Higher Education 14 (1985) 433-445 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam Printed in the Netherlands

STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: POLITICAL MODELS*

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THREE

DESMOND RUTHERFORD and WILLIAM FLEMING University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

and HAYDN MATHIAS University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT

This article describes three models which give insight into the factors that promote or inhibit change in institutions of higher education: a structural model; a social model; and a personal model. Although each offers a distinctive perspective, a number of recurrent themes are identified where the models support and complement one another. The usefulness of the three models in practice is illustrated by analysing how they might help in a possible innovation - the rapid expansion of Continuing Education in a traditional university.

Introduction

Demographic and economic trends present many institutions of higher education with two sharply contrasting alternatives: substantial contraction or adaptation without growth. The first of these alternatives is generally un- acceptable. The second can only be realised through the reallocation of scarce resources to provide courses which will more accurately respond to current and future needs and which, in turn, will attract increased numbers of "non- traditional" students. This will be a difficult and painful process. Thus a theoretical perspective that can be readily understood and acted upon by senior administrators and academics is urgently needed since institutions of higher education are notoriously difficult to manage effectively, particularly when resources are being constrained.

* This is a revised and extended version of a paper presented at the Sixth International Conference on Higher Education, University of Lancaster, August 28-31, 1984.

0018-1560/85/$ 03.30 �9 1985 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

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Both Davies and Morgan (1982) and Ellstrom (1983) have described four organizational models of higher education institutions. The latter argued that these models do not represent mutually exclusive alternatives but are comple- mentary, depending on organizational goals and decision-making processes. The four models described by Davies and Morgan are: the bureaucratic model; the collegial model; the political model; and the organized anarchy model. However the most appropriate model - particularly for the universities - seems to be the latter. In the original study, Cohen and March (1974) pointed out that the president of a university (i.e., the most senior administrator) has only a modest control over the events of an institution's life, that central direction is extremely problematic and that the institutions themselves are best described a s organized anarchies. Such organizations exhibit the following general properties: problematic goals (i.e., inconsistent and ill-defined preferences that are constantly changing); unclear technology (i.e., unsystematic and ill-understood problem- solving procedures); fluid participation (i.e., variability in the amount of time and effort that members devote to the organization).

Hewton (1982) suggested some of the reasons for this state of affairs: an organizational system based on subject departments rather than on a central administration; a value system which stresses the autonomy of both individual academics and departments; a decision-making system which relies on a complex committee structure to encourage debate and dissent but one in which the actual decision-making process is obscure; and a covert power system which is largly controlled by Heads of Departments. Nevertheless, institutions of higher education have, in the past, been able to respond to the opportunities provided by an expanding student body and, consequently, increased resources. However it is questionable whether they can respond as effectively to the different and much more severe challenges and strains posed by contraction or adaptation without growth.

In this article we describe three models which we believe provide some insight into the factors that promote and inhibit innovation and change in institutions of higher education. All three models draw on the concept of change as an essentially political process in sharp contrast to the rational model developed, in particular, by Havelock (1973). This rational model emphasises a problem-solving process which involves six stages: building relationships; diagnosing the problem; acquiring resources; choosing the solution; gaining acceptance; stabilizing the innovation. In addition, Havelock described the tactics and skills needed by the "agent of change" at each stage and used the term "linkage" to describe the essential interaction between users and experts as separately and together they sought to effect change. The rational model is extensively documented in the literature (e.g., Lindquist, 1978; Boud and McDonald, 1981; and Rutherford, 1982) and should be seen as complementary to the perspective that we will develop in this article.

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Models

A STRUCTURAL MODEL

Becher and Kogan (1980) described the organization of higher education in terms of four levels: central authority; institution; basic unit (approximating to department); individual. Each level is characterised by a distinct set of values and tasks, and two inter-related processes of interaction: the normative mode, which focuses on the maintenance of values; the operational mode, which focuses on the execution of tasks. The normative mode is further divided into intrinsic (i.e., essentially personal values) and extrinsic (i.e., values that are transmitted by the next level in the hierarchy). Interaction between adjacent levels occurs in the normative mode through the expression of judgements and in the operational mode through the allocation of tasks and resources. The resulting eight-cell matrix provides an elegant but necessarily over-simplified model of the key structures and processes in higher education.

