HC 117

House of Commons

Foreign Affairs Committee

South Africa

Fifth Report of Session 2003–04

Reports and Evidence from the Foreign Affairs Committee since 2001

The following reports and evidence have been produced in the present Parliament.

Session 2003–04 REPORTS

Fourth Report Human Rights Annual Report 2003 HC 389

Third Report Iran HC 80

Second Report Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism

HC 81 (Cm 6162)

First Report Foreign Affairs Committee Annual Report 2003 HC 220

First Special Report Implications of the Work of the House and its Committees of the Government’s Lack of Co-operation with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into The Decision to go to War in Iraq

HC 440

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

Written Evidence Overseas Territories HC 114

Written Evidence The Biological Weapons Green Paper HC 113

Written Evidence Private Military Companies HC 115

Written Evidence Turkey HC 116

Session 2002–03 REPORTS

Twelfth Report Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003

HC 859 (Cm 6107)

Eleventh Report Gibraltar HC 1024 (Cm 5954)

Tenth Report Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism

HC 405 (Cm 5986)

Ninth Report The Decision to go to War in Iraq HC 813 (Cm 6062) and (Cm 6123)

Eighth Report Zimbabwe HC 339 (Cm 5869)

Seventh Report Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2001, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny

HC 474 (Cm 5943)

Sixth Report The Government’s proposals for secondary legislation under the Export Control Act

HC 620 (Cm 5988)

Fifth Report The Biological Weapons Green Paper HC 671 (Cm 5857)

Fourth Report Human Rights Annual Report 2002 HC 257 (Cm 5320)

Third Report Foreign Affairs Committee Annual Report 2002 HC 404

Second Report Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism

HC 196 (Cm 5739)

First Report The Biological Weapons Green Paper HC 150 (Cm 5713)

First Special Report Evidence from Mr Andrew Gilligan to the Committee’s Inquiry into the Decision to go to War in Iraq

HC 1044

HC 117 Published on 18 May 2004

by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited

House of Commons

Foreign Affairs Committee

South Africa

Fifth Report of Session 2003–04

Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 27 April 2004

£23.00

The Foreign Affairs Committee

The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated public bodies.

Current membership

Rt Hon Donald Anderson MP (Labour, Swansea East) (Chairman) David Chidgey MP (Liberal Democrat, Eastleigh) Fabian Hamilton MP (Labour, Leeds North East) Eric Illsley MP (Labour, Barnsley Central) Rt Hon Andrew Mackay (Conservative, Bracknell) Andrew Mackinlay MP (Labour, Thurrock) John Maples MP (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon) Bill Olner MP (Labour, Nuneaton) Greg Pope MP (Labour, Hyndburn) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley MP (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston) The following Members were also members of the Committee during the Parliament. Sir Patrick Cormack MP (Conservative, Staffordshire South) Richard Ottaway MP (Conservative, Croydon South)

Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at : www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm. A list of Reports produced by the Committee in the present Parliament is printed in the inside front cover of this volume.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Steve Priestley (Clerk), Geoffrey Farrar (Second Clerk), Ann Snow (Committee Specialist), Kit Dawnay (Committee Specialist), Kevin Candy (Committee Assistant), Julia Kalogerides (Secretary) and Chintan Makwana (Senior Office Clerk).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerks of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Committee Office, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone numbers for general enquiries are 020 7219 6106/6105/6394; the Committee’s email address is foraffcom@parliament.uk.

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Contents

Report Page

Conclusions and recommendations 3

Introduction 9

Background: challenges facing South Africa 12

Economy 12

Inequality 15

HIV/AIDS 16

Crime 18

Land reform 19

UK–South African relations 21

‘Broad and deep’ 21

‘Periods of turbulence’ 22

Trade liberalisation 22

War in Iraq 24

Changes in development assistance priorities 25

‘Brain drain’ 26

South Africa’s role in its region 27

A regional superpower? 27

Peace-making and peace-keeping 30

United Kingdom support 30

Southern African Development Community 31

South Africa and Zimbabwe 34

Background 34

United Kingdom policy towards Zimbabwe 35

South African policy towards Zimbabwe 35

Reasons underlying South Africa’s policy 36

Signs of change 38

The way forward? 38

South Africa’s international role 41

The African Union 41

Commonwealth 43

United Nations 45

UNCHR 45

UN Reform 46

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South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 48

NePAD 48

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 49

Response of the United Kingdom and the G8 50

What difference will NePAD make? 51

Value of NePAD 51

Importance of the APRM 51

Response of the G8 53

Conclusion 54

South Africa and the war against terrorism 55

Work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in South Africa 58

Consular work 59

Visa entry clearance 59

Trade and investment (UKTI) 61

British Council 62

BBC World Service 64

Estate management 65

Conclusion: a special relationship? 67

Annex A 69

List of abbreviations 69

Annex B 71

Visit to South Africa 71

Formal minutes 73

Witnesses 75

List of written evidence 77

3

Conclusions and recommendations

1. We conclude that, while there remains a number of difficult challenges to be faced, the prospects for the South African economy are generally very positive. If it is to deliver the employment and increased national prosperity the country needs, however, a significant increase in direct foreign investment will be needed. We recommend that the Her Majesty’s Government continue to strive to stimulate and encourage private investment in South Africa. (Paragraph 15)

2. We commend the South African Government for its work in tackling so boldly the lack of economic opportunities experienced by many black people in the country. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with its South African counterpart to promote a better understanding of ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ among British investors, and potential investors, and to assist them in seizing the opportunity that it represents. (Paragraph 21)

3. We conclude that the British Government is playing a key role in the fight against the scourge of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, and throughout the world. As always, though, more could be done and we recommend that the Government maintain an active dialogue with the South African Government on this subject in order to assess what further assistance could be given. (Paragraph 28)

4. We conclude that the fight against crime, especially violent crime, is one of the most serious, and difficult, challenges facing South Africa at this time. We recommend that the British Government continue to offer significant assistance to South Africa in this field, and that co-operation projects currently in place are strengthened and improved, particularly those relating to improving the professional training of police officers. (Paragraph 32)

5. We conclude that, at this time, the South African Government appears to be pursuing a sensible and considered policy of land reform, that seeks to address the historically unequal distribution of land in the country. However, we consider it is critical to South Africa’s future prosperity that any moves towards land expropriations similar to those seen in Zimbabwe are firmly resisted. (Paragraph 37)

6. We are pleased to conclude that, in general, South Africa and the United Kingdom enjoy excellent bilateral relations on a very broad front of activities and interests. We recommend that the FCO, in its Response to this Report, sets out how it considers bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa could be strengthened further in the future. (Paragraph 40)

7. We recommend that, within the constraints imposed on it by the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, the British Government should do more to make clear its commitment to opening up trade to the developing world and reforming the CAP at all opportunities. (Paragraph 48)

8. We conclude that the reputation of the United Kingdom in South Africa has undoubtedly been seriously weakened by differences in the two countries’ approach towards Iraq. We recommend that the Government seek to repair the damage done

4

to the relationship by this disagreement, at every possible opportunity. (Paragraph 51)

9. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office sets out how the cut in DfID’s assistance to middle-income countries will affect the Foreign Office’s work in South Africa, and whether alternative sources of funding will be available to carry on some of the very valuable work being done there. We further recommend that the FCO set out what inter-departmental consultation took place prior to the re-allocation being announced. (Paragraph 54)

10. We recommend that the Government ensure that the United Kingdom, while respecting the rights of individuals, does not denude South Africa of its much-needed skilled professionals and continue to monitor developments in this area. (Paragraph 57)

11. We conclude that South Africa has played a crucial and very welcome role in its conflict resolution work across the continent. It has brought new energy and focus to attempts to settle long-running disputes such as those in Burundi and the DRC. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer every assistance to South Africa to strengthen its work in this vital field, while remaining fully involved in the continent itself. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out how it sees further co-operation in the field of peace-keeping work and training of regional forces developing in the long–term. (Paragraph 68)

12. We conclude that SADC has the potential to play a very valuable role in helping to solve many of the challenges facing its region. If it is to realise this potential, however, and to be taken seriously as a respected international organisation, it must be willing to recognise the failings of member states whose behaviour does not meet the expectations placed upon them by SADC’s high aspirations. (Paragraph 74)

13. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with South Africa, as a key player in the organisation, to support SADC’s work generally and encourage it to take seriously its role in promoting good governance and respect for human rights. (Paragraph 75)

14. We conclude that: (Paragraph 96)

a) South Africa and the United Kingdom unquestionably share the same objective for Zimbabwe—the return to a fully-functioning and economically vibrant democracy that respects the human rights of its citizens; (Paragraph 96.a)

b) South Africa is acting in the manner it sincerely believes to be the most effective and the most likely to bring about the desired goal identified above; (Paragraph 96.b)

c) the situation of the Zimbabwean people will continue to deteriorate unless effective pressure is brought to bear on the Government of Robert Mugabe to change its disastrous and self-seeking policies, and South Africa is the best placed external force to stimulate that change; and (Paragraph 96.c)

5

d) South Africa, and the region more generally, will continue to suffer from Zimbabwe’s plight until such a change takes place, not least by deterring much-needed foreign direct investment. (Paragraph 96.d)

15. We recommend that the British Government: (Paragraph 97)

a) continue to maintain the strongest possible pressure on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the human rights of its citizens and to call free and fair elections, especially through multilateral means; (Paragraph 97.a)

b) recognise the importance of South Africa in achieving a long-term solution to the severe crisis affecting Zimbabwe; (Paragraph 97.b)

c) seek the closest possible co-operation with South Africa on achieving the mutually desired outcome of a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe; and (Paragraph 97.c)

d) seek to promote a greater understanding of its genuine concerns about Zimbabwe in South Africa, and elsewhere on the continent, and the facts about the land reform issue. (Paragraph 97.d)

16. We conclude that the African Union holds the potential to deliver significant improvements in the standard of life for Africans, and should be fully supported by the United Kingdom and the EU. The recent creation of an African court of human rights and the agreement on a continental peace-keeping force are to be particularly welcomed, demonstrating, as they do, a commitment to tackle some of the most fundamental problems facing Africa at this time. South Africa has played a crucial role in all these developments. (Paragraph 106)

17. We recommend that the Government continue to work with South Africa, and all its African partners, to assist the AU in realising the impressive ambitions it has set for itself. (Paragraph 107)

18. We conclude that South Africa plays a crucial role as a leading member of the Commonwealth, actively supporting the organisation’s aim of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds and supporting global respect for human rights. The recent disagreements over Zimbabwe at Commonwealth meetings—the issue that “poisons everything it touches”—should not be allowed to damage the organisation’s very valuable work, nor the UK’s working relationship with South Africa within the body. We recommend that the British Government seek every possible opportunity to restore any damage done to inter-Commonwealth relations by the recent disagreements at the Abuja CHOGM, while maintaining the organisation’s tough stance on Robert Mugabe’s continuing human rights abuses. (Paragraph 113)

19. We conclude that the role South Africa has played at the UNCHR to prevent even the discussion of resolutions that address the appalling human rights situation in Zimbabwe is deeply regrettable, especially in light of the very positive involvement it has with the rest of the UN’s work, and could be damaging to South Africa’s wider interests. (Paragraph 116)

6

20. We conclude that the arguments for reform at the United Nations, particularly at the Security Council, are undeniable. We also conclude that were there to be an ‘African seat’ on the Council, South Africa would be amongst the strongest African candidates, filling nearly all of the criteria for such a position. We recognise, though, that this will be a matter for African nations themselves to settle when the time arises. (Paragraph 121)

21. Given the evidence that we have seen during this inquiry, we conclude that NePAD has the potential to deliver significant, and important, changes within Africa and to its relationship with the rest of the world. Both sides of the Partnership, though, need to understand fully both the challenges and the opportunities that it presents. African nations have to recognise that good governance and respect for human rights are central to their development prospects, and to how they are perceived by both foreign governments and potential private investors. The G8, in turn, needs to see beyond the confines of the peer review mechanism and recognise the progress that African nations have already made in delivering on their commitments. (Paragraph 140)

22. We recommend that in partnership South Africa and the United Kingdom work together to ensure that it is not simply left to ‘wither and die’ as so many previous programmes have been. The British Government needs to impress upon South Africa, and its fellow AU members, the importance of a rigorous peer review mechanism for spreading good governance in the continent, and for attracting much-needed foreign investment. At the same time, it should use every opportunity, especially its forthcoming Presidencies of the G8 and the EU, to ensure that the developed world delivers on its commitment to support genuine African growth and development. Mutuality is the basis of the relationship. (Paragraph 141)

23. We conclude that South Africa has an important role in the war against terrorism, especially by helping to prevent international terrorists using the continent as a base for their activities elsewhere in the world. South Africa has a particularly crucial role to play, as an influential African nation in disseminating best practice in anti-terrorism activity across the continent. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer substantial assistance to ensure that South Africa can both combat international terrorism within its own borders and act as a catalyst for improving Africa’s ability to respond to the threat. (Paragraph 149)

24. We recommend that, in the light of the importance of the United Kingdom’s relationship with South Africa and the crucial work being done by the Post there, the level of staffing and resources allocated to the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa be at the very least maintained, if not increased, in the long-term. (Paragraph 152)

25. We recommend that UK Visas continue to monitor closely the demands on staff and resources at the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa resulting from the increasing numbers of entry clearance applications being received there. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out what extra resources and personnel have been allocated to visa entry clearance work in South Africa since 2003. (Paragraph 159)

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26. We conclude that the trade and investment section of the High Commission in South Africa is performing to a high standard in assisting British businesses to operate there and exploit new opportunities. (Paragraph 165)

27. We conclude that the British Council is carrying out very important work in South Africa, both in promoting a deeper relationship between the two nations and in providing crucial educational support to the South African Government. We are also convinced that the Chevening scholarship scheme is a vital part of the British Council’s work, and a very important way in which the United Kingdom can influence future decision-makers. We recommend that the FCO give serious consideration to increasing the number of scholarships available to South Africans in the near future. (Paragraph 171)

28. We further recommend that the British Council continue actively to support civic organisations and to train their leadership. (Paragraph 172)

29. We conclude that the BBC World Service’s Bureau in Johannesburg is carrying out excellent work in producing high-quality and informative programmes for both radio and television. We recommend that the Bureau continue to be given the funding it needs to carry on this important work. We further recommend that the BBC World Service give serious consideration to increasing the resources it allocates to its Swahili service in the future. (Paragraph 179)

30. We strongly recommend that the FCO does not repeat the gross error it has made in so many other locations of exchanging a valuable and appreciating property—the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town—which is clearly greatly assisting the promotion of United Kingdom interests, for rapidly depreciating ICT assets. (Paragraph 181)

9

Introduction

1. On 27 April this year, South Africa celebrated the tenth anniversary of its first fully democratic, non-racial, elections. On that date in 1994 the vile apartheid regime formally ended, and Nelson Mandela, after spending twenty-seven years of his life as a political prisoner, took his hard-won place as President of the Republic. Since that time, South Africa has grown in a way that was inconceivable during the dark days of the previous regime. The country has become an example of good governance and respect for human rights in Africa; it has sought to heal divisions caused by past injustices without recourse to the blood-letting or interminable detentions and trials seen in so many similar situations; it has assumed a leading role in the United Nations, the Commonwealth and many other international fora; it has injected new vigour and resources into the resolution of long-running conflicts in Africa, and has achieved many other positive changes.

2. Given the significance of this landmark in South Africa’s history, we felt that it was an opportune time to review the strength and vitality of the United Kingdom’s very important relationship with South Africa, a key strategic partner in both regional and international affairs. The breadth of this relationship is considerable, including significant two-way flows of trade, investment, tourism and migration. The two governments also work closely together on a range of issues and share a significant number of mutual global concerns and ambitions. We felt it important, therefore, to assess how these ties could be strengthened and improved as South Africa celebrates its achievement. We also noted that neither we nor our predecessor committees had reported on South Africa in detail since 1991.1

3. On 24 July last year, therefore, the Committee officially launched its inquiry into ‘South Africa’, with the following terms of reference: “to inquire into the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in relation to South Africa, in the light of the strong historical connections that link the United Kingdom and South Africa, and its important role in the Commonwealth, in the region and in Africa as a whole.”2 In particular, we agreed, the inquiry would examine:

the UK’s diplomatic and political relations with South Africa, both bilaterally and as a member of the EU;

South Africa’s role in the region of Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, and the continent more widely;

South Africa’s role within relevant regional and international bodies, most notably the African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations;

the impact of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NePAD) and the G8 African Action Plan on South Africa;

1 Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 1990–91, United Kingdom Policy towards South Africa and the

other states of the region, HC 53-I. Also relevant is: First Report of Session 1995–96, The Future Role of the Commonwealth, HC 45–I.

2 “Announcement of a new inquiry: South Africa”, Foreign Affairs Committee press release 2002–03/37, 24 July 2003. All post-1997 Committee publications and press releases are available at the Committee’s home page, which can be accessed via: www.parliament.uk.

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South Africa’s contribution to the war against terrorism; and

the effectiveness of the Foreign Office’s work in South Africa, including the entry clearance operation, the work of UK Trade International, the British Council and the BBC World Service.3

In this Report we set out our findings of our inquiry into these six main areas, and the conclusions and recommendations we have reached as a result of our deliberations.

4. In the course of our inquiry, the Committee received a large number of useful memoranda from a range of individuals and organisations.4 We took oral evidence on three occasions, from five sets of witnesses: on 9 December from Professor James Barber, University of Cambridge, Professor David Simon, University of London, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University, and Mr Alastair Fraser, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA—the successor to the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK);5 on 27 January from Mr Richard Dowden, Royal African Society, Dr Steve Kibble, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), Mr Christopher Paterson, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., and Mr Ashley Roe, Severn Trent Water International Ltd.;6 and on 2 March from Mr Chris Mullin MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mr Andrew Lloyd, Head of Africa Department, Southern, and Mr Andy Sparkes, former United Kingdom Deputy High Commissioner, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.7 All the evidence we received is printed in full at the end of this volume.

5. As part of our inquiry, we also visited South Africa from 8 to 13 February. While there we met a number of key interlocutors from across a wide spectrum of society and gained a great deal of very valuable information for our final report. A copy of our programme is annexed to this Report. We should like to thank all those who have assisted us during our inquiry, both here and in South Africa.

6. We extend our especial gratitude to our Specialist Adviser for this inquiry, Professor Jack Spence OBE, King’s College, London, whose assistance throughout our proceedings has been invaluable.

3 Ibid.

4 p 77, List of Written Evidence

5 Ev 7, Ev 34

6 Ev 51, Ev 60

7 Ev 82

11

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8 UN Cartographic Section (South Africa, no. 3768 Rev. 5, January 2004), www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/

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12

Background: challenges facing South Africa

7. During our inquiry, and especially during our visit to South Africa, we have been repeatedly impressed by the tremendous progress that the country has made since its first democratic elections in 1994 in so many areas of life. As The Times columnist, Mr Matthew Parris recently observed:

Fitfully but unmistakably, the new South Africa is working. The country today is richer, happier, more powerful, fairer and more secure than it was a decade ago. And the direction is still up.9

This view has been echoed by much of the evidence we have received, stressing how the pessimists who, prior to the elections in 1994, predicted a dire future for South Africa have been confounded.10 One submission stressed the triumph of democracy, in particular:

Since 1994, South Africa has been grappling with the daunting task of unravelling institutionalised racism in every sphere of society. The greatest single tribute to the success of that struggle is the fact that South Africa is one of the most democratic countries in the world. Democratic in the formal sense, with a free and fair electoral system, an independent judiciary, a free press and one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. But democratic also in the sense that millions of people, in their communities and workplaces, are actively engaged in grassroots political activity.11

During the course of our inquiry, South Africa successfully held its third fully democratic and multi-racial election.

8. Inevitably, however, since 1994 South Africa has had a number of tremendous challenges to overcome, not least the bitterly divisive legacy of an apartheid policy that affected every aspect of people’s life. A number of these issues have been drawn to our attention during the inquiry and we comment on some of them below. Where appropriate, we also comment on how the United Kingdom is working in partnership with the South African Government to help it face them.

Economy

9. As can be seen from the graph below (figure 2), in comparison to its Southern African neighbours South Africa’s economy is a ‘giant.’ It has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around $120bn, relatively low inflation and a growth rate of around 4% per annum at present. After two serious crashes, in 1996 and 1998, the Rand appears to be stable and slowly gaining value. In general, the South African Government has followed strictly the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on economic policy, and has won praise from it and other international financial institutions.

9 “A pessimist recants: the new South Africa is working”, The Times, 25 October 2003

10 See, for example: Q 170 [Mullin]

11 Ev 18, para 2.3 [ACTSA]

13

Figure 2: total GDP of Southern African states 2002–04

0

20

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Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe

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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database12

10. In a recent paper, two commentators highlighted South Africa’s economic dominance of the southern half of the continent, generating 45% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and 75% of the South African Development Community’s (SADC). They also stated that the economy:

stands out in Africa not only in terms of its size, but also in terms of depth of expertise, technology and management. Macroeconomic fundamentals and their management remain sound. Fiscal policy is robust ... Monetary policy is healthy.13

11. However, it should be noted that, while South Africa’s economy is much larger than its African neighbours, when it is compared to other middle-income nations, it is not so outstanding. The graph below (figure 3) gives a few comparisons—Argentina and Columbia are probably the closest to South Africa in terms of population.14

12 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/01/index.htm

13 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?”, Adelphi Papers 361 (November 2003), p 42

14 Latest population figures: South Africa – 42,768,678; Argentina – 38,740,807; and Colombia – 41,662,073 (Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook 2003, January 2003, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook).

14

Figure 3: GDP of South Africa compared to other middle-income nations

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

Argentina Brazil Colombia India Mexico Pakistan South Africa

$ bi

llion

2002

2003

2004

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database

12. Commentators also highlighted a number of significant challenges faced by the economy. For example, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, of Brunel University, stated in his memorandum to the Committee that:

inherited serious structural deficiencies and developmental backlogs have continued to inhibit growth and undermine confidence. The requisite restructuring will take more time to achieve, and will continue to present the government with difficult political choices. ... The key economic policy challenges remain the low levels of fixed investment, the ‘jobless’ nature of economic growth, the shortage of skills, privatisation, and South Africa’s failure to become a major exporter of manufactured goods.15

These views were echoed in Mr Blumenfeld’s oral evidence, where he described the process of tackling some of the structural deficiencies in the South African economy as, “like turning a super tanker around; it is a very slow process.”16 The problem of unemployment, which currently stands at around 35–40%, is a particularly pressing one and was a dominant issue in the recent election campaign. Geographically, South Africa is at the tip of an under-performing continent away from the dynamic growth markets of the world. The legacy of apartheid on the education of the black majority remains a major barrier to growth.

13. Those to whom we spoke all agreed that the South African Government had made some very difficult decisions in order to achieve stable, long-term economic growth. They also all believed that one of the keys needed to unlock the country’s potential was increased foreign investment, something which has not always been forthcoming since 1994.17

15 Ev 33

16 Q 54

17 See, for example: Q 59 [Blumenfeld].

15

14. Britain is already one of the largest investors in South Africa, and there is considerable two-way trade between the countries (see para 38 below for more details). We heard from the UK Trade and Investment section of the High Commission in Johannesburg how they were encouraging even more British businesses to invest in the country, bringing much-needed foreign capital, skills transfers and employment opportunities. It is in this area that the United Kingdom can probably be of greatest assistance in supporting South Africa’s economic growth and development.

15. We conclude that, while there remains a number of difficult challenges to be faced, the prospects for the South African economy are generally very positive. If it is to deliver the employment and increased national prosperity the country needs, however, a significant increase in direct foreign investment will be needed. We recommend that the Her Majesty’s Government continue to strive to stimulate and encourage private investment in South Africa.

Inequality

16. Linked closely to the issue of economic growth is that of the unequal benefit which different sections of the population have derived from the country’s success. The total GDP figures given above hide dramatic differences in the incomes of the very rich and very poor in the country. For example, although per capita income in South Africa was around $2,300 in 2002, 2% of the population were still living on less than a dollar a day.18 South Africa also ranked 111th out of 175 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), between Syria and Indonesia.19 ACTSA’s submission described South Africa as: “the world’s second most unequal country.”20

17. Given South Africa’s past, it is unsurprising that it is the black population who suffer worst from poverty, joblessness and social deprivation. In 1998, when the first properly-researched figures for inequality and poverty in South Africa were published, the sharp contrasts between the living standards of the different ethic groups was revealed.21 For example, 61% of black South Africans were ‘poor’, compared with only 1% of whites, and the infant mortality rate for whites was 7.3 per 1,000 births, while that for blacks was 54.22

18. To tackle this problem in 1995, the South African Government introduced a range of initiatives and programmes under the heading, ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ (BEE), which aimed to encourage the redistribution of wealth and opportunities to black and other previously disadvantaged communities. This policy has steadily developed since that time and, following a 2001 report by the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC), the Government agreed a target strategy for ensuring that companies become

18 UN Statistics Division www.unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=580

19 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures a country's achievements in three aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment ratio; and standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita. For more details, see: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/faq.html#21.

20 Ev 19, para 2.10. Also see QQ 185–6 [Mullin].

21 “Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Report prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality”, May 1998 www.gov.za/reports/1998/poverty

22 Ibid., pp 20 and 29

16

more representative of the population as a whole. For example, the Commission called for 25% of the top-listed companies to be black-owned by 2010.

19. BEE faces a number of very difficult obstacles before it is to succeed. Possibly the greatest is the lack of an educated and skilled black workforce, after years of official Government neglect before 1994. The policy has also been criticised for being seen, at least in its initial stages, to be merely creating a new black elite.23 A recent article in The Financial Times on this subject, made clear the imperative for the policy to achieve tangible results:

South Africa needs to get black empowerment right, for the sake of both the economy and its nine-year-old non-racial democracy. In a country with some of the world’s starkest social contrasts, broader economic participation by black people could cement faster economic growth and enhanced political stability.24

20. However, progress is slowly being made: black ownership of public companies, for example, was 9.4% in 2002 compared with 3.9% in 1997 (and virtually non-existent before 1994).25 The British and South African companies we spoke to during our inquiry were also very positive about the way in which the Government was handling this matter, calming fears of BEE being imposed from ‘on high’; indeed most of them saw it as more of an opportunity than a threat. The FCO, through UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), has assisted in the process of promoting understanding of how BEE works in practice, by organising seminars on the subject for concerned businesses.

21. We commend the South African Government for its work in tackling so boldly the lack of economic opportunities experienced by many black people in the country. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with its South African counterpart to promote a better understanding of ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ among British investors, and potential investors, and to assist them in seizing the opportunity that it represents.

HIV/AIDS

22. South Africa has a bigger HIV-positive population than any other country in the world at present.26 Approximately five million South Africans, 11 per cent of the population, are HIV-infected; it is estimated that 600 people die every day from the disease in South Africa.27 In its memorandum to the Committee, Save the Children estimated that the pandemic has created around 700,000 orphans, with 34.5% of pregnant women aged 25 to 29 being infected in 2002.28

23 See, for example: Q 61 [Blumenfeld].

24 “The emergence of a black business class”, Financial Times, 5 November 2003

25 South African Government, Towards ten years of freedom: progress in the first decade, challenges of the second decade, October 2003, www.gov.za

26 UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002, July 2002 http://www.unaids.org/en/default.asp

27 Q 43 [Fraser]

28 Ev 114

17

23. While in South Africa, we also heard of the significant impact that the disease was having on businesses, particularly on the extractive industries. The high infection rate was inevitably leading to a greatly increased turnover of staff. One interlocutor suggested that in five years time some firms could face the prospect of having to replace one third of their workforce every year.

24. The response of President Mbeki’s Government to HIV/AIDS has been controversial, particularly with regard to the provision of anti-retroviral drugs (ARDs) to sufferers. There was a concerted public campaign last year, led by a well-organised group of AIDS activists, known as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), protesting against the Government’s policy at that time. On 17 November, the Government agreed to provide ARDs in state hospitals. It estimates that more than 50,000 people will receive the drugs in the first year, and up to a million by 2007.29

25. During our visit to South Africa, we were privileged to visit the ‘Hospice in Soweto’, one of a very few such institutions in South Africa. Around 75% of its patients suffered from HIV/AIDS, and the majority of the much-needed palliative care was carried out in the community by trained carers. We were told that there was still a great stigma attached to HIV/AIDS, and many families would deny that the patient had the disease. Poverty also forced some families literally to ‘dump’ patients in the street or at a local clinic because they simply did not have the resources to pay for their care.

26. The UK, along with other international donors, provides some support to the hospice. It has received limited funds for the past five years from the Small Grants Scheme, which is DfID funded but administered by FCO. We were concerned to be told by the Foreign Office, therefore, that, “the future of the Small Grants Scheme beyond March 2005 is uncertain.”30 The Office promised, however, to work with DfID to look for alternative sources of funding. We shall monitor progress on providing funds for this project.

27. On the whole, however, the United Kingdom can be extremely proud of the assistance it has provided to combat HIV/AIDS. The Minister informed us that the Government had provided around £30 million towards combating the disease in South Africa alone.31 Globally, Britain is now the second largest bilateral donor on HIV/AIDS after the USA, providing more than £270 million in 2002–03.32 As the Minister recognised, though: “It is not enough of course, and it is never going to be enough.”33 Our colleagues in the International Development Committee have examined this subject in detail in their recent report.34

28. We conclude that the British Government is playing a key role in the fight against the scourge of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, and throughout the world. As always, though, more could be done and we recommend that the Government maintain an

29 “Pretoria Aids drug decision wins wide approval”, Financial Times, 21 November 2003

30 Ev 81

31 Q 230

32 HC Deb, 9 December 2003, col 914

33 Q 230

34 International Development Committee, Third Report of Session 2002–03, The Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa, HC 116

18

active dialogue with the South African Government on this subject in order to assess what further assistance could be given.

Crime

29. The high prevalence of crime, particularly violent crime in the inner-cities, is one of the most significant and well-publicised problems facing South Africa at this time. This is not only an extremely serious issue in respect of individual citizens’ everyday life, but also has a very detrimental economic impact through its deterrence of much-needed tourism and trade. Mr Blumenfeld observed in his oral evidence:

The crime problem is serious, it creates difficulties for any firm wanting to send skilled personnel there because they have a responsibility for their welfare, and there is both a perception but also a reality that crime levels are high particularly in certain areas. There is no question that it does have an impact on investment.35

We believe it is important to note, however, that the prevalence of crime in South Africa, as in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, varies greatly from area to area and it is misleading to view the entire country as being especially dangerous or crime-ridden. Much of the most violent crime is, sadly, confined to the township areas, mainly affecting the urban black population.

30. While in South Africa we visited a local police station in Alexandra and met some of the officers who work there. We also met a secondee from the Metropolitan Police who was working there at the time, supporting their work. We heard and saw at first hand some of the difficulties they face everyday. We were also very pleased to have the opportunity to discuss some of these issues with Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, who was able to give us a broader insight into how the Government is tackling the problems.

31. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Chris Mullin MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, recognised the scale of the problem, but was unable to offer any significant strengthening of this bilateral assistance:

The maintenance of the rule of law is a prerequisite for stability and economic success, particularly if you wish to attract foreign investment. The South Africans are as well aware of that as we are. Do I see any possibility of expanding the assistance we already give? Modestly, I think. We are talking about capacity building here, things like training. Sir John Stevens, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, I know has personally taken an interest in the Met’s operation there and I think he is in South Africa at the moment. At the end of the day it comes down to providing them with effective training and resources, and perhaps bringing some of them over here to see how we do things. I can see scope for modest expansion but, at the end of the day it is the South Africans who are going to have deal with this problem; it is a very serious problem. We can just do our best to help and advise in all capacities.36

35 Q 67

36 Q 228

19

32. We conclude that the fight against crime, especially violent crime, is one of the most serious, and difficult, challenges facing South Africa at this time. We recommend that the British Government continue to offer significant assistance to South Africa in this field, and that co-operation projects currently in place are strengthened and improved, particularly those relating to improving the professional training of police officers.

Land reform

33. Since 1994, the South African Government has been struggling with the issue of land reform. The Land Affairs Department announced recently that some 700,000 people had received almost three million hectares of land through the Government’s restitution and redistribution programme since the end of apartheid.37 The Department recently reported a “remarkable increase” over the past year in the number of land claims settled, but said it would be a major challenge to complete all claims by its deadline of 2005. Only land that was unfairly expropriated under apartheid is eligible for redistribution.

34. Many South Africans have been frustrated at the slow pace of reform, however, and the apparent “foot dragging” by some of those involved in the process. In 1994, the ANC promised to redistribute 30% of farmland in 10 years. So far only around 3% has changed hands, and 90% of commercial farmland remains in the hands of approximately 50,000 white farmers.38 Earlier this year, President Mbeki, therefore, announced amendments to the land restitution law, which would, in the Government’s opinion, “expedite land reform and reverse the legacy of apartheid.” 39

35. There has been strong criticism of this move from some groups, with critics claiming that they will allow the Minister of Land Affairs to expropriate land without a court order and without the landowner’s agreement.40 Unsurprisingly, references to what happened in neighbouring Zimbabwe, and recent developments in Namibia, are frequent.41

36. We were reassured, therefore, to hear from a number of sources within and without South Africa that what was happening there was a genuine, well-managed programme of land reform. Both Mr Richard Dowden, of the Royal African Society, and Dr Steve Kibble, of the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR), told us that, while there was a land movement in South Africa, it was nothing like the “state-sponsored ... violent” force seen in Zimbabwe. Indeed, Mr Dowden observed:

I would have thought there was far more threat from modernisation and mechanisation to the livelihoods of rural South Africa and the general process of globalisation than there would be from taking over farms in the way it has been done in Zimbabwe.42

37 News24.com, 25 November 2003

38 “Mbeki to join land grab club”, Sunday Times, 4 January 2004

39 See, for example: “Mbeki can seize white farms”, The Times, 31 January 2003.

40 See, for example: Ev 135

41 “Namibian Workers To Seize Land From White Farmers”, Independent, 6 November 2003

42 Q 109

20

37. We conclude that, at this time, the South African Government appears to be pursuing a sensible and considered policy of land reform, that seeks to address the historically unequal distribution of land in the country. However, we consider it is critical to South Africa’s future prosperity that any moves towards land expropriations similar to those seen in Zimbabwe are firmly resisted.

21

UK–South African relations

‘Broad and deep’

38. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), in its initial memorandum to the Committee, described the relationship between the United Kingdom and South Africa as, “broad and deep”.43 It highlighted a few of the significant ties that bind the two countries together:

£5 billion of two-way trade in goods and services;

£12 billion of United Kingdom investment in South Africa, making it the largest foreign investor there (nine of the top twenty foreign employers in the country are British);44

around 275,000 South African visitors to the United Kingdom each year, making it the country’s most popular long-haul destination (accounting for almost 40% of all overseas departures), with well over 400,000 Britons going the other way, a number that is steadily rising year-on-year;45 and

approximately 750,000 Britons living in South Africa, one of the largest communities of British expatriates anywhere in the world. Around 350,000 South Africans currently live in the United Kingdom.46

39. The Foreign Office stated that the United Kingdom and South African Governments work together on a wide variety of issues and at all levels of the two administrations. The Office highlighted the “mutual interests” the countries share, such as the promotion of sustainable development, support for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and a commitment to fighting poverty in Africa.47 It detailed, in particular, bilateral co-operation on peace-keeping activities, promotion of the New Partnership for African Development and the strengthening of trade links, all of which we examine in further detail below. There have been frequent high-levels visits, including those by HM The Queen in 1999 and President Mbeki in 2001. Cultural links are also very strong, with a recent highlight being the visit of the England football team and especially Mr David Beckham, which had done a great deal to raise awareness of Great Britain in the country. Other evidence we have received has similarly emphasised the strength and diversity of the ties that bind the two countries together.48

43 Ev 67, para 6

44 Ev 71–72, paras 45, 47 and annex E

45 Ev 117, paras 4.1 and 4.4 [VisitBritain]. Figure for UK visitors to South Africa supplied by the South African Tourist Board.

46 Ev 112 [Mills]

47 Ev 67, para 6

48 See, for example: Ev 99 [LGIB].

22

40. We are pleased to conclude that, in general, South Africa and the United Kingdom enjoy excellent bilateral relations on a very broad front of activities and interests. We recommend that the FCO, in its Response to this Report, sets out how it considers bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa could be strengthened further in the future.

‘Periods of turbulence’

41. Although, on the whole, bilateral relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom are very good, there will always be aspects of the relationship which serve to create tension and occasional discord. During this inquiry, a number of key issues were brought to our attention as being such irritants in Britain’s relationship with South Africa, which had helped to engender ‘periods of turbulence’ in the recent past. Some were long-term issues that included a wide variety of factors and players, others were specific problems that had arisen only recently. We wish to address four of these issues in our Report: trade liberalisation; the impact of the war in Iraq; development assistance to South Africa; and the perceived ‘brain drain’ from South Africa to the United Kingdom.

Trade liberalisation

42. On 14 September last year, the latest negotiations in the Doha round of world trade talks, organised by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), collapsed without agreement being reached.49 No country or national grouping would take responsibility for the failure of the talks. The developing nations pointed the finger of blame at the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU), in particular, for being unwilling to cede ground on the vexed issue of subsidies for agricultural produce. On the other hand, many European countries were critical of African and Asian nations who had been unwilling to discuss restrictions on investment and competition. South Africa took a crucial role in the negotiations as a leading member of the G20+ (or G22) group of developing nations, along with the People’s Republic of China, India and Brazil.50

43. Many of our memoranda and witnesses during the inquiry have highlighted the collapse of the talks, and the wider issues it raised of the inequalities in world trade, as being one of the biggest problems dogging South Africa’s relations with the United Kingdom, and indeed the rest of the developed world.51 Professor James Barber, of the University of Cambridge, for example spoke of the imperative to create a far more, “even field” in international trade.52 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA), in its memorandum, went so far as to say that South Africa’s relations with the EU had been “poisoned” by its

49 For details of the collapse of the talks see, for example: “Investment row causes WTO talks to collapse”, Financial

Times, 15 September 2003.

50 At Cancun the G20 (sometimes known as the G20+ or G22) consisted of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala have left since Cancun, and Nigeria, Indonesia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have joined.

51 See, for example: Ev 110 [Mills] and Ev 17 [ACTSA].

52 Q 11

23

failure to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in particular.53 We also noted a recent article by the head of the South African delegation to the WTO, Faizel Ismail, in which he specifically makes clear South Africa’s anger at the EU’s agricultural subsidies in particular:

The EU is the world’s largest subsidiser of agriculture and thus causes the greatest harm to the livelihoods of the world’s poorest people in developing countries. Through a combination of high subsidies and high tariffs, the EU’s policies stimulate agricultural overproduction in Europe, fuels artificially low world prices, and constrains and often prevents the access of developing country products to its markets. ... agricultural negotiations are the centrepiece of the DDA [Doha Development Agenda]. Failure to produce movements on this issue will slow down the entire process, bring the negotiations to a halt, and threaten the future of the WTO itself. EU member states are confronted with a choice between maintaining their protectionist positions on agricultural reform and their commitment to the multilateral trading system and development. How will the EU member states confront this reality?”54

44. In general, it was reported to us, the United Kingdom was seen as being more reasonable and progressive on the subject of trade liberalisation, and on reform of the CAP especially, than some other EU member states. However, with particular reference to Cancun, Professor David Simon, of the University of London, suggested that: “there was evidence that Britain did not dissent from the overall EU position which has caused some consternation among people in South Africa and others.”55 Mr Richard Dowden similarly commented:

That is really what South Africa and other African countries would like to see us doing: Britain being a much stronger voice in favour of a better deal on debt, on reducing agricultural subsidies, allowing Africa and other countries to earn their place rather than have to wait on aid.56

45. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin acknowledged that this was an issue about which the South Africans felt strongly.57 He believed, however, that they recognised the United Kingdom had played a “fairly honourable role” at Cancun, where the United Kingdom had been:

pressing very hard for trade liberalisation and the fact there was a failure was no fault of ours. I think that is widely recognised. Similarly within the EU we have played a leading role in campaigning for doing away with the CAP and reforming the agricultural subsidies.58

53 Ev 20, para 3.7

54 Faziel Ismail, “An Insider’s Insight”, Africa after Cancun: Trade Negotiations in Uncertain Times, South African Institute of International Affairs, November 2003

55 Q 12

56 Q 124

57 Q 173

58 Ibid.

24

46. The Minister also highlighted the EU–South Africa Trade, Co-operation and Development Agreement (TDCA), which had been signed in 1999 but which was yet to be ratified by all parties.59 The Agreement covers trade relations, financial aid and development co-operation between the Community and South Africa, as well as a number of other areas. Mr Mullin told us that, thanks to the Agreement, “by 2010 95 per cent—by value—of all South African exports to the EU will be free of tariffs.”60

47. Despite this significant step forward in liberalising trade between the EU and South Africa, it is clear to us that the intransigent position adopted by some other member states towards trade liberalisation and CAP reform is undoubtedly continuing to damage the EU’s relations with South Africa, and other developing nations, and with it the UK’s bilateral relationship. From what we heard while in South Africa, we also fear that the Government is over-estimating the extent to which South Africa, and other developing nations, distinguish the United Kingdom as a “good guy” on this issue, compared to other EU member states.

