Stonewalling and Suspicion during Presidential Scandals

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2012 65: 290 originally published online 12 May 2011Political Research QuarterlyScott J. Basinger and Brandon Rottinghaus

Stonewalling and Suspicion during Presidential Scandals

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All modern presidents must endure scandals within their administration. In the short term, a scandal can sink the president’s approval rating (Zaller 1999; Andolina and Wilcox 2000). A scandal can prime public opinion on related issues, as occurred with Central America policy after the Iran-Contra disclosures (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). In the long term, scandals play a central role in determining presidents’ legacies, and scandals can undermine public trust (Miller 1999). Scholars have docu-mented consequences of presidents lying (Alterman 2004) and of presidents perpetuating secrecy (Graubard 2004), but these accounts neither draw from nor contribute to scientific scholarship on the president as a rational public actor. According to Cameron (2002, 655), “If scandal seeking and scandal mongering are normal political tac-tics . . . then political scientists need to learn their logic.”

Several works have addressed presidents’ use of public opinion polling during scandals (Heith 1998, 2004; Rottinghaus and Bereznikova 2006) and rhetorical strategies for recovery after scandals (Quirk 1998; Dunn 2000; Blaney and Benoit 2001; Hacker, Giles, and Guerrero 2003). However, we find no studies of the president’s most impor-tant decision: whether to stonewall when allegations ini-tially surface. Essentially, stonewalling is the choice not to communicate with the public. This alternative is absent from existing scholarship on presidential communication, which emphasizes “offensive” communication strategies, aimed at achieving legislative and policy goals (Cohen 1995, 1999; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards 2003). Scholars have rigorously researched presidents’ public appeals on behalf of legislation (Rivers and Rose 1985;

401416 PRQ65210.1177/1065912911401416<italic>Basinger and Rottinghaus</italic>Political Research Quarterly

1University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:Scott Basinger, University of Houston, Department of Political Science, 447 Philip G. Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204-3011 Email: [email protected]

Stonewalling and Suspicion during Presidential Scandals

Scott J. Basinger1 and Brandon Rottinghaus1

Abstract

Scholars possess little theoretical understanding of how presidents behave during scandals. Existing presidential scholarship has focused on “offensive” communication, aimed at achieving legislative or policy goals, whereas the authors’ interest is in “defensive” communication. Using a game-theoretic signaling model of the president–media relationship, the authors identify conditions affecting White House stonewalling and media feeding frenzies. The president’s optimal behavior changes depending on circumstances, particularly the level of presidential involvement in the alleged misdeeds. The authors illustrate this with a case study of the Iran-Contra scandals and an empirical analysis of scandals from the Nixon through the Bush administrations.

Keywords

presidency, communications, game theory, scandals

Barrett 2005), budget proposals (Kernell 2007; Canes-Wrone 2006), agency appropriations (Canes-Wrone 2001), fund-ing for foreign policy initiatives (Canes-Wrone 2006), and veto threats (Cameron 2000). In each case, the moti-vation for going public is “inciting” or “arousing” or “persuading” the public. A president might be deterred from communicating if the president’s position represents a minority position (Canes-Wrone 2001) and when speaking may damage popularity (Brace and Hinckley 1993) or if “staying private” would improve chances of winning legislative concessions (Covington 1987). Our interest in this article is in presidential “defensive” communi-cation strategies when the White House is under attack.

This article proceeds in four parts. First, we define presidential scandal and outline our assumptions about president–media interactions during a scandal. Second, we present a formal model of stonewalling, treating scandal politics as a signaling game.1 We derive postulates about the factors that affect presidential stonewalling. The model can incorporate a wide range of factors, but we focus on the effect of suspicion about the president’s involvement in the scandal or its cover-up. We examine presidential behavior in the Iran-Contra scandal, which presents a unique natural experiment because of President Reagan’s



Basinger and Rottinghaus 291

varying level of involvement in different aspects of the scandal. Finally, we provide a simple empirical analysis of presidential scandals from the Nixon through the Bush administrations.

Scandals as InteractionsAll presidents experience scandals, but not all instances of presidential deception become scandals. Pfiffner (2004, 18) contends, “Just as most people lie, so do most presi-dents.” A president might deceive to “prevent embarrass-ment and preserve political viability,” such as President Kennedy hiding his Addison’s disease (see Dallek 2010). A president also might deceive for reasons of national security. When a U-2 spy plane was downed in Russian airspace in February 1960, President Eisenhower claimed it was a weather research plane; he and his staff agreed that lying was the best option to save his effec-tiveness during a summit meeting (Pfiffner 2004, 41). When Premier Khrushchev produced the aircraft’s rem-nants and pilot, Francis Gary Powers, the administration was forced to admit that Eisenhower had authorized the intelligence-gathering missions (Pach and Richardson 1991, 218). These episodes of deception could have affected our views of each president, could have undermined policy goals, and could have led to official scrutiny, legal fights over executive privilege, and termination or resigna-tion of key staff. What makes a scandal distinct from deception is how it is reported and whether public disap-probation becomes part of the story.

We define a presidential scandal as allegations of illegal, unethical, or immoral behavior by the president, a senior administration official,2 or a nominee that comes to light during the president’s term in office and that occurred before or while the individual occupied office.3 While other definitions might be conceivable, our definition is consistent with the sense that scandals involve a “trans-gression” (Thompson 2000) or an act contrary to conven-tional morality or “a set of shared values” (Garment 1992), but it is also more specific. President Kennedy’s secrecy about his health and Eisenhower’s secrecy about spy planes do not fit our definition because scandal is not equivalent to deception.

Our definition adds specificity to past definitions in three ways. First, regarding the class of actions that can generate a scandal, we include inappropriate sexual rela-tionships because of the important and unique place they hold in the panacea of political scandals,4 and we include instances of allegedly illegal and unethical behavior. The “White House coffees” scandal fits our definition of scandal because the Clinton–Gore reelection campaign was inves-tigated for legal violations, even though it was eventually uncovered that the coffees occurred in the residence (see Davis 1999). The firing of seven federal prosecutors in

December 2006 fits our definition of scandal, even though Justice Department officials chose not to press criminal charges. The definition clarifies what events or actions are excluded, particularly instances of negative publicity, such as when Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally shot a hunting partner. This definition excludes unpopular policy decisions and any instances of sheer incompetence, such as FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina (see Adut 2008). We also exclude any unsubstantiated allegations, rumors, innuendo, and gossip (see Schultz 2000). These limits allow us to avoid (as much as possible) so-called scandals that are partisan-based charges with little or no merit (Ginsburg and Shefter 2002).

Second, our definition is specific in terms of the class of actors whose misbehavior can generate a presidential scandal. Actors must be part of the executive branch or a nominee, but must also be placed high enough—or close enough to the president—that the scandal is relevant to the president’s image or administration. Even a “lightning rod,” who absorbs political damage on the president’s behalf (see Ellis 1994), can result in some deprivation to the administration. Third, our definition is specific about when misbehavior occurred and when it is revealed for it to have an impact on the current president. Misbehavior by persons who left an administration and revelations of a former president’s misbehavior (e.g., Warren Harding’s or John Kennedy’s affairs) would not directly affect the current president, unless the current president was some-how allegedly involved. Misbehavior by presidential and vice presidential candidates, especially those who withdrew (e.g., Gary Hart) or lost the election (e.g., John Edwards), might also be scandalous but would not count as presi-dential scandals. The clarity this definition provides per-mits consistent measurement over time. It also permits one to distinguish between—and therefore to study the causal linkage between—scandals and negative media coverage.

Our primary interest is in the president’s public actions once a presidential scandal initially comes to light. Our assumption is that “the buck stops” with the president.5 Discussions of how to cope with a scandal can reach the Oval Office even if the president is not responsible for the alleged misbehavior. According to one veteran of scandal battles, there are “two different pathways of handling a scandal crisis once it breaks out, by getting the truth out yourself—‘tell it all, tell it early’—versus ‘deny, deny, deny’” (Davis 2006, 17-18).

One strategy that the White House can adopt is to coop-erate, by providing a full accounting of the situation, allowing the truth to become public and ensuring that responsible parties accept blame and suffer appropriate consequences (including resignation or a withdrawn nom-ination). “Telling it all” may require some investigation to uncover the truth, and presidents have allowed and have even encouraged investigations into alleged misbehavior.



292 Political Research Quarterly 65(2)

In October 1964, Chief of Staff Walter Jenkins was arrested on a morals charge, “a polite way of saying that he has been caught in a compromising sexual encounter with another man” (Schultz 2000, 363). President Johnson requested the FBI to investigate whether Jenkins’s behavior created a security risk. The investigation concluded that national security had not been compromised, although Jenkins resigned voluntarily. In September 1979, Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan was accused of using cocaine at a New York nightclub, Studio 54. Utilizing the new provi-sions of the Ethics in Government Act, President Carter appointed an independent counsel, who conducted a lengthy investigation but found no concrete evidence to support the allegations. In April 1991, when Chief of Staff John Sununu was accused of using military aircraft for personal trips, President Bush asked the comptroller general to investigate. Sununu was required to repay the government and later resigned when further financial improprieties came to light. Even the Iran-Contra scandals, which we discuss in detail below, were initially investi-gated by a presidential commission, known as the Tower Commission.

The alternative strategy that the White House can adopt is to interfere with the truth becoming public and insulate the responsible parties against blame or consequences. So-called stonewalling covers a broad range of actions: selective release of information to create a false impression, counterallegations (“a vast, right-wing conspiracy . . .”), misleading statements (“I don’t recall . . .”), claims of executive privilege claims, cover-ups, and outright lying. President Nixon’s actions after the Watergate Hotel break-in provide a multifaceted example of stonewalling tactics.6 Although Nixon did not authorize the actual break-in, his approval of a scheme to expand domestic intelligence gathering was the genesis for the operation. President Nixon delayed the release of the truth from the very first moment he found out about the connection between the burglars and the White House (Small 1999, 276). The president and his White House counsel, John Dean, decided they could ensure the continued silence of those involved in the cover-up by providing them “hush money” (Woodward and Bernstein 1976, 14). Several of those under indictment, including James McCord, alleged that they were pressured to remain silent and to plead guilty. The White House press secretary, Ron Ziegler, repeatedly denied the allegations and counterattacked the Washington Post, accusing its editor-in-chief of aiding a partisan campaign against the president. Later, White House staff obstructed a congressional investigation by denying the Senate Watergate Committee’s lawyers access to the Oval Office tape recordings, citing executive privilege. The president fired special prosecutor Archibald Cox. Ultimately, in a May 1973 statement, Nixon lied about his role in the cover-up.

Under what conditions will presidents decide to stone-wall? What factors influence this decision? Existing liter-ature on presidential scandals consists mainly of isolated case studies, including rich descriptions of events (e.g., Stewart 1996; Toobin 2000; Woodward and Bernstein 1974, 1976) and participants’ evaluations of the events (e.g., Blumenthal 2003; Davis 1999; Walsh 1997). These studies are informative but fail to provide theoretical insight into presidents’ strategies. One might speculate that presidents’ personalities are relevant, and while some presidents are unwilling to cede political ground to oppo-nents, others would be willing to endure scrutiny. Alternatively, one might conjecture that the type of alleged misconduct is relevant, and while some presidents are defensive about certain character traits or facets of their reputation (Pfiffner 2004), others have different sensitivities. To move beyond speculation and conjecture, we require a stronger and more general theory to predict and explain the conditions in which presidents are likely to stonewall.

Our thesis is that presidential strategies depend on the media environment as well as the political environment and contemporary political practices (see Ginsberg and Shefter 2002). The public looks to elites in the media to judge the importance of an alleged scandal (Miller 1999; Kiousis 2003; Woessner 2005). The way that a scandal is reported and the questions that the reporters ask influence whether the public perceives the president to be culpable (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Maurer 1999). We suggest that the media’s anticipated reactions are a critical determi-nant of the president’s actions. How obsessively will the media pursue the story if the president stonewalls? Consider the following three quotes. First, according to Sabato (1993, 63), “Ever since Watergate, most investi-gative journalists’ goal has been not just sensational reve-lation but the downfall of their target, a trophy head for their wall.” Second, according to Garment (1992, 81-82), “The aggressive, investigative, adversary style of journalism and the attitudes that go along with it have become the accepted measure of journalistic excellence. . . . The central purpose of the journalistic craft . . . is to bring citizen’s attention to the flaws in their institutions and leaders.” Third, Isikoff (1999, 355) defends his reporting on Clinton’s sex scandals: “This was not Watergate—nor did I ever imagine that it was. But that doesn’t mean it wasn’t right to undertake the enterprise. Presidents ought not be per-mitted to deceive the public. . . . Clinton’s recklessness and arrogance deserved to be uncovered. Exposure, not impeachment, was the only remedy that interested me.” When the president is not forthcoming, the media become increasingly suspicious of presidential involvement, which shapes the media’s reaction. Consequently, the president’s anticipation of suspicion shapes the president’s action. We formalize this expectation in the next section.




We acknowledge that Congress also has a role to play in the outcome of a presidential scandal, but for a multi-tude of reasons we focus on the media in this article. First, the media tend to move first in releasing allega-tions and tend to be more critical in raising public inter-est. When a Democratic congressman attempted belatedly to jumpstart interest in “Debategate” (Sabato 1993, 11, 81), the media frenzy quickly subsided. Second, congressional investigations are sensitive to the media’s and the public’s initial and continuing interest in a scandal. Garment (1992, 153) describes congres-sional attention to scandals as “erratic” and writes that “because of the general climate and the demands of modern election campaigns, congressmen thirst with special intensity for media exposure, while competitive media scramble after scandal news.” The media and Congress benefit from coordination;7 therefore, Congress is likely to pursue the same scandals as the media. Importantly, congressional involvement does not imply a greater likelihood that the truth will emerge because grandstanding may impede the investigation of a target (see Walsh 1997), or because so-called watch-dogs might pursue a partisan wedge rather than the truth (see Nyhan 2009). Ultimately, congressional and prose-cutorial actions are filtered through the media, making our choice to focus on media reaction as a first step a justifiable one.

Regardless of whether “players” other than those in the White House and the media are taken into account by the theory, one fact is clear: the president and his persecutors interact in a setting of asymmetric informa-tion. When the media first uncover a potential scandal, they do not know how politically damaging it might be to the president. We have already discussed how scan-dals differ by the type of allegation that is made, and scandals also vary in the degree to which the president is involved. Presidents do not need to have been involved in an initial, first-order transgression to become involved in a scandal because presidents may have committed second-order transgressions in preventing the initial misbehavior from coming to light. The Watergate scan-dal exemplifies this point.

Because the media are initially uncertain about an allegation’s validity and the president’s degree of involvement, the media’s level of suspicion is relevant. At one extreme, Carter desired to run a “purely ethical” White House in the aftermath of Watergate (Kaufman 1993). At the other extreme, Clinton was besieged by accusations about his personal life during the campaign, and when Clinton was accused of having a sexual affair with an intern, the media were suspicious because of past allegations (Brock 1994; Isikoff 1999). In the for-mal model presented in the next section, suspicion of the president’s involvement is incorporated directly.

A Signaling Model of Stonewalling

Our model of presidential scandals treats the White House–media interaction as a sequential game of incomplete information. Specifically, we use a signaling game because the better informed player acts, and the worse informed player reacts after potentially updating his or her infor-mation. The actions available to players, the order of actions, and the information held by the players when they act are illustrated using the extensive form in Figure 1. The president can adopt one of two actions when con-fronted with an alleged a scandal: cooperate or stonewall. After the president acts, the media can adopt one of two possible reactions: they must decide whether to “pursue” the matter and continue to investigate or “accept” the president’s action and turn their attention to other matters. The game begins with “nature” selecting the type of scan-dal that is revealed: have the media uncovered misbehavior in which the president became involved, or was the president not involved? The president is assumed to be fully aware of his involvement, but the media observe only whether the president stonewalls or cooperates, but not the scandal’s type. The media’s uncertainty is illus-trated by combining pairs of the media’s choice nodes into “information sets.” We assume that the media’s sus-picion, that is, their prior belief about the probability that the president became involved in the scandal, is common knowledge.

Identifying an equilibrium requires identifying two strategies, one for each player, that are mutual best responses. A strategy is a complete, contingent plan: it specifies an action whenever a player hypothetically would have a choice, regardless of whether that choice node is reached along an equilibrium path. A strategy for the president specifies two choices: to cooperate or stone-wall if involved and to cooperate or stonewall if not involved. Allowing mixed strategies, the president’s strategy is represented by two variables: α ≡ pr(cooperate|involved) and β ≡ pr(cooperate|not involved).8 A strategy for the media specifies two choices: to accept or pursue if the president cooperates and to accept or pursue if the presi-dent stonewalls. The media’s strategy is represented by θ ≡ pr(accept|cooperate), and ϕ ≡ pr(accept|stonewall). The equilibrium strategies should also be a best response to beliefs, which refers to the posterior probability distri-bution over the scandal’s “type.” The president is fully informed when he acts; the media know that the president is fully informed and use the president’s action to update their belief about the scandal’s type. The president ratio-nally anticipates that the media will use the president’s actions to update their beliefs. Let p ≡ pr(involved) denote the common prior belief about the probability that the president was involved, assuming 0 < p < 1. Using Bayes’s theorem, we define the following posterior distributions:




r ≡ pr(involved|cooperate) = αϕp___________

αp + β(1–p)

s ≡ pr (involved|stonewall) = (1 – α)p __________________

(1 – α)p + (1 – β)(1 – p)

The first equation can be solved only if it is not the case that α = β = 0; the second equation can be solved only if it is not the case that α = β = 1.

Before the model can be solved, outcomes and payoffs must be specified. There are three essential outcomes. First, if the president cooperates and the media accept, then the president loses utility, although the amount of utility lost depends on both the type of misbehavior and the level of presidential involvement. We assume that if it is proved that the president is involved in either a first-order or a second-order transgression, then the loss is substantial; we normalize the value to 1 utile. If the pres-ident is not involved in a proven scandal, then the loss is 0 < x

P < 1 utiles; the magnitude of x

P might vary, for

example, depending on how close the accused official is

to the president and whether the transgression was first order or second order. Second, if the president stonewalls and the media accept, then the story will disappear quickly. Although there may be some initial detriment to the president, these costs are already sunk; therefore, we normalize the payoff of this outcome to a loss of 0 utiles. Third, if the president stonewalls and the media pursue, then the president is sure to bear some additional losses, but it is not certain that the scandal will be proved. Therefore, when the media pursue following presidential stonewalling, the president’s utility loss has both a proba-bilistic and a certain component. We assume that the pres-ident suffers the utility losses identified above (1 or x

P,

depending on the scandal’s type) probabilistically when he stonewalls and the media pursue. We let q denote the probability of a scandal being proven, with 0 < q < 1. The president loses additional fixed costs certainly; these fixed costs represent the president’s lost prestige or popularity while under attack. We assume that c

P utiles are

subtracted from the president’s payoff in a stonewall−pursue outcome, regardless of the scandal’s type.

Nature

Not involved (1–p)

Involved (p)

President President

Stonewall(β = 0)

Cooperate (β = 1)

Stonewall (α = 0)

Cooperate (α = 1)

(1–s) (s)

Media (1–r) Media (r)

Accept(φ = 1)

Pursue(φ = 0)

Accept(θ = 1)

Pursue(θ = 0)

Accept(φ = 1)

Pursue(φ = 0)

Accept(θ = 1)

Pursue(θ = 0)

0 − xp 0 −1

0 + xM 0 + 1 + 1 − cM +q − cM

−q − cp – 1 − cp

+xM − cM +xMq − cM

−xp − cp −xpq − cp

Figure 1. Formal model in extensive form




The president suffers a loss when a scandal is proved, but the media benefit. If the president admits to a scandal, we normalize the media’s gain to 1 utile if the president is involved and 0 < x

M < 1 utiles if the president is not

involved. If the president stonewalls and the media accept, the media’s payoff is normalized to 0 utiles. If the president stonewalls and the media pursue the matter, then the media benefit probabilistically, receiving the payoffs listed above (1 or x

M) with probability q, but must expend effort and

scarce resources to pursue a scandal: cM

utiles are sub-tracted from the media’s payoff, regardless of the scandal’s type. A key comparison for the media is whether its likely payoff (the product of q and 1 or x

M) offsets the opportunity

cost of pursuing one scandal. Payoffs are displayed at each terminal node of Figure 1; the president’s payoff is listed first and the media’s payoff is listed second.

A solution to this game will take the form of a “perfect Bayesian equilibrium,” which specifies the following six items: two actions for the president (α and β), two actions for the media (θ and ϕ), and two posterior beliefs for the media (r and s). Two conditions must be satisfied in com-puting the equilibrium: sequential rationality requires that each action by each player maximizes its utility given its beliefs and given the other player’s actions and beliefs; consistency requires that beliefs be calculated from priors and the first actor’s strategy, using Bayes’s theorem, along the equilibrium path.9 A pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium either can be “separating” if the president adopts a different action when he is involved than when he is not involved or can be “pooling” if the president adopts the same action regardless of the scandal’s type. We find one separating equilibrium (under certain condi-tions) in which the president cooperates if he is not involved in the scandal and stonewalls if he is involved. We also find three pooling equilibria (under different parameter conditions). Let us describe the four equilibria and the sets of parameter conditions delineating which equilibrium is attained.

Pooling Equilibrium 1: Above the Lawstrategies and beliefs {α = 0; β = 0; θ =1, ϕ = 1; r = 0, s = p}

Parameter condition p < cM

– qxM

___________

q(1 – xM

)

In the Above the Law equilibrium, the president stone-walls, regardless of whether the president is involved or not involved. The media react to stonewalling by accept-ing, and as a consequence, the truth of the president’s involvement is not revealed. Because the president stone-walls for both minor and major scandals, the media cannot update their beliefs; therefore, their posterior probability that the president is involved equals their prior probability

(i.e., s = p). For the media to accept the president’s stone-walling, it must be the case that the probability that the president is involved (p) is relatively low. Another way of stating this condition is that the media’s opportunity cost of pursuing (c

M) is high relative to the probability

that a scandal is proven times the benefits if the scandal is proven: c

M > q · (p + (1 – p) · x

M). If these conditions

are met, then this equilibrium obtains for any value of cP.

Pooling Equilibrium 2: Under SiegeStrategies and beliefs {α = 0; β = 0; θ = 1,

ϕ = 0; r = 0, s = p}

parameter conditions p > c

M – q xM ___________

q(1 – xM

)

cp < x

p (1 – q)

In the Under Siege equilibrium, like in the Above the Law equilibrium, the president stonewalls, regard-less of whether the president is involved or not involved. Again, because the president stonewalls for both types of scandals, the media cannot update their beliefs (i.e., s = p). Unlike the Above the Law equilibrium, however, in Under Siege the media react to stonewalling by pursu-ing the story. Because the president never fully coop-erates, the truth behind the president’s involvement is revealed probabilistically, with probability q. The new parameter conditions are that the probability that the president is involved in the scandal (p) is high relative to the media’s costs of pursuing the story and that the presi-dent’s cost of continued conflict (c

P) is low relative to

his probable loss. The first condition can be restated: the media’s certain cost of pursuing the story is low relative to the probability and the benefits of the scandal being proved: c

M < q · (p + (1 – p) · x

M). During the Watergate

investigation, reporters Woodward and Bernstein faced difficult obstacles such as reluctant witnesses, resistant editorial management, and a noncooperative White House. These factors increased the cost of working on the story, but the benefit of catching the president in a major scandal was large enough to pursue. However, a sufficiently large increase in c

M or sufficiently large

decreases in q or p would have caused the media to drop the story, leading back to Above the Law.

Separating Equilibrium

Strategies and beliefs {α = 0; β = 1; θ = 1, ϕ = 0; r = 0, s = 1}


M – qxM __________

q(1 – xM

)

xp. (1 – q) < c

p < (1 – q)




In the separating equilibrium, the president stonewalls if involved and cooperates if not involved. Because the president takes distinct actions, the media learn that the president is involved if and only if the president stone-walls (i.e., s = 1 and r = 0). Consequently, the media will pursue the story when the president stonewalls, as long as their costs (c

M) are sufficiently low, relative to the proba-

bility and the benefits of the scandal being proven. As before, the first condition can be rewritten c

M < q · (p +

(1 – p) · xM

). During the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal, the president stonewalled, but because the nonmainstream media had already broached the subject of an affair between the president and an intern, the cost of pursuing the story for the media was low (Woodward 1999). The media’s credible threat to pursue induces the president to cooperate when the president is not involved because the cost of continued hostilities (c

P) outweighs the president’s

expected net gain, once we take into account the proba-bility that the truth will not be revealed (i.e., the second condition can be rewritten as –q · x

P – c

P < –x

P). In the

separating equilibrium, the truth behind the president’s involvement is revealed for certain if the president is not involved but is revealed only probabilistically if the pres-ident is involved.

Pooling Equilibrium 3: Out for JusticeStrategies and beliefs {α = 1; β = 1; θ = 1,

ϕ = 0; r = p, s = 1}


M – qxM _________

q(1 – xM

)

cP > (1 – q)

In the final pooling equilibrium, the president does not stonewall in any case but instead cooperates, regardless of whether he is involved or not involved. The media accept, but because its costs are relatively low, it would have pur-sued had the president chosen to stonewall. This credible threat that the media would pursue combined with a high cost for continued hostilities induce the president to coop-

erate. This equilibrium holds as long as s ≥

cM

– qxM

____________ .

q(1 – xM

)

In the Out for Justice pooling equilibrium, the truth of the president’s involvement is revealed for certain.

The formal model contains five parameters; in the rest of this section we move toward generating testable hypotheses by studying how variations in the exogenous parameters affect the endogenous variables (i.e., both players’ behavior in equilibrium), noting that changes between equilibria occur at key thresholds. In our opinion, the best way to understand the various parameters’ effects

is to look at how they affect increases in potential stone-walling behavior. That is, we ask, how do parameter changes shift the prediction away from the Out for Justice pooling equilibrium in which presidents always cooperate and the truth is always revealed?

Suppose we fix a condition, cM

< q · (p + (1 – p) · xM

), to ensure that the media would always respond to stone-walling by pursuing. The two parameters that directly affect the president’s action are the president’s cost (c

P)

and the probability that the truth is revealed (q). Sufficient decreases in c

P or q would lead first to the separating

equilibrium, in which the president stonewalls only when the president is involved. Further decreases in c

P or q

would lead away from the separating equilibrium to Under Siege, in which the president stonewalls in any type of scandal. Suppose we relax the condition on c

M

stated above. The two parameters that directly affect the media’s willingness to pursue, and therefore that indi-rectly affect the president’s willingness to stonewall, are the media’s cost (c

M) and the prior belief that the presi-

dent would be involved in a scandal (p). Sufficient increases in c

M or decreases in q or p will lead to Above

the Law, in which the president always stonewalls because the media always accept.

The political cost to the president (xP) and the gain to

the media (xM

) from a scandal in which the president was not involved are variables that vary (and probably covary) across types of scandals, the proximity of the accused offi-cial to the president, and the political environment. From the president’s perspective, if we hold c

P and q constant,

an increase in xP reduces the likelihood of surpassing the

threshold between Under Siege and the separating equi-librium. Thus, an increase in x

P should have the direct

effect of making it more likely that the president will stonewall. From the media’s perspective, if x

M is very low,

then cM

is more likely to exceed the q · (p + (1 – p) · xM

) threshold, which implies that we should observe Above the Law. If we hold c

M and p constant, then an increase in

xM

reduces the likelihood of cM

surpassing this thresh-old. Thus, an increase in x

M makes more credible the

media’s threat to pursue the story if the president stone-walls. Consequently, if x

P is high relative to c

P and q,

and if xM

is high relative to cM

and q, then we will observe the Under Siege pooling equilibrium in which the presi-dent stonewalls and the media pursues.

To summarize this discussion we draw the following four propositions from the formal model. First, presi-dents are more likely to stonewall when the president is involved in a scandal than when the president is not involved. Second, the president is more likely to stonewall when the media is not highly suspicious of the president (low p) or when the media faces high costs for pursuing the scandal (high c

M). The former point is counterintuitive:

presidents who seem more trustworthy are more likely to




abuse that trust in an individual instance and to get away with it, all else equal. Third, presidents are more likely to stonewall when it is improbable that the truth is revealed (low q) and when the president will not suffer much if the media pursues (low c

P). Fourth, the president is more

likely to stonewall—in spite of the media’s greater likeli-hood of pursuing—when the scandal is viewed as more significant (high x

M, high x

P), even though the president is

not involved. Reversing any of these conditions will lead to greater cooperation on the part of the president and a greater probability that the truth will be revealed.

A Case Study/Natural ExperimentThe attention of this article now shifts from presenting our theory of presidential behavior to evaluating a key proposition from the formal model. We begin by present-ing a case study, the focus of which is stonewalling ver-sus cooperating in the two distinct scandals within the Iran-Contra scandal. Because the president was directly involved in one aspect of the scandal (arms sales to Iran) but not the other aspect (diverting funds to the Contras), this case study presents a natural experiment. We hold constant the main actors and the political environment and vary only the president’s involvement in the alleged mis-behavior. The formal model implies and the case study confirms that presidents are more likely to stonewall if involved than if not involved, all else being held constant.

The Iran-Contra scandal is two separate scandals, affecting two policies in two separate hemispheres, with different levels of presidential involvement. One scandal involved a covert policy of arms sales to Iran, aimed at convincing moderate elements in Iran to assist American efforts to release several American hostages held by Hezbollah. In the summer of 1985, Israel shipped more than 500 American-supplied antitank weapons to Iran, achieving the release of Reverend Benjamin Weir. When Iran rejected a subsequent shipment of antiaircraft mis-siles, claiming they were defective (including being marked with the Star of David), a top-secret intelligence directive, a “finding” that Ronald Reagan signed on January 17, 1986 (Woodward 1999, 99), authorized a new policy of selling weapons directly from the United States.

Oliver North, then a Lt. Colonel in the Marines and a staff member at the National Security Council (NSC), acted as the go-between for the national security adviser (first Robert “Bud” McFarlane, and then John Poindexter) and the Iranians. According to the independent counsel’s report, Reagan, Vice President Bush, Attorney General Meese, Chief of Staff Regan, and CIA Director Casey were present at NSC meetings that discussed the Iran operation, and all approved of the sales. Within the highest levels of

the administration, only Secretary of State Schultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger expressed opposition, arguing that the operation violated the Arms Export Control Act. McFarlane, accompanied by North, traveled to Iran in late May to negotiate for hostage releases; he left the meeting empty-handed, but an October shipment of 500 antitank weapons secured the release of hostage David Jacobsen on November 2.10 Both the McFarlane delega-tion’s visit to Tehran and the arms shipments were exposed on November 3, in the leftist Beirut magazine Al Shiraa.11

Another scandal involved a policy of covertly support-ing rebels in Nicaragua. Reagan had campaigned on a platform of opposition to the Marxist Sandinista regime, fearing a domino effect in Central America (Woodward 1987; Alterman 2004). Congress passed two amendments in 1982 and 1984, both introduced by Representative Edward Boland; the first prohibited the CIA from spend-ing funds to overthrow the Sandinistas. Millions of dollars for Nicaraguan aid was restored to the 1984 Department of Defense (DOD) appropriation; however, the second Boland amendment prohibited the CIA, DOD, or any other agency or entity of the United States from spend-ing funds on behalf of the Contras. With the mandate against aiding the Contras in place, North arranged to divert proceeds from the arms sales to a so-called Enterprise headed by retired General Richard Secord, who arranged for weapons purchases and deliveries.

In June 1986, the House of Representatives passed a “Resolution of Inquiry,” requesting documents related to NSC contacts with Contras or with “private persons or foreign governments involved in Contra resupply.” Poindexter knowingly lied that NSC staff were complying with the Boland amendments. In August, North testified falsely before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that he had not violated the Boland amend-ments. The covert operation collapsed when, on October 5, an American cargo plane loaded with weapons was shot down in Nicaragua. One of the three Americans on board, Eugene Hasenfus, survived the crash and acknowledged that he was part of a CIA operation. Although the admin-istration had bought enough time to get a $100 million aid package through Congress, on November 22, 1986, Justice Department officials investigating the Iranian arms sales uncovered an NSC memorandum that outlined how North would divert profits to the Contras.

Public perceptions of the president’s involvement in the Iran-Contra scandals were of specific concern to the White House staff. The results of internal polls conducted by Dick Wirthlin revealed that a majority (55 percent) disagreed with the statement “John Poindexter and Oliver North operated independently in setting up the Iran-Contra arms deal, without any specific instructions or authority from President Reagan.”12 In the same survey, 64 percent




agreed with the statement “It is simply too hard to believe that only two men in the White House knew anything about money from arms sales to Iran being shifted to the Contras.”13 This was especially worrisome given the belief that the media’s attitude toward the president had also changed since the early Reagan administration. Immediately after the 1981 assassination attempt, the media were perceived as friendly and deferential (Alterman 2004, 243; see also Hertsgaard 1988). But the expansion of news outlets, especially on cable television,14 led Donald Regan to opine, “The press was so excited that the atmosphere had become primal” (Woodward 1999, 113). Countering this impulse is the fact that the media depend heavily on official sources in covering foreign affairs (Hallin, Manoff, and Weddle 1993), which ensured that the media would have a high cost of pursuing with an uncertain benefit.

On the elements of the Iran-Contra scandal that did not involve President Reagan, the White House chose a strat-egy of cooperation. First, Attorney General Edwin Meese was put in charge of internally investigating White House staffers’ possible legal infractions (Walsh 1997). Second, on the same day that Attorney General Edwin Meese admit-ted that some of the funds from the Iranian arms sales had been diverted to fund the Contra rebels, national security adviser John Poindexter resigned and North was fired (Woodward 1999, 113). Reagan admitted in his diary that the “smoking gun” necessitated these resignations (Reagan 2007, 453). Reagan was willing to let Poindexter and North testify before Congress, to “get this d—m thing over with,” if they received immunity from prosecution (Reagan 2007, 460). William Casey, director of the CIA, resigned a month later after recovering from a stroke (Woodward 1999, 116; Abshire 2005, 67). Third, days after the Justice Department uncovered the NSC memo, Reagan formed a special commission, headed by for-mer senator John Tower and including former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The Tower Commission issued a lengthy and critical report on February 26, 1987, that identified no direct role for Reagan in the scandal. Fourth, seeing potentially serious legal viola-tions, Attorney General Meese sought appointment of an independent counsel.

On the elements of the Iran-Contra that did involve the president, particularly the arms-for-hostages trade, the White House stonewalled. Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh described this as “a willful cover-up that extended all the way to the Oval Office” (Walsh 1997, xv). This occurred at several points. First, Poindexter and Casey argued against disclosure of the Iranian arms sales, even though the story was confirmed by the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Rafsanjani (Walsh 1997, 8). The White House released a press statement asserting that “our policy

of not making concessions to terrorists remains intact.” Second, the president routinely proclaimed in public and private that “we did not trade arms for hostages,” a clear fabrication (Morris 1999; Alterman 2004). Although the president had admitted to Secretary of State Shultz that he knew of the shipments of arms to Iran, Schultz and Weinberger defended the president in their briefings to the congressional intelligence committees (Woodward 1999). Third, the administration refused to declassify infor-mation needed to prosecute North. North and Poindexter shredded documents at the NSC, even destroying the orig-inal presidential finding that authorized the Iran arms sales (Abshire 2005, 68; Cannon 2000, 617). Finally, the strategy to protect the president hinged on blaming McFarlane, even though numerous individuals were aware that the president had authorized the arms sales (Alterman 2004, 285; Morris 1999).

The president’s mea culpa on national television on March 4, 1987, continued to deflect responsibility. Reagan stated, “As angry as I may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still accountable for those activities. As disappointed as I may be in some who served me, I’m still the one who must answer to the American people.” A memorandum from Mitch Daniels notes,

For now, the public separates this incident, however horrific, from the rest of the president’s record. This is another good reason to express regret about the actions taken in pursuit of the Iran policy and about the consequences. We must show that we, too, view this as one aberrational misstep in an otherwise consistent and successful Presidency.15

Despite appearing apologetic, Reagan did not cooperate with an investigation of the arms-for-hostages deal. In fact, Reagan did not acknowledge that he had authorized the shipments to Israel until his autobiography (Reagan 1990, 501).

The Iran-Contra scandals’ revelation led to the largest and fastest drop in presidential approval in recorded history, from 67 percent to 46 percent, according to the November 1986 New York Times/CBS News poll. Reagan survived the scandal, however, and the Gallup poll recorded a 64 percent approval rating for Reagan when he left office in 1989. Alterman (2004, 293) summarizes the scandal: “The nation never faced up to the conse-quences of what it meant to be led by dishonest officials. . . . In the long run, President Reagan’s reputation returned to its pre-scandal levels and the entire episode came to be viewed by many as just a bump on the road to Cold War victory.” Ginsberg and Shefter (1990) argue that this strategy protected the president, the presidency, and the Reagan administration’s agenda in Congress. In the Iran-Contra case, stonewalling on Iran while allowing




investigation of the Contra aid was successful,16 and the media’s interest in the complex and enigmatic story dwindled.

An Additional Empirical ExaminationWe acknowledge that the Iran-Contra scandal may not be a representative scandal. An unusually large number of individuals were accused of misbehavior—fourteen faced criminal charges and eleven were convicted—and the scandal involved international security issues where the media faces hurdles to investigating. To assess whether the pattern of behavior observed in the Iran-Contra scandal is echoed in other presidential scandals, we generated a list of presidential scandals from the Nixon administra-tion through the Bush administration. (The appendix at http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/ provides further detail on our data collection.) Between 1972 and 2008, we identified 87 events as scandals, including the Iran and Contra scandals, for an average of 2.35 scandals per year (roughly one every five months). Utilizing news-paper articles and presidential papers, we coded whether the president’s initial action was to cooperate or stone-wall. The initial behavior was coded as stonewalling if the White House delayed releasing information, released only partial information, did not cooperate with another institution’s investigation, or deflected blame with a par-tisan attack. The initial behavior was defined as cooper-ating if an involved party immediately resigned, was disciplined internally, or made financial restitution (pay-ing fines, fees, taxes, etc.), or if the White House called for an internal or external investigation or released full information and documentation about an event.

Overall, we observe a nearly even division of presi-dential initial behavior: forty instances of stonewalling (46 percent) and forty-seven instances of cooperating (54 percent). When the president was involved in a scan-dal, the initial behavior was to stonewall in ten of fifteen scandals, roughly 67 percent. When the president was not involved, the administration stonewalled in thirty of seventy-two scandals, roughly 42 percent. A difference-of-proportions test allows rejection of the null hypothesis at conventional significance levels.17 In summary, the hypothesis that the administration is more likely to stone-wall when the president is involved in a scandal than when not involved withstands empirical scrutiny.

ConclusionThis article has advanced the scientific analysis of presi-dential scandal and has clarified presidential behavior in response to political scandal. We are aware that this study has its limitations. Our formal model treats the media as a unitary actor, despite Sabato’s (1993, 52) caution that “the

media constitute no monolith, and news organizations are too disorganized and too competitive for much plot-ting to occur.” However, despite the apparently growing polarization of news organizations, especially on cable television, a pack mentality ensures that few organiza-tions are left out of a feeding frenzy. We also chose not to incorporate Congress, independent counsels, U.S. attor-neys, or Garment’s (1992) “cast of thousands” of poten-tial prosecutors. Our empirical research focuses on the effect of presidential involvement and suspicion of the president, to the exclusion of other factors that might play a role. Nevertheless, this research extends our understanding of presidential behavior in the context of “defensive” communication, gives us insight into how presidents behave in a strategic fashion.

For a political environment obsessed with political “spin” resulting from scandal (Quirk 1998), there has been little scholarly work on how presidents “play defense” when confronted with allegations of scandal. A political scandal, whether large or small, has the potential to derail a presidential policy message, focus attention on govern-ing mishaps, highlight an administration’s flaws, or deprive the president of his cabinet members, advisors, surrogates, nominees, and so forth. Our formal model pro-vides a framework for understanding presidential public behavior in these politically damaging situations. The model also focuses our attention on the contextual factors that induce presidents to stonewall or cooperate.

In particular, we identify three important implications or revelations resulting from this article. First, one clear implication of the formal model is that the president’s dominant strategy is not always to hide the truth, and the dominant strategy is not always to “tell it all.” Although the media are perceived to always be “on the hunt” and presidential perceptions of being “hunted” never dissipate (Stewart 1996), optimal presidential behavior necessarily changes depending on circumstances. For example, higher costs to the president from prolonged investigation tend to decrease stonewalling, although this depends on the media’s relative costs and perceived benefits of pursing. The advice to “tell it early, tell it all, and tell it yourself” (Davis 1999) should be dependent on the circumstances of the scandal and on the context. The nature of opposi-tion, the relative costs, the probability the truth would be revealed, and the country’s suspicions about the presi-dent’s involvement influence which strategy is optimal.

Second, the findings here shed light on political accountability. Avoiding a mutiny of justice requires that the truth regarding the president’s involvement be revealed. Truth is more likely to be revealed when presidents cooper-ate than when they stonewall, and the formal model allows us to establish that there are four equilibria; predicted behavior and hence the probability that the truth is revealed differ across the four equilibria. A scandal will remain unproven in the Above the Law equilibrium




(probability = 0). The truth is revealed by chance in Out for Justice (probability = q) and in the separating equilib-rium (probability = 1 – p + pq). A scandal will be proved with certainty in Under Siege (probability = 1). Factors that affect the president’s and the media’s strategies affect political accountability. Circumstances that make it more likely that the president will stonewall, such as a lack of media suspicion (low p) or the presence of procedures that keep some material classified or privileged (high q), have the potential to dislocate the proper course of consti-tutional governance.

Third, proactive communication is not uniformly essential to presidential success. Presidents do not neces-sarily need to talk their way out of a problem when an administration is confronted with allegations of wrongdoing. Indeed, recent literature suggests that presidents do not necessarily find success in communicating their policy positions to the public (Edwards 2003). These results hint at a theory of presidential speech restraint where, despite being involved in the “hyper-rhetorical” presidency where presidents are expected to continuously go public (DiIulio 2007), presidents should be strategically selec-tive in where and under which conditions they address the public. This finding is in line with those of others who discover that a president’s best strategy is not to always go public but to do so selectively when the conditions are tactically favorable (Canes-Wrone 2001). Although it seems counterintuitive for presidents involved in a public relations problem to say little, in some instances this is the president’s best strategy and one that is at odds with the dominant paradigm of presidential communication.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Financial Disclosure/Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

1. This model is been formulated generally, to facilitate easy adaptation to other contexts, such as presidential and vice presidential candidates, governors, and legislators, with minor adjustments.

2. We include cabinet secretaries and cabinet-level officers (e.g., White House chief of staff, director of the Office of Management and Budget); assistant, deputy, and under-secretaries of cabinet departments; heads of independent federal agencies and bureaus; and the first lady. We also include nominees during the period when their confirmation is being considered, including Supreme Court nominees, because the president can withdraw a nomination.

3. Our inquiry includes persons other than the president; therefore, our topic is distinct from “the character issue” as studied by Pfiffner (2004).

4. See Apostolidis and Williams (2004), Hagood (1998), Ross (1988), Sullivan (1994).

5. This assumption allows us to investigate instances where the president himself apparently had no knowledge of the events surrounding the scandal.

6. For excellent reviews of how presidents have used execu-tive privilege to hide damaging information from the pub-lic, the media, and Congress, see Rozell (2002) and Fisher (2003).

7. We can envision the interaction between the media and Congress being modeled either as a minimum effort coor-dination game, where both players profit only when both invest, or a “Battle-of-the-Sexes” game, where both players wish to focus attention on the same alleged scandal but may value different scandals differently.

8. Consequently, pr(stonewall|involved) ≡ 1 – α, and pr(stonewall|not involved) ≡ 1 – β.

9. One must also specify off-equilibrium-path beliefs. We assume the following: a president who was expected to stonewall but cooperates instead must have been uninvolved (r = 0 off the equilibrium path); and a president who was expected to cooperate but stonewalls must have been involved (s = 1 off the equilibrium path). The assumption is benign. A less restrictive assumption is simply that s > r (i.e., the conditional probability of having been involved is higher if the president stonewalled than if the president cooperated).

10. The independent counsel’s report indicates that missiles were sent to Israel in May and on to Iran on October 28. Israel’s missiles were replaced with “a more recent vintage” on November 7.

11. It is crucial to note that the Iranian component of the scan-dal was reported after the aid to the Contras was discov-ered, when an American cargo plane was shot down in Nicaragua. Therefore, discovery of the president’s authori-zation of arms sales could not have raised suspicion about the president’s involvement in the Contra aid.

12. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, Iran: polling data 5 of 6 (464525), folder 7 of 8, March 26–27, 1987 D/M/I poll, box 12.

13. Ibid.14. See Baum and Kernell (1999).15. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, Iran: polling data 3 of 6,

folder 5 of 8, “Daniels to Regan,” December 4, 1986, box 12.16. President Clinton was less fortunate when he stonewalled.

“For years, Clinton went into a full Watergate defense. He denied, stonewalled, parsed the language, belittled, and attacked. In the course of defending himself, he lost control of his presidency” (Woodward 1999, 516).

17. z = 1.854, with a 95 percent confidence level critical value of 1.645 (one-tailed).




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Stonewalling and Suspicion during Presidential Scandals

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