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Strikes, Lockouts and Bankruptcy:

An Analysis of Recent Crises in the 21st Century American Orchestra

Devan Pope

Senior in College Scholars

Performing Arts Management Emphasis

May, 2014

Dr. Gary Sousa, Mentoring Professor

School of Music

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 3

INTRODUCTION 4

METHODOLOGY 5

LITERATURE REVIEW 7

RESULTS 11

CONCLUSIONS 40

REFERENCES 45

APPENDICES 49

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ABSTRACT

Through case studies with orchestras of different sizes, budgets, and caliber, this

paper examines the process of negotiating collective bargaining agreements and

the resulting change in work place culture that can result. Drawing on

multidisciplinary sources, including management and musicians from specific

United States orchestras, orchestra consultants, experts, bloggers, and news

sources, this paper points to fatal errors that occur during the negotiating process

which can result in, or extend, work stoppages, and advises orchestra managers

on best practices for avoiding these errors. The culminating research points to

three ideas which influence the negotiation process including fundamental

discrepancies in strategic vision, lack of transparency and consistency in

communication, and the absence of respect. In a volatile industry where public

perception and healthy management can easily mean the difference between

balanced budgets and bankruptcy, analysis of past mistakes and knowledge of

best practices is essential. This paper can serve as a framework for

understanding the impact of key negotiations on the field and a guide to

orchestra managers embarking on negotiations in times of economic hardship.

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INTRODUCTION

After the fall of the US economy in 2007, businesses and nonprofits across the

country were faced with challenges and shortfalls of new proportions. Orchestras

were no different, in fact, they felt the weight of the economic collapse heavily. It

has been said by many top scholars in the field of classical music that “America’s

Orchestras are in Crisis” (Kennicott, 2013). For years we have witnessed

catastrophic situations unfold at many of America’s top orchestras: Philadelphia

orchestra declared bankruptcy, Minnesota Orchestra musicians were locked out

from performing for a year and a half, Honolulu Symphony shut its doors and

many more similar situations occurred. Through all of these dismal events, the

culture of the American symphony orchestra has become characterized by

musician and management relations that are vitriolic, finances that are unstable

and a sweeping mindset that substantial changes must be made in the industry.

For current and emerging orchestra managers whose true desire is to prosper

the future of the orchestra and orchestral music through sound decision making

and business strategy, it is important to look to the past for knowledge of what

works and what does not. This study examines the financial struggles and

bargaining conflicts of five orchestras: the Minnesota Orchestra, the Detroit

Symphony Orchestra, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, the San Francisco

Symphony and the Nashville Symphony. Through case studies and analysis, the

following questions have been considered: What mistakes do managers make as

they go into contract negotiations? Is it possible to retain positive relationships

between management and musicians and avoid a work stoppage in times of

extreme financial instability? What are some factors which can positively impact

negotiations between musicians and management? What do musicians cite as

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the main reasons for initiating a work stoppage? Throughout the course of

research that addressed those overarching questions, the researcher has

identified three “best practices” that can be applied by managers in Collective

Bargaining Agreement negotiations. These best practices are: foster a culture of

respect towards musicians by limiting negative public statements, maintain

authenticity and transparency of information, and take steps to align

stakeholders’ perception of the value of symphony orchestras. The conflicts of

the five orchestras studied reveal the use of these practices both positively and

negatively.

METHODOLOGY

In the research for this project, numerous information collection methods were

used including in-person and telephone interviews and lectures with members of

orchestra management, boards and musicians, published articles and blog posts

from orchestra consultants, industry leaders, advocacy groups, and national

news sources. The first of the interviews conducted was with Rachel Ford,

Executive Director of the Knoxville Symphony Orchestra. Ford was chosen as an

interview subject, in part, due to the success of the Knoxville Symphony

Orchestra in matters of healthy finances and musician relations, and also

because of her connection to the researcher. Questions used in this interview are

located in Appendix 1. The information obtained in this interview was left out of

the final paper, due to relevance. The next interview was conducted with Kenneth

Freed, who has performed as a violist in the Minnesota Orchestra for a number

of years, and served on the Strategic Planning Committee preceding the lockout.

Questions used for this interview is also available in the Appendices, Appendix 2.

For the final interview, the reporter spoke with Nicky Carpenter, member of the

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Minnesota Orchestra Board of Directors, and arts leader. In addition to

interviews, the researcher attended lectures with top orchestra professionals as

part of an “Essentials of Orchestra Management” seminar in New York City

February 4-15, 2013. These lectures included Peter Pastreich, orchestra

consultant and former Executive Director of Nashville Symphony Orchestra, St.

Louis Symphony and San Francisco Symphony; Jay Blumenthal, Director of

Symphonic Services at the American Federation of Musicians; Giancarlo

Guerrero, Music Director of the Nashville Symphony Orchestra; Deborah Rutter,

President and Chief Executive at the Chicago Symphony Orchestra; and Brent

Assink, Executive Director at the San Francisco Symphony. These lectures and

interviews, which make up the first portion of research, informed the researcher

on specifics about situations that were not detailed to the general public and to

advise on lessons learned from career professionals. The other portion is made

up of data and analysis from orchestra consultants, public domain financial

documents, and news articles/publications. “Adaptistration,” a website and blog

run by orchestra consultant Drew McManus was used as a primary source of

data throughout the research. This website along with “Mask of the Flower

Prince,”(an arts blog) “Save Our Symphony Minnesota” and “Save Our

Symphony” (Detroit), independent advocacy groups, and numerous national and

local news services provided much of the remaining data used by the researcher.

For the orchestra management industry, peer-reviewed journals and

official studies are the outlier. Much of the knowledge-sharing in the industry

comes from magazines, blogs and face-to-face conversations. Thus, the

researcher was forced to rely on these methods for research. The applicants

chosen for interviews and lectures were selected on the basis of relevance to

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both the topics at hand and the field as a whole, their position in the orchestra of

interest, and their relation to the researcher in terms of availability for interview

and location.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Arts attendance has long been a contributor to the longevity and overall

health of symphony orchestras. Managers often cite shrinking audiences as

indicators of the need for change of programming or a restructured orchestra

model. In reviewing the overall culture of symphony orchestras in the United

States, it is important to grasp the changing landscape of classical music as a

whole before relating this to a specific orchestra. Every four years the National

Endowment for the Arts publishes a research study titled, “Survey of Public

Participation in the Arts.” The survey demonstrates shrinking audiences overall in

performing arts activity attendance. Significant drops for classical music

attendance occurred from 2002 to 2008 from 11.6% to 9.3% and again from

2008 to 2012 to 8.8%. Between 2008 and 2012, however, relative increases

occurred in Jazz (7.8% to 8.1%), dance other than ballet (5.2% to 5.6%) and

opera saw no change. Classical music attendance by age has also shifted

revealing audiences growing older but less young attendees taking their place.