48. We recommend that, within the constraints imposed on it by the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, the British Government should do more to make clear its commitment to opening up trade to the developing world and reforming the CAP at all opportunities.

War in Iraq

49. As in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the recent military action in Iraq aroused strong passions in South Africa. The majority of South Africans were strongly opposed to the war in Iraq and many government ministers put their objections on the record. In January 2003, President Mbeki himself said that: “We are not aware of any information that would suggest that Iraq has been in serious material breach of the Security Council resolution.”61 He also criticised what he saw as the hypocrisy of the United States: “They say nothing whatsoever against Israel’s weapons of mass destruction. ... Of course, from their point of view, the matter has nothing to do with principle. It turns solely on the question of power.”62

50. While visiting South Africa, we heard this opposition to the war repeated by a large number of interlocutors. Criticism focused particularly on what was perceived to have been the unilateralism of the USA and, it was argued, the consequent undermining of the role of the United Nations (UN). As Mr Mullin observed:

... it was the issue over the lack of a second resolution for the invasion at the United Nations. The South Africans, rightly, have a very high regard for the United Nations and they felt that the alliance should have received United Nations’ endorsement before the actual invasion.63

59 Q 174. At the time of writing, 14 of the 15 EU member states had ratified the agreement, leaving only one member

state and South Africa (Ev 80).

60 Q 174

61 “Mbeki broadsides Bush with tough anti-war vow”, Saturday Star, 24 January 2003

62 Ibid.

63 Q 182

25

He believed, however, that the relationship with South Africa was sufficiently “mature” that such differences could arise and be discussed sensibly.64 He felt that it was no more than a “temporary phenomenon.” We hope so too.

51. We conclude that the reputation of the United Kingdom in South Africa has undoubtedly been seriously weakened by differences in the two countries’ approach towards Iraq. We recommend that the Government seek to repair the damage done to the relationship by this disagreement, at every possible opportunity.

Changes in development assistance priorities

52. In its supplementary memorandum to the Committee, the FCO noted a recent change in development assistance priorities of the Department for International Development (DfID):

Hilary Benn announced in January 2004 that DfID’s programme of work in the middle-income countries of Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland) would reduce from £35 million in 2004/5 to £25 million in 2005/6, in compliance with DfID's commitment to spend 90% of its resources in low-income countries by that year.65

This reduction in the assistance being given to South Africa will impact on a number of the projects the British Government currently has in place in South Africa. It was made clear to us in South Africa that this reduction in the funds allocated to the country was deeply regretted, and that many co-operation projects would suffer as a result.

53. While the aid budget is wholly the responsibility of the DfID, this shift in priorities will inevitably impinge on the FCO’s work in maintaining and improving strong diplomatic ties with South Africa. We were disappointed to learn from the Minister, therefore, that there had apparently been little prior consultation between DfID and the FCO on this matter, and to hear Mr Mullin dismiss the reduction as a “fairly minor irritant.”66 We believe that, although the reduction is relatively small in terms of the Government’s overall spending on development assistance, this re-allocation of funds will have a significant effect at a micro-level, in South Africa. On crude indices, South Africa is indeed a middle-income country but these figures shield gross disparities income within the country (see paragraph 16). Money spent in the Republic is likely not only to be used more effectively but could also have a positive regional impact.

54. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office sets out how the cut in DfID’s assistance to middle-income countries will affect the Foreign Office’s work in South Africa, and whether alternative sources of funding will be available to carry on some of the very valuable work being done there. We further recommend that the FCO set out what inter-departmental consultation took place prior to the re-allocation being announced.

64 Q 184

65 Ev 80

66 Q 176–7

26

‘Brain drain’

55. Professor David Simon, and others who gave evidence to the Committee, highlighted the targeted recruitment by some United Kingdom employment agencies of South African doctors, teachers and nurses as a significant annoyance to the relationship. He questioned whether this was “ethical and/or appropriate” given the UK’s concern for South Africa’s development.67 Mr Alastair Fraser, of ACTSA, echoed this concern:

it is something which enormously annoys both South Africans and the South African Government. It is quite a complex issue to try and find a solution to ... but there are numerous issues, some of them to do with the operation of British employment agencies which recruit in South Africa, both their recruiting techniques and what they are telling people the situation will be in the UK.68

It was noted by other witnesses, however, that South Africa itself has benefited from an inflow of skilled labour from other parts of the continent.69

56. Mr Mullin, in his oral evidence to us, recognised the seriousness of this problem.70 He highlighted a recent memorandum of understanding that had been signed by the South African Health Department and the National Health Service on the subject but accepted that this would not stop the aggressive tactics of some individual agencies. The Minister concluded that:

We can certainly try to make sure that some ethical standards apply and we can try to make sure that there is a two-way fertilisation between out two health services, which is one of the things which this Memorandum of Understanding attempts to address.71

57. We recommend that the Government ensure that the United Kingdom, while respecting the rights of individuals, does not denude South Africa of its much-needed skilled professionals and continue to monitor developments in this area.

67 Ev 6, para 3

68 Q 70

69 Q 70 [Blumenfeld]

70 Q 178

71 Ibid.

27

South Africa’s role in its region

A regional superpower?

58. Nearly all of those who gave evidence to our inquiry agreed that South Africa was undoubtedly emerging as the principal regional power in Southern Africa, and perhaps the continent as a whole. Keith Somerville, of the BBC World Service, stated that it was: “the dominant military and economic power in Southern Africa, and the most influential nation in sub-Saharan Africa.”72 Dr Jakkie Cilliers, of the South African Institute for Security Studies (SAISS), similarly said that the nation “had emerged from political and economic isolation to become the dominant power in the region.”73

59. Professor Barber highlighted three particular reasons why South Africa was able to “punch above its weight” in regional affairs: it had the “momentum of the past” (its liberation struggle) which had drawn it to the world’s attention and given it leverage with both Western and African leaders; it had the personal resources of men such as ex-President Mandela; and it was a “giant” in economic terms in comparison to its African neighbours.74 (See graph above for comparisons of the South African GDP with some of its neighbours—figure 2.) In South Africa, the economic and communications infrastructure also functions far better than in its neighbours.

60. However, all of these submissions cautioned against becoming complacent about South Africa’s ability, or willingness, to act as a regional ‘superpower’. They highlighted a number of factors, including the relative weakness of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the pressure on politicians to deal with many of the country’s domestic problems first. Perhaps most importantly, South Africa is understandably unwilling to be seen as, in the words of one commentator, “a regional bully or hegemon” seeking to dictate to the rest of the continent.75 Keith Somerville observed:

The country was also made cautious regionally by the role of the country, its armed forces and intelligence services during the end of apartheid era. South African forces had carried out raids against or intervened militarily or in support of rebels in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe—as well as being an occupying power in Namibia.

Robert Mugabe has been quoted as saying that with the end of apartheid in South Africa, countries in the region did not want to swap being victims of apartheid aggression for being treated by the new government as a province of South Africa—this has inhibited Pretoria’s willingness and ability to exercise influence regionally. Some have described it as leading to a situation of Pretoria being damned if it does something and damned if it doesn’t.76

72 Ev 106

73 Ev 109

74 Ev 4

75 Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?”, International Affairs 79/4 (2003), p 822

76 Ev 107

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61. It is also arguable that, following the dramatic events of 1990–94, the world community expected too much of South Africa’s ability to tackle both its own significant domestic challenges and those of the continent as a whole. In his memorandum, Professor Barber expressed this succinctly:

World leaders hurried to South Africa to bathe in its reflected glory, to identify with Mandela, and to encourage it to accept continental leadership. In the West, South Africa was hailed as Africa’s best hope of securing peace and prosperity in that troubled, poverty-plagued continent. A burden of expectation descended on the new government’s shoulders, which was enhanced by Mandela’s personal prestige—by assuming that he could achieve ends that eluded others.77

This fear of raising expectations too high was echoed in a recent speech by the Deputy President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, when he said that initial expectations of the country in 1994 were so high that a more realistic appraisal of what the country could achieve was needed.78

77 Ev 2. See also: Q 5 [Barber]

78 Q 116 [Kibble]

29

Figure 4: South Africa in its wider region

Source: UN Cartographic Section79

79 UN Cartographic Section (Africa, no. 4045 Rev. 4, January 2004), www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/index.htm

(amended to highlight SADC member states)

Southern African Development Community (SADC) Member States(Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe)

Socotra

Providence Is.

Agalega Is.

Farquhar Is.Aldabra Is.

Amirante Is.

Zanzibar

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TromelinSt. Helena

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Cairo

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TANZANIA

MOROCCO

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

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CENTRALAFRICAN REPUBLIC

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UGANDA

CÔTE- D'IVOIRE

LIBERIA

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Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONSJanuary 2004

Department of Peacekeeping OperationsCartographic Section

The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance

0

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by the United Nations.

30

Peace-making and peace-keeping

62. Since 1994, the South African Government has undertaken a number of initiatives, some unilateral, some in the context of regional groupings, to try to bring peace to long-standing African disputes. These have included interventions in Lesotho, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The South Africans have also becoming increasingly involved in regional peace-keeping operations, despite the weaknesses in the SANDF noted above.

63. The two largest operations South Africa is currently involved in are in Burundi and the DRC. South Africa has played a key role in helping to broker peace in the latter country, both between the internal factions and the external players involved (primarily Rwanda and Uganda). It currently has around 1,400 troops stationed there as part of the UN Mission, and its reputation is not tarnished as is that of the military forces of Zimbabwe.

64. In Burundi, South Africa is currently leading an AU peace-keeping mission in the country, along with Ethiopia and Mozambique—African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)—the first ‘African Mission’ for the AU. South Africa is supplying 1,600 of the total force strength of 3,235.80 The United Kingdom, EU and US are all supporting the peace-keeping mission, but it is undoubtedly proving a significant strain on South Africa’s financial and military resources. While in South Africa, we were told that it was hoped that the UN might be able to take a more active role in supporting the mission to reduce the burden on the participating nations.

65. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recently reported to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi, praising the Mission’s work there:

Despite the financial constraints that have plagued AMIB from the outset, the force has performed to the highest standards in implementing its mandate in Burundi. It has played a key role in providing an atmosphere of security and in assisting the parties to achieve progress in the disarmament process. 81

He went on to recommend strongly that the UN’s role in Burundi be expanded, to “provide the support required to consolidate the peace process.”82 The Secretary-General envisaged that the AMIB force would remain the core military component of any future mission.

United Kingdom support

66. Given the terrible impact that many long-running African conflicts have had on its peoples and the continent as a whole, South Africa’s willingness to take on the burdens of peace-keeping duties is extremely welcome. We were very pleased to note the long-term assistance that the United Kingdom has been giving to support South Africa’s emerging peace-keeping role. A British military assistance and training team (BMAT) has been working with the SANDF for eight years now.

80 African Union Document PSD/206/B/2387, www.au.org

81 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on Burundi, 16 March 2004, para 62

82 Ibid., paras 63–4

31

67. The supplementary memorandum we received from the FCO also noted the most recent joint exercise to take place:

Exercise AFRICAN SHIELD, a UK/South Africa joint Command Post Peace Support Operation took place from 6-26 November 2003. Around 850 personnel drawn from both countries participated and it was the largest ever bilateral military exercise on South African soil. The objective of the exercise was to practise the command and control of a peace support operation in Africa. The exercise scenario concerned a fictional country abutting South Africa, riven by civil war, needing a Chapter 7 mandated coalition of the willing to turn a fragile cease fire agreement into a permanent peace.83

Such exercises are clearly very valuable for both sides, and do much not only to strengthen capabilities but to help cement the two nations’ close working relationship. Given what we have said earlier about South Africa’s reluctance to assume the mantle of regional ‘superpower’, however, the United Kingdom must clearly guard against giving the impression that it is withdrawing from the continent and leaving the burden of such work on the shoulders of South Africa.

68. We conclude that South Africa has played a crucial and very welcome role in its conflict resolution work across the continent. It has brought new energy and focus to attempts to settle long-running disputes such as those in Burundi and the DRC. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer every assistance to South Africa to strengthen its work in this vital field, while remaining fully involved in the continent itself. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out how it sees further co-operation in the field of peace-keeping work and training of regional forces developing in the long–term.

Southern African Development Community

69. South Africa is a key member of the regional Southern African Development Community (SADC). This organisation was originally established in 1980, in part as an attempted counterweight to apartheid South Africa, and its original membership of nine has now grown to fourteen: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa (which joined in 1994), Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.84 SADC’s objectives include the promotion of development and economic growth, the alleviation of poverty, the enhancement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support for the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.85

70. Since its foundation, SADC has developed a number of different institutions and embraced a wide range of ambitious programmes and targets. For example, the member states aspire to create a free trade area by 2008, a customs union by 2012 and a common

83 Ev 80

84 The Seychelles is due to leave the organisation in July 2004.

85 For further information, see: www.sadc.int.

32

market by 2015.86 One recent development was the signing of a Mutual Defence Pact in August last year, which aimed to promote regional co-operation in politics, defence and security. This followed on from the establishment of the SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, which is intended to prevent conflicts and breakdown of law and order, both between and within member countries.

71. Critics, however, frequently point to the gap between protocols signed in SADC and their subsequent delivery. In a recent article, Ms Anne Hammerstad, of the South African Institute of International Affairs, highlighted this growing “credibility gap” between the rhetoric and actions of SADC, particularly in the field of security co-operation. She identified a number of key weaknesses with the organisation, including, in her opinion, its failure to engage fully with civil society and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and its lack of a common vision and identity. This was echoed by Dr Kibble who spoke of the need for a greater “SADC consciousness.”87

72. Another key weakness of the organisation highlighted in our inquiry, has been SADC’s inability to deal effectively with situations where member states disagreed or refused to be bound by majority opinion. Keith Somerville highlighted the destabilising role played by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC, despite the protestations of fellow SADC members such as South Africa. A number of memoranda also highlighted SADC’s unwillingness to recognise the problems in Zimbabwe or to reprimand President Mugabe in any way.88

73. Mr Mullin expressed his particular frustration at SADC’s reticence on Zimbabwe:

We are rather disappointed; they betray a level of ignorance that disappoints us. For example, last August they put out a statement calling for the EU to end its economic sanctions against Zimbabwe; there are no economic sanctions. Following the Commonwealth Conference they put out another unhelpful statement which, again, did not demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the situation.89

The Minister stressed, though, that the United Kingdom was anxious to encourage SADC, and had offered them considerable support as an organisation. This included the donation of a quarter of a million pounds to help restructure its secretariat and a further £11 million, over the next four years, towards supporting the secretariat’s regional trade and investment in integration work. The FCO was also supplying a senior adviser on tax policy for three years.

74. We conclude that SADC has the potential to play a very valuable role in helping to solve many of the challenges facing its region. If it is to realise this potential, however, and to be taken seriously as a respected international organisation, it must be willing to recognise the failings of member states whose behaviour does not meet the expectations placed upon them by SADC’s high aspirations.

86 Anne Hammerstad, “Defending the State or Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads”,

South African Institute of International Affairs, Report number 39, p 1

87 Q 117 [Kibble]

88 See, for example: Ev 109 [Cilliers].

89 Q 195 [Mullin]

33

75. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with South Africa, as a key player in the organisation, to support SADC’s work generally and encourage it to take seriously its role in promoting good governance and respect for human rights.

34

South Africa and Zimbabwe

Background

76. The deteriorating human rights situation in Zimbabwe has been well-reported elsewhere.90 As time has gone by, President Robert Mugabe’s regime has shown an even greater, and more ruthless, determination to remain in power, regardless of the cost to the Zimbabwean people. Latest reports indicate that inflation there is running at almost 700% and the unofficial exchange rate is now around 5,500 Zimbabwean dollars to the US dollar.91 The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that almost 40% of the population are malnourished and it is providing food for around four million people (out of a total population of around 12½ million).92 The crackdown on the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party and all voices critical of Mr Mugabe’s government—including the last independent newspaper, The Daily News—also appears to be continuing unabated.93

77. This Committee has been involved in an ongoing inquiry into Zimbabwe since 2001, and we have produced three Reports on the country in recent years.94 In our latest Report, produced in May 2003, we devoted a section to the issue of ‘Zimbabwe in its region.’ We concluded that:

if Zimbabwe’s neighbours were fully to assume their responsibilities—for example, by imposing targeted non-trade sanctions similar to those already imposed by the EU, by some Commonwealth countries and by the United States—Mugabe's regime would be further isolated, his opponents would be encouraged and his days would be numbered. We further conclude that the Government would be entirely right to accept such a step, if it is taken, as evidence of the intention of the countries concerned to adhere to the principles to which they have committed themselves under NePAD and other international agreements, qualifying them to receive the benefits of those programmes. We recommend that Ministers take every opportunity to make this point clear to their counterparts in southern Africa.95

78. In its reply, the Government simply stated that:

The Government fully agrees. We make this point in our regular dialogue with Zimbabwe’s neighbours and other African states.96

90 See, for example: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Cm 5967, September

2003, pp 49–52.

91 “How Zimbabwe defies economic collapse”, Financial Times, 10 March 2004

92 See WFP website: www.wfp.org.

93 See, for example: “Zimbabwe paper off the streets”, BBC News, 6 February, 2004; “Mugabe's foes 'face constant attacks': MPs tell of threats and violence from ruling party support”, The Guardian, 9 March 2004; and “Mugabe suspends last of independent judges”, The Times, 1 March 2004.

94 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 456; Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813; and Eight Report of Session 2002–03, Zimbabwe, HC 339

95 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eight Report of Session 2002–03, Zimbabwe, HC 339, para 48

96 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Zimbabwe, Session 2002–03: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 5869, July 2003, p 5

35

United Kingdom policy towards Zimbabwe

79. The policy of the United Kingdom Government towards Zimbabwe continues to be, “to maintain pressure on the Zimbabwe government to bring about a return to respect for human rights and the rule of law in the country.”97 The British Government has sought to achieve this through a variety of peaceful means. As we have noted in a previous Report, the United Kingdom’s status as the former colonial power in Zimbabwe makes any attempt to influence the situation in the country on a purely bilateral basis very difficult.98 President Mugabe has become adept at using any British criticism of his regime as an excuse for a tirade against the United Kingdom. Recently, for example, he even accused Britain and the USA, of maliciously using the internet to undermine his country’s independence and “to foment instability”.99

80. The British Government has, therefore, increasingly tended to attempt to apply pressure on President Mugabe’s Government through various international fora, a policy for which we have expressed our support.100 Most notably it has sought to garner international support for its position in the Commonwealth—from the Councils of which Zimbabwe was suspended in 2002—and the EU. In February this year, the latter organisation agreed to renew its sanctions regime against Zimbabwe and extend their scope, raising the number of senior members of President Mugabe’s regime subjected to a travel ban and asset freeze from 79 to 95.101

South African policy towards Zimbabwe

81. South Africa has taken a very different attitude from the United Kingdom towards the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. Since the crisis began to unfold in its northern neighbour, the South African Government has pursued a policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ to achieve the same desired ends as the British Government—a return to democracy and respect for human rights. This it contrasts unfavourably with what it perceives to be the ‘megaphone diplomacy’ of the United Kingdom and the EU. South Africa, and President Mbeki in particular, have consistently refused to criticise the policies of Robert Mugabe’s that are steadily bringing his country to its knees.

82. Much of the evidence we have received for this inquiry has been highly critical of what commentators see as South Africa’s “kid glove handling” of President Mugabe, who is clearly damaging not only Zimbabwe but the whole region.102 There have been significant refugee flows out of Zimbabwe to most of its neighbours. It is estimated that there are approximately 2–3 million in South Africa alone, and that the country’s steady collapse has already cost the South African taxpayer over £1 billion.103 There is also the damage being

97 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Cm 5967, September 2003, p 52

98 Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, para 43

99 Speech delivered by President Mugabe at the World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, Switzerland, 10 December, 2003, www.itu.int/wsis. (“Internet a tool of British imperialism, says Mugabe”, The Daily Telegraph, 11 December 2003.)

100 See, for example: Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, para 48.

101 “Zimbabwe sanctions extended by EU”, BBC News, 23 February 2004

102 Ev 110 [Cilliers]. See also: Ev 6 [Simon] and Ev 106 [Somerville].

103 Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?”, International Affairs 79, 4 (2003), p823

36

done to the region’s, and indeed the continent’s, reputation amongst overseas government and investors.104 As we discuss below, Zimbabwe has also soured relations within the Commonwealth and the UN.105

83. In the light of these considerations, it is even more surprising, therefore, that South Africa has almost gone out of its way to support President Mugabe’s regime in recent years. The country has repeatedly defended it at various international gatherings and meetings, and resisted all pressure to apply further pressure on the country. Most recently it did this at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Abuja late last year, which was dominated by the issue.106 He expressed his anger at the organisation’s unwillingness to agree to this request in a strongly-worded public letter, in which he blamed the United Kingdom and its protection of its white “kith and kin” for the situation in Zimbabwe. 107 He also stated that the land issue was central to the crisis, even going so far as to say that: “With everything having failed to restore the land to its original owners in a peaceful manner, a forcible process of land redistribution perhaps became inevitable.”108

Reasons underlying South Africa’s policy

84. A number of those who have provided evidence to this inquiry, and to whom we spoke while in South Africa, attempted to explain why South Africa had failed to take a tougher line with Zimbabwe. Some of the reasons given included:

regional solidarity—President Mbeki’s pride in being an African and his strong belief in ‘African solutions to African problems,’ makes him unwilling to be seen as bending to the demands of the West over an African issue (being the “West’s poodle” as one memorandum observed).109 As noted above, South Africa is also constrained by its fears of being seen as a regional superpower, dictating to its smaller neighbours.110

shared history—the West has arguably failed to recognise the impact of the two nations’ shared struggle for freedom. ACTSA highlighted the fact that up to 80,000 Zimbabweans died during the country’s independence struggle, and it also provided much-needed aid to those fighting for freedom in South Africa and Namibia.111

land reform—this is still an extremely contentious issue in both countries, with a great deal of resentment over the past unequal distribution of land and resources.112

104 Ev 109 [Cilliers]. See also: Ev 44 [Kibble] and Q157 [Paterson].

105 See paras 111–2, 115

106 Ev 44 [Kibble]

107 President Thabo Mbeki, “We will resist the upside-down view of Africa”, ANC Today, volume 3, no. 49 (12-18 December) www.anc.org.za

108 Ibid.

109 Ev 44 [Kibble], Ev 3 [Barber] and Q 19 [Barber]

110 Ev 21, para 4.8 [ACTSA]

111 See, for example: Ev 21 [ACTSA] and Q 96 [Dowden].

112 See, for example: Ev 44 [Kibble], Ev 17 [ACTSA] and Q 96 [ Dowden].

37

the West’s ‘double standards’—there is anger that the West appears to be so active on the issue of Zimbabwe, while apparently ignoring issues of, arguably, far more pressing importance for Southern African nations, such as the adverse impact of globalisation.113

popularity of Mugabe—surprisingly, the ZANU-PF Government and Robert Mugabe, in particular, remain very popular among large sections of South Africans. In some quarters he is even viewed as the only African leader to have really stood up to the West and to have actively reversed the legacy of colonialism.114

85. The domestic implications for the ANC Government of criticising President Mugabe and the dangers of regional destabilisation following any change of government in Zimbabwe were similarly raised as possible considerations.115 While in South Africa we were also told that, while publicly South African ministers refused to criticise Mugabe, meetings were frequently held in secret between representatives of the two governments at which far more frank exchanges of views took place.

86. It is difficult to assess which of these reasons, if any, are the most compelling for the South African Government. The evidence we heard during our inquiry suggested that it was the first of the suggestions given above—the strength of African solidarity—that was the most important factor in President Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe. Professor Barber described an unwritten law, whereby “African states do not turn on each other in international fora, but close ranks when attacks are made against one of them.”116 Professor Gerrit Olivier, of the University of Pretoria, went further in a recent article, stating that the South African Government, “meticulously respects the sovereignty of African countries, viewing judgement on their human rights records, however odious and harmful, as unwarranted interference in their domestic affairs.”117

87. Alternatively, though, it was suggested to us while in South Africa, that the Government’s view was strongly shaped by the country’s own experiences of national reconciliation and rebirth from 1987 to 1994. During that period two almost implacably opposed groups—the ANC and the ruling National Party—had sat down together in private talks (initially in completely secret negotiations) and slowly thrashed out the agreement which eventually brought apartheid to an end. The current ANC Government, it is suggested, sees similar private talks between the two main parties in Zimbabwe—ZANU-PF and the MDC—allowing them to resolve the situation gradually and in their own time, as the only real way to make progress.

88. Our visit to South Africa also showed us, at first hand, the strength of feeling that exists over the third point identified above: land reform. Many of the interlocutors to whom we spoke, clearly believed sincerely that what was happening in Zimbabwe primarily centred on the issue of righting colonial wrongs and restoring land to those from whom it had been

113 See, for example: Ev 44 [Kibble] and Q 15 [Hamilton].

114 See, for example: Ev 1 [Barber] and Q 15 [Barber].

115 See, for example: Ev 44 [Kibble], Ev 1 [Barber], Q 96 [Dowden] and Q 102 [Kibble].

116 Ev 5 [Barber]

117 Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?”, International Affairs 79/4 (2003), p 817

38

taken seventy-odd years previously. In addition, many argued strongly that the United Kingdom, instead of concentrating on criticising Mugabe, should be looking to pay its fair share for land reform.

89. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that we investigated the issue of land reform in Zimbabwe thoroughly in our previous reports on Zimbabwe and identified clearly that the United Kingdom had been keen to fund equitable land re-distribution, but was unwilling simply to pour money into the pockets of Mugabe’s henchmen.118 It is clear, however, that this conclusion has not been accepted by many in South Africa, nor on the continent more widely.

Signs of change

90. There are indications that while President Mugabe remains popular among many South Africans, domestic concern is growing over the damage he is doing to his own country and the region. Most of Southern Africa’s churches have spoken out against South Africa’s support for Mugabe, for example. Archbishop Desmond Tutu recently made a veiled criticism of the Government for ignoring the human rights violations in Zimbabwe.119

91. Some of South Africa’s fellow African states also appear to be losing patience with Robert Mugabe. Relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana, in particular, have steadily declined in the past few months and the Botswanan Government is currently building a security fence along its 500 km border with Zimbabwe, which will have the effect of impeding the flow of refugees.120 The Nigerian President, President Olusegun Obasanjo, made clear to President Mugabe that he would not be welcome at the recent CHOGM in Abuja.121

The way forward?

92. At present, it is difficult to see how South Africa’s handling of Zimbabwe will develop in the future. On the one hand, the majority of our evidence suggests that if any outside force has influence on the thinking and actions of Robert Mugabe’s Government, it is South Africa. It has been argued that, were it willing, South Africa could use a number of levers on President Mugabe’s regime, not least through its supply of the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s power:

They do not even have to turn off the lights, just remind them that all their electricity comes from South Africa by turning them off for an hour in the evening from time to time. There are a 1,001 ways: they could tighten the border, they could put patrols on the border to pick up Zimbabweans coming across. There are 1,001 ways in

118 Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, para 7 ff.

119 “Tutu hits out at Mugabe’s African supporter”, Daily Telegraph, 16 December 2003

120 See also: SA 6 [Somerville] and Ev 112 [Lemon].

121 Ev 44 [Kibble]

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which neighbouring countries, where one is very big and powerful, can send messages very simply.122

93. On the other hand, many South Africans we spoke to argued that the United Kingdom, and the West generally, was over-estimating the influence they had over Zimbabwe; if they spoke out too strongly, they would simply be ignored. They also felt that there was a lack of understanding for their situation as a neighbour. Their position has been summed up by one commentator thus:

A tightening economic squeeze, which only South Africa had the capacity to impose, would have hastened the political and economic implosion of Zimbabwe, might have rebounded on Pretoria to disastrous effect via a mass influx of refugees, disrupted trade links and caused generalised chaos on the borders.123

Also, given what we have already said about the constraints on South Africa’s freedom of action owing to its history and political outlook, such radical options as turning off the lights would appear to be ruled out in practice.

94. As to how the United Kingdom should act on this very difficult issue, our witnesses were generally clear:

one of the mistakes we could make would be believing that British pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Zimbabwe would be a positive thing ... South African quiet diplomacy should be more balanced, much clearer condemnation of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe for example. But South Africa being seen to act in response to a United Kingdom demand for it to do so is likely to be extremely counter-productive. ... Every time the megaphones come out in the UK, it tends to have an unfortunate result, whatever the intention.124

We also received this impression during our visit to South Africa from those to whom we spoke.

95. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin made clear the United Kingdom’s doubts about South Africa’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy:

I cannot, at the moment, point to any seriously positive outcome and previous predictions that there would be a positive outcome have not so far born fruit, but I do not necessarily put that down to any lack of effort on President Mbeki’s part but to a particular stubbornness on the part of Mr Mugabe125

He stated explicitly, though, that he did not believe that South Africa was neglecting its responsibility toward Zimbabwe:

if anybody has influence over Mr Mugabe then President Mbeki would be the one, but Mr Mugabe is a very stubborn man and he has brought his country to the edge of

122 Q 107 [Dowden]

123 James Hamill, “South Africa and Zimbabwe”, Contemporary Review, July 2002, vol 281 (1638), p36

124 Q 71 [Fraser]

125 Q 202

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ruin. There is cause to doubt whether he would listen to anyone: his former comrades in South Africa, let alone advice that comes freely from Western Europe or America or somewhere else. ...

It is certainly not our position ... that the South Africans are doing nothing to help in Zimbabwe; they are.126

96. We conclude that:

a) South Africa and the United Kingdom unquestionably share the same objective for Zimbabwe—the return to a fully-functioning and economically vibrant democracy that respects the human rights of its citizens;

b) South Africa is acting in the manner it sincerely believes to be the most effective and the most likely to bring about the desired goal identified above;

c) the situation of the Zimbabwean people will continue to deteriorate unless effective pressure is brought to bear on the Government of Robert Mugabe to change its disastrous and self-seeking policies, and South Africa is the best placed external force to stimulate that change; and

d) South Africa, and the region more generally, will continue to suffer from Zimbabwe’s plight until such a change takes place, not least by deterring much-needed foreign direct investment.

97. We recommend that the British Government:

a) continue to maintain the strongest possible pressure on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the human rights of its citizens and to call free and fair elections, especially through multilateral means;

b) recognise the importance of South Africa in achieving a long-term solution to the severe crisis affecting Zimbabwe;

c) seek the closest possible co-operation with South Africa on achieving the mutually desired outcome of a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe; and

d) seek to promote a greater understanding of its genuine concerns about Zimbabwe in South Africa, and elsewhere on the continent, and the facts about the land reform issue.

126 QQ 201 and 204

41

South Africa’s international role

98. One of the most dramatic signs of South’s Africa post-apartheid ‘rebirth’ has been the country’s reappearance on the world stage. Before 1994, South African foreign policy was largely concerned with defending and justifying apartheid abroad. The result was the country’s exclusion from a host of international organisations and the imposition of boycotts and sanctions, such as the ban on sporting contacts, the UN arms embargo and EU sanctions. However, since the holding of the first free and fair elections under universal suffrage, South Africa has assumed a key role in nearly all the major continental and international organisations. We have discussed its role in SADC above (paras 69–75) and here concentrate on its work within three key fora: the African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

The African Union

99. The African Union (AU) replaced the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) at the Durban Summit of African leaders in July 2002.127 In the Sirte Declaration, which called for the establishment of the AU, African heads of state and government argued that a revitalised body was needed to accelerate: “the process of integration in the continent to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they are by certain negative aspects of globalisation.”128 There are currently 53 members of the African Union. The ‘vision’ of the Union is described as follows:

The AU is Africa’s premier institution and principal organization for the promotion of accelerated socio-economic integration of the continent, which will lead to greater unity and solidarity between African countries and peoples.

The AU is based on the common vision of a united and strong Africa and on the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion amongst the peoples of Africa.

As a continental organization it focuses on the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda of the Union.129

100. The AU has inherited a number of institutions from the old OAU, and developed several others, partly modelled on those of the EU. These include the Assembly, Executive Council, Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Commission, which is based at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On 18 March this year, the Pan-African

127 “The African Union legally came into being in May 2001 but its formal launch took place in Durban in July 2002. The

last Assembly of Heads of State from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was held on 8 July 2002. It was immediately followed by the Inaugural Summit of the African Union from 9-10 July 2002.” Ev 69, para 24

128 For further details, see: www.africa-union.org/home.

129 Ibid.

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Parliament also held its inaugural meeting. This assembly is made up of five Members (at least one of whom is a woman) from the legislatures of each member state of the Union which has ratified the relevant protocol. 130 One of the Union’s key policies has been the New Partnership for Africa (NePAD), which is discussed at length below (see paragraphs 122–41). The organisation is currently headed by President Joaquim Chissanó of Mozambique.

101. Two recent developments have also strengthened the Union’s commitment to promoting human rights and conflict resolution in the continent. In January this year, 15 AU members (including South Africa) agreed to create an African Court of Human and People’s Rights.131 This move has generally been welcomed by human rights organisations as an important step forward in tackling human rights abuses on the continent. However, they stress that the court will need ‘teeth’ and the co-operation of member states if it is to be effective.

102. Meeting in February in Libya, AU leaders also agreed to the creation of an African peace-keeping force. This will eventually consist of five brigades of soldiers, policemen and military observers—in total approximately 15,000 people—to be led by South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt. The force will be directed by the PSC, which came into being last year, and has 15 members drawn from across the Union’s membership. It is hoped that the new body will be able both to tackle present conflicts in the continent, such as that in Uganda, and help prevent future clashes arising.132 It is also part of the Union’s wider commitment to create ‘African solutions to African problems’, without having to resort to outside nations for assistance.

103. As the FCO noted in its memorandum to the Committee, South Africa (and President Thabo Mbeki in particular) has played an “active role in taking forward change” in the revitalisation of the OAU and participates fully in all the activities of the new African Union.133 President Mbeki served as the Union’s first Chairperson from July 2002 to July 2003, and has been especially active in the creation of the African peace-keeping force discussed above.

104. In his oral evidence to the Committee, Mr Mullin stated that he was “mildly optimistic” about the new organisation, and the change from the old OAU:

It has changed from an organisation that was mainly concerned with African solidarity and sweeping problems under the carpet to an organisation that now genuinely acknowledges the problems on their continent and the recognition that Africans must increasingly take responsibility for resolving them.134

The Minister had previously outlined to the House, in answer to a written question, how the United Kingdom was supporting the organisation: £1,089,745 to the AU Conflict

130 “Inaugural and the First Session of the Pan-African Parliament”, Africa Union press release No. 019/2004, 19 March

2004

131 See, for example: “African rights court’s slow start”, BBC News, 25 January 2004.

132 “Coping with conflict,” The Economist, 17 January 2004; “Africa leaders agree joint force”, BBC News, 28 February 2004; and “How to put the house in order—an African peacekeeping force”, The Economist, 13 March 2004

133 Ev 69, para 24

134 Q 208

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Management Centre and the its wider peacekeeping work (£5.9 million to the African Mission in Burundi), plus some small-scale support to the Union’s administrative work.135

105. Some commentators have, however, questioned whether the Union’s worthy ambitions will bring about genuine change on the continent. Concerns have been expressed that the aspiration of promoting genuine continental integration is somewhat over-ambitious. Professor Simon, for example, told us, that: “My sense is that in many parts of the region, there would be greater support for the more geographically-specific regional economic initiatives, like SADC and ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] because they are more coherent.”136

106. We conclude that the African Union holds the potential to deliver significant improvements in the standard of life for Africans, and should be fully supported by the United Kingdom and the EU. The recent creation of an African court of human rights and the agreement on a continental peace-keeping force are to be particularly welcomed, demonstrating, as they do, a commitment to tackle some of the most fundamental problems facing Africa at this time. South Africa has played a crucial role in all these developments.

107. We recommend that the Government continue to work with South Africa, and all its African partners, to assist the AU in realising the impressive ambitions it has set for itself.

Commonwealth

108. Under Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd—architect of ‘Grand apartheid’—South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961, shortly after the country had become a republic.137 This voluntary departure pre-empted the country’s anticipated expulsion from the organisation, following the growing revulsion of the world community at the policies of Verwoerd’s administration. It was with great joy, therefore, that the Commonwealth welcomed South Africa back into its councils in 1994, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela—the man who had done so much to fight the evil of Verwoerd’s legacy.

109. South Africa is now a key member of the Commonwealth, taking an active role in all aspects of the group’s work. It served as Chair of the Commonwealth from 1999–2002. South Africa was also a member of the ten-country High Level Group of member states, which was established at the 1999 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Durban to review the role of the Commonwealth in the 21st Century.138

110. Professor Simon told us that South Africa valued its role within the Commonwealth:

135 HC Deb, 22 January 2004, col 1417W

136 Q 22

137 Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd (1901–1966) was Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966, when he was assassinated. During his premiership the Sharpeville Massacre took place, the African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress were banned, South Africa became a republic and Nelson Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment. He is chiefly remembered as the ‘architect of apartheid’.

138 The group also included Australia, India, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Trinidad & Tobago, the United Kingdom, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. For the Group’s final report, see: “Report by the Commonwealth High Level Review Group to Commonwealth Heads Of Government, Coolum, Australia”, March 2002, www.chogm.org/chogm2002.

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President Mbeki himself sees it very much as one of a suite of global multilateral institutions where South Africa can play a pivotal role, often as a broker between if you like the old Commonwealth and the new Commonwealth.139

He felt that South Africa had particularly welcomed the accession of Mozambique and Cameroon in 1995, neither of which had been British colonies or protectorates, as a sign of the Commonwealth assuming a “wider role than simply a former British ex-colonial club.”140 Professor Barber agreed with this assessment and stressed the role that South Africa sees itself playing in the Commonwealth, and other such international fora, as that of “a bridge-builder between the first and third worlds.”141 This view of the Commonwealth as a valuable means of allowing developed and developing nations from across the globe to interact was also echoed during our visit to South Africa.142

111. As noted above (para 80), the most recent high-profile Commonwealth meeting, the CHOGM held at Abuja in December last year, once again brought differences in opinion to the fore on the vexed question of Zimbabwe.143 Although the meeting eventually agreed on continuing Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Council of the Commonwealth for another year, this result was not achieved without considerable acrimony. President Mbeki himself was reported to have been particularly angry at the decision, and the weekly public letter he wrote shortly after the meeting’s conclusion reflected fully his views on the subject.144 (President Mugabe announced that Zimbabwe would leave the Commonwealth with immediate effect, following the meeting’s decision.145)

112. We agree with Mr Mullin, who stated in his evidence to us that, “the entire Zimbabwe issue poisons everything it touches.”146 He was confident, however, that the situation was not irredeemable:

What I took heart from was that actually most African countries went along—it was done by consensus in the end, as you know—with maintaining the suspension. However, there were some fairly tough arguments and if it did do any damage I think it was only temporary.147

He also rejected strongly the criticism, which had been reported to us, that the United Kingdom delegation to CHOGM could have achieved more in relation to Zimbabwe, with better preparation and a greater willingness to engage fully with other partners.148

139 Q 29

140 Ibid.

141 Q 29. Also see: Ev 110 [Mills].

142 All the states of the immediate region are now members of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Angola. Namibia only had a narrow connection with the Commonwealth previously, through the responsibility of the Cape Colony for the administration of Walvis Bay. Mozambique is the only totally non-English speaking member of he association, although Cameroon is predominantly Francophone.

143 For further details of the Abuja meeting, see: www.chogm2003.info.

144 President Thabo Mbeki, “We will resist the upside-down view of Africa”, ANC Today, volume 3, no. 49 (12–18 December), available at: www.anc.org.za.

145 “Zimbabwe quits Commonwealth” BBC News, 8 December 2003

146 Q 210

147 Ibid.

148 Q 211

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113. We conclude that South Africa plays a crucial role as a leading member of the Commonwealth, actively supporting the organisation’s aim of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds and supporting global respect for human rights. The recent disagreements over Zimbabwe at Commonwealth meetings—the issue that “poisons everything it touches”—should not be allowed to damage the organisation’s very valuable work, nor the UK’s working relationship with South Africa within the body. We recommend that the British Government seek every possible opportunity to restore any damage done to inter-Commonwealth relations by the recent disagreements at the Abuja CHOGM, while maintaining the organisation’s tough stance on Robert Mugabe’s continuing human rights abuses.