This model is undoubtedly general in its formulation. The distinctions between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" values at each level may be conceptually neat but practically difficult to separate. There is an implication of a hierarchical process of judgements passing down from higher to lower levels although the nature of decision-making is recognised by the authors as "negotiative" rather than "managerial" or "consensuar'. Similarly, the model suggests that only adjacent levels interact although, again, it is acknowledged that the same individuals may find themselves working at different levels in the system.

The concept of different levels has also received support from Clark (1983). In particular, he described the differences in priorities and preferred procedures between the "understructure" (i.e., the departments or operating units), the "middle structure" (i.e., the institution in its entirety), and the "superstructure" (i.e., the wider system which includes the central authority). For example, a characteristic of the understructure is to pursue ever greater autonomy and fragmentation through professional models of interaction and organizational arrangements. In contrast, the superstructure seeks to impose order and unity generally by more sophisticated formal structures and increased bureaucratic control. There is considerable tension between the levels and different strategies for change are therefore appropriate.

Becher and Kogan argued that a predisposition for change is created when the equilibrium between normative and operational modes is disturbed and values and tasks conflict. They characterised innovations in higher education depending on whether there is an external or an internal impetus to change, whether they are preceded by a change in values (i.e., normative to operational) or in tasks (i.e., operational to normative), and whether they challenge or confirm existing norms. Some kind of external pressure or power is usually needed. However, the nature of this external power is more effective when it is

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diffuse (e.g., market pressures) or takes the form of incentives for growth and expansion. Prescriptive pressure is ineffective except when it directly threatens survival.

To summarise, the model predicts that an innovation is likely to be successful if there is external pressure emphasising normative to operational change which is evolutionary rather than radical in character. On the other hand, internally generated initiatives tend to be associated with operational to normative change and, again, are evolutionary and relatively slow-moving in character.

A SOCIAL MODEL

Lindquist (1978), reporting on four years of systematic study into planned change at several American colleges and universities, identified five factors which, he argued, stood out as critical ingredients in any attempt to introduce change into the practices of complex organizations: interpersonal and in- formational linkage (i.e., crossing formal organizational boundaries and bring- ing people together and then confronting them with new ideas and information); active openness (i.e., actively seeking for new ideas and information beyond one's primary group); initiating, guiding, involving and influential leadership (i.e., contrasting with the style traditionally associated with a strong authoritarian father figure); ownership (i.e., recognising the need to involve those persons whose understanding, acceptance, time and skills are needed to carry out the change); material and psychic rewards.

Berg and Ostergren (1977; 1979) carried out a thorough investigation of seven fairly radical innovations in course development and teaching methods in a number of Swedish universities. They argued that since each innovation takes place in a unique institutional context the various groups - both social and organizational - that make up the social system need to be identified and their inter-relationships analysed. Furthermore, they argued that the actions of individuals are largely determined by the groups to which they belong. Berg and Ostergren identified four decisive factors which enabled them to explain why some innovations were successful and why others failed. The four factors are: gain/loss (i.e., the advantages and disadvantages for groups and individuals particularly in the areas of security/stability and personal satisfaction/self- realisation as a consequence of the innovation); ownership (i.e., the quality of feeling that groups and individuals experience because of their involvement in the creation and introduction of the innovation and, hence, their commitment to its success); leadership (i.e., primary leaders who had introduced the innovation, secondary leaders who created or were involved in part of the innovation, formal leaders who were in positions of authority and supported the innovation and opposition leaders were all identified); power (i.e., the exercise or the threat of

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the exercise of power was found to be essential in order to implement, sustain and, in particular, to institutionalise the innovation).