14% of adults ages 65-74 attended classical music performances, up from 12.2%

in 2008 whereas attendance in 18-24 year olds has dropped to 6.6% from 6.9%

(Shewfelt, 12). These figures can have a negative impact on income generated

from ticket sales and many orchestras have seen this decline in recent years.

How has the economy and arts attendance affected income to orchestras

from corporate sponsorships? “The BCA Survey of Business Support of the Arts”

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tracks numbers and motivations of business partnerships with arts organizations.

The 2012 survey shows uphill trends in giving for the arts from businesses since

the economy entered a recovery period. The chart below shows percent changes

in arts giving from 2006 to 2012. Giving dropped significantly between 2006 and

2009, likely in response to the recession, but increases from 2009 to 2012 show

recovery.

Median contribution to the arts per U.S. Business is at an all-time high since

2006 with $1000 per business compared to $800 figure in 2006 and $750 in

2009. These numbers can play significantly on an orchestra’s ability to raise

enough funds to balance budgets and continue to produce the same level of

artistic quality and programming (“BCA Survey of Business Support of the Arts,

7).

Another factor which impacts the internal culture of symphony orchestras

and can have serious implications on negotiations, is workplace satisfaction for

musicians. Do the musicians gain fulfillment from their jobs in symphony

orchestras? A study by Jutta Allmendinger, J. Richard Hackman and Erin V.

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Lehman on workplace satisfaction in multiple industries investigated the

motivations and personal outcomes surrounding a career as a professional

musician in a symphony orchestra. The study produced a set of results which

was shocking to many of those inside the field and out: orchestral musicians are

relatively unhappy when it comes to their jobs. In fact, out of the thirteen job

paths studied as part of their research, including mental health treatment, flight

attendants, industrial production and federal prison guards, symphony orchestra

musicians were ranked 7th in workplace satisfaction. The career ranking number

one in this workplace satisfaction survey, however, was musicians working in a

string quartet. This points to the very nature of the current institution of symphony

orchestras that contribute to that dissatisfaction not the career as a musician.

The study showed that, out of all other careers analyzed, musicians rated the

highest in internal work motivation. This means that musicians are extremely self-

motivated to perform well and do not need a reward or punishment from a

superior in order to reach potential best in the workplace. Musicians are

motivated by their own “pride and professionalism.” General workplace

satisfaction and satisfaction for growth opportunities were scored generally low

with scores of 5.4 and 4.9 out of seven respectively (Allmendinger, 201). After

this study was published, Robert Levine, principal viola of the Milwaukee

symphony and well known critic of the orchestra industry and son Seymour

Levine presented a response which theorized that the lack of control over work

environments is primarily responsible for the high stress levels which lead to the

conclusion of workplace dissatisfaction. How does this lack of control and

satisfaction lead into negotiations (Levine, 15)? Drew McManus presented his

theory to this viewpoint in a blog post titled, “The Money Drug.” Here he argues

that the lack of control on an everyday basis for orchestra members leads to a

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strong reliance being placed on the Collective Bargaining Agreement as the only

outlet for impacting working conditions. This leads musicians to push for things

such as additional time off and more compensation in order to deal with these

overall feelings of dissatisfaction. He asks in response to this idea, “Would you

choose a high-stress, low artistic satisfaction work place offering you $75,000 or

a workplace that offered a level of high artistic satisfaction and low stress with

only $60,000 base salary?” (McManus, 2004) These views of changing

attendance and funding for the arts combined with evidence of dissatisfied

musicians lead into the analysis of financial and labor issues at play in today’s

American symphony orchestra.

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RESULTS

With so many orchestras facing significant obstacles in fundraising,

budgets, and bargaining, it seemed the number of ways an orchestra could fail

were endless. After having examined many orchestras from the United States

only, I have identified four unique models whose specific orchestra size,

quality/budget, management style/decision making, and circumstances align to

achieve a specific end result. These four situations will be presented as models

to the broader orchestra landscape; by doing this we can point to the best

practices and key mistakes that led to the end result of each of these situations.

The four models, which will be broken down into further detail in the paragraphs

are as follows:

Long-term lockout: Minnesota Orchestra

Long-term strike: Detroit Symphony Orchestra

Short-term strike: San Francisco Symphony/ Chicago Symphony Orchestra

No work stoppage, in financial trouble: Nashville Symphony Orchestra

Each of these orchestra models has approached the topics of strategic planning,

negotiations, shared power, and public perception in differing ways which have

resulted in both favorable and unfavorable outcomes. Further study beyond the

scope of this paper, would identify and analyze a large-budget, major orchestra

that has not experienced extreme financial shortfalls or work stoppages in recent

years and to extend the study to smaller, regional orchestras for comparison.

On February 1, 2014, management and musicians of the Minnesota

Orchestra [MO] ratified a new three year contract agreement which ended a bitter

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year and a half long lockout (Kerr, 2014). After an entire season and a half worth

of concert cancellations, numerous musician resignations, and world-renown

Music Director, Osmo Vanska’s resignation, the Minnesota Orchestra finally

ended the dispute on January 15, 2014 (Cooper, 2014) and will return to the

stage (“Conductor Osmo Vanska Resigns from Minnesota Orchestra,” 2013).

The longest labor stoppage in orchestra history, with the second longest being

the Detroit Symphony which will be detailed in a later section, did not, however,

leave the orchestra undamaged. The trust among management, musicians,

board, and patrons will take years to repair, if at all possible. Due to the extreme

nature of this dispute, and the numerous instances of mis-management present,

it is essential that the reader understands the inner workings of this situations to

serve as the model for terrible decision making, with horrendous outcomes. The

Minnesota Orchestra failed to follow what the researcher has identified as best

practices of vision alignment among stakeholders and respect.

The Minnesota Orchestra, before the lockout, was a glorious major

symphony orchestra with a growing reputation as a “destination orchestra.”

The term “destination orchestra” will be used throughout the remainder of the

paper and, for these purposes, the researcher chose to provide a definition of

how this term is being used nationally. A “destination orchestra” is one where

musicians aspire to complete their careers and from which they will eventually

retire. They work their way through smaller, regional orchestras, playing in those

orchestras for a portion of their income while also supplementing that income,

through teaching, freelancing, or another method. When musicians audition and

win a seat in a “destination orchestra,” this usually becomes the largest, if not

only, source of income and benefits for the musician. The amount of time

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devoted to orchestra work increases significantly, and many stop taking

additional auditions as they have reached that they consider to be the top, or

their final destination.

The symphony paid musicians an average annual salary of $113,000

competitive among peer institutions as the eighth highest paid orchestra in the

United States, according to 2011/2012 figures. Michael Henson, CEO, was

appointed in 2007, five years before the lockout began and, since his

appointment, the organization had seen significant increases in fundraising

effectiveness (Cooper, 2014). His leadership occurred alongside Board President

Jon Campbell (Grow, 2013). Henson came to the Minnesota Orchestra from

Europe where he served as President of the Bournemouth Orchestra (Lebrecht,

2014). Board President, Jon Campbell, holds a full time career as Executive VP

for Wells Fargo (Grow, 2013). In the 2011-2012 season the Minnesota Orchestra

Association began a $50 million fundraising campaign with the purpose of

renovating Orchestra Hall. The organization set out to temporarily relocate to the

Convention Center throughout the renovations, with the grand opening of the hall

set for summer 2013 (Vision for a Sound Future, 5).

Things appeared to be on the rise for the Minnesota Orchestra. In a

period of new artistic triumphs, such as a Grammy-winning Sibelius symphonies

record with Music Director Osmo Vanska, (Bream, 2014) and feelings of

“solidarity and pride” spreading throughout the musicians, according to Kenneth

Freed, long time member of the Minnesota Orchestra viola section who also

served on the Artistic Advisory and Strategic Planning committees (Freed, 2014),

one might wonder what caused the culture to become so negative so quickly. In

examining the Minnesota Orchestra Association’s [MOA] approach to financial

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reporting and money matters, the apparent strategy taken towards contract

negotiations, lack of communication and transparency, fundamental differences

in the vision for the future of the Minnesota Orchestra among constituents, and

the idea of respect appear to be the root causes of the tumultuous, drawn out

dispute. The MOA, in this paper, serves as an example of not following the best

practices of respect, transparency and strategic-vision alignment that the

researcher believes to be imperative.

Before diving into the details of the negotiation, it is necessary to have a

clear understanding of the financial situation of the orchestra in the years

preceding the lockout, with special attention paid to years 2008-2012. Just as

many orchestras in the country and around the globe have seen, nationwide

declines in classical music performance attendance, and declines in arts-giving

have put significant strains on financial stability. The National Endowment for the

arts showed that attendance was down to 9% of all adults. Arts-giving is also

down 13% according to the 2010 Giving USA Report, used by the Minnesota

Orchestra in the MOA Strategic Plan 2012-2015. In response to these factors,

the MO has had an unsustainable financial structure for over 10 years (Vision for

a Sound Future, 7). To cope with these declining resources and rising costs, the

MOA began using large withdrawals from their endowments in order to balance

the budget each fiscal year.

The MOA maintains one main endowment as well as two additional endowment-

style funds called Oak Leaf and the St. Paul Foundation. For the purposes of this

paper, any draws from these three sources will be considered endowment draws.

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The suggested endowment draw annually for the MOA is 5% (Freed, 2014). In

the years between 2004 and 2012 combined draws from the endowments were

between 11% and 14% (Jacobson, 33).

Despite a clear need to restructure, given the consistent, excessive, endowment

draws beginning in 2004, the MOA set out on a $50 million campaign for

renovations of Orchestra Hall. This move, according to the MOA, was intended to

“draw in diversified audiences” (Vision for a Sound Future, 5)

Despite the timing of the renovations, and whether it was financially the correct

move on the part of the MOA, there are serious issues with transparency of

financial reporting present throughout the campaign for renovations which must

be addressed.

As part of the plan for financing the Orchestra Hall renovations, the MOA

sought $14 million in bonds from the Minnesota state legislature. In hearings with

the Office of the Legislative Auditor, Henson is quoted to have stated:

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“On the financial front, we have announced balanced budgets over the

last three consecutive years, and we are facing the current economic downturn

with a degree of stability…we are facing the current economic downturn with

some fortitude and consistency of planning” (Jacobson, 8).

From these statements, it would appear that Henson was either unaware of the

orchestras true financial state or was intentionally shielding this knowledge in

order to secure funding from the legislature. Statements made in the presence of

the MO Board of Directors appear to suggest the latter. In a February 2009

Board meeting the Chair of the Finance committee said:

“If the deficit is between $3 million and $5 million in fiscal 2010, it will be

of the same size range for the next two years of the musicians’ contract. This is a

serious liquidity issue, and the MOA already has $11 million in debt. Our job is to

leave behind a sustainable business” (Jacobson, 6).

This is the first demonstration of the lack of transparency to the donors and

public as well as to the musicians. In another board meeting, just seven months

later, Bryan Ebensteiner, VP of Finance revealed what appears to be the MOA’s

strategy for securing government funding and also the beginning of the plan for a

sharply concessionary contract at the next opening of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement.:

“Balances in 2009 and 2010 would support our state bonding aspirations,

while the deficits in 2011 and 2012 would demonstrate the need to reset the

business model” (Jacobson, 7).

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These statements made in 2009 and the audited financial statements of the

orchestra association through years 2009-2012 show that the plan came to

fruition.

The chart above shows the revenue less expenses for years 2009-2012

(Jacobson, 24). These figures include the endowment draws for each of those

years. Let’s return to the quote given by CEO Michael Henson,

“On the financial front, we have announced balanced budgets over the last three

consecutive years…” (Jacobson, 8).

When we draw the key word “announced” from this statement, it points to the

following theory: instead of actually balancing budgets that year, the MOA used

increasing endowment draws in years 2009 and 2010 to appear financially stable

for the purposes of state bonding initiatives. The chart of endowment draws

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which appeared above also support those claims. Endowment draws that had

increased in 2009 and 2010, were cut back in 2011 and 2012, causing

announced deficits of $2,907,000 and $9,730,000 for 2011 and 2012

respectively. These financial reportings lead into the MOA’s approach to

negotiations. They paint the picture of financial uncertainty that was necessary to

the MOA for securing a concessionary contract from the musicians, and

implementing a new strategic plan with a very different vision for the future of the

orchestra and orchestra hall (Jacobson, 26).

In projections to the city of Minneapolis, as part of the state bonding application

procedure, the MOA included budget projections from 2011 to 2014.

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These projections indicated a plan to reduce endowment draws by 16%, bring in

moderate increases to contributions and also include a reduction of 16% for

overhead expenses, which included $3.3 million in salary and benefits. Prior to

the lockout, this document shows plans for major musician concessions, before

negotiations even began (Jacobson, 18). It is these actions: the state bonding

application, the statements made only in the company of the board, and the

modified endowment draws that demonstrate where the author believes the MOA

failed to follow the best practice of transparency and authenticity. Had the

management chosen to communicate their plans in a different, more honest,

way, in the opinion of the researcher, negotiation could have achieved far

superior outcomes.

In addition to financial reporting, there are a number of key actions by the

MOA which contributed to the overall culture of the organization and

negotiations. In November of 2011, a year prior to the lockout, management

released the “Vision for a Sound Future,” the strategic plan which had been in the

works for years. First, the approach to musician involvement in the core decision-

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making in the organization requires some analysis. Historically, musicians, as a

primary stakeholder in their orchestras, are granted representation in major

decision-making, including programming, music director searches, auditions,

strategic planning and others dependent on the orchestra. In this regard, the

MOA followed protocol and gave themselves a safety net for the press when

questioned about musician involvement in the plan. Five or six musicians (an

estimation of Kenneth Freed) served on the strategic planning committee but

Kenneth Freed, one of those representatives, shared some insight into the actual

nature of those meetings. He stated that strategic planning meetings ended up

being “a complete waste of musician time.” He came to the meetings with many

new ideas for “adapting to the new world,” knowing the orchestra was struggling

financially, but the board and management immediately disregarded all ideas.

They had formed the new vision for the orchestra in previous meetings without

musician input, and used these meetings to inform Freed, and the other

musicians, what that vision was, and to claim musician involvement in the

process (Freed, 2014). As such, the strategic plan states:

“The ideas in this plan have been developed...over the last 18 months in

an organization-wide planning process that involved Board, management and

administration, musicians and music director – each contributing in their area of

expertise.” (Vision for a Sound Future, 2)

In addition to his interpretation of the meetings, for those 18 months of planning,

musicians were not invited until the six months-preceding negotiations.

Part of the strategic planning process also included the shaping of a new

mission statement, and thus a new vision for the future of the organization.

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Without the input of major stakeholders-including musicians- they crafted this

new significant change that included removing the word orchestra from the

mission. For reference, the old and new mission statements are included below.

Old Mission Statement:

Our mission is to enrich and inspire our community as a symphony orchestra internationally recognized for its artistic excellence.

Our mission will be implemented by:

• Enhancing the traditional core of concerts with innovative approaches to programming and format;

• Providing the finest educational and outreach programs;

• Representing and promoting the Minnesota Orchestra and the State of Minnesota to audiences across the state, across the country and around the world through tours and electronic media;

• Maintaining an acoustically superior hall with a welcoming environment.

New Mission Statement

The Minnesota Orchestral Association inspires, educates and serves our community through internationally recognized performances of exceptional music delivered within a sustainable financial structure.

This extreme change represents a fundamental difference in vision for the

orchestra among stakeholders (“The Changing Mission of the MOA”, 2013). The

best practice, in this situation, that has been neglected, is strategic alignment. If

the MOA strongly believed in the necessity for a new direction for the

organization, a better strategy, in the researcher’s opinion, would be to introduce

and discuss this vision for the future outside of the bargaining table.

Financial transparency, and the availability of financial materials to

musicians so they have the ability to make informed decisions about their

Collective Bargaining Agreement, is essential for negotiation in good faith. The

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MOA provided this material in an unusual way. While many orchestra

management teams will hold meetings for sharing and explaining financial

information with musicians, these meetings are scheduled annually, or

semiannually, and are optional. Close to the expiration of the CBA for the MO,

however, management began to hold “lectures” in which they shared troubling

financial information with orchestra members. These meetings were not only

required for musicians to attend, but they also used musician services as part of

these meetings. This action is unprecedented in the field, and due to the timeline

for when they began, musicians viewed this as going against the negotiation

process (Freed, 2014).

Once the CBA was officially reopened for negotiation, the MOA submitted the

first offer. In addition to an approximately 30% drop in wages and an increase in

required pay out for benefits, the red-line agreement included more than 30 work

rule changes which favored the agenda of the management. Some excerpts from

the offer have been included below to demonstrate the nature and scope of these

amendments.

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This contract offer, full of “draconian cuts,” (a term which grew in popularity

amongst MO musicians) would have been enough in many circumstances to

force a work stoppage. The next step taken by management, however,

guaranteed it. Rather than allow room for negotiation of each specific item, the

MOA demanded the musicians come back with a counter offer. The musicians

had no room to negotiate given those conditions and were stating they had no

idea where to begin with crafting a counter proposal. This appears, in

combination with other evidence, to be leading towards a strategic lockout

(Minnesota Orchestra Redline Agreement).

Another piece of information that was discovered supports the theory of a

strategic lockout, and has also resulted in serious public criticism and loss of trust

towards the MOA from musicians and donors. On May 24, 2012, the MOA

purchased a large number of domain names to stifle public displays of support

for the Musicians of the Minnesota Orchestra. These domain names included:

savetheminnesotaorchestra.com, savethemnorchestra.com,

savethemnorchestra.org, saveourorchestra.com, saveourorchestra.net,

saveourorchestra.org, saveourminnesotaorchestra.com,

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saveourminnesotaorchestra.org, saveourminnesotaorchestra.net,

saveourmnorchestra.com, saveourmnorchestra.org, savetheorchestra.com,

savetheorchestra.org (Jacobson, 15)

While many other elements of the MOA situation could have led to other

outcomes, and pointed to different strategic imperatives, the purchase of these

domain names before the lockout occurred is clearly indicative of an anticipated,

long term lockout.

To follow all of these variables was a PR campaign from the MOA riddled

with negativity and a lack of respect toward musicians. The CEO, Michael

Henson remarked

“When we get up and running again, as other orchestras in this position

have, we will advertise for the jobs that we need to replace, and I’m sure we will

get an astonishing bunch of individuals who will want to perform and live in this

great city” (Hogstad, 2014).

For management, who wishes to keep relations with orchestra members

generally positive and professional, this comment was out of line. In this regard,

the MOA failed, again, to follow the best practice of respect. As a result of these

factors, the MMO issued an official vote of no confidence in the CEO and pushed

for board removal of this top manager (Musicians of the Minnesota Orchestra,

2012).

The Minnesota lockout teaches many valuable lessons on governance,

transparency and respect which will be explored in more detail in the conclusions

section of the paper. . The most contentious work stoppage in orchestra history

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has changed the face of the institution of the Minnesota Orchestra for years to

come, and has had a significant impact on beliefs and focus nationwide, as they

relate to CBA negotiations. Of all work stoppage situations for symphony

orchestras, in this writer’s opinion, the Minnesota Orchestra ranks the most

significant, followed closely by the Detroit Symphony Orchestra.

The Detroit Symphony Orchestra [DSO] situation shares many of the

same issues present throughout the negotiations of the Minnesota Orchestra.

The overarching situations at play, which forced the strike and caused it to

extend for a painful six months, were economic conditions nationwide that

especially impacted the city of Detroit, a public relations nightmare from both

sides, and the idea of artistic deterioration of a world renown ensemble.

Unfortunately much of the information for this section has been removed from the

internet due to time relevance. Therefore, the data presented gives an overview

into some of the main issues present in this negotiation.

The economic downturn of 2008 had serious impact on orchestras and

arts groups all over the nation. Detroit, as a city, was hit especially hard. Due to

this, some of the area’s major corporations including the industry giants Ford and

General Motors reduced philanthropic spending. This put Detroit in dire

circumstances and had a direct impact on the financial stability of the Detroit

Symphony Orchestra. Having been given millions in donations by corporations

like Ford, the DSO felt the fall of the auto industry strongly. In addition to the

steep reductions in corporate donations after 2008, the economic impact on

individuals reduced donations to the DSO as well (Pilkington, 2010). Instead of

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the usual smaller donations coming from a wide range of individuals, donations

were concentrated to a smaller donor pool giving larger donations. This model

was able to keep the orchestra from experiencing immediate trouble, but was

clearly an unsustainable model. This revenue stream issue was exacerbated by

debts already owed by the DSO. In 2003 the DSO underwent a major

reconstruction of their orchestra hall, the Max M. Fisher Music Center. In a time

of stable economy and significant inflows of revenue, the renovation seemed an

obvious next step for a growing, world-recognized orchestra. This left the

orchestra with a 54 million dollar debt; however, that became crippling when

challenged by other concerns. Anne Parsons, CEO of the DSO remarked:

“Until the fall of 2008 we were in our Polyanna phase. We still believed

we were Herculean, that we could keep pushing through no matter what was

going on around us. But we had a train wreck of factors coming at us."

This economic scare caused the DSO management to reconsider their whole

model of what was most important for this orchestra. This leads into the particular

set of situations surrounding contract negotiations, which led to the six-month

strike (Pilkington, 2010).

The first of two major grievances involved salary. The earliest contract

proposals were suggesting large scale cuts in salary and benefits for all

musicians. Management is quoted in announcing 22% cuts, while musicians

were stating the figure was closer to 30%. For incoming members of the

orchestra, the reduction in starting salary would have been 40% (Pilkington,

2010). These extreme cuts would have moved the orchestra from its place as

tenth in the nation in base compensation for musicians to twentieth (Strubler,

27

2010). Musicians expressed concerns that salary reductions of such significance

would drive the top musicians to seek other orchestra jobs, and reduce the

quality of the orchestra as a whole. This was not the only reason for the strike, or

for the strike extending the length of time it did. Throughout negotiations during

the work stoppage, musicians were countering with proposals that included

reduced salaries of around 22%. The two main points which kept them on strike

were the proposed plan for long-term reductions in salary, and work rule changes

(Stryker, 2010). The first of these-long term cuts- would, according to musicians,

permanently damage the quality of the orchestra. The musicians were willing, in

light of the economy, to take a concessionary contract if there were increases in

pay towards the end of the contract period. This is a result of their apparent

willingness to give back in times of hardship but the desire to retain the level and

quality of the orchestra over time. The second of these changes in the proposed

contract which the musicians spoke out about was to the language regarding

working rules and conditions as they related to the culture of the organization.

When revenue streams were dwindling and donations became concentrated,

management turned to increased community engagement with the hope that

increasing the reach in the greater Detroit area would draw in new donors and

expand the relevance of the orchestra. The musicians, however, felt this moved

away from the strategic plan musicians, management and board had recently

worked together to complete. Shelly Heron, oboist in the DSO said,

"Our strategic plan ... was essentially being shelved so that the powers-

that-be could ram home massive change using the financial crisis as cover"

(Stryker, 2010).

28

It was not the addition of community engagement concerts that was troubling to

musicians but the apparent shift from the focus of symphonic repertoire in the

orchestra hall to primarily community concerts.

“When we went on strike it wasn’t over the community concerts. We did

those before to a certain degree. We went on strike because we didn’t want the

orchestra to be destroyed. When you have an orchestra that bases itself on

community concerts, which are all over the place, you lose a little bit of your

musical integrity because you are used to playing in a hall under certain

acoustics, your body responds to certain echoes that you get back… I think it

was very important…I don’t mind those things. But doing a community concert as

a season opening is a little sad to me” (Jones, 2011).

These two factors together became a major factor in the length of strike.

“Expecting the players to accept a sweeping redefinition of their jobs in the

broader context of a 30% pay cut is unreasonable” (Stryker, 2010). This is the

point when the best practice of strategic-value alignment could have been

effective. The musicians and management were divided in their interpretations of

the DSO’s primary responsibility. How dedicated is the orchestra to performing

symphonic works in the concert hall in contrast to community events. In this

writer’s opinion, had the management taken steps to align those ideas, outside of

negotiations, the DSO could have begun the process of exploring new directions

and opportunities without making the musicians fear their jobs being redefined for

them.

The negotiations between management and musicians of the Detroit

Symphony Orchestra is a situation that from the very beginning was brimming

29

with negative public statements, outcries, and attacks. After having negotiated for

a few months behind closed doors, the musicians first went public with a leaflet in

a Meadow Brook Music Festival performance, which appears below.

30

While this style of publication is fairly standard in work stoppage situations, this

particular document was the first officially released document regarding

negotiations, and occurred three months prior to the strike (McManus, 2010).

Another public relations choice the DSO made in the course of

negotiations was a switch of the use of its official Facebook page from neutral to

actively engaging in negotiation discussions. An article posted to NPR on March

16, 2011 discusses the situation, and advises against the use of Facebook as

part of negotiation tactics. A particular post worth noting occurred when a

member of the administration responsible for social media posts questioned the

group Save Our Symphony and pondered whether or not this group is made up

of people who “actually contributed money to the DSO.” This comment infuriated

many members of the community and patrons of the DSO and gained as many

as 169 comments most of which were extremely negative. Some patrons

remarked:

“I am shocked, saddened and disgusted by this post. If you're trying to

prove how unprofessional you can be, bravo.”

“I've been on the fence during this whole strike thing, trying to learn the

whole story, and this post finally teeters me over to the side of the musicians”

(Guerra, 2011).

The next public relations fiasco which occurred for the DSO involved

soloist Sarah Chang. Chang was engaged to perform Bruch’s Violin Concerto

with the DSO prior to the strike but the performances were cancelled because of

the work stoppage. Management chose to host the soloist for a recital in

Orchestra Hall in lieu of performing the concerto with orchestra. The Detroit

31

Orchestra Association allowed for patrons to exchange tickets for the cancelled

orchestral performances for this one and charged $25 admission to the general

public. The organization and the soloist received serious pushback from this

move.

This situation took an additional level of controversy when the recital was

cancelled by the soloist. After receiving numerous e-mails with career

intimidation and threats of physical violence, Chang chose to cancel the recital.

She is quoted as stating,

“My original intention to bring music to the community has been derailed,

and I have been unwillingly drawn into an inner dispute that does not

appropriately involve me” (Walkin, 2010).

The final public relations information which will be discussed as part of this paper

is important because it involved a breach of trust. On January 1, 2011, two

months into the strike, musicians and management agreed to a media blackout

with a bargaining session scheduled for that day. The management of the DSO

broke that agreement for a blackout, and released a statement that blamed

musicians for stalling the talks from a violation of start and end date agreements

for the proposed contracts. The musicians had revised the proposal under those

terms and submitted to management on the same afternoon as the press release

mentioned above (McManus, 2011). Management and musicians displayed a

lack of respect in the way the entirety of each public relations campaign was

delivered.

32

Through the examples of the Minnesota Orchestra and the Detroit

Symphony Orchestra, we have seen two case studies of the devastating effects

on the relationships with musicians, donors and subscribers that can occur when

a work stoppage is prolonged for an extended period of time, and some of the

critical issues that can contribute to such a situation. The remainder of this

section will focus on orchestras that faced difficult circumstances but whose

approach to solving complex disagreements had far less permanent negative

organizational impacts. These three orchestras became the foundation of the

development of the author’s identified best practices. The orchestras

demonstrated the transparency, respect, and stakeholder cohesion that the

researcher believes is fundamental in successful negotiations. For this portion,

we will be investigating a short term strike at a nationally ranked symphony

orchestra. There are two major strikes which very closely resemble one another

in length, musician points of contention, and actions taken, and will thus serve as

a model for this situation. These are the strike of the San Francisco Symphony

[SFS] which began March 13, 2013 and was ended April 1, 2013 (Wakin, 2013),

and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra [CSO] strike from September 22, 2012

(Caro, 2012) to September 25, 2012 (Brewer, 2012). For the purposes of this

section, the focus will be on the San Francisco Symphony with data related to the

Chicago strike added where relevant. The events surrounding the SFS situation

which deserve analysis are the orchestra’s position as a top ten American

orchestra, public opinion of the strike itself, and management’s treatment before,

during, and after the strike.

The first criterion that makes this situation unique is the San Francisco

Symphony’s position as one of the top-10-highest compensated orchestras in the

33

United States. This designation carries significance, especially in negotiations.

Musicians view this as a destination ensemble and focus much of the energy in

their careers to winning a position with this orchestra. This means that the top

talent from all over the world-but especially the United States- are competing for

a spot in this orchestra. This causes the orchestra to deliver an incredibly high

artistic quality to audiences. Along with this comes a desire, from musicians and

administration, to retain that talent and the orchestra’s place in the top 10, and

even progress farther up the list in pursuit of artistic excellence. This was a major

talking point throughout the negotiations.

Just prior to the 2012 strike, SFS musicians were offered a contract which

included no increase in pay for the first year, a 1% increase the following year

and 2% the year after that. This moderate increase was surprisingly low to

musicians, considering how previous contracts had included much higher pay

increases. Executive Director, Brent Assink remarked in response to this:

“We will continue to work hard to develop a fair agreement that

gives our talented musicians a contract that reflects our stature as one of the top

orchestras in the country but also one that sets a prudent financial course for the

future” (SF Symphony Musicians Strike Forces Cancellation, 2013).

This slight increase was combined with an increased expectation on musicians to

pay for healthcare coverage premiums. Assink also remarked, in response to

this,

“Many of America's top orchestras are facing similar challenges with

increased concert production, pension, and health care costs currently outpacing

revenue growth. We are developing a multi-year plan to achieve a balanced

34

operating model, including identifying and growing new sources of revenue and

at the same time reducing the growth rate of expenses” (SF Symphony

Musicians Strike Forces Cancellation, 2013).

The argument here is the same argument used for the CSO strike, the necessity

to maintain standing in the competitive salaries and compensation for top 10

orchestras. Below is a chart of the 10 highest paid orchestras in season

2009/2010 with some data of changing compensation figures through 2014.

According to “Adaptistration,” SFS and CSO are very high on this list, and

maintaining rank or moving up in rank are desired qualities for maintaining the

highest level of artistic talent (McManus, 2011).

35

In many cases of work stoppage, public opinion can heavily impact the

outcome, especially when major donor or government figures become involved.

In the case of San Francisco, when the musicians went on strike it can be

assumed the musicians thought they would have at least a divided public with

many supporters, a neutral majority and some opposition. What they discovered,

however, after the strike was announced was a surprisingly larger pool of public

dissenters. One iconic article released during the course of the strike was titled,

“San Francisco’s Sulky Strikers Deserve Ridicule” (Hoelterhoff, 2013). Although

the article was highly negative towards musicians and bordered on hyperbole, it

warned that there is a fine in the eyes of the public between strikes with due

cause and strikes that appear to go against common sense. What was the

apparent cause of public critique? According to an article from the San Francisco

Civic Center, it was the orchestra’s pay grade. SFS is the third highest paid

orchestra in the United States, behind only the Los Angeles Philharmonic and the

CSO. Part of the musician’s point of contention is pay parity with those

orchestras, and much of the public saw this as a poor reason to disappoint

patrons with cancelled concerts and a cancelled Carnegie Hall tour (Strickland,

2013). It appears, due to the widely spreading public acknowledgement of

orchestra difficulties including the Minnesota Orchestra and St. Paul Chamber

Orchestra facing 20-30% pay cuts, Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, Philadelphia

Orchestra and Honolulu Symphony and other orchestras on the brink of

bankruptcy or closure- patrons experienced a lack of sympathy for musicians

being paid $141,700 base salary with increases beginning the second year of the

contract (Gereben, 2013). It is possible that this public perception, that did not

favor the musician’s points, could have been a factor which shortened the length

of the strike.

36

Another related talking point by the musicians was the fear of losing top

players to Chicago or LA, for which they cited the departure of David Herbert,

principal timpanist who won, and subsequently accepted, a job with the CSO. In

an open letter to the public about his departure, Herbert stated his reasons for

accepting the Chicago job to be “a growing disconnect between management

and musicians” and the lack of interest in management to accommodate him with

practice space for his timpani ("Symphony Timpanist David Herbert Leaving SFS

for Chicago Symphony Orchestra", 2013). This contributed to the already

negative public view of the musicians when statements from management

showed a true attempt to provide Herbert with a compensation package which

would incentivize him to remain with the SFS:

“It's unfortunate that David feels that he was not valued and supported as

an artist at the SFS. He is very talented member of the orchestra and when he

showed interest in the CSO position was offered sizeable additional salary and

longevity bonus to stay in San Francisco, on top of his current salary of

$214,000. To underscore our support for David, he also receives 16 weeks paid

vacation a year, six more than most musicians, to pursue personal artistic

projects important to him as we greatly value our musicians' varied artistic

interests outside of Davies Symphony Hall as members of our vibrant arts

community” (Gereben, 2013).

Management responses, public statements, and attitudes toward the

musicians of the San Francisco Symphony, stand in stark contrast to many work

stoppage situations, especially those identified at earlier points in the paper.

Throughout the entirety of the strike, every statement from management released

to the public, especially those of Executive Director Brent Assink, expressed a

37

fundamental appreciation for musicians, a desire to come to a mutually

agreeable contract, and refrained from placing blame for the work stoppage on

musicians or union representatives (Gereben, 2013). This demonstrates that the

SFS fundamentally believes in the necessity to demonstrate respect and

authenticity, an integral part of management and musician relations.

The view of negotiations when financial conditions are unstable, based on

historical precedent, is the inevitability of a work stoppage. However, the

Nashville Symphony Orchestra [NSO] situation shows that it is possible to

navigate financial instability without negotiating in the eyes of the public and ratify

an agreement. The set of circumstances involved in the Nashville Symphony

Orchestra contract negotiations include a series of disasters outside of

management’s control that contributed to the increasing deficits and need for

financial restructuring, transparency of financial information for musicians and the

public, and a temporary contract with plans for returning to previous

compensation figures quickly.

In recent years, the NSO has seen significant improvements in artistry

and quality of programming. Now the largest performing arts institution in

Tennessee, the orchestra boasts innovative programs and a vibrant music

director in a city known for its musical history. A series of disasters has

challenged the orchestra to maintain balanced budgets. The first of these, as is

consistent across orchestras nationwide, was the economic downturn. After the

fall of the economy, gifts to the symphony fell drastically from just over $39

million in 2008 to just $10.6 million in 2012. Likewise, investment income saw

similar drops down to only $2.2 million in 2012 from the $6.4 million the year

before (Kozinn, 2013).

38

The NSO situation is unique in the broader context of the economic

outlook, however, because of a devastating flood which hit the downtown

Nashville area in May 2010. This natural disaster caused around $40 million in

damages to Schermerhorn Hall, which is financed by the NSO. The sequence of

these events contributed to a combined shortfall of $39 million since fiscal year

2009. These factors, though problematic, were not attributed to management

shortcomings or their inability to successfully raise funds on a year to year basis

(Kozinn, 2013). This showed in musician interpretation of the events. James

Zimmerman, principal clarinet of the NSO remarked,

“No one had the idea that this was management’s fault” (Zimmerman,

2013).

Incompetency of orchestra managers being a go-to argument in concessionary

contracts, this ideology can have positive results on the culture of negotiations.

Transparency of financial information is an additional component that

contributes to the end result of a ratified contract for this orchestra. According to

Zimmerman, Alan Valentine, CEO of the NSO, communicated the bad news of

financial shortcomings directly to the musicians honestly and with urgency.

Musicians were never left in the dark only to be surprised by a concessionary

contract offer when the time for negotiations arrived. This transparency carried

over to the public as well. A “New York Times” article on June 7 by Allan Kozinn

stated that the symphony management kept the public updated through, “a series

of open letters and updates on its website” (Kozinn, 2013).

The two final elements to this situation which aided the organization in

avoiding a work stoppage while still ratifying a contract with significant cuts was

39

the temporary nature of this contract, and the matching of cuts across

management. The final contract that was signed by musicians and management

included a 15% pay cut for musicians. Orchestra members stated that these cuts

were “similar to cuts the administrative staff had taken.” Not only were the

financial burdens shared amongst orchestra members, administrative staff and

senior management, but orchestra musicians were praised for their willingness to

sacrifice in hard times. Valentine said the sacrifice would “allow (the NSO) to

continue offering the same level of programming,” and Laura Ross, Nashville

musicians’ union representative, echoed his statements by stating:

“Although it was a difficult contract, the musicians agreed because they believed

their role in the community was important.”

The agreed-upon contract, however, is clearly temporary in nature. A one-year

agreement, which will reopen for negotiation in July 2015, was a plan to regain

fiscal viability not to restructure the role of musicians. The press release

announcing the ratified contract contains verbiage acknowledging this. The

contract was described as a “stop-gap measure” and the musicians said they

“look forward to working with the Symphony Association towards a mutual goal of

restoring NSO salaries to a level commensurate with their world-class talent as

soon as possible” (Ridley, 2013).

Respect, a temporary contract, and extenuating circumstances all came together

to allow the Nashville Symphony to come to an agreement while avoiding a work

stoppage.

40

CONCLUSIONS

There is a growing disconnect between public perceptions of the value of

symphony orchestras and live classical music as a whole. There are two schools

of thought and a wide spectrum of belief in the middle that demonstrate these

ideas about value. One school of thought can be summed up by the phrase

intrinsic value. People with this mindset believe that orchestras and classical

music possess value simply from the very nature of the art form. Because of the

tradition of symphonic music, and the intellect involved in the processes of

composing, preparing, and performing classical music, this art should be

preserved and promoted. This leads to the perception that orchestras have no

need to expand community relevance, connect directly with audiences, or

collaborate with other art forms. With this mindset, orchestras exist-and will

always continue to exist- for the production of symphonic music, especially

western European classical works. Some problems that can result from this

school of thought include orchestras producing too many concerts geared

towards the performance of European classical music even when demand from

audience shrinks, as evidenced by loss of revenues from subscriptions and

individual ticket sales. Another problematic result to this belief involves wages for

orchestra musicians that may no longer be supported by the market. This

argument came into play in Detroit as many people questioned whether a world-

renowned orchestra has the ability to exist in a mid-size city. The result may be

that the demand simply does not exist, at least for a model of exclusively

symphonic music performed in a concert hall.

There is another school of thought on the opposite end of the spectrum

whose argument can produce equally problematic results in orchestras as the

41

intrinsic value argument. This view comes with the idea that classical music is

dead. People claiming this point of view believe the only way to preserve the

orchestra in the United States is by doing away with the majority of classical

concerts, by shrinking Masterworks and chamber offerings and, instead, focusing

on Pops, community performances, and guest artists that blend genres. This

school of thought often leads to extreme adjustments in strategic direction for

orchestras when held by one or more decision-making stakeholders.

The main obstacle with these two schools of thought comes when

stakeholders in a single organization hold beliefs on opposite ends of the

spectrum or disagree strongly as to where on the spectrum their organization fits.

This is where one of the arguments from the Minnesota Orchestra lockout

becomes relevant. The MOA, namely Henson and the board chairs, appeared to

strongly favor the argument that classical music as it currently stands can no

longer exist. This could explain the evident push towards eliminating a wide

range of orchestra concerts, and adding more pops and guest artist programing

for the purposes of securing a stable financial future for the Minnesota Orchestra.

For current and future managers of orchestras, the identified best

practice, in the researcher’s opinion, from this idea of disconnect between ideas

of the value of orchestras is a need for evaluation within the manager’s own

organization. The vision and mission of the organization could exist at any point

along the spectrum of value and each orchestra will have a different realization of

what that value means to the community. However, this idea must be known and

supported by all constituents. If managers can 1. Identify how their stakeholders

view the value of their orchestra 2. Communicate how, as the manager, they

think about this value, and 3. Assure that all primary stakeholders are aligned in

42

this big idea which directly impacts the strategic direction of the organization, it

will have positive impacts on the organization in critical times, such as

negotiations. This best practice can insure that no stakeholder is blindsided by

steps towards a new strategic direction for the organization during the negotiation

process.

Throughout each of the negotiations discussed in this paper, a key idea

that regularly presented itself was either the presence or absence of authenticity,

transparency, respect, and musician involvement. The best practice that the

researcher has identified involving these concepts is the necessity for respect

and transparency at all times, especially in the potentially heated environment of

contract negotiations. First comes the idea of authenticity and transparency.

There are a few parts to this concept. The first of these is consistency of what the

top manager divulges. Does what the management says one year carry on to the

next year? If the musicians are told the organization is in good financial health

one year and then soon before the contract is opened for negotiations are

informed that this is not, in fact, the case, they will be much less willing to believe

management’s claims throughout the negotiation. The next part of authenticity

and transparency is consistency across stakeholders. Does what one says to the

board, echo what is said to the musicians, press, donors, funding institutions, etc.

If musicians are hearing one story from management but another story entirely

from other reliable sources, the trust necessary for negotiating in good faith will

be completely lost. Another element to the critical relationship between

management and musicians is respect. When interacting with the press, the

board and donors, especially during negotiations, but this is imperative at all

times, how does the way you speak about the musicians of the orchestra say

43

communicate the value the organization places on them. Do the musicians know

how much they are valued or does key leadership forget to remind them? Does

top management view the musicians as entirely replaceable or value each

individual as an artist, critical to the unique sound of the orchestra? In both the

Minnesota and Detroit situations, the executive leadership is quoted to have

made similar statement about the easy replacability of the entirety of their

musicians.

“When we get up and running again, as other orchestras in this position

have, we will advertise for the jobs that we need to replace, and I’m sure we will

get an astonishing bunch of individuals who will want to perform and live in this

great city”- Michael Henson, MOA (Hogstad, 2014).

"That's their choice not mine, if they choose [to go] because they are

making less money temporarily, I respect that. But then the question is who is

going to take the job? Will we be able to fill those jobs? I don't want to do this, but

were I to analyze, is there enough talent out there to replace players who leave, I

would have to say given the number of orchestras that haven't been hiring and

the number of musicians coming out of Juilliard, Curtis, New World, China and

elsewhere – and the number of talented musicians in great orchestras in the

smaller cities in America who pay less than we are offering – I would have to say

sadly: I don't want to do this but there are talented players out there"- Anne

Parsons, DSO (Pinkington, 2010).

In San Francisco, Chicago and Nashville, however, a statement like that would

be entirely unheard of and in fact, public statements included wording such as

44

“Chicago Symphony Orchestra musicians are world class professionals,

and deserve every dollar and every benefit offered in this contract” –Deborah

Rutter, CSO (Chicago Symphony Orchestra Association).

In negotiations, executive leaders should focus on creating an environment

where the other side feels comfortable enough to do the right thing for the future

of the organization. If you constantly focus energy on negative PR points and

exaggerated spin, this gives the wrong environment and sets up the tone for

exclusively emotional bargaining. This can also lead either side to seek the “win”

in negotiations. This means that often the ideals can become, “if we don’t get

what we want, we will make them suffer.” When this becomes the mentality, very

little good can result from negotiations. By consistently following the best practice

of treating musicians with respect, and maintaining authenticity and transparency

or everything said, managers can foster an environment of mutual trust. This

trust can serve as the difference between a sound financial future for the

organization, and a devastating work stoppage.

45

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Interview Questions with Rachel Ford

1. When is the last time the KSO was in contract negotiations? Tell me about the process.

2. What are the fears one has when going into negotiations?

2. As management, what are the outcomes you are hoping for?

a. Procedural

b. Financial

c. Other?

3. What do expect from the musicians in return?

a. Negotiations

b. Counter-offers

4. Do you believe it makes a big difference being a smaller orchestra?

5. What kind of struggles do you face as a small orchestra as opposed to larger ones in negotiation?

6. What are some advantages to being a smaller orchestra for negotiations?

7. What is the role of the American Federation of Musicians for the negotiations in Knoxville?

8. How much does the contract change from year to year?

Financial Situations

1. How do you, as executive director, insure that your budget stays in the black each year?

2. When setting the original budget, how do you account for possibly not meeting projections?

3. What aspects must you look at each season when deciding a budget/reviewing a budget?

a. Programming

b. Development

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4. What is offered (education/outreach programming, runouts, masterworks, pops)

a. Hall rental vs. owning a performance space

5. Are there major catastrophes you plan for?

6. What is the relationship between the budget and the endowment?

7. How does budget planning change with account to economic downturns?

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Appendix 2: Interview Questions with Kenneth Freed

1. Tell me about your position at the Minnesota orchestra and your involvement with the contract negotiations.

2. Give me some background to the story. At what point did you realize the orchestra was in financial trouble? Was this something that was well known as it began to happen or did you find out close to negotiation time?

3. In the few months approaching negotiations, what were you (and other musicians) feeling about the impending negotiation? Were you nervous? Hopeful? Etc.

4. Tell me about your reactions to the initial contract proposal.

5. Tell me about your experience during the lockout. Did you perform with the other musicians without management? What happened in the ongoing talks or periods when there were no talks?

6. What do you think about the contract now? Have you seen it?

7. Tell me about the culture of the orchestra and how it has changed over the past few years. Did management and musicians communicate pre-lockout, during the lockout, now?

8. What do you think of the “non-confidence vote” for Henson and how it affected the talks, how is it playing out now?

9. What do you think about the MD’s role throughout this event?

10. What was involved in the strategic planning process?

11. What would you have done differently and wished management had done differently?

12. Other thoughts, commentary?