United Nations

114. South Africa has similarly played a full role as member of the United Nations. The Foreign Office described it as a “major player”, both in the Group of 77 nations at the UN (the G77) and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which it was chair from 1998 to 2003. 149 South Africa has also hosted two major recent UN conferences: the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, in 2001;150 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002—the biggest meeting ever organised by the UN.151

UNCHR

115. In 2003, South Africa was the co-ordinator for the African Group at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). In our Report on the FCO Human Rights Annual Report 2002, the Committee noted that:

The UNCHR is the UN’s main forum for the discussion of human rights. It has 53 members, elected by the wider UN membership, and meets annually in Geneva in March or April each year to, “examine, monitor and publicly report either on human rights situations in specific countries or territories or on major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide.” The 2002 plenary session of the Commission was not a successful one. The FCO described it as: “a highly­charged, confrontational session with voting... split between developed and developing countries.” It reported that many resolutions regarded by the United Kingdom and EU as important were defeated and that much use was made of procedural devices to inhibit the Commission’s work.152

The latest FCO Annual Report on Human Rights stated that although prospects for the 2003 session of the Commission “seemed even less promising,” it was “less politicised than

149 The Group of 77 (G77) was established in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries at the end of the first session

of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It gradually developed into a permanent institutional structure. Although the membership of the organisation has increased to 135 countries, the original name has been retained. For further details, see: www.g77.org.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was established in 1955, and aims to represent the political, economic and cultural interests of the developing world. It now has 116 members, drawn from across the globe.

150 For further details, see: www.un.org/WCAR.

151 For further details, see: www.johannesburgsummit.org.

152 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2002–03, Human Rights Annual Report 2002, HC 257, para 79

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many had expected.”153 The Commission successfully passed motions on the situation in countries such as Burma, North Korea and Turkmenistan. However, once again, and this time under the co-ordination of South Africa, the African Group of nations prevented all discussion of an EU resolution on Zimbabwe by means of a procedural motion.154 The “poison” of Zimbabwe disrupts the work of yet another important international body.

116. We conclude that the role South Africa has played at the UNCHR to prevent even the discussion of resolutions that address the appalling human rights situation in Zimbabwe is deeply regrettable, especially in light of the very positive involvement it has with the rest of the UN’s work, and could be damaging to South Africa’s wider interests.

UN Reform

117. South Africa, like many UN member states, argues that the organisation is in need of fundamental organisational reform. The United Kingdom shares this concern and has set out its proposals for possible improvements on a number of occasions.155 Both nations stress that any reform should encompass the whole organisation, but public attention on this issue has largely been focused on reform of the Security Council.

118. At present, the UN Security Council reflects the post-war balance of power. It has five permanent members—the Peoples’ Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the USA—plus ten other, non-permanent, members on a rotating basis. The five permanent members have the power of veto over all business. Many commentators feel that the permanent membership fails to reflect the realities of the world in the twenty-first century. The dominance of European nations among the five has caused particular annoyance.

119. The British Government has committed itself to expanding the Council to include “new permanent members who represent the regional realities of the modern world.”156 Such “realities” are largely interpreted as adding, at least, one new permanent member from South America, Africa and an additional one from Asia. In a recent debate in the House, the FCO Minister Bill Rammell indicated that the United Kingdom supported the principle of India and Brazil’s permanent membership of a reformed Council.157

120. It is generally accepted that South Africa would be, as one witness described, the “natural inheritor” of any African seat in the Security Council.158 It has demonstrated repeatedly that it would have the necessary resources, international respect and commitment to multilateralism to fully justify a place at the table. Chris Mullin indicated that the Government certainly supported an African seat on the Security Council and that South Africa would be an “obvious candidate.”159 However, he recognised that this was not 153 FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Cm 5967, September 2003, pp 111–2

154 Ev 70, para 27 [FCO]

155 See, for example: FCO, The United Kingdom in the United Nations, Cm 5898, September 2003.

156 Ibid., p 44

157 HC Deb, 11 November 2003, col 205

158 Q 33 [Barber]

159 Q 212

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for him to determine. As we were told during meetings in South Africa, this will be a matter for African nations to settle amongst themselves. They may well compromise on a rotating seat for the continent.

121. We conclude that the arguments for reform at the United Nations, particularly at the Security Council, are undeniable. We also conclude that were there to be an ‘African seat’ on the Council, South Africa would be amongst the strongest African candidates, filling nearly all of the criteria for such a position. We recognise, though, that this will be a matter for African nations themselves to settle when the time arises.

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South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NePAD

122. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NePAD) was officially launched at a meeting of African Heads of State and Government in Nigeria in October 2001. It had developed previously under a number of different names, including the New African Initiative (NAI) and the Millennium African Renaissance Programme (MAP).160 From the outset, NePAD has aspired not to be simply another funding mechanism, but more an “agenda for change” within the continent.161 NePAD’s founding document states:

This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world. ...

We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and the eradication of poverty, as well as a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest. ...

We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts.162

123. The stated aims of the programme are:

a) to eradicate poverty;

b) to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development;

c) to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy; and

d) to accelerate the empowerment of women.163

160 For further details, see: www.nepad.org.

161 Ibid.

162 NePAD Framework Document, October 2001, p 1, www.nepad.org/en.html

163 “NePAD in Brief”, www.nepad.org

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These ambitions will be achieved through a number of means, including: good governance, African ownership and leadership, partnership within and without the continent, regional and continental integration, and increased competitiveness of African countries and the continent. In July 2003, African leaders agreed that, as a reflection of the programme’s ‘African-ness’, NePAD would be integrated into the newly-formed AU within the following two to three years.

124. South Africa, and President Thabo Mbeki in particular, has been at the forefront of NePAD’s development, chairing its Steering Committee and the sub-committee on Peace and Security. South Africa also supplies NePAD’s secretariat, which is currently based in Pretoria. The FCO described the country as “a founding nation” of NePAD, and stated that “President Mbeki has mobilised support for NePAD among African and international leaders.”164 In an article on NePAD, Mr James Hamill, of the University of Leicester similarly stressed President Mbeki’s crucial contribution to NePAD:

The strong ‘Africanist flavour of NePAD, with its emphasis on restoring African pride and responsibility, coupled with an astute grasp of global dynamics and the desire to position Africa within the international mainstream, perfectly captures the political philosophy of South African President Thabo Mbeki.165

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

125. One element of NePAD that sets it apart from many previous schemes is that progress towards the aspirations of NePAD by individual African countries will be monitored by peer review: the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The mandate and purpose of the APRM are set out clearly in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by participating nations:

the mandate of the African Peer Review Mechanism is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. ...

the primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building.166

126. The reviews will be overseen and directed by a panel of seven “Eminent Persons”—Africans who have distinguished themselves in relevant fields. Only those countries who volunteer to undergo the process will be scrutinised under the APRM. To date, sixteen African nations have volunteered: Algeria; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Republic of Congo; Ethiopia; Gabon; Ghana; Kenya; Mali; Mauritius; Mozambique; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal;

164 Ev 70, para 29. See also: Ev 109, para 2 [Cilliers].

165 James Hamill, “Despots or Aid “, The World Today, vol 58 (6) (June 2002), p 17

166 Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism, paras 6 and 8, www.nepad.org

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South Africa; and Uganda.167 Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda will be among the first countries to be reviewed.

Response of the United Kingdom and the G8

127. In its memorandum to this inquiry, the Foreign Office stated emphatically that:

the United Kingdom Government strongly supports NePAD. We recognise that NePAD is a long-term agenda requiring substantial engagement and political commitment.168

Like other members of the G8, the UK’s response to NePAD is primarily channelled through the G8 Africa Action Plan.169 This document was agreed at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in July 2002.170 It welcomed NePAD as a “bold and clear-sighted vision of Africa’s development,” and agreed that it provided “an historic opportunity to overcome obstacles to development in Africa.”171

128. While the G8 nations set out a range of responses to NePAD in areas such as peace and security, governance, trade, health and education, it is noteworthy that the Partnership was primarily seen by the member nations as:

first and foremost, a pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development. African Leaders have personally directed its creation and implementation. They have formally undertaken to hold each other accountable for its achievement. They have emphasized good governance and human rights as necessary preconditions for Africa's recovery.172

Progress on the Action Plan was reviewed at the G8’s next summit in Evian, in June 2003, and is due to be discussed again later this year at the Sea Island Summit, in the USA.173

129. As the FCO notes in its submission, the United Kingdom has been strongly involved both in drafting the G8’s original response to NePAD and in ensuring that it remained on the Group’s agenda for future meetings. Indeed many commentators, both inside and out of Africa, see the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister in particular, as NePAD’s principal ‘champion’ in the West.

167 Angola recently indicated that it too wished to participate in the APRM (Q 216 [Mullin]) but it has yet to sign the

Memorandum of Understanding.

168 Ev 71, para 38

169 The other seven members of the G8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States of America.

170 G8 Africa Action Plan, agreed at the G8 Summit, Kananaskis, Canada, on 27 June 2002, available at: www.g8.gc.ca.

171 Ibid., para 1

172 Ibid., para 3

173 For further details, see: www.g8.fr/evian/english/home.html and www.g8usa.gov

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What difference will NePAD make?

Value of NePAD

130. The evidence we have received for this inquiry reflects a wide range of views on NePAD, and the G8’s response. ACTSA, in its written evidence, told us that it represented: “a unique opportunity for the leaders of the world’s richest nations to turn their grand rhetoric into concrete change for poor people in Africa.”174 Mr James Hammill, in his article on NePAD, similarly believed that, at least initially, the scheme had encouraged “cautious optimism,” in the developed and developing worlds, as it represented a much greater commitment from the richest countries toward Africa than previously shown. It was also “essentially an indigenous scheme formulated by African leaders themselves,” far better than previous, “externally imposed, often paternalistic and certainly deeply resented ‘solutions’.”175

131. However, NePAD seems to suffer severely from being different things to different people (one of our witnesses used the simile of the “elephant being investigated by blind men”176). To African nations it is, arguably, seen as a way of securing much-needed development assistance, inward investment and better access to global markets. To the G8 it is seen as a way of achieving their principal objectives for the continent: better governance and improved respect for human rights. As Professor Simon observed:

Since its inception, NePAD has struggled both to establish effective structures for the achievement of its strategic objectives, and to combine the need to win donor support with the variety of alternative visions of African development that have the support of various governments.”177

Importance of the APRM

132. In particular, much debate has focused on the viability and effectiveness of the APRM. As noted above, it was this innovative feature of NePAD that drew much attention from the G8, as a sign that African leaders were finally serious about ‘putting their own house in order’. Indeed, Mr Mullin, in his oral evidence to us, went so far as to describe the “rigour” of the APRM as the “key test” for NePAD as far as the British Government was concerned.178

133. While G8 members have been stressing this element of the Partnership, though, the evidence presented to us suggests that African leaders have been growing less enthusiastic, stressing that the Mechanism is voluntary and steadily limiting its scope of scrutiny.179 One memorandum stated, for example, that: “there is little doubt that it [NePAD] has met with resistance in much of Africa, where its good governance message is seen as a threat in some

174 Ev 24, para 7 [ACTSA]

175 James Hamill, “Despots or Aid “, The World Today, vol 58 (6) (June 2002), p 17

176 Q 90 [Dowden]

177 Ev 6

178 Q 216

179 See, for example: Ev 98 [Taylor].

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quarters.” 180 The President of Senegal, Mr Abdoulaye Wade, was recently reported as calling into question the peer review mechanism. He apparently believes that it will be undermined by the length of time needed, the absence of objective norms and the lack of any sanctions to make countries comply.181 As Mr Dowden told us, in his oral evidence:

[NePAD] will not do anything for the ones who do not want to change themselves. It is a key, but the individual countries have to turn that key in the lock.182

134. It has also been suggested to us that South Africa has contributed to confusion among donor states by arguing that the AU would now be responsible for political peer review, confining NePAD’s APRM merely to the economic field. Dr Ian Taylor, of the University of Botswana, in his memorandum stated that:

Such a position contradicts both one of the main selling points of the NePAD and what Mbeki had postured previously. ... NePAD was sold to its Western partners on the basis that it would advance democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance and that such principles would be guided and monitored through the establishment of a ‘peer review mechanism.’ ... serious questions as to what exactly is the point of NePAD if all it is going to do is review economic progress in Africa are now being asked.183

He went on to argue that this apparent revision of the role of the APRM would result in the programme being seen merely a ‘rubber stamp,’ and that it has already led to a “palpable cooling off of the world’s community for the NePAD.”184 This concern has been echoed by others.185 This is unfortunate. Africa has to prove itself attractive to the world investor community at a time of intense competition.

135. A number of critics have highlighted the failure of NePAD, and South Africa in particular, to tackle its first serious challenge: Zimbabwe. Dr Cilliers stated that:

South Africa’s kid glove handling of Zimbabwe’s governing elite has served as a reality check for many of Africa’s development partners in terms of their expectations of NePAD and prospects for the African Peer Review Mechanism.186

This view was echoed by Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld in his oral evidence:

NePAD is about improving good governance and the South African Government almost seems to be saying, ‘Zimbabwe is such a special case we just cannot deal with that under NePAD, it is too complicated.’187

180 Ev 112 [Mills]

181 “Senegal’s president questions 'peer reviews'”, Financial Times, 29 November 2003

182 Q 91

183 Ev 98

184 Ibid.

185 See, for example: Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “The Future of Africa: A New order in Sight?”, Adelphi Papers 361 (November 2003), p55

186 Ev 109

187 Q 75

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Another observer summed the situation up succinctly: “Africa can embrace the requirements and benefits of the NePAD programme, or it can embrace Mugabe, but it cannot embrace both.”188

Response of the G8

136. Criticism has, however, also been levelled at the response of the G8 to NePAD. Professor Simon suggested that the 2003 G8 Evian Summit was:

felt to be disappointing by both sides. NePAD and the African communities were looking for some concrete evidence of G8 commitment ... and, vice-versa, they were looking for progress on peer review mechanism, but at the moment there is this kind of dancing around but nobody is prepared to take the first step and say, ‘We are going forward.’189

137. ACTSA, in its oral and written evidence, went further. It warned against NePAD, and the APRM in particular, “being used as yet another form of conditionality, shaping African societies and economies for the benefit of the G8, instead of Africans.”190 Mr Fraser, of ACTSA, also told us that NePAD set out an, “ambitious challenge,” to the EU and USA to reform the unfair trading conditions which prevent access to the developing world to overseas markets:

The interesting thing about the G8 response to NePAD is that it has attempted to ignore entirely that structural debate and to shift focus on to the issues which interest us.

He also went on to say:

The G8 has within its power to completely kill NEPAD off and I think it is doing a good job of it so far, because its response to the structural challenges has been so disappointing, on debt, on trade, and even on the promises it has made on aid or aid for AIDS specifically, it is either “No Comment” or it is an empty promise.191

These concerns were echoed in part by Mr Dowden. He highlighted the progress that had been made in improving governance in a number of African states (Ghana and Botswana), which were, he argued, not being recognised by the G8 as something that should be rewarded.192

138. Doubts were also raised about the level of commitment to NePAD from different members of the G8. Dr Steve Kibble told us, for example, that Americans had “more or less abandoned” NePAD.193

188 James Hamill, “Despots or Aid?”, The World Today, vol 58(6) (June 2002), p19

189 Q 40

190 Ev 24

191 Q 79

192 Q 95

193 Q 90. See also: Q 90 [Dowden]; and Q 94 [Dowden].

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139. The Minister for Africa, Chris Mullin MP, recognised some of these doubts about the G8’s response to NePAD:

I am sure there is possibly some concern that all members are not pulling in the same direction at the same speed. I think everyone is pulling in the same direction but not necessarily at the same speed.194

He did, however, stress that the Government, and especially the Prime Minister, remained “hopeful” of NePAD’s prospects and was determined that “this potentially worthwhile initiative,” should not be allowed to “drift into the sand.”195 He also stated that the Government intended to make full use of its forthcoming presidency of the G8 to “boost our commitment to Africa.”196

Conclusion

140. Given the evidence that we have seen during this inquiry, we conclude that NePAD has the potential to deliver significant, and important, changes within Africa and to its relationship with the rest of the world. Both sides of the Partnership, though, need to understand fully both the challenges and the opportunities that it presents. African nations have to recognise that good governance and respect for human rights are central to their development prospects, and to how they are perceived by both foreign governments and potential private investors. The G8, in turn, needs to see beyond the confines of the peer review mechanism and recognise the progress that African nations have already made in delivering on their commitments.

141. We recommend that in partnership South Africa and the United Kingdom work together to ensure that it is not simply left to ‘wither and die’ as so many previous programmes have been. The British Government needs to impress upon South Africa, and its fellow AU members, the importance of a rigorous peer review mechanism for spreading good governance in the continent, and for attracting much-needed foreign investment. At the same time, it should use every opportunity, especially its forthcoming Presidencies of the G8 and the EU, to ensure that the developed world delivers on its commitment to support genuine African growth and development. Mutuality is the basis of the relationship.

194 Q 219

195 Q 218

196 Q 219. The United Kingdom will act as President of the G8 in 2005. From July to December 2005, it will also hold the six-monthly rotating Presidency of the European Union.

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South Africa and the war against terrorism

142. In November 2001, this Committee launched a rolling inquiry into ‘The Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism.’197 Since that time we have taken a large amount of evidence on the subject and produced four substantial Reports to the House. These have covered a wide range of issues including the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the USA, the work of Al-Qaeda and the recent war in Iraq.198 During this inquiry, we have been struck repeatedly by the all-embracing and global scale of this conflict against terror. Although South Africa does not appear to be on the ‘front-line’ of the war against terrorism, given the international scale of the struggle, we felt it to important to examine this element of UK-South African relations in our Report.

143. In its memorandum, the Foreign Office stated that South Africa had responded swiftly to the September 11 attacks in the USA, condemning terrorism without equivocation, and offering to the USA both humanitarian support and the full co-operation of its security agencies.199 In a follow-up statement, the South Africans cautioned that the USA’s reaction to terrorism should be coupled with a longer term response of isolating terrorists through international co-operation, “to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment”.200 The FCO also noted that South Africa had taken a number of concrete steps in the war against terrorism: joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), for example. It is working closely with the United Kingdom to tackle money-laundering activities that can help fund terrorism. It has also presented three comprehensive annual reports to the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).201

144. Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, whom we met while visiting South Africa, informed us that the country enjoyed good co-operation on terrorist-related issues with both the United Kingdom and the USA. He was very conscious of the need to ensure that South Africa did not become a ‘safe haven’ for terrorists evading justice. The Minister noted, however, that, at that time, domestic terrorism, particularly from those groups based on ‘gangsterism’ and drugs, was a more pressing concern for the Government. In its memorandum, the Foreign Office provided some information on this issue:

The South African Government’s intentions and actions on countering terrorism are laudable. The Counter Terrorism Bill is working its way through Parliament ... The work of South African agencies involved in countering terrorism is not always fully co-ordinated, but is improving. The South African Police Service is confident that it

197 “Launch of new inquiry: Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism”, press release No. 7 (Session 2001–02),

13 November 2001

198 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2001–02, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 384; Second Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 196; Tenth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 405; and Second Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 81

199 Ev 71, para 41 ff.

200 Ibid.

201 The UN CTC was established in September 2001 by Security Council Resolution 1373, to strengthen the capability of states to combat terrorism. For further information, see: www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/index.html.

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is on top of recent domestic terrorist threats from domestic groups, including People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and the Boermag (a white far-right organisation). 202

Dr Jakkie Cilliers commented in a similarly positive manner on the Government’s response to this domestic threat.203

145. Other evidence we have seen stressed the danger of ignoring the terrorist threat in Africa. In a recent article on this subject, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills highlighted the fact that the largest terrorist atrocities prior to 11 September 2001 took place on the continent—the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring 574.204 They also referred to the US’s National Security Strategy of September 2002, which stated that 9/11 had:

taught the United States that weak states ... can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.205

During his 2003 visit to Africa, President Bush stated that he would “not allow terrorists to threaten the African peoples or to use Africa as a base to threaten the world.”206

146. There have been attempts to improve and co-ordinate the African response to terrorism, most notably through the AU.207 However, many states in the continent lack the resources and expertise to cope with the demands the international war against terrorism places upon them. In his evidence to us, for example, Dr Mills stated that:

Most African police forces are extremely weak and cannot combat day-to-day crime, much less be the front-line forces in combating instability. Intelligence collection is also very poor in most African countries.208

147. In the light of the difficulties faced by many African states in meeting their commitments, Dr Cilliers suggested that:

South Africa’s contribution to the global war against terrorism lies primarily in passing on this experience in intelligence-driven policing operations to their counterparts in Tanzania, Kenya and other neighbours.209

202 Ev 71, para 43. People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, a Western Cape Muslim-based group, was formed by local

people in response to gang violence on the Cape Flats. However, it turned into its own terror group, almost indistinguishable from the other gangs. The Boermag is an extreme right-wing, white supremacist group.

203 Ev 109

204 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “Africa and the War on Terror”, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol 10 (Winter/Spring 2002), p 29 ff

205 Ibid., p 29

206 Ibid., p 34

207 Ibid., p 34

208 Ev 111

209 Ibid.

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We agree. As in so many areas, South Africa, with its well-established police and intelligence structures, can act as a good example of best practice, which can be disseminated across the continent.

148. However, the United Kingdom, and the wider global community, needs to recall at all times that the fight against terrorism, vital as it is, should not lead us to neglect our broader commitments to nations not directly affected by the conflict. As Dr Steve Kibble observed in his oral evidence:

Africa’s problems have very little to do with terrorism, except possibly as a kind of marginalisation, because so much effort of the world is concentrated on those areas where there is terrorism, or thought to be the potential for terrorism. Africa suffers, but indirectly and not by engagement.210

149. We conclude that South Africa has an important role in the war against terrorism, especially by helping to prevent international terrorists using the continent as a base for their activities elsewhere in the world. South Africa has a particularly crucial role to play, as an influential African nation in disseminating best practice in anti-terrorism activity across the continent. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer substantial assistance to ensure that South Africa can both combat international terrorism within its own borders and act as a catalyst for improving Africa’s ability to respond to the threat.

210 Q 111

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Work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in South Africa

150. The United Kingdom’s representation in South Africa is one of the largest British Posts in the world, reflecting the country’s size and importance, both bilaterally and within the region. Like most Posts it has a number of different responsibilities for a number of different areas, such as consular work, visa entry clearance and promoting trade and investment with the UK. This is in addition to the Post’s purely political work and the promotion of wider bilateral links. The BBC World Service and the British Council (the FCO’s two largest agencies) also have significant ‘regional hubs’ in South Africa.

151. There are four principal FCO offices in South Africa: the High Commission in Pretoria; the Consulate-General in Cape Town, where the South African Parliament and the largest body of British expatriates are located; the United Kingdom Trade and Investment (UKTI) Office in Johannesburg; and the Consulate General in Durban, which will handle purely trade matters from the middle of this year. There are also two Honorary Consulates in Port Elizabeth and East London. The figures for staff numbers are given in the table below, with comparisons to diplomatic representation of other nations.

Figure 5: diplomatic representation in South Africa

UK-based staff Locally-engaged staff

Pretoria Johannesburg Cape Town Durban

36 6 4 1

122 29 17 10

United Kingdom total 47 178

France 30 20

Germany 47 39

USA 250 450 Source: FCO211

152. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin stated that:

There is a review of all our operations going on at the moment so it would be very rash of me to make too many long-term commitments, but I do expect our staffing in South Africa to remain broadly as it is for the foreseeable future.212

211 Ev 76

212 Q 223

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The Minister was referring to an internal review of staffing and resources worldwide currently being conducted by the Foreign Office, in the light of its new strategy: “UK International Priorities.”213 We recommend that, in the light of the importance of the United Kingdom’s relationship with South Africa and the crucial work being done by the Post there, the level of staffing and resources allocated to the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa be at the very least maintained, if not increased, in the long-term.

Consular work

153. Like all Posts overseas, one of the prime responsibilities of the British High Commission in South Africa is to offer assistance to United Kingdom nationals travelling and working there. The figures below illustrate the scale of some of the work this section of the High Commission undertakes (all figures are approximate):

750,000 United Kingdom nationals live in South Africa—making it the fifth largest British expatriate community in the world;214

over 400,000 British visitors to South Africa each year;

50,000 personal callers to United Kingdom consular offices in 2003;

200,000 telephone enquiries;

17,000 postal/fax/e-mail enquires; and

23,000 passports issued (90% in less than five working days).215

154. The consular section of the High Commission employs five UK-based officers and eighteen locally-engaged staff, in Pretoria and Cape Town. In addition to the work outlined in the figures above, the staff undertake hospital and prison visits, and offer assistance to the families of British nationals who have died while in South Africa. In 2002, the High Commission was closely involved with the provision of assistance to British tourists affected by the Piet Retief coach crash in Mpumalanga province, in which five Britons were killed.216 This incident illustrated the vital importance of having competent staff on the ground, with good local knowledge, who can respond quickly to crises as they arise.

Visa entry clearance

155. Although South Africans do not require prior entry clearance to visit the United Kingdom, this is necessary if they intend to work or settle, do. Last year, the High Commission in Pretoria (which handles all the Post’s visa work) dealt with around 29,335 visa applications, of which 93.1% were approved. 217 The Visa Section currently consists of 213 FCO, United Kingdom International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO, Cm 6052, December 2003

214 For information, the largest ten British expatriate communities are: Canada - 3.2 million; Hong Kong - 3 million; Australia - 2 million; USA - 1.2 million; South Africa - 750,000; Spain - 620,019; New Zealand - 400,000; Republic of Ireland - 375,000; France - 130,000; and Italy - 60,000 (all figures approximate).

215 Ev 78, annex D

216 “Fifth SA bus Briton dies”, BBC News, 31 October 2002

217 Ev 77, annex C [FCO]

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one Entry Clearance Manager (ECM), five Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) and twenty-two locally-engaged staff.

156. As the table below indicates, last year the Post met all three of the Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets set for it:

Figure 6: performance of the High Commission in South Africa against PSA targets for visa entry clearance work

PSA Target Actual

Tier 1 and Tier 2 (straightforward non-settlement/residence applications) resolved within 24 hours.

90% 92%

Average waiting time for a Tier 3 (non-settlement applications) interview. 10 working days

One day

Average waiting time for a Tier 4 (settlement applications) interview 12 weeks One week

Source: FCO218

157. Last year, the Post saw an increase of 28% in the number of applications it dealt with compared to the previous year.219 This reflected the steady increase in demand for United Kingdom visas seen across the world.220 The Post attributed the increase in demand it had experienced, in part, to South Africa rejoining of the Commonwealth in 1994. Since that time, South Africans have been able to apply for working holidaymaker (WHM) visas—these allow Commonwealth citizens aged between 17 and 30 to come to the United Kingdom for an extended holiday of up to two years, during which time they can seek employment to support themselves. They can also apply for permit-free employment on the grounds of British ancestry.

158. The FCO’s entry clearance operations worldwide are run by UKVisas, which is managed by the FCO and the Home Office jointly.221 In its memorandum, the FCO noted that, as from 13 November 2003:

South African nationals will be affected by the United Kingdom Government’s implementation of the EU-wide Residence Permits scheme, i.e. those who wish to stay in the United Kingdom for more than six months will need to apply for Entry Clearance before arrival.

Based on IND [Immigration and Nationality Directorate222] statistics for the number of South African nationals admitted to the United Kingdom in 2001-2 for more than 6 months, we estimate that this change in policy will generate around 19,000 visa

218 Ev 78, annex C [FCO]

219 Ev 78, annex C

220 FCO, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 2003, Cm 5913, p 123

221 For further information, see: www.ukvisas.gov.uk.

222 The Immigration and Nationality Directorate is an agency of the Home Office. It is responsible for immigration control at air and sea ports throughout the United Kingdom and for considering applications for permissions to stay, citizenship and asylum. For further information, see: www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk.

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applications in the first year following its introduction. UKVisas have agreed the additional deployment of 3 locally-engaged staff.223

The FCO told us that: “Additional staff and resources will be deployed if necessary.”224

159. We recommend that UK Visas continue to monitor closely the demands on staff and resources at the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa resulting from the increasing numbers of entry clearance applications being received there. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out what extra resources and personnel have been allocated to visa entry clearance work in South Africa since 2003.

Trade and investment (UKTI)

160. As noted above (paragraph 38), the UK’s commercial relationship with South Africa is a very significant one, with over £5 billion in two-way trade each year.225 The main focus of the FCO’s commercial work in the country is the UKTI offices in Johannesburg, which employs around 35 staff (locally-engaged and UK-based). Commercial work is also carried out at the posts in Durban and Cape Town. In an average year, the Post sees over 500 visiting United Kingdom business people and assists 12–15 trade missions and 4–5 visiting exhibition groups.226

161. Between 1998 and 2000 the FCO ran a major campaign, entitled ‘Britain and South Africa: Partners in Opportunity’, to raise awareness in the United Kingdom of the opportunities in the South African market. In recent years, particular emphasis has been placed on helping United Kingdom companies take advantage of opportunities arising from the South African privatisation programme and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). These include opportunities in the water, airports, ports, healthcare, telecommunications and railways sectors.

162. One of the most significant recent commercial undertakings between South Africa and the United Kingdom was the contract won by BAe Systems to supply 52 aircraft to South Africa, with which UKTI was closely involved.227 The contract is worth around £1.5 billion to BAe. While the purchase has not proved to be without controversy,228 we were pleased to note the ‘offset’ commitment negotiated as part of the deal. This promises to deliver much-needed additional investment in South Africa of nearly £5.5 billion. Both Governments are monitoring the delivery of this commitment closely, and at present BAe appears to be on track to meet its commitments.

223 Ev 78, annex C, paras 7–8

224 Ibid., para 9

225 Ev 71, para 45 [FCO]

226 Ibid.

227 Ev 72, paras 49 and 51

228 See, for example: Ev 122 [CAAT]; and Ev 131 [Corner House].

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163. During our inquiry, witnesses from British companies that operated in South Africa gave very positive reports of the work of UKTI. One stated that they had been “extremely helpful,” and “very knowledgeable.”229 Another told that us that:

From our point of view they have been very, very supportive in South Africa. We had a lot of contact with them; they have provided us with leads, with contacts and been very supportive ...

I believe that they do create an environment which enables us to get access to key decision makers within government.230

164. These views were echoed by nearly all the business people we met while visiting Johannesburg and Cape Town earlier this year. They had all received valuable assistance from staff at the High Commission, who had developed expertise in a wide range of business sectors.

165. We conclude that the trade and investment section of the High Commission in South Africa is performing to a high standard in assisting British businesses to operate there and exploit new opportunities.

British Council

166. The British Council has a significant presence in South Africa. Its memorandum for this inquiry stats that the Council’s aims in the country are to:

enhance the UK’s reputation with the authority generation by supporting their transformation agenda;

demonstrate United Kingdom creativity and innovation to the young South Africans who will influence the country’s future; and

strengthen civil society though developing access to information and through developing leadership.231

167. The Council works though a main office in Johannesburg, which we saw during our recent visit, and three smaller offices in Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban. It receives around £2.35 million per annum in Grant-in-Aid from the FCO, with extra funding coming from other sources.232 This represents the budget for the whole Southern African region of the British Council, though, which also includes Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. There are currently five UK-based staff in the South African office, and thirty-seven locally engaged personnel.

168. As its memorandum notes, the British Council runs a number of schemes in South Africa. One of the most important of these is its ‘training for change’ programme. This involves a variety of initiatives, including working with the South African Department of

229 Q 138 [Paterson]

230 QQ 137–138 [Roe]

231 Ev 102

232 Ibid.

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Education, overseeing university and schools links and the management of the Chevening scholarships.233 Given the difficulties South Africa is facing at present in the field of education, particularly further education, it is clear that the work of the British Council in this area is extremely valuable and greatly appreciated. We were pleased to note that Mr Paterson, of Macmillan Publishers, believed the “Council’s reputation is very good in South Africa.”234 This was echoed by the other interlocutors whom we met while in South Africa.

169. We were concerned, however, to hear that one witness had been informed, that the Chevening scholarships, which are managed by the British Council, might be “reduced in number, [and] that the higher educational links might be discontinued.”235 However, when questioned on this matter, Mr Mullin assured us that he was unaware of any planned cuts and that the number of scholarships available to South Africans was anticipated to be broadly similar to previous years. The Minister subsequently, in a written answer to the House, provided details of the number of scholarships awarded between 2000 and 2004 on a country-by-country basis. 236 As can be seen from the table below, the number of scholars from Southern Africa has been relatively stable.

Figure 7: Chevening scholarships awarded in Southern Africa, 2000/01–03/04

Country 2000/01 2002/03 2003/04

Botswana 4 6 8

Lesotho 2 6 4

Mauritius 6 5 7

Mozambique 6 6 4

Namibia 4 6 6

South Africa 31 26 33

Swaziland 3 6 4

Source: FCO237

170. The myriad of active non-governmental organisations which flourished in the apartheid era, particularly in the townships, provided much of the grass roots democratic infrastructure at the time, representing the majority of South Africans. The British Government, at least in the later years of the apartheid regime, had a creditable role in funding and generally encouraging their work. It is still of importance that such Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) continue to work as intermediary bodies, as checks

233 Chevening scholarships, are funded by the FCO and administered by the British Council. They enable overseas

students to study in the United Kingdom. The scholarships are named after the Foreign Secretary’s official country residence: Chevening House. For further details, see: www.chevening.com.

234 Q 153

235 Q 11 [Simon]

236 HC Deb, 18 March 2004, 415W

237 Ibid.

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and balances, against any authoritarian temptations of government. They should be encouraged and their leaders given appropriate help and training.

171. We conclude that the British Council is carrying out very important work in South Africa, both in promoting a deeper relationship between the two nations and in providing crucial educational support to the South African Government. We are also convinced that the Chevening scholarship scheme is a vital part of the British Council’s work, and a very important way in which the United Kingdom can influence future decision-makers. We recommend that the FCO give serious consideration to increasing the number of scholarships available to South Africans in the near future.

172. We further recommend that the British Council continue actively to support civic organisations and to train their leadership.

BBC World Service

173. The BBC World Service (BBC WS) operates its Africa news-gathering co-ordination centre for radio and TV from Johannesburg. It is one of the Service’s seven major ‘hubs’ located round the world and provides news coverage for World Service radio, BBC World television and the BBC’s International Facing Online News Site.238 During our visit to Johannesburg, we were glad to be able to visit the Bureau and meet some of the staff who work there.

174. The BBC WS’s Bureau in Johannesburg is very active, producing a wide variety of high-quality, informative programmes for both radio and television. For example, ‘Focus on Africa’, which offers evening news and analysis from the region, and the recently-launched Africa Live programme that encourages listeners to interact with the broadcasters by phone, e-mail and text message with comments on specific African issues and problems.

175. In its memorandum to our inquiry, the BBC WS noted that it had a comparatively small radio and TV audience in South Africa, where there is strong local market competition.239 However, a number of its news items, both radio and TV, are now being re-broadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), and some other companies, which has helped to increase its profile. We were particularly pleased to note that the BBC WS had replaced CNN in providing selected news items to SABC 3.240

176. During our visit to the Bureau, we raised the issue of broadcasts in Swahili by the BBC WS in Africa. The BBC WS estimated that there are approximately 100 million speakers of Swahili in Africa, of whom about 25 million speak it as their first language.241 At present, the World Service transmits five programmes a day in Swahili for a total of two hours and twenty minutes (two hours and two and a half hours on Saturday and Sunday respectively).242 It is estimated that these programmes attract an audience of approximately

238 Ev 126. The other six centres are in: Delhi; Singapore; Jerusalem; Washington; Moscow; and Brussels.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid. The exact number of Swahili speakers is, however, not completely clear. Ethnologue, for example estimates that Swahili is spoken by 5 million people as their first language, and by 30 million as their second. For further details, see: www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code =SWA.

242 Ev 130 [BBC WS]

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18.4 million people (primarily in the DRC, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda).

177. We questioned the World Service as to whether, in light of the large number of Swahili speakers and the competition from other national radio services, this was sufficient. We were reassured, however, that despite rival services being offered by a number of other providers, the BBC WS was still attracting larger audiences in the three countries with the largest Swahili-speaking populations than its two “traditional competitors”—Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) and Voice of America (VOA). These figures are set out in the table below:

Figure 8: Percentage of total adult population listening to broadcasts in Swahili in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

Broadcaster Kenya Tanzania Uganda

BBC World Service 31 59.8 7.5

Deutsche Welle 8 57 1

Voice of America 7 28 1

Source: BBC World Service

178. In response to our question as to whether the World Service had any plans to make changes to its Swahili service in the near future, the BBC WS replied that it was, “planning to improve its audibility still further by increasing the number of FM transmissions in most of the target areas especially Southern Tanzania and other major towns in Kenya.”243

179. We conclude that the BBC World Service’s Bureau in Johannesburg is carrying out excellent work in producing high-quality and informative programmes for both radio and television. We recommend that the Bureau continue to be given the funding it needs to carry on this important work. We further recommend that the BBC World Service give serious consideration to increasing the resources it allocates to its Swahili service in the future.

Estate management

180. An issue that this Committee has addressed on a number of occasions in recent years, has been that of the FCO’s asset recycling programme. In our report on the Office’s 2003 Annual Report we stated that:

The Foreign Office’s overseas estate consists of over 4,300 properties. Although 70% of these are leased, the Office still owned assets worth approximately £960 million worldwide as at March 2002. Since 1998, the FCO, in agreement with HM Treasury, has been engaged in an ‘asset recycling programme’, under which future investment, primarily in ICT [Information and Computer Technology] and the estate, is funded by the sale of FCO property at home and abroad. The process involves the Office

243 Ibid.

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identifying and selling properties that have become, “surplus through re-prioritisation, or which are not operationally effective or good value for money.” ...

We conclude that there are very grave concerns about the long-term impact the asset recycling programme is having on the FCO's overseas estate. There is a real danger that, in its attempts to take full advantage of the scheme agreed with HM Treasury, the Foreign Office is selling properties below their real value in order to meet a short-term target. 244

181. Given our deep concern about the long-term viability of the asset recycling programme, we were very disappointed to hear from Mr Mullin, therefore, that the FCO is actively considering selling the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town.245 This is a large and very attractive property that can accommodate a wide variety of functions—conferences, hosting visiting delegations, receptions, etc. While visiting Cape Town, we attended a reception at the Residence held to mark the opening of the South African Parliament for a new session. The event attracted a large number of senior opinion formers, including several Government ministers, and it was clear that the location had played an important part in making the event such a success. We strongly recommend that the FCO does not repeat the gross error it has made in so many other locations of exchanging a valuable and appreciating property—the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town—which is clearly greatly assisting the promotion of United Kingdom interests, for rapidly depreciating ICT assets.

244 Twelfth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003, HC 859, paras 57 and 64

245 QQ 224–5

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Conclusion: a special relationship?

182. It is clear that the United Kingdom’s relationship with South Africa is an extremely important one, as we have described in detail in the paragraphs above. A question that has often arisen during our inquiry, though, is whether this is a ‘special relationship.’ South Africa, for many good reasons, enjoys excellent relations with nearly every country in the world. It is the ‘partner of choice’ for most non-African nations working in the continent and is much sought after as a key regional player, both on a continental and international basis. The United Kingdom is not alone, therefore, in seeking South Africa’s friendship. Moreover, there exists an ‘ambivalence’ in some quarters of South African society towards Britain, owing to such factors as the history of colonialism and to arguments over the commitment of the United Kingdom to combating apartheid in the past.

183. However, given what we have seen and heard during this inquiry, we feel confident to conclude that the relationship is indeed a special one. The co-operation that we witnessed at all levels of government; the very significant flows of trade, investment and tourism between the two nations; the shared values and aspirations, on both a continental and global scale; the large diasporas of expatriates in both countries; and perhaps even the shared admiration for the talents of sporting heroes such as David Beckham. All of these point to a mature, honest and many-layered understanding, with both nations able to work together in a spirit of equality and mutual trust, and a relationship that is well able to weather the ‘turbulence’ of occasional disagreements.

184. As we have noted in our Report, South Africa faces a number of major challenges and opportunities in the years ahead. Challenges such as the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; opportunities such as the chance of securing long-term peace and prosperity for Africa through NePAD. It is our sincere hope that the United Kingdom can work in genuine partnership with South Africa to help it tackle both, and that this relationship will continue to flourish and grow for many years to come.