There is substantial overlap between the two models. Berg and Ostergren's suggestion to identify the various groups rather than the individuals who interact and influence the success or failure of the innovation provides a starting point. The interactions between the groups can then be analysed by combining the decisive factors from the two models. Ownership and leadership are mentioned in both although the latter receives a rather different emphasis. Lindquist's notion of rewards appears very similar to Berg and Ostergren's concept of gain/loss. On the other hand, linkage and openness do not appear in Berg and Ostergren's model as "decisive factors" but are rather incorporated as part of their analysis in terms of "descriptive factors for internal and external relations". These two factors are considered of variable importance and as ways in which levels of conflict may be controlled within the system. Power does not appear quite so specifically and openly in Lindquist's model but is recognised more as a latent factor.

The relative importance placed on the factors by each model arises from their different theoretical origins. Lindquist, following Havelock, placed more emphasis on a systematic and comprehensive strategy for effecting planned change and on the contribution of the "agent for change". Berg and Ostergren focused more on the conflict generated within a system and viewed innovation in terms of a political process of internal negotiation among various interest groups. There is considerable agreement between the two models in their identification of those key factors which are likely to determine the success or failure of an innovation. It would seem that these factors have a significance which to a large extent transcends their different theoretical origins. Although previously (Mathias and Rutherford, 1983) we have attempted to combine the two models, in this article we will draw only on Berg and Ostergren's model.

To summarise, the model predicts that an innovation is likely to be successful if there are clear gains and few losses to be made, a strong sense of ownership, effective leadership, and a sensitive and timely exercise of power to secure the innovation. Innovation processes are, however, dynamic so that the characteristics of gains and losses, ownership, leadership and power may differ and may exert a variable influence over the passage of time.

A PERSONAL MODEL

Argyris and Schon (1974), Argyris (1982) and, particularly in relation to higher education, Heller (1982) and Fleming and Rutherford (1984) have argued that actions a re informed by a Theory-in-Use which consists of "governing values" and associated behavioural strategies of which, for the most part, we are largely unaware and over which we have little control. Three different Theories- in-Use were descr ibed- Model 1, Model l a (the direct opposite of Model 1)and

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Model 2 - and a distinction was made between these and the often very different values and strategies we proclaim in public - our Espoused Theory.

Most attempts at radical innovation fail because the participants' actions are determined by a Model 1 Theory-in-Use. Commonly held values which contribute to a Model 1 Theory-in-Use include: defining goals in private with a minimum of consultation; maximising winning and minimising losing actions to achieve these goals; being rational and avoiding expressions of feelings. To achieve such goals, these values are translated into the following strategies: controlling and manipulating colleagues and the environment; seeking respons- ibility for and ownership of specific goal-orientated tasks; unilaterally protecting oneself and preventing others from being hurt. The unintentional consequences of these values and strategies in practice are the escalation of existing problems and the creation of new problems.

There aretwo reasons why this occurs: first, academics who seek to achieve their unilateral and undiscussable goals by controlling and manipulating others provoke either increasing resentment or superficial compliance; second, in- ferences and evaluations of colleagues' ideas, behaviour and competence are not made explicit and tested with the inevitable result that errors and misunder- standings are perpetuated and compounded rather than resolved. Argyris and Schon defined attempts to solve problems which did not allow academics to identify, question and, if necessary, change their governing values and the corresponding ineffective strategies as "single-loop problem-solving", and concluded that for the most part such attempts were doomed to failure.

The actions of academics whose governing values are directly opposite to Model 1 are said to be informed by a Model la Theory-in-Use. In decision- making situations such academics appear diffident and indecisive, guided by pragmatism rather than conviction. Their relationships with others are charac- terised by a frankness which is often tinged with criticism and sarcasm. Thus the consequences for innovation and change of the Model l a Theory-in-Use are equally ineffective. However it is important to appreciate that while Model 1 and la strategies can solve problems of a routine nature, they cannot solve problems of a non-routine type such as those which arise at a time of crisis and fundamental change.

