TABLE OF CONTENTS Offer and Objection – Court Action Tender of Excluded Evidence Proof Beyond...

TABLE OF CONTENTSOffer and Objection – Court Action

Offer and ObjectionHeirs of Pasag v. Parocha 1

Tender of Excluded EvidenceYu v. CA 3

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Preponderance of Evidence

Rivera v. CA 4Supreme v. CA 6

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

People v. Berroya 7

Substantial EvidenceLustre v. CAR 12GSIS v. CA 13

Circumstantial EvidencePeople v. Santiago, ibid 18People v. Mendova, ibid 18

Court Action Extajudicial Confession

People v. Soriano 19People v. Reyes 21

Power to Stop Further Evidence Evidence on Motion

Bravo v. Borja 23

Heirs of Pasag v. Parocha | MelApril 27, 2007Heirs of Pedro Pasag, represented by EufremioPasag; Heirs of Maria Pasag, represented byAsuncion Ortiola; Heirs of Isidro Pasag,represented by Virginia P. Mendoza; Heirs ofBasilio Pasag, represented by Milagrosa P. Nabor;and Heirs of Fortunata Pasag, represented byFlorentina S. Membrere, petitioners vs.Sps. Lorenzo and Florentina Parocha, Priscilla P.Abellera and Maria Viloria PasagVELASCO JR

SUMMARY: Heirs of Pasag filed a complaint againsttheir cousins, Sps. Parocha et al to recover theirshare from 3 parcels of land left by theirgrandparents which their Uncle Severino allegedlyappropriated for himself, fraudulently excludingthe other heirs. Sps. Parocha, in their Answer,averred that the properties of the decedents hadalready been partitioned among the heirs and thattheir father Severino had valid title on theproperties. Trial commenced. When the Heirs ofPasag rested their case, they failed to submit aformal offer of their documentary exhibits within

the required period. They asked for severalextensions but they were still unable to submitwithin the extended period. RTC deemed waivedtheir right to make a formal offer. After 5 mosfrom the original period granted, they finallysubmitted said offer but RTC denied it for theirconsistent failure to submit. Sps. Parocha filed aMotion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence whichwas granted by the RTC. SC and CA affirmed.DOCTRINE: Failure to make a formal offer within aconsiderable period of time shall be deemed awaiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidencethat has not been offered shall be excluded andrejected. The party who terminated thepresentation of evidence must make an oral offerof evidence on the very day the party presentedthe last witness. Otherwise, the court mayconsider the party's documentary or objectevidence waived.

FACTS: Benito & Florentina Pasag died intestate

leaving behind all their properties to their 8children—Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino,Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata.

Severino, the predecessor of Sps. Parocha(resps.) allegedly appropriated to himself 3properties of the decedents.

o For the first 2, covered by OCT 2983 &1887, he executed an affidavit of self-adjudication and claimed that he is thesole, legal, and compulsory heir ofBenito & Florentina Pasag. Afterwards,he executed a deed of absolute sale oversaid properties in favor of hisdaughter, Florentina Parocha.

o For the 3rd, covered by OCT P-20607, heallegedly used the same affidavit ofself-adjudication to secure a free patentover an agricultural land that had long beenunder the possession of theirpredecessor.

Heirs of Pasag (Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Mariaand Fortunata), the grandchildren of theoriginal owners Benito & Florentina, filed acomplaint for declaration of nullity ofdocuments and titles, recovery of possessionand ownership, reconveyance, partition anddamages at RTC Pangasinan against Sps. Parochaet al.

o They alleged a share over the 3properties which formed part of theestate of their deceased grandparents

In their Answer, Sps. Parocha averred that theproperties left behind by Sps. Benito &Florentina Pasag had already been partitionedamong their 8 surviving children.

o For the first 2 parcels of land, theyare Bonifacio's share of which he later

EVIDENCE Digests: Week 7 – Offer and Objection (cont.) – Court Action | 1

on renounced in a Quitclaim Deed infavor of his brother, Severino.

o For the 3rd, said land had been inSeverino's possession and occupationsince 1940, thus, giving him the rightto apply for and be granted a freepatent over it. Severino's title had nowbecome indefeasible.

Mar. 19, 1996: The trial of the case commenced Mar. 9, 1999: Heirs of Pasag rested their case

and were granted 10 days within which tosubmit their formal offer of documentaryexhibits. However, they failed to submit thesaid pleading within the required period.

Apr. 19, 1999: Heirs of Pasag asked the RTC togive them until May 11, 1999 to submit theiroffer of evidence. RTC granted their motion.

May 11, 1999: They again failed to submittheir offer of evidence and moved for anotherextension of 5 days. However, they stillfailed to submit their formal offer ofevidence within the extended period.

June 17, 1999: In an Order, RTC deemed waived Heirs of Pasag’s right to make their formaloffer of evidence.

July 27, 1999: Heirs of Pasag moved for theadmission of their offer of evidence.

Sept. 1, 1999: RTC issued an Order denyingHeirs of Pasag’s formal offer of evidence fortheir "consistent failure" to submit it.

Sps. Parocha (resp.) filed a Motion to Dismiss onDemurrer to Evidence.

RTC: Granted Sps. Parocha’s demurrer toevidence and ordered the dismissal of theComplaint. MR denied.

CA: Affirmed RTC. Heirs of Pasag failed toprove their claim by a preponderance ofevidence.

o "No concrete and substantial evidencewas adduced by Heirs of Pasag" tosubstantiate their allegation thatSeverino, the predecessor of Sps.Parocha, fraudulently executed anaffidavit of self-adjudication in orderto exclude them from the settlement ofthe estate of Benito & Florentina Pasag.

Hence this petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45

o There was a denial of due process whenthe CA affirmed RTC Resolution whichdeemed their right to offer evidence aswaived despite the negligence of theircounsel

o CA should have remanded the case forfurther proceedings

ISSUES:1) Whether RTC was correct in ruling that theHeirs of Pasag’ has waived their right to offertheir documentary evidence? (YES)

2) Whether RTC was correct in dismissing thecomplaint on a demurrer to evidence? (YES)RATIO:1. The documentary evidence of the Heirs of Pasagis inadmissible. RTC had reasonable ground toconsider that Heirs of Pasag had waived theirright to make a formal offer of documentary orobject evidence. Despite several extensions oftime to make their formal offer, they failed tocomply with their commitment and allowed almost 5months to lapse before finally submitting it.Heirs of Pasag's failure to comply with the ruleon admissibility of evidence is anathema to theefficient, effective, and expeditious dispensationof justice.

Waiver of Formal Offer of Evidence Rule 132, Sec. 34: "The court shall consider

no evidence which has not been formallyoffered."

REASON: A formal offer is necessary becausejudges are mandated to rest their findings offacts and their judgment only and strictlyupon the evidence offered by the parties atthe trial.

o Its function is to enable the trialjudge to know the purpose or purposesfor which the proponent is presentingthe evidence.

o This also allows opposing parties toexamine the evidence and object to itsadmissibility.

o It facilitates review as the appellatecourt will not be required to reviewdocuments not previously scrutinized bythe trial court.

WAIVER: Strict adherence to the said rule isnot a trivial matter. The formal offer ofone's evidence is deemed waived after failingto submit it within a considerable period of time.

o In Constantino v. CA, the court did not admitan offer of evidence made after a lapseof 3 months because to do so would"condone an inexcusable laxity if notnon-compliance with a court order which,in effect, would encourage needlessdelays and derail the speedyadministration of justice."

WHEN TO OFFER:o Rule on guidelines to be observed by TC

judges and clerks of court in theconduct of pre-trial and case of deposition anddiscovery measures (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC )

On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required tomake his formal offer of evidenceafter the presentation of hislast witness and the opposing


party is required to immediatelyinterpose his objection thereto.

Thereafter the judge shall makethe ruling on the offer ofevidence in open court.

However, the judge has thediscretion to allow the offer ofevidence in writing in conformitywith Sec. 35, Rule 132.

o Sec. 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules ofCourt

"Documentary and object evidenceshall be offered after thepresentation of a party'stestimonial evidence." "Suchoffer shall be done orally UNLESSallowed by the Court to be done inwriting.

o CONSIDERED JOINTLY: The party whoterminated the presentation of evidencemust make an oral offer of evidence onthe very day the party presented thelast witness. Otherwise, the court mayconsider the party's documentary orobject evidence waived.

FORMAL OFFER IN WRITING: While Sec. 35 of Rule132 says that the TC may allow the offer to bedone in writing, this can only be tolerated inextreme cases where the object evidence ordocuments are large in number (ie. from 100and above) and only where there is unusualdifficulty in preparing the offer.

o The party asking for such concessionshould however file a MOTION, pay thefiling fee, set the date of the hearingnot later than 10 days after the filingof the motion (Rules of Court, Rule 15,Sec. 5) and serve it on the address ofthe party at least 3 days before thehearing.

o It is a litigated motion and cannot be done ex parte .

PREPARATION FOR OFFER: The draft of the offerof evidence can already be prepared after the pre-trial order is issued, for, then, the counsel isalready fully aware of the documentary orobject evidence which can be put to use duringtrial.

o Under the pre-trial guidelines, the TCis ordered to integrate in the pre-trialorder, the ff. directive:

No evidence shall be allowed tobe presented and offered duringthe trial in support of a party'sevidence-in-chief other thanthose that had been identifiedbelow and pre-marked during thepre-trial. Any other evidence not

indicated or listed below shall beconsidered waived by the parties.

However, the Court, in itsdiscretion, may allowintroduction of additionalevidence in the ff. cases:

(a) those to be used oncross-examination or re-cross-examination forimpeachment purposes;

(b) those presented on re-direct examination toexplain or supplement theanswers of a witnessduring the cross-examination;

(c) those to be utilizedfor rebuttal or sur-rebuttal purposes; and

(d) those not availableduring the pre-trialproceedings despite duediligence on the part ofthe party offering thesame.

o Both parties should obtain, gather, collate,and list all their respective pieces ofevidence—whether testimonial,documentary, or object—even prior to thepreliminary conference before the clerk of courtor at the latest before the scheduled pre-trialconference.

o Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived andrendered inutile.

o The parties should strictly adhere tothe principle of "laying one's cards on thetable."

o Hence, to obviate interminable delay incase processing, the parties and lawyersshould closely conform to therequirement that the offer of evidencemust be done orally on the day scheduledfor the presentation of the lastwitness.

TC is bound to consider only the testimonialevidence presented and exclude the documentsnot offered.

Documents which may have been identified and markedas exhibits during pre-trial or trial but whichwere not formally offered in evidence cannot in any mannerbe treated as evidence.

Neither can such unrecognized proof beassigned any evidentiary weight and value.

IDENTIFICATION v. FORMAL OFFER: o Identification is done in the course of

the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied


by the marking of the evidence as anexhibit.

o Formal offer is done only when the partyrests its case.

o The mere fact that a particular documentis identified and marked as an exhibitdoes not mean that it has already beenoffered as part of the evidence.

o Any evidence which a party desires tosubmit for the consideration of thecourt must formally be offered by theparty; otherwise, it is excluded andrejected

2. Dismissal of the complaint is proper ondemurrer to evidence by Sps. Parocha. Heirs ofPasag have failed to sufficiently prove theirallegation that Severino fraudulently excluded theother heirs of Benito and Florentina Pasag in thesettlement of the latter's estate. They merelyargued that the Complaint should be "threshed outin a full blown trial in order to establish theirrespective positions on issues which are a matterof judicial appreciation." A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for

the expeditious termination of an action;thus, abbreviating judicial proceedings.

Sec. 1 of Rule 33 of the ROC: After theplaintiff has completed the presentation ofhis evidence, the defendant may move fordismissal on the ground that upon the facts and thelaw the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of theplaintiff's evidence to sustain a verdict.

In passing upon the sufficiency of theevidence raised in a demurrer, the court ismerely required to ascertain whether there iscompetent or sufficient proof to sustain theindictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

TC & CA were correct in dismissing theComplaint.

While Heirs of Pasag maintain that the estateof Benito and Florentina was never partitionedamong their heirs, the testimony of theirwitness, Eufemio Pasag (son of Pedro) duringcross-examination, proved otherwise as headmitted that the children of Benito &Florentina, had received properties asinheritance from the said spouses.

He testified that there was no last will andtestament and that each child of the decedentsreceived property of their own as a result ofthe death of his grandfather.

DISPOSITIVE: DENY the petition and AFFIRM CADecision and Resolution.

Yu v. CA | NiceNovember 29, 2005PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, and VIVECALIM YU, Respondents.TINGA, J.

NATURE: Petition for Review of CA Decision (Rule45)SUMMARY: Viveca filed a case for legal separationagainst her husband, Philip Yu, alleginginfidelity on his part. She moved for subpoenas tobe issued to Insular Life for them to produce aninsurance policy and application form of Philip’ssuspected child. This motion was denied by thetrial court on the ground that the documents wereinadmissible as what was contained therein wasprivileged information. The CA reversed, holdingthat the trial court’s ruling was precipitate onthe matter of admissibility of the documents. SCaffirmed CA, ruling that the trial court could nothave been able to rule on admissibility at thatpoint, as it could not have known then whether theevidence was relevant or not.DOCTRINE:

Section 40, Rule 132 provides that beforetender of excluded evidence is made, theevidence must have been formally offeredbefore the court. And before formal offerof evidence is made, the evidence must havebeen identified and presented before thecourt.

While trial courts have the discretion toadmit or exclude evidence, such power isexercised only when the evidence has beenformally offered.

During the early stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a trialcourt judge to know with certainty whetherevidence is relevant or not, and thus thepractice of excluding evidence on doubtfulobjections to its materiality should beavoided.

Note: Guys, this is a very short case. Kung ano yung nandito, ETONA YUN. So if she asks something that isn’t here, you can say withconfidence “IT WASN’T MENTIONED IN THE CASE, MA’AM.”FACTS:

March 15, 1994: Viveca Lim Yu filed a casein the RTC against her husband, Philip SyYu, an action for legal separation anddissolution of conjugal partnership on thegrounds of marital infidelity and physicalabuse.

During trial, Viveca moved for the issuanceof a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandumto officers of Insular Life Assurance Co.Ltd. to compel production of the insurancepolicy and application of a personsuspected to be Philip’s illegitimatechild.


Philip opposed the motion on the groundthat such documents were inadmissible. (notin case, but deduced from CA ratio, just to complete thestory)

The trial court denied the motion. It ruledthat the insurance contract is inadmissibleevidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000 issued by the Insurance Commissionwhich presumably prevents insurancecompanies/agents from divulgingconfidential and privileged informationpertaining to insurance policies. The courtadded that the production of theapplication and insurance contract wouldviolate the Civil Code (A 280) and theCivil Registry Law, both of which prohibitthe unauthorized identification of theparents of an illegitimate child.

Viveca went up to the CA on certiorari(Rule 65), alleging grave abuse ofdiscretion on the RTC’s part. The CAsummarized the issues she raised asfollows: i. W/N an insurance policy and filled-

out application form can be admittedas evidence to prove a party’sextra-marital affairs in an actionfor legal separation; and

ii. W/N a trial court has the discretion to deny a party’s motion to attachexcluded evidence to the recordunder Section 40, Rule 132 of theRules of Court.

The CA ruled for Viveca, holding that shewas merely seeking the production of theinsurance application and contract, and wasnot yet offering the same as part of herevidence. It set aside the RTC order, andheld that:

o Philip’s objection to the admissionof the documents was premature, sothe trial court’s pronouncement thatthe documents are inadmissible wasprecipitate;

o the contents of the application andcontract cannot be considered asprivileged information, because theInsurance Commissioner had alreadyissued an opinion that the Circularwas not intended to impedecompliance with lawful orders; and

o a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a party’sprivilege to tender excludedevidence, as this privilege allowssaid party to raise on appeal theexclusion of such evidence.

Philip argues that Viveca had alreadymooted her petition before the CA when shefiled her formal offer of rebuttalexhibits, with tender of excluded evidencebefore the trial court.

Viveca asserts that the details in theinsurance policy are crucial to the issueof Philip’s infidelity and his financialcapacity to provide support to her andtheir children. Further, she argues thatshe had no choice but to make a tender ofexcluded evidence considering that she wasleft to speculate on what the insuranceapplication and policy ruled out by thetrial court would contain.