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Annex A

List of abbreviations

ACTSA Action for Southern Africa AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome AIPPA Access to Information and Privacy of Information Act AMIB African Mission in Burundi ANC African National Congress APRM African Peer Review Mechanism AU African Union BBC WS BBC World Service BEE Black Economic Empowerment BMAT British Military Assistance Team CAP Common Agricultural Policy CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions DDA Doha Development Agenda DfID Department for International Development DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ESAAMLG Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group EU European Union FATF Financial Action Task Force FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FDI Foreign Direct Investment G8 Group of Eight G77 Group of Seventy-Seven GBU Governing National Unity GDP Gross Domestic Product HDI Human Development Index HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IFIs International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund LGIB Local Government International Bureau (UK) MAP Millennium African Renaissance Programme MDC Movement for Democratic Change MEPP Middle East Peace Process NAI New African Initiative NAM Non-Aligned Movement NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council NePAD New Partnership for African Development NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations OAU Organisation of African Unity OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

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PAC Pan African Congress PAGAD People Against Gangsterism and Drugs PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers PSC Peace and Security Council RDP Reconstruction and Development Program RSA Republic of South Africa SA South Africa/n SACP South African Communist Party SADC South African Development Community SALGA South African Local Government Association SANDF South African National Defence Force SARPCCO Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation TAC Treatment Action Campaign TDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement UK United Kingdom UKUZA United Kingdom Unites with South Africa UN United Nations UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National

Union for the Total Independence of Angola) US United States WCAR Word Conference Against Racism WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WTO World Trade Organisation ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

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Annex B

Visit to South Africa

Monday 9 February Meeting with HE Ms Ann Grant, High Commissioner and her Board of Management Discussion with representatives of civil society: Dr Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies; Mr Eddy Maloka, Africa Institute; Mr Moletsi Mbeki, Mr Molefe Tsele, General Secretary, SA Council of Churches; and Willie Hofmeyer, Director, Assets Forfeiture Unit Tuesday 10 February Meeting with representatives of the UK media in South Africa Visit to BBC World Service Bureau, Johannesburg Discussion with representatives of UK and South African businesses at UKTI offices, Johannesburg Meeting with Mr Ayanda Ntsaluba, Director General, and senior officials, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria Visit to British Council, Johannesburg Wednesday 11 February Visit to ‘Hospice in Soweto’, Johannesburg Visit to Alexandra Police Station, Johannesburg Thursday 12 February Discussion with civil society groups in Cape Town Meeting with Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security Meeting with Dr Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joint meeting with Mr Jordan Zweledinga Pallo, Chairperson, and Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, National Assembly, Cape Town Friday 13 February Discussion with representatives of UK businesses, Cape Town Meeting with Members of the Democratic Alliance

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Formal minutes

Tuesday 27 April 2004

Members present: Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr Eric Illsley Mr Andrew Mackay Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples Mr Bill Olner Mr Greg Pope Sir John Stanley Ms Gisela Stuart

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report [South Africa], proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 148 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 149 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 150 to 158 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 159 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 160 to 171 read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 172 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 173 to 184 read and agreed to.

Annexes agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the Minutes of Evidence.

Ordered, That the appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.—(The Chairman.)

[Adjourned till Tuesday 4 May at half past Two o’clock.

75

Witnesses

Tuesday 9 December 2003 Page

Professor James Barber, University of Cambridge Ev 7 Professor David Simon, University of London Ev 7 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University Ev 34 Mr Alastair Fraser, Policy Officer, Action for Southern Africa Ev 34

Tuesday 27 January 2004

Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society (RAS) Ev 51 Dr Steve Kibble, Africa Advocacy Officer, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) Ev 51 Mr Christopher Paterson, Executive Director, Macmillan Publishers Ltd Ev 60 Mr Ashley Roe, Business Development Director, Severn Trent Water International Ltd Ev 60

Tuesday 2 March 2004

Mr Chris Mullin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 82 Mr Andrew Lloyd, Head of African Department Southern, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 82 Mr Andy Sparkes, former UK Deputy High Commissioner, South Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 82

77

List of written evidence

Professor James Barber, Centre for International Studies, Cambridge Ev 1

Professor David Simon, Centre for Developing Areas of Research, Royal Holloway, University of London Ev 6

Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) Ev 17

Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University Ev 32

Dr Steve Kibble, Africa/Yemen Advocacy Officer, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), London Ev 44

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 67; Ev 79; Ev 80; Ev 81; Ev 94; Ev 97

Dr Ian Taylor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana Ev 97

Local Government International Bureau (LGIB) Ev 99

The British Council Ev 102

Mr Keith Somerville Ev 106

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies Ev 109

Dr Greg Mills, National Director, SA Institute of International Affairs Ev 110

Dr Anthony Lemon Ev 112

Save the Children UK Ev 113

VisitBritain Ev 116

Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa (Cofesa) Ev 118

Professor Gerrit Oliver Ev 120

Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) Ev 122

The Royal Institute of International Affairs Ev 125

BBC World Service Ev 126; Ev 129

The Corner House Ev 131

Ms Adriana Stuijt Ev 134

TAU SA Ev 135

Mr Basil T Hone Ev 138

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Tuesday 9 December 2003

Members present

Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr John MaplesMr Fabian Hamilton Richard OttawayMr Eric Illsley Mr Greg PopeAndrew Mackinlay Sir John Stanley

Written evidence submitted by Professor James Barber, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge

THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In this paper I tempt to give a broad overview of South Africa’s (SA) external relations over the pastdecade—its international activities and roles, its position in international organisations and its relations inAfrica—and the settings in which it has operated.

It is unusual for a society to experience fundamental domestic change. It is equally unusual to face amajorchange in its international setting. Yet SA during the past decade has experienced both. The newgovernment, most of whose members initially had little or no administrative experience, has struggled todevelop a society undergoing a political revolution at home while establishing itself in a disorderedinternational setting. However, two provisos may be added. First, revolutions are usually not fixed pointsin time, but rather (as in SA) are processes stretching over time. Second, although there has been greatchange in SA, it has been uneven and much remains from the past. While there has been profound politicalupheaval; internal social and economic relations have altered more slowly and superficially.

Measured in terms of resources SA is a small/medium state. Yet it has gained greater internationalattention than states with greater resources. As a result it has—in a phrase which Nelson Mandela wouldsavour from his early boxing days—been able ‘to punch above its weight’ in global aVairs. There are anumber of reasons for this, including the momentum of the past.

TheMomentum of the Past: ColdWar and NewWorld Order

In the decades following WWII South Africa’s racial policies became a matter of international concern.As the struggle against apartheid developed into a “great moral cause”, SA became a pariah state; sanctionswere imposed on it, and the anti apartheid campaign absorbed into the fabric of international organisations.At the same time a low intensity war developed between the white government and the liberationmovements(AfricanNational Congress and PanAfricanist Congress). Several neighbouring black states, by supportingthe liberation movements, brought down Pretoria’s wrath on themselves, in the form of e a cross border“destabilisation” policy.

Harold Macmillan had made clear in his “Wind of Change” speech (1960) that he—and by implicationotherWestern leaders—were concerned not only about racial issues, but whether post colonial Africa wouldturn to East or West in the Cold War context. However, the West’s response to the situation wascharacterised by vacillation and ambivalence. In Britain’s case successive governments sought the middleground in a situation were the contending parties saw no room for compromise. The liberation movementsaccused Britain of putting its material interest before its moral concerns by failing to give them support andrefusing to impose further sanctions against SA.

For its part the apartheid government saw itself as the target of aMoscow inspired “total onslaught”, andaccused the West, not only of failing to give support, but kowtowing to the Afro-Asian states by imposingsanctions. Pretoria dismissed the British as “wish wash liberals” at best, and communist fellow travellersat worst.

In contrast with the West the Soviet bloc gained prestige in black Africa by supporting the armedliberation movements—including the ANC’s armed wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe). This military support—together with its alliance with the Communist Party (SACP)—drew the ANC towards the Soviet bloc andits socialist ideas; while rejecting Western capitalism.

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Ev 2 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

A New World Order and the SA “Miracle”

The demise of the Soviet bloc was greeted with joy the in the West, but consternation in the ANC.Internationally the tension of Cold War gave way to the short lived hopes of a NewWorld Order. PresidentGeorge Bush (Snr) spoke of a world free from threats, of states living in harmony under the rule of law; andFrancis Fukuyama trumpeted the triumph of theWest by declaring “the end of history”. At the UNButros-Butros Ghali published his “Agenda for Peace”. The hope was that persistent international problems—whether in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Balkans, or Southern Africa—could be resolvedpeacefully. In the event only in SAwere such hopes realised, where aUNnegotiated settlement was achievedin 1989, followed by the SA “miracle”.

It started in February 1990 when President F.W. de Klerk seized the initiative—confident that with thecollapse of the Soviet Union the ANChad been seriously weakened and the threat of the total onslaught haddisappeared. He lifted the ban on political parties and released Nelson Mandela. Four years of negotiationfollowed—with the National Party (NP) Government and the ANC as the major players—before a new SAwas born. The international community strongly supported the negotiating process and to an extent sawitself as midwife of the new democratic state. Furthermore, the hope was that the successful outcome ofnegotiations in SA, and the earlier Namibia settlement would act as models for others to follow.

Therefore, although the end of apartheid and the emergence of a new democratic polity had been achievedby South Africans themselves through negotiation, the international community was involved and themomentum of the past ensured its continuing interest in the future.

The New South Africa: Self Identity and the Burden of Expectation

For all his charm and bonhomie Mandela proved to be a formidable negotiator, and although theoutcome of the negotiations had elements of compromise it largely favoured the ANC. The agreement wasfor the introduction of a five year interim constitution, with a Government of National Unity (GNU) atthe helm. At the same time principles—strongly influenced by Western liberal values—were laid down fora permanent constitution.

At the 1994 election the ANC gained more than 60% of the national vote, followed by the NP with 20%and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 10%: with seats in the National Assembly distributed in directproportion to the national votes cast. Like all major parties the ANC is a broad church. Under its bannerat election time it forms the main element of a tripartite alliance with the South African Communist Partyand the Congress of South African Trade Unions. When the GNU was formed, it consisted of the ANC,which was the dominant element (with Mandela as President and Mbeki as a Deputy President): togetherwith the NP (led by de Klerk as Second Deputy President) and the IFP led by Chief Buthelezi who becamea cabinet minister. After two years the NP followed a disgruntled de Klerk out the GNU.

World leaders hurried to SA to bathe in its reflected glory, to identify with Mandela; and to encourage itto accept continental leadership. In the West SA was hailed as Africa’s best hope of securing peace andprosperity in that troubled, poverty plagued continent. A burden of expectation descended on the newgovernment’s shoulders, which was enhanced by Mandela’s personal prestige—by assuming that he couldachieve ends that eluded others.

The new government identified itself with “the South” and more especially Africa; (whereas the whiteregime had presented itself as an outpost of European/Western civilization in an alien continent). However,it could not ignore the changes in the international setting. If it wanted help and support, or to increase itstrade and economic development, it had to turn to the West. This was reflected in the overseas trips ofMandela and Mbeki. Both have made many visits to the West, where they have paid court to business andfinancial institutions, sometimes at the expense of anti apartheid groups. Only once did Mandela visitMoscow and that no more than a Swan song, at the end of his Presidency. Furthermore, when the ANCagreed principles for the conduct of foreign policy, they were peppered with the ethical values of the West:respect for human rights, commitment to peace; promotion of democracy; support for internationalorganisations; and “universality” (prepared toworkwith all)—with “human rights” as the corner stone. Thenew government soon discovered that such valueswere open to challenge and diVerences of interpretation—as, for instance, in its failed attempt to apply “universality” in the “Two Chinas Policy” (PRC and Taiwan).Soon SA was accused by radical critics that while it claimed a 3rd World identity it had succumbed toWestern ideas and values. Pretoria denied this, and pointed to its continuing good relations with states whichthe West branded as “rogues”.

One of the clearest cases of the new government’s dilemma came from the first Commonwealth conferencethatMandela attended—inNewZealand in 1996. At the time there was concern at breaches of human rightsby a military regime in Nigeria led by General Sani Abacha. The breaches included the detention of ChiefAbiola, who had won the last election, but was now a political prisoner. A further case concerned thetreatment of theOgoni people, fromwhose land in theNiger delta, large quantities of oil had been extracted.While the government and Shell had profited from the oil, the Ogoni, led byKen Sarow-Wiwa, claimed thatthey had gained nothing and instead had their territory ruined. The regime responded by arresting SarowWiwa and a number of his follower. Thy were brought before a military court, accused of conspiring to plota coup, and of rioting leading to the death of a chief, and were sentenced to death. With increasing

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 3

international concern about Nigria the SA government became actively involved—in line with its statedprinciples. In its attempts to mediate it employed quiet diplomacy—with visits by Mbeki and ArchbishopTutu among others.

When, on his is arrival in New ZealandMandela was questioned about Nigeria, and the fate of the Ogoniprisoners in particular, he was sanguine, believing diplomacy would be eVective. He was wrong. While theconference was still in session news was received that Saro Wiwa and his colleagues had been executed.Mandela was furious and humiliated. He accused the Nigerian regime of “judicial murder”. He called forthe severance of diplomatic ties, Nigeria’s expulsion from the Commonwealth, he urged the UK and USAto impose an oil embargo; and he recalled the SAHighCommissioner. On his return home he called a specialmeeting of the SouthernAfricanDevelopment Community (comprising SA and all its neighbours) to decideon further action. In the event Mandela’s proposals led nowhere. He ran into a wall of silence andindiVerence. The Western states continued to buy oil, and the rest of Africa refused to act.

The other African states sawNigeria, not as human rights oVender but as amajor continental power thathad loyally supported the liberation struggles against colonialism. The LiberianGovernment thought it was“was very shocking” for Mandela to allow SA “to be used in the division and undermining of Africansolidarity”. The Nigerians themselves described Mandela’s attitude as “horrific” and they too called forAfrican solidarity. A Nigerian minister described Mandela as the black leader of a white state—implyingthat white oYcials and Western ideas were too influential.

Even at home Mandela found little or no support. The cry for African unity was echoed from theDepartment of Foreign AVairs to the ANC (which also remembered Nigeria’s contribution to its electioncampaign—rumoured to beUS$10m). In parliamentMbeki spoke of the dangers of acting alone and of overestimating SA’s strength. SA, he said, was not involved in exploiting Nigerian oil or acting as her bankers,whereas those that were and had real power (ie Western states) instead of directly challenging Nigeria hadused and humiliated Mandela. They had left him out to dry.

Mbeki had succeeded in regaining ground by steering the government away from an attack on a fellowAfrican state to criticism of the West. The case had underlined the problems of SA acting as a custodian ofthe continent’s morals. It was a lesson that became imprinted in the government’s memory.

One of theWest’s hopes was that SA would take the lead in continental peace making and peace keeping.Yet, while Pretoria was ready to play an active international role, it resented being branded as the West’spoodle. Thus Mandela was not prepared to cut links with old allies and more recently Mbeki has refusedto make public attacks on Mugabe. The government saw the Western pleas to act as Africa’s peacekeeperas an attempt to shuZe oV their own responsibility. In any case, although SA’s armed forces were bettertrained, experienced, and disciplined than elsewhere in Africa, they had been trained and were experiencein fighting, not to keep the peace. With British help, the old rivals—the forces of the liberation movementsand those of the white government—have undertaken the diYcult tasks of merging together and beingtrained in new roles. Yet, even when the government has been prepared to involve itself in peace making ithas discovered that its eVorts are not always welcomed and produce mixed reactions (eg in the vastDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the tiny Lesotho).

The Economy

The economy inherited by the new government was “mixed” in a double sense—with segments of the 1stand 3rd worlds; and with private and state controlled sectors. (Under the apartheid government the statesector had been used to counter sanctions and to protect white workers). In the new debate all are agreedof the desirability of both growth and redistribution of wealth and income. In broad terms, those whoemphasise growth favour a strong private sector, whereas those whose priority is redistribution supportgreater state control. This continues to be a divisive issue within the ANC. The new government’s first eVortproduced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This went through several drafts,starting like a socialist blueprint but finishing with its emphasis on a mixed economy. Within a couple ofyears the RDP was pushed aside as the government—with increasing emphasis on growth and the privatesector—introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR).

Naturally SA has tried to use economic circumstances to its advantage. It identifies itself with the ThirdWorld, and has served as chair in the Non Aligned Movement (which has reinvented itself since the end ofthe Cold War as the voice of the Third World). However, not everybody has been prepared to accept SA’sown self evaluation. This was discovered when it applied for Lome terms of trade with the EU—its majortrading partner. The EU view is that SA was too developed and advanced to qualify for Lome. Prolonged,tough negotiations followed, which resulted in a bilateral Trade Development and Cooperative Agreement(TDCA). This fell short of SA’s early hopes, but was claimed to oVer benefits to both sides. DuringClinton’spresidency, SA has also established a mutually beneficial relationship with the USA, through theestablishment of a Binationall Commission and the African Growth and Opportunity Programme.

On other occasions Pretoria has been prepared to play its 1st World card. For example, in seeking directforeign investment it has stressed the strength and high standards of the business community, the excellentcommunications, financial and transport services, the government’s financial sobriety, and in opening upthe economy.

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Ev 4 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

There have been economic progress—initially there was a peace dividend, the lifting of sanctions andexternal development aid. Since then further advances can be attributed to sound government financialpolicy, plus its preparedness to open up parts the economy. This has led to the extension of trade, the growthof tourism and some investment by foreign companies. A recent report (Africa Investor October 2003)underlined the positive aspects of the economy—claiming that as a financial centre Johannesburg is nw toAfrica what New York is to the Americas, and by pointing to industrial successes, including the motorindustry. However, progress has been slower than the government had hoped or assumed.Direct investmenthas been disappointing, and unemployment remains a major problem. A number of explanations can befound for the disappointments. They include:

local crime which continues to flourish deterring tourist and external investors, as well as underminingexisting economic activity (eg with the murder of white farmers damaging the agricultural industry); b) theadverse impact of HIV/aids; which is ravishing the society and economy; and c) the fag ends of apartheidwith its inbred prejudices and its complex layers of ineYcient bureaucracy.

Added to these internal issues are regional problems, over which SA has little control but are of majorconsequence for her. Most of the neighbouring states are poor—some among the poorest in the world;others are unstable (eg Zimbabwe); and some have been torn apart by civil wars (eg Angola). As well as thegeneral recognition that SA cannot flourish in a sea of poverty, its relative wealth acts as a honey pot forimmigrants (legal and illegal) from neighbouring states, exacerbating the problems of unemployment andcrime. Nobody knows the true number of illegal immigrants but estimates range from 2 to 8 million (theoYcial SA population is c 40 million).

The International Bridge Builder and “Go Between”

Alec Erwin, the Minister of Trade and Industry, at a meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO),claimed that “South Africa is a bridge between and developed and the developing worlds”. He was arecognising that SA’s mixed economy and society create an opportunity to play a linking/facilitating rolebetween the First and Third worlds. However, to play such a role requires not only willingness on SA’s part,but the acceptance and trust of others who are involved. The frequency with which SA has been invited toplay this role is a sign of the trust it has gained in international organisations. For example Erwinwas electedas president of the WTO, SA was invited to take the chair of NAM; and it was in the same spirit that SAhas been invited to the World Economic Forum at Davos; and when, as chairman, Mbeki broke previousNAM practice by inviting the developed states to send observers to the meeting in Durban.

It is not only in an economic/development setting that SA has sought act as a “go between”. It has alsobeen active at international gatherings concerned with nuclear developments and the campaign to ban landmines, and it has helped to initiate the formation of a new grouping of states around the Pacific rim. Furtherand more controversially it has sought to act as a bridge between Western values and ideas and those ofAfrica and more generally the 3rd World. Inevitably there has been controversy about SA’s stand on someissues, and its interpretation and application of principles. Nor have all SA’s eVorts achieved their desiredoutcome, aswitnessed by the recentWTO failure to reach agreement at Cancun.However, a further exampleof trust, this time at a personal level, is the success ofMandela and Professor JakesGerwel (DirectorGeneralof Mandela’s OYce)” in persuading Colonel GadaY of Libya to seek a settlement with the US and UKgovernments of the long standing Lockerbie air tragedy.

South Africa in Africa

Relations with the rest of Africa have been the most intense and challenging of all the new SA’s externalrelations. The ANC came to power emphasising its commitment to the continent. It spoke of its “great pridein being African”, and recognised the particular debt it owed to its neighbours who had contributed to andhad suVered in the liberation struggle. In the years that have followed the government has reiterated againand again its African identity, its debt to the continent, and eagerness to play a full part in its development.In its attempt to reassure fellow Africans it has underlined that it has no intention of using its resources andstrength to impose a new hegemony. Its aim is simply to co-operate with others on equal terms as sovereignstates. Pretoria also realises that SA’s self interest and future are tied to the continent—that it cannot achieveeither security or prosperity if it is surrounded by poor, unstable and violent neighbours. As Alfred Nzo,then Foreign Minister told a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1995:“We cannot be an island of prosperity surrounded by a sea of poverty”.

Yet, while there is no reason to doubt Pretoria’s commitment to the continent, there are problem ofrealising its ends. To start with SA is simply not just another African state. It is so muchmore advanced anddeveloped than the rest of the continent that it cannot avoid playing aleading role. The question is notwhether it will be a prominent actor but how and in what may. In the Southern African region it is a giant.

When Pretoria works in harmony with another state, all is well—as in the case of the massive HighlandsWater Project in Lesotho, and more widely in the relationship with Mozambique (doubtless aided byMandela’s marriage to Graca Machel). In Mozambique’s case both sides have recognised the advantage ofco-operation, with results such as the development of theMaputo corridor. Yet in other places matters havenot gone smoothly. SA’s strength has produced jealousy and suspicion. Seen fromSA the expansion of trade

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 5

and investment has been beneficial to the whole continent. That view is not always shared by others. Somecomplain that SA gains most of the advantage (with a large balance of trade surplus), that its majorcompanies have forced local companies out of business and that the control of business still lies in whitehands.

Nor have the complaints been confined to economic aVairs. Some of the strongest criticism has come fromZimbabwe, which, much to Mugabe’s chagrin, was ousted by the new SA as leader at the Southern Africa’smajor organisation—the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Following Mandela’selection as SADC chairman there was a clash over control of a security body chaired by Mugabe. Mugabeclaimed that it could act independently, whereas Mandela claimed it was subordinate to SADC. Moregenerally JonathanMoyo—now aMinister in Zimbabwe—criticised SouthAfricans for their arrogance andtheir assumption that they could speak for all Africa. SA has also encountered obstacles in its peace makingeVorts, as in the DRC, where Laurent Kabila snubbed it, and in Lesotho—where in 1998, despite an appealfor help from the Lesotho PrimeMinister. As in the case of the Commonwealth and Nigeria (see above) SAwas accused of bullying a small neighbour, of absorbing too many Western ideas of whites in the society.

Among SA’s leaders Mbeki has been especially prominent in committing himself to the continent—aswitnessed by his famous “I am an African” speech in welcoming the new constitution, his advocacy of anAfrican renaissance, the leading part he played in negotiating NEPAD, and his support the new AfricanUnity. Yet evenMbeki cannot brush aside diYculties and disappointments. In Africa it appears that a stepforward in one area is countered by a reverse elsewhere. Thus while the recent elections in Kenya wentreasonably well, that is countered by the chaos that reigns in Zimbabwe. Hopes of the end of fighting inAngola are matched by a continuing conflict in the DRC. Yet for all the problems Mbeki retains his faith,and that faith helps to shape some of his controversial views. Thus in relation to HIV/Aids he resents whathe sees as Western attempts to attribute the disease largely to the continent and to see Africans as primitivepeople, who are unable to control their sexual behaviour. For Mbeki, the wretched living conditions inwhich many Africans are forced to live is a major factor explaining the dreadful death toll.

Further controversy surrounds Mbeki’s reaction to developments in Zimbabwe. Mbeki has followed thepath of quite diplomacy. He has resisted pressure both domestic and internationally to pursue a muchtougher line. Why? First, he realises that Mugabe has a strong following among Africans (including SA)—from his role in overthrowing the white Rhodesian regime; and from his seizures of white farms to restorethe land to, what many Africans regard as its rightful owners. Second, and arising from the first, is hisconcern that a tougher line against Mugabe would create political rifts at home (including the ANC).Finally, with the Nigerian case in mind (see attachment) he wants to avoid condemnation by other Africanstates as acting as the West’s poodle. He was not prepared to break what Maxi van Aardt has called the“unwritten law” by which “African states do not turn on each other in international fora, but close rankswhen attacks are made against one of them”.

Summary

SA’s international relations over the past ten years can be summarised as follows:

— It has gained greater international attention than its resources appear to warrant.

— because of:

(a) the past concern re apartheid;

(b) its position in Africa;

(c) the peaceful, negotiated settlement; and

(d) the personality of Mandela.

— The new SA identifies itself with the ThirdWorld, and and seeks to act as a bridge between 1st and3rd Worlds. Its mixed economy is the foundation for the latter claim.

— On coming to power the ANC agreed a set of “idealistic” foreign policy, principles but in oYcediscovered that they were often diYcult to implement.

— Somewhat reluctantly it recognises the current strength of the West, has accepted many of itsvalues (perhaps unconsciously—absorbing the dominant values of the time) and in trade andeconomic activities West is major partner. However, is eager to avoid being branded as West’sagent in Africa.

— Supports a variety of international organisations, and is widely respected in them.While an activeUN member it favours reform of the Security Council, with SA gaining permanent membership.

— A strong commitment to Africa, based on a combination of sentiment and hard headed interest—recognising support in the liberation struggle, and for the future, recognising the SA cannotflourish surrounded by poverty and instability.

— In an age of globalisation and powerful regional blocs, it seeks co-operation with other Africanstates (eg NEPAD) and is eager to extend economic links, but has mat a mixed response.

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Ev 6 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

— Is ready to play a part in peacemaking and peacekeeping but not to over extend itself, or isolateitself (as in Nigeria case), or let the powerful Western states oV the hook.

Professor James Barber

Written evidence submitted by Professor David Simon, Centre for Developing Areas of Research, RoyalHolloway, University of London

NEW INQUIRY INTO SOUTH AFRICA: ISSUES RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION

1. Thank you for the personal invitation to submit this memorandum. Clearly the range of issues thatcould potentially be examined is vast, but I believe that the six broad but closely interrelated themesidentified in the Announcement of the Inquiry cover the principal ground well. I will group my suggestionsfor issues to address using the relevant of these headings.

The UK’s Diplomatic and Political Relations with South Africa

Bilaterally

2. How eVectively has the FCO’s engagement with post-apartheid SA reflected the changingcircumstances in SA and the region, in the sense of seeking genuine partnership and recognising SouthAfrica’s leadership role in southern, and indeed, the rest of Africa? Here it would be important to ascertainperceptions in South Africa as well as in the UK.

3. The impact of current British recruitment campaigns for skilled health and education workers, inparticular. The key issue requiring attention here is the known (and on occasion recently even admitted)‘brain drain’ eVect of such recruitment in sectors where South Africa itself has serious shortages of skillsas it attempts post-apartheid transformation by providing more equitable access to appropriate levels andqualities of social services and human capacity development. Are such campaigns therefore ethical and/orappropriate at a time when the UK is also—and quite correctly—funding various initiatives in health andeducation in SA, especially at the level of tertiary skills?

4. UK asylum policy in respect of South Africans: South Africa’s recent addition to the so-called ‘WhiteList’ of countries from where asylum seekers will be presumed to have unfounded cases already appears tobemaking it yetmore diYcult for peoplewith very plausible fears of persecution to have their claims assessedfairly. Even before this recent development, South Africans claiming asylum were being treated with greatscepticism. I have personal experience of this through the provision of expert evidence for asylum appeals.Although asylum policy falls under the HomeOYce, there are clear ramifications for perceptions of the UKabroad and hence for important aspects of FCO work. Accordingly, is there adequate liaison and ‘joinedup thinking’ between the two departments?

Multilaterally

5. Is the UK being suYciently proactive and successful in ensuring a fair and equitable dispensation forSouth and southern African trade with the UK and the EU as a whole? Many South African perceptionsof the Free Trade Agreement and the process of its negotiation are very critical and are far from any senseof equitable partnership.

South Africa’s role within the Southern African region

6. How eVective has communication and collaborative eVort between the ECO and SA been with respectto addressing the Zimbabwe crisis? The rather diVerent approaches adopted by successive ministers of stateappear to have made little diVerence in terms of headway, either with the South African or Zimbabweangovernments. At the same time, the SAgovernment’s softly-softly approach has also had little success. Can away be found to promote joint and productive eVorts that escape charges of non-African (even neocolonial)interference and also provide evidence for North-South partnership?

South Africa’s role within international bodies

7. Akin to the question in para 5 above, is the UK maximising its eVorts within the EU, but alsobilaterally, to ensure equitable outcomes to regional and global negotiations on trade and developmentissues, such as the Doha Round of WTO negotiations? There was little evidence of British dissent from thehardline approach of the EU at Cancun, for instance. At the heart of these issues are the twin questions as towhat substance there is to the government’s claimed “ethical foreign policy”, and whether there is adequate“joined-up” thinking and action between the ECO andDEID to ensure eVective coordination andmutuallyreinforcing activities?

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 7

8. What is the British government’s perception of the AfricanUnion in comparison to its predecessor, theOAU?Howwell placed does theUKperceive SouthAfrica, especially PresidentMibeki, to be to promote aneVective agenda within it?

The impact of NEPAD

9. Has the UK government’s open enthusiasm for NEPAD been translated into appropriate supportbeyond rhetoric and a “wait and see” attitude? Certainly, the outcome of the Evian Summit was mostdisappointing in this regard.

10. Is the UK government suYciently attuned to diVerences of opinion within Africa to the NEPAD asthe most appropriate instrument for promoting development and, in that light, what steps are being takento maintain support for SADC initiatives and bilateral programmes? Is support for South Africa’sleadership role being balanced suYciently by eVorts to ensure that all member states benefit from itsprogrammes, not just SA and the other continental powers (see Attachment 2—from International AVairs2001). Again, both the FCO and DfID have roles here.

The EVectiveness of the FCO in South Africa

11. Is suYcient being done through the Chevening Scholarships and related schemes to provide theessential longer-term support for the education of a highly skilled leadership corps? These play very valuableroles and should not be subject to short-term changes in priorities or political dynamics. Similarly, if thecurrent suspension of the British Council’s Higher Education Institutional links scheme, pending a reviewof its global operation, were to be extended or the scheme dropped, it would impede generally positiveinteruniversity and other tertiary institutional collaboration.

12. I confirm that I would be happy to provide further details, or to answer questions, regarding theseor related issues during the forthcoming oral hearings.

Professor David Simon

September 2003

Witnesses: Professor James Barber, University of Cambridge, and Professor David Simon, University ofLondon, examined.

Q1 Chairman: Gentlemen, may I welcome the two the country—happily for many reasons, not leastof you to our Committee. Professor James Barber, the wonderful example of the first President,Emeritus Professor of Durham University currently Nelson Mandela, things have been very diVerentadvising the University of Cambridge’s Centre of and if we want a text, I was struck with whatInternational Studies, who worked in the field of Matthew Parris said recently in an article in TheSouth African studies for very many years, and Times on 25 October which was called: “Apublished extensively; and Professor David Simon pessimist recants: the new South Africa isof Royal Holloway, University of London, working”.1 The quote is: “Fitfully butspecialising in Southern African regional issues, unmistakably the new South Africa is working. Theagain published extensively on foreign policy and country today is richer, happier, more powerful,development. We welcome you to what is the first fairer and more secure than it was a decade ago,of the sessions of the Committee in respect of South and the direction is still up . . . TremendousAfrica. As a Committee we decided in the middle problems remain: HIV/AIDS, unemployment, theof July to undertake an inquiry into South Africa unrealistic aspirations of the poor. Partyand to inquire into the role of the Foreign and allegiances clustered around racial and tribalCommonwealth OYce in relation to South Africa groupings continue to stunt real democracy. Canin the light of the strong historic connections which these things be solved?” Are you gentlemenlink the United Kingdom to South Africa. We have optimists or pessimists?three planned sessions. The first is today; the Professor Barber: I think what has been said bysecond is due to take place on 3 February with Matthew Paris is very fair. It is a much moreanother panel of experts, and then, finally, on 9 attractive place to visit and much fairer but, ofMarch with a Foreign OYce minister before, as course, it has enormous social problems as allusual, we produce our report. Gentlemen, I had the societies have, particularly in South Africa withprivilege personally of being almost ten years ago HIV/AIDS as you mentioned, and crime andat the remarkable election in South Africa: I was unemployment, but overall, if you have to take asupervising the international observers in Port broad balance of one side or another, yes, it is aElizabeth and there was a great euphoria. Prior to much better place now. I, too, was at the 1994that there had been dire predictions about SouthAfrica going the way of Algeria with the 1 “A pessimist recants: the new South Africa is working”,

The Times, 25 October 2003.infrastructure collapsing, with the minority fleeing

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election and it was a marvellous up-lifting personnel from South Africa which has an adverseeVect on public services, education and health.experience. Since then, of course, things have not

been perhaps as uplifting but overall I think that is Where do you think the major failings are?Professor Barber: There has been but this is aa fair judgment of Matthew Parris.

Professor Simon: I would concur with that and mixed picture because South Africa gains fromsome countries of the region. The brain drain is notparticularly, if you take as the baseline the period of

intense violence and intimidation that led up to that all one-way. For example, it has gained fromZimbabwe. Zimbabwe has a fine educationalelection, the transformation which followed is truly

remarkable. I guess the longer-term answer depends structure and regional movements out ofZimbabwe have been helpful to South Africa inin a sense on whom within what position in South

African society you speak to. There are many who some ways, but I remember the health services inthis country were starting to recruit largishwould argue that the change has been quite

remarkable; that the achievements are legion. If you numbers of nurses and doctors and therefore inthat sense we gained at South Africa’s expense—talk to many of the historically disempowered or

unempowered, particularly in rural areas or urban and not just us but Australia and New Zealand aswell. A fair number of doctors moved there. Sotownships, you get a diVerent picture, and I have

heard it said quite recently that, “Very little has there has been movement but it is a mixed picture.It is an area I have read about rather thanchanged, our lives are much as they were before”.

Personally I find that hard to believe—precisely researched myself, but I do believe there is a mixedpicture. South Africa has gained some of the brainbecause of the substantial change to the political

economic climate, the overall situation, the repeal in drain from the region as well as losing some tomore advanced countries.many profound ways of the legal apparatus that

apartheid initially underpinned. Even though thelegislation has been gone now in some cases for Q4 Chairman: So it has been disadvantageous tosixteen or so years, it is a question of structural Zimbabwe?change as much as superficial change whereby hangs Professor Barber: That is right.the conundrum between the appearances of goodwilland progress and peace to all men and women, and

Q5 Mr Illsley: Could I introduce a few questionsthe ability to address the fundamental, deep-rootedon South Africa’s role within the region? Alreadyand historical legacies of inequality and deprivation.South Africa has been described to the Committeeby a number of sources as the principal economic

Q2 Chairman: But the legacy of the Group Areas and military power in sub-Saharan Africa. I thinkAct is still there? the World Service talked about it being theProfessor Simon: Yes. It is much more diYcult to dominant military and economic power in southernrecast concrete, bricks, mortar and steel and glass Africa. Professor Barber referred to South Africa,than it is to amend legislation, and that, I think, is a “punching above its weight”. To what extent wouldvery good illustration of how change can only come you agree that South Africa is the dominantabout in diVerent ways, at diVerent speeds and in economic and military power within the region,diVerent contexts. People can move and the extent and would you add any caveats to that?to which there has been residential integration Professor Barber: No, I am sure it is. In almostreflects in the first instance the working of the every respect South Africa is more advanced andprivate property market because that is the larger than its neighbours, but the South Africansprincipal means by which people can escape from are conscious that they cannot prosper fully as antheir previous group area since the legislation was island in a sea of desperation, and they arerepealed. But only a small proportion of people surrounded by diYculties. Angola, the Democratichave the wherewithal to do that and therefore are Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe are all inpeople who do not remain trapped either in high diYcult circumstances at the moment, and this hasdensity townships or shanties or squatter areas or a drag eVect. There may be a brain drain, as I havesome other form of social housing. Even the million mentioned, but overall the picture is not a good oneor so RDP2 houses which were built in the first six in the region. This has an adverse impact on Southyears of the post-apartheid period, one of the few Africa which is the giant, and there is this burdenRDP targets achieved, people speak disparagingly of expectation. We all somehow think that Southabout because they are smaller than their Africa can solve the regional problems and I do notpredecessors, the so-called matchbox houses of the think it can by itself: it needs help internationally,apartheid era, many of them built in a way that has and so, returning to your question, it seems to megiven way to a rise in structural faults and so on. there is too much a burden of expectation on SouthSo it does depend whom you spoke to in what Africa in the region.context, but there are many targets which are beingachieved now and take longer to gestate. Q6 Chairman: Do you agree?

Professor Simon: At one level yes, at another no,and again I think it reflects the duality because weQ3 Chairman: Finally from me, Professor Barber,cannot talk about the rest of the Southern Africawhich areas, if any, disappoint you? I have heardor sub-Saharan Africa in such singular terms. Lasta number of concerns about the exodus of skilledyear I found myself in the space of about six weeksin South Africa, Ghana and Uganda on separate2 RDP—Reconstruction and Development Programme.

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business, and the contrasts in terms of what people Defence Force of a lack of equipment and so onwere thinking and talking about and particularly and so forth, does South Africa have the necessarytheir view, for example, of the NePAD3 programme capabilities to be putting itself forward for theseas a whole and South Africa’s role within it, roles? Coming back to your burden of expectation,illustrate the tensions and these conundrums very are we expecting too much of South Africa inwell. Even within South Africa, which is one of the accepting these roles and, if that is the case, whatleaders of the programme, there are many people further help should we and the rest of the westernwho are extremely sceptical and, indeed, critical of nations be giving to South Africa in that peace-Mbeki’s personal role and the Government’s keeping monitoring way?position overall. Why? Largely, not entirely, Professor Barber: Some of the situations like thebecause of the tension—and this is the big caveat DRC rely on everybody’s ability to handle themthat I would add to what James just said—and frankly. The early dilemma after 1994 for the Souththere is a direct sense within black South Africa, to African armed forces was bringing together verythe extent one can generalise, of a trade-oV between disparate elements and merging them into onethe use of resources and energy to redress the national force—a very diYcult job. I think it hashistorical inequalities and the poverty within South gone reasonably well towards the end but withAfrica and the use of the skills and the resources many earlier diYculties because you had to mergeof the investment to address similar disparities the liberation forces together with the old Southinternationally within southern and sub-Saharan African forces and the Bantustan forces, which hadAfrica. In Ghana and in Uganda for slightly to be formed into one coherent force. It was adiVerent reasons, but broadly because they are remarkable achievement to do it at all but therewhat you might call second-string economies and were lots of diYculties in doing so, of course, andpowers within sub-Saharan Africa, the perception while that was taking place South Africa waswas very critical because they feel they are likely to reluctant to involve itself in peace-keepingget very little out of the NePAD deal, and they operations. I think that phase is largely over, andpoint to the big four or five, if you like, who are they are more prepared to involve themselves inthe main drivers behind NePAD as the ones who peace-keeping, but to equip yourself in peace-will gain mainly from the investment and the new keeping is diVerent from other situations for theopportunities from abroad. armed forces. There has been a big debate about

the arms purchase. You need to know what you areQ7 Mr Illsley: Just taking that a little bit further, going to use them for before you buy your arms,the “burden of expectation”, and looking at South and the arms purchase was mainly on the primaryAfrica’s peace-making and peace-keeping role, role of defence of the borders. Whether that is goodsince 1994 South Africa has attempted to broker for peace-keeping or not is an open debate, so therepeace in a number of African conflict areas. In has been uncertainty both about the peace-keepingwhich of these areas do you think it has seen role and about the arms purchase.greatest and least success, and for what reasons? Professor Simon: The period immediately afterProfessor Barber: I think the overall picture has not 1994 was characterised by a deliberate rundown ofbeen particularly bright. It has improved slightly in South Africa’s military capacity in every sense: thethe DRC.4 It was at first virtually rejected in the scrapping of conscription, which had been in manyDRC but I think it has got some peace-keepers senses the backbone during the apartheid period;there now. Angola is quieter. Mozambique is the the planned obsolescence of some of the materiel;one big success story in relation to South Africa and the reduction in the standing armyand there it has been a combination of what has notwithstanding the reintegration issue, withhappened in Mozambique itself. South Africa has assistance from BMATT5 as had been the case inbeen able to oVer Mozambique substantial help. Zimbabwe and Namibia before, got to a pointThe Maputo corridor and the help it gave when where it was realised that some re-equipment wasthere were floods in Mozambique was very useful required and also retraining, hence theso there it has had direct help, but also the controversial arms deal. But I would like to add atcombination of political change in Mozambique this point a fundamental dilemma for South Africawhich has gone along similar lines at the same time and, indeed, other countries in Africa in respect ofas South Africa’s. Also the personal connection

South African peace-keeping or any other militarybetween Nelson Mandela and Joachim Chissano Iform of intervention, and that is simply this: untilam sure has helped.the early 90s, the experience of the rest of Africain terms of South Africa’s military was as a

Q8 Mr Illsley: Given that the South African destructive, destabilising force, invading andgovernment has shown an increased willingness to occupying part of Angola and so on, sabotaging asinvolve itself in regional peace-keeping dutiespart of that whole period of conflict, and that is stillbeyond the DRC, and bearing in mind thevery firmly embedded in the minds of many peoplememorandum which you probably have not seenin South Africa and beyond. So the thought ofwhich we received from the BBC World Serviceseeing South African soldiers in uniform andthat pointed out problems within the South Africanbearing arms as part of some other presence is stilla diYcult one. That is waning with time and, as3 NePAD—New Economic Partnership for African

Development.4 DRC—Democratic Republic of Congo. 5 British Military Advisory and Training Team.