Argyris and Schon also described a Model 2 Theory-in-Use which, they claimed, provided academics with the skills they need to address and solve their own problems. Model 2 values emphasise: production of valid information particularly with respect to goals and personal relationships; free and informed choice in decision making; internal commitment to decisions made and the evaluation of their effects. Appropriate strategies include: strong advocacy of personal positions coupled with an invitation to others to confront and dispute these; free expression and testing of the validity of inferences and evaluations of the ideas and actions of colleagues; willingness to work with others and share

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power in the resolution of common problems. Academics whose actions are informed by a Model 2 Theory-in-Use are able to reflect on the causal role of their governing values and change them when needed (i.e., what Argyris and Schon termed "double-loop problem-solving") with the consequent increase in personal effectiveness. The outcome of a Model 2 Theory-in-Use is no less than "the creation of a new behavioural world" through a greater sense of openness and spirit of cooperation.

One of the difficulties is that it is quite possible to articulate in all sincerity a Model 2 Espoused Theory yet for action, unknowingly, to remain firmly rooted in a Model 1 or la Theory-in-Use. However, differences between Espoused Theory and Theory-in-Use, once made explicit, can provide a powerful stimulus to change.

To summarise, the model emphasises the pervasive nature of the Model 1 Theory-in-Use with the inevitable result that, for non-routine problems, there is often an insight and recognition of what should be done, but an inability to produce effective action that would secure the required change. A Model 2 Theory-in-Use provides a real possibility of being able to solve the challenging problems that confront institutions of higher education. However the difficulties involved in changing Theories-in-Use are very substantial.

Themes

Is not our purpose to synthesise the three models since each offers a characteristic perspective on the processes of innovation and change? We suspect that such a synthesis - were it attempted - would do justice neither to the complexities of the processes involved nor to the insights that the various models can provide. However, it is possible to highlight some recurrent themes and to point out where the models support and complement each other.

First, within an institution of higher education there are various groups with legitimate but perhaps conflicting goals and priorities. Each group will view a prospective innovation in a different way, depending on how its own responsibilities and aspirations are likely to be affected. Becher and Kogan identified these different groups in a rather formal and mechanistic way by analysing the different levels in the system, each with its own set of relatively fixed values and tasks. On the other hand, Berg and Ostergren argued that the formation and maintenance of such groups is a much more organic process, depending on the nature of the innovation itself and the implications that may follow.

Second, some problems are routine and can be dealt with in a relatively straightforward manner whereas others appear intractable and require a new and more radical approach to their solution. Berg and Ostergren's model

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emerged from a study of radical changes in academic practices (i.e., system- divergent) rather than changes which confirmed or extended well-established practices (i.e., system-convergent). This distinction between routine and non- routine problems is also found in Argyris and Schon's model. Routine problems can be solved fairly satisfactorily using Model I or 1 a strategies but non-routine problems require the more sophisticated Model 2 approach.

Third, each group may approach a problem in two quite different ways: the first occurs in the rhetoric of discussion about the analysis of problems and the possibilities for change; the second occurs in the implementation of a chosen solution. In actual discussions and statements of policy, groups will in all sincerity espouse the values they claim to hold but these are not necessarily the values that guide and inform their actions. Becher and Kogan recognised the important distinction between values and actions when they described the normative and operational modes respectively. They argued that a predisposi- tion for change is produced when values and actions are out-of-phase. An essential feature of Argyris and Schon's model is that individuals and groups may espouse certain values yet act in quite different ways and be unaware of this difference. This finding has profound implications for innovation and explains why, as we have suggested earlier, there is often insight into a problem, recognition of what needs to be done but an inability to effect the desired change.

Fourth, radical changes must be preceded by a change in values and changes in procedures without a corresponding change in values will remain at a superficial and transient level (i.e., the latter will tend to maintain and protect the status quo rather than expose, confront and solve the serious problems facing the institution). Becher and Kogan suggested that normative to operational changes were likely to be more long lasting and effective than those which they classified as operational to normative. The necessity of changing values also lies at the heart of Argyris and Schon's model in that the values that underly the ineffective Model 1 or la Theory-in-Use need to be replaced by Model 2 values.

