward the physical sun, the shiningEye of Nous.100 Here, the theurgical elements of Hermes’ teaching become evi-dent for it is not Hermes who sings but the divine Powers that sing throughhim. Hermes invokes them:

96 In Finamore and Dillon, Iamblichus De Anima, 70.1–5 (my translation).97 Ibid., 70.5–10.98 For references to Porphyry’s position see Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 13–15.99 In his De Anima, Iamblichus says: ‘According to the Ancients, souls freed from generation

co-administer the cosmos with the gods … [these] liberated souls create the cosmos withthe angels …’. See Finamore and Dillon, 74.6–9 (my translation).

100 The role of the sun as the agalma of the Nous and of the One itself was part of the laterPlatonic tradition. See, for example, Proclus’ practice of theurgic communion with Heliosin his Platonic Theology 2.11, cited by Fowden, Egyptian Hermes, 127–128. His prayer isremarkably similar to that of Hermes in Corp. Herm. 13.

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O Powers within me, sing to the One and to the All. Sing together, all youPowerswithinme, as I wish it. OHolyGnōsis, you have bathedme in light;through you I am singing the noetic light. I take joy in the joy of Nous. Allyou Powers sing the hymn with me.101

After identifying the Powers that liberate the soul from its confusion, Hermes,who has become united with the will of the Demiurge, continues:

The Powers that are inme sing these things; they chant the universe [intoexistence]. They complete your Will, your plan, as it proceeds from youand returns to you as [perfected] universe.102

Hermes performs this theurgic hymn to demonstrate to Tat the culminationof rebirth: becoming united with the will of the Demiurge, participating incosmogenesis, and chanting the universe into being. To enter this state isto shift one’s orientation from part to whole, from mortal to immortal. Anyaversion the initiate may have felt toward the body to achieve the lesser goalsof catharsis would have been overcome through this rebirth and experience ofthe whole.

Iamblichus says that from this divine and noetic perspective the soul ‘con-tains otherness and multiplicity’.103 One’s physical body is no longer a prisonbut becomes the nexus through which divinity is hermetically revealed andconcealed. To see the body or material reality as an obstacle would indicatethat the soul was still in a preliminary stage of catharsis. Having unitedwith thecreative cause, the soul bestows demiurgic generosity to all things, includingits own body. According to theurgists, this shift of orientation is marked by therecovery of our spherical ochēma that moves circularly with the Nous.104 Theinitiate then exists in a particular mortal body but at the same time, as Hermesreports, ‘I went out of myself into an immortal body’. He entered the spheri-cal ochēma of theurgists that is co-extensive with the cosmos.105 In this state

101 Corp. Herm. 13.18.102 Ibid., 13.19.103 Iamblichus says ‘the more we raise ourselves from parts to wholes, the more we discover

the eternal union that exists there … contains otherness and multiplicity’ (Myst. 59.7–11).104 In his Timaeus commentary, Iamblichus says: ‘the noēsis of the soul and the circular

motion of [celestial] bodies imitate the activity of theMind (nous)’ (Comm. Tim. frag. 49.1[Dillon]).

105 Corp. Herm. 13.3. The ochēma for Iamblichus is an immortal body through which wereceive and express the Nous and become homologous to the entire cosmos. Praising the



the mortal body becomes the living agalma—as the cosmos is an agalma—encircled by the Demiurgic Nous. Hermes describes this experience as fol-lows:

I imagine no longer with the sight of my eyes but with the noetic activityof the [divine] powers. I am in heaven, in earth, in water, in air; I amin animals, in plants, in the womb, before the womb, after the womb …everywhere.106

He has become divine in the purified etheric body that theurgists call Augoei-des, the body of light, and yet he remains a man and speaks to Tat.107 This dualorientation is intrinsic to all of theurgy, as Iamblichus explains:

Thewhole of theurgy presents a double aspect. One is that it is conductedbymen,whichpreserves ournatural rank in theuniverse; the other is that,being empowered by divine symbols, it is raised up through them to beunited with the gods and is led harmoniously into their order. This canrightly be called taking the shape of the gods.108

For theurgists matter was only an obstacle to the soul if it had not yet beenpurified. Once purified, the soul’s material obstacles become divine icons.Theurgists remain human; they preserve ‘our rank’ in the universe, yet at thesame time are united with the gods and ‘take on their shape’. Iamblichus’understanding that the soul’s divinization is non-dual is clear:

The benevolent and gracious gods shine their light generously on theur-gists, calling their souls up to themselves, giving them unification, and

sphere, Iamblichus says: ‘it takes in all the shapes in the cosmos by reason of its sphericalshape; the sphere is the only shape that can include all the elements. Therefore, as byits singleness it reflects its similarity to the noetic Universe, so by its spherical shape itimitates that Universe’s containing of wholes’ (Comm. Tim. frag. 49.4 [Dillon]).

106 Corp. Herm. 13.11.107 Iamblichus designates a genre of theurgic divination as phōtagōgia, by which theurgists

draw divine light into their etheric bodies. He says: ‘This [phōtos agōgēn] somehowilluminates the ethereal and luminous vehicle (augoeides ochēma) surrounding the soulwith divine light, and through this vehicle divine appearances … take possession of ourimagination’ (Myst. 132.9–12). It is through this ‘luminous spirit’ (augoeides pneuma) thattheurgists provide a place (chorein) to receive the gods (ibid., 125.5–6).

108 Ibid., 184.1–6.

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accustoming them, while they are still in their bodies, to be detached fromtheir bodies and turned to their eternal and noetic principle.109

When Hermes says to Tat that ‘you see me with your eyes, my child, but bygazing with bodily sight you do not understand what I am; I am not seen withsuch eyes’, he is speaking from the theurgic place of two realms: human anddivine.110 Tat sees Hermes in his natural rank in the universe, not in his ethericand immortal body. Yet, to negate the visible body in favor of the etheric, follow-ing adualist orientation,wouldnegate thedemiurgic activity that characterizesthe divine. From Iamblichus’s perspective, it would cut oneself off from thegods. For the later Platonists, divinity is not a state; it is an activity; it is theenergeia emanating from the One, unfolded and inverted demiurgically by theNous. The culmination of rebirth in this perspective must include the physicalbody or it would not be genuine rebirth. Like Hermes, the purified soul receivesthe energeiai of the Nous in the continual creation of the world; the initiateshares in demiurgy. Hermetic rebirth is to give birth to the cosmos.

4 Conclusion: TheWomb of Silence, the Chōra of the Cosmos

According to Iamblichus, the curriculum for reading of Platonic dialoguesbegins with the study of the Alcibiades i and Phaedo that portray the mate-rial body as a prison, and culminates with the study of the Timaeus and Par-menides where material bodies and theological states reveal the powers of theOne orchestrated by the Demiurge.111 The portrayal of matter in this curricu-lum is alchemically transformed as it reflects the soul’s gradual alignment withthe ‘eternal measures’ (metra aidia) of the Demiurge.112 The Platonists’ view ofthe material cosmos shifts from pessimism to optimism, from dualism to non-

109 Ibid., 41.4–11.110 Corp. Herm. 13.3.111 Dillon, Iamblichi Chalcidensis, 15; see the Platonic source for attributing this curriculum

to Iamblichus: Westerink, The Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, ch. 26.15–16. The culminating dialogues are the Timaeus and the Parmenides, which Iamblichusdesignated as ‘perfect’ (teleious; 26.34), the former covering everything addressed in the‘physical’ and the latter everything in the ‘theological’ dialogues.

112 Myst. 65.6. See this paideia laid out in the Timaeus 43b–44c where the soul’s proportions,disturbed in the experience of birth, can be recovered through right education; also seeTimaeus 90c–d where the embodied soul learns to realign itself with the measures of theDemiurge revealed in the heavens.



dualism. In the theurgic culmination of this paideia, the soul ritually receivesthe demiurgic energeiai and the body becomes, as Iamblichus puts it, ‘an organof the gods’113 just as Hermes becomes a vehicle for divine powers. Hermeticpaideia follows the same process as theurgic paideia. Although Hermetic ini-tiation cannot be taught, Hermes reveals an essential condition to experiencerebirth. Rebirth comes from the ‘womb of silence’.114 Before Hermes sings thehymn of rebirth he declares that it is ‘hid in silence’. In nhc vi,6, at the initi-ation into the eighth and ninth spheres, Hermes says to his son that ‘languageis not able to reveal this … the souls and the angels that are in it sing a hymnin silence;’ he then tells his son to ‘sing it’ while remaining silent.115 Hermestransmits this mystery after having reached the ‘beginning of the Power that isabove all powers, the one that has no beginning … a fountain bubbling withlife’.116 Here the intimacy described by Kingsley is evident, for between fatherand son a spiritual transmission occurs not seen even in Platonic texts.117 Thefather says: ‘It is your business to understand; it is my job to be successful atspeaking thewords that spring from the source that flows insideme’.118Not onlymust the student be receptive, the teacher alsomust be receptive to the flow ofthe primal fountain. It is not information that is transmitted but noetic activ-ity: the fountain flows through the father and the son as they enter its noeticenergeia. As Mahé observes, ‘what is most important is not what Hermes andthe disciple say but what they do and what they experience while saying it’.119This is the insight behind the theurgic turn among later Platonists. It is whatcannot be taught and what Porphyry, looking for a precise articulation, cannotlearn. This, inmy view, is the esoteric teaching that leads to gnōsis. It is not sub-tle or secret information but transformed awareness. What cannot be thoughtcan nevertheless be received—and enacted.

The trigger for this transmission is silence, when the mind becomes still,when we become utterly receptive. In his discussion of Egyptian deities inOn the Mysteries Iamblichus reiterates this point in his discussion of Hermetictheology. He says:

113 Ibid., 115.4–5.114 Corp. Herm. 13.2.115 nhc vi,6.58,16–20. Unless otherwise stated, I refer to the translation of D. Parrott in

Robinson (ed.), Nag Hammadi Library in English.116 Ibid.117 Kingsley, ‘Knowing Beyond Knowing’, 23–24.118 nhc vi,6.55.19–22; translation by Kingsley, ‘Knowing Beyond Knowing’, 23.119 Mahé, ‘La voie d’ immortalité’, 365; my translation and emphasis.

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Hermes gives first rank to Kmeph, the leader of celestial gods whom hedeclares to be Nous thinking himself and turning his thoughts to himself;but prior to him he places the Indivisible One that he calls the “first actof magic” and which he calls Heka. It is in him that the primal noeticelement rests and who is the primal object of noēsis, and it is he, it mustbe specified, who is worshipped by means of silence alone.120

Iamblichus identifies the Indivisible One with the Egyptian Heka, the god ofmagic who, according to the Coffin Texts, exists before all other gods, beforeall duality, and who plays an essential role in cosmogenesis.121 The synthesis ofthe god ofmagic and cosmogony in Abamon’s defense of theurgy seems fitting,for upon receiving this divine power, the theurgist shares in the demiurgy ofthe cosmos which, as perpetually enacted by the Egyptian Heka, is ‘magic ofa higher order’.122 But to worship this god and receive his power one must besilent. The initiatemust become, asHermes tells Tat, a pure receptacle, awombthat understands in silence.123

According to Iamblichus the One cannot be known, yet we are ‘envelopedin its divine presence’.124 Prior to discursive awareness, we possess an innategnōsis of the gods that is co-existent with our nature. Accessing this gnōsis ispossible only through theurgic receptacles and Iamblichus provides an exten-sive taxonomy of appropriate ritual objects that correspond to the capacitiesof theurgists.125 In proportion to one’s receptive capacity (epitedeiotēs), these

120 Myst. 263.1–5. I am convinced by the argument of Dennis Clark and before him, ElsaOréal,that the inexplicable Eikton of the Greek text should receive a rough breath and indicatethe Egyptian god of magic, Heka. This, in turn, helps to correct the otherwise puzzlingsuggestion by Gale of prōton maieuma at 263.4 as ‘first product’ (found in the Clarke,Dillon, Hershbell translation) for prōtonmageuma found in the earliest manuscripts. Thiscorrection of Gale’s “emendation” would restore the Greek text and replace ‘first product’with ‘first act of magic’, which would be appropriate for the god of magic, Heka (see Clark,‘Iamblichus’, 10–11).My translation follows that of Clark, 3. Saffrey and Segonds, Jamblique,195; 328–329, retainmageuma as ‘premier oeuvre magique’ from the earliest manuscriptsm and v, c. 1460 and c. 1458.

121 Clark, ‘Iamblichus’, 11–12.122 Ibid., 12–13.123 Corp. Herm. 13.2.124 Myst. 8.8.125 Iamblichus spells this out in On the Mysteries. There are three kinds of theurgy that

correspond generally to embodied souls as well as specifically to the needs of any souldepending on what divine energy it needs to receive. See my discussion in Shaw, Theurgyand the Soul, 162–216.



ritual objects (sunthēmata) unite the theurgist with the deity either by habit,communion or complete union.126 Ultimately, by virtue of catharsis and grad-ual filiationwith the divine, theurgists regain their spherical ochēmata and canoffer the divine a receptacle that Iamblichus says is like the ‘pure and divinematter’ that receives the gods in cosmogony.127 For the later Platonists, Platorevealed this unknowablematrix of revelation in the Timaeus: it is themysteri-ous maternal receptacle (hupodochē) and space (chōra) that allows the Formsto come into existence.128 This cosmogonic chōra, which Plato says cannot bethought,129 has—according to Iamblichus—its correlate within us and is thereceptacle for every act of theurgy.130 This womb of creation that Plato callsnurse andmother is utterly empty: it is semantically vacant, silent, and ungras-pable.131 This chōra is the womb of Hermetic rebirth throughwhich the initiateis reborn by giving birth to the world. The silence of the Hermetica and theur-gists is not the negation of sound or speech—as if silence were the alternativeto language; it is, rather, the root and source, the womb from which all sounds

126 Iamblichus says that prayer ‘greatly enlarges the soul’s receptacle (hupodochē) of the gods’(Myst. 238.13–14). It has three stages: (1) the soul is collected and becomes consciousof the presence of the gods; (2) we are conjoined to the gods and experience theirgifts; and (3) the soul experiences a complete union (henōsis) with the divine (ibid.,5.26). In his discussion of the soul’s possession by the gods, Iamblichus also makes athree-fold distinction: ‘sometimes there is mere participation, sometimes a communion,and sometimes even union (henōsis) …’ (ibid., 111.10–13).

127 Ibid., 232.17128 Tim. 51a; 52b.129 Ibid., 52b.130 The role of the receptacle spelled out in Myst. 232.11–233.6, 238.13–239.10. See Shaw, ‘The

Chōra’, 103–129.131 The chōra is the “Nurse of Becoming” (geneseōs tithēnē; 52d), Mother and Receptacle

(mētēr kai hupocochē; 51a), completely void of all forms (50e) and scarcely an object ofbelief (mogis piston), i.e., unthinkable (52b). In the Chaldean Oracles the theurgist is toldto approach the undivided noetic source as follows: ‘You must not perceive it intently,but—bringing back the sacred eye of your soul—extend an empty mind (keneon nous)into that Intelligible to know it, for it exists outside your mind;’ Chaldean Oracles, frag.1 (Majercik). I have used Majercik’s translation as well as Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism,224; also see Ahbel-Rappe’s remarks in her translation of Damasc. Princ., pp. 237–238. Inhis Commentary on the Timaeus, i.257.30–258.8, Proclus maintains that this unthinkablereceptacle—known only through a ‘bastard kind of thinking’ (nothos logismos 52b)—isthe highest state possible to the soul. He puts it bluntly: ‘the bastard (nothon) is betterthan the nous’ (dioti kreittōnos tou noein) (258.4–5). I use the translation from Lankila,‘Hypernoetic Cognition’, 152.

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arise.132 This original silence is the functional equivalent of the whole withrespect to parts; just as the whole contains and remains hidden in its parts, sosilence remains hidden in language, and it is the presence of this noetic silencethat is awakened and transmitted in the esoteric discourse between Hermeticfather and son: simultaneously revealing and concealing the mystery.133

Thus, Hermes sings the cosmogonic hymn by remaining silent, which is tosay, by remaining utterly receptive, as the cosmogonic chōra of the Timaeus isreceptive to the Forms and births them from her womb. The theurgist andHer-metist reach the primal silence of theOne only by receiving andunitingwith itscreative energeiai: chanting out the sounds that cosmogonically proceed fromit. Hermetic initiates are revealed as lords of cosmogenesis, the ‘lord of citizensin every place’,134 yet remain hidden. They take on ‘the shape of the gods’, yetremainmortal, ‘holding our natural place in the cosmos’.135Hermes tells his son‘sing while you are silent’.136 The secret remains hidden while being revealed.The way of Hermes is the way of immortality concealed and revealed inmortalexistence.

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Taking the Shape of the Gods: A Theurgic Reading of Hermetic Rebirth

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