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James alluded, the role in DRC has been quite The Committee suspended from 3.33 pm to 3.43pm for a division in the House of Commons.instrumental. The other success I would point to,

that he did not mention, is Nelson Mandela’s rolein brokering agreement, however fragile it remains, Q11 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the remit ofin Burundi, which received much less attention this Committee is to scrutinise the foreign policy ofthan the DRC, Zimbabwe and Angola. the British government, and I would like to ask you

both what you consider to be the top priorities forthe British Foreign OYce in relation to SouthQ9 Mr Illsley: Turning to brief questions on theAfrica.Southern Africa Development Community which itProfessor Barber: Let me try. One of them will bejoined in 1994, what useful role does the SADCto help in the quest for trade. You will never getplays in facilitating economic and politicalan absolutely level field, so far as I can see, but todevelopment within southern Africa?help get it as level as possible. It is one of the thingsProfessor Simon: It played a far more useful andthat Alec Erwin6 mentioned when he was over hereactive role until the conflict in the DRC broke outrecently—they want fairer trade situationsand Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola becameparticularly in parts of the agricultural structure.directly involved. They are three of the SADCThey have an agreement, of course, with themembers and their involvement was, in eVect,European Union on a free trade arrangements, butunilateral without going through the appropriate the implementation of that is important. It is notSADC channels, which exist for multilateral just having an agreement but it is how it isagreement before such involvement commences, implemented, and I think it is in British interests toand that eVectively emasculated the organisation help South Africa as much as possible in that. So

for several years—in fact, it damned nearly brought that is certainly one area. In another area, if SADCit to its knees. Another element of the dilemma is is going to be eVective, HIV/AIDS should be onethat there are at least three regional institutions of the areas which it addresses because you cannotwith increasingly overlapping membership and in contain this to one country, it spreads over thethe post-Cold War period also increasingly similar whole region, and if we can give them anyaims and objectives. SADC is arguably the assistance and help in that we ought to do so.foremost; then there is COMESA, the Common Professor Simon: I would draw attention to severalMarket for Eastern and Southern African which things. The first and perhaps most problematic isstretches all the way up to Djibouti and Eritrea, the ambiguous, ambivalent relationship betweenand the oldest of them all, the Southern African South Africa and the United Kingdom which in aCustoms Union dating from the period of the sense we saw coming to a head again at theunion of South Africa in 1909–10, which now links weekend at CHOGM7 over, in this particularup South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland instance, Zimbabwe, but that is one—albeit veryand Namibia and is the only real customs union important—illustration of the diYculty and theto date of the three, although the others have now way in which particular problems can cloudcommon markets and free trade areas on their otherwise very productive and broadly co-operativeagendas. But progress has been slow. The free trade relations that have existed since the transition inarea within SADC is being implemented very South Africa. In that sense the diYculty is thatgradually. It is supposed to have an eight-year South Africa finds itself, as we were saying earlier,implementation period, but that has been delayed, in a leadership role on the one hand and also in theand the individual countries are struggling with the role of a recipient of aid and transitional assistanceold dilemma of, “Do we lower and remove the in various guises of the sort that we have alluded to.barriers to trade amongst the membership for the In that particular context, things like the Cheveningcommon good relative to what we as country X, Y studentship awards are profoundly important, andor Z might gain or lose individually?”, and the role of the British Council, which comes underespecially for the smaller, weaker countries that is the Foreign OYce. Here I would like to enter somea very real dilemma. concerns regarding the current view of those

activities. One hears that the Cheveningstudentships might be reduced in number, that theQ10 Mr Illsley: Regarding what you said about thehigher educational links might be discontinued andcountries which paralysed SADC for several yearsa variety of those other mechanisms which are bothbecause of their inability to continue, what then isof direct benefit to Britain but also cruciallythe significance of the recently signed Mutualimportant to that longer term support, not least inDefence Pact by SADC members?the context of expanding the skillbase,Professor Simon: Potentially it is part of the compensating for the loss of people through HIV/resumption of progress. There used to be AIDS and so on. But the bigger issue of trying tosomething called the Organ for Politics, Defence find accommodation with a country like Southand Security which was a semi-detached institution Africa over joint foreign policy and World Trade

headed by Robert Mugabe, and a few years ago Organisation-related issues is very complex. Thewas part of the restructuring after South Africa diYculty is how to find a strategy that works, andjoined SADC that was given a diVerent status andbrought in, and this Mutual Defence Pact is part 6 Mr Alexander Erwin, South African Minister of Tradeof the political programme of SADC and this and Industry.

7 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.reconfigured organ.

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here I could draw attention to the contrast between and it is very clear from that work that there is alarge category of people, not necessarily for partythe policy of at least one former minister of state

for African aVairs and the South African political reasons but nevertheless through well-founded individual fears of persecution in terms ofgovernment. One tried very upfront, full-on

tackling of the issue; the South Africans, as they the scope of the UN declarations on refugees andassociated legislation, who should notstill do, prefer quiet African unity, supposedly

behind-the-scenes role, and yet when you talk to automatically be assumed to have no bona fide caseand should be seen and heard on their merits.oYcials on both sides it is clear that they feel

equally frustrated at the lack of progress. So this isa real dilemma and it is not easy to say, “That was Q14 Chairman: Professor Barber, have you had anyright, this was wrong”, but it is a critical issue further thoughts?which is now likely to complicate the relationship Professor Barber: No, I do not think so. The lastbetween South Africa and the United Kingdom, time I wrote about this I said it was ‘a comfortableparticularly after CHOGM at the weekend. relationship’.Professor Barber: I would like to add internationalcrime. South Africa, after 1994, became a centre for Q15 Mr Hamilton: I wanted to move on to theinternational crime including the drugs trade. We subject of Zimbabwe, South Africa’s neighbourhave given some help, I know, but that is another and the problems in that benighted country. As youarea in which we could help. may know, this Committee has had an on-goingSir John Stanley: Following on from what you have interest in Zimbabwe; we have published threeboth said, can you tell us whether there are any reports to date, the latest was in May, and weparticular policies that the British Government is devoted a section of our report to Zimbabwe in itscurrently following that you would like to see region.8 May I just quote a small paragraph fromaltered, or any policies not being followed now that that report? We said that, “if Zimbabwe’syou would like to see being adopted? neighbours were fully to assume their

responsibilities—for example, by imposing targetednon-trade sanctions similar to those alreadyQ12 Mr Maples: In relation to South Africa!imposed by the EU, by some CommonwealthProfessor Barber: I think we could do probablycountries and by the United States—Mugabe’smore in training people, for police and, as Davidregime would be further isolated, his opponentsmentioned, universities. I know our universities,would be encouraged and his days would bedare I mention it, here at the moment arenumbered”.9 The Government fully agreed with us,controversial and under-funded maybe butby the way, in its response to our Report. However,compared with South Africa we are very well oVsome people who have submitted evidence to thisand it is the staV and post-graduates that would beinquiry have said that one of the reasons that Southuseful for us to help. I will try to think of othersAfrica is doing very little about Robert Mugabe isas we go along.that there is this belief that the West has doubleProfessor Simon: The one I would urge moststandards; there is anger that the West appears tostrongly is that beknighted term, “joined-upbe so active on the issue of Zimbabwe yetthinking” and, crucially, joined-up action to followapparently ignores the adverse impact ofthe joined-up thinking, particularly in the interfaceglobalisation on countries like South Africa.between the FCO and DfID, the Home OYce orFirstly, why do you think that President Mbeki hasthe Department of Trade and Industry in respectbeen so reluctant to criticise the Mugabe regime inof negotiations at the World Trade Organisation,Zimbabwe, given the damage he is doing to thatthe problems encountered at Cancun, and the waycountry and to the whole region, and to whatin which South Africa is again emerging as aextent is South African policy on Zimbabwe asignificant player. But there was evidence thatreflection of demand for African unity as opposedBritain did not dissent from the overall EU positionto an unwillingness to tackle the problem ofwhich has caused some consternation amongZimbabwe?people in South Africa and others in that groupProfessor Barber: I think President Mbeki hasof players.problems both at home and abroad if he takes toostrong a line. Robert Mugabe is not regarded in the

Q13 Sir John Stanley: You are referring to the tariV same light by many blacks in South Africa as weissue, are you? regard him. For example, when the foreignProfessor Simon: In particular yes, but the wider minister, Dr Zuma, was here recently, she talkedagenda as well. Secondly, in respect of FCO and about righting an historical injustice—that is theHome OYce co-operation, or collaboration, in land question. Now, we do not perhaps see it asterms of policy towards asylum seekers and strongly as “an historical injustice”, so there is thatmigrants from South Africa. South Africa was side. I am told when Robert Mugabe was in Fortrecently added to the so-called “White List” of Hare some months ago he was greeted as a herocountries from which asylum seekers will normally because he challenges the old colonial structure, sobe presumed to have no bona fide case and are internally there are people in the ANC who wouldtherefore subject to the new accelerated processthat has been introduced. I have personally been 8 Foreign AVairs Committee, Eighth Report of Sessioninvolved over the last year in a number of asylum 2002–03, Zimbabwe, HC 339, paras. 44–48.

9 Ibid., para 48.claims and appeals as a provider of expert evidence,

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be critical of Mbeki if he took too strong a line perhaps the issue I was alluding to earlier in respectagainst Mugabe. Equally internationally, and the of the Foreign OYce versus the South Africancase I quoted in my paper was that some time ago relationship and what we saw at CHOGM at thewhen Mandela tried to take a very firm stand on weekend. But again, as James has said, it is by noNigeria in the Saro Wiwa case, that isolated South means a universal sentiment; there are many inAfrica from the rest of Africa. It burnt its fingers South Africa who feel just as desperate as thevery badly on the Saro Wiwa case, and I do not MDC10 supporters in Zimbabwe and many others,think they have ever forgotten it. Do I need to particularly on the part of Africa, but again thereremind you of the case? are diVerences. In west Africa my experience is that

many people are much more openly critical of whatMugabe is doing and will say he is putting all of

Q16 Mr Hamilton: No, I remember it very well, but us under a cloud, giving us all a bad name. In eastmy question then further to what you have said is Africa there is much more of the sentiment thatthis: surely, when pictures are broadcast—and they James mentioned where people respect Mugabe asmust be broadcast in South Africa—of the having the guts to stand up against the vestedrepression of the Movement for Democratic interests and the existing power structures of theChange, of the economic disaster that has been

international architecture.brought about, is it simply the case that the SouthAfrican government blames the West in some wayfor what is happening economically to Zimbabwe Q17 Mr Hamilton: Surely it is one thing to standand does not see Robert Mugabe as the cause of up against those structures and, as Professorthat economic damage and the repression that he Barber said, to challenge the old colonial structure,is using against opposition? Is that seen simply as that is accepted, but when you see Africansa way of putting down people who are supporting starving, when you see that starvation and foodwestern ideas, or white ideas. being used as a weapon against African opponents,Professor Barber: It is not that simple. I am sure surely that is very diVerent to dismantling the oldthere is criticism and I am sure Mbeki himself colonial structures? I still fail to understand whyrecognises the dilemma and the damage Mugabe is that is not condemned.doing, but I am trying to explain how he faces that Professor Simon: I would agree, and that is whypublicly. They have tried to do it by quiet people I talk to in various parts of west Africadiplomacy which has failed, of course—and there increasingly are taking the more openly criticalare some very strong critics including Mbeki’s view, and we saw President Obasanjo at thebrother. He leads a campaign against Mugabe in weekend at CHOGM, but I think in east andSouth Africa and there was a meeting at the South southern Africa, the areas where white colonialAfrican Institute of International AVairs which I settlement was profound and therefore landattended that was very strongly against what was expropriation most widespread, that historicalhappening in Zimbabwe, so there are very strong consciousness is rather diVerent and there is acritics, but if you ask me why Mbeki behaves as he sense, perhaps ironically, in keeping with the UNdoes, I try to understand. and OAU11 charter that these are domestic aVairsProfessor Simon: I would distinguish three elements of fellow member states in which you do notto the answer. One is the issue you have already intervene, at least not publicly in that way.alluded to, the allegations of double standards, andhere we do not even need to look to relationshipsor treatment of diVerent countries but diVerent Q18 Mr Hamilton: Can I ask either of you whetherstages in respect of Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia you think there is any sign that South Africa’sbefore that, and people draw attention to the fact policy is now changing as things get worse inthat, even though there were international Zimbabwe?sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia, as Professor Simon: I have seen little evidence thus far,it was at the time, they were not strongly enforced at least on the public side of the policy. I thinkdespite appearances, and some of the key economic there are some intense debates and diVerences oflinkages were maintained, that notwithstanding. opinion fairly high up in Government, andThe second element is the historical debt that certainly the flip side of that is that there has beenMbeki personally, and the ANC in general, feels growing concern within South Africa, and alsotowards Zimbabwe and the other frontline states Namibia, that if the land questions in those twofor the sheltering and support during the struggle countries are not successfully dealt with, thenagainst apartheid, and in some cases Mozambique Zimbabwe’s style scenario is no longer beyond theand sometimes Zimbabwe using the territory as a realm of possibility in South Africa and Namibia.forward base, certainly giving asylum and refuge to There is great concern, and a couple of weeks agomany South Africans. The third one is that in the Namibian government intervened veryAfrica as a whole, some would say, although others forcefully to forestall a threatened land invasion bywould draw more tight geographically regionally people who were members, as it happens, until veryspecific boundaries, there is a sense that you do not recently of the SWAPO12 aYliated trade union.fall out in public, you do not attack a fellowAfrican leader at these sorts of international fora 10 Movement for Democratic Change.but you deal with this quietly within the confines 11 OAU—Organisation of African Unity.

12 SWAPO—South West Africa Peoples Organisation.of your collective home, as it were. That was

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Q19 Mr Hamilton: Do you think that the Foreign complex social, political, economic problems whichare set out in its constitution as itsmajor role. Is this aOYce and the British government has failed torealistic approach?understand the reasons why the South AfricanProfessor Simon: It is a very good question. Thegovernment cannot act more strongly againstanswer isdiYcultbecause it isprobablyshadesofgreyZimbabwe and Robert Mugabe?andmatters of degree, at least in the short term. OneProfessor Simon: I think there has been an attemptof the key issues that somewould find problematic isto understand them. Whether that understanding isthe role thatLibya’spresidenthasplayed in thewholefully fledged, I am not sure, but it also reflectstransformation from the OAU to the AU, and thediVerent positions and the whole question of theway inwhich it is alleged in somequarters that hewasuniversality of human rights, of the balanceattempting to do this to create something, as it were,between individual human rights and collective andinhis own imageandperhaps anotherwayof lookingsocial rights mediated by these historic inequalities.at it would be to counter the increasing influence ofThat is the nub of the disagreement.South Africa and the southern cone, if you like,Professor Barber: One may add to it Mbeki’swithin the pan-continentalmovements. It is not quiteparticular pride in being an African. He is the oneclear howmuch of the resourcing he is providing butwho launched the African renaissance idea and hecertainly during the transitional process and thethinks that too often black people have beennegotiations that followed it was substantial, so Iblamed when whites have done wrong. He is a manthink there is a little bit of concern there.My sense iswho is proud of his ancestry and does not want tothat in many parts of the region there would bebe seen as somebody trying to undermine the blackgreater support for the more geographically specificside, black unity, so there is a personal elementregional economic initiatives, like SADC andcoming into it as well. I am sure he has tried toECOWAS14 because they aremore coherent . . .change Mugabe but he does not want to be seen as

a leader standing out against another black figureQ23MrChidgey: Support fromwhom?who, as David said, was a major liberation figure.Professor Simon:Themember states themselves, andthey would see those as more potentially useful

Q20 Mr Hamilton: And, of course, you could vehicles for the economic collaboration than thepan-understand thatmore if the opposition in Zimbabwe continental. At the continental level, the questionwaswhitebut it is not—well, it is partlybut it seems to becomes the relationship between theAfricanUnionbemainly black. and NePAD and, again, there is still some definitionProfessor Barber:Yes. that we need to have there.Professor Simon:Verymuch so. Professor Barber: It is rather early to judge, that is the

dilemma. It isanew initiativeand thehope is thatnewinitiatives improve things, but SADC itself hasQ21 Mr Hamilton: Finally, do you think the Britishreorganised itself recentlywith the hope that itwill begovernment, the Foreign OYce here, can in any waymore eYcient. In the past it gave out segments to ainfluence South Africa’s attitude towardsparticular state to carry out, for example, SouthZimbabwe? What should the FCO do now toAfrica had health as one of its segments, but it wasinfluence future events or from what you say, done by civil servants in SouthAfrica.Now there hasProfessor Barber, is Thabo Mbeki’s position really been a change in SADC and they have six areas in

pretty solid and he is not going to change? which they operate as a central unit, and the hope isProfessor Barber:He is not going to change publicly, that that will bemore eVective.I do not think. The hope is that he will put somepersonal pressure, but I cannot see Mugabe moving

Q24 Mr Chidgey: On that point, particularly yourbecause of the sort of pressure that South Africa hasreference to SADC, has the disappearance ofexerted so far. If you really wanted to pull the plugZimbabwe damaged the AU and, particularly,youcouldstopsupplyingnot just foodbutelectricity ,SADC?transport and so on, but SouthAfrica has not done itProfessor Barber:Oh, I should think it has damagedso far and I cannot see it doing it in the future, so wemost things, yes. There was a big argument earlierjust have to go on and hope, that somehowMugabebetweenMugabe andMandela over SADC’s Organwill be removed.for Defence and Security because Mugabe had beenrather cock of the walk before the South Africansarrived. When the South Africans arrived MandelaQ22MrChidgey: Iwould like to raise somequestionsbecame the dominant personality and Chairman ofconcerning South Africa and the African Union. AsSADC. Mugabe, put out by this, wanted to have ayou know President Mbeki was a very strongseparate area of his own and he tried to take over thesupporter of the OAU, and also first president of theOrgan, so they had quite a substantial clash.AU13.We all know, of course, that relations betweenProfessor Simon: I would agree with that.the AU and the west, particularly the United

Kingdom,wereat timesmore thanalittle strainedbutwhat I am particularly interested in is how does the Q25 Mr Chidgey: You, of course, know that Southnew African Union diVer from the old? What Africa was very strongly for the creation of a Peace

and Security Council within the AU. I really want topotential do you think it has to tackle eVectively the

14 ECOWAS—Economic Community ofWest African States.13 AU—AfricanUnion.

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Ev 14 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon

ask you whether you think the scheme will come to it has quite a strong civil society and it has a pressthat is reasonably free and critical. When it comesfruition and what it could achieve, bearing in mind

they see this as a vehicle to produce an African to the OAU I have only once visited it and I foundit rather depressing experience so I am a poorstand-by force, rather along the lines of the EU

model, I suppose. But I want to link that question to advocate of it. Whether the AU will be better, I donot know.something you alluded to earlier which is the

controversy over the arms deals in South Africawhich go right up to the Vice-President. It is amatter Q27 Mr Chidgey:We have touched on this alreadyof record that Mbeki decided he will not be but it relates to our relations in this area with Southprosecuted even though there seems to be quite a lot Africa and, of course, those of the EU, lookingof evidence that suggests a prosecution should have particularly at the AU’s aims for the continentgone ahead, and this involves two major very large which involve peace-keeping forces as well. Reallycompanies, if not entirely British they certainly have what I want to ask you is, in short, what morea very large British involvement in their operations. could we be doing in the United Kingdom and theSo really I am asking, first, how can South Africa EU to assist the AU in achieving its aims, and dohave any credibility in a programme such as we suVer at all from the fact that this arms deal inNePAD, which is linked to the AU which Mbeki is South Africa has been a huge controversy, and theya great supporter of and which is out there to drive are the key players in trying to establish a regionalagainst and eliminate corruption, when at the very peace-keeping force? Does that rebound in any wayhighest level within their own Government there are in the assistance that the United Kingdom canhuge questions about the propriety of arms oVer? Is that rather tarnished by this because of thepurchases? If you then link that to whether they have involvement of British firms?any credibility in sponsoring a pan-African peace- Professor Barber: I doubt it. It seems to me the AUkeeping force, does it not all seem a bit of a mess? is a broader issue than the arms deal. Now the EUThat is one way of putting it, but it does not have relationship with Africa generally is one that, as Imuch credibility, does it? mentioned before, I would like to see moreProfessor Simon: I can understand that view and I sympathy with in terms of freedom of trade and sothink the central diYculty to grapple with is, on the on, and encouragement of the people of Africa toone hand, the sense that I think does have genuine be able to sell us their goods, so it is that generalroots at least in some quarters amongst African level, that Britain can play a role in the EU helpinggovernance that there is a need for some such the AU in that sense.institution and, on the other hand, increasing Professor Simon: I would underline that last point.concern which has been reflected in some of the Many people in South and southern Africa seecritiques oVered by South Africa and other African Britain as potentially one of the main allies withinstates that ultimately what is driving this is a western the EU context, particularly over fishing rights andattempt to devolve international peace-keeping other resources, where Spain or other countriesdown to the continental and subcontinental region. have taken quite hardline positions. My sense, toParticularly they would point to the role the US has answer your question more directly, is that thetaken on in the post-Cold War period as global FCO and the British government more generallypoliceman and enforcer, in the sense that, as we have have been far more positive in responding toheard in recentweeks, theAmerican government has NePAD than thus far to the African Union, butrealised even it has limitations of resourcing and even there I would characterise it largely aspersonnel to do this in too many conflict zones something like, “Make encouraging noises but let’ssimultaneously, and really what is driving this is an wait and see; let’s look for evidence of progressattempt to devolve that responsibility and the risks before committing ourselves.”and so on on to Africans.

Q28 Mr Chidgey: But NePAD is an AUprogramme.Q26 Mr Chidgey: But is not that the wish of theProfessor Simon: That relationship is not asAfrican countries themselves?straightforward as it may seem.Professor Simon: Well, there is support in some

circles but not unanimously. There is great concernabout this and therefore the balancing act to be Q29 Mr Maples: I want to look at South Africa introdden is how to support, train, facilitate and to a slightly bigger context. How does it see theresource this without, again, being seen to be the Commonwealth, its role in the Commonwealth,“sugar daddy” to something that is “going to dance how it might use it, whether it feels it gets used byto the pay master’s tune”. the Commonwealth? How do they see that?Professor Barber: What I would say is that South Professor Simon: I think Mbeki’s take on thatAfrica has been more open than most places. There would be rather diVerent today from a week ago,is corruption, of course as in all societies, but at for very obvious reasons. Let me answer it in anleast in South Africa there is reasonably free press, indirect way. I think the kind of perspective we hadit investigates things, and we know about the portrayed by Mugabe at the weekend of nothingdegree of corruption. So in that sense it is rather but a talking shop and a club does it a disservicehard to say that it is like other African states. I and demeans it. That said, Zimbabwe’s departurethink South Africa in some ways is diVerent from probably does not demean the Commonwealth in

the short-term because there are precedents that ifother African states, and one of the elements is that

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 15

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon

there is a change of Government the country could Africa certainly does, to quote the phrase, “punchabove its weight.” That depends obviously onbe invited to rejoin, and that gets us out of that

particular problem. In specific relation to South maintaining and retaining support withinAfrica andagain there is that slight ambivalence because of theAfrica, I have little doubt that President Mbeki

himself sees it very much as one of a suite of global historical role and the sense on the part of many ofthe smaller and weaker countries that South Africamultilateral institutions where South Africa can

play a pivotal role, often as a broker between if you stands to gain much more than they do from manyof these pan-African and global movements, so thatlike the old Commonwealth and the new

Commonwealth—Europe, Australasia, Canada, is a tension line I would draw attention to.and Africa, Asia. The trouble is, what happened atthe weekend has probably been something of an Q33 Mr Maples: Do you think in both theseimplicit or indeed explicit rebuke to Mbeki’s contexts, the Commonwealth and the Unitedenvisaged role. I think broadly speaking there is Nations, South Africa has fully bought in? To whatstill fairly solid support for South Africa’s extent has it bought into the good governance,membership and role, and South Africa has been democracy, human rights, rule of law agenda? Thatgreatly encouraged by the accession of seems to be going pretty well within South Africa,Mozambique, more recently of Cameroon, in the but has it bought into that agenda as far as the restsense that, in that respect, it might assume of the Third World is concerned? Do we see them assomething more of a wider role than simply a an absolutely essential ingredient, that it is not goingformer British ex-colonial club, because after all to work for them if they do not have these thingsMozambique was never a British colony, in place?protectorate or anything else. Professor Barber: If I may go back, in terms of theProfessor Barber: South Africa sees itself as a UN, they may not say it openly to you but theybridge-builder between the first and third worlds, would like to see a reform of the Security Counciland in that sense it has been reasonably successful. with permanent seats for an African or AfricanWhen it first came into the world of multilateral states, and they see themselves of course as theinstitutions, after 1994, there was great enthusiasm natural inheritor of the seat forAfrica. Others do notof course. A friend of mine was at one of the necessarily share that view.meetings, on fisheries I think, and he said that whenthe South Africans came in everybody stood up

Q34 Mr Maples:Would they see that as somethingand cheered; he said it was like the Second Coming.they could use to promote this agenda, or is ourThey have managed to build on that and I thinkagenda fundamentally diVerent from theirs in thisone of the successes of South Africa has been inrespect?things like the World Trade Organisation, in theProfessor Simon: I think it also depends, in the senseNePAD movement and so on, to be a bridgeof chronology, which interests predominate within,between the First and Third worlds, and they seesay, the Department of Foreign AVairs. Certainly init that way. I will again quote Alec Erwin who said,the first few years after transition in 1994 there was“We have both the First and Third Worlds here,remarkably little change of key personnel except attherefore we are in a position to help.” I can onlythe very top. So they had a strong continuity of, ifagree, I think it has been one of the most successfulyou like, old guard people who had served under theareas of South Africa’s international eVorts toNational Party government, and that played a quitebridge-build.important role in terms of South Africa’s responseon a number of these sorts of initiatives and the

Q30 Mr Maples: Can they be both a bridge-builder relatively uncomplicated way in which South Africaand a leader of Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa? signed up to some of these apparently universal,Professor Simon: They are attempting to be, yes. individualised rights. Gradually as personnel change

was eVected, as the Mandela regime has yielded tothe Mbeki regime and his very diVerent vision, thatQ31 Mr Maples: Are those things at some point

going to come into conflict? has become a little more complicated, and there isthis balance which I alluded to in response to anProfessor Barber: They have not always been

welcomed by African states. Some African states earlier question, between the sense of a more, as itwere, communalist, collective African perspectivehave said, “They are trying to speak for us and they

do not understand”. They did not get full support on rights rather than the kind of Western focus onthe principal priority of individual rights, and thatfor their Olympic bid from some Africans, so there

is uncertainty. diYculty again, that conflict, I think is beginning tocome out in some of the apparently divergent viewsand responses to diVerent initiatives, often in quiteQ32MrMaples:The same question really in relationrapid succession.to theUnitedNations. TheUnitedNationsmight be

a better place to play that role of bridge-builder.Professor Simon: Again, there is evidence in several Q35 Mr Chidgey: Just a few questions on NePAD.

We have touched on it so I will try and be succinct.respects, one of which, perhaps most conspicuously,was South Africa’s role in promoting the Ottawa You have already made clear to us that there is a

feeling that NePAD suVers from being diVerentTreaty banning landmines in 1997. There are otherexamples where the bridge-builder role has been things to diVerent people, both within and outside

the continent. Some see it as a tool for securingplayed very successfully and in that case South

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Ev 16 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon

better governance, particularly donors, and others question the Peer Review Mechanism. Heapparently believes it will be undermined by thesee it as a means of securing more aid for African

nations. Can those two needs be satisfied, or is it a length of time needed, the absence of objectivenorms and the lack of sanctions to make countriesgame of chess?

Professor Simon: Yes, as they say. comply. That is very interesting because SouthAfrica and Ghana are the first two countries toChairman: A good game of doubles—not a ball

between you! volunteer to be subject to this, so are we going to seeSouth Africa as an example of best practice? Will itmean that, in fact, eVectively it will not changeQ36 Mr Chidgey: Let me be specific. Really it is a

question of whether you believeWestern donors will significantly poor governance in African countries?Will it be in eVect toothless? Is this a huge challengecontinue to support NePAD without an eVective

Peer Review Mechanism. I want to couple that with for South Africa or will it just pass by?Professor Barber: Yes, I think it is a big challenge.an interesting contrast and that is that the United

States administration does not support NePAD, ithas its own Millennium Fund which has a rather Q39 Mr Chidgey: Is there anything we can do in the

UK as British foreign policy to aid this process?more commercial approach to assisting Africa.Professor Simon: Yes. Professor Simon: Assisting South Africa to play a

leadership and catalytic role in respect ofmechanisms like that could bear some fruit.Q37Mr Chidgey: I would like your views on, will we

support that Peer Review, and is the Americanapproach the best way for Western donors? Q40Mr Chidgey: Should we be using the carrot and

stick through the G8 Action Plan in the UK’s policyProfessor Simon: I think the answer to the latter isprobably no. There is an important role for a towards Africa?

Professor Simon: I would be tempted to say thatmultilateral approach and the broad strategy oftrying to co-ordinate an EU policy is probably right. putting some funds and some commitment up-front

would be as useful as that. Certainly, as you will seeThe critical question, which I alluded to earlier, is towhat extent the EU in general or Britain in particular in one of the attachments to my memorandum, the

Evian Summit earlier this year was felt to beis prepared to put something up-front beyondsaying, “We are waiting for evidence of development disappointing by both sides. NePAD and the

African communities were looking for someon the ground”, and this Peer ReviewMechanism isprecisely one of those thresholds which people are concrete evidence of G8 commitment or OECD

commitment and, vice-versa, they were looking forcarefully waiting to be crossed. There again we seediVerences within NePAD as to how readily the progress on peer review mechanisms, but at the

moment there is this kind of dancing around butindividual member countries are prepared to sign upto that sort of thing. It comes back to this earlier nobody is prepared to take the first step and say,

“We are going forward.”diYculty which many governments have, aboutbeing seen publicly and especially now through somekind of formally instituted African mechanism to be Q41 Mr Chidgey: Very specifically then, are you

saying you do not agree with the principle that G8rebuking and reprimanding other countries. I thinkthe one glimmer of hope is that they would probably support should be withheld until improvement in

good governance can be demonstrated?prefer to do it in that more specifically African-centred forum than either the Commonwealth or the Professor Barber: I think in South Africa there is

evidence of good governance; enough to encourageUN, which is a kind of north-south global forumwhere the pressure to stand united might be even us.stronger.Professor Barber: All I would add is that the Q42 Mr Chidgey: Enough to unlock the support

from G8?American view since Bill Clinton’s time has been toemphasise private enterprise not aid. They have been Professor Barber: Yes.

Professor Simon:And in a growing number of otherpushing that very hard.Professor Simon: And the principal beneficiaries of countries. Certainly some support up-front with

caveats as a reserve position, but crucially being seenthe African Growth and Opportunity Act in the firstyear or two of its operation have been only two or to be willing to commit some resources and move

forward on that basis and not stand back.three countries—South Africa, Nigeria and to alesser extent Kenya—which again reflects minerals Professor Barber: Yes, I agree.

Chairman: A perfect note on which to end.and mineral-based manufacture.Gentlemen, you have been most helpful to theCommittee. I call this first session to an end and weQ38 Mr Chidgey: On this Peer Review Mechanism,

you will be aware that President AbdoulayeWade of will begin in ten minutes’ time with the nextwitnesses and Mr Illsley will begin.Senegal was recently reported as calling into

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 17

Written evidence submitted by Action for Southern Africa

1. Summary

1.1 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) is the successor to the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK.Since 1994, ACTSA has been challenging decision-makers in the UK and Europe to support peace,democracy and development across Southern Africa (as defined by membership of SADC—the SouthernAfrican Development Community).

1.2 ACTSA is a campaigning organisation with a membership of roughly 3000 individuals and 250aYliated organisations—trade unions, church groups, local ACTSA groups, and others. Our membershipis based in the UK and most of our funding comes from membership fees, aYliate fees and donations.

1.3 ACTSAworks in solidarity with the governments and people of the region to raise awareness of theirperspectives, needs and priorities. Our main focus is on educating and mobilising the British public, and onlobbying the British government and the EU to secure progressive policies towards the region.

1.4 ACTSA’s work builds on its close ties with South Africa’s liberation movement. We have alsodeveloped close relationships with mass-based movements emerging to tackle South Africa’s newchallenges.We believe that, wherever possible, the people of the region should directly represent themselves,and have organised for delegations of South African representatives, including government ministers,regional premiers, MPs, trade negotiators, representatives from Jubilee South Africa, South AfricanChurches, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and various of its aYliate unions, theTreatment Action Campaign (TAC) and community groups aVected by UK owned asbestos mines, to:

— address public meetings;

— brief the media;

— lobby parliamentarians, ministers and oYcials representing the FCO, DTI and DfID in the UK,the EU and the Commonwealth; and

— build relations with civil society groups in the UK, including churches, trade unions and NGOs.

1.5 ACTSA’s campaigns include: lobbying for fairer trade deals between Southern Africa and Europe;calling for the cancellation of apartheid-caused debt; campaigning for greater international commitment tothe war on AIDS; and building support for peace and democracy in countries including Angola andZimbabwe.

1.6 ACTSA welcomes the Foreign AVairs Select Committee’s decision to carry out an inquiry into UKforeign policy towards South Africa. We would like to submit, for the Committee’s consideration, thefollowing comments. These comments do not purport to represent the views of the above-mentioned SouthAfrican organisations, although they are informed by ACTSA’s relationships with them. We wouldencourage the committee to seek submissions of evidence directly from South African governmental,political, civil society and academic sources. We would be happy to advise on potential sources ofinformation and witnesses for the committee’s investigation.

1.7 This submission:

— Provides a brief sketch of political and economic progress as South Africa approaches its firstdecade of freedom (Section 2);

— Considers the role of international actors in shaping and constraining the choices open to the newlyfree SouthAfrica as it seeks to overcome the legacy of apartheid, including through theEU’s Tradeand Development Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, (Section 3);

— Reflects briefly on South Africa’s response to this international environment, and its foreignpolicy, including South Africa’s approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe (Section 4) and its promotionof a new partnership between Africa and the rich world (Section 5);

— Asks whether the UK has a diplomatic or political strategy towards South Africa, and what thatmight involve, (Section 6);

— Looks in some depth at the UK’s response to calls for a new partnership between Africa and therich world, and at the G8’s “Africa Action Plan”, (Section 7) focusing on what the UK should doto promote a more just global trade regime (Section 8), achieve debt cancellation (Section 9), de-link aid from structural adjustment conditions (Section 10) and meet the challenge of the AIDSpandemic (Section 11); and

— Concludes that if, as the FCO claims, NEPAD is a “key plank of the foreign policy of Tony Blair’sGovernment,”1 that policy and government have failed decisively. We propose a number of policyrecommendations to the FCO that we hope the Foreign AVairs Committee will support(Section 12).

1 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003.

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Ev 18 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

2. South Africa’s First Decade of Freedom

2.1 The South African people fought a long and bitter battle for the sovereign right to mandate their ownpolitical authorities, to shape their own futures and for a fair share in the wealth generated by the country’sfarms, industries and resources.

2.2 During apartheid, racism and inequality were enshrined in law and aVected every aspect of life. BlackSouth Africans could not vote, own land or property outside certain designated areas, could only work incertain areas and in certain jobs, and could not marry outside their racial group. State institutions—thepolice, army and public administration—were geared towards the protection of white privilege at all costs.

2.3 Since 1994, South Africa has been grappling with the daunting task of unravelling institutionalisedracism in every sphere of society. The greatest single tribute to the success of that struggle is the fact thatSouth Africa is one of the most democratic countries in the world. Democratic in the formal sense, with afree and fair electoral system, an independent judiciary, a free press and one of the most progressiveconstitutions in the world. But democratic also in the sense that millions of people, in their communities andworkplaces, are actively engaged in grassroots political activity, mobilising, educating, protesting,sometimes denouncing, and certainly influencing the government, the rich and the powerful. South Africa’sthree trade union federations between them claim almost 3 millionmembers. SouthAfrica’s streets are oftenwitness to the mobilising capacities of a diverse range of social movements—against debt, privatisation,evictions and war, and for worker’s rights, a basic income grant, land redistribution and the free publicprovision of electricity, water, housing and healthcare.

2.4 As a result of the power and diversity of these and other social movements, major political decisionsin South Africa are subject to heated public contest and negotiation. For example the recent announcementof a national AIDS treatment plan comes after many years of bitter struggle, led by groups representingpeople living with AIDS, supported by the trade unions and a wide-ranging political coalition. TAC and itssupporters piled pressure on their Government, using every democratic tool in the box. They mobilised andeducated communities across the country, targeted themedia, established their constitutional rights throughthe courts, exercised their rights to civil disobedience, and engaged with and influenced the local structuresof the ANC. In the end, a majority cabinet decision over-ruled well-documented resistance to the plan. Weshould welcome this development and act to support the implementation of the plan.

2.5 Sceptics have discussed the ongoing struggle between factions within the ruling “tripartite alliance”as if the contradictions within the alliance represent a weakness of SouthAfrica’s political system. However,it could equally be argued that the alliance itself, between the African National Congress (ANC), the SouthAfrican Communist Party (SACP) and the countries biggest trade union federation, COSATU, and thedissent and open debate that it generates, tolerates and mediates, represent an almost unique, andtriumphant, expression of democracy.

2.6 South Africa’s National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) also provides aninnovative statutory forum within which government, business, union and community representativesengage in a form of social dialogue. Although this process has its weaknesses and will not always deliverconcrete results, NEDLAC has played a role in negotiations over the recent Growth and DevelopmentSummit (GDS), which debated the Government’s controversial privatisation strategy, and in discussionsover the national AIDS treatment plan.

2.7 Despite the incredible political achievements of the new South Africa, the comparable economic“miracle” that many dreamed of, has not been fully realised. Since 1994 there have been many advances forSouthAfrica’s poormajority. InNovember 2002, Statistics SouthAfrica released amajor report comparinghousehold earnings and spending for October 1995 and October 2000.2 The report finds that Governmentled social investments and programmes have delivered amajor expansion in free or subsidised basic services,including health care and schooling. The proportion of people with access to clean water climbed from 79%to 83%. Those with access to electricity for lighting rose from 64% to 72%. Those with access to telephonesrose from 29% to 35%. People living in formal housing rose from 66% to 73%. Further gains have followedsince 2000.

2.8 However, in each of these areas, significant percentages of the population still do not have access tothe essentials of a dignified life. Furthermore, ordinary workers and poor communities face an ongoingeconomic crisis. Unemployment is approaching 40%. One million formal sector jobs have been lost in fiveyears; work has been casualised and informalised.

2.9 The Statistics SouthAfrica report finds that, in terms of income, the average SouthAfrican householdbecame significantly poorer between 1995 and 2000. The poorer half of South African households slippedbackwards in these five years relative to the richer half, andwhile the averageAfrican household experienceda 19% fall in income over the period, the average white household experienced a 15% increase. The reportalso found that operating profits exceed the entire wage bill going to labour as a proportion of GDP.

2 Statistics South Africa, “Earnings and spending in South Africa: Selected findings and comparisons from the income andexpenditure surveys of October 1995 and October 2000”, November 2002.

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 19

2.10 These dry statistics do little to bring to life the desperate situation in which millions of SouthAfricans continue to subsist. However, the social tensions that they inevitably generate are everywhere tobe seen in the world’s second most unequal country. While wealth and land remain heavily concentrated inthe hands of a minority, factory workers, miners, farm labourers, rural and urban communities, facingrampant unemployment and a massive AIDS crisis, struggle to support themselves and their families. As inmost poor countries, poverty in South Africa disproportionately aVects women, children, the elderly andthe disabled.

2.11 Whilst few underestimate the enormous challenge of overcoming the legacy of apartheid, it isunsurprising that South Africans continue to debate the wisdom of government policies to do so. Forexample, trade unions have argued that most progress has been made in those areas where the Governmenthas pursued policies explicitly condemned by the neo-liberal economic model. These include: themaintenance of parastatal companies with clear development mandates, such as electricity andtelecommunications; freely provided services such as water and electricity, and active social subsidies, suchas housing policy.

2.12 Critics add that, in many areas, progressive advances in social services have been undermined bypolicies more attuned to international pressures for “labour market flexibility”, and “liberalisation”—shorthand for low-wage, insecure work, and privatisation of state monopoly companies. For example, guided byits public sector developmental mandate, and assisted by its temporary fixed line monopoly, Telkom hasbuilt 2.67 million new telephone lines, many to poor communities. However, over two million of those lineshave been cut-oV because the poor communities to which they had been delivered could not pay for theservice. This was related both to the income poverty of the general population, and to pressures on Telkomto reduce international call prices (the niche market most likely to face competition under a plannedprivatisation package), a policy that has been balanced by hiking call prices in the domestic market.

