Still a World of States! Transnational Social Actors and International Trade Governance
Transcript of Still a World of States! Transnational Social Actors and International Trade Governance
Still a World of States! Transnational Social
Actors and International Trade Governance
© Chalmers Larose, Ph. D
Association canadienne de science politique, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3-5 juin, 2004
Introduction
Since the 1980s, the end of the Cold War and the
globalization of capitalism stimulated a set of issues that
affect the course of world politics. With the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, which succeeded
the defunct General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the dynamics of trade negotiations have evolved
considerably, and trade has, more than ever before, become
a contentious issue in domestic as well as international
politics. The WTO followed in the footsteps of a reigning
neo-liberal economic paradigm that matured within corporate
organizations, government bureaucracies and academic think
tanks. These interrelated processes generated new issues for
social actors to confront. As a result, renewed scholarly
interests in the study of non-state actors in world
politics surfaced. Though more generally assumed than
thoroughly assessed, academic scholarship has thus attempted
to highlight the influence of NGOs, taken as “the shock
troops of civil society”, in the international arena.1
A primary task of this research is to discuss the impacts
and influence of transnational actors on international trade
governance, particularly the processes of trade
liberalization.2 Recent scholarly interpretations of
transnational activism established that, in the
globalization era, transnational civil society will
institutionalize normative structures that bypass state
power.3 Many transnational civil society pundits equally
foresee a world of citizens’ organisations and social
movements not only as counter-power to a world of states but
also as agents for domesticating ‘the international’. In
this article, I critically assess the power of transnational
civil society, in particular the contentious assertion that
transnational activists, in generating international norms,
can shape and redefine state interests.4
1
Indeed, the liberal variant of transnational advocacy
research views international activist organizations as
political actors acting ‘in their own right’5. It is
suggested that transnational civil society not only has
fundamentally an anti-state character but also engages in
practices that can possibly reshape the ‘architecture’ of
international politics by denying the primacy of states or
of their sovereign rights.6 For Richard Price, transnational
civil society not only exists as a community of political
engagement in world politics but is also able to teach
governments what is appropriate to pursue in politics.7 As
for K. Sikkink, transnational advocacy groups are crucial
for the creation of new norms and discourses and contribute
to restructuring world politics by altering the norm
structure of global governance.8
In order to address the liberal contention, this paper
critically explores, in a comparative historical
perspective, the influence of non governmental organizations
(NGOs) in countering, resisting, formulating and setting the
global trade policy agenda. I ask the following questions:
2
Is transnational civil society influential in the arena of
international trade governance? Has transnational civic
activism impacted on the outcome of trade liberalization
proposals that have been put forward since the advent of
economic globalization? I argue that global policy-making
1. By non-governmental organisation, I mean any
organisation which is not established by a government and
that provides links between state and market, and between
local and global levels. See Bas Arts, The Political Influence of
Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions,
(Utrecht: International Books, 1998, p. 50); Leon Gordenker
and Thomas G. Weiss “Pluralizing Global Governance:
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions” in Leon Gordenker and
Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) NGOs, the UN and Global Governance,
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 17-47;
SustainAbility, The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change,
(London: Second Edition, 2003).
2. For a conceptualization of transnational actors, refer to
Sydney Tarrow, “The New Transnational Contention:
Organizations, Coalitions, Mechanisms”, paper presented at
3
remains a product of interstate bargaining and is nurtured
by powerful state-corporate alliances. In the current state
of affairs, national states still hold the political
leverage to set up the legal and institutional framework for
globalization as well as for citizens’ participation in
the Annual Congress of the American Political Science
Association, (Chicago, 1 September 2002); Sydney S. Tarrow
« La contestation transnationale » Cultures et Conflits Sociologie
politique de l’international, No 38-39, (summer-fall, 2000).
3. See generally, Andrew Linklater « Citizenship and
Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State » in
Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler (eds.) Re-
imagining Political Community, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World
Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society”, Millennium
Journal of International Studies, vol. 21, (no. 3, 1992, p. 389-420);
Susan Burgerman Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Anne-Marie Clark,
Elizabeth Friedman, and K. Hochstetler « The Sovereign
Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO
4
global politics9. Hence the influence of civil society
organizations in the area of international trade deserves to
be empirically assessed and systematically studied on a case
by case basis rather than thoroughly assumed. The relative
NGO ability for and success in deconstructing the dominant
Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment,
Human Rights, and Women » World Politics (vol. 51, p. 1-35,
1998); Paul Wapner, “Politics beyond the State:
Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics”, World
Politics, (vol. 47, 1995, p. 311-340); Richard Price,
“Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World
Politics”, World Politics (vol 55, July 2003, p. 579-606.;
Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational
Civil Society Targets Landmines”, International Organization (Vol.
52, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 613-644); Ann M. Florini and P.
J. Simmons, “What the World Needs to Know”, in A. M. Florini
and P. J. Simmons (eds.), The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational
Civil Society, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2000); Margaret E. Keck Kathryn Sikkink Activists beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell
5
discursive premises of economic liberalism and in building
transnational networks of anti free trade activists and
social protesters across issues and regions may not
ultimately lead to substantial changes in policy outcomes,
particularly in the area of free trade negotiations.
University Press, 1998); Kathryn Sikkink, “Restructuring
World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power” in
Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.)
Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Movements, Networks, and Norms,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p. 301-
317).
4. Price (1998), opcit.
5. Wapner (1995), opcit
6. Lipschutz (1992: 390), opcit
7. Price (1998: 639), opcit
8. Cf. Sikkink (2002: 302), opcit
9. Saskia Sassen, “The Participation of States and Citizens
in Global Governance”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (Vol
10, Issue 1, winter 2003, p. 5-28).
6
In the realm of international trade politics, the state-
corporation conglomerate prevails. Since NGOs operate in a
world of states, then their degree of influence will likely
vary in accordance with the characteristics of the issue and
the degree of permeability of the target. I further argue
nonetheless that, through pressure politics, NGOs and other
civil society allies have been very instrumental in, first,
raising awareness about the social and environmental impacts
of liberalizing trade and, second, in derailing important
steps undertaken by free trade proponents at the
multilateral as well as bilateral level in order to secure
free market objectives. In support of my arguments, I study
the impacts of NGOs’ actions and strategies on the policy
processes and outcomes of selected trade liberalization
agreements.
The first section points to the potential of transnational
civic activism in world politics by unveiling the concept of
political influence. Here, I focus mainly on the growing
role played by non state actors in international politics
and the current interplay between NGOs and international
7
trade. Then I present NGOs’ responses in relation to four
selected free trade or trade-related initiatives, namely:
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTFA), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the initiative in
favour of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI), and the WTO Doha Development trade agenda. Finally, I
draw some critical reflections on the sovereign limits of
NGOs’ activism in changing the outcomes of free trade
negotiations and explore issues for further research.
Transnational Actors and Policy Influence: An
issue-orientated approach
Contemporary international relations are inconceivable
without the study of input provided by transnational actors.
As Richard Price rightfully states, “we cannot understand
some key outcomes in world politics without taking account
of the influence of TCS actors”.10 Theoretically, influence
is generally understood as “the modification of one actor’s
behaviour by that of another”11. A player exercises
8
political influence if his presence, thoughts or actions
cause a political decision-maker to meet his interest or
objectives. According to Bas Arts, influence is the
achievement of one’s policy goal with regard to an outcome
in treaty formation and implementation12. Political
influence presupposes a causal linkage between specific
outcomes on the one hand and specific player interventions
on the other. Hence the degree of influence of an actor in a
given policy process remains the necessary observable
component to measure its success and achievement in
relations to policy outcomes.
The issue as to when and why transnational campaigns succeed
or fail has not yet been systematically worked out by
transnationalists. What are the intervening variables that
explain variations in policy successes and outcomes? Are
there ‘necessary conditions’ to achieve influence? In
10 . See Price (2003: 591), opcit.
11 . Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson (eds.) The Anatomy of
Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 3).
12 . Bas Arts, opcit, p. 58.
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addressing those questions, Susan Sell and A. Prakash
suggest that success or failure to achieve a desired outcome
critically depend on how effectively a network is able to
shape a given agenda.13 Success in influencing policy
processes, they argue, lies not in claimed moral superiority
of the agenda but in the network’s superior abilities to
create and make the most of political opportunities by
exploiting a crisis, constructing a problem, mobilizing a
coalition, and grafting its agenda onto policy debates”.
Since civil society barely has access to material power,
thus transnational activists rely mostly on moral authority
as a prime factor of influence.
Indeed, it has been amply demonstrated through recent
research conducted in the area of human rights and
environmental activism that positive results have been
13. Susan K. Sell and Amesh Prakash, “Using Ideas
Strategically: The Contest between Business and NGO Networks
in Intellectual Property Rights”, International Studies Quarterly
(2004) 48, p. 143-175.
10
achieved by transnational human rights groups in changing
the behaviour of governments on human rights issues.14
However it has also long been proven that moral authority
does not work in a vacuum and that a set of prerequisites
remain indispensable in the process of influencing political
outcomes. As proposed by Susan Burgerman, transnational
actors may achieve the kind of policy influence desired to
the extent that the following parameters can be reckoned
with: the existence of relevant international norms and
transnational activists; the existence of elites in the
target state that have control over the armed forces and
that have concern about their country’s international
reputation; and the existence of organized domestic groups
linking up with transnational activists.15
In another respect, numerous scholars also point out that if
economic and security interests in the target state collide
with the normative objectives pursued by transnational
activists, this can inhibit the enforcement of human rights
principles and agreements. A well entrenched proposition
suggests that state preferences matter and great powers
11
still enjoy the ability and capacity of affecting outcomes
in world politics. In that sense, domestic conditions become
instrumental in explaining the variations in transnational
actors’ policy influence. Domestic structures, as Thomas
Risse-Kapen observes, “mediate, filter and refract the
efforts by transnational actors and alliances to influence
policies in the various issue-areas”.16 In order to affect
policies, he says, transnational actors “have to gain access
to the political system of their target state” and must
generate “winning policy coalitions in order to change
decisions towards the desired direction”.17
In addition, NGOs’ capacity to gain influential access
inside global trade institutions and within free trade
14. See, for example, Keck and Sikkink (1998), opcit; Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change” International Organization (vol. 52, No 4,
1998, p. 887-917); Thomas Princen and Mathias Finger,
Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global,
(London: Routledge, 1994); Paul Wapner 1995, opcit).