Fifth, "leadership" is important in order to facilitate change. Berg and Ostergren listed "leadership" among their four decisive factors, although they did not define precisely what they meant by "effective" leadership. However, Lindquist, in his analysis, described the style of leadership that seems to be necessary:

Leadership, however, was not the kind traditionally associated with a strong, authoritarian father figure. No leader succeeded in telling largely autonomous professionals how to educate; no leader succeeded in making directions stick if those professionals were not in agreement with the leader's instructions. Rather, the approach to leadership which made a difference was a combination of initiating change activities, structuring and guiding and pushing and supporting the planned change process (Lindquist, 1978, p. 241).

These characteristics are very close to those exhibited by a Model 2 leader in

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Argyris and Schon's model. Nevertheless, it is still arguable that many academics prefer, in practice, a Model 1 leader with the "form" of participation in decision- making but not the reality. A Model 1 leader might appear to make the minimum of demands, thus allowing academics tO concentrate on their two main priorities: contributing to the advancement of their discipline and establishing a reputation among their peers in the wider academic community. A certain flexibility in leadership style is needed which obviously depends on the circumstances and those involved. However, at a time of crisis when difficult decisions about conflicting priorities have to be taken, Argyris and Schon would argue for the necessity of Model 2 leadership.

Finally, "power" is important if change is to be legitimised and insti- tutionalised. Becher and Kogan described the different forms of power - diffuse market pressures, incentives for expansion, prescriptions for contraction - and emphasised that the exercise or, at least, the threat of the exercise of power is usually needed if an innovation is to be successfully introduced, maintained and secured. Berg and Ostergren identified "power" as the most important of their four decisive factors. Many innovations flourish for all too brief a period and then disappear as their originator's enthusiasm wanes or he leaves the institution - integration into the routine life of the department or the institution remains an unaccomplished goal. On the other hand, "power", when it is applied in a coercive way, is rarely effective on its own as Clark has pointed out:

... changes initiated at the top commonly need the support of interests residing at lower levels. Those at the top have to "carry the field" rather than command it, building internal constituencies and coalitions to support and implement their own desires. So many centrally-announced reforms have no lasting deposit because internal constituencies are not effectively summoned to support them (Clark, 1983, p. 144).

C a s e S t u d y

In order to examine the usefulness of the three models in practice, we will now analyse very briefly how they can help in, for example, the rapid expansion of Continuing Education in a traditional university. We will assume that this expansion will take place through a programme of post-experience courses arranged by academic departments and that a small Department of Continuing Education will play a central role in stimulating new developments and in co-ordinating the on-going programme of existing courses.

Becher and Kogan's model suggests that the active support of senior administrators - providing the necessary internal pressure and resources - is essential. It is senior administrators who bear the primary responsibility for promoting an institutional ethos that is responsive to new ideas and more likely to welcome change. However, if an attempt was made to impose the innovation upon reluctant and suspicious academics, then the prospects for success would

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be much less favourable - there could be superficial compliance but the reality would be one of lack of interest, prevarication and covert obstruction. For example, if senior administrators tried to promote Continuing Education by arguing that this might ensure the survival of particular departments, it is doubtful whether this coercive strategy would be credible and effective.

The innovation would be more likely to succeed if there had been a change in values among the generality of academic staff in support of Continuing Education. Some academics may have become convinced of the growing demand and necessity for updating professional knowledge and skills whereas others may regard Continuing Education as a legitimate area of interest and even expansion. On the other hand, courses arranged on a "one-off" basis by academics who are not committed to the expansion of Continuing Education, but who are perhaps under some pressure from their Head of Department, are unlikely to be successful.

It is also arguable that Continuing Education can only succeed in a traditional university if academics are able to plan, teach and examine in their usual ways (i.e., if the differences between courses organized for Continuing Education and traditional university courses are, in the first instance, of a minor nature). In other words, the expansion of Continuing Education should be an evolutionary process drawing on the existing skills and resources of those academics who are directly involved. Demands for radical changes in, for example, teaching methods are unlikely to be welcome among academics.

Berg and Ostergren's model focuses first of all on the identification of the interested groups: the senior administrators; the Department of Continuing Education; and the generality of academic staff. It is the senior administrators who need to exercise their "power" in an appropriate manner in order to ensure the expansion of Continuing Education. It is the Department of Continuing Education which will have to exercise the most sensitive "leadership" and balance the aspirations of the senior administrators with those of the academic staff. It is the generality of academic staff who must experience "ownership" through the organization and teaching of courses, and who must be convinced of the value of their efforts ("gain/loss"). Berg and Ostergren's model highlights the particular contribution that is needed from each of the various groups. For example, the influence ("power") exerted by the senior administrators needs to be expressed in practical ways with realistic incentives to support the academic work of individuals and departments ("gains") rather than in terms of threats and exhortations about what is for "the good of the university". Similarly, a certain route to disaster would be for the Department of Continuing Education to seek greater control ("ownership") of the courses from the academic departments.

Argyris and Schon's model focuses particularly on the leadership required

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to effect the innovation, principally by the senior administrators and by the person appointed as Head of the Department of Continuing Education. Model 2 skills will be of immense advantage since they alone can help academics to confront difficult problems, explore possible solutions and, most importantly, implement an agreed course of action. It will be of vital importance to ensure that academics do not feel controlled and manipulated, and that misunderstandings are not perpetuated and compounded. The following "pen portraits" of a Model 1 and a Model 2 Head of Department give an indication of the kind of leadership that, first, will not facilitate the innovation and, second, that will facilitate the innovation.

MODEL 1 HEAD

This Head regards himself very much as the "leader" of (his) department. He is a rather secretive person and sees it as his role and responsibility to make important decisions himself(often in private) and to ensure that these are carried out. He is something of a politician and is extremely skilled at persuading/cajoling others to his point of view. Some see him as a rather "cold fish" because he is not given to expressing his own feelings and it often seems difficult to "pin him down" on specific points. However, he is extremely protective and loyal to his own staff and does not tolerate "idle gossip" from staff about their colleagues.

MODEL 2 HEAD

This Head regards himself as the "chairman" of the department. He is open and cooperative. On important issues he readily offers his own ideas for discussion, with data to back them up, and invites comment. He dislikes "woolly thinking" and constantly asks colleagues to substantiate their opinions. However he strives for consensus and joint decision-making. Although he does not interfere in personal matters, he lets you know how you stand with him professionally and does not duck out of difficult situations. Where there are problems he always looks for ways to help rather than to assign blame and protect his own position.

This preliminary and cursory analysis of a realistic situation underlines the contribution that each of the three models can make to facilitating innovation. The processes are obviously complex and no one model is adequate.

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Concluding Remarks

The inescapable conclusion from this analysis is that if institutions of higher education are to respond effectively to the continuing challenges on their traditional autonomy and practices then radical changes in current values and behaviours are needed. Fortunately, Argyris and Schon's model clearly identifies those values which inhibit change and those which enable people to work together effectively and solve their common problems. However the difficulties involved in changing well-established value systems are very substantial. Argyris and Schon argued that the way forward is for those in positions of authority and power to seek to match their own values and consequent actions more closely to those of Model 2. In addition, Becher and Kogan provide an invaluable insight into the higher education system and offer guidelines at a strategic level to facilitate innovation. Berg and Ostergren's contribution is at a more tactical level in that their four factors can provide an economic model through which the process of change can be monitored and necessary interventions can be planned and executed.

In conclusion, the challenge facing higher education can hardly be over- estimated. Nevertheless the theoretical models which we have briefly outlined in this article may - through their different but complementary perspectives - go some way in helping senior academics and administrators to face an uncertain future with greater insight and confidence.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Tony Becher, Donald Bligh and Mike Shattock for their interest and encouragement during the preparation of this article.

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