2.13 The Government recently responded to fierce criticism of their privatisation policies by conveningthe Growth and Development Summit. The summit saw some shift away from an economic developmentstrategy premised on privatisation, liberalisation and attraction of FDI as the principal drivers of growth,and an increased focus on the mobilisation of domestic resources. It also announced increased investmentin infrastructure, expanded public works programmes and the building of co-operatives. As PresidentMbeki put it, “It is sometimes argued that higher rates of economic growth, of 6% and above, would, ontheir own, lead to the reduction of the levels of unemployment in our country. This is part of a propositionabout an automatic so-called trickle-down eVect . . .None of this is true. . . To get to this point will requiresustained government intervention.”3

3. International Pressures and Constraints

3.1 Whatever one thinks of the economic, social and foreign policies being pursued by the South AfricanGovernment, it is clear that they are the subject of a legitimate process of democratic debate within thecountry. However, it is similarly clear that this process is subject to a range of illegitimate pressures andconstraints. These pressures are similar to those imposed on all theoretically sovereign African countries bythe international economic system and the institutions tasked with running that system—including theWorld Bank, IMF andWTO. Theymilitate not only against the “sustained government intervention” in theeconomy advocated by PresidentMbeki, but also, by eliminating alternative economic and political models,against democratic decision making. Both the international economic system and these institutions aresignificantly influenced by UK government policy, and by the EU.

3.2 South Africans have been extremely closely attuned to these dangers since before the transition todemocracy. The ANC’s “Reconstruction and Development Programme” (RDP) of 1994, reads,“Relationships with international financial institutions (IFIs) such as theWorld Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund must be conducted in such a way as protect the integrity of domestic policy formulationand promote the interests of the South African population.”4 However, the IFIs themselves have also beenwell aware of South Africa’s riches, and have been extremely keen to influence the country’s developmentstrategy to secure maximum openness to international financial flows and investors. From the mid-1990s,IFI “reconnaissance missions” made regular visits to South Africa, seeking to influence decision-makersand policy.

3.3 And indeed, the IFIs have many reasons to be pleased with the progress of their agenda in SouthAfrica. Corporate taxes have dropped from 48% to 30% from 1994 to 1999, while import tariVs have alsodropped, as have controls on capital flight.5 This integration into the global economy has deliveredsignificant international investment in the South African economy. However, it has also led to much greatervulnerability to unpredictable trade, investment and financial flows. In 2000, President Mbeki noted, “The

3 Mbeki, T, Bold steps to end the “two nations” divide, ANC Today, 22 August 2003.4 African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme, Johannesburg, Umanyano Publications,Section 6.5.16, 1994.

5 Bond, P, “Against Global Apartheid”, UCT Press, South Africa, 2003, pp vii. Particularly significant was the abolition, inMarch 1995 of the “financial rand” exchange mechanism, which acted as a tax on financial outflows.

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globalisation of the economy, resulting from among other things rapid movements of huge volumes ofcapital across the globe, objectively also has the eVect of limiting the possibility of states to take unilateraldecisions.”6

3.4 South Africa’s new vulnerability, and resulting economic instability, was exposed particularly cruellyby the currency crash of February 1996 (emanating from a “sell” report from Zurich bankers who falselybelievedMandela to be ill). A direct result of the crash was the adoption by the government, under pressurefrom investors and the IFIs, of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in June 1996.The policy introduced a “homegrown” structural adjustment programme for South Africa, eVectivelyreplacing the RDP. In March 1998 a second crash hit the rand and in recent years the currency hasexperienced continuing instability.

3.5 At the same time, it must be recognised that South Africa has remained considerably moreindependent of the international financial institutions than any other sub-Saharan African state. Makingsure that it remains that way requires international policies that allow South Africa to avoid the slope todependence on heavily conditioned aid and trade deals down which so many other African countrieshave slipped.

3.6 A major opportunity for European countries to support South African eVorts to establish itseconomic independence was provided by negotiations, concluded in 1999, for the Trade, Development andCo-operation Agreement (TDCA). Europe is South Africa’s main trading partner, with around 40% ofSouthAfrica’s exports sold to European countries, so this deal was of enormous significance. The EuropeanCouncil described the agreement as “a symbol of the strong links of friendship and solidarity between thepeople of Europe and Southern Africa.”

3.7 The deal contained a number of welcome elements, including the elimination of tariVs on most ofSouth Africa’s industrial goods, special protection for sectors South Africa considers sensitive, and EUsupport for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries who are suVering serious adjustmentcosts as a result of the deal. However, the process of negotiations, and the final agreement, far frommeetingthe promises made to South Africa at the end of apartheid, illustrated the self-interest and aggressivepromotion of narrow interests that dominate the EU’s trade negotiating process and agenda.

— In 1995, the EU refused South Africa’s request to negotiate trade relations alongside the 71African, Caribbean and Pacific countries with which the EU negotiated under the LomeConvention (nowCotonouAgreement). The EU insisted that SouthAfrica negotiate a Free TradeArea. Such bilateral deals, negotiated between partners of unequal strength, rarely deliversignificant development benefits. By splitting South Africa oV from the wider Southern Africanregion, in which it is already significantly integrated economically, the deal has also increasedtensions between South Africa and her poorer neighbours.

— South Africa also wanted to include European commitments to reform the Common AgriculturalPolicy as part of the agreement. The EU refused to negotiate on this issue. The refusal of the EUto negotiate an end to the CAP continues to poison trade discussions in the WTO and under theCotonou Agreement.

— The negotiations promised to improve access to Europeanmarkets for South Africa’s agriculturalproducts. However, Europe insisted that certain products be put on an “exclusion list”, meaningthey would not be discussed, and South African goods would continue to face the high tariVbarriers that were a legacy of the apartheid era, and are higher than those paid on goods enteringEurope from more wealthy middle-income countries.

— Other diYcult issues during the talks included the insistence, mainly by Spain, on linking the dealto a separate agreement on fisheries. In the final stages the most contentious issue was theappellation of South African port and sherry.

3.8 It is markedly diYcult to dis-aggregate the impacts of any particular trade deal on growth anddevelopment. However, the EU has claims that the TDCAhelped stimulate a 50% increase in SouthAfricanexports to the EU since 1999. However, factoring in movements in commodity prices and exchange ratefluctuations tells a diVerent story. For example, the price of platinum, which accounts for 7% of SA exportsto the EU, has gone up 40% in the last 2 years. Secondly, most of South Africa’s major exports aredenominated in dollars. Between 1999 and the end of 2001, the value of the Euro against the dollar fell 24%,generating an automatic increase in the Euro value of South African exports. A realistic assessment of theTDCA requires moving beyond headline figures to look at the impact of the deal on the restructuring ofproduction. The questions we should be asking are: does “free trade” enable SouthAfrican industries to addmore value to products locally, create employment, and move away from dependence on decliningcommodities towards new products with higher demand growth and higher price trends? Only by achievingthis can we expect to transform the basis of South Africa’s integration into the world economy, and thustackle poverty and promote sustainable development.7 Finally, despite some compensation, the Southern

6 Mbeki, T. (2000), “Keynote Address to the ANC National General Council”, Port Elizabeth, 12 July, quoted in Bond, P,“Against Global Apartheid”, UCT Press, South Africa, 2003, pp vii.

7 See paper by Paul Goodison, ERO, to ACTSA conference, “The Cotonou Trade Negotiations: Building European Solidarityfor Southern Africa”, October 2002, ACP House, Brussels. www.actsa.org/shop

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African Customs Union (SACU) countries have suVered severe losses of customs revenue under the deal.For Swaziland the customs duties collected from European imports and shared out between the customsunion members accounts for up to 40% of government revenue.

4. South Africa in theWorld—Diplomatic Policies, Including Towards Zimbabwe

4.1 South Africa has recognised that one African country cannot tackle a hostile international contextalone. South Africa has thus sought to engage with the diplomatic challenges of its region and to strengtheninstitutions and agendas capable of facing the rich world in a united manner.

4.2 South Africa has engaged energetically with the multilateral system since the isolation of theapartheid years, re-entering the Commonwealth in 1994, taking over the Chair of the Non-AlignedMovement in 1998, and playing a prominent role in both the Organisation for African Unity, the AfricanUnion and the Southern African Development Community. South Africa has also played an activediplomatic role in African conflicts, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

4.3 However, South Africa’s policy on the crisis in Zimbabwe has been extremely controversial. ManyBritish MPs have argued that South Africa bears the heaviest responsibility for a solution to theZimbabwean crisis, and appear to expect Zimbabwe’s neighbour to adopt draconian tactics—fromswitching oV the power supply, imposing widespread economic sanctions, or even sending in troops—totackle the regime. We believe that all of these options are both unrealistic and would prove counter-productive in the struggle for peace, economic recovery and democracy to Zimbabwe. If the Foreign AVairsCommittee wish, through this enquiry, to contribute to this struggle, they will need to approach this issuewith caution.

4.4 In order to understand, and to engage constructively with South Africa, the UK Government willrequire a sensitive understanding of the debate on Zimbabwe within Africa, and much of the rest of thedeveloping world, where Mugabe’s rhetorical stand against the imperialistic west is frequently applauded.It is also important to understand the historical roots of the crisis—and the responsibilities and lessons forfuture policy which this history implies. ACTSA’s May 2002 submission to this Committee’s ongoingenquiry into UK Foreign Policy on Zimbabwe goes into significant detail on this issue.8 However, here wedraw out just four key issues that should be considered.

4.5 Firstly, the overthrow of white minority rule in Rhodesia was not only a victory for the Zimbabweanliberation movements, but a critical turning point in the other struggles in the region. Up to 80,000Zimbabweans died in the fight for freedom. Independent Zimbabwe’s continuing solidarity with thestruggles in South Africa andNamibia cost it dear in more lives and economic hardship. This history standsin stark contrast to many of the western nations who stood by or actively supported the apartheid regime,and cast a heavy shadow over international attempts to promote democracy and human rights.

4.6 Secondly, from 1987, Zimbabwe’s donors, led by theUKandUS, used independent Zimbabwe’s debtcrisis and aid dependency to pressure for economic liberalisation. The subsequent process of adjustment andrecession imposed on Zimbabwe reversed post-independence social and economic gains, and sowed theseeds of the current political crisis.

4.7 Thirdly, while land is only one element of Zimbabwe’s complex crisis, it lies in some ways at the rootof the problem. As the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition recently noted, an equitable land reform processcontinues to be “stuck between the British dodging of its commitments, government’s lack of transparency,the commercial farmers” blinkered view of the issue, and a large but voiceless majority in favour ofredressing the ills of the past.”

4.8 Finally, it must be recognised that South Africa’s size, wealth and diplomatic strength concern manyAfrican countries, including Zimbabwe. South African diplomatic eVorts are constrained by suspicion of apotential regional hegemonic power.

4.9 As a result, ACTSA believes that UK should adopt the following principles in its engagement withthe Zimbabwean crisis, and thus in its dialogue with South Africa on these issues:

— Respect the need for a negotiated solution to the crisis that results froman internal political processreflecting the needs and perspectives of Zimbabwean people.

— Recognise the deep suspicions within the region towards British motives in Zimbabwe, resultingfrom its colonial legacy and its continuing economic stake in theminority white domination of keyparts of the economy.

— Recognise that a solution to the crisis will not be achieved through Euro-American pressure, orindeed through bilateral South African interventions, and that regional actors and multilateralbodies must lead international engagement with Zimbabwe.

8 ACTSA, Zimbabwe: Evidence for the Foreign AVairs Select Committee, 2002.www.parliament.uk/parliamentary—committees/foreign—aVairs—committee.cfm

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— Recognise that inequality and underdevelopment, for which international actors bear a significantresponsibility, must be addressed if a lasting solution is to be found. Future economic support forequitable land reform, reconstruction and development should be provided without attaching thekind of strict economic conditions that have contributed to Zimbabwe’s economic collapse andpolitical crisis.

4.10 In recognition of these realities, South Africa has opted for what it describes as “quiet diplomacy”throughout Zimbabwe’s current crisis. Happily, British ministers have also broadly recognised theserealities, and have generally respected the fact that careless rhetoric can have damaging diplomatic andpolitical outcomes. Ministers have also recognised the importance of taking a multilateral approach todealing with Zimbabwe. The Foreign Secretary stated in May 2003, “I welcome the eVorts of South Africato deal with the problems of Zimbabwe. Last week’s visit to Harare by Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo andMuluzi was an important event. Like those Heads of State, we want to see resumption of dialogue betweenZANU-PF and the opposition; an end to intimidation and violence; a tackling of the major issues inZimbabwe of governance, human rights and the rule of law; and a path back to a democratically elected andaccountable government, pursuing policies that benefit all the people of Zimbabwe. We will work withSouth Africa and the region to achieve this.”9

4.11 Whilst ACTSA is broadly supportive of these lines, neither South Africa nor the UK have alwaysgot it right on Zimbabwe.

4.12 South Africa has not always been consistent or balanced in its quiet diplomacy (keepingdisappointingly silent on human rights violations while oVering loud support for land redistribution). Whatis needed from both South Africa and the UK is more consistent diplomacy that is even-handed andbalanced. South Africa is in a unique position to play the role of a trusted facilitator in negotiations, andto supportmore active engagement by SADC, the AUand other African actors. To play this role eVectively,South Africa needs to acknowledge that the crisis is multifaceted, and is not just about land. South Africashould then promote dialogue and negotiations without preconditions or preconceived notions of the bestsolution, and in the firm belief that it is Zimbabweans who will need to lead and design the way forward.

4.13 ACTSA believes that the UK should do all it can to avoid a bilateral exchange with Zimbabwe—such exchanges play into Mugabe’s characterisation of the country’s deep crisis as resulting solely from aspat with Britain. Just as South Africa needs to regionalise its response to Zimbabwe, the UK needs tocontinue working internationally, including through the Commonwealth. Despite domestic pressures formegaphone diplomacy, this should be done quietly, not through the media. Where pride, a sense of moralsuperiority or defence of perceived British interests in Zimbabwe have been allowed to influence policy andpresentation, damaging mistakes have been made, splitting international organisations. The UK mustexplicitly and publicly refuse to increase diplomatic pressure on African mediators by threatening Westernsupport for Africa, through NEPAD or any other mechanism. Similarly, it would be self-defeating forBritain to put pressure on South Africa to resolve the issue. In order to retain influence within Africanforums, South Africa cannot be seen to be heeding such pressure, and in any case does not agree with aninterventionist approach.

4.14 Finally, and crucially, the UK must recognise its historic contribution to the crisis and announce agenuine and significant package to support land reform and unconditional support for reconstruction. Thiswould strengthen the UK’s credibility with African mediators.

5. South Africa’s Response to the International Context—Economic Policies

5.1 Beyond the immediate Southern African context, the South African government has also recognisedthat SouthAfrica will not flourish unless it plays a part in revolutionising patterns of international economicrelations that have disempowered the African continent. In August 2003, South African President ThaboMbeki wrote passionately of his concerns about the ability of African governments and people to developand pursue their own political and economic projects. He argued that following the vibrant political andcivil debate that emerged at the end of the colonial period, “It seems to have happened that the Africanperiod during which the hundred flowers bloomed came to an end. The contending voices representing thehundred schools of thought fell silent. . . So dependent did we become on foreign donors that we felt obligedto proclaim as loudly as we could, the messages, the words and phrases the donors needed to hear, so thatthey could approve oYcial development assistance for the following year. And so we studied the textbooksand the manuals, to understand what the benefactors wanted of us. . . we end up as the voice that givespopular legitimacy to decisions we neither made, nor intended to make, which our “friends” made for us. . .The matter in contention is—who will set the national and continental agenda!”10

5.2 At least rhetorically, British politicians accept the power of this challenge. Speaking in South Africa,Baroness Amos recently argued, “At the heart of our foreign policy, therefore, is co-operation, notcolonialism. . . Colonialism is about the imposition of values by force, the exploitation of resources by force,

9 Jack Straw, South Africa is making a diVerence for good in the world, May 2003.10 Mbeki, T, “Letter from the President: A hundred flowers under the African sun”, ANC Today, Volume 3, No. 30.1–7 August 2003.

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the domination of one race by another. Those days are gone.”11 Whether or not we accept that “those daysare gone”, Baroness Amos” statement also begs a question: does the absence of force in relations betweencountries imply that values are not being imposed, that sovereignty is respected, that there is an absence ofcoercion?

5.3 As President Mbeki suggests, the imposition of values continues not only by force, but througheconomic coercion. In particular, the imposition of conditions on aid and debt relief, and unfairly negotiatedtrade rules, narrow the policy space available to African governments. And “capacity building”programmes for governmental and non-governmental actors can be designed to generate consent, evenactive support for Northern agendas. This is also a critique that the UK Government seeks to pre-empt. InJanuary 2002, Baroness Amos described the objectives of the Africa Action Plan thus, “We want to addressthe policy constraints that inhibit Africa’s development. This means taking concrete measures in the areasof trade and investment, aid and debt.”12 This is an agenda that ACTSA fully supports. However, it is farfrom clear that it either reflects the Africa Action Plan or UK policy. The question that we believe thecommittee should seek to answer is whether these laudable objectives are reflected inUKGovernment policyand practice in relation to both South Africa and NEPAD. We now move on to examine these questionsin turn.

6. UK Strategy Towards South Africa

6.1 Naturally, this committee’s principle concern is with FCO policy and practice. However, we believethat eVective engagement with South Africa implies that the FCO will need to develop pro-active policiesacross awide range of issues, including investment, trade, aid and debt. FCOwill also need to promote cross-departmental coherence with DfID, DTI, the Treasury, No 10 and in some cases, DEFRA. This sectiontalks to these diverse agendas.

6.2 TheUK is the single largest source of both tourism and foreign investment into SouthAfrica. 750,000UK citizens are also resident in South Africa. The UK imports 7.6% of South Africa’s exports and UKexports make up almost 10% of South Africa’s incoming goods. Relations between our countries are bothclose and historic.

6.3 British investment is thus very important to South Africa, particularly in two key sectors: tourismand mining. Tourism is a fast growing industry, contributing to the South African economy through jobcreation, foreign exchange earnings and infrastructure development. It is estimated that, for every 8 touristswho visit South Africa, one new job is created. However, although British tourism to South Africa isbooming, much of the money spent by British travellers to the region never reaches the South Africaneconomy. It is British tour operators, airlines andmultinational hotel chains that benefit themost withmuchof the holiday money “leaking” out of South Africa. Because of the type of holidays that they go on, Britishvisitors contribute less per day to the local economy than visitors from other European countries, and onlyhalf that contributed by visitors from other parts of Africa.

6.4 While investment in tourism and mining has created employment, many British companies paypoverty wages, adopt the lowest possible health and safety standards, and do little to promote blackempowerment, training and education. Themining industry in particular is notorious for its lax employmentconditions. ACTSA recently campaigned in support of a legal battle that eventually forced British companyCape plc to pay compensation to South African workers dying from asbestos-related diseases. As ArchiePalane of the South African National Union of Mineworkers told ACTSA, “Too many multinationalcompanies neglect the health and safety of their workers in the raw pursuit of profits. This case should oVera valuable lesson to those companies who continue this form of exploitation.”

6.5 British investment has real potential to contribute towards SouthAfrican development. However, theSouth African Truth and Reconciliation Commission“s final report called for business to do more toovercome the legacy of apartheid. UK policy appears at the moment so concerned with the “rights” and“opportunities” available to British capital that the rights and opportunities of South African people areignored.

— The Government should encourage economically beneficial and socially and environmentallyresponsible investment by British companies in South Africa. Furthermore, as global leaders,British companies investing in South Africa can and should do more than the legal minimum tocontribute to addressing the legacies of apartheid and building a more equal South Africa.

— The UK Government should encourage British companies that profited from apartheid, andensured that it lived longer than it would otherwise have done, to acknowledge their historicresponsibilities and contribute towards community reparation funds.

6.6 Nonetheless, a reading of key policy documents of various UK government departments withresponsibility for relations with South Africa does not give any clear sense of how the governmentunderstands its strategic objectives for the relationship.

11 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003.12 Baroness Amos, Speech the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, 30 January 2002.

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6.7 One does not have to read very far beneath the headlines of the Foreign OYce website’s descriptionof UK relations with South Africa to understand that the FCO understands its strategic objectives in SouthAfrica primarily in terms of the corporate interests of UK multinational companies. The FCO expressesconsiderable concern about the generation of “economic opportunities” through the promotion of anaggressive privatisation strategy, and maximum economic openness towards European investors. TheForeign OYce shows some awareness of the highly political nature of its agenda, commenting, “PoliticaldiYculties in pushing privatisation forward have been reflected mainly through the left-leaning and unionelements within the ANCGovernment, who are strongly opposed to handing control of state assets to whatis still a white dominated business sector. The ANC’s alliance partner, the Congress of South African TradeUnions (COSATU), has pledged to resist anymove on restructuring that theGovernment is likely tomake.”

6.8 Despite this, the FCO is happy to report, “There has been a strong emphasis in our activities on theopportunities likely to arise from the privatisation programme and the promotion of PPPs (Public PrivatePartnerships) in South Africa. These include amongst others the water, airports, ports, healthcare andrailways sectors. Other priority sectors include education & training, IT, and the automobile industry. Thefree trade provisions of the EU/South Africa Agreement came into force on 1 January 2000. The UK is thesecond largest European trader with South Africa (after Germany). The Agreement has already boostedSouth Africa’s prospects in Europe, and liberalisation towards free trade over the 12-year transition periodwill strengthen the UK’s commercial position in South Africa.”

6.9 In contrast, DfID claims that its £30 million annual budget in South Africa is focussed on povertyelimination. This objective, and certain elements of DfID’s new 5-year strategy, agreed in 2002, are to bewelcomed. This includes the commitment of up to 30% of DfID-SA’s budget to an AIDS programmedesigned to broaden and strengthen the responses of key South African institutions to AIDS, aimingtowards a reduction in the number of newHIV infections and of the impact of AIDS on individuals, familiesand communities.

6.10 ACTSA does not believe, as some have argued, that a “poverty focus” in aid programmingnecessarily implies reduced assistance to “middle-income countries” like South Africa. Rather, aid to SouthAfrica should be targeted at pockets of deep poverty. We also do not accept that aid to middle incomecountries, or anywhere else should focus on “policy influence”. There is a clear danger that doing so divertsfrom humanitarian objectives and towards the economic or strategic self-interest of donor states.

6.11 In this context, we are concerned that the single largest contract issued by DfID in its January 2003contracts round was worth £6,363,435 (the next largest was just over £1.3 million and no others topped the£1 million pound mark). The contract was issued to the Adam Smith Institute (International Division), to“Support Services for Public Enterprise Restructuring in South Africa”13. We believe that the committeewould be well advised to investigate this award more closely, and to question Ministers as to its value andcontribution to a South African led development strategy. This contract could do with being tested againstBaroness Amos’ claim that, “The days when the UK’s aid was supply driven are over. We no longer say—Britain will give you this because we think you need it.”14

7. UK Strategy Towards the African Continent

7.1 Prime Minister Tony Blair has provided eVusive backing for a “new partnership with Africa”. Theengagement of the G8 with this proposal, and the production of an “Action Plan on Africa”, represents anhistoric opportunity for the leaders of the world’s richest nations to turn their grand rhetoric into concretechange for poor people in Africa.

7.2 The crucial test for the G8, and thus for the UK, is whether they can deliver on their ownresponsibilities, rather than blaming Africa for its poverty. Any plan for “African development” mustredress the policies that create and sustain an unequal relationship between Africa and the G8. Otherwise,rather than ending the failed international supervision of African development, a “new partnership” risksbeing used as yet another form of conditionality, shaping African societies and economies for the benefit ofthe G8, instead of Africans.

7.3 The G8’s Action Plan on Africa is their response to the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development”(NEPAD), an initiative by African leaders, headed by the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria,Egypt and Senegal. NEPAD is a “call to the rest of the world to partner Africa in her own development onthe basis of her own agenda and programme of action”. 15

7.4 Africa has paid a high price for the imbalances of its relationship with the rich world. The continenthas become a laboratory for a series of social, economic and political experiments, directed by internationalinstitutions. These experiments are widely recognised to have failed. Africa has lost out in the globalisationprocess. International negotiations have established unfair rules for trade and international institutionshave enforced inappropriate policies on African countries. Africa’s dependence on international aid hasenabled rich country donors to force on African governments economic policies that have reflected the

13 From “contracts” section of DfID website (www.dfid.gov.uk), accessed 25 Sept 2003.14 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003.15 NEPAD, October 2001 www.nepad.org

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interests of the rich world and their multinational companies rather than the interests of Africa’s people.These policies have contributed to economic collapse andmassive increases in poverty in Africa. By the year2000, average income in Africa was 10% below the level in 1980.16 48% of the continent’s population live inabsolute poverty.17 Sub-Saharan Africa is the home to two thirds of the people in the world living with HIV/AIDS, and because of AIDS, average life expectancy in Africa has been cut by 15 years, currently standingat just 47.18

7.5 The approach of blaming Africa for its problems, thereby ignoring its exploitation by the rich world,has been all too evident in the G8’s engagement so far. The G8 now need to recognise and address theirhistoric and contemporary contributions to underdevelopment, corruption, conflict and undemocraticpolitics. We believe that the UK should push the G8 to move beyond a generalised debate on governance,and hazy promises of aid, and to deliver concrete change to:

— Secure the benefits of trade for Africa;

— Make real progress on debt cancellation;

— End structural adjustment conditionality; and

— Kick start the war on AIDS.

As part of their response to NEPAD, the G8 should provide significant new aid funding for Africa.But NEPAD is too important to become yet another tool that is used to enforce the Washington consensuson Africa.

The UK should act bilaterally:

— to support the NEPAD process with substantially more funds,

— do so without adding yet more political or economic conditionality.

The UK should encourage other G8 states to follow its lead.

8. Securing the Benefits of Trade for Africa

8.1 From colonialism to the present time, Africa has been heavily involved in the global economy. Thecontinent’s plantations, farms and mines have exported raw materials (primary commodities) to the richcountries, where processed products are made and then sold back to Africa. This ensures that the richcountries receive the vast majority of the wealth generated by an international economic system that relieson African raw materials and low wage labour.

8.2 This system has been enforced by the IMF and the World Bank. They have encouraged Africancountries to focus on producing a narrow range of “cash crops” for export. Because they give the same “onesize fits all” advice to many countries, there has been a huge increase in the supply of commodities such astea, coVee and cocoa as well as minerals such as copper. When the supply goes up, the price goes down. Thesystem has ensured a steady supply of cheap products to the richNorth, but repeated declines in world pricesfor commodities have done huge damage to the aspirations which people had for development at the timeof independence. Africa generates nearly 30% more exports today than in 1980, yet their value has crashedby more than 40 percent.19 It is scarcely credible that these consequences were not predicted by institutionsthat are staVed mainly by economists.

8.3 African farmers have also been badly hurt by the subsidies which G8 countries pay to their farmers.These subsidies encourage G8 farmers to grow more food than is needed in their domestic markets. Theresulting surpluses, like the EU’s “butter mountain”, are then exported to Africa (dumped) at prices lowerthan those for locally produced food.20 The plight of African farmers forced oV their land by such unfaircompetition has been largely ignored in the slanging match between the US, the EU and Japan over whosesystem of subsidies is the worst. The value of agricultural subsidies by the OECD, the “rich countries club”,is greater than the entire GDP of sub-Saharan Africa.21

8.4 To add insult to injury, the G8 use international trade rules to encourage African nations to open uptheir markets, stopping them from defending themselves against dumping. African governments were wellaware of the limitations of exporting primary commodities and, at independence, many countries tried to“diversify” their economies by moving into manufacturing. To get oV the ground, new African industriesneeded protection against foreign imports, because of the disadvantages they had against international

16 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Performance, Prospects and Policy Issues, New York, 2001, pp 7www.unctad.org

17 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002.18 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, 2001.19 Quoted in Patrick Bond, “What is Pretoria Planning for Africa?”, Sangonet Newsletter 45, December 2001.20 FAO, Agriculture, Trade and Food Security, Volumes I and II, Rome, 2001.21 OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries: Monitoring and Evaluation, OECD, 2001.

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competitors in terms of transport, scale and lack of infrastructure. But the G8 countries’ insistence onmarket openness meant that African countries were unable to protect new industries. Rapid reductions intariVs and quotas decimated the new industries, leading to massive unemployment.22

8.5 Building a base of internationally competitive industries is essential for African nations. It is a long-term challenge that needs active government involvement. But the G8 are denying African countries therights to use policies that have been tried and tested both in East Asia and in the G8 countries themselves.There are few, if any, examples of countries that have developed simply by “getting the prices right”.

8.6 However, African governments are now facing more and more restrictions in their developmentoptions through IMF and World Bank conditions and WTO agreements.

These restrictions include:

— limiting the use of import barriers;

— prohibiting the use of conditions on investment (for example, requiring textile factories to buylocally grown cotton);23

— limiting the copying of products from overseas;24 and

— limiting the preferences that can be given to local industries over foreign multinationals.25

8.7 This list will get longer if the EU is successful in overcoming the opposition of African tradenegotiators to startWTOnegotiations on issues such as investment. African resistance to this agenda causedthe collapse of the 2003 WTOMinisterial in Cancun. If the multilateral trading system is to regain the trustof African negotiators, the EU must re-think its approach. The UK could play a pivotal role here, bringingEuropean trade negotiators back under the guidance of member states, and re-working their negotiatingmandate.

8.8 Meanwhile, the EU, and other rich nations are protecting their own companies from competitionfrom more eYcient African producers. Import barriers in the EU concentrate on agricultural produce suchas dairy products, vegetables, nuts, fruits, wheat and rice and on labour intensive industries, such as textiles,clothing and footwear. These are exactly the goods that African producers could export competitively.

The barriers which prevent them from doing so include:26

— high duties (“tariV barriers”) that raise the cost of exports from Africa and other developingcountries trying to enter the European market;

— quotas that control how much African produce can enter EU markets; and

— “non-tariV barriers” such as technical requirements or unnecessary product standards.

8.9 Shamefully, the structure of the EU’s trade barriers also inhibits Africa’s eVorts to industrialise anddiversify. Processing or manufacturing the food that African farmers grow within the region, the timberextracted and the minerals that are mined could provide a significant number of local jobs and foreignexchange earnings. Yet, tariV barriers on processed goods entering the EU countries are often higher thanon raw products. For example, the European tariVs on orange juice are much higher than those on oranges.Similarly, there are low tariVs on cocoa beans, high tariVs on partly processed cocoa butter and prohibitivetariVs on chocolate.

8.10 A recent report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development shows the way that African andother developing countries are marginalised in world trade through the combination of tariV escalation andthe domination of commodity industries by a small number of multinationals.27 Their bargaining powerensures that most of the profits are captured by the multinationals and the well paid, skilled jobs remain inthe rich nations.

8.11 The EU have repeatedly broken their commitments (such as those made under the last round oftrade negotiations—the Uruguay Round) to open up to agricultural imports from the developing world.One exception is the EU’s “Everything but Arms” initiative which provides duty free access to LeastDeveloped Countries, covering approximately 93% of their exports—and has been a useful step forward.However, the poorest countries are the least well placed to take advantage of such preferences. And manyother countries, like Zimbabwe and Namibia, that might be able to benefit, are not classified as “leastdeveloped”, and are thus excluded. The EU says that it cannot extend the Everything But Arms initiativeto all developing countries because it wants to stay within existing WTO rules. But such a scheme would behugely welcome, and forthcoming negotiations on regional integration agreements present an opportunityto change the WTO rules themselves. These are examples of concrete policy initiatives that the UK shouldseek to promote within both the WTO and the EU.

22 ShaVaeddin SM,The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Export andGDPGrowth in Least Developed Countries, UNCTADDiscussion Paper 85, Geneva, 1994; and BuYe E, Trade Policy in Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press.

23 WTO agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).24 WTO agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).25 Such as under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).26 See for example, ACTSA, Freedom to Grow: bringing down the barriers to Southern Africa’s trade with Europe, Action forSouthern Africa, London, Jan 2002, www.actsa.org/shop.htm

27 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2002, Geneva.

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8.12 The hollowness of rich country promises to reform their agricultural policies have been consistentlyrevealed by the lack of progress in reforming the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This is an area wherethe UK shares an agenda with development campaigners—but has so far failed to deliver concrete results.

8.13 The UK and the EU are already devoting considerable political energy to securing access to Africa’smarkets for their multinational companies. The range of institutions and policies used to promote thisagenda includes:

— the IMF and World Bank;

— the EU’s Cotonou Agreement;

— bilateral trade and investment treaties; and

— WTO negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and

— Proposed new WTO agreements on issues such as investment and government procurement.

8.14 NEPAD was conceived to challenge the logic of a system that has driven Africa into poverty. TheUK must resist the temptation to use the Action Plan for Africa as a means to make NEPAD into yetanother tool to achieve its market access aims.

8.15 The UK must recognise that trade rules are unfair to the poorest nations and must convince richcountries within the WTO to act unilaterally to redress the imbalances. They must ensure that their tradepolicies promote genuine development. Recent rounds of trade negotiations have been based on the refusalof the rich nations to make concessions unless developing countries agree to allow foreign companies moreaccess to their markets. The WTO must be reformed to give Africa an equal place at the negotiating tableand stop undermining Africa’s eVorts build a stronger regional bloc. The UK should energetically pursuean agenda in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations that:

— allowsAfrica to develop its ability to trade by protecting key sectors and promoting diversification;

— tackles the crisis in commodity prices;

— agrees an ambitious timetable to phase out subsidies that result in dumping of agriculturalproducts and subsidised over-fishing in Africa’s waters;

— ends tariV escalation that prevents Africa processing its raw materials; and

— removes the barriers that stop Africa selling to G8 markets.

9. Making Real Progress on Debt Cancellation

9.1 During the late 1980s, Africa’s inability to trade its way out of poverty led to a crisis of debt payments.The prospect of debt default presented a serious threat to the survival of high street banks and significantWall Street players. In response, the World Bank and IMF played a central role in supervising Africaneconomies to ensure that the debts were paid.

9.2 The costs were high to Africa’s people. Debt repayments are having a devastating impact on Africandevelopment. African countries are forced to spend almost $15 billion per year repaying debts to G8countries and the international financial institutions, crippling development programmes, health andeducation investments and eVorts to cope with the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis.

9.3 In many cases, the debts which African governments are repaying can be described as “odious” in thefirst place. According to international law if a loan is “used against the interests of the local populace” thenit is “odious” and need not be repaid. In 1973, the United Nations began to describe apartheid as a crimeagainst humanity. Nevertheless, the international financial community continued to make loans to SouthAfrica’s apartheid regime. The Archbishop of Cape Town has said that South Africa’s debt “should bedeclared odious and written oV”.

9.4 The apartheid regime not only oppressed its own people, but waged a full-scale war againstMozambique and Angola, made raids into all the neighbouring states, and imposed an economic blockadeon Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The suVering was immense. Faced with a suddenloss of income and the need to protect their people, the governments of the region borrowed heavily frominternational agencies like the IMF and the World Bank. Campaigners in Southern Africa have called forrecognition that this £28 billion of “apartheid caused debt” is illegitimate and should be written oVcompletely.28 A movement is now growing to call for reparations for the impact of loans to supportapartheid and corrupt regimes.

9.5 The tyranny of compound interest rates resulted in huge repayments on Africa’s debts. Sub-SaharanAfrica’s foreign debt rose fromUS$60 billion to US$206 billion between 1980 and 2001. Over the past threeyears, debt repayments by sub-Saharan African countries has been US$16 billion greater than incomingloans. 29

28 Action for Southern Africa , The debt of apartheid, ACTSA, London, May 1998.29 Quoted in Patrick Bond, “What is Pretoria Planning for Africa?”, Sangonet Newsletter 45, December 2001.

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9.6 The world-wide Jubilee movement emerged in response to this immense human crisis, and themobilisation of millions of people succeeded in focussing the minds of the G8 on debt. Unfortunately, theG8’s response to the debt crisis, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC), is woefullyinadequate and under-funded.

9.7 HIPC is based on the idea of writing oV that part of a country’s debt that the governments will neverbe able to aVord to pay oV. The macro-economic calculations involved fail to recognise either that manycountries have now paid back the original loan several times over, or the illegitimacy of much African debt.Many African campaigners therefore argue that it is not a question of “can’t pay, won’t pay”, but rather“don’t owe, won’t pay”.

9.8 Even if it was working,HIPCwould provide just enough debt reduction for African countries tomeettheir debt service payments, but no extra money for the poorest nations to invest in their people and theireconomy and to escape from the vicious cycle of debt and poverty.

9.9 But the World Bank and the IMF have acknowledged that the HIPC is failing, even according to itsown criteria:

— of the five countries that have passed Completion Point (i.e. the point where countries receive finaldebt stock cancellation), the debts of at least two will not be “sustainable”.

— 8-10 of the 21 other countries that have passed Decision Point (i.e. those that have qualified toenter the HIPC process and received initial reduction in their debt service payments) will not have“sustainable” levels of debt even after Completion Point. 30

9.10 The current “top-up” approach to the HIPC Trust Fund merely acts as a temporary measure forthose countries that have already failed the debt sustainability ratio. It is far below the level of relief neededfor the poorest countries to achieve sustained economic growth. And it is even further from the fullcancellation that many African campaigners demand and that is required to achieve the internationallyagreed Millennium Development Goals, such as halving the proportion of the world’s population living inabsolute poverty.31

9.11 The initiative for NEPAD emerged largely fromAfrican civil society demands for debt cancellation.In 1999 the OAU kicked oV the NEPAD process by tasking Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika toseek a renegotiation of the debt deadlock. In the eyes of African campaigners, the G8 will have failed if itdoes not deliver unconditional debt cancellation. The UK should represent these demands within the IFIsand the Paris Club meetings:

— endorsing the principle of full debt cancellation,

— providing a financing plan for its achievement.

10. Ending Structural Adjustment Conditions

10.1 Africa’s relationship to the rich world was transformed by the debt crisis. During the 1980s andmuch of the 1990s, the World Bank and IMF attached more and more strings to new loans, aid and debtrelief. These Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) assumed that liberalisation policies wouldstimulate economic growth, which would reduce poverty. Since publication of the UNICEF report,“Adjustment with a human face” in 1987, NGOs and researchers have revealed the high costs of structuraladjustment on the lives of African people.

10.2 UN agencies have also criticised SAPs and exposed the degree to which they have failed, evenaccording to their core criteria of promoting economic growth. The UN Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD) recently reported that “while structural adjustment programmes have beenapplied more intensively and frequently in Africa than in any other developing region, barely any Africancountry has exited from such programmes with success. . . This is true not only for countries which are saidto have slipped in implementation of stabilisation and adjustment programmes. . .but also most of the coreand good adjusters.”32

10.3 African governments have been forced to adopt these policies because they desperately need newloans—not least to pay back previous debts. The pressure to comply with structural adjustment policies isalso increased by the fact that the IMF has come to act as a “gatekeeper” for all international aid. All othermajor national aid donors, like USAID, the UK’s DfID and the EU look for the IMF’s “seal of approval”before providing assistance.

10.4 This conditionality has also led to the globalisation of African politics and has had a corrosiveimpact on democracy.33 Until very recently, new loans from theWorld Bank and IMF to African countrieswere negotiated under conditions of secrecy. The documents, which were devised and written in

30 HIPC Review 2002, World Bank.31 Jubilee Research and the Jubilee Debt Coalition “The Unbreakable Link—Debt Relief and the Millennium DevelopmentGoals” London, February 2002.

32 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Performance, Prospects and Policy Issues, New York, 2001, pp 5.33 World Development Movement, States of Unrest—Resistance to IMF Policies in Poor Countries, WDM London, 2000www.wdm.org/Cambriefs/Debt/unrest.pdf

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Washington, were rarely prepared in local languages, and have not normally been disclosed, let alonesubjected to parliamentary scrutiny or public debate. The hollowing out and globalisation of Africanpolitics has contributed to political decay in many countries. This lies at the root of much poor governancein Africa. The G8 would do well to remember this when berating Africans for their lack of attachment todemocracy.

10.5 Facing popular resistance to austerity policies imposed by the IMF, many African governmentshave resorted to authoritarian means to suppress civil society and trade union movements. Until veryrecentlyWestern donors congratulated these governments for showing the “political will” to impose policieswhich did massive harm to the poor. In the face of massive popular resistance to adjustment in poorcountries, the World Bank have argued that adjustment has failed, not because of they had misdiagnosedAfrica’s economic illness, but because the patient was refusing to swallow the medicine.

10.6 So in 1999, theWorld Bank and IMFannounced that SAPswould be replaced by PovertyReductionStrategy Papers (PRSPs). The new PRSP framework focuses on “building ownership” by giving developingcountry governments the initiative in designing programmes and insisting on the involvement of civil societyorganisations in the process. These reforms have been widely welcomed by some, including the UK, whichhas adopted the PRSP as the centre-piece of its development assistance strategy.