15. Susan Bergerman (2001: 4-5), opcit
12
negotiating apparatuses may also be affected by external as
well as internal impediments. Among the external factors are
issues related to the escalating power and influence of
transnational corporations, the presence of like-minded but
dominant states and their pre-eminent role in the structure
of governance, and the complexities inherent in the
formation of trade negotiating blocks. Internal impediments
are associated with issues of representation,
accountability, legitimacy, transparency and the growing
asymmetry of power within networks.18 All these interrelated
factors help frame NGOs’ momentum when it comes to
propelling their agenda onto the trade policy process and
getting substantial political outcomes.
16. Thomas Risse-Kapen, “Introduction: Bringing
Transnational Relations Back in” in Thomas Risse-Kapen (ed.)
Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures
and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995, p. 25).
17. Ibid, p. 25
13
Notwithstanding these structural constraints, transnational
NGOs hold enormous political leverage that is often
exercised in the form of ‘soft power’. This may take the
form of information politics, symbolic politics,
accountability politics or leverage politics.19 In that
regard, they propose, question, criticize and publicize.
Most importantly, they continuously serve - in some specific
issue-areas such as development, the environment, aid and
humanitarian relief etc. - as the linking arm between civil
society, the state and international institutions. In some
cases, their regular access to policy-making is generally
provided by international governance structures (the UN
agencies being a case in point) as constituted by states.20
18. See P. J. Nelson, “Agendas, Accountability, and
Legitimacy among Transnational Networks Lobbying the World
Bank” in Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink
(eds.) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Movements, Networks, and
Norms, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002,
p. 131-154).
14
This ultimately enables transnational actors to influence
multilateral negotiations to the extent that those actors
adopt such strategies as lobbying activities in the domestic
societies of powerful states, coalitions with international
organizations and coalition-building with smaller states.21
To a certain extent, the 1990s - largely praised as the
‘decade of the ‘transnational’ - have been marked by a
certain number of events that have helped nurse the claims
made by liberal transnational activists, and have given
impetus to the optimistic rhetoric that actually resonates
in the transnational politics scholarship. Indeed, the 1997
Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to a coalition of NGOs for
their participation in the campaign to ban landmines.
19. Cf. Sikkink, (2002: 304), opcit
20. For a review, see Clark et al. (1998), opcit; Tarrow
(2000), opcit.
21. Thomas Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics”
in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.)
Handbook of International Relations (London : Sage Publications,
2002, p. 255-274), p. 265.
15
Likewise the defeat of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) in 1998 was largely viewed as being
orchestrated by transnational NGOs. NGOs have also had their
share of input in the climate talks that led to the adoption
of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. There were equally
the 1990s boycotts of rainforest timber, organised globally
by groups like Friends of the Earth. It is also worth
mentioning that pacifist NGOs, geared toward the defence of
moral and civil rights, have intensely lobbied for the
adoption of a nuclear test ban treaty in 1996.
According to J. Matthews, such path-breaking examples are
evidence that “increasingly NGOs are able to push around
even the largest governments”.22 To the extent that national
governments are now sharing power with businesses, with
international organizations, and with a multitude of
citizens and groups, liberal transnationalists contend that
the steady concentration of power in the hands of states
that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia may be
16
over.23 As a result, a post-Westphalian state, whose primary
function is to mediate between the different political
loyalties, identities and authorities, is said to be on its
way to replace the nation-state.24
In all, those scholarly writings echoed the power and
influence of transnational actors in world politics. They
have been empirically tested in a wide range of issues,
ranging from the low politics of human rights and the
environment to the high politics of international security,
the transnational efforts to ban antipersonnel land mines
being a hard case in point. Such findings have thus lent
22. Cf. Jessica T. Matthews, « Power Shift », Foreign Affairs
(January/February 1997, p. 50-66)
23. Linklater (1998: 114)
24. For a critique, refer to Mustapha Kemal Pacha and David
Blaney, “Elusive Paradise: The Promise and Peril of Global
Civil Society”, Alternatives, (vol. 23, 1998, p. 417-450); James
Fulcher, “Globalization, the nation-state and global
society”, The Sociological Review (vol. 48, No. 4, 2000, p. 522-
543)
17
support for an overarching view in the study of
transnational politics: the capacity of non-state actors to
contribute to restructuring world politics. However, as I
argue, international trade still represents the missing link
in this overall optimist equation. One of the key findings
of this study is that the very nature of international trade
policy has not changed since the inception of the World
Trade Organization and the more aggressive pattern of
mobilisation endorsed by civil society actors. As we
contend, it has not yet been empirically demonstrated the
extent to which the agendas pursued by NGOs have actually
influenced the outcome of international negotiations in the
realm of trade. Transnational actions taken in relation to
issues related to trade liberalization have not successfully
impacted on policy outcomes arising out of international
trade negotiations.
To the extent that transnational organizations are also
embedded in market-based institutions driven by material
interests and characterized by organizational insecurity,
competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty, attempts to
18
reconcile material pressures with normative motivations may
produce outcomes dramatically at odds with liberal
expectations.25 As stated by John Keane, “markets are an
intrinsic empirical feature, a functionally intertwined
prerequisite, of the social relations of actually existing
global civil society”.26 We may well live in a world in
which civil society actors are geared toward normative and
virtuous objectives, but we are still framed by a world of
states and corporations tailored by instrumental concerns.
Although NGO pressures have had tremendous impacts in some
specific governance issues, structural issues concerning
space and time, as well as context and opportunities, still
preclude any attempts at universalisation.
25. A. Cooley and J. Ron « The NGO Scramble: Organizational
Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational
Action » International Security (Vol. 27, No 1, summer 2002), pp.
5-39.
26. John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003, p. 78.
19
In short, there is little systematic evidence to sustain
claims that the ‘transnational society world’ has somehow
overtaken the ‘state world’.27 As suggested by Clark,
Friedman and Hochstetler, in order to properly measure the
degree of NGOs’ influence on a given global policy area, one
needs to look at their quality of access and their proximity
to global forms of governance.28 Hence the factors that
intervene in the relationship between transnational actors
and trade must be properly appreciated.
Transnational activism in the Global Free Trade
Arena
To a large extent, trade seems to entertain a complex
relationship with civil society.29 Up until the early 1980s,
consumer and environmental organizations did not actively
27. See Risse (2002: 255)
28. Cf. Clark et al. (1998).
29. For an account, see Edward M. Graham, Fighting the Wrong
Enemy: Antiglobal Activists and Multinational Enterprises, (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000).
20
engage in trade activism. Looking back to the early
development of commercial capitalism in Europe, one can note
that the Anti Corn Law League in Britain represents the
first civil society movement on a trade issue.30 As a matter
of fact, in contemporary times the evolution of civil
society activism in trade followed two broadly interrelated
events.
First, one has to refer to the crisis of the Keynesian
economic paradigm which ended the post-war equilibrium
between a liberal world market and the domestic
responsibilities of states.31 During early 1980s, in order
to tackle the recessionist and inflationist spiral, neo-
classical economists pleaded in for a paradigm shift and a
30. Y. Said and M. Desai “Trade and Global Civil Society: The
Anti-Capitalist Movement Revisited” in Mary Kaldor, Helmut
Anheier and Marlies Glasius (eds.) Global Civil Society 2003,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Susan Ariel
Aaronson, Taking Trade to the streets: The Lost History of Public Efforts to
Shape Globalization, (Ann Harbour: The University of Michigan
Press, 2001).
21
retreat from the Keynesian “Grand Compromise”. Instead, it
was proposed a return to a new form of economic liberalism
that embodied the pre-eminence of a self-regulated market
based on, among other things, the free movement of goods,
capital and investments. In other words, as Neera Chandhoke
argues, the ability of the market to regulate itself, as
well as to provide for both growth and well-being, was
legitimized32. The State had to be rolled back both to
encourage the unhindered flow of capital and to enable the
market to display its dynamics.
Second, and in conjunction with the neo-liberal assault from
above, there has been a surge in information and
communication technologies which instilled a process of
empowerment from below and stimulated networks of activists.
The informational revolution increased the capacity of
activists to collect, collate, select, and publicise
information on a variety of specialized issues. It allowed
organisations to network across the world through fax,
email, the Internet, teleconferencing, etc. The birth of
cyberspace activism enabled transnational activists to
22
engage in strategic alliances, information exchange, and
mobilizing practices on shared issues and common values.
Engaging North American Free Trade
The events surrounding the conclusion of the Canada-US Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989 greatly symbolized the
inception of modern trade activism in the universe of social
protest in advanced capitalist states. When the Canadian
government in the mid-1980s, proposed to liberalize trade
with the United States, the decision sparked a lot
31. See John Gerrard Ruggie, “International Regimes,
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar
Economic Order” International Organization (Vol. 36 (1982), p. 379-
415). See also, Andrew Glyn et al. “The Rise and Fall of the
Golden Age” in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Shor (eds.)
The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990).
32 . Neera Chandhoke, “The Limits of Global Civil Society” in
Global Civil Society Yearbook 2002, (London School of Economics: The
Center for the Study of Global Governance, 2002).
23
controversy within Canadian society.33 Canadian social
groups voiced their immediate concerns with regard to the
neo-liberal path taken by the then Tory government. The
boldest reaction came however from labour unions. Headed by
the Canadian Labour Congress (CTC), unions vindicated that
free trade with the United States was part of a neo-liberal
corporate offensive and therefore would lead to a
significant loss of jobs in the short term and to an
imminent sovereignty deficit.34 The anti-free trade camp
grew rapidly and included such like-minded actors as the
Council of Canadians and the National Action Committee for
the Status of Women. This culminated in the creation of the
Action Canada Network whose aim was to forge consensus among
social groups, establish mobilizing strategies and
coordinate the Canadian anti-free trade campaign.35
On the other hand, Canadian environmental activists entered
the anti-free trade locomotive as late comers.36 The
structural links between trade and the environment were not
yet fully documented and assessed. Though the spread of a
global environmental consciousness tends to stimulate the
24
attachment to ecological values, the nexus between global
commercial activities and their concrete environmental
repercussions did not otherwise constitute a systematic
concern for environmental advocates from both sides of the
border. Whereas in Canada some environmental researchers and
activists kept a certain level of interest in the trade
debate, American environmentalists remained however passive,
indifferent and much less preoccupied.37
Two major factors bolstered that newfound interest and
commitment. First, during the course of 1987 the World
Commission on the Environment issued a report entitled Our
Common Future that called for reconciling economic growth
with policies sustaining the environment. Second, in 1991, a
GATT dispute settlement panel sided with the government of
Mexico in a dispute between Mexico and the US over a ban
adopted by the latter on tuna fishing in accordance with the
1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act.38 Mexico appealed to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the
panel ruled in its favor. That GATT panel held that the US
law violated GATT Article III on national treatment.
25
Incidentally, transnational encounters of anti trade
activists spread incrementally across North America. Many
observers note that the debate over NAFTA was a catalyst for
the formation of unprecedented alliances, cross-border
coalitions and transnational networks among previously
disconnected individuals and groups in North America.39 A
33. Cf. Chalmers Larose, Militantisme transnational: Syndicats et
écologistes devant les accords de libre-échange nord-américain, (Ph. D
dissertation, Université de Montréal, 2000).
34. “Submission to the Parliament Joint Special Committee on
International Relations of Canada concerning bilateral trade
with the United States”, Canadian Labor Congress, (Ottawa, 18
July 1985); equally, Canadian Labor Congress, Social Dimensions
of North American Economic Integration: Impacts on Working People and
Emerging Economic Responses, (Report prepared for the Human
Resource Development Department, Ottawa, 1996).
35. See Peter Blyer, “Coalitions of Social Movements as
Agencies for Social Change: The Action Canada Network” in
William K. Carroll (ed.) Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social
Movements in Theory and Practice. (Toronto: Garmond Press, 1992).
26
significant number of domestic interests groups then met with
their direct counterparts in the NAFTA countries. For
example, in late 1991, an international meeting was held in
Zacatecas, Mexico, between social activists of the three
countries in order to discuss the social dimensions of trade
liberalization. The participants adopted the Zacatecas
Declaration condemning NAFTA and proposing to replace it by a
continental development pact.40 A significant number of NGOs
also met with their direct counterparts in the NAFTA
countries. They set up strategies aimed at cross-border
organizing and engaged in talks that debated such actions as
transnational organizing, transnational
solidarity/networking, tri-national exchanges, etc.
36. Janine Ferreti, former executive director of Pollution
Probe, (Interview, Montreal, 10 April 1997).
37. John Audley, former Sierra Club and National Wildlife
Federation (NWF), environmental and trade consultant
(Interview, Washington D.C., 21 January 1998).
38. Cf. Edward Graham (2000), opcit
27
In many instances, labor and environmental groups have been
able to raise social awareness across North America with
regard to the nature of the corporate free trade
initiatives. They have also been very instrumental in
denouncing the human costs of the maquiladoras along the US-
Mexican border and in accompanying the social awakening of
the Mexican poor. However, by 1992, on the eve of the
American presidential election, the negotiating parties
responded to the criticisms launched by social actors. They
signed two controversial side agreements, one related to the
environment (the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation) and the other, designed to take up labour
39. David Ronfeldt and Cathryn L. Thorup, “NGOs, Civil
Society Networks and the Future of North America” in Rod
Dobell and Michael Neufeld (eds.) Transborder Citizens: Networks
and Institutions in North America. (British Colombia: Oolichan Books,
North American Institute, 1994, p. 31).
40. See “Joint Declaration of Zacatecas” in Memorias de
Zacatecas, (Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio,
México D.F., 1991).
28
standards (the North American Agreement on Labour
Cooperation). They also agreed that these agreements would
not be incorporated within the main body of the trade
agreement, stirring widespread anger and outrage.
Many NGOs quickly became very disillusioned with the NAFTA
outcome and their confidence and effervescence at the start
rapidly shifted into a “siege mentality”, a feeling of
growing powerlessness and disinterest in the process.
Indeed, as far as the basic grievances of NGOs were
concerned, the side agreements remained an empty vessel. Not
only did they fail to address NGOs’ critics with regard to
the unjust nature of free trade, but also they fell short of
acting as a defence mechanism against the anticipated social
effects of free trade. In other words, free trade
negotiators in alliance with corporate interests used the
side agreements as an appeasing mechanism and a counter-
mobilization strategy in order to water down the anti free
trade atmosphere that was progressively emerging from part
of the American unions and environmental groups on the eve
of the 1992 elections.
29
From the outside-in: the MAI, Seattle and the Doha
Development Agenda
With the signing of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round in
Marrakech, Morocco, on 15 April 1994, and the establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, on 1
January 1995, the dynamic between transnational social
actors and trade evolved considerably. As the free trade
political agenda shifted from a regional to a global focus,
NGOs thus started to pay closer attention to the functioning
of international economic institutions and to challenge the
state-centric structure of international trade governance.
The announcement of negotiations for an OECD-led
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) inaugurated a new
political opportunity structure that contributed to
energizing the anti free trade mobilizing artillery.
The MAI negotiations brought to the collective memory large-
scale, street fighting opposition to a multilateral
commercial agreement.41 Technically, the MAI purported to
41. Cf. Graham (2000: 8), opcit
30
establish in the area of investment the non-discrimination
clause which requires countries to apply the same treatment
to all foreign investors. In addition, the agreement
proposed to grant governments as well as enterprises and
foreign investors the right to appeal decisions taken by
governments with regard to regulation of foreign
investments. NGOs perceived this proposal as reminiscent of
NAFTA chapter 11 and the dangerous precedence set by the
Ethyl Corporation case. For many, that case signaled that
environmentally motivated law or regulation could be
challenged in court by investors under NAFTA chapter 11 and
that the state could not act freely according to its will.42
Most of the Western NGOs, led by Multinational Monitor,
Oxfam International, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, ATTAC and
others, quickly established a nexus between free trade and
42. On NAFTA chapter 11, see Howard Mann and Konrad von
Moltke “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing
the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the
Environment”, International Institute for Sustainable
Development (ISSD), Working Paper, 1999.
31
global investment deregulation as enshrined in the OECD
draft proposal. Hence, by 1997 demonstrations and rallies
in major European cities increased significantly. National
anti-MAI campaigns were established in almost every OECD
country from Europe to North America. On 12 February 1998,
an international coalition of NGOs launched an unprecedented
campaign against the MAI, stating that “the MAI would give
corporations unprecedented power to directly challenge
government’s environmental, health, labor and other
safeguards”.43 By the summer of 1998, representatives of
some NGOs posted themselves regularly near the OECD’s
offices in Paris, where they beat on drums and chanted anti-
MAI mantras.44 In the fall of 1998, the negotiating
authorities suspended the MAI talks. Officially, the parties
suggested that the MAI failed for reasons of “irreconcilable
disagreements” among the participating actors. Interested
observers, however, attributed the MAI ‘breakdown’ to
43. Cf. “Joint NGO Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment”, (Washington D.C., 12 February 1998).
44. Graham (2000: 40), opcit
32
mounting NGO criticisms and strategic pressures. According
to Jason Potts of the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD) in Canada:
NGOs played a major role in defeating the MAI. In fact,
it fell apart because of NGOs. NGOs’ pressures actually
had an effective impact on trade policy although in
that case it was just on and off; it did not really end
up being a productive result. It was just a blocking
mechanism like a boycott”.45
As a matter of fact, as the views of the negotiating parties
clashed on issues concerning the relevance of a global
investment regime, NGOs showed a unified discursive rhetoric
and established a transnational pattern of mobilization.
Not only did the MAI debacle inspire the resurgence of NGO
activism in international trade governance but also it
demonstrated that a defying posture and consistent pressure
exercised from the outside-in may actually challenge state
expectations and distort pre-established outcomes.
45. Jason Potts, International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD), (Interview, Montreal, 5 March 2004).
33
To a certain extent whereas the anti-MAI mobilization did
not end up giving NGOs greater access and influence in the
shaping of a corporate-led global investment mechanism, it
certainly defied conventional wisdom by countering and
derailing a major international initiative backed by
powerful states. In this sense, the MAI opposition stands as
a clear step taken by NGOs in relation to their capacity to
manufacture resistance to the corporate-led free trade
architecture. The social protest against the MAI revealed
their status as agents of a burgeoning transnational civil
society as well as their growing step toward influencing the
dynamic of the international trade architecture.
The significance of Seattle
After meeting in Singapore in 1996 and in Geneva in 1998,
the WTO ministers of trade met again from 30 November to 3
December 1999, in Seattle. A two-tier strategy was put
forward by diverse institutionalized NGOs. On the one hand,
they resolved to amplify street mobilization and
denunciation with fellow anti-globalization activists. And,
34
on the other hand, transnational activists, in alliance with
a certain number of emerging and least developed countries,
put forward an ‘open door policy’ which aimed at voicing
their concerns within the more formal and official circles
in and around the Seattle forum of negotiations. It was in
this respect that, on the eve of the WTO meeting, on 29
November 1999, a cohort of institutionalized NGOs decided to
take part in the Seattle Symposium on International Trade Issues in the
First Decades of the next Century.46
In Seattle, the dialectics of confrontation quickly
prevailed over the rhetoric of cooperation. In Mary Kaldor’s
appreciation, Seattle reflected deep political cleavages
where, on one side, were the parochialists allied to the
liberal globalisers, foreshadowing a global system dominated
by corporate interests and the richest countries and, on the
other side, were the global civic networks.47 Not
46. For details, see “Summary Report of the Seattle Symposium
on International Trade Issues in the First Decade of the
Next Century”, Sustainable Development, (vol. 34, No 1, 1
December 1999).
35
surprisingly, NGOs and diverse civil society actors opted
for a blocking strategy and rallied with anger and
discontent. With continued demonstrations, rallies, heavy
clashes in the streets between protesters and the police
forces, an unworkable atmosphere eventually contributed to
disturbing and disrupting the course of the Third WTO
ministerial meeting. As a result, the participating states
failed to agree on an agenda for the negotiation round about
the further opening of trade borders.
In the end, the Seattle trade talks ended acrimoniously.
States were not able to reach consensus on the most
important issues and NGOs again claimed an epic victory over
states and corporations. The turn of events in Seattle
showed the internal discrepancies within the governance
infrastructure. For Fred Halliday, issues of dispute
management and deadlocks inside the conference reflected
long time opposition between diverging state interests.48 As
47. Mary Kaldor “Civilising Globalisation? The Implications
of the Battle in Seattle”, Millennium Journal of International Studies
(Vol. 29, No 1, 2000 pp.105-114), p. 113.
36
for Jan Art Scholte, “social movements of the kind
represented on the streets of Seattle have achieved only
marginal reforms of global economic governance”49. In our
view, the Seattle episode remains a cornerstone in
transnational activism. I agree with Halladay that “only the
future will tell whether Seattle marked a step towards a
more equitable and effective global governance, or another
stand-off between the proponents of feckless ruckus and of
hegemonic control”.50 But the fact remains that not only did
Seattle energize critics of economic liberalism but also it
became a rallying symbol among transnational activists in
view of the more turbulent rounds of talks which were
scheduled to come.
On the road to Cancun
The Seattle failure convinced pro free traders, governments
and WTO officials alike, to adapt to the new parameters of
the politics of global free trade. Selecting the venue and
dealing with street protests became the landmark of the new
approach. A new round of multilateral trade negotiations was
37
ultimately convened in Doha, Qatar, on November 2001. During
the Doha meeting, trade officials initiated a broad range of
issues known as the Doha Development Agenda. They resolved to
meet again for a fifth ministerial meeting in Cancún,
Mexico, in September 2003, in order to take stock of
progress made in the negotiations, and to discuss ways of
moving forward the Doha Development Agenda. However, during
the course of 2002, the European Union proposed to reopen
the Doha agenda of negotiations in order to include some
issues related to investments and competition, issues that
were previously paralyzed during the ill-fated MAI episode.
Better known as the “Singapour issues”, these issues include
48. Fred Halliday «Getting Real About Seattle» Millennium Journal
of International Studies (Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, pp. 123-129).
49. On this point, see Jan Aart Scholte “Cautionary
Reflections on Seattle” Millennium Journal of International Studies
(Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, pp.115-121).
50. Fred Halladay (2000 : 129), opcit
38
four areas: trade and investment, trade and competition
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.
In Cancún, transnational activists acted as political
entrepreneurs. They refined heir action repertoire, deployed
targeted political strategies, and provided information and
normative frames to like-minded social actors and state
allies. According to the French Magazine Le Nouvel Observateur,
non governmental organisations played a bridging role by
conducting a true “guerrilla war” in order to unite poor
countries against Europe and the United States. Oxfam
International took a very active role in this campaign and
emerged as a leading “counter-power”.51 Many Oxfam lobbyists
were in direct contact with several developing countries’
delegations, giving advice and perspectives in offering
their expertise, framing the issues and building the Cancun
“refusal front”.52 Intense lobbying efforts came also from
such influential NGOs as the consumer advocacy group Public
39
Citizen from the US, Greenpeace International, Third World
Network, Focus on the Global South, and the French-born
organization ATTAC.
As Europe and the United States, among others, showed strong
reluctance to reduce their agriculture subsidies, the WTO
Cancún talks reached a deadlock when some delegates from
Africa, the Caribbean and Asia (the ACP countries), backed
by the Group of 21, walked out, accusing the most developed
nations of failing to offer sufficient compromises and of
wanting instead to settle the Singapore issues. The
political impacts made by NGOs in relation to the Cancún
outcome have been differently interpreted. Most certainly,
NGOs provided technical assistance to some developing
countries and were instrumental in those countries’
51. Cf. Christian Losson “Oxfam: Force de frappe solidaire”,
Libération, 20 January, 2004.
52. Stephane Arteta “Les ONG au service des pays du Sud :
Comment Céline a monté le front du refus”, Le Nouvel
Observateur, 18 September 2003, No 2028,
http://www.nouvelobs.com/artciles/p2028/a215511.html.
40
technical assessment of the deal-making process that saw the
collapse of the Doha Development Agenda in Cancùn. During
the full five days of the Summit, NGOs gathered within the
global network Our world is not for sale and lobbied each and every
delegation from the South.53
However, as far as issues concerning success and achievement
were concerned, some NGOs downplayed the results that were
achieved in Cancùn and showed a great deal of cautiousness.
Whereas the organization Food First cited the Cancùn
collapse as the “victory of the people”, Oxfam indicated
that it took “no delight in this failure”, calling it a
“missed opportunity”. Oxfam’s campaign director, Adrian
Lovett, noted that in Cancun there was “an incredible sense
of unity among developing countries” but that “the
responsibility for the collapse of the summit lies mostly
with the USA and the European Union (EU) who failed to
deliver on their commitment to put development at the heart
53. See, Laurence Caramel “L’ampleur des désaccords Nord-Sud
met l’OMC en échec : L’influence grandissante des ONG anti-
OMC” Le Monde, 16 September 2003.
41
of the WTO talks”.54 By contrast, Public Citizen viewed the
Cancùn demise as “reminiscence of Seattle”, and claimed that
it was a “victory for global civil society and developing
countries”. Friends of the Earth International equally
stated that “despite intense pressure from the business
lobbies, and bullying by the European Union and the US,
developing countries have stood their ground”.
Cancùn departed from Seattle in the sense that well thought
out caution and wisdom replaced the killer instinct
inherent in the NGOs blocking approach in Seattle. Many NGOs
even dismissed the charges of being the ‘Cancùn killers’. As
noted by Jason Potts:
NGOs were happy with the Cancùn outcome because
developing countries stood up for their rights. But
they were not happy that it came to that….I suspect it
is going to lead to more bilateralism... That is also a
way of saying that NGOs might have failed in Cancùn to
54. Cf. “The WTO and global trade after Cancun”,
http//www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/tarde/interview_alo
vett.htm.
42
the extent that they have now instilled a situation
which is even less favourable to developing countries.
Oxfam equally displayed a positive reading of the steps made
in Cancùn and the future of the WTO in managing
international trade activities among nations:
Many groups were happy about the Cancùn failure and
prayed for the end of the WTO. On our side…. we are
happy to know that the negotiations will continue and
that this may produce a better result in a future
meeting. We believe that the negotiations should remain
in the framework of the WTO. It is better to have an
agreement that is not so satisfying than not to have an
agreement at all.55
Ultimately, this position reinforces the view that the
question of NGOs’ achievements in relation to the trade
liberalization scheme cannot be measured by focusing on
short-term outcomes like Seattle or Cancun. Success still
remains inescapable from the long-term goal of reducing the
55. Justine Lesage, Oxfam Quebec communication director.
Interviewed by the author, 16 February 2004, Montreal
43
North-South divide. Some NGOs, like Greenpeace for example,
are of the view that achievement should be measured in light
of establishing connections between the trade liberalization
model and the impacts on the lives of ordinary people and
the planet.56 By any measure, NGOs actions in Cancùn have
yet to be followed by concrete responses from governments
that would help unveil new WTO rules or agreements on issues
that would facilitate poor countries’ abilities to develop
and, at the same time, modify the dynamic of international
trade relations.
Conclusion
This article has discussed the influence of non state actors
in the area of international trade. It has shown that NGOs
face enormous challenges when it comes to impacting on
56. Jo Dufay, Executive director of Greenpeace Canada
(Interview, Montreal, 10 March 2004)
44
policy outcomes of free trade negotiations and to exerting
regulatory influence in the World Trade Organization and
regional trade organisations. The successive waves of
transnational civic activism that have targeted the global
trading system have yet to substantially impact on treaty
formation. Indeed, the free trade paradigm remains the core
ideological reference and policy prescriptions for most of
international trade relations and the impact of the World
Trade Organisation is being felt directly as the new
foundation for international economics.57 As a consensus-
based organisation with diverse membership, consisting of
representatives largely from national trade ministries, and
a national mandate of trade liberalization, the WTO has not
yet managed to build up institutional mechanisms for a
concrete participation of non-state actors in the global
trade governance machinery. Transnational activism against
57. See J. Cameron and K. Campbell, “A Reluctant Global
Policy-Maker” in Richard E. Steinberg (eds.) The Greening of
World Trade Law: international trade organizations and environmental issues,
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2002).
45
trade liberalization illustrates that NGOs operate in a
world of states and are still at the margins of
international trade governance.
Despite these structural challenges, non-state actors have
established themselves as global players and informed agents
in a world increasingly mapped by multiple transnational
social ties. In the course of the last decade, anti free
trade and development NGOs - by virtue of their outside-in
mobilizing practices - have contributed to de-constructing
the founding premises of the neo-liberal free trade
initiatives. Through shock tactics and communicative skills,
they have also shown a talent for promoting an alternative
trade discourse. They have also shown a talent for
derailing as well as disrupting selected trade or trade-
related negotiating processes in targeted institutional
forums at the regional or global level, as the fall out of
the MAI, Seattle and Cancun processes have amply
demonstrated. As a result, it is no longer accidental for
trade policy-makers to engage in consultative dialogue with
46
civil society actors as a step toward responding to demands
for greater governance of international trade.
Our analytical survey confirms that the question of NGOs’
achievement in transnational policy processes needs to be
interpreted as issue-specific and can not be apprehended as
a definite propensity of such actors to impact on all issue-
areas of transnational politics. Policy outcomes vary in
accordance with the issue (i.e. international trade) and the
target (states, corporations and international
institutions). Since trade remains a premiere instrument of
statecraft and a powerful attribute of economic dominance,
trade policy choices and international trade negotiations
will likely reflect established state interests and
preferences. Furthermore, notwithstanding the degree of
autonomy of international organizations and their political
leverage, international institutions are created by states
and remain subjected to a state-based system of
international negotiation. As a result, it is exceptionally
difficult for such institutions to open up to non-state
participation at any meaningful level.58
47
Transnational actors have posed in concrete terms the issue
of the future of global trade governance. And transnational
actions - whether in the framework of the FTA, NAFTA, the
MAI, and the WTO rounds of negotiations - have challenged
the ability of the current interstate system, and the
international institutions that states create, to open up to
citizens’ participation in global governance and be
effectively democratic and accountable. Would NGOs have
exerted policy influence and outcomes in free trade
negotiations had they been full participants in the global
trade negotiating machinery? The answer to that hypothetical
question remains open-ended. What is paramount, however, is
that the impact of non state actors is fast being felt in a
quite number of issues relating to global governance. As
this study unveils, states no longer absorb the overall
magnitude of the global public sphere and transnational
58 . Cf. Michael Edwards, « Introduction » in Michael
Edwards and John Gaventa (eds.) Global Citizen Action, (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
48