ISSUE #1: W/N the CA was correct in setting aside the

trial court order (YES)RATIO #1:

While trial courts have the discretion toadmit or exclude evidence, such power isexercised only when the evidence has beenformally offered.

For a long time, the Court has recognizedthat during the early stages of thedevelopment of proof, it is impossible fora trial court judge to know with certaintywhether evidence is relevant or not, andthus the practice of excluding evidence ondoubtful objections to its materialityshould be avoided.

A judge of first instance may possibly fallinto error in judging of the relevancy ofproof even where a fair and logicalconnection is in fact shown. When such amistake is made and the proof iserroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassedand possibly unable to correct the effectsof the error without returning the case fora new trial. On the other hand, theadmission of proof in a court of firstinstance, even if the question as to itsform, materiality, or relevancy isdoubtful, can never result in much harm toeither litigant, because the trial judge issupposed to know the law; and it is itsduty, upon final consideration of the case,to distinguish the relevant and materialfrom the irrelevant and immaterial. If thiscourse is followed and the cause isprosecuted to the Supreme Court uponappeal, the SC then has all the materialbefore it necessary to make a correctjudgment.

In the instant case, the insuranceapplication and the insurance policy wereyet to be presented in court, much lessformally offered before it. In fact, Viveca


was merely asking for the issuanceof subpoena duces tecum and subpoena adtestificandum when the trial court issued theassailed Order. The trial court was not in aposition to make a declaration ofinadmissibility at this point. Hence, itacted in grave abuse of its discretion.

Anent Philip’s claims that the petition wasmooted because of Viveca’s Tender of ExcludedEvidence, the same must fail.

Section 40, Rule 132 provides that beforetender of excluded evidence is made, theevidence must have been formally offeredbefore the court. And before formal offerof evidence is made, the evidence must havebeen identified and presented before thecourt. While Viveca made a "Tender of ExcludedEvidence," it was not the tender contemplatedby the rule, for obviously, the insurancepolicy and application were not formallyoffered much less presented before thetrial court.

The “Tender” was at most a manifestation ofthe fact that the documents were declaredinadmissible by the trial court even beforethese were presented during trial.

DISPOSITION CA affirmed.

Rivera v. CA | ChrissaJanuary 23, 1998ESMUNDO B. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMY ROBLES, PEREGRINO MIRAMBELand MERLINA MIRAMBEL, respondents.PANGANIBAN, J.:

SUMMARY: Respondents Robles et al built houses onwhat they claimed to be public land. Rivera claimsthey were built on his private land and filed anejectment case. MTC ruled in favour of Rivera, RTCreversed. CA dismissed case as neither partieswere able to make a definitive ruling on the issueof whether or not the houses constructed by theprivate respondents are within the private landowned by the petitioner or a public land as therewas no field survey (aside from the one by Rivera)nor ocular inspection. SC affirmed and dismissedthe case for failure to establish a CoA.DOCTRINE:

Basic is the rule in civil cases that “theparty having the burden of proof mustestablish his case by a preponderance ofevidence.”

“preponderance of evidence is meant simplyevidence which is of greater weight, ormore convincing than that which is offeredin opposition to it.”

a party who has the burden of proof in acivil case must establish his cause of

action by a preponderance ofevidence. When the evidence of the partiesis in equipoise, or when there is a doubtas to where the preponderance of evidencelies, the party with the burden of prooffails and the petition/complaint must thusbe denied.

Nature: petition for review on certiorari of CAdecision dismissing case for lack of merit;stemming from ejectment case

Facts: (tell me a story: derived from all over thecase):

private respondents Amy Robles PeregrinoMirambel, and Merlina Mirambel built theirrespective houses on land which theyclaimed was public land adjacent to privatelot of Rivera, as they had been caretakersthereof since the year 1969. Said publicland was applied for by their principal,Jose Bayani Salcedo.

Rivera claims that the houses were built onhis private land which he and his parentshave been in possession of. He had the lotin question surveyed.

FACTS accdg to CA and as told by SC: July 19, 1990, petitioner Rivera filed

complaints for ejectment against privaterespondents Amy Robles Peregrino Mirambel,and Merlina Mirambel, (3 civil cases)before MTC of Valenzuela, Branch 81.

On August 8, 1990, movant Jose Bayani A.Salcedo filed an urgent motion forintervention on the ground that he has alegal interest in the subject for heapplied for title of the public land under‘MSA No. (11-6) 131’, which was denied onJanuary 2, 1991.

private respondents Robles et al filedtheir answers, respectively.

After submission of their position papers,MTC rendered joint judgment in favour ofRivera

o ‘In fine, by evidence plaintiff haspreponderably established his causeof action.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiff . eachdefendant to..:

a). To remove her house and tovacate plaintiff’s land, togetherwith all persons claiming rightsunder her;b). To pay plaintiff reasonablecompensation for her use andoccupancy of the land from May 29,1990 up to the time that sheactually vacates the same, at therate of P500.00 a month;


c). To pay plaintiff attorney’sfees in the sum of P3,500.00; andd). To pay the costs of suit.

RTC reversing and setting aside thedecision of the MTC. Ruled for respondents

o “The evidence on record presented bythe plaintiff does not also showthat his parents and himself haveprior possession of the land inquestion. The evidence presented bythe defendants, however, show thatthey have been the caretaker of thesaid public land which was appliedfor by their principal, Jose BayaniSalcedo.

o It is very evident that thedefendants are not squatters on theprivate land of the plaintiff.

o the lots where private respondentsbuilt their houses are outside ofthe land owned by Rivera

CA dismissed the petition for failure ofpetitioner, as plaintiff before the trialcourt, to prove a cause of action

o “Rivera maintains that the RTCcommitted grave abuse ofdiscretion .. such finding lacksevidentiary basis…

o The decisive issue in the case atbar is “whether or not the lot whereprivate respondents constructedtheir abode within the land [owned]by Rivera.”

o The MTC believes so while the RTCruled otherwise and stated that thehouses are located in a publicland. After a careful scrutiny ofthe decisions of the courts a quo, Wefind that both decisions are notsupported by substantial evidence.

o MTC stated that: ‘The evidence onhand indubitably (sic) show howeverthat a title on the property hasbeen issued to herein plaintiff(Rivera).’

o CA: It must be noted, however, thatthere is no showing that theevidence on hand showed that the loton which private respondentsconstructed their abode are [sic]located in the ‘titled’ property ofthe petitioner.

TC Order directing the LandManagement Bureau to conduct afield survey and to submit areport thereof to enable theCourt to determine whether theland subject matter of thesecases is a public or private

land, was neverimplemented. It can be seenthat there is no certaintythat the houses of the privaterespondents are located on thelot owned by the petitioner.

Nor was there an ocularinspection sanctioned by thecourt where the parties wereduly represented. The Courtcannot rely solely on thesurvey commissioned by oneparty for it may be self-serving absent a thoroughverification thereof.

o RTC’s reliance of a letter datedJune 7, 1971 of the District LandOfficer Jesus B. Tabao to Rivera’spredecessor-in-interest informinghim that his application cannot begiven due course because of theprior application of Jose BayaniSalcedo (June 26, 1969) is misplacedfor it does not prove anything. Theabovementioned observations aspertaining to the trial court’sfinding that “the private land ofthe petitioner and his parentsencroached upon the subject land ofthe public domain to an area of moreor less 400 square meters due to re-survey made by the plaintiff and hisparents”.

o courts a quo failed to make adefinitive ruling on the issue ofwhether or not the housesconstructed by the privaterespondents are within the privateland owned by the petitioner or apublic land. The parties shouldhave conducted a field surveydirected by the court below or tohave an ocular inspection of thesubject premises.

o Verily, it appears that petitioner,as plaintiff failed to establish acause of action, hence, thecomplaint must perforce bedismissed.

Issue/s:WON private respondents’ houses lie insidepetitioner’s land (NOT PROVEN)WON petitioner was able to prove that fact/WONpetitioner proved his cause of action (NO)RATIO:SC:The petition is unmeritorious.Proof Required in Civil Cases

Basic is the rule in civil cases that “theparty having the burden of proof must


establish his case by a preponderance ofevidence.”

“preponderance of evidence is meant simplyevidence which is of greater weight, ormore convincing than that which is offeredin opposition to it.”

CAB: petitioner (as plaintiff) has theburden of proving that the houses ofprivate respondents were located within histitled land. To justify a judgment in hisfavor, petitioner must therefore establisha preponderance of evidence on thisessential fact.

Petitioner Rivera points out that the fieldsurvey, verification and measurement of hisland by his privately hired geodeticengineer, Ildefonso Padigos, “found thatprivate respondents’ houses are situatedinside the same.” Petitioner assails the CAfor considering the same “undeserving ofcredence and belief” and insufficient toprove his case.

SC is not persuaded. The extant records ofthis case support the finding of the CAthat the aggregate of evidence submitted byboth parties was insufficient to determinewith certainty whether the privaterespondents’ houses were inside thepetitioner’s titled property.

respondents’ claim that their houses werebuilt on public land, which AttorneySalcedo applied for, is not convincingbecause petitioner has a transfercertificate of title over the same parcelof land.

Likewise unconvincing is the private surveycommissioned by the petitioner himself toprove that the houses of privaterespondents encroached on hisproperty. The reliability of the surveywould have been indubitable had it beenproperly authenticated by the Bureau ofLands or by officials thereof.

the field survey ordered by theMetropolitan Trial Court was neverconducted. Neither was an ocularinspection of the premises held in thepresence of both parties. The absence ofboth processes precluded the finaldetermination of the main issue.

“Where the evidence on an issue of fact isin equipoise or there is doubt on whichside the evidence preponderates[,] theparty having the burden of proof fails uponthat issue.” Therefore, as “neither partywas able to make out a case, neither sidecould establish its cause of action andprevail with the evidence it had. They arethus no better off than before they

proceeded to litigate, and, as aconsequence thereof, the courts can onlyleave them as they are. In such cases,courts have no choice but to dismiss thecomplaints/petitions.”

PROCEDURALIn any event, we are here called upon essentiallyto review the public respondent’s assessment ofthe weight of the evidence presented by bothparties. This factual question, however, may notbe raised in a petition for review under Rule 45of the Rules of Court. This rule is subject towell-recognized exceptions,[19] but petitionerfailed to prove that this case falls under one ofthem. If for this reason alone, the petitionshould be denied.DENIED

Supreme v. CA | Clarisse November 21, 2001SUPREME TRANSLINER INC., FELIPE SIA and NOVENCIOFLORES, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GLORIA BRAZAL and minorLOTIS BRAZAL, represented by her father, NOELBRAZAL, respondents.QUISUMBING, J.

Nature of action: petition seeks to annul thedecision1 dated September 21, 1995, of the Courtof Appeals in CA G.R. No. 39784, and itsresolution2 dated June 18, 1996 denyingpetitioners' motion for reconsiderationSUMMARY: Gloria Brazal and her daughter Lotis wereriding a jeepney driven by Reynaldo Decena. Theywere going to Candelaria, Quezon. The jeepneycollided with a Supreme Transliner bus, and as aresult, they suffered injuries that needed medicalattention. Thus, they filed an action for damages(based on quasi-delict against the bus company andits owner, as well as its driver, and based onbreach of contract for the jeepney driver andowner). The Trial Court ruled in favor of theBrazals and held that the allegations in thecomplaint were established by preponderance ofevidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the TCdecision. The issue on preponderance of evidencecame about because Supreme and Sia are contendingthat the evidence appreciated came from their co-defendants Decena and Villones (the jeepney driverand the owner), and was not adopted by theBrazals, so it cannot be appreciated in theirfavor. The SC ruled against Supreme and Sia,ruling that while BOTH the Brazals and the co-defendants Decena and Villones must establish thenegligence by preponderance of evidence, theevidence adduced by Decena and Villones in theiraffirmative defense may be appreciated in favor ofthe Brazals in determining preponderance ofevidence.


DOCTRINE: (For further discussion on burden ofproof, please see ruling portion)

Preponderance of evidence is determined byconsidering all the facts and circumstancesof the case, culled from the evidence,regardless of who actually presented it.

Facts: Supreme Transliner Inc. and Felipe Sia are

the registered owners of a bus driven byco-petitioner Novencio Flores.

On September 24, 1990, the bus collidedwith a passenger jeepney carrying privaterespondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. At thetime of the incident, the jeepney was ownedand registered in the name of MarcelinoVillones and driven by Reynaldo Decena.

As a result of the collision, privaterespondents Brazal suffered injuries. Theyinstituted Civil Case for damages againstpetitioners based on quasi-delict and againstVillones and Decena for breach of contract.

Supreme and Sia, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Country BankersInsurance Company, insurer of the Supreme.

Testimonies during the trial Gloria Brazal

o Testified that on September 24,1990, she and her daughter Lotiswere on board the passenger jeepneywhen the Supreme Transliner bus hitit, causing them injuries thatrequired medical treatment

Decena and Villones o Testified on their own behalf o Presented Luzviminda Malabanan and

Sgt. Nicolas M. Roxas as witnesses o Decena recounted that on September

24, 1990, at about 2:00 P.M., he wasdriving a passenger jeepney boundfor Candelaria, Quezon. On board,the jeepney was about fifteenpassengers, including privaterespondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal.Upon reaching Sampaloc, Sariaya,Quezon, a Supreme Transliner buscoming from the opposite direction,suddenly appeared on a curvedportion of the road and overtookanother jeepney, which it was thenfollowing. Thereafter, the buscollided with Decena's jeepney

Supreme and Sia presented Novencio Floresand Moises Alvarez, the Manager of SupremeTransliner

o Both testified that the passengerjeepney was running very fast whenthe accident occurred.

o On the third-party complaint,petitioners showed that they alreadysubmitted the required documents forinsurance claim and that CountryBankers Insurance Company promisedto settle the claim, but did not

Trial Courto The Brazals have established by

preponderance of evidence theallegations of the complaint

o Declared that Flores was negligentin operating the bus, while Siafailed to exercise the diligence ofa good father of a family in thechoice, supervision and direction ofhis employees

o Awarded damages in favor of theBrazals

o Ordered Country Bankers to paythird-party plaintiffs an amount notexceeding P50,000

Court of Appealso Affirmed TCo there was competent and preponderant

evidence which showed that driverNovencio Flores' negligence was theproximate cause of the mishap andthat Felipe Sia failed to performthe required degree of care in theselection and supervision of the busdriver.

o actual damages representing themedical expenses incurred by privaterespondents were properly supportedby receipts

Supreme and Sia’s argumentso the Court of Appeals erred in

affirming the trial court's decisionwhich was mainly based on theevidence proffered by their co-defendants Decena and Villones.

o contend that this evidence, whichproved their liability for quasi-delict,could not be appreciated againstthem because the same was notadopted, much less offered inevidence by private respondents.Neither did Decena and Villones filea cross-claim against them.

o Consequently, in accordance withSection 1,6 Rule 131 and Sections 347

and 358, Rule 132 of the Rules ofCourt, said evidence was placedbeyond the court's consideration,hence they could not be held liableon the basis thereof

Private Respondents (Brazals)


o contend that Philippine courts arenot only courts of law but of equityand justice as well.

o The Court of Appeals, being a courtof record, has to appreciate all thefacts and evidence before it indetermining the parties' rights andliabilities regardless of who amongthe litigants actually presented thesame.

o the issue is being raised for thefirst time, thus it is highlyimproper to nullify or reverse theCourt of Appeals' decision basedsolely on a completely new andforeign ground

ISSUE 1: Who has the burden of proving liabilityof petitioners? Private respondents and co-defendants – quantum of proof required ispreponderance of evidence

Burden of proof is the duty of a party topresent evidence to establish his claim ordefense by the amount of evidence requiredby law, which is preponderance of evidencein civil cases.9

The party, whether plaintiff or defendant,who asserts the affirmative of the issuehas the burden of proof to obtain afavorable judgment. For the defendant, anaffirmative defense is one which is not adenial of an essential ingredient in theplaintiffs cause of action, but one which,if established, will be a good defense -i.e. an "avoidance" of the claim

Both private respondents (the Brazals) aswell as the jeepney driver Reynaldo Decenaand its owner Marcelino Villones claim thatthe bus driver, Novencio Flores, was liablefor negligently operating the bus. Forprivate respondents, the claim constitutestheir cause of action against petitionerswhich said private respondents must proveby preponderance of evidence. At the sametime, the same claim is a matter ofaffirmative defense on the part of Decenaand Villones who are impleaded as co-defendants of petitioners. Therefore, bothprivate respondents as well as the said co-defendants had the burden of provingpetitioners' negligence by the quantum ofproof required to establish the latter'sliability, i.e. by preponderance ofevidence

ISSUE 2:W/N the evidence presented by the co-defendants Villones and Decena should be

considered in determining preponderance ofevidence against Supreme and Sia (YES)

The evidence presented by the jeepney ownerand its driver, Villones and Decena, formspart of the totality of the evidenceconcerning the negligence committed bypetitioners as defendants in quasi-delictcase. Preponderance of evidence isdetermined by considering all the facts andcircumstances of the case, culled from theevidence, regardless of who actuallypresented it.11 Petitioners' liability wereproved by the evidence presented by Decenaand Villones at the trial, taken togetherwith the evidence presented by the victimsof the collision, namely herein privaterespondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal

Petitioners' reliance on Sections 34 and 35of Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtmisplaced.

o Petitioners cited these rules tosupport their allegation thatevidence by Decena and Villonesshould not be considered in privaterespondents' favor since the latterdid not adopt much less offer themin evidence.

o Nothing in Section 34 requires thatthe evidence be offered or adoptedby a specific party before it couldbe considered in his favor. It isenough that the evidence is offeredfor the court's consideration.

o We find, moreover, no pertinence inpetitioners' invocation of Rule 35,on when to make an offer, except toindicate to us petitioners' relianceon inapplicable technicalities thatbetray the lack of merit of theirpetition

DISPOSITIVE: petition is DENIED. The decision andresolution dated September 21, 1995 and June 18,1996, respectively, of the Court of Appeals arehereby AFFIRMED

People v. Berroya | KatDecember 12, 1997PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, SPO4 JOSE VIENES andFRANCISCO MATEO, accused-appellants.ROMERO, J.

SUMMARY: Chou, a Taiwanese national, was kidnappedin Multinational Village, Parañaque, Metro Manilafor 7 days until his family paid a ransom of P10Million. RTC rules that Beroya, Vienes and Mateowere guilty. SC reversed as to Berroya and Vienesbut affirmed as to Mateo. It ruled that the


prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonabledoubt the guilt of Berroya and Vienes. As toBerroya, the testimonies of Reyes and Pagtakhanwere not credibleDOCTRINE: Proof beyond reasonable doubt does notmean such a degree of proof as, excludingpossibility of error, produces absolute certainty.The law requires only moral certainty or thatdegree of proof which produces conviction in anunprejudiced mind.

FACTS:(I tried to make it as chronological as possible pero di siya isangnarrative lang kasi iba iba sila ng sinabi. Basta ang order:Planning/MeetingsKidnappingNegotiationRelease. Phonecalls were from Kidnapping until after release) Testimony of Chief Inspector Wilfredo Reyes

April 21, 1993: Michael Evasco, an informerof Reyes, approached him and informed himof Francisco “Kit” Mateo’s invitation tojoin a kidnap for ransom operation.

o Reyes knew Kit as an acquaintance ofCol. Berroya, as the former used tovisit the latter at his office in1992 and 1993.

o Reyes and Berroya were then assignedto Task Force Gemini and Task ForceLawin.

Reyes signifying willingness to join theoperation, asked for the name of thepossible victim, but Evasco declined.

Next morning: Reyes went to Col. PanfiloLacson to inform him about the kidnappingscheme.

o He was designated to go undercoverto infiltrate the group of KitMateo.

April 30, 1993: C/Insp. Reyes wasintroduced by Evasco to Kit Mateo.

o Kit Mateo told him, “Okey, tutal Sir, pare-pareho naman tayong mga bata ni Berro saka niBarako, okey lang, sige puwede kang sumama.”

o It was understood by Reyesthat Berro referred to Berroyawhile Barako referred to GeneralAlqueza.

o Doubtful of Kit Mateo’s sincerity,Evasco told the former, “Pare, itong saatin ay pera-pera lang, wala tayong hulugandito.”

o Kit Mateo responded: “Hindi, totooito. Totoo itong gagawin natin. Ang mga taongkasama natin dito ay si Colonel Berroya, siGeneral Alqueza, ang classmate ni Col. Berroyana si Colonel Danilo Sta. Clara…”

o The subject of the kidnap operationremained undivulged.

May 7, 1993: Reyes together with Evasco,met with Kit Mateo at the latter’s office,

Le France, Jovan Condominium, ShawBoulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

o Several other persons, includingJose Vienes and William Teng, acriminal known to Reyes, werepresent thereat.

o Kit Mateo held a meeting where theywere given their respectiveassignments.

o Michael Evasco was to lead the groupwho would conduct the actualabduction.

o Two back-up teams were designated,with SPO4 Vienes heading one of thetwo teams.

o Reyes was tasked to remain at CampCrame to monitor the activities ofthe operating units.

o As Evasco still evinced some signsof apprehension, Mateo instructedhis wife, Vinia Mateo, to callBerroya.

o She, in turn, passed it on to LennyPagtakhan, one of the personspresent, who later informed Kit that“…wala pa si Berro, pero nagpapa return callako.”

o Moments later, Pagtakhan advised KitMateo that Berroya was already onthe line.

o Kit Mateo talked over the phone andafterwards gave a thumbs up signsaying “Okey na pare, at ito pala ay mayclearance na kay Barako.”

May 10, 1993: Reyes again went to theoffice of Kit Mateo. It was then that hemet and was introduced to accused-appellantBerroya, with Kit Mateo saying to Berroya“Sir, ang bata n’yo ni Barako, kasama rin natin yan.”In response, Berroya said: “Willy, pagbutihinn’yo lang, ito naman ay alam ni Barako.”Thereafter, they talked of other things,allegedly because Reyes was ashamed todiscuss the kidnap operation with Berroya,who was his superior.

It was only on May 20, 1993 when Reyes cameto know of the Chou kidnapping, when Col.Lacson told him about it and ordered him toverify whether Kit Mateo’s group wasresponsible.

o That evening, he met with Evasco,who made known to him how the groupkidnapped Chou. Evasco also told himthat Berroya sent Kit Mateo andWilliam Teng to Hongkong to collectthe ransom money.

o He was given a black paper bagcontaining money.


o That same night, he turned over themoney to Sr./Supt. Basilio Lucero,who issued to him an unofficialhandwritten receipt for P50,000.00.

Testimony of Lenny Pagtakhan, a “comadre” of KitMateo and his wife

May 7, 1993: Pagtakhan was present thewhole day at Kit Mateo’s office.

o There were several persons present,including Vienes and William Teng.With Kit Mateo presiding, the grouphad a meeting regarding the intendedabduction of a Taiwanese national.

o Michael Evasco was charged withtaking the Taiwanese while SPO4 JoseVienes and Kit Mateo were to act asback-up.

o During the meeting, Kit told hiswife, Vinia Mateo, to call “Berro”,referring to Sr/Supt. ReynaldoBerroya.

o She in turn instructed Pagtakhan tocall “Berro.”

o She called “Berro” up but as he wasnot there at his office, she pagedhim through his beeper.

o After a time, Berroya returned thecall.

o Receiving the call, she informedMateo that “Berro” was on theline.

o As the two conversed, she listenedthrough the extension line, thus sheoverheard Mateo say “Sir, I have alreadygiven instructions to the group.”

o Berroya told Mateo to call him thenext day or that they should meet onMonday.

o Mateo replied in the affirmative. May 10, 1993: the whole group, including

Mateo, Vienes and Teng, held anothermeeting to discuss the plan to kidnap aTaiwanese national.

o Kit Mateo initially presided overthe meeting.

o Berroya took over when he arrived. o He was accompanied by C/Insp.

Wilfredo Reyes. o The meeting lasted until midnight. o She overheard Berroya say: “O sige

kailangan malinis ang pagkuha ng tao.” May 11, 1993 afternoon: Kit Mateo and his

group, including Vienes and Teng, butwithout Berroya and Reyes, arrived at theoffice.

o They were excited, with Vinia Mateotelling her that the Taiwanese wasalready downstairs.

o She, however, did not get to see thevictim.

A week or two later, she was with Mateo andVienes when the latter distributed theransom money.

o They went to an undisclosed motorshop in Quezon City where Mateo andVienes, after conversing withBerroya, gave several bundles ofmoney to the latter (which as far asshe knew was P1 Million).

FACTS FROM RECORD May 11, 1993 (12:30nn): Chou Cheung Yih,

alias “Jack Chou”, a Taiwanese national,was abducted (pero kidnapping case to) by 4men in Multinational Village, Parañaque,Metro Manila.

o His abductors seized his cellularphone and other personal effects.

o He was detained in a safehouse inParañaque,

Ff day: His father, Chou Cheng Fu, who wasin Taipei City, was reached via telephoneby the kidnappers who demanded a ransom ofUS$ 5 Million, but after several phonecalls and a protracted negotiation, theyagreed upon P10 Million to be remitted toFu Wa San Company, a Hongkong firm, througha jewelry store in Taiwan.

May 17, 1993: The father remitted themoney, using a check, to Hongkong throughthe jewelry store.

o Chou Cheung Yih was consequentlyreleased in the afternoon of thatsame day.

When presented on the witness stand, ChouCheung Yih failed to identify anyone of theaccused.

After the kidnapping incident, aninvestigation was conducted by thePresidential Anti-Crime Commission, throughCol. Panfilo Lacson and C/Insp. MichaelAquino, in coordination with Taiwanese andHongkong authorities, Piltel and the PLDTCompany.

PHONE CALLS: Based on the record of phone calls provided

by Piltel and the Royal Hongkong Police, aphone call was placed on May 11, 1993 fromChou Cheung Yih’s cellular phone to thetelephone number of Mateo’s Le Franceoffice.

May 14, 1993, another call was made fromthe same cellular phone to a telephoneregistered under the name of SamuelAbellera, a neighbor of Mateo at MasbateStreet, Project 4, Quezon City.

o Telephone No. 882-27-70 (Hongkong),registered under the name of Lee Kim


Jok, called the direct line to theOffice of the Chief of SpecialOperations Group, Southern PoliceDistrict Command, Fort Bonifacio,Makati, Metro Manila. At that time,the Chief of said office was Mateo.

o A Cellular Phone registered underBerroya’s name placed a call to thetelephone number of Kit Mateo’soffice.

The telephone number of Mateo’s Le Franceoffice made nine calls to the telephone inHK (under Lee); one on May 14; one on May15; four on May 17; and another three onMay 18, 1993 — during the ransomnegotiations for the release of Chou CheungYih and one day after his release.

Lee’s HK tel. no. called Mateo’s office onMay 14, 15 and 16, 1993 — also during theperiod of ransom negotiation.

Lee’s HK tel. no also made four calls onMay 15, 1993, and three calls on May 17,1993 to Chou Cheng Fu, father of the kidnapvictim.

The (Lee) Hongkong telephone number wastraced to Flat B, 8th Floor, Hyde ParkMansion, 53 Peterson Street, Hongkong,which apartment was found to be registeredin the name of Lee Kim Jok and Emil Ongalias “William Teng” or “Reynaldo Manio.”(IMPT)

FACTS ULIT May 14, 1993: Mateo and William Teng went

to Hongkong. May 17, 1993: William Teng collected in

Hongkong the ransom money paid by ChouCheng Fu.

o This was evidenced by the faxmessage of Hung Chee Co. in Taipei,to the Fu Wa San Co. dated May 17,1993, as well as the check stubdated May 17, 1993 in the name ofReynaldo Manio. The check amountedto HK$ 2,962,963.00.

An Information dated September 22, 1993charged accused-appellants SuperintendentReynaldo Berroya, SPO4 Jose Vienes,Francisco “Kit” Mateo and 13 others, withthe crime of kidnapping

Not one of the prosecution witnesses sawthe actual abduction. All the evidenceconcerning accused-appellants’participation in the crime iscircumstantial.

Prosecution presented Reyes and Pagtakhan(testimonies in upper part)

Defense of Berroya and Vienes were denialsand alibi

RTC (July 28, 1993): convicted Berroya,Vienes, and Mateo (as conspirators)

o (1) Chief Superintendent DictadorAlqueza, (2) Lt. Col. Danilo Sta.Clara and (3) Lavinia Mateo, forinsufficiency of evidence and forreasons of reasonable doubt, areACQUITTED

o guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofthe crime of kidnapping defined andpenalized under Art. 267 of the RPCand as the crime was committed priorto the effectivity of Republic Act7659, the aforesaid accused SeniorSuperintendent Reynaldo Berroya,SPO4 Jose Vienes and Francisco Mateoalias “Kit” are hereby sentenced tosuffer the penalty of ReclusionPerpetua with all the accessories ofthe law.

o pay Chou Cheng Yih alias “JackChou”, a Taiwanese businessman,jointly and severally: P10Munrecovered ransom money, P1M AD,P2M MD, P1M ED and P400K AF

ISSUE: W/N the circumstantial evidence linking theaccused-appellants to the kidnapping is sufficientto sustain a judgment of conviction beyondreasonable doubt? NORATIO:

Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987Constitution provides that “(i)n all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocentuntil the contrary is proved…”

Given this presumption, the State must thusprove the guilt of the accused beyondreasonable doubt, and this presumptionprevails unless overturned by competent andcredible proof.

The State is required, in the discharge ofthe burden imposed upon it, to establish byproof all the essential elements of thecrime with which the defendant is chargedin the indictment, and to establish beyonda reasonable doubt that the accused isguilty of said crime.

In the absence of such a degree of proof ofthe defendant’s guilt, he is entitled to anacquittal, regardless of whether his moralcharacter is good or bad.

It is not sufficient that the preponderanceor the weight of the evidence points to theguilt of the accused, as evidence showing amere possibility of guilt isinsufficient to warrant a conviction.

The necessity for proof beyond reasonabledoubt lies in the fact that “in a criminalprosecution, the State is arrayed againstthe subject; it enters the contest with a


prior inculpatory finding in its hands;with unlimited means of command; withcounsel usually of authority and capacity,who are regarded as public officers, andtherefore as speaking semi-judicially, andwith an attitude of tranquil majesty oftenin striking contrast to that of defendantengaged in a perturbed and distractingstruggle for liberty if not for life. Theseinequalities of position, the law strivesto meet by the rule that there is to be noconviction when there is a reasonable doubtof guilt.”

However, proof beyond reasonable doubt doesnot mean such a degree of proof as,excluding possibility of error, producesabsolute certainty.

o The law requires only moralcertainty or that degree of proofwhich produces conviction in anunprejudiced mind.

Crimes are not usually intended to beaccomplished under the direct gaze ofwitnesses; nor is the planning thereof donein public.

o Hence, the necessity ofcircumstantial evidence to prove thesame.

But for circumstantial evidence to besufficient to support a conviction, all thecircumstances must be consistent with thehypothesis that the accused is guilty andat the same time inconsistent with thehypothesis that he is innocent, and withevery other rational hypothesis except thatof guilt.

Thus, for circumstantial evidence to besufficient for conviction, the followingrequisites must concur: (i) there must bemore than one circumstance to convict; (ii)facts on which the inference of guilt isbased must be proved; and (iii) thecombination of all the circumstances issuch as to produce a conviction beyondreasonable doubt.

CAB: While no general rule has beenformulated as to the quantity ofcircumstantial evidence which will suffice,the State has failed to adduce the quantumof proof necessary to convict and tooverthrow the constitutional presumption ofinnocence in favor of Berroya and Vienes.

BERROYA The evidence taken against him consists of

the testimonies of C/Insp. Reyes and LennyPagtakhan, as well as the record of phonecalls made from and to him.

However, as regards the testimony ofC/Insp. Reyes, a substantial part thereof

is inadmissible. C/Insp. Reyes’ testimonyis riddled with inconsistencies andinfirmities such that it lacks that degreeof conclusiveness required to convict theappellant.

o Reyes never learned the identity ofthe intended victim, but only that akidnap operation was being plannedby Kit Mateo’s group.

o He never participated in the actualkidnapping, but was only told thedetails thereof by Michael Evasco onMay 20, 1993.

o “A witness can testify only to thosefacts which he knows of his personalknowledge, that is, which arederived from his own perception...

o Thus, the same is hearsay which isinadmissible in evidence.

o Kit Mateo’s statement on April 30,1993 to the effect that “Okey, tutalSir, pare-pareho naman tayong mga bata niBerro saka ni Barako, okey lang, sige puwedekang sumama”, as well as Mateo’sstatement to assuage Evasco’s fearsin this wise “Hindi, totoo ito. Totoo itonggagawin natin. Ang mga taong kasama natindito ay si Colonel Berroya, si General Alqueza,ang classmate ni Col. Berroya na si ColonelDanilo Sta. Clara…” are likewiseinadmissible against accused-appellant Berroya as “the rights ofa party cannot be prejudiced by anact, declaration, or omission ofanother... Res inter alios acta.

o With reference to the May 7, 1993telephone conversation, Kit Mateosupposedly talked to Berroya in thiswise: “Okey na pare, at ito pala ay mayclearance na rin kay Barako.”

There is no showing that itwas indeed Berroya that Kitwas talking to.

Even if it was indeed accused-appellant, the same isambiguous at best. There is noproof as to the exactconversation between Kit andthe accused-appellant, northat the statement alluded torefers to the kidnapping ofChou.

o The same observation goes forBerroya’s alleged statement to Reyeson May 10, 1993 that: “Willy, pagbutihinn’yo lang, ito naman ay alam ni Barako.”

Again, the utterance isequivocal.


In fact, according to Reyes,other than said statement, thekidnapping operation was neverdiscussed by him and accused-appellant on that day.

o As to Reyes’ contention that he wastasked to infiltrate Mateo’s group,the same is open to doubt.

He never submitted any report,nor was he mentioned in thePACC reports.

The P50,000.00 allegedly givento him by Evasco was evidencedonly by an unsignedhandwritten receipt, and thesame was never included byPACC in its reports to theDepartment of Justiceregarding the matter.

Lastly, Reyes was supposedlyinvited by Mateo toparticipate in the kidnapping,yet it was only on May 20 whenhe learned of the same.

o Moreover, it is odd that it wasEvasco, the supposed emissarybetween Mateo and Reyes, and one ofthose supposed to be involved in theoperation, who showed signs ofapprehension at the outcome of theplan, such that he needed to begiven proof of Berroya’sparticipation in the nefarious plan,while Reyes, the newcomer, neverbecame wary of the group’s bonafides.

Similarly, Lenny Pagtakhan, the otherprincipal witness, gave inconclusivetestimony as to Berroya’s complicity in thecrime charged. The testimony of LennyPagtakhan, with regard to Berroya, cannotlikewise be accorded the trustworthinessand credibility required of a witness in acriminal case.

o She testified that Kit Mateo andBerroya had a telephone conversationon May 7, 1993, where she overheardMateo tell appellant that he hadgiven instructions to the group.

Appellant Berroya then said,“All right, call me up tomorrow or let usmeet on Monday.”

Standing alone, there isnothing incriminatory in theabove statement.

o With respect to the May 10, 1993meeting to kidnap a Taiwanesenational, allegedly presided over by

Berroya, the actual name of thevictim was never mentioned.

In fact, Pagtakhan admittedthat she was not a participantthereof, as the same was heldbehind closed doors.

On cross-examination, shechanged her testimony, sayingthat the statement “O sigekailangan malinis ang pagkuhang tao,” which she initiallyimputed to appellant was notsaid by Berroya, but actuallyby Kit Mateo.

o Additionally, her version of factsconflicts with that of C/Insp.Reyes.

She alleged that on May 10,1993, the group discussed thekidnap scheme from 5:00 p.m.until midnight. Reyes, on theother hand, denies that therewas a discussion of the same,purportedly because he wasashamed to discuss the samewith his superior.

Her narration that accused-appellant Berroya arrived atthe Le France officeaccompanied by Reyes iscontradicted as well by Reyes,who said that accused-appellant was already at theLe France office in theevening of May 10, 1993 whenhe arrived.

o As for the money allegedly given toBerroya by Kit Mateo, there is noproof that it came from the ransommoney paid by Chou Cheng Fu.

Finally, as to the matter of the phonecalls presented in evidence as allegedlyincriminatory of Berroya, the records onlyidentify the numbers where the calls weremade and received.

o They do not show who were the actualcaller and receiver thereof; nor dothey reveal the matters discussedduring the telephone conversations.

o To inject sinister meaning to thesecalls is risky, being fraught withspeculation.

o As regards the first call, the samewas made from Chou’s cellular phoneat the time that he was already incaptivity.

However, the call was directedto Samuel Abellera, a neighborof accused-appellant.


It proves nothing as to theguilt of the accused. Berroyaand his neighbor are twodistinct individuals, andabsent proof that it wasBerroya who received the call,the same cannot be heldagainst him.

o The second call from Hongkong to theSpecial Operations Group, SouthernPolice District Command, FortBonifacio, again does not constituteconclusive proof of Berroya’s guilt.

Although appellant was thechief of said office, there isno showing that he was the onewho received the call.

In fact, said phone wasregistered in the name of thegovernment.

Moreover, the prosecutionwitness failed to state underoath that the same was notbeing used by other members ofthe Special Operations Group.

o As for the third call made on May14, 1993, there is no evidence as tothe subject matter of theconversation thereof.

Worse, Kit Mateo never went tohis office on that day as hewas in Hongkong at the time.

Then too, it must be borne inmind that Mateo and Berroyawere longtime acquaintances.

A telephone call between them,if it transpired at all, isnot highly improbable or evensuspect.

Sol-Gen: “the theory of the prosecutionagainst appellant Berroya has too manyloose ends that it has dismally failed totie up to the satisfaction of theconstitutional requirement of proof beyondreasonable doubt. Appellant Berroya’s twindefenses of alibi and denial, to be sure,are weak, but the incurably ambiguousevidence of the prosecution simply cannotjustify appellant Berroya’s condemnationfor the rest of his life where there aredisturbing whispers of doubt that he isguilty.”

VIENES As to appellant Jose Vienes, the evidence

presented against him by the State onlyestablishes his presence at the May 7, 1993and the May 10, 1993 meeting at the LeFrance office in Mandaluyong.

o During those meetings, a kidnappingscheme, with an undisclosedTaiwanese national as victim, washatched.

o Appellant Vienes was to serve asbackup during the actual kidnapping.

o Additionally, Vienes is said to havebeen present on May 11, 1993 at theLe France office when the groupallegedly had the kidnap victim atthe basement thereof.

Not one of the prosecution witnesses sawthe actual kidnapping. No one saw appellantVienes participate therein. Even the victimfailed to identify him as one of theperpetrators thereof.

In point of fact, the trial court convictedhim as a principal largely due to hisalleged conspiracy with Mateo. The findingof conspiracy was based on his closefriendship with Mateo and his presence inthose two crucial meetings.

Conspiracy must be established by positiveand conclusive evidence.

o It cannot be based on mereconjectures but must be establishedas a fact. The same degree of proofrequired to establish the crime isnecessary to support a finding ofthe presence of conspiracy, that is,it must be shown to exist as clearlyand convincingly as the commissionof the offense itself.

o An assumed intimacy is of no legalbearing inasmuch as conspiracytranscends companionship.

Furthermore, in order to hold an accusedliable as co-principal by reason ofconspiracy, he must be shown to haveperformed an overt act in pursuance orfurtherance of the conspiracy.

o That overt act may consist of activeparticipation in the actualcommission of the crime itself, orit may consist of moral assistanceto his co-conspirators by beingpresent at the time of thecommission of the crime, or byexerting moral ascendancy over theother co-conspirators by moving themto execute or implement theconspiracy.

o Hence, the mere presence of anaccused at the discussion of aconspiracy, even approval of itwithout any active participation inthe same, is not enough for purposesof conviction.


o Thus, assuming Vienes was a participant in theplanning to abduct a Taiwanese national, in theabsence of eyewitnesses to the actual abduction,there is a paucity of evidence as to whether ornot Vienes carried out his part of the plan.

Vienes’ presence at the May 7 and May 10meetings is insufficient to convict him.

In fact, even the evidence as to hispresence in the May 10, 1993 meeting isinconclusive.

o While both Reyes and Pagtakhanpinpoint appellant Vienes as presentin the May 7 meeting, Reyes does notsay that he was present on May 10.

o Pagtakhan, on the other hand, sayshe was.

o His presence at Le France on May 11,1993, when the victim was said to bedownstairs, cannot be held againsthim, as the same is belied by theprosecution itself, which claimsthat the victim was never brought toLe France.

Consequently, without proof that appellantVienes personally took part in theexecution of the kidnapping, there is onlyat most, a conspiracy with the otheraccused.

Conspiracy alone, without the execution ofits purpose, is not a crime punishable bylaw except in special cases, none of whichis present in the case at bar; hence,appellant Vienes cannot be held criminallyliable.

MATEOo However, accused-appellant Kit Mateo tells

of an altogether different story. The factson record as regards him constitute anunbroken chain leading to the fair andreasonable conclusion that he is guilty ofkidnapping.

o While the testimonies of prosecutionwitnesses C/Insp. Wilfredo Reyes and LennyPagtakhan may not have produced the moralcertainty necessary to convict appellantsBerroya and Vienes, the same, coupled withthe other pieces of evidence gathered bythe prosecution, are more than sufficientto overthrow the presumption of hisinnocence and establish his culpabilitybeyond reasonable doubt.

o Consider the following antecedents. o It has been proved that indeed there

was a plot to kidnap a Taiwanesenational, albeit his identity wasunknown. The same was formulated onMay 7 and May 10, 1993. AppellantMateo was present at the aforesaidmeetings; in fact, he presided over

the same. William Teng was presentat these meetings.

o In the afternoon of Chou CheungYih’s abduction, his cellular phonewas used by his abductors to callMateo’s Le France office. During theransom negotiations, there was anexchange of phone calls betweenappellant Mateo’s telephone andWilliam Teng’s place in Hongkong.During the same period, WilliamTeng’s telephone called up thevictim’s father seven times.Appellant Mateo presented not asingle shred of evidence to rebut orexplain the reason for such calls.Certainly, such exchange of phonecalls cannot be considered merelycoincidental.

o On May 14, 1993, appellant Mateowent to Hongkong with William Teng,allegedly to buy spare parts for aVolkswagen used for racing.Appellant never presented any proofof his purchase of said spare parts,nor that such spare parts wereunavailable in the Philippines. Hisreason for going to Hongkong isvague and tenuous.

o The above-mentioned circumstancesfurther bolster the inculpatory linkbetween Mateo and William Teng, theperson who personally collected inHongkong the ransom money remittedby Chou Cheung Yih’s father on May17, 1993.

o Taken altogether, the unequivocaltestimonies of the principal witnessespointing to appellant Mateo as the one whopresided over the May 7 and May 10 meetingat Le France; William Teng’s presence atthe aforesaid meetings; appellant’s closeassociation with William Teng; appellant’strip to Hongkong together with WilliamTeng; the series of calls between Mateo’soffice and Teng’s flat in Hongkong; thecalls from Teng’s flat to the victim’sfather during the same period; and WilliamTeng’s collection and receipt of the ransommoney — all collectively and ineluctablyconstitute an unbroken chain leading to asingle conclusion — that there was aconsummated conspiracy between appellantMateo and Teng to kidnap Chou Cheung Yihfor ransom.

o Appellant Mateo assails the credibility ofprosecution witnesses Reyes and Pagtakhan.

o Although the same cannot be reliedupon to convict appellants Berroya


and Vienes, the same does not holdtrue as regards appellant Mateo.

o The testimony of a witness may bebelieved in part and disbelieved inpart, as the corroborative evidenceor the lack thereof and theprobabilities and improbabilities ofthe case may require.

o We find appellant Mateo guilty of the crimecharged.

o It is the law that requires proof beyondreasonable doubt.

o This, the prosecution has failed toeven approximate.

o It does not mean that accused-appellantsare lily-white or as pure as driven snow.

o If the inculpatory facts and circumstancesare capable of two or more explanations,one of which is consistent with theinnocence of the accused of the crimecharged and the other consistent with theirguilt, then the evidence does not fulfillthe test of moral certainty and is notsufficient to support a conviction.

DISPOSITIVE: Berroya and Vienes REVERSED and ASIDE;acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt(Immediate release from custody is ordered unlessthey are being held on other legal grounds)MATEO AFFIRMED.

Lustre v. CAR | ErikaMarch 31, 1964EMILIANO LUSTRE and FELIPE N.LUSTRE, petitioners, vs.COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, PAULINO GUTIERREZ and BENJAMINGARCIA, respondents.REYES, J.B.L., J.

NATURE: Petition to review the decision of theCourt of Agrarian Relations, Cabanatuan CitySUMMARY: Respondents Gutierrez and Garcia weretenants of a parcel of land owned by DominadorArambulo. Arambulo sold the land in question toRuiz et al. Ruiz et al then leased the land topetitioners Lustre. Petitioners Lustre beganplowing the land by tractor, excluding Gutierrezand Garcia from the landholdings. The Lustresrefused to recognize Gutierrez and Garcia’s statusas tenants. Gutierrez and Garcia filed an actionfor damages and reinstatement as tenants beforethe Court of Agrarian Relations. CAR ruled intheir favor. The Lustres assail the decision asnot being supported by substantial evidence. SCaffirmed CAR.DOCTRINE: The absence of substantial evidence isnot shown by stressing that there is contraryevidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for

the appellate court cannot substitute its ownjudgment or criterion for that of the trial courtin determining wherein lies the weight of theevidence, or what evidence is entitled to belief.The task of an appellant in agrarian cases,therefore, is to set out the evidence in supportof the findings made by the Court of AgrarianRelations and show how no reasonable person wouldbe willing to accept it as adequate proof.

FACTS: 1957: respondents Paulino Gutierrez and

Benjamin Garcia were engaged by DominadorArambulo, former owner of the land-holdingsin question, sharp tenants on 50-50 sharingbasis in 2 hectares each (the land islocated in Cabanatuan City)

o They began working and cultivatingthe landholdings in the agriculturalyear 1957-58 under the supervisionof Arambulo's duly appointedoverseer, Jose Gutierrez

o They realized gross harvest of 27and 30 cavans of palay in saidagricultural year and afterdeducting the seeds, reaping andthreshing fees the net harvest weredivided on the 50-50 sharing basis,sharing 8.5 and 9.75 cavans ofpalay, respectively (8.5 forGutierrez, 9.75 for Garcia)

o Landholder Arambulo received thesame amount of shares from Gutierrezand Garcia

Note: This part is unclear but I think itmeans the landholder Arambulo got theremaining 50% since it’s on a 50-50sharing basis

May 1958: Arambulo, who had incurred andwas incurring debts from Salud Vda. deChico, in the form of seeds and tractorfees, entered into an agreement with saidSalud Vda. de Chico.

o De Chico was to receive the sharesin the landholding in question inArambulo’s place

o The gross harvests from theseholding in 1958-59 were 122 and 92cavans of palay, respectively. Afterdeduction of the proper items fromthe gross produce, Gutierrez andGarcia shared 52 and 37.7 cavans ofpalay, respectively, with thelandholder de Chico receiving thesaid amount of shares (Same as previous‘Note’ above)

1959: Arambulo sold the whole parcel of 12hectares to Icasiano Ruiz, Maria de Ruizand Leonor de Lustre


Same year: Icasiano, Maria and Leonorleased the land to Atty. Felipe Lustre,counsel for and one of Emiliano and FelipeLustre in this case

Emiliano Lustre, co-petitioner, wasconstituted manager of the property.

April 2, 1959: Emiliano Lustre, under thedirection of Atty. Lustre, began plowingthe land by tractor.

April 3, 1959: while the plowing was stillgoing on, respondents Gutierrez and Garcia,seeing that their holdings were beingplowed by other persons, approachedEmiliano Lustre to object to the plowingbut Lustre refused to recognize theirstatus as tenants.

Gutierrez and Garcia repaired to the officeof the Mayor of San Antonio and theAgricultural Tenancy Commission inCabanatuan City and reported the incident.

o The efforts of the representativesof the Mayor and the AgriculturalTenancy Commission to induceEmiliano Lustre to reinstateGutierrez and Garcia were of noavail

Notwithstanding, Gutierrez and Garciareturned to their respective landholdingsand continued cultivating the same untilthe latter part of May 1959 when they wereagain stopped by respondent EmilianoLustre.

Hence, they filed an action before theCourt of Agrarian Relations Cabanatuan Cityfor damages and reinstatement as tenants

CAR: ruled in favor of Gutierrez andGarcia; awarded damages and ordered theirreinstatement as tenants

Emiliano and Felipe Lustre: assails thedecision as not supported by substantialevidence (RA 1267 [Act Creating CAR], Sec13); they filed a motion for new trial(DENIED)

ISSUE: W/N the decision is supported bysubstantial evidence (YES)

RATIO: Emiliano and Felipe Lustre seem to have

lost sight of the fact that substantialevidence in support of the findings of theCAR does not necessarily import preponderant evidence,as is required in ordinary civil cases.

Substantial Evidence : such relevantevidence as a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support a conclusion (AngTibay vs. CIR)

The absence of substantial evidence is notshown by stressing that there is contraryevidence on record, direct or

circumstantial, for the appellate courtcannot substitute its own judgment orcriterion for that of the trial court indetermining wherein lies the weight of theevidence, or what evidence is entitled tobelief (From Saingco vs. CAR [1957] to Eugenio Chavezvs. CAR [1963])

TASK OF APPELLANT (in agrarian cases): toset out the evidence in support of thefindings made by the CAR and show how noreasonable person would be willing toaccept it as adequate proof.

o It is not enough to indulge ingeneralities, such as appellant'sthesis that one engaged inmechanical farming cannot possiblyhave tenants, a proposition that hasbeen rejected by the SC in Somera, etal. vs. Galman, et al. [1959]

o Somera, et al. vs. Galman, et al. [1959]: thefact that the landholding is undermechanized farming does notnecessarily preclude the employmentof tenants aside from or in additionto hired laborers

DAMAGES CAR: based its award of damages on the

harvest immediately preceding the unlawfulejectment.

Emiliano and Felipe Lustre: should be basedon the harvest during the unlawfuldispossession, and the tenants’ incomeduring the period of ejectment be deductedtherefrom.

SC: CAR should enjoy discretion inselecting the basis year

Sec 27(1) of RA 1199 [Agricultural Tenancy Act of thePhils, 1954]: The landholder shall notdispossess the owner of holdings except forany of the causes enumerated in Sectionfifty, and without the cause having beenproved before, the dispossession authorizedby, the court otherwise, he shall, asidefrom the penalty of fine and/orimprisonment provided any violation of thisAct, be liable to the tenant for damages tothe extent of the landholder's participation in theharvest in addition to the tenant's rightunder Section twenty-two this Act.

Since the burden of proving damages is onthe dispossessed tenant, he cannot bereasonably required to prove the harvest ofthe land during his absence therefrom.

And, as pointed out by Gutierrez andGarcia, there is nothing to prevent thelandlord from leaving the land uncultivatedduring years following the tenant'sejection in order to block claim for


damages. The Agrarian Court, thereforeshould enjoy discretion in selecting theyear of tenure that is to serve as basisfor the award, so long as the harvest forthat year is not an abnormal one.

The earnings of the tenant during theperiod of unlawful ejectment are not nowdeductible from the award damages.

o Potenciano vs. Estefani [1955]: SC, ongrounds equity, ruled to deduct suchincome but said case was decidedunder the prior law, Act 4054. Sec27(1) above is the one applicable tothe present case; it not onlyprovides for a quantum of damages tothe tenant, based on the landlord'sshare in the harvest, but addsthereto his rights under Section 22,which states: (1) the tenant shall be free towork elsewhere when the nature of his farmobligations warrants his temporary absence fromhis holdings.

This right, although already granted underSec 20, Act 40541, was not then a rightadditional to the recovery of damagesconsequent to unlawful dismissal, but underRA 1199, as amended, it is to be added tothe damages recoverable.

The denial of the motion for new trial wascorrect, inasmuch as what was sought to beintroduced in evidence is not newlydiscovered evidence within thecontemplation of the rules but “forgottenevidence”, its admission being within thediscretion of the court. (Moran)

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

GSIS v. CA | Dan25 September 1998GSIS, Petitioner, vs.CA and ZENAIDA LIWANAG, Respondents.Davide, Jr., J.NATURE:Petition for Review seeking to reverse theCA’s ruling granting Zenaida’s claim forcompensation benefits under PD 626, setting asidethe ECC decisionSUMMARY:Jaime, a Police Superintendent, died due toHepatitis B. His widow, Respondent Zenaida filed aclaim with GSIS for benefits, which the latterdenied. On appeal to the ECC, the GSIS ruling wasaffirmed as Zenaida failed to show that thesickness was the result of an occupational diseaseunder Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees’Compensation. On appeal to the CA, the appellate

1 AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF TENANTS (APARCEROS) INAGRICULTURAL LANDS DEVOTED TO THE PRODUCTION OF RICE AND TOREGULATE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND THE LANDLORDS OF SAIDLANDS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

court reversed the ECC, finding that the documents(Investigation Report and the Report of the PNPBoard) submitted by Zenaida sufficiently provedher claim. GSIS then appealed to the SC, whichgranted the Petition and held that Zenaida failedto adduce substantial evidence to bolster herclaim.DOCTRINE:Since Jaime’s disease was not among those listedunder Annex A of the Rules on Employees’Compensation, Zenaida’s burden of evidence beforethe ECC was to prove, by substantial evidence, thecausal relationship between her deceased husband’sillness and his working conditions.“Substantial evidence is more than a merescintilla. It means such relevant evidence as areasonable mind might accept as adequate tosupport a conclusion. The statute provides that‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of lawand equity shall not be controlling.’ The obviouspurpose of this and similar provisions is to freeadministrative boards from the compulsion oftechnical rules so that the mere admission ofmatter which would be deemed incompetent injudicial proceedings would not invalidate theadministrative order. But this assurance of adesirable flexibility in administrative proceduredoes not go so far as to justify orders without abasis in evidence having rational probativeforce.” (Ang Tibay v. CIR)

FACTS:- Respondent Zenaida Liwanag (Zenaida) is the

surviving spouse of the late Jamie Liwanag,who died on 14 September 1994. Jamie was 48years old then and had served the Police forcefor 27 years. At the time of death, he was aSenior Superintendent of the PNP.

- On 28 August 1994, Jamie was admitted at theMedical Center of Manila due to Ascites(according to Wikipedia, it is theaccumulation of fluid in the peritonealcavity) and poor appetite. The CT Scan showed“Cirrhosis with probable Hepatocellular CA, HB5A3 positive.” Despite medical intervention,Jaime died due to “Upper GI Bleeding,Cirrhosis Secondary to Hepatitis B;Hepatocellular Carcinoma.”

- Zenaida filed a claim with GSIS forcompensation benefits. The claim was deniedfor not being an occupational disease underthe law; neither was the risk of contractingthe ailment of the deceased increased by hisemployment as a member of the police force.

Ruling of the ECC- On appeal to the Employees Compensation

Commission (ECC), pursuant to Sec. 5, RuleXVIII of PD 626 (“Further Amending Certain


Articles of [PD 442] Entitled Labor Code ofthe Philippines), the GSIS ruling was affirmedand the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

o Section 1(B), Rule III of the AmendedRules on Employees’ Compensation clearlydefines when a disability or deathresulting from illnesses is consideredcompensable: “For the sickness and theresulting disability or death to becompensable, the sickness must be theresult of an occupational disease listedunder Annex "A" of these Rules with theconditions set therein satisfied;otherwise proof must be shown that therisk of contracting the disease isincreased by the working conditions.”

o It found that, “Apparently, P/Sr. Supt.Liwanag’s ailments are not inherentamong policemen and everybody issusceptible to the said diseasesregardless of one[’]s job.”

o “It is well settled under the Employees’Compensation Law that when the ailmentis not the direct result of the coveredemployee’s employment, like the instantcase, and the appellant failed to showproof that the risk of contracting thedisease was increased by the coveredemployee’s employment and workingconditions the claim for compensationbenefits cannot prosper.”

o The ECC found no casual relation betweenJaime’s ailments and his employment andworking conditions. It also found thatthe nature of his work did not increasethe risk of contracting said diseases.

- Zenaida filed a Petition before the CA.

Zenaida’s arguments before the CA (TAKE NOTE OFTHE EVIDENCE PRESENTED)- Zenaida relied on two documents to prove the

causal relation between Jaime’s ailments andhis employment and working conditions. (NOTE:See end of the digest were the documents arequoted in full. The SC also quoted them infull because they were deemed important)

o First: “Investigation Report Re Death ofthe Late P/SSUPT JAIME M. LIWANAG” dated14 September 1994, submitted by CristetoCristeto Rey R. Gonzalodo, Police ChiefInspector, Investigator on Case [AnnexE]

o Second: “REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF LODBOARD TO DETERMINE THE LINE OF DUTYSTATUS OF THE LATE P/SSUPT JAIME J.LIWANAG PNP” [Annex F] (The case did notsay what “LOD” stands for. Maybe Line OfDuty? Haha)

- Zenaida also argued that the requirement ofproof of a causal relation between aclaimant’s ailments and his employment andworking conditions “admits of exceptions andmust yield to the higher interests ofjustice.”

o She advocated for a liberalinterpretation of social legislationstatutes, citing jurisprudence which,however, dealt with the relaxation ofthe procedural requirements as regardsthe late filing of pleadings and/orbelated appeals.

GSIS’ argument before the CA- In its Comment, GSIS argued that since Jaime’s

ailments were not among those listed asoccupational diseases, the burden then lay onherein private respondent to prove that therisk of contracting the disease was increasedby her late husband’s working conditions andemployment as a member of the PNP.

- As regards the Investigation Report [Annex E],GSIS pointed out that said Report fallaciouslyconcluded that the deceased contractedHepatitis B in the course of his employment assome of his co-workers in his office testedpositive for Hepatitis B.

o GSIS deemed this reasoning as mereallegations which were inadmissible.

o It contended that the ailments of thedeceased were not inherent amongpolicemen and everybody was susceptibleto the disease regardless of one’s work.

- In sum, GSIS asserted that “there was nosubstantial evidence pointing to a reasonableconnection, much less, a direct causalrelation, between the deceased’s ailments andthe nature of his employment; and that whilesocial legislation statutes had to beinterpreted liberally in favor of the intendedbeneficiaries, undue compassion for victims ofdiseases not covered by the law would endangerthe integrity of the State Insurance Fund anddeprive beneficiaries truly deserving ofbenefits.”

ECC’s arguments before the CA- The ECC, represented by the OSG, echoed the

arguments of GSIS. It merely added that asregards the nature of Hepatitis B and the needfor substantial evidence proving that the riskof contracting the same was increased by one’sworking conditions: “It is a sickness thatstrikes people in general. The nature of one’semployment is irrelevant. It makes nodifference whether the victim is employed ornot, [a] white collar employee or a blue


collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dwelleror a resident of a rural area.”

Ruling of the CA- The CA ruled in favor of Zenaida. “In said

exhibits [E and F], it is clearly shown thatprior to the employment of the deceased toactive duty as [a] 2nd Lieutenant in thedefunct Philippine Constabulary up until hisappointment as [a] regular officer (DirectCommand) to his position at the time of hisdeath as Senior Police Superintendent, he wasfound to be physically, medically and mentallyfit for the service. It was also concludedthat it [was] highly believable that the lateS/Supt. Liwanag acquired his illness in thecourse of his employment with the PNPconsidering that there are some personnels[sic] in his office who [tested] positive[for] Hepatitis B (reactive virus). Inconclusion, it was recommended that deathbenefits due to the legal heirs be granted.Conformably, said evidences [sic] aresufficient under P.D. 626.”

- “The degree of proof required under PD 62[6]is merely substantial evidence, which meansrelevant evidence as a reasonable mind mightaccept as adequate to support a conclusion.Besides under the law, it is not required thatthe employment [is] the sole factor in thegrowth, development and acceleration of hisillness. It is enough if his employment hadcontributed, even in a small degree, to thedevelopment or acceleration of the disease.(Magistrado vs. ECC, 174 SCRA 605 [1989])”

- The CA noted that GSIS did not submit contraryevidence to rebut the Exhibits. Thus, they didnot “counter-attack the conclusions arrived atthat the cause of death . . . is workconnected and acquired from [Jaime’s]employment.”

o After all, the policy of PresidentialDecree 626 is to provide a [sic]meaningful and appropriate compensationto workers in the event of work relatedcontingencies. As the law is social incharacter for the promotion anddevelopment of a tax exempt employee’scompensation program whereby employeesand their dependents, in the event ofwork related disability of death, maypromptly secure adequate income ormedical benefits, it is only fitting andproper that all doubts be interpreted infavor of labor. In this way, the veryessence and creation of employmentcompensation laws will be given moremeaning.

- GSIS then filed the instant Petition.

GSIS’ arguments before the SC- GSIS assails the CA’s “taking into

consideration only the records of theproceedings conducted by the xxx PNP,” as whatit seems to have forgotten was that saidinvestigation was only for the purpose ofdetermining the line of duty status of the[deceased] and if his ailment was workconnected.

- GSIS also argues that Hepatitis B cannot beacquired by mere mingling with other peoplewho test positive for the illness, hencereliance by the CA on the PNP investigationconstituted reversible error as the same, byitself, did not constitute substantialevidence.

- Medical argument: “It should be rememberedthat Hepatitis B is not just acquired bysimple association. There was no medicalproof/evidence presented how the [deceased]could have acquired his illness. Hepatits B.[sic] According to the medical view point(Merk [sic] Manu[a]l p. 100) HBV is oftentransmitted parenterally, typically bycontaminated blood or blood products. Routinescreening of donor blood for H B s Ag hasdramatically diminished posttransfusion HBVinfection but transmission via needles sharedby drug abusers remain[s] an importantproblem. There is an increased risk inpatients in renal dialysis and oncology unitsand to hospital personnel in contact withblood. HBV is associated with a wide spectrumcarrier state to acute-hepatitis, chronichepatitis, cirrhosis, and hepatocellularcarcinoma. While it was mentioned that therewere some personnel in the office of the[deceased] who [were] positive with HepatitisB, it was not medically shown or proven thathe had any association with them that mighthave transferred the disease to him in amedically proven means as stated above.”

ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the documents relied onby Zenaida are substantial evidence (NO)

RATIO:Review of certain basic postulates governingemployees’ compensation (Labor part)- First. PD 626 abandoned the presumption of

compensability and the theory of aggravationunder the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

- Second. For the sickness and resultingdisability or death to be compensable, theclaimant must prove either of two things: 1)that the sickness was the result of anoccupational disease listed under Annex "A" of


the Rules on Employees’ Compensation; or 2) ifthe sickness is not so listed, that the riskof contracting the disease was increased bythe claimant’s working conditions.

- Third. The claimant must prove this causalrelation between the ailment and workingconditions by substantial evidence, since theproceeding is taken before the ECC, anadministrative or quasi-judicial body.

o Within the field of administrative law,while strict rules of evidence are notapplicable to quasi-judicialproceedings, nevertheless, in adducingevidence constitutive of substantialevidence, the basic rule that mereallegation is not evidence cannot bedisregarded. (Narazo v. ECC)

- Fourth. In case of doubt in construction andinterpretation of social legislation statutes,the liberality of the law in favor of theworking man and woman prevails in light of theConstitution’s social justice policy. (ECC v.CA)

- On the other side of the coin, however, thereis a competing, yet equally vital interest toheed in passing upon undeserving claims forcompensation. If diseases not intended by thelaw to be compensated are inadvertently orrecklessly included, the integrity of theState Insurance Fund is endangered.

o Raro v. ECC: Compassion for the victims ofdiseases not covered by the law ignoresthe need to show a greater concern forthe trust fund to which the tens ofmillions of workers and their familieslook to for compensation whenevercovered accidents, diseases and deathsoccur.

o This stems from the development in thelaw that no longer is the poor employeestill arrayed against the might andpower of his rich corporate employer,hence the necessity of affording allkinds of favorable presumptions to theemployee. This reasoning is no longergood policy. It is now the trust fundand not the employer which suffers ifbenefits are paid to claimants who arenot entitled under the law. The employerjoins the employee in trying to havetheir claims approved. The employer isspared the problem of proving a negativeproposition that the disease was notcaused by employment. (Santos v. ECC)

o Moreover, the new system instituted bythe new law has discarded, among others,the concept of "presumption ofcompensability and aggravation" andsubstituted one based on social security

principles. The new system isadministered by social insuranceagencies - the GSIS and the SSS - underthe ECC. The purpose of this innovationwas to restore a sensible equilibriumbetween the employer’s obligation to payworkmen’s compensation and theemployee’s right to receive reparationfor work-connected death or disability.(Tria v. ECC)

Substantial Evidence discussion (IMPORTANT PART)- Since Jaime’s disease was not among those

listed under Annex A of the Rules onEmployees’ Compensation, Zenaida’s burden ofevidence before the ECC was to prove, bysubstantial evidence, the causal relationshipbetween her deceased husband’s illness and hisworking conditions.

- The SC noted that Zenaida merely relied on thePNP Reports and nothing more. Unfortunately,said Reports merely contained sweepingstatements and conclusions and treated thematter in a most perfunctory manner.

- The Result of Hepatitis B Lab Test of all ODPLPersonnel was made available to the PNPInvestigation Board, but the details of thelab test were not disclosed and there wasmerely the general averment that five (5) outof 45 ODPL personnel contracted Hepatitis B.

- Also noteworthy was the statement of P/SInsp.Ritualo before the PNP Board that Hepatitis Bis transmitted through body fluids orsecretion, but there was no showing whatsoeveras to the degree of contact, if any, betweenthe deceased and his office mates whocontracted Hepatitis B.

- The SC agreed with GSIS’ contention that, “thereport on the investigation on the ailment ofthe [deceased] merely stated ‘it is highlybelievable that his illness was acquired inthe course of his employment.’ This statementwas not based on medical findings but on alayman’s point of view which should not begiven weight by the Honorable Court for suchis tantamount to hearsay.”

- Ang Tibay v. CIR: “Substantial evidence is morethan a mere scintilla. It means such relevantevidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion. [citationsomitted] The statute provides that ‘the rulesof evidence prevailing in courts of law andequity shall not be controlling.’ The obviouspurpose of this and similar provisions is tofree administrative boards from the compulsionof technical rules so that the mere admissionof matter which would be deemed incompetent injudicial proceedings would not invalidate theadministrative order. [citations omitted] Butthis assurance of a desirable flexibility in


administrative procedure does not go so far asto justify orders without a basis in evidencehaving rational probative force.”

- While the PNP Reports were enough to grantbenefits under PNP Rules and Regulations, thedearth of evidence adduced by private Zenaidamilitates against the grant of compensationbenefits under PD 626.

- The SC also noted that the PNP Board’sconclusions were founded upon the Ministry ofNational Defense Department Order Number 162dated 15 January 1965, i.e., that a member ofthe military who died while in active serviceis presumed to have died in the line of dutyand not as a result of his own misconductunless there is substantial evidence to rebutsuch presumption.

o “This only buttresses our observationthat the proceedings before the PNPBoard and the ECC are separate anddistinct, treating of two (2) totallydifferent subjects”

- Also, the PNP Board’s conclusions may not beused as basis to find Zenaida entitled tocompensation under PD 626

o The presumption afforded by the Orderrelied upon by the PNP Board concernsitself merely with the query as towhether one died in the line of duty,while P.D. No. 626 addresses the issueof whether a causal relation existedbetween a claimant’s ailment and hisworking conditions.

o These issues are different, calling fordiffering forms of evidence, thusaccounting for the existence of afavorable presumption in favor of aclaimant under the Defense DepartmentOrder, but not under P.D. No. 626 whenthe disease is not listed under Annex"A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’Compensation.

Due process in administrative proceedings- Also, Police Chief Inspector Gonzaldo should

have inhibited himself from the proceedingsconducted by the PNP Board as he was the onewho prepared the Investigation Report (AnnexE)

- The SC in Ang Tibay v. CIR laid down the guidelinesbut it failed to explicitly state therequirement of an impartial tribunal whichdictates that one called upon to resolve adispute may not sit as judge and jurysimultaneously, neither may he review hisdecision on appeal.

- Rivera v. CSC, quoting Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v.CA: In order that the review of the decisionof a subordinate officer might not turn out to

be a farce, the reviewing officer mustperforce be other than the officer whosedecision is under review; otherwise, therecould be no different view or there would beno real review of the case. The decision ofthe reviewing officer would be a biased view;inevitably, it would be the same view sincebeing human, he would not admit that he wasmistaken in his first view of the case.

Want of industry on part of Zenaida’s counsel(part of Zenaida’s failure to adduce substantialevidence)- Zenaida merely adopted the following to

convince the SC to uphold the CA ruling:o her Petition for Review filed with the

CAo her Comment filed before the CAo ECC’s Comment filed before the CAo Notice of Judgment and Decision of the

CA- The total absence of any semblance of

discussion on the issues betrays a deplorabledegree of want of industry on the part ofprivate respondent’s counsel, both as far ashis client and the courts are concerned.

Conclusion- The CA should have respected the ECC’s

findings on the technical matter concerningJaime’s illness.

- ECC’s rejection of private respondent’s claimwas not unfounded, in fact, the ECC even tookthe pains to quote from a medical manual inorder to substantiate its holding.

- “This is one instance when, pursuant toprudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal’szeal in bestowing compassion should haveyielded to the precept in administrative lawthat in absence of grave abuse of discretion,courts are loathe to interfere with and shouldrespect the findings of quasi-judicialagencies in fields where they are deemed andheld to be experts due to their specialtechnical knowledge and training.”

DISPOSITIVE:Petition granted; CA decision set aside; ECCdecision reinstated.

ANNEX E: INVESTIGATION REPORT

Republic of the PhilippinesDepartment of the Interior and Local GovernmentNational Police CommissionNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICEDIRECTORATE FOR PLANSCamp Crame, Quezon City


14 September 1994

ODPL-A

SUBJECT: Investigation Report Re Death of thelate P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG

TO: Officer-In-Charge, DPL P o s t

I. AUTHORITY:

Verbal Order of the Officer-In-Charge, DPL.

II. MATTERS INVESTIGATED:

To determine the causes surrounding the death of thelate P/SSUPT JAIME M. LIWANAG, Deputy Director forPlans and the Line of Duty Status thereof.

III.FACTS OF THE CASE: x x x

IV. DISCUSSION:

1. The late late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG had beenvigorously/mentally examined before he was called toActive Duty as Second Lieutenant in the defunctPhilippine Constabulary on 16 January 1969 which wasrepeated when he was appointed as Regular Officer(Direct Commission) on 1 Aug. 1971. From that initialrank he gradually rose to Police Senior Superintendentwith Physical/Medical examination as a matter ofrequirement for promotion. All the while, P/SSUPT JAIMEM LIWANAG was physically/mentally fit for the service.

2. It [is] highly believed that the late P/SSUPT JAIMEM LIWANAG acquired his illness in the course of hisemployment with the Philippine National Policeconsidering that there are some personnel in his officewho are positive to [sic] Hepatitis B (Reactive) virus.

IV. CONCLUSION:

The death of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG was inLine of Duty and not attributable to his own misconductor negligence.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Recommend that the death benefits due to the legalheirs/beneficiary (ies) of the late P/SSUPT JAIME MLIWANAG be granted to them.

(signed) CRISTETO REY R GONZALODO Police Chief Inspector Investigator on Case

ANNEX F: REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF LOD BOARD TO DETERMINE THELINE OF DUTY STATUS OF THE LATE P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAGPNP

UNIT/ORGANIZATION: Directorate for Plans, NHQ PNP CampCrame, Quezon City

DATE/TIME: 040900 October 1994AUTHORITY: Letter Order Nr 454 dtd 04 October 1994

PRESENT:

P/SSUPT FRANCISCO F CABACCANG, MDS - ChairmanP/SUPT REYNALDO R. ALBERTO, LS - MemberP/CINSP CRISTETO REY R GONZALODO - Mbr/RecordedP/INSP SERVILLANO B. RITUALO, PHPGH - MemberP/INSP LYDIA M DAVID, BFAD - Member

ABSENT: P/SINSP EMMA S LACANDULA - DPRM - Member

040900 Oct 94

CHAIRMAN - - - There being a quorum, I hereby declarethat the Board will come to order. Mr. Member/Recorder,what is the order for today?

Member/Recorder: Mr. Chairman, we have been convenedpursuant to Letter Order Nr 454 NHQ PNP dtd 04 Oct 94to determine the Line of Duty (LOD) Status of the lateP/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG, then Deputy Director for Planswho died at Medical Center Manila Manila located alongTaft Ave corner UN Ave. Manila on or about 132210 Sep94. xxx

Chairman: So, [t]herefore (referring to all themembers) having been detailed as members andmember/recorder, do you swear and affirm to thoroughlyexamine today’s proceeding, the evidence now availablein your possession without partiality, favor,affection, prejudice or hope of any reward?

Member/Recorder: Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do.

Member: On the otherhand [sic], P/SSUPT FRANCISCO FCABACCANG, having been detailed as Chairman of thisBoard, do you swear and affirm to thoroughly examinetoday’s proceeding, the evidence now available in yourpossession without partiality, favor, affection,prejudice or hope of any reward?

Chairman: Yes, I do.

Chairman: Mr. Member/Recorder, what are the evidencenow in the possession of [the] LOD Board?

Member/Recorder: Chairman, the available evidences[sic] are as follows:

Appointment Order


Death CertificateMedical CertificateAbstract Clinical Record ofP/SSUPT LIWANAG JMSpot ReportInvestigation ReportResult of Hepatitis B Lab Test ofall ODPL PersonnelStatement of Service

Chairman: Based on the record, the immediate cause ofdeath of the late P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG, then DeputyDirector for Plans was due to Cardio-Respiratory ArrestSecondary to Gastro-Intestinal bleeding as a result offulminating Hepatitis. How was he infected by thisVirus?

P/SINPS RITUALO: It is highly possible that he gotinfected just recently in the Directorate for Planssince there were five (5) other ODPL pers[onnel] out ofthe total strength of forty five (45) who are reactiveto Hepatitis B Antigen Test. Modes of transmittal arethrough body fluids and secretion. Another proof isthat all the immediate members of his family arenegative [for the] Hepatitis B Virus.

P/CINSP GONZALODO: ODPL received an undated report onHepa B Test finding from the Chief, Laboratory Section,PNPGH on 15 June 1994, when did P/SSUPT LIWANAGactually know that he was positive [for] Hepatitis B?

P/SINSP RITUALO: He came to know about it as early as19 Apr 94 when he visited my office at the LaboratorySection, PNPGH. On 20 June 1994 when he came to myoffice again, I advised him to go slow with his work asI observed something unusual in his Liver Profile.

P/SUPT ALBERTO: Where did P/SSUPT LIWANAG g[e]t thisHepatitis B?

P/SINSP RITUALO: I strongly believe that he got thiswhile working [at] Headquarters since this is [sic]already endemic in this camp. You can get infectedanywhere? [sic]

P/SUPT ALBERTO: So, do you want to say that this kindof disease was acquired by the late P/SSUPT LIWANAGwhile serving the Philippine National Police?

P/SINSP RITUALO: Yes, sir.

P/CINSP GONZALODO What type of Hepatitis [did] the lateP/SSUPT LIWANAG acquired [sic]?

P/SINSP RITUALO: It was of Acute Fulminant Type. Theeffect is so immediate that one out of ten usuallydies.

P/SINSP DAVID: I would like to inform the Board thatunder Ministry of National Defense Department Order Nr162 dtd 15 Jan 65, a military personnel who died whilein the Active Service is presumed to have died in [the]

Line of Duty and not as a result of his own misconductunless there is substantial evidence to rebut suchpresumption.

P/CINSP GONZALODO: Is this still binding [upon] PNPPersonnel?

P/SINSP DAVID: Yes, sir. We are still using this as areference.

P/SUPT ALBERTO: Based on the records and the foregoingdiscussions, it is hereby resolved that P/SSUPT JAIME MLIWANAG died in [the] Line of Duty. Mr Chairman, Itherefore move that all the benefits due the late P/SRJAIME M LIWANAG be granted to his legalheirs/beneficiary(ies) and henceforth, be likewisecleared from money and property accountabilities.

Member/Recorder: I second the motion.

CHAIRMAN: After a judicious appreciation of allevidences [sic] and after hearing the members of theBoard, I personally favor the motion, hence, I nowdeclared [sic] it as carried, voted upon affirmativelyand duly resolved unanimously by the LOD Board. Do wehave other more business to transact?

MEMBER/RECORDER: No more other business, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN: There being no other business to transact,upon motion duly made and seconded, this LOD proceedingis hereby adjourned.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing are true andcorrect records of the LOD (P/SSUPT JAIME M LIWANAG,PNP) Board proceeding.

(signed)P/SSUPT F[R]ANCISCO F. CABACCANG, PNPChairmanP/SUPT REYNATO R ALBERTO, PNPMemberP/CINSP CRISTETO REY R GONZALODO, PNPMember/RecorderP/SINSP SERVILLANO B RITUALO, PNPMemberP/SINSP LYDIA M DAVID, PNPMember

People v. SantiagoSUMMARY: Santiago harbored a grudge with Carigayover an irrigation dispute. The CAFGU agent whosettled their dispute heard of Santiago’sintention to kill Carigay, which he did on NewYear’s Eve 1993. Unfortunately for him, aneyewitness was able to see him commit the crime.On the strength of the eyewitness’ testimony,Santiago was convicted of the murder of Carigay.Santiago was also convicted of the murder ofCarigay’s live-in partner on the basis ofcircumstantial evidence, which the SC found to


have established an unbroken chain of causesconnecting him to the death of said woman.

DOCTRINE: Rule 133, Sec. 4 allows conviction for acrime on the basis of circumstantial evidenceprovided the requisites are met. “No general rule can be laid down as to the number ofcircumstances that must be adduced in evidence to prove the guiltof the accused. What is paramount is that all the circumstancesproved must be consistent with each other, consistent with thehypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same timeinconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with everyrational hypothesis except that of guilt. The facts andcircumstances must be such as are absolutely incompatible uponany reasonable hypothesis with the innocence of the accused andincapable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis otherthat of the guilt of the accused.” Circumstantial evidenceis sufficient as basis for conviction if itconstitutes an unbroken chain leading to one fairand reasonable conclusion proving that accusedcommitted the crime, to the exclusion of allothers.

RATIO: Beloya’s unimpeached testimony is

sufficient to prove that Santiago killedCarigay.

o Findings of the trial courts areaccorded great respect owing totheir inherent advantage of seeingthe deportment of the witnessesfirst-hand.

o Although Beloya’s testimony wasuncorroborated, the Court issatisfied that he properlyidentified Santiago as the culprit,having seen and known him longenough. Beloya was able to seeSantiago by the light of thepetromax lamp and the flashlight heshone on the latter and hiscompanions.

o The finding that there were multiplekillers is supported by the autopsyreport.

o The killing was qualified by abuseof superior strength as Carigay wasdown on the ground, unarmed, when hewas hacked down by 5 men. Dwellingwas not appreciated as it was notalleged in the information.

There is enough circumstantial evidence toestablish that Santiago killed Samsona.

o There was no direct evidencepointing to Santiago as Samsona’skiller; however, the accumulatedcircumstantial evidence establishesthis, to the exclusion of otherpossible explanations.

o The autopsy report, Beloya’sidentification of Samsona’s voice asshe pleaded for her life andSantiago’s voice shouting “I willkill you all”, and his positiveconfirmation that he saw Santiagocome out of the house in pursuit ofCarigay, together lead to theconclusion that Santiago killedSamsona as she was pleading for herlife.

o The Court also held thatidentification of a person by one’svoice is acceptable where it isestablished that the witness hadknown such person being identifiedfor a number of years. It wasestablished that Beloya had knownSantiago for a long time and wasfamiliar with his voice.

o The killing of Samsona was qualifiedby abuse of superior strength,Samsona being a woman

People v. MendovaSUMMARY: Defendants were convicted of Robbery withDouble Murder for having robbed the house ofMatias Cabantac, and killing his 2 daughters,Remedios and Clarita. The 3 defendants were seenentering Matias Cabantac’s house carrying bolos byone witness, Forunato Tabucao. Another witness sawthe defendants strike and stab the murder victims,Clarita and Remedio. Defense counsel contendsthere was no evidence of conspiracy, however theSC said that there was enough evidence to showthat the defendants were related to another andall harbored grudges against Matias Cabantac toconvict.

Material facts:Testimony of Fortunato Tabuaco, farmer andmerchant:

In the morning of January 31, 1953, hewalked to visit Hilario Centina of Pangdan,and that at about 8am he passed the yard ofMatias Cabantac and saw the 3 accused go uphis house. The 3 carried bolos

Forunato reconized them, the house beingonly 25 brazas away, and that he knew thempersonally

That evening, he was informed of the deathof the 2 daughters

He helped to notify the authorities, but atthat time he did not disclose what he hadseen because he was afraid of the accused

Testimony of Jaime Manheron, farmer from the samebarrio:

Jaime went early that morning to the storeof Fortunato to say he was unable to gather


the latter’s coconuts because he had todrive away some carabaos roaming in hisrice farm at Pangdan

He then returned home after Fortunato toldhim to do it another day; after eating, heproceeded to his rice field, arriving ataround 9am

Following carabao footprints, he suddenlyheard the shouts of 2 children behind asmall hill at the edge of his farm

Peeping through some bushes, he saw HilarioMendova dragging Clarita, while Alfredo andBautista were holding Remedios

o He heard Clarita say, “I am going toreport to Mama and Papa that yourobbed in the house”

Hilaro then struck Clarita with a bolo inthe head and mouth, while Alfredo slashedRemedios on the neck and on the head abovethe ears; Bautista took his turn instabbing them

Shocked, Jaime quietly left the place,fearing he might be spotted and liquidated,remembering that Hilario was the “hatchetman” (executioner) of the brigands of Leyte

Because of this, he hadn’t the courage tocome forward until after the culprits hadbeen arrested or were about to be taken

Defendants tried to discredit Jaime’s testimony,since he was the leading witness.

They couldn’t show that the slayingoccurred somewhere else; so they attemptedto show he was somewhere else.

HELD: SC says that it is error to believe thatwithout Jaime, the prosecution can’t stand

Fortunato Tabucao’s testimony and the cluesof record, would sufficiently sustain averdict of guilt. Nothing has been adducedagainst the veracity of Tabucao, except hisfailure to promptly disclose what he knew.

Yet he had reasons to be cautious: HilarioMendova was a known killer, and was atlarge.

To sum up, the prosecution’s case iscomplete: corpus delicti; eye-witnessaccount; sufficient circumstantialevidence; motive of the crime; alibi untruebecause uncorroborated.

People v. Soriano | EmersonMarch 13, 2013PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.GERALD SORIANO alias PEDRO, accused-appellant.Sereno, C.J.:NATURE: Appeal of a CA decision imposing reclusionperpetua. Criminal case for rape with homicide.

SUMMARY: Soriano was accused of raping and killingan 8 year-old girl. He was convicted on the

strength of his extrajudicial confession made tothe town mayor and the police investigator; alsothere was circumstantial evidence pointing to himas the only possible culprit: he was seen drinkingon the day the crime happened; according to thewitnesses he was the only person who was seenusing the road nearest the crime scene at the timeof commission of the crime; and that the dirtyclothes confiscated from him were the same ones hewore on the day the crime was committed. RTCsentenced him to death; CA reduced his sentence toreclusion perpetua. On appeal, SC acquitted him,holding that there was not enough circumstantialevidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt thatSoriano raped and killed AAA. There were otherfactual possibilities that were not excluded bythe facts established by the evidence in thiscase, so the doubt as to the guilt of the accusedmust be resolved in his favor. The extrajudicialconfession made to the mayor and the policeinvestigato is inadmissible in evidence because itwas obtained in violation of Soriano’s custodialinvestigation rights under the Constitution, sincehe was not provided with counsel. DOCTRINE: In cases involving the special complexcrime of rape with homicide both the rape and thehomicide must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,as the victim can no longer testify against theperpetrator of the offense. Thus, a resort tocircumstantial evidence becomes inevitable toprove the case. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of theRules of Court, circumstantial evidence issufficient for conviction when the concurrence ofthe following factors obtain: (a) there is morethan one circumstance; (b) the facts from whichthe inferences are derived have been proven; and(c) the combination of all the circumstances issuch as would prove the crime beyond reasonabledoubt. These circumstances and facts must beabsolutely incompatible with any reasonablehypothesis propounding the innocence of theaccused. CASE AT BAR: The law enforcers' misstepsin the performance of the investigation and theprosecuting attorney's careless presentation ofthe evidence cannot lead to any other conclusionother than that there are doubts as to the guiltof the accused.

FACTS December 31, 1998

o 8:00 AM – Gerald SORIANO arrivedwith the nephew of Alice HIBAYA todrink liquor at her house inKatutungan, Wao, Lanao del Sur. Hestayed there until about 10:00 AM

o Hibaya saw Soriano drink some moreat the house of one NoelQUINATADCAN, who lived about twometers away from her.


o 3:00 PM - Hibaya saw Soriano leavewith his other companions.

o Around that time, VICKY Bearneza wasgrazing her carabao on a palm roadwhen she saw Soriano, clad in ayellow t-shirt and blue denim,walking drunkenly towards theshortcut to Wao. She did not seeanyone else pass by the area untilshe went home about 5:00 p.m.

o 3:30 PM - Vicky’s sister BBB sawSoriano, whom she later similarlyrecalled was in yellow t-shirt andpants, pass by her house as hewalked to the direction of Wao. Itwas also around the same time thatshe was expecting her 8-year-olddaughter, AAA, to take the sameshortcut on her way home fromharvesting palay.

o 6:00 PM - BBB asked for help inlooking for AAA. The other residentsassisted in the search, which lasteduntil midnight and turned out to beunsuccessful.

January 1, 1999, about 8:00 AM - TOMASBearneza, Vicky’s husband, found thelifeless body of AAA in a canal along theshortcut. She was naked except for hershorts, which loosely hung below her knees.Her face and breast revealed bite marks.

The health physician of the Wao DistrictHospital, Dr. Calico Haji Ali (Dr. Ali),examined the body of AAA. He observed thepresence of human bite marks on the rightside of her face and on her left breast.According to his examination, she was rapedand her death was caused by drowning.

Soriano confessed to Wao Mayor Elvino C.Balicao (MAYOR BALICAO) that he was underthe influence of alcohol when he killedAAA, but denied having raped her.

January 2, 1999 - the Chief Investigator ofWao, SPO4 Edwin B. Bacerra, Sr. (SPO4BACERRA), questioned Soriano. Because therewere no lawyers available and Sorianoclaimed to be a minor, a DSWDrepresentative assisted him during theinvestigation.

o Soriano admitted that he saw AAAnear the canal. AAA tried to runaway, but he caught up with her. Shethen started shouting for help,prompting him to panic and chokeher. Thereafter, he removed herclothes, bit her left breast andthrew her into the water. Thesestatements were reduced into writingand signed by both Soriano and the

DSWD representative. February 17, 1999 - Soriano was charged

with rape with homicide in an Information,which reads in part:

o That on or about December 31, 1998at around 4:00 o’clock [sic] in theafternoon at Barangay Katutungan,Municipality of Wao, Province ofLanao del Sur, Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the said accused,did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously, and bymeans of force, violence andintimidation, grabbed AAA, a girl ofeight (8) years old, covered hermouth, bitten [sic] her right faceand left breast and succeeded inhaving sexual intercourse with heragainst her will, and thereaftergrabbed the victim’s neck andchocked her to death and threw herbody into the water of irrigationcanal of Katutungan, Wao, Lanao delSur.CONTRARY to and in [v]iolation ofthe last paragraph of Article 335 ofthe Revised Penal Code as amended.

SORIANO’S VERSIONo December 31, 1998

8:00 AM - He and three othermen drank Tanduay at Hibaya’shouse while they roasted apig.

2:00 PM - they had transferredto the house of Quinatadcan,where they had a couple ofbeers.

Around 3:30 PM - Sorianoclaimed that he was not quitedrunk when he went home usingthe shortcut to Wao. He washome by 5:00 p.m.

o Jan. 1, 1999 - Some policemen cameto his house. Thinking that he wasbeing hired to harvest corn, hevoluntarily submitted himself tothem. However, he was detained atthe police headquarters.

o Soriano claimed that, withoutinforming him of the contents of thedocument, SPO4 Bacerra made him signit in front of the DSWDrepresentative. Mayor Balicaopurportedly questioned Sorianoinside the former’s vehicle,threatened him that he would be fedto the crocodiles if he would notconfess, and promised to help him if


he would admit to having perpetratedthe crime. Allegedly for thesereasons, Soriano confessed tokilling AAA.

RTC DECISIONo Marawi City RTC Br. 10 found Soriano

guilty of rape with homicide. o Imposed death penalty. He was

likewise ordered to pay the heirs ofAAA in the amount of P100,000 incivil indemnity and P50,000 in moraldamages.

CA DECISIONo On automatic review, CA affirmed

RTC, but lowered the sentence toreclusion perpetua withouteligibility for parole. Civilliability was decreased to P75,000.Soriano was also ordered to pay theheirs of AAA moral and temperatedamages in the increased amounts ofP75,000 and P25,000, respectively.

o CA disregarded the extrajudicialconfession obtained from Soriano byMayor Balicao and SPO4 Bacerra.

Soriano filed a Notice of Appeal under Rule124, Sec. 13.

ISSUE (HELD)W/N the entirety of the circumstantial evidencepresented by the prosecution was sufficient tosustain Soriano’s conviction. (NO)

RATIO1) CA CORRECTLY EXCLUDED SORIANO’S EXTRAJUDICIALCONFESSION

It should be underscored that followingSec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution, theCA was correct in ruling that theextrajudicial confession elicited by MayorBalicao and SPO4 Bacerra from Sorianowithout the presence of counsel isinadmissible in evidence.

Thus, the only issue is whether thecircumstantial evidence presented by theprosecution was sufficient to hold Sorianoguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimeof rape with homicide.

2) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICTSORIANO

SORIANO’S ARGUMENTSa) The estimated time of death of AAA

did not preclude the possibilitythat other culprits had perpetratedthe crime.

b) The prosecution failed to establishthat he had caused the bite marksfound on AAA.

c) He had never been found to be in the

company of the victim.d) It was not shown that he had gone to

the place where her cadaver wasfound;

e) While he was seen going towards thedirection of the crime scene, thisfact does not conclusively provethat he had raped and killed thevictim.

f) His soiled clothes were not found ator near the area where the crime wascommitted, but were taken from hishouse without the benefit of asearch warrant.

The prosecution faces a great deal ofdifficulty in cases involving the specialcomplex crime of rape with homicide becauseboth the rape and the homicide must beproven beyond reasonable doubt, as thevictim can no longer testify against theperpetrator of the offense. Thus, a resortto circumstantial evidence becomesinevitable to prove the case.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules ofCourt, circumstantial evidence issufficient for conviction when theconcurrence of the following factorsobtain: (a) there is more than onecircumstance; (b) the facts from which theinferences are derived have been proven;and (c) the combination of all thecircumstances is such as would prove thecrime beyond reasonable doubt.

These circumstances and facts must beabsolutely incompatible with any reasonablehypothesis propounding the innocence of theaccused.

CASE AT BAR: the prosecution failed toestablish the existence of an unbrokenchain of circumstances that lead to noother logical conclusion but the guilt ofthe accused.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL BASES OF THE RTC DECISION 1. Soriano and his companionsadmittedly had a drinking spree atHibaya’s house and Quinatadcan’sstore until 3:00 PM of December 31,1998.2. Soriano was seen by one of thewitnesses while she was grazingtheir carabao at about 3:00 to 5:00PM at the barangay road leading tocrossing [sic] when he passed byunder the influence of liquor,wearing a yellow T-shirt and maongpants that appeared clean but whenwitness was shown of the soiled anddirty yellow T-shirt and maong pantsduring the trial she affirmed that


it was the same set of clothes3. Soriano was wearing the sameaforesaid clothes when he was seenby AAA’s mother walking on the roadto Katutungan crossing, where thecrime was committed at around orbetween 3:00 to 3:30 p.m. on thesame day;4. That the post mortem examinationon the body of AAA containedcontusions which are signs ofviolence inflicted upon her, andthat she was raped before beingkilled; and that there waslaceration of the hymen;5. That the position of the body ofthe victim indicated she had beenraped and simultaneously killed.6. That the body of the victim wasfound in the grassy area near thecanal where her under pants was[sic] beside her and without clothesin her body, where the accused waslast seen to have pass [sic] by. Andthat no other persons have passed byexcept the accused at that point intime.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL BASES OF THE CA DECISION o Soriano was seen walking towards the

direction of the "short-cut" road toWao where the body of the child-victim was found. He admitted thathe used that road in going home.According to BBB, she saw Sorianopass by her house at around 3:30p.m. That was also the time when AAAwas supposed to be on her way homeusing the same "short-cut" road.Soriano confirmed that BBB saw himand that he had spent the daydrinking liquor.

o Soriano was admittedly at the sceneof the crime at the time the childwas discovered to be missing.

o Soriano was the only person seengoing to that road. He admitted thathe saw no one else using that road.

o Soriano stated that he arrived athis home at around 5:00 that sameafternoon. By his own testimony, hewas there at the scene of the crimeat around the time it happened.There can be no doubt that he rapedand killed AAA as he was the onlyone out there in the "short-cut"road.

SC HOLDING o The foregoing findings

unquestionably establish that AAA

was raped and killed. However, thecircumstances presented by theprosecution do not form a solid andcohesive narrative that proves withmoral certainty its contention thatSoriano perpetrated these heinousacts.

o The only circumstances cited toimplicate Soriano are the following:

(a) he passed through theshortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m. on31 December 1998;

(b) Vicky did not see anyoneelse use that road from 3:00 p.m. to5:00 p.m. on that day

(c) the soiled garmentsconfiscated from him wereidentified to have been thesame ones he was wearing then.

o To an unprejudiced mind, the factthat Soriano was the only one whomVicky saw pass through the shortcutto Wao from 3:00 PM to 5:00 PM doesnot logically lead to any conclusionregarding his participation in theraping and killing of AAA. It is amere conjecture that can be refutedby other equally conceivable andrational inferences.

o It is possible that Vicky did notsee the killer because he came fromthe same place as AAA; but, insteadof traversing the shortcut afterraping and killing the victim, heactually went back to his point oforigin.

o The mere fact that Soriano's clotheswere soiled cannot isolate him asthe only probable suspect,considering that his garments werenot found anywhere near the scene ofthe crime, but at his own home.

o As a consequence, the circumstancesborne out by the records areseverely insufficient to establishthe culpability of Soriano as onemay reasonably extrapolate otherpossible scenarios other than thosepointing to his guilt. The evidencein this case having fallen short ofthe standard of moral certainty, anydoubt on the guilt of the accusedshould be considered in favor of hisacquittal.

o The law enforcers' missteps in theperformance of the investigation andthe prosecuting attorney's carelesspresentation of the evidence cannotlead to any other conclusion other


than that there are doubts as to theguilt of the accused.

DISPOSITIONCA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SorianoACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED.

People v. Reyes | MicoMay 27, 1966THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff andappellee, vs.CESAR REYES Y ENGRESO, ET AL., defendants, CESAR REYES Y ENGRESO, defendant and appellant. BENGZON, J.P., J.NATURE: Appeal from CFI Decision convicting Reyesfor the crime of robbery with homicide

SUMMARY: Two unidentified men robbed the home ofone Mrs. Pangan, killing, in the process, herhusband Dr. Pangan. The authorities were notmaking progress at the time. However, upon theapprehension of one Cesar Reyes, who had in hispossession a gun, the detectives assigned to thecases were able to match empty cartridges found atthe scene of the crime to said gun, leading toReyes’ arrest. Reyes then admitted hisparticipation in the robbery and signed aconfession to this effect. He now contests hisconfession. SC sided with the CFI, upholding itsconviction based on the signed confession sayingit was entered into freely and voluntarily,therefore, paired with the evidence of the corpusdelicti, were sufficient to convict Reyes of thecrime.

DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court provide that anextrajudicial confession suffices to convict ifthe same is corroborated by evidence of corpusdelicti.

FACTS: Between 7:30 and 8:30pm, Mrs. Pangan was at

her home in Kamias, QC preparing for supperwhen suddenly, a man with a gun appeared,threatening to shoot her if she resisted

o Mrs. Pangan, her children, and hermaid Fleurida, were told by that manto get inside a small room in thekitchen

o A second man thereafter appeared whokept watch

o The man with the gun then demandedmoney

The Pangas’ houseboy, Jesus Macasusi, justthen returned, but he too was confined inthe same room

Mrs. Pangan and Fleurida were takenupstairs by the gun wielder, who thereafterransacked the rooms upstairs

o Later, they were all confined in thebathroom, along with the driver

Suddenly, Mrs. Pangan and her companionsheard 2 gunshots outside the house

o The driver and houseboy left to seewhat was happening

The police, having been called by thedriver, came and found Dr. Manuel Pangandead on the driveway. He died of severehemorrhage, secondary to a gunshot wound ofthe chest

o From the premises, at the driveway,2 empty cartridges were found

o The robbers were able to acquirediamond earrings, a diamond ring,earrings with brillante stones, awristwatch with solid gold bracelet,a radio transistor, a fountain pen(you serious, P11), one men’swristwatch

The authorities made no initial progress atthe time.

o Later on, detectives Santos and Dinoread in the papers of theapprehension of one Cesar Reyes forillegal possession of firearms inManila

o They then sent the 2 emptycartridges for examination to theCriminal Investigation Laboratory ofthe Manila Police Department

o Said Agency reported that the cartridges came from the gun takenfrom Cesar Reyes

Cenon Andalis, the owner of the gun, andReyes were then investigated but theydenied any participation in the crime andso they were released

Reyes was later arrested in Ilocos Sur pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued byCFI Manila for illegal possession offirearms

Later, Reyes, in the presence of 2 newspaper reports, admitted his participation in the robbery and signed aconfession in which he claimed that he borrowed thegun from PC Sgt. Andalis and that his companionswere Pedro Cabrera, and one other whom he didn’tknow

An Information was filed in CFI Rizalagainst Reyes, Cabrera, and one John Doe asPrincipals, with Andalis as accomplice inthe crime of robbery with homicide

o CFI convicted Reyes primarily on thebasis of his confession, andacquitted Andalis on the ground ofreasonable doubt

ISSUE:1. Was the fact of the commission of the crime established?

YES


a. Was the extrajudicial confession confession valid?YES

RATIO:An Extrajudicial Confession Suffices to Convict ifthe Same is Corroborated by Evidence of CorpusDelicti ( Rule 133, Sec. 3 )

Confession was Freely Entered Into The issue of voluntariness is one depending

upon the credibility of contendingwitnesses

o Such matter is within the specialcompetence of the trial court, andthe SC sees no reason to disturb itsfindings and conclusions that theconfession was voluntarily given andnot forcibly extracted

Reyes disclaims his confession upon theassertion that he signed it only because hewas maltreated into doing so by the police

o However, a review of the evidencewould show that the confession wassigned freely and without Reyesbeing forced to do so by inflictionof harm

o Reyes signed it in the presence ofpolice officers and newspapermen

He was later brought before QCFiscal Agloro where heaffirmed the confession andsigned it once more

o His excuse was that he was unable totell the Fiscal he was maltreatedbecause his “gums were swollen then”

Such explanation is flimsy andridiculous; Reyes could haveeasily pointed out his allegedswollen gums to the Fiscal

o His signature also appeared to be continuous and stable, even incomparison with his specimensignature made in open court

Patrolman Ruiz, the one who took down theconfession in Q&A form, denied the allegedmaltreatment

o Reyes has not presented any medicalcertificate to prove any injuryreceived by him during the processtaking said confession

All he presented was a medico-legal slip purporting toattest to a slight contusionand abrasion on him on a datelong before the confession

o Reyes as well contended that themaltreatment did not force out fromany confession

Content of the Confession

S: Humigit kumulang sa ika-8:00 ng umaga, Deciembre17, 1958, ako po ay nagpunta sa Signal Corp, DilimanQuezon City, upang hiramin iyong baril ni Sgt. CenonAndalis.

o Ipinahiram naman ni Andalis itong .45 calibre niya. Umuwi na ako sa aming bahay sa GuipitSampaloc, Manila.

Nuong gabi ng Deciembre 20, 1958 mga humigitkumulang sa 7:00 ng gabi, ay dumating itong si PedroCabrera na pinsan ko sa aming bahay sa GuipitSampaloc, at umakyat siya sa itaas, kinuha niya iyongbaril ni Andalis sa loob ng aparador ng anak ko, atpagkatapos ay sinabi niya na sumama ako sa kanya atmerong lakad.

o Nagtanong ako kung anong lakad ang sinasabiniya, and sagot niya sa akin ay "Basta't sumamaka at merong lakad tayo."

o Lumabas kami ng bahay at sa paglabas naminay naroroon na iyong jeep na A.C. at itongnagmamaneho.

o Lumakad na kami, sa gawing Legarda kamidumaan at nagtuloy na kami sa Kamias Road.

Pagdating namin sa Kamias Road, Q.C., ay bumaba itongdriver at si Pedro Cabrera at sabi sa akin ay mangloloobsila. Umalis na nga sila habang ako naman aynaghihintay ng di kalayuan sa bahay na papanhikin nila.

Lumipas at mahigit na kalahating oras, pagkataposnuon ay nakadinig ako ng dalawang putok ng baril.

o Tapos, ay lumabas itong dalawang kasama ko attumatakbo.

Tinanong ko kung bakit merong pumutok, ang sagot saakin ni Pedro Cabrera ay "KASI LUMALABAN IYONGDOCTOR", kaya nagpaputok sila sa itaas. Pagsakay nila sajeep ay nagtuloy na kami sa Legarda sa may Pantranco.

Binigyan ako ni Pedro Cabrera ng P20.00, at iyongtransistor at relos na nakuha nila doon sa bahay nanilooban nila, ay dinala nila, ako ay iniwan na nila saPantranco.

It is doubtless that in giving Cabrera thegun he borrowed from Sgt. Cenon Andalis,Reyes knew it would be used in the robberyhe had agreed to take part in. Such can begleaned further in this part of theconfession:

o 14. T: Nalalaman ni Sgt. CenonAndalis na itong baril na hiniram moay gagamitin sa panghuhuldap?

S: Opo ... alam po niya ... atsa katunayan ay pumaparte siyasa lakad namin.

Proof of Corpus Delicti The fact that the empty shells recovered

from the scene of the crime tallied, underballistics examination, with test shellsfrom the gun found in appellant'spossession; and the fact that some of thearticles taken in the robbery werementioned in the confession, provide the


required corroboration of the confession bythe proof of corpus delicti .

On Alibi Anent the defense of alibi — that appellant

was at the time of the crime in the storeof his wife at Sampaloc selling puto bumbong— the same necessarily fails, in view ofthe confession. In not sustaining saiddefense, therefore, the court a quo did noterr.

DISPOSITIVE: Judgment Affirmed

Bravo v. Borja | KarlaFebruary 18 1985JOJO PASTOR BRAVO, JR., ETC., petitioner, vs.HON. MELECIO B. BORJA, ET AL., respondents.Plana, J.

SUMMARY: Bravo was charged with murder. He filed amotion for bail based on the fact that theevidence against him is not strong and that he isa minor (16 yo) hence entitled to a privilegedmitigating circumstance, which would make themurger charge against him non-capital. He hadattached a certified copy of his birth certificatein his motion for bail. RTC denied this. Hissucceeding motions for reconsideration were alsodenied. RTC judge refused to take cognizance ofBravo’s unchallenged minority allegedly becausethe certificate of birth was not offered. The SCruled that evidence of petitioner's minority wasalready a part of the record of the case. It wasproperly filed in support of a motion. It would bea needless formality to offer it in evidence.DOCTRINE: Evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part ofthe record of the case. It was properly filed in support of a motion.It would be a needless formality to offer it in evidence. Rule 133,Sec 7 says that: “When a motion is based on factsnot appearing of record the court may hear thematter on affidavits or depositions presented bythe respective parties, but the court may directthat the matter be heard wholly or partly on oraltestimony or depositions.”

NATURE: Petition for certiorari and mandamus forbail or transfer to the custody of MSSD pendingtrial

FACTS: Jojo Pastor Bravo was charged by the RTC of

Naga with murder for the killing of oneRamon Abiog.

Detained in the city jail of Naga after hisarrest, Bravo filed a motion for bail basedon two reasons:

o (a) that the evidence against him isnot strong in view of the retractionby Ferdinand del Rosario, one of theprosecution witnesses, of his

previous statement naming Bravo asthe assailant; AND

o (b) that he is a minor of 16 years,entitled as such to a privilegedmitigating circumstance under Art 68of the RPC (which would make themurder charge against him non-capital)

During the hearing, the retracting witnessDel Rosario (presented by Bravo) madeanother turn-about, and declared againstBravo.

RTC Judge Melencio Borja then DENIED themotion for bail on the finding that theevidence of Bravo’s guilt is strong, andhis minority was not proved.

Bravo filed a motion for reconsiderationo Stated that: (a) his minority had

been proved by his birthcertificate, which was attached tothe memorandum in support of hismotion for bail, showing that he wasborn on February 26 1967

o (b) that his minority had never beenchallenged by the fiscal; and

o (c) that the offense charged, asregards Bravo, is not capitalbecause even if convicted, he couldnot be sentenced to death because ofhis minority.

o Again attached to the motion forreconsideration was a duly certifiedcopy of Bravo’s birth certificate.

The Fiscal opposed the motion, on theground that the evidence of guilt isstrong, but did not contest the minority ofpetitioner.

RTC → DENIED the motion forreconsideration.

Bravo then filed a motion praying that hebe placed in the care and custody of theMinistry of Social Services and Development(MSSD), pursuant to Art 191 of P.D. No. 603(Child and Youth Welfare Code)

o “Care of Youthful Offender Held forExamination or Trial. — A youthfuloffender held for physical andmental examination or trial orpending appeal, if unable to furnishbail, shall from time to time (sic)of his arrest be committed to thecare of the Department of SocialWelfare or the local rehabilitationcenter or a detention home in theprovince or city which shall beresponsible for his appearance incourt whenever required x x x”

RTC → DENIED the motion to be placed in thecare and custody of MSSD.


o Art 191 is not applicable since itcould be invoked only where theminor is charged with a bailableoffense, as could be gleaned fromthe phrase “if unable to furnishbail.”

NBI Regional Office at Naga submitted itsreport, copy of which was sent to the CityFiscal of Naga. (NBI Report)

o It found that it was the prosecutionwitness, Ferdinand del Rosario, andnot Bravo, who killed the deceasedAbiog.

When the murder case was next called forhearing, the defense unilaterally movedorally that the trial of Bravo be reset inorder to give the City Fiscal more time tostudy the NBI report.

o Motion was DENIED as dilatory(intended to cause delay)

Bravo filed a formal Motion forReinvestigation praying that theproceedings be suspended and that the CityFiscal of Naga be ordered to reinvestigatethis case.

It does not appear what action, if any, thecourt has taken on this motion. Neitherdoes it appear that the City Fiscal of Nagahas taken any move to reinvestigate thecase.

So, Bravo filed this instant petition(never gonna give up!) for certiorari andmandamus, seeking his release on bail ORtransfer to the custody of the MSSD pendingtrial, pursuant to Art 191 of PD No. 603.

o Bravo also seeks the issuance of awrit of mandamus commandingrespondent Judge to remand the caseto the City Fiscal of Naga forreinvestigation.

Bravo’s main contention (as to his motion forbail):

Even assuming that the evidence of guiltagainst him is strong, the charge ofmurder, as to him who is only 16 years old,cannot be capital because the death penaltycannot be imposed on account of hisminority, which entitles him to a penaltyreduction of one degree.

ISSUE #1: WON Bravo is entitled to bail as a matter of right.(YES, to be further explained in RATIO #2)

RATIO #1: (CrimPro recall)Under the Constitution, "all persons, except thosecharged with capital offenses when evidence ofguilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be

bailable by sufficient sureties." (Article IV,Section 18.) Generally, therefore, bail is amatter of right before conviction, unless theaccused is charged with a capital offense and theevidence of guilt is strong.

The charge against Bravo is murderqualified by tracheary + 2 aggravatingcircumstances: evident premeditation andnocturnity.

o The crime is a CAPITAL OFFENSE,punishable by reclusion temporal inits maximum period to death.

Bravo’s argument above hardly finds support in the law.

Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules ofCourt, a capital offense is "an offensewhich, under the law existing at the time ofits commission, and at the time of theapplication to be admitted to bail, may bepunished by death."

o It is clear from this provision thatthe capital nature of an offense isdetermined by the penalty prescribed bylaw, with reference to which it isrelatively easy to ascertain whetherthe evidence of guilt against theaccused is strong.

o Moreover, when the Constitution orthe law speaks of evidence of guilt,it evidently refers to a finding ofinnocence or culpability, regardlessof the modifying circumstances.

To allow bail on the basis of the penaltyto be actually imposed would require aconsideration not only of the evidence ofthe commission of the crime but alsoevidence of the aggravating and mitigatingcircumstances.

o There would then be a need for acomplete trial, after which thejudge would be just about ready torender a decision in the case.

o As perceptively observed by theSolicitor General, such procedurewould defeat the purpose of bail,which is to entitle the accused toprovisional liberty pending trial.

NEVERTHELESS , where it has been establishedwithout objection that the accused is only16 years old, it follows that, ifconvicted, he would be given "thepenalty next lower than that prescribed bylaw," which effectively rules out the deathpenalty.

o The Constitution withholds theguaranty of bail from one who isaccused of a capital offense wherethe evidence of guilt is strong.


o The obvious reason is that one whofaces a probable death sentence hasa particularly strong temptation toflee.

o This reason does not hold where theaccused has been established withoutobjection to be a minor who by lawcannot be sentenced to death.

ISSUE #2: WON Bravo has proven his minority. (YES)

RATIO #2: Bravo has been raising his issue since the

beginning.o In his motion for bail, petitioner

alleged that he was a minor of 16and this averment was neverchallenged by the prosecution.

o Subsequently, in his memorandum insupport of the motion for bail,petitioner attached a copy of hisbirth certificate.

o And finally, after respondent Judgehad denied the motion for bail,petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration, attaching thereto acertified true copy of his birthcertificate.

The respondent Judge refused to takecognizance of Bravo’s unchallenged minorityallegedly because the certificate of birthwas not offered.

SC: The respondent Judge is WRONG. Evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part of

the record of the case. It was properly filed in supportof a motion. It would be a needless formality to offer it inevidence. Respondent Judge therefore actedwith grave abuse of discretion indisregarding it.

o Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec 7:Evidence on motion. — When a motion isbased on facts not appearing ofrecord the court may hear the matteron affidavits or depositionspresented by the respective parties,but the court may direct that thematter be heard wholly or partly onoral testimony or depositions.

It results that petitioner is entitled tobail as a matter of right, which makes itunnecessary to decide whether he, being aminor, is entitled to be placed pendingtrial in the care and custody of the MSSDpursuant to Article 191 of P.D. No. 603.

Turning to the reinvestigation aspect ofthe petition, the plea therefor must beaddressed to the City Fiscal of Naga, whohas direction and control of the criminalprosecution and who is the primary official

called upon to evaluate the evidence,ascertain the existence of a prima facie caseand determine who should be criminallyindicted.

o In case of unjustified refusal bythe City Fiscal to conduct areinvestigation, the proper recourseis to appeal to the Minister ofJustice who exercises control andsupervision over fiscals.

DISPOSITION: Orders of respondent Judge denyingbail are set aside. Bail is fixed at P15,000 andhis release is ordered upon the posting thereofand its approval by the trial judge, unlesspetitioner is held for some other cause.


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