10.7 However, we believe that this enthusiasm for PRSPs is misplaced. The real choices that developingcountry governments are “allowed” to make remain constrained by orthodox prescriptions, with coremacroeconomic policies still mandated by the IMF. Some PRSPs had to go back and forth between theHIPC countries and the IMF/WB up to six times before they were to be finally approved. New-foundconcerns with “ownership” and “poverty” appear to have more to do with spin than delivery. 34

10.8 The internal governance of the IFIs is also an issue of significant concern. Within the World Bank,all sub-Saharan African countries are represented by just two directors, while eight rich countries enjoy adirector each and the US maintains veto power by holding more than 15% of the votes. The IMF/WB chiefexecutives are chosen from, respectively, the EU and US, with the US treasury secretary holding the powerof hiring and firing. South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel has argued, “We simply do not seemto have the right sort of institutions for eVectivemultilateral discussion and agreement between states.Whilethe BrettonWoods Institutions nominally operate by consensus, they are steered quite convincingly by theirmajor financial backers. This can have significant implications, for example, in deciding which countries theFund should assist when financial contagion breaks out in several regions at once. Another example, andone that is especially pertinent in Africa, is how conditionality is applied to adjustment loans to a countryhit by a decline in commodity prices.”35

10.9 The UK is a major shareholders in the IMF and the World Bank. The UK should publiclyacknowledge the failures of past conditions attached to aid and loans. They should argue and vote for:

— removal of the powers of veto of the IMF over economic policy;

— policies that ensure that future aid and loans support development priorities established throughinternal, democratic processes; and

— Proposals to rebalance voting shares and governance structures to ensure the accountability ofthese institutions to poor countries.

11. TheWar on AIDS

11.1 In the West medical care for people with HIV/AIDS is continually improving, but in Africa peopleare dying because they cannot aVord to invest in the healthcare or medicines that could save their lives.AIDS is spreading fast, with 3.4 million new infections in Sub-Saharan Africa in 200136, the equivalent ofan estimated 7,000 new infections per day in Zimbabwe alone.37

11.2 The crisis presents a fundamental challenge to the international community. In response, the richestcountries in the world agreed at their Group of Eight (G8)meeting in June 2001 to support TheGlobal Fundto Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria. The announcement raised high expectations that rich countrypoliticians were finally enlisting themselves in a “war on AIDS” of the scale needed to stop the disease in itstracks. Two years on, the Global Fund is up and running. It is the best vehicle we have to mobilise aconcerted global campaign against AIDS. And yet, while world leaders vie for the title of “Africa’s bestfriend”, the Global Fund has everything it needs—except the funds.

34 WorldDevelopmentMovement, Policies toRollback the State and Privatise,WDM, London, April 2001, www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/DEBT/PRSPcrit.htm

35 Manuel, T, Minister of Finance, Republic of South Africa, Globalisation, Income Distribution and the Role of the State,Comments delivered, 24 March 2003 in Geneva, to the ILO Commission on the Social Aspects of Globalisation.

36 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, 2001.37 “Estimated Worldwide HIV/Aids Infections: 47 002 057”, Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), May 31, 2002.

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11.3 The Global Fund has already delivered positive changes. It has mobilised significant new financialresources and funded high-quality proposals from developing countries. It has allocated over $1.5 billionover two years for innovative, life-saving projects. The Fund’s success has transformed expectations. AIDSactivists, doctors and community workers in rich and poor countries have started to talk confidently abouthumanity’s capacity to tackle the pandemic.

11.4 Nonetheless, rich countries, and the UK in particular, are now putting the Fund’s achievements injeopardy. The Global Fund is in financial crisis. President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania argues, “the realproblem is lack of political will among the rich countries and corporations. If they can spend over $300billion to subsidise agriculture . . . they can surely spare $10 billion for the Global Fund.”

11.5 The Global Fund needs to raise at least $2.5 billion in 2003, $3.8 billion in 2004, over $8 billion in2005, and almost $9 billion every year from then on. In order to raise these huge totals, each rich countrywill need to contribute a proportion consistent with their share of global wealth, as measured by its grossdomestic product.38 On this basis, the UK should provide 4.5% of these annual targets. Most rich countriesare nowhere near providing their fair share. HIV/AIDS operates as a vicious circle—the more people areinfected, the harder it becomes to provide treatment and to prevent future infections. As a result, the longerwe leave tackling the disease, the more it will cost to do so in the future. We need action now.

11.6 The fact that the Fund receives and responds to applications from recipient countries makes it hardto project how much money it will need. However, on the basis of the two rounds of applications processedso far, we can assume that the Global Fund will need to raise at least $2.5 billion in 2003, $3.8 billion in2004, and over $8 billion a year from then on.39

11.7 The current funding crisis presents a major moral challenge to all donors. If they do not secure thelong-term future of the Global Fund, people who have moved onto life-saving anti-retroviral treatmentswill have to come oV them again. This raises the spectre of drug-resistant strains of the virus emerging inaid-dependent countries that establish treatment regimes on the basis of aid flows, only to see the sameprogrammes dry up.

11.8 The injustice of the current situation is causing outrage around the world. Stephen Lewis, UN envoyfor HIV/AIDS in Africa, found on a recent trip to Southern Africa that, “it is impossible to overstate howstrongly people feel—from Cabinet Ministers to People Living With HIV/AIDS—that the Global Fund isthe best vehicle we have to finance the struggle against the pandemic. Every country yielded the samequestions:Whenwill themoney come?Does theGlobal Fund have enoughmoney?Why don’t governmentscontribute to it? What happens if it goes bankrupt?. . . It’s legitimate to ask: what’s wrong with this world?What’s wrong with the rich countries? Why are they willing to jeopardise the integrity of the most hopefulfinancial instrument we have to combat the cruellest disease the world has ever seen?”40

11.9 In January 2003, President Bush announced a new AIDS initiative, providing $15 billion over fiveyears, and signing a bill with the potential to increase the US contribution to the Global Fund to $1 billiona year. This funding is conditional upon theUS providing nomore than one third of theGlobal Fund’s totalfunds. In other words, the US has laid down a powerful challenge to the rest of the world, which mustcontribute at least $2 billion a year in order to release America’s full contribution.

11.10 In response, at the June 2003G8 Summit, French President Jacques Chirac, British PrimeMinisterTony Blair and European Commission President Romano Prodi have all said that they would like to seeEurope contributing $1billion to the Global Fund—to match the US funding. However, there isconsiderable disagreement as to where that money should come from. One potential source is unspentEuropean Commission aid money. However, the EU’s administrative procedures are complex, and thereare a number of other claims being made on the money—for projects on water, education and debt relief.This is also not “new”money, having already been earmarked for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

11.11 France has therefore suggested that the bulk of themoney should come from the Europeanmemberstates, and has provided an example for the rest to follow, tripling its contribution to the Global Fund to$177 million a year. This is more than four times the UK commitment, though the two countries have verysimilar sized economies. Italy and Germany have also made recent announcements of new funds.

11.12 In May, Britain’s new Minister for International Development, Baroness Valerie Amos,announced that the UKwas to contribute a further $80 million to theGlobal Fund. This money, if deliveredthis year, could havemade amassive diVerence.However, this “newmoney” (whichwill come out of existingaid budgets) will only be handed over to theGlobal Fund in two instalments of $40million in 2006 and 2007,and even then will represent a cut in the UK’s annual donations. In fact, by 2006, the UK should be aimingto providing ten times this amount.41 This dismal record brings into question the sincerity of Tony Blair’sleadership role in increasing European donations. TheUKseems to be relying on the EuropeanCommission

38 A table showing recommended pledges from the G8 to the Global Fund based on an equitable contributions framework isavailable from the aidspan website. www.aidspan.org

39 These figures have been generated largely from the Fund’s own spending projections. See “How Much Money Does theGlobal Fund Need? How Much Does it Have?” by Bernard Rivers, 24 March 2003 www.aidspan.org

40 Dollar equivalent figures are from the Global Fund website, as updated 30 June 2003. www.globalfundatm.org41 ACTSA, Funding the War on AIDS, May 2003, www.actsa.org

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to provide the bulk of new European money. However, if this does not happen, there is currently noindication that the UK is willing to increase its own contribution. In other words, the UK wants Europe tomatch America’s $1 billion, as long as it doesn’t have to pay for it.

11.13 Africa’s poor health infrastructure should not be used as an excuse to do less. The internationalcommunity can easily aVord to declare a comprehensive war on AIDS that includes investment inprevention, care and treatment.

— The UK should aim to ensure that the Fund receives at least $2,521 million in 2003.

— The UK should give at least an extra $72 million this year, at least a further $124 million in 2004,and $315 million in 2005.

— From 2006 theGlobal Fund needs to be raising almost $9 billion a year. TheUK should encouragethe Global Fund’s donors to commit to annual, dues-based contributions.

11.14 Beyond increased funding, global trade rules also place major constraints on the ability of poorcountries to respond to the AIDS crisis.Most African countries have no home-grown drug industry, so theyneed companies in other countries to supply themwith cheaper versions of expensive western drugs. Almosttwo years ago developing countries won a great victory against the pharmaceutical lobby when tradeministers at the WTO signed the “Doha Declaration” agreeing that health needs should override the“intellectual property” rights of pharmaceutical multinationals.

11.15 But from that moment on, the US blocked a solution and backtracked on the promises made atDoha. The European Parliament proposed a neat 52 word agreement. However, when on 30 August 2003,the US finally agreed to new rules, the deal negotiated with the European Commission created a complex3,200 word text. Developing countries successfully stopped the US from excluding many diseases from thedeal. However, the new compromise places enormous obstacles in the way of aVordable medicines actuallybeing made available where they are most needed. Poor countries without their own drugs industry will nowhave to ask another country to license a local company to produce and export cheap generic copies ofpatented drugs. But any country oVering to assist still risks retaliation from rich countries. The agreementprovides so much scope for interpretation that the only likely winners are the army of lawyers the EU andUS will employ to tie up any attempt be developing countries to make use of the agreement.

11.16 The new deal missed a massive opportunity to establish clear and simple rules that would delivercheap drugs and bring the bullying tactics of the EU and the US to an end once and for all.

11.17 Despite these limitations, Canada has recently announced that it plans to introduce legislation toallow generic drug manufacturers to make generic versions of anti-retrovirals for export to developingcountries. The move could substantially increase the volume of generic production and help Africancountries to source the stable, high quality supply of generic anti-retrovirals to meet its massive needs.

11.18 This contribution should also encourage governments around the world to use the compulsorylicensing route to develop production, and shows that it is possible for governments to stand up to pressurefrom the pharmaceutical industry and the US government. The move is important, because as producingcountries (such as India and Brazil) implement their TRIPS obligations and provide full patent protectionfor pharmaceutical products, the supply of generics will inevitably dwindle. To ensure a sustainable supplyof generics, more countries must be able and willing to produce for export. The greater the number ofproducing countries, the more likely generics will be available for import.

11.19 The UK should follow Canada’s lead and do it all to provide practical support for the productionof significant volumes of generic drugs for export.

12. Conclusion

12.1 ACTSA strongly welcomes the Foreign AVairs Select Committee’s decision to hold an enquiry intoUK policy towards South Africa. The imminent tenth anniversary of freedom provides an excellentopportunity to meditate on how far South Africa has come since the end of apartheid, and how far thecountry still has to travel. It also oVers countries that would hope to count themselves among SouthAfrica’sfriends to consider the nature and health of their relationship.

12.2 ACTSA argues in this submission that the UK needs to focus its assistance to South Africa moreclosely on humanitarian considerations, and needs to exercise extreme caution when considering an“influencing” agenda towards policy issues that ought to be decided according to internal democraticprocesses.

12.3 We also urge that the UK’s most energetic engagement should be with the wider continentalcampaign for a new partnership between Africa and the rich world.

12.4 Both the UK and the G8 have paid unprecedented lip-service in recent years to tackling Africa’scrisis. Our PrimeMinister, and other global leaders have promised; development focused trade-rules, an endto the debt crisis, more aid with fewer strings and a real engagement with the global AIDS crisis. But whenthe media circus surrounding set-piece international conferences has died down, Africa has been quietlyforgotten. Promises made on extra aid to Africa (G8 2002) and extra money for the Global Fund to Fight

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AIDS, TB and Malaria (G8 2003) have been conspicuous only for the manner in which they have beenbroken. African complaints that the G8’s Africa Action Plan fails to engage with key structural issues oftrade, debt relief and aid conditionality have simply been ignored.

12.5 Despite this reality, Baroness Amos repeated in March 2003, “the Prime Minister’s determinationto help Africa to help itself is as strong now as it has ever been. Our commitment toNEPAD, in which SouthAfrica is such a key driver, is a major plank of the foreign policy of Tony Blair’s Government.”42 If acommitment to Africa is truly a major plank of British foreign policy, the Foreign AVairs Committee will findit diYcult to deliver anything but a damning verdict on the FCO’s attempts to pursue that policy.

12.6 The G8 have so far eVectively ignored NEPAD as proposed by African leaders, developing theirown plan, centred on their own priorities. NEPAD is first and foremost an appeal to the rich world toalter the unequal basis of North-South relations. It notes, “The New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing the relationship thatunderpins it. Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid,nor for marginal concessions.”

12.7 The Africa Action Plan ducks this challenge entirely, as the G8 argue that NEPAD is, “first andforemost, a pledge byAfricanLeaders to the people ofAfrica to consolidate democracy and sound economicmanagement, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development.” (Para 4, Africa ActionPlan) The G8 have thus chosen to use NEPAD as another opportunity to lecture African nations on theirfailings. They refuse to recognise that the current trade and debt arrangements are unjust, and requirechange per se. Rather they are using miserly debt relief, trade concessions and aid promises as bargainingchips for which they will demand a high price—the opening up of African markets to Westernmultinationals, privatisation of essential services and further cuts in state spending.

12.8 Furthermore, the insistence of the G8 countries that as a group they cannot adopt a co-ordinatedplatform, but will each act alone eVectively begs the question, what is the point of the G8? The G8commit to “mobilise and energise global action, marshal resources and expertise, and provide impetusin support of the NEPAD’s objectives.” (Para 6) They also state that, “We will pursue this Action Planin our individual and collective capacities, and through the international institutions to which webelong.” (Para 10)

12.9 The UK has so far done little to challenge the limitations of the G8 Africa Action Plan, urgingcampaigners to recognise the realities of global power politics, and to focus on winning “deliverables”.The concept of deliverables recognises in eVect that the biggest blockage to eVective change is a lackof political will within the G8 to take the major structural challenges presented by NEPAD seriously,and a determination to pursue business on the usual agenda, through the usual channels andinstitutions.

12.10 The UK’s response has been to focus attention on what the UK can and has achievedbilaterally. Some of this is welcome. However, if the G8 has a useful function in relation to Africa, itis that it provides an opportunity for leadership. The UK needs not only to lead by example, but topunch above its weight for Africa, committing negotiating capital in international forums in whichthe UK has influence, to make trade fair, end the CAP, cancel third world debt and transform theinternational role of the IFIs.

12.11 The leaders of the rich world eVectively abrogate responsibility for their own political power,announcing themselves constrained by frameworks and agreements made by political and technicalinstitutions like the WTO, the World Bank and the EU. They do so in denial of the fact that the G8 are theeVectivemasters of each of these institutions. If theG8 itself has any useful function it is in recognising globalchallenges and in developing new agendas for these institutions which G8 members commit to pursuingenergetically.

October 2003

Written evidence submitted by Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld

Policy Objectives

Economic policies in South Africa since 1994 have had two broad objectives:

— economic regeneration; and

— “empowerment” of “historically disadvantaged” citizens.

These two objectives have been accorded diVerent weights at diVerent stages. For both, the achievementsof the first post-apartheid decade have been mixed.

42 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003.

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Regeneration

Positives: (modestly) increased growth, fiscal stabilisation, lower inflation, tax reform, increased exports,independent monetary policy, trade policy liberalisation, progressive elimination of exchange controls,growth of public-private partnerships in infrastructure development.

Negatives: low fixed investment levels (domestic and foreign); low savings ratio, rising unemployment,balance of payments weakness, currency volatility, slow privatisation progress.

Overall performance has arguably been disappointing. However, expectations of significantly more rapidgrowth—the “lion economy” scenario—were unrealistic because the inherited serious structural deficienciesand developmental backlogs have continued to inhibit growth and undermine confidence. The requisiterestructuring will take more time to achieve, and will continue to present the government with diYcultpolitical choices. One major lesson of the first decade is that while the creation of a “market-friendly” policyenvironment is a necessary condition for faster growth, it is not a suYcient condition. The key economicpolicy challenges remain the low levels of fixed investment, the “jobless” nature of economic growth, theshortage of skills, privatisation, and South Africa’s failure to become a major exporter of manufacturedgoods.

Empowerment

Empowerment policy focused initially on the labourmarket, withmeasures to eliminate racial and genderdiscrimination and promote equity, rather than to alter the inherited pattern of ownership and control ofproductive resources. AYrmative action programmes combined with wide-ranging legislation in an eVortto render the composition of the labour force more “representative” at all levels, but these measures werewidely perceived by business as cost-raising.

A wave of privately-driven corporate black economic empowerment (BEE) equity deals in the late 1990sfailed to raise the black-owned share of market capitalisation significantly due to a number of high-profilefailures caused by flawed financing structures. The prime objective of BEE was also widely perceived as thecreation of a small get-rich-quick black capitalist elite.

The subsequent BEE Commission argued that lack of “meaningful” empowerment and “ingrainedracism” were fundamental structural impediments to faster growth, and called for a state-driven nationalBEE strategy incorporating mandatory “de-racialisation” targets. However, the government’s new “broad-based” BEE strategy has largely eschewed heavy-handed intervention in favour of negotiated sectoral BEE“charters”, incorporating a “scorecard” approach for measuring progress towards agreed targets.

Hitherto, despite generous financial incentives, small-business growth has been disappointing.AYrmative procurement procedures, in both the public and private sectors, are now spawning numerousempowerment joint ventures. However, it remains unclear how many of these ventures will provesustainable.

Market incentives and government policies are now combining to render BEE—broadly defined—bothinevitable and desirable for business. BEE, in all its guises, has also helped enlarge the new black “middleclass”. However, little attention has so far been paid to the additional costs and risks of BEE and theconsequent eVects on growth and job creation. BEE strategies have to balance two overriding—but alsopotentially conflictual—needs: to remain internationally competitive, while visibly promoting domesticsocio-economic equity. Whether the short-term costs of accelerated empowerment will be outweighed bythe longer-term benefits remains highly uncertain. Against the background of increasing levels of absolutepoverty, if BEE fails to lift economic growth on to a higher plane, profound political and economicconsequences could ensue.

Implications for UK Policy

In addition to seeking reduced industrialised country protectionism towards developing countries ingeneral, the UK should continue to promote bilateral trade with, and investment in, South Africa; focusdevelopment assistance on poverty relief, HIV/AIDS programmes, training and skills transfers, andcapacity development in South Africa; and encourage further development of an investor-friendly policyframework.

Jesmond Blumenfeld is Associate Senior Lecturer in Economics at Brunel University, London and AfricaRegion Head at Oxford Analytica Ltd. He was formerly Chairman of the Chatham House Southern AfricaStudy Group.

Jesmond Blumenfeld

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Ev 34 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Witnesses:Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University, andMr Alastair Fraser, Policy OYcer, Action forSouthern Africa, examined.

Chairman: Gentlemen, I welcome our two new In other words, it will slow the rate of growth, forexample, but will not do much more than slow it.witnesses, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld of Brunel

University, University of Oxford and Oxford Even a one percentage point slow-down in the rateof growth is serious but we are not talking about aAnalytica, who, as I know personally, was one of the

key figures in the Chatham House Study Group on catastrophic melt-down, or at least that is what theresearch suggests. One of the reasons for that is thatsouthern Africa for very many years. I welcome also

Mr Alastair Fraser, a Policy OYcer for the Action although the majority of people who are HIV-positive and who will die from AIDS are unskilled,for Southern Africa, which is a successor

organisation of the anti-apartheid movement in the poor people, there is a great pool of other unskilledlabour available to replace them. Much moreUK. Gentlemen, welcome. I can assure you that we

are unlikely during the course of your session to be diYcult, of course, when you come to replacingskilled personnel, professional people and so on. Sosummoned by the bells to vote, so you can relax on

that. Let us move straight into business and I call one can look at a whole series of areas in which thereare clear costs which would be incurred and try toMr Illsley.come to some understanding of what the impactwould be. The other thing I would say which has

Q43 Mr Illsley: One issue which a lot of people who been evident, not only in South Africa and otherdo not make a study of southern Africa would African countries as well but particularly in Southrecognise is the incidence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, is that having seen the inability orAfrica.My two questions to kick oV this session are, unwillingness of theGovernment to take active stepswhat impact has the HIV/AIDS pandemic had on to deal with the problem, a substantial number ofSouth Africa’s domestic politics and what eVect will employers, particularly large employers, have doneit have on the country’s future? One interest I have in their own kind of cost benefit analysis and workedthat is that I have been to meetings in the past where out it is actually more cost eVective for them toSouth African and other countries’ politicians have provide free treatment for their own workers, and inmentioned the number of key personnel—teachers, some cases for the families of their employees aswell,doctors, etcetera—who have died from AIDS, rather than sit back and do nothing. Sowe are seeingsubstantial numbers, where those countries simply a two-pronged approach to the problems from bothwere not able to train the people to replace the ones the public and the private sectors.who died. Your comments on that please. Mr Fraser: I think obviously the most significantMr Blumenfeld: It has had a profound impact on the impact in South Africa is on the people who arepolitics of South Africa, mainly because, in a rather dying. It is estimated there are 600 people dyingmaverick kind of way, President Mbeki has clearly every day in South Africa alone from AIDS. One ofhad some personal diYculties with the whole the major political impacts has been to revealconcept of the HIV/AIDS virus. There has been a essentially the strength of South African civil societygreat reluctance on the part of the South African in terms of its response to that, the emergence of thegovernment to take active steps to deal with the Treatment Action Campaign and its ability topandemic. That has changed quite dramatically in mobilise the unions, parliamentarians, the mediathe last 18 months or so, first with an undertaking to and almost the whole country in order to secure theprovide anti-retrovirals to all pregnant women, that pressure required to bring about the five year plan,was about 18 months ago, on a universal basis, the national treatment plan and the budget toalthough the roll-out of that is very slow. More support it. I agree with some of whatMr Blumenfeldrecently, first in August, an undertaking to provide has said but if I could pick up a couple of things. Theanti-retrovirals for people in an advanced stage of first one is on the companies. As he has suggestedthe disease, and much more recently than that an some companies have noticed treating their workersundertaking to have a universal programme over a may be one way of cutting their costs but there is aperiod of time, which would make anti-retroviral tension in there in that the level of unemployment intreatment available to everyone who was HIV- South Africa means that the workforce is essentiallypositive. So it has been a very delayed process and replaceable, so we are talking about a minority ofvery controversial and it has infuriated, exasperated, companies there. There is a lot of work which couldand alienated a great many constituencies both be done particularly with British investors or withdomestically and internationally. As I say, it is in the British companies to ensure that treatment plans goprocess of changing which means we will now have out to both the workers and to members of theiran attempt to deal with the issues of prevention and families.the issues of treatment. As far as the future isconcerned, on the economic side it is very diYcult to

Q44 Mr Illsley: Is there any obvious reason whyoVer any clear answers. There are a number ofMbeki took the attitude he did? Was it economic,models which have been used in an attempt tothat he did not want to pay for the drugs, or did hemeasure the demographic and macro-economicsimply refuse to acknowledge the extent of theeVects. There are disagreements amongst scholarsepidemic?about the validity of those results. What research

there has been has tended to suggest that in macro- Mr Blumenfeld: It is diYcult to say without askingPresident Mbeki himself, but insofar as one caneconomic terms, oddly enough, the impact of the

HIV/AIDS pandemic is probably relatively limited. understand how hismind has worked on this, I think

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it goes back to his deep, passionate concern and might like to look at almost its presentation there.There seems to be an approach that there is anpride in being African and a perception, rightly or

wrongly, on his part that there were people in the economic debate within South Africa about whatmodel should be followed, and the UK it appears toWest, in the industrialised world, who were in his

view blaming Africa for the emergence of this new me is putting itself very firmly on one side of thatdebate in a way which could be seen as interferencedisease, and it was a kind of visceral reaction on his

part to that. It is very diYcult to explain. I do know, in a domestic economic debate. I find that worryingand would be interested in the UK taking a diVerentbecause I have spoken to people who at the time

were in close correspondence with him about the line. In terms of the policies the UK should pursuemore vigorously, debt cancellation for the region ofissue, that he got some of his information in the first

instance from the internet and picked up the notion southern Africa, although not such a big issue forSouth Africa but for the southern African region,of the dissident view about HIV/AIDS and the

argument was that there is no such thing as the HIV there has been a lot of talk and very little action oneVective debt cancellation. Similarly, on trade bothvirus, or certainly if there is it is not that that causes

AIDS, that the problem is social deprivation, within the WTO and the EU CAP talks as well as inthe review of the South African Free Tradepoverty and the susceptibility of poor people and

deprived people to all kinds of infectious illnesses, Agreement which is coming up, I think the UKcould take a much more aggressive role with theand that is where the eVorts should go. It is that sort

of understanding of the problem which led the European Commission whose position is distinctlyunsympathetic.Government to focus particularly on diet and other

issues as the means of dealing with the problem. Mr Blumenfeld: I think I said in my memorandumthat obviously there are certain policy issues that theMr Fraser: On the pricing issue, I do not think it isUK should be pursuing in relation to developingnecessarily helpful to try and pry into the President’scountries in general, and you have been round thismind on those issues. There is a Cabinet decision toparticular course before on the issues of agriculturalgo ahead on a new track and that is what we shouldprotectionism in the Common Agricultural Policyfocus on. I think the issue of drug pricing is key andand so on, which I think is harmful to theit does restrict South Africa’s ability to roll out andevelopment prospects of not only South Africa buteVective treatment plan. There has been a recentother countries as well. I would take a slightlyagreement within the WTO to make production ofdiVerent approach fromMrFraser in saying that thedrugs an easier thing for developing countries to do.South African government has been striving veryThere are steps though which theUK could still takeseriously in the past decade to regenerate economicto move the agenda forward. Canada, particularly,growth, to regenerate the economy and in so doinghas been looking at whether as a G8 country itto tackle all the challenges that the country faces. Inshould be considering the production of genericmy view, the most straight forward and obvious taskdrugs for export to African countries. TheUK couldfor the British government is to give every support todo a similar thing which would require somethat process. It has been a painful process for Southlegislative change but I think it would be one of theAfrica because there has been a huge degree ofthings the UK could do to win some goodwill wherestructural adjustment which has been needed to thea lot has been lost through the pharmaceuticaleconomy, it is politically diYcult in some cases tochallenge to the South African Medicines Act and aachieve those policies, and they are slow to deliverless than helpful approach from the WTO.benefits. Every support that the UKgovernment cangive to the creation of an environment that is

Q45 Sir John Stanley: Can I start by asking you the favourable for investment, that tackles the skillsame question which I asked the two previous shortage, which is a fundamental constraint onwitnesses. Could you tell us whether there are growth and development in South Africa, that looksparticular British government and particularly towards the relief of poverty, assistance withBritish Foreign OYce policies which are being combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all those kindpursued now which you would like to see altered, of issues that is where the focus certainly ofand whether there are policies which are not being economic policy on the part of the UK governmentadopted now which you would like to see followed? should lie.Mr Fraser: I tried to work out what the ForeignOYce policy was towards SouthAfrica as part of the

Q46 Sir John Stanley: Can I turn to a specific issue.process of responding to your inquiry, and it was notWhen I was in SouthAfrica in September, I was toldeasy to see it. I do not think there is a coherent Southtomy surprise that the number of white farmers whoAfrica strategy, as it were, and there is certainly nohave been murdered in South Africa is greater thancoherence between departments. Reading some ofthe number who have been murdered in Zimbabwe.the Foreign OYce website documentation, one ofDo you believe that is factually correct or not?the most worrying things from my perspective is theMr Blumenfeld: Yes.heavy focus on business opportunities for UKMr Fraser: No idea.companies as almost the Foreign OYce’s primary

concern in South Africa. Given the history and therelationship between our two countries, I do not Q47 Sir John Stanley: Am I right in saying that thethink that should be our primary concern, also given overwhelming preponderance of the farm attacksthe situation of poverty and AIDS and those kind of and murders which are taking place have been in the

Transvaal in the north?issues in South Africa. I think the Foreign OYce

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Mr Blumenfeld: I am not au fait with the particular safety or union rights, which we take to be quitestandard here, is just not there and it is very diYcultgeographic distribution. I am aware of the problem

but not the distribution of it. to follow through.Mr Fraser: I could not help you on that.

Q50 Sir John Stanley: Do you see any prospect inSouth Africa of the aspirations of black people inQ48 Sir John Stanley: I believe they are

overwhelmingly in the north. Do you have any South Africa for land ownership being able to bematched in terms of the voluntary availability ofcomments on this particular issue? Do you believe

this high level of attacks and indeed of murders suitable land?Mr Blumenfeld: The land reform programme inwhich are taking place is basically motivated by

criminals who are seeking to rob etcetera, or do you South Africa has been slow to develop. Again this isnot particularly an area of expertise on my part butbelieve there is a racist element behind it?

Mr Fraser: I am afraid you are asking me to delve I am aware of the fact that it has moved up thepolitical agenda in the wake of the developments ininto the mind of somebody committing the act. I

could not do that. Zimbabwe. I am not sure that the land issue in SouthAfrica has quite the same fundamental politicalMr Blumenfeld: I am not really in a position to

speculate. I have seen the various reports, I am salience as it has certainly in Zimbabwe and possiblyother countries as well. That is because that is notaware of the inquiries that the South African

government instituted into the problem and the where it seems, from the point of view of the mainpolitical parties, their constituent interestsconclusion that it reached, that these were

predominantly criminal acts. I have to say that the predominately lie. I think they lie elsewhere. Thereare competing issues to do with land reform in termsprima facie evidence, the anecdotal evidence, one

sees and hears about the nature of many of these of ownership and tenure. There is one school ofthought which would argue that land reform oughtattacks gives rise to certain questions about that. But

I would not have suYcient expertise to be able to to be redistributive in nature, and there is anotherschool of thought which would argue that landgive you a clearer answer than that.reform should be productivity-enhancing in nature,and they do not necessarily lead to the same kind ofQ49 Sir John Stanley: I wonder if either of you sawpolicies. I would suspect that the proponents of thethe BBC report which I saw a fewmonths ago, it wassecond view, the productivity-enhancing view,only a relatively short clip and it may have beenprobably have the ear of Government more than therepresentative or completely unrepresentative, but itothers simply because they are probably betterwas a piece about the attacks on white farms in theorganised. In South Africa it might be slightly morenorth, and it showed first of all a group of blackbalanced in that I know there are NGOs which arelabourers at least one of whom had been veryconcerned about landless people in South Africa,severely beaten up by the white farmer, and it wasbut I would suspect the productivity-enhancing viewthen followed by what I have to say was a quitewould probably have a stronger purchase on this.appalling interview with the white farmer who tookBut, I have to repeat, this is not an area of expertisethe line that physical beating up was basically theI would claim.only language which his workers understood. If thatMr Fraser:The only thing I would add to that is thatwas in any way representative, that would suggest toaccess to land and secure tenure is at least as muchme there is a singularly unreconstructed apartheid,an issue in urban areas as it is in rural areas inAfrikaner type view amongst certain sections of theSouth Africa.white farming population. Does what I am sayingSir John Stanley: I agree, there are crucial issues inand what youmay or may not have seen on the BBCrelation to housing and the ever-expanding shantiesring true, or do you think that was veryin Johannesburg and Cape Town. I understand that.unrepresentative?

Mr Blumenfeld: All I can say is, if, as you say, it isrepresentative I would be as appalled as you are. I Q51 Chairman: Gentlemen, on the economy I recall

some years ago, Anglos commissioned one of theiram unable to give you an answer as to whether it isrepresentative or not. Certainly we know that there senior members to write why the economy was

under-performing. Clem Sunter—you mayare plenty of issues around farming, ruraldevelopment, land issues, employment issues, which remember the book—said one of the conclusions

was not remarkable, it was that South Africa washave aVected agricultural employment over manydecades. It would be surprising—welcome but placed in an unfavourable geographical position at

the end of a continent which was under-performingsurprising—if attitudes had changed in the ruraloutposts of South Africa as radically as they have generally, it did not have growth economies as its

neighbours, and therefore nothing much could bechanged elsewhere.Mr Fraser: The only comment I would have is that done about that. However, it did say that the other

major component of the poor performance was theI think a lot of people are aware South Africaimplemented some very progressive labour laws education of the black majority, that at the time of

the Bantu Education Act the blacks were hardlyearly on in the transition but obviously following upand implementing labour standards and union taught science, there was a minuscule number of

black engineers, and that meant private companiesrights in far-flung farms has been very challenging,as it is in workplace factories in far-flung areas. The had to educate their own engineers and scientists

from the majority. Has that changed? Is there asize of the civil service required to do the health and

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fundamental change in the South African education programme, partly ideological opposition but partlyalso a pragmatic recognition that there would besystem so that black men and women can hope to

achieve in science? Are the resources going there? thousands more jobs lost. I think one should bear inmind that from the time of the onset of the recessionCan we expect any serious change?

Mr Blumenfeld: The allocation in the annual budget in South Africa in 1989 and from then until the timeof the political transition in 1994, half a million jobsto education is the highest share of any category of

expenditure. So within the resources available there were lost, and since 1994 until now another half amillion jobs have been lost. So one is looking at very,seems to be no question that the Government is

putting considerable emphasis on education. very fundamental structural problems.

Q52 Chairman: And the results? Q55 Mr Chidgey: Carrying on from the Chairman’sMr Blumenfeld:We are looking at a very long-term comments, we have tackled the business of skillsprogramme. It is a generation before it has any really shortages and the educational issues, but this wholesignificant eVect. To go back to your preamble, I business of structuring the economy is worth morethink that the explanation for slow growth in South examination. There is a concept we hold that theAfrica and the diYculties of regenerating the South African economy is capable of being theeconomy is much more complicated than simply powerhouse of the region, and yet you have alreadythat it sits at the end of a continent which is far away set out there is resistance to privatisation as a way offrom world markets and the skills issue, though the bringing in the investment presumably needed toskills issue is absolutely crucial. I think there is a modernise industry and make it competitive withinwhole raft of factors which have been constraining the African continent, and I am conscious that Mreconomic development in South Africa, which was Fraser’s paper sets out a view which opposespart of the inheritance of the ANC when it came to privatisation. Is this not the conundrum?Unless youpower. It is the most advanced economy in Africa do get a step change in the African economy tocertainly, but it was beset by a whole host of enable it to benefit from a much invigorated exportproblems. You have mentioned the skills deficit market, you are not going to bring in the changeswhich I think was absolutely crucial . . . which will eventually lead to mass employment even

if you have increased the education opportunities forthe majority of the population. Whilst I do not holdQ53 Chairman: And science education for blacks.a flag up for the privatisation policy we have beenMr Blumenfeld: Absolutely, because blacks underthrough in this country, it is a fact that a decade orapartheid were denied any kind of useful andso after they were introduced, or two decades, we dotechnological education like that. But there werehave more or less full employment, and the twoalso very serious developmental backlogs in terms ofthings are not inseparable. Is there not an issue herehousing, infrastructure, access to water and so on,of a knee-jerk reaction to something whichall of which are part of the social wage, if you like,philosophically sounds unacceptable, yet evidencewhich helps to build productivity. There wereelsewhere shows it does perhaps provide a solutionextreme degrees of poverty and inequality in theto the problem?country, there were very serious structuralMr Fraser: Three points on those comments. Thedeficiencies to the economy and I would mentionfirst is, our submission does not opposethree in particular. First, a very seriouslyprivatisation, what it says is that economic decision-uncompetitive manufacturing sector; South Africamaking should be the business of the South Africanwas not competitive in world markets inpeople, and there is a highly heated debate in Southmanufactured goods. Secondly, a severe balance ofAfrica between the trade unions, various wingspayments constraint which eVectively precluded thewithin the ANC . . . .economy from growing at a more rapid rate on a

sustained basis. Thirdly, a very poor employmentgenerating capacity, so when investment did take Q56 Mr Chidgey: So you are reluctant to haveplace it tended to add very little to employment. foreign investment because that may mean foreignThese are characteristics which go way back in control?South Africa’s history. Mr Fraser:No, foreign investment is absolutely key

to growth in South Africa. The point is, is there apolicy prescription which follows, either from theQ54 Chairman: How successfully have these factors

been addressed? Foreign and Commonwealth OYce or even thisCommittee ofMPs, towards SouthAfrica. If we talkMr Blumenfeld: They are in the process of being

addressed, some of them more successfully than about UK policy towards South Africa, is it thebusiness of the Foreign OYce to be attempting toothers. But I think ten years is a relatively short time

to turn that round, because it is like turning a influence the economic policy followed by the SouthAfrican government, or is that a question for thesupertanker around, it is a very slow process. It is a

politically painful and diYcult process because South African people? That is the question I wantedto ask in the paper. Any conjecture I might have onstructural adjustment, which is what it is—it is self-

imposed in this case rather than externally imposed whether privatisation works for South Africa is tosome extent irrelevant, I am not a South Africanby the IMF or the World Bank but the solutions are

fundamentally the same—destroys jobs. That is why citizen, neither are you, neither is anybody whoworks in the Foreign OYce. The second point on thethere has been such resistance within the unions and

the left wing of the ANC to a privatisation idea, and this may seem contradictory, that we can

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export a model of privatisation which may or may of the collapse in international markets. But inpractical terms, if you look at the flow of foreignnot have worked in the UK to the conditions in

South Africa I think is highly contestable. There is direct investment into South Africa since 1994, thereare only two years inwhich there was very significantan assumption within a lot of UK policy towards

South Africa that South Africa is a normal country, foreign direct investment: one was I think the partialprivatisation of South African Airways, and thea bit like us only poorer. It is not; it is nothing like

us. The legacy of apartheid, the position within the other was the first partial privatisation of Telcom.What does it do? It brings in foreign currency, itglobal economy, the position and relationship to the

international financial institutions, are completely contributes to tax and Government revenues andthereby assists the budgetary problem, and it alsodiVerent and makes the situation in South Africa

completely diVerent. The idea that we can help to brings with it new technologies, access to newtechniques and technologies and know-how. That isexport a model there which will work there by

default is I think completely flawed and something South Africa’s own, home-grown privatisationpolicy. It has been diYcult for them to implement itwe should get away from.for political reasons and they have suVered as aresult of their slowness in doing so.Q57MrChidgey: I think that is a very fair point, but

it does beg the question, what model would work inSouth Africa and how we, as outsiders, how our Q60MrChidgey: Is by any chance, and I am not sureGovernment through its policy, could help the on this at all, within this equation, within thisappropriate model for South Africa. controversy, this opposition, whatever, is there aMr Fraser: There probably is not an appropriate factor there that there is a concern that themodel for southern Africa. The countries of South privatisation exercise might result in the creation ofAfrica— a new elite, a new ruling class to replace the old,

white-based elite?Mr Blumenfeld:No, I would not say that, because allQ58 Mr Chidgey: I am interested in South Africa.privatisation transactions would, like most otherMr Fraser: Even in South Africa, to my mind, thereinvestment transactions, be subject to the whole newis not amodel; it is almost a fallacy of economics thatapproach which ensures there is a substantial blackthere is a model which must be applied to thisempowerment element within the investment.country. There is a political process, a very diYcult

political process, which relates to all kinds oflegitimate demands within society. That process and Q61Mr Chidgey:Could it be a black elite which wasthe democracy in South Africa, which is its greatest created out of this process?achievement since the transition, are to some extent Mr Blumenfeld: A black elite has been created, andcontingent on SouthAfricans being allowed tomake again this is a contested issue and one of thedecisions for themselves, and for that debate being problems around the whole black economicallowed to happen as it happens in developed empowerment programme. In the second half of thecountries. 1990s there was a privately-driven, market-driven

process whereby corporations sold oV stakes toblack empowerment groups, the terms on whichQ59 Mr Chidgey: I would like to pose the next

question. Surely the continuous stability and they were done, the financial structures underlyingthose deals, were often not very sound, they weredevelopment democratically of South Africa

depends upon reaching the population right down to based on black groups borrowing substantial fundsin the hope that both capital gain on the stocklevels which were previously excluded under the old

regime? So you cannot just say, “We have no market and organic growth within the companieswould enable them to repay those loans, and thesolution”, because if we have not got a solution then

the stability of South Africa is at risk. stock market then collapsed. So what one got was aperception of black economic empowerment, whichMr Blumenfeld: I would argue there is a home-grown

South African policy on this. In 1996 when the was the creation of a get rich quick, capitalist elite.That led to the appointment of the BlackGrowth, Employment and Redistribution

Programme, known as GEAR, was introduced, Empowerment Commission which deliberated fortwo or three years, produced a report which hasprivatisation (which was not called privatisation but

called restructuring of state assets) was a key element formed the basis of the new legislation which iscurrently going through Parliament for thewithin that. It is a contested policy, there is no

question about that, and for that reason, and one establishment of what is called the broad-basedblack economic empowerment strategy. There isneed hardly tell you, it is diYcult for governments

when they are opposed by their own party members concern about the fact that a relatively small numberof elite people are benefiting from this to theon important policies to carry those policies

forward. We do not have to go far away to find that. exclusion of others; that is very much part of thedebate in South Africa.So it has been a diYcult process for the Government

to go through, but in August 2000 the Department Mr Fraser: Just on that, there is an important pointabout the idea of a home-grown adjustment processof Public Enterprises finally came up with a very

coherent, substantial agenda for privatisation. It in South Africa, because although I have saideconomic policy should and is being made by Southunfortunately was still a bit slow in implementing

that and therefore, particularly in the case of the Africans, the key focus both for the Foreign OYceand for this Committee should be on thetelecommunications corporation, Telcom, fell foul

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international constraints on South African policy therefore if one empowered blacks one would getmuch more rapid economic growth. That has yet tomaking. We need to be aware that, for example, thebe seen.shift from RDP to GEAR was heavily informed by

the currency crisis in South Africa, itself in manyways a result of the international financial system Q63 Richard Ottaway:What is the logic in that?over which the UK has significant influence, and Mr Blumenfeld: If something is a constraint and youtherefore it is somethingwe can do something about. remove the constraint, presumably you areSimilarly, the World Bank and IMF advisers, who expecting—ultimately answer to the board members in the UKto some extent, were oVering so-called expert advice

Q64 Richard Ottaway: Why was lack of blackin South Africa right through the transition andeconomic empowerment a constraint?through the RDP/GEAR period, and we need to beMr Blumenfeld: That was the argument of theaware of that. We need to be aware of what ourCommission, it is not my argument, I am simplyGovernment is selling to the World Bank and IMFreporting the findings of the Commission. I am justto sell to other countries. South Africa is alsotrying to say that I think the reasons why Southconstrained by the rules in the Trade Development Africa has problems growing at a much more rapidCo-operation Agreement with the EU, and it is rate are very complex and there are a wide range of

constrained by the rules of the WTO, and South them. For one thing the market is relativelyAfrica itself is very aware of these problems and has constrained because you have had for fourlaid out an ambitious challenge to it in the form of generations a relatively small number of people whoNePAD, which you talked about earlier. It runs owned assets, had access to income-enhancingthrough all these issues. The interesting thing about educational opportunities and so on, and the vastthe G8 response to NePAD is that it has attempted majority did not, so by definition you have ato entirely ignore that structural debate and to shift restricted domestic market. The more that marketfocus on to the issues which interest us. So there is a grows the greater the economic opportunities whichreal problem there and if we are not able to pick up are there. The more blacks are acquiring assets andon that, we are not really saying anything to the UK property and marketable skills, the greater thegovernment. benefits which will come from that. My concern is

that it is being seen as the key policy aspect at themoment, and whilst there are certainly strongcommercial arguments for firms to take account ofQ62 Richard Ottaway:May I touch on the point Mrthe pressures for black empowerment, some of thisBlumenfeld touched on, black economicis being induced. It reminds me in a way of the era ofempowerment. You seemed to be suggesting athe Reconstruction and Development Programmesecond ago that you did not think it was makingimmediately after 1994. The Reconstruction andmuch progress. Is that right? If so, what can be doneDevelopment Programme was the ANC’s policyto speed it up?manifesto and when you spoke to South Africans, itMr Blumenfeld:What I was suggestingwas it did notdid not matter who you spoke to, you could not findmake much progress in the first phase of this, whichanybody who did not believe in the Reconstructionwas in the late 1990s, and it became a ratherand Development Programme, but it proved not todiscredited strategy. In a way, black economic be a coherent strategy and it was dumped veryempowerment has now become almost the new quickly, by early 1996 the RDP oYce had been

religion in South Africa, and that I have to say closed down and the RDPhas been abandoned in allworriesme somewhat. There is no quibbling with the but name and replaced by this new Growthfact that blacks need to be empowered, that a much Employment and Redistribution strategy. Onegreater share of ownership and control of resources senses the same sort of thing happening now inought to be exercised by black South Africans, my relation to black empowerment. Everybody is on theconcern about the current policy is that it comes out black empowerment wagon. Without in any wayof the report of the Black Empowerment denigrating the need for greater empowerment, ICommission which came up with the key conclusion think there is insuYcient attention being paid to thethat economic growth in South Africa is being risks and the costs which are involved. Insofar as thefundamentally held back by the lack of perceptions of those risks inhibit new investment,empowerment and by engrained racism within the that is a factor which ought to be taken into account.control of the economy. My point about that, and I Mr Fraser: My only comment would be about UKspelt it out earlier, is that I think one should not be companies and investors and again focusing onwhatlooking for simplistic explanations for why growth contribution we can make to black economicin South Africa has been slow. It is a very empowerment. There is an obvious need for blackcomplicated story, there are huge structural economic empowerment. In 1995-2000 the averageproblems which need to be addressed or are in the household income for an African family in Southprocess of being addressed, and lack of Africa dropped 19 per cent, for a white family it roseempowerment of blacks is only one element of that. 15 per cent, so there is an obvious need. There is the

issue of a mass consumer market amongst the blackBut the conclusion of the Commission was that thispopulation which is essential to have a balancedwas a fundamental constraint on economic growth,economic development. I would come back to thepoint that South Africa is not normal, it is one of the15 Reconstruction and Development Programme.

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world’s most unequal societies, and that does dramatic eVects. There was a whole series ofaYrmative action programmes which had the samesomething distorting not just to society but to the

economy, and whatever it means, black economic consequences.empowerment is a necessary rejoinder to thatsituation. For UK companies, I guess our investors Q67 Chairman: How significant is crime, or theneed to be looking at what they can do to make the perception of crime, as a deterrent in terms of inwardmaximum contribution to the society and the investment and skilled personnel at a senior levelcommunities they are investing in. For example, in moving to South Africa?fields like tourism and mining, and a lot of the Mr Blumenfeld: It is one of a number of factorsinvestments are in those fields, it is very easy to which inhibit inward investment. There is no gettingrepatriate profits very quickly without any away from it. The crime problem is serious, it createssignificant impact on the local environment. So it is diYculties for any firm wanting to send skilledthinking through what the UK companies can do to personnel there because they have a responsibilitygo beyond the legal minimums, which in South for their welfare. There is a perception but also aAfrica compared to the UK are fairly basic—they reality that crime levels are high particularly inare not legally required to leave very much in the certain areas. There is no question that it does havecommunities—and they need to think, “Do we need an impact on investment. It is of course one of theto hit the legal minimums or do we need to become reasons why one of the most rapidly growingmodel employers and model investors”, and there industries in South Africa is the security industry, itare questions about what the UK government could is an ill wind which blows nobody any good, butdo to encourage that. there is no getting away from the thrust of your

question.Mr Fraser: It is diYcult to know what is going on inQ65 Richard Ottaway: Has black economic the mind of investors, it is rather like knowing what

empowerment filtered down into the education is going on in the mind of criminals. I suppose thesystem at all? two most useful comments I can add are that theMr Blumenfeld: It depends what you mean by black latest crime statistics suggest there is someeconomic empowerment. If you are asking whether downward trend and that there is a new plan for thethe composition of the labour force or the regeneration of central Johannesburg.composition of the school teaching force withineducation has changed, the answer is yes,

Q68 Chairman: Is that an area where the UK candramatically. But it really depends what you meanhelp—in training?by empowerment. I would understandMr Fraser: There are already police exchanges andempowerment in that sense tomean eVective controlthat kind of thing, so I imagine so, yes. The situationand direction and ownership of productivein Johannesburg is interesting because it is theresources.location where big investors, both South Africanand foreign, will look, and having a city of that sizewhich has a CPD16L in the situation it is in at theQ66 Richard Ottaway:Has this been discussed? Is itmoment is bizarre.part of the national curriculum? I am sure there is no

such thing as a national curriculum but is itbecoming part of everyday life? Q69 Chairman: Is the Carlton Hotel stillMr Blumenfeld: I would answer that rather mothballed?diVerently by saying there was a whole series of Mr Fraser:There is a lot of property still mothballedlegislative measures in the mid-1990s, some of the but there is a plan which has emerged for the statefirst legislative actions that the Government legislature and the state Government to take overundertook, whichwere to redress what it regarded as significant land and some of the empty buildings in

Johannesburg city centre—they are trying to turn itthe inequities and imbalances in the labour market,into a pedestrianised area—and there may be someand that is where the empowerment thrust was in thehope that the atmosphere in that area could befirst three to four years of the new Government. Itturned around.was to begin a process of correcting the legacy of

discrimination and inequality in the labour markets.So there were a number of employment equity laws Q70 Chairman: How significant a constraint is theand related laws which were passed that sought to exodus of trained people? We may be benefiting ourensure that the composition of the labour force at all own National Health Service, for example, at thelevels and in all occupations and across all firms and expense of South Africa. Is that a significant factor?sectors more accurately reflected the composition of Mr Fraser: It is a huge factor and it is somethingthe population. It was not quite a quota system but which enormously annoys both South Africans andit was informed by the same idea, that the the South African government. It is quite a complexcomposition of the labour force, not just at the issue to try and find a solution to in that you cannotunskilled level but at the middle management level stop people travelling or taking individual decisionsand senior management level and the board of about how to lead their lives. There has been, as Idirectors level and so on, should reflect more understand it, a deal struck recently to do with theaccurately both the gender composition of the operation of British employment agencies whichpopulation and the racial composition. That waswhere the thrust was initially. That is having very 16 Central Police Department.

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recruit in South Africa, both their recruiting Q72MrHamilton: I understand that and I think youare right, Professors Simon and Barber expressed ittechniques and what they are telling people thevery clearly, but I wonder this: surely South Africasituation will be in the UK. There is then theas a sort of beacon of democracy in the region wouldsituation for nurses when they arrive in the UK, andenhance its own reputation by being seen to comeit is something UNISON has done quite a lot ofdown fairly hard on an African leader who iswork on, the situation for migrant nurses arrivingoppressing many more of his own people than anyhere and finding it is not quite what was advertised.perceived colonial influence or white influence?Mr Blumenfeld: I would not dissent from that at all.Mr Fraser: I think it rather depends what you meanI would add of course that the opposite is happeningby “come down very hard”.withinAfrica, in that SouthAfrica is denudingmany

other African countries of their skilled personneland professional people from teaching, universities Q73Mr Hamilton:Well, be very critical and try andand professions. You find people from every corner support a democratic change in Zimbabwe as well asof the African continent in South Africa at the economic change. It seems to me the people who aremoment, and they have gone there because the suVering are the very people who cannot aVord toopportunities seem to be better there than in their suVer, not that anyone can aVord to suVer.home countries. So it is a complex issue. Mr Fraser: Nobody disagrees with that. I think the

question of what South Africa’s best role could be isa diYcult one. Its current approach is claiming to be

Q71 Mr Hamilton: I think both of you were in the a mediator between the two parties, and obviouslyroom when I asked Professors Simon and Barber for anyone attempting to act as a mediator, overtabout Zimbabwe and South Africa, and South bias is a problem. One of the comments we haveAfrica’s relations with Zimbabwe and the attitude of made is that South Africa is in danger of being seenleaders in South Africa. I wanted to explore some of to be overtly biased in favour of the regime, and itthose points with you. You will have heard me say needs to balance this position, but balancing thisthat we have published three reports as a committee position does not mean coming out in favour of theinto Zimbabwe, the latest being in May of this year, opposition, taking a very strong public line. It is aand one of the points we drew attention to in our very diYcult balancing act.most recent report was the fact that South Africacould have enormous influence on the Mugabe Q74 Mr Hamilton: Is there not enough evidenceregime in Zimbabwe but seems very reluctant to be made public of the severe oppression of anybodyat all critical. In the light of the worsening situation who opposes Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe?in Zimbabwe, especially the economic spiral Mr Fraser:Of course there is. Everybody recognisesdownwards and the eVect that has not on the white that. The question is how useful is it to shout thatfarmers who are left but on the Zimbabwean from the rooftops as compared to announce youpopulation, the African Zimbabweans, I wonder believe there are human rights abuses in the country,whether you would concur with Professors Simon announce you believe it is a complex crisis whichand Barber in their views that there were many involves the economy, governance, AIDS, famine,complex reasons why South Africa and especially etcetera, you understand the breadth of the issue andThaboMbeki refused to be critical openly of Robert that you want to be a mediator and a neutralMugabe despite the gross violation of human rights mediator. It simply depends on how you want itin Zimbabwe? done. I never quite know what people mean. WhenMr Blumenfeld: I do not think I would be able to add you say “South Africa should come down veryvery much beyond what they said. I think they hard”, if you mean South Africa should cut oV thesummed it up fairly accurately. power, you will not find a mass-based democraticMr Fraser: I have submitted comments to your legitimate movement in Zimbabwe which agreesZimbabwe inquiry as well. Particularly given the last with you, so why say it? That is the dilemma forfew days, one of the mistakes we could make would South Africa.be believing that British pressure on South Africa toput pressure onZimbabwewould be a positive thing. Q75 Mr Hamilton: I know, Mr Blumenfeld, youSouth Africa has its reasons which have been wanted to come in but let me finish oV by asking youdiscussed for its approach to Zimbabwe, some of this: is there any sign that South Africa’s oYcialwhich we would disagree with—South African quiet policy is changing to become, as you say,Mr Fraser,diplomacy should be more balanced, much clearer more balanced between the parties so it can be acondemnation of the human rights abuses in genuine mediator and ensure the very people whoZimbabwe, for example. But South Africa being are suVering have their suVering alleviated?seen to act in response to a UK demand for it to do Mr Fraser: None that I have seen.so is likely to be extremely counter-productive. So in Mr Blumenfeld: No, I do not think so, though theterms of FCO policy, there are real questions about pressure is on and I think that pressure should behowmuch is done in the background and howmuch maintained. As a UK citizen I would hope veryis done in the foreground. Our consistent advice to much that the UK government will at everythe FCO is, yes, they should be talking but they opportunity, not necessarily in public but certainlyshould be talking in the background. Every time the in private, make clear to the South Africanmegaphones come out in the UK, it tends to have an government that it is in South Africa’s and Africa’s

own interests that this problem be dealt with, thatunfortunate result, whatever the intention.

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the South African government in my view made an one thing you can say about the Peer ReviewMechanism is that it is a remarkable thing to talkerror of judgment to begin with in not distancing

itself suYciently from what was going on. The about doing. Nobody else in the world does it. Ithink that we need to be careful about howwe chivvyreasons for that were partly explained by Professors

Simon and Barber, but I think also because there people along and saying, “Come on, everybodymustget into this thing”; though we are a supporter of thewas a poor judgment made by South Africa’s policy

makers on the nature of the problem and the issues idea I think there has to be a certain level ofunderstanding about what people are committing tothat it was going to raise, and I think they are

backing themselves into a corner. It is very diYcult and what kind of achievement that would be.to change policy in that way without losing face.NePAD is about improving good governance and Q78 Mr Chidgey: I wonder if the EU nations wouldthe South African government almost seems to be be happy to have a peer review mechanism, but thatsaying, “Zimbabwe is such a special case we just is an aside.We have looked at NePAD already, howcannot deal with that under NePAD, it is too significant is it, what can it potentially deliver forcomplicated.” My personal view is that this is a case SouthAfrica and for theContinent as a whole?Haveof a naked attempt to retain power, and I do not buy you anything you want to add?all the arguments that the key issue is land reform; I Mr Fraser: NePAD as a whole?do not dismiss the importance of land reform but Ilook at the consequences of the land reform policy

Q79 Mr Chidgey: Yes, what can it deliver?introduced and I am appalled. So I do think there isMr Fraser: I think it is enormously significant, evenan onus on theUK government to recognise this andif it is diYcult to work out what it is. The fact thatto push for change. It is very diYcult from thea large group of African countries are able to agreeoutside to bring about change, it can only come fromto a programme which lays out particularly theinside, but every support should be given to that.structural challenges within the internationalsystem and sets that out as a challenge to the rich

Q76MrChidgey:You were both here to listen to the world, “What are you going to do about this, weearlier evidence and you may remember I asked a are serious about this, we are going to come to thenumber of questions about NePAD, so I will try and G8 meetings and ask you what you will deliver”, Ido this fairly shortly as you must know the think is enormously significant. The G8 has withinquestions. There is one I did not ask before and I its power to completely kill NePAD oV and I thinkwould like to run by you, and this is concerning the it is doing a good job of it so far, because itsPeer Review Mechanism which we are all familiar response to the structural challenges has been sowith. I understand that so far 16 countries have disappointing, on debt, on trade, and even on thevolunteered to be reviewed, and Ghana and South promises it has made on aid or aid for AIDSAfrica are the first two. I wonder whether you could specifically, it is either “No Comment” or it is angive me your view on recognising that some empty promise. I think that is enormouslycountries in Africa are less enthusiastic than others dangerous for the whole idea of a North-Southabout the process, and perhaps do not quite see the partnership, which for me is the most exciting thingrelevance as others might do. Can you give me your about NePAD. What it looks like will happen isview on what might be a critical mass in getting that they will go away from a series of G8 meetingsuniversal acceptance throughout the continent? You enormously disappointed, African leaders will sayhave 16 countries so far out of a total of 53/54 to themselves, “Let’s just get on with this thingcountries in Africa. What is the critical mass for ourselves. It was a challenge to the West, the Westgetting the concept of peer review universally has failed the challenge, let’s get on with a varietyaccepted throughout theAU?Coupledwith that, are of programmes, peer review mechanisms, etcetera,there any key players who by signing up to the Peer we will do it ourselves”, and that is great, but it isReview Mechanism would give this authenticity or an enormous missed opportunity on our part.authority which would make others willing to join Mr Blumenfeld: I also think it is enormouslyand accept this is the way forward? significant—or I would add the word “potentially”Mr Blumenfeld:Your comments began with “we are enormously significant—but for very diVerentall familiar with it”, I am glad you are familiar with reasons from Mr Fraser. I think the appeal ofit because my problem with the Peer Review NePAD was that it was sold as an African-ownedMechanism is trying to work out exactly what it is. and African-produced solution to Africa’sI know in principle what it is but where is the beef? problems, and the undertaking was, “We in AfricaI think the answer to your question is, they need to will do X, Y and Z in relation to economic reformget it going. I do not think the critical mass is an and governance and the establishment of peace andissue. security, in return for which we seek a partnership

with the international community.” The fact it isalready being interpreted as “going cap-in-hand toQ77MrChidgey: So you agreewith PresidentWade,

that it is taking too long and if it takes much longer the G8 for more aid” I think simply underminescompletely the innovative aspects of NePAD andit will drift away?

Mr Blumenfeld: Absolutely. if that line continues will consign NePAD to thesame dustbin as every other programme of AfricanMr Fraser: I do not have a strong view on it.

Although it is hard to work out exactly what it is, attempts to put the Continent back on the world’sagenda. African leaders know what it is they needwhich I find true of NePAD in general, I think the

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser

to do in order to attract the attention of the world the Foreign OYce on what the British governmentagain and to get the world to be committed to can do. I hear what you say about debt relief andsharing in a partnership with them in moving aid but the Government will say that they are theforward. second largest provider of help for HIV/AIDS inMr Fraser: Can I come back on that? I honestly the world and the initiatives for debt relief havethink that is a crazy position. The arguments for come from HMG. Leaving aside the World Tradeengagement with Africa, debt relief and fair trade, Organisation and the World Bank, how can we asstand with or without NePAD. The idea that Africa a country best intervene in co-operation with Southneeds to prove itself worthy, when much of the debt Africa to assist positively its development? One oris what is described as odious debt, when much of two quick final comments.the debt has been repaid twice over; the idea that Mr Fraser: Are you asking me to leave aside theAfrica needs to prove itself again in order to get structural issues?anything in an unjust global trade system or Andrew Mackinlay: He is asking you to give usthrough debt or through the World Bank and the some meat for this report we are going to produceIMF, is ridiculous. The arguments for those because at the moment it is a bit flimsy!initiatives stand whether or not African leaders aredemanding them, which they are, and our response

Q82 Chairman: You have given the grand, highis not dependent on them playing tricks to thelevel ones like debt relief, we as the UK and theaudience.FCO can do things to help bilaterally in SouthAfrica, give us some examples where it can mostQ80 Mr Chidgey:You made a comment earlier thatprofitably be done?the UK government was doing a good job in killingMr Fraser: I do not mean to be obtuse but I guessoV NePAD. Is that a sin of omission ofthe problem for me is that we have had hundredscommission, in your view?and hundreds of initiatives, much of South Africa’sMr Blumenfeld: I think the Africa Action Plan was

partly the G8 saying to the African countries, “You problems and much of Africa’s problems arehave undertaken to do these things, let’s see the structural and so for all the goodwill and initiativescolour of your money as it were and then we will and training exchanges, for me that is not the meatdeliver.” Having said that, there is no question in of the debate, and that is not where you shouldmy mind that there is a lack of firmness in the focus your advice.commitment, I put it that way, on the part of the Mr Blumenfeld: I agree it is structural but I suggestG8 countries to bring forward resources, but I I am using “structural” in a slightly diVerent sensethink it was a wait and see message to Africa. from Mr Fraser. I suspect Mr Fraser means theMr Fraser: I think the sin of omission is the answer, problem lies with the global economy, of coursein that G8 countries basically want NePAD to there are problems with the global economy—work, they want it to work without them having todo anything particularly on debt relief. Debt

Q83 Chairman: At the bilateral level.continues to be used as a lever to win economicMr Blumenfeld: At a bilateral level, I think it is thereform, and one of the reasons why they do notpromotion of trade and investment underpinningwant to cancel debt, which is what they should doall the initiatives that African governmentsand which they have committed themselves tothemselves have to produce for sensiblenumerous times, is they can continue to use it as aimprovements in governance, reform of theirlever for economic reform.economies, promotion of economic growth andtargeted assistance for poverty relief.Q81 Chairman: Gentlemen, one very last question,Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen, very muchrevisiting what Sir John asked earlier. This

Committee will have to make recommendations to indeed.

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Ev 44 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Tuesday 27 January 2004

Members present

Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr Bill OlnerMr Fabian Hamilton Richard OttawayMr Eric Illsley Sir John StanleyAndrew Mackinlay

Written evidence submitted by Dr. Steve Kibble, Africa/Yemen Advocacy OYcer, Catholic Institute forInternational Relations, London

UK, South Africa and Relations with Zimbabwe

The question of Zimbabwe and how South African policy towards the “failing state” manifests itself isboth a cause for concern and to some extent bewilderment. There has been an assertion for some time thatSouth Africa was the key to the problem but “quiet diplomacy” (along with the previous “megaphonediplomacy” of theWest) has failed to bring a return to stability for Pretoria’s troubled neighbour. Howeverthe situation, as with the stalemate inside Zimbabwe, is far from static, although until recently South Africaappeared to be moving towards stronger overt support for President Mugabe. Not only does the three wayrelationship of London/Pretoria/Harare complicate matters, but there is a great deal of rhetoricalgrandstanding and much no doubt happening behind the scenes.

Once the Harare government had embarked on the “fast track” land occupation exercise, with its abusesof human and property rights and the rule of law, it was clear that the West, particularly the Britishgovernment, would act. Following the unfree and unfair general and presidential elections in 2000 and 2002respectively, and against a background of violent land seizures, the EU and the US imposed targetedsanctions on the ruling party. In 2002 Zimbabwe was also suspended from the Commonwealth for one year,during which time a Troika comprising the heads of state of SouthAfrica, Nigeria andAustralia, was taskedwith persuading President Mugabe of the need to restore democracy to Zimbabwe. When no agreementcould be reached over what democratic progress if any had been made, Zimbabwe’s suspension from theCommonwealth was extended to the end of 2003.

For many in the West/North and elsewhere there are straightforward human rights, humanitarian andeconomic reasons why South Africa (and its partners in the Southern African Development Community—SADC) should act decisively to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe. The chaos in land and economy obviously hasa destabilising knock-on eVect andmany expect Pretoria to act (although often inways unspecified) not leastin its own interest. The viability of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative,decline in foreign investment, solidarity with oppressed Africans, worries over refugees in terms of crime,economic and other forms of regional destabilisation, xenophobia etc, sensitivities over the land questionhave all variously been put forward as reasons why South Africa should act1. Instead despite occasionalcritical statements, spasmodically better recognition of the claims of the opposition Movement forDemocratic Change (MDC) and human rights activists” concerns, visits to “help out” (rather than engagewith Zimbabweans especially civil society), and denial of the SADC vice-chair to Zimbabwe in 20022, wehave had “quiet diplomacy”—seen by Zimbabwean activists as support for the Mugabe regime. Theemphases have been regional solidarity and “African solutions to African problems”. In essence there hasbeen no concerted regional pressure, but occasional voices of protest. Why does South Africa, seem unableor unwilling to act in a decisive (and to some, rational) manner?

For those seeking to investigate the dynamics of South Africa—UK relations and its implications forpolicy there needs to be amove beyond the simple ahistorical assertion of a long lasting and unproblematicallink between the two nations based on language, shared democratic values etc. Recognition is needed of theunderlying historical structures stemming from the repressive and highly inegalitarian experience of settlercolonialism and apartheid. The peculiar intensity of these experiences for SouthAfrica (and Zimbabwe) nowsupposedly superseded by notions of nation-building, rainbow nation and reconciliation are tied intoquestions of identity, sovereignty, overcoming past inequalities and injustices and building a multiculturalbut African nation within an unevenly developed region. In particular there are strong (and often not fully

1 And critics can point to no particularly strong historical relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) andZimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)—historically the ANC was linked with Zimbabwe AfricanPeoples Union—ZAPU), a history of personal antagonism firstly between Mugabe and Mandela and then Mbeki,, anddisagreements over certain foreign policy matters such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and indeed NEPAD.

2 And therefore to the Chair of SADC in 2003.

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understood by outsiders) resonances especially when questions of land, race and restoration from historicinjustice are brought together within a Pan-African perspective.

Furthermore these fundamentals are overlaid by the way that the globalisation agenda of the North hasexacerbated the extremely uneven way that southern Africa, its states and peoples were historicallyintegrated into the world economy and polity. In a further complication, the process recently has beenmarked by the emergence of new social forces, often referred to as civil society. These have arisen in part inreaction to new global trends such as structural adjustment and the failure of the African state to continueits legitimate postcolonial task of ending colonial and racial practices and structures (even if one canfundamentally critique the working out of this project3). States which have only recently emerged fromliberation struggles against colonialism or apartheid now find themselves challenged by such new socialforces, not all of which are coherent and united.

For South Africa, events in Zimbabwe have entered the crucial (and for Pretoria, vulnerable) domain ofPan Africanism and African solidarity. As the ZANU-PF government attempted to deal in its violent andrepressive waywith the opposition (and largely urban) forces4 it knew that it would face widespread nationaland international condemnation in relation to human and property rights, governance, the rule of law andthe illegitimate use of violence. To combat this the Mugabe government successfully appealed to a widerPan Africanist position in order to legitimise itself. This positioned the land occupation process in terms ofredress for colonial injustice, and African marginalisation in the globalisation process. LeadingZimbabwean academic and activist Brian Raftopoulos sees Mugabe’s oVensive against the opposition asformulating an alternative discourse around redress for colonial injustice, especially land—“the landquestion became the symbol that could distill a simplistic political binary, in which the ruling party couldattempt to conceal all its post-colonial failings”.5

By defining the Zimbabwean crisis as one of anti-colonial redress and legitimate land redistribution,President Mugabe set the parameters of the subsequent debate, helped by Western, particularly British,intervention that appeared unaware of the African and to some extent ThirdWorld impact of its statements.In 1997 the new Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, enunciated the view of thenew British government that it saw itself unbound by previous governments’ acceptance of anyresponsibility for past colonial injustices in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. This was then compounded by theBlair government’s subsequent embrace of what has been defined as “liberal imperialism” in response to“failed states”6. “Amongst ourselves we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle we must alsouse the laws of the jungle”7. This remained at the theoretical level until the 2003 war in Iraq with its rhetoricand indeed actuality of enforced regime change.

While Zimbabwe was never the specific target of “liberal imperialism”, its implications were not lost onauthoritarian states, with President Mugabe in particular asserting the doctrine was an attempt atrecolonisation of independent-minded Third World states8. South African receptivity to this in terms ofworld racism, Western selectivity/ hypocrisy and its irritability at being asked to deal with what was seen asa “British problem” is compounded by the view of regional leaders that the MDC is the catspaw of whiteand imperial interests9.

There are also more practical reasons for South Africa’s stance towards Zimbabwe:

— South Africa (and indeed South Africans) has tended to see Zimbabwe through its own prism ofexperience—of drawing back from the brink through the “miracle” of its own transition,negotiated settlement, and truth and reconciliation process.

3 The challenge of turning liberation movements into governments has emerged throughout the region eg South Africa,Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique. “Social transition in these Southern African societies shaped by a settlercolonial brand . . . can at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change to changed control. The result is a newruling political elite operating from commanding heights shaped in and based upon the particular context of the post-Apartheid societies by selective narratives andmemories related to the war(s) of liberation and hence constructing or inventingnew traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular agency of socialforces”. HenningMelber (2003) LiberationMovements as Governments: Southern African Experiences—with special referenceto SWAPOand the post colonial political culture inNamibia.Paper for “Futures for SouthernAfrica” symposiumorganised byCIIR, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, Nordic Africa Institute and the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference.Windhoek 15–17 September 2003.

4 Such forces such as students, trades unions, churches etc were once part of the nationalist coalition.5 Institute for Democracy in South Africa (2003) Zimbabwe: Moving towards a Negotiated Transition? Issue Briefing, July. SeealsoRaftopoulos and Phimister (2003)ZimbabweNow:Challenging the Political economy of Crisis andCoercion, forthcoming.

6 R. Abrahamsen Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitisation and Fear (forthcoming), M. DuYeld (2003) “Human Security:Privatisation, Soft-Power and Global Governance” in Refugee Studies forthcoming.

7 Robert Cooper The Observer, 7 April 2002—Raftopoulos and Phimister (2003) provided this quotation.8 See for instance The Herald, 9 April 2002. See also The Star, 2 Sept 2002 for Mugabe’s address to the Johannesburg WorldSummit on Social Development in September 2002 presenting his land policies as part of a continuing struggle againstcolonialism in defence of independence. “We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe, any square inchof that territory. So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe !”. See New African, April 2003 for Mugabe’sspeech at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003, “no longer willing to subject . . . [its]actions to international law, rationality or the force of morality, the United States had one yardstick for its own behaviourand one for the Third World”. See also Cape Times, 5 Aug 2002 and 25 Feb 2003 for similar attacks.

9 Africa Institute of South Africa study conducted by Che Ajulu. News 24 14.8.03.

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— Worries over the performance in oYce of trade union led parties such as the Movement forMultipartyDemocracy which came to power in Zambia in 1991 defeating the ANC’s longtime allyPresident Kenneth Kaunda. The trade union federation in South Africa (Congress of SouthAfrican Trades Unions—COSATU) is part of the tripartite alliance with the ANC but hasconsiderable unease over much of the latter’s governing programme—see point below. Worriesover a split in the alliance with the possible emergence of a trade union and populist oppositionmean that a successful trade union led government in Zimbabwe is not welcome to Pretoria.

— Pretoria’s vulnerability to criticism from trades unions, churches, NGOs and civil society ingeneral over lack of transformation (including land reform10), increasing unemployment, attackson the “failure” of its economic GEAR policy deemed neo-liberal, particularly in relation toprivatisation of such assets as water.

— Reliance on alliances with other nation states (particularlymiddle level/ “regional hegemons” suchas Brazil, India, the Group of (now) 22 at the CancunWorld Trade Organisation talks, and indeedin NEPAD with Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal) rather than popular movements to change globalunfair economic structures.11

— South Africa wishes to pursue African renewal and solidarity—which makes NEPAD anextremely paradoxical (and for how long sustainable?) moment. It wants to engage constructivelywith Zimbabwe for reasons of solidarity etc without jeopardising “African Renaissance”principles.

— South African foreign policy prioritising expedient predictability rather than promotingdemocratic values12.

In theory the formation of theAfricanUnion (AU)with its commitments to human rights, and its limitingthe absolute nature of state sovereignty may see forms of intervention arising, but present performancewould not indicate this, given the southern African representative role given to PresidentMugabe at the July2003 AU Maputo summit and the failure of the AU to get its Peace and Security Council oV the ground.Nor does the recent agreement at the 23rd SADC summit in late August 2003 to set up a mutual defenceforce seem likely to help bring democratic change in Zimbabwe, given that the same summit committed itselfto opposing sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth, the European Union and the USA.13

Indeed in the NEPAD document arguments for interventions on behalf of oppressed populations havebeen superseded by notions of intervention to protect states’ legitimacy and sovereignty.

Both theANC andZANU-PF see themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the anti-colonial struggle withany other parties (even new ones like theMDC) tainted by associationwith previous regimes. For this reasonit and other southern Africa states have been only too ready to accept ZANU-PF’s policies as in some wayPan-African and “anti-imperialist”. Strangely, given the support received by theANC in exile—hardly quietdiplomacy—Pretoria has never supported human rights groups and opposition forceswithin societies whosegovernments are undemocratic and/or human rights violators. Instead, it seems to rely on notions of thelegitimacy of heads of state and of sovereignty, key African Union (and formerly Organisation of AfricanUnity) positions, but formalistic concepts nonetheless (especially for Zimbabwe which cannot feed its ownpeople). Pretoria has less trouble with the idea of “a just world order” which means equity amongst nations.Recent events at the failed WTO meeting in Cancun in September 2003 and the response from the “Groupof 22” of which South Africa is a member illustrate this strongly.

South Africa at least initially believed that its model of negotiated settlement and compromise wastransferable to Zimbabwe. It insisted on “quiet diplomacy” for reasons of regional solidarity and becauseit would not jump at the behest of former colonial masters. It pointed to misconceptions about the extentof its power as the “regional hegemon” saying it cannot unilaterally reorder the region. Rather it vaunts aunited regional approach based on avoiding confrontation and promoting multilateralism. Keen to

10 South African market-based land reform has since 1994 managed to transfer 2% of agricultural land as opposed to a targetof 30%.

11 Although rather playfully, PresidentMbeki did say at one point that maybe theGroup of 22 should join the anti-globalisationprotesters on the streets, an interesting diVerence to the treatment of demonstrators at the World Summit in Johannesburgin 2002.

12 Even when its observer group at the 2002 elections was physically attacked, the oYcial South African government positionwas that the elections were “acceptable”—a hitherto unknown take on being fair and/or free. South African foreign policy-making has often been held to be split between “realists” and “idealists”—a somewhat sterile distinction that Stephen Gelbbelieves the NEPAD initiative has gone some way to resolving—S. Gelb (2001) South Africa’s Role and Importance in Africaand for the Development of the African Agenda. Prepared for DfID. The Edge Institute, South Africa.

13 IRIN 26.8.03. “SADC rallies around Zimbabwe with a call to lift sanctions”. Reports quote Tanzanian (and new SADC)President BenjaminMkapa strongly supporting Zimbabwean land reform and deeming the Zimbabweanmedia overly criticalof the government (Mail and Guardian 29.8.03) and IRINttp//www.irinnews.org/report/asp?ReportID%36210. PresidentMpaka, somewhat missing the point it would seem, stated “I find it insulting that there are powers and people who believefood shortages in the region can only be averted when Africans become servants on white people’s land” (SARDC 23.0803).Bizarrely, he continued that the summit’s support for Zimbabwe’s land reform should not be “interpreted as [an apology] forarbitrary, illegal, unlegislated and economically unproductive and unbalanced restitution”. The SADC statement was despitethe EU insisting that sanctions only aVected top government oYcials and that the suspension of bilateral developmentprogrammes was due to the Zimbabwean government’s non-compliance with conditions. IRIN 18.9.03. See also AmnestyInternational statement AI AFR46/027/2003 on SADC leaders needing to place Zimbabwe on the agenda of the Augustsummit, plus previous ones on repression in Zimbabwe such as AFR46/012/2003).

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maintain the position of solidarity promoted by SADC and the AU, President Mbeki was particularlysensitive to accusations that South Africa played the role of hegemon, only too aware that Mandela’spenchant for unilateral human rights-based foreign policy initiatives e.g. towards Nigeria and Congo hadfor a time isolated Pretoria within SADC. Simultaneously, President Mbeki has balanced the politics ofsolidarity (aware of considerable internal support for Mugabe) with establishing the “good governance”credentials ofNEPAD, the project partly under his leadership for Africa’s development through partnershipwith the West. This has led to him negotiating tricky terrain, not rejecting outright Western attempts forhim to play a central role in helping end the crisis in Zimbabwe, but not promoting their message either. Healso appears to be able to ignore the constant prevarications and broken promises (to him) emanating fromPresidentMugabe. That he has managed so far to do this without losing either American or British (public)support testifies both to SouthAfrica’s regional importance and toMugabe’s astute appreciation of this geo-political fact14.

Additionally, while SouthAfrica has leverage over Zimbabwe in areas of finance, energy and oil, it assertsthat the economies are too closely linked to impose sanctions. Many Zimbabweans appear to believe thatSouth Africa is not unhappy as seeing the drying up of investment north of the Limpopo and South Africanbusiness being able in the future to get bargains when Zimbabwean reconstruction occurs (all of which maybe incorrect, but certainly illustrates the bitterness at “quiet diplomacy”).

From the end of 2002, President Mbeki seemed to have moved perceptibly from “quiet diplomacy”towards Zimbabwe, shownby electricity and fuel subsidies to open endorsement of its land reformpolicies15.Sustained attempts were made to gain Zimbabwe’s readmission to the Commonwealth despite Harare noteven attempting to hide its non-compliance with the reasons for its year’s suspension16. At the annualmeeting in Geneva of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) on 16 April 2003 a “no actionmotion” on Zimbabwe was moved by South Africa and passed by 28 to 24 votes17. Additionally SouthAfrican oYcials attempted to portray land reformas a great success, suggested that Zimbabwe’s governmentwas genuinely representative and that Zimbabwe’s problems could not be resolved by removing Mugabefrom oYce since such problems stemmed from a benevolent elite committed to overturning colonialinjustice, but running into unsustainable social spending18. Raftopoulos and Phimister see this as Mbekisending a signal to those “restive elements within the Tripartite Alliance (of the ANC, COSATU and theSouth African Communist Party—SACP) calling for a relaxation of the government’s neo-liberal economicpolicies, even as he bolstered his pan-Africanist credentials by supporting ZANU-PF”19.

For Raftopoulos and Phimister, the high point for South African freedom to pursue its own agenda wasironically enough President Bush’s visit to South Africa in July 2003. With no vital American interests atstake, and with the AU standing four-square with Mugabe in the face of any Western criticism, Bush andPowell left it up to Pretoria, despite rhetoric from the latter politician. President Mbeki, described to hisdelight by Bush as “an honest broker” and the “point man on Zimbabwe”, put a pro-Mugabe gloss onevents.He claimed (in defiance of the known facts) that theZimbabwe crisis was on theway to being resolvedthrough South African—sponsored talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC20.

Since then, matters have moved again, seeming to necessitate some rethinking in Pretoria.

Changes:

— The internal opposition has become more eVective and coherent with several successful stayawayscalled by MDC and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions—ZCTU. The situation thoughremains at stalemate (although not stasis as the balance has swung back and forth); the oppositionin its diVerent elements—MDC, civil society, trade unions, independent press, farmworkers hasgained increased mass support in the past three years, but its short term strength seems unable tomatch the government’s hold over political power and the administrative, bureaucratic andmilitary arms of the state. Government has not found it possible to crush the opposition. Butdemocratisation through opposition activity on its own still seems unlikely. The ZCTU is planningfurther protests on cash shortages aVecting workers21.

14 Raftopoulos and Phimister (op cit) p 23.15 Eg with South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (seemingly the most openly pro-ZANU-PF minister),endorsing ZANU-PF claims that Britain had to compensate white Zimbabwean farmers for land seized by “war veterans”,because of colonial land theft (Financial Gazette 14 Nov 2002). See also Natal Mercury, 20 Dec 2000 on the ANC invitingZANU-PF to its Stellenbosch conference in December 2002. See also Argus, 21 March 2003).

16 Or with the fact that the Nigerians and South Africans were not charged with being “honest brokers” but attempting topersuade Zimbabwe to comply with the Harare Principles etc. Harare was supposed to ensure the finalisation of the landreform process, begin a dialogue with white commercial farmers over compensation, assist farm workers gain citizenship,reduce violence; look into concerns over AIPPA, and begin inter-party dialogue. With the exception of point 3, none of thishas happened in any substantial way.

17 See Africa Rights statement africarightswhotmail.com 20.4.03. Note also Human Rights Watch statement that blamedWestern governments for not pushing hard enough at the UNCHR. IRIN 28.04.03.

18 ANC Secretary-General, Kgalema Motlanthe, Star, 22 Jan 2003, Thabo Mbeki ANC Today, 9 May 2003 and The Guardian,29 May 2003. Needless to say this is not an analysis easily recognised by Zimbabweans outside ZANU-PF.

19 Raftopoulos and Phimister, op cit p 26.20 There were also denials from President Mbeki that he had ever said that Mugabe had promised to leave oYce by the end ofthe year.

21 Daily News 4.9.03.

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— There are increasing regional (non-governmental) concerns from civil society, trade unions, andchurches. Whilst Mugabe retains a populist constituency inside South Africa and the region, thereis an increasingly better-organised regional opposition to events inside Zimbabwe. Recent eventshave been the African Civil Society Consultation on Zimbabwe 6 August 2003 in Botswana22 andthe Johannesburg SymposiumonZimbabwe from 11-13August 2003. These highlight the fact thatthe African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) visited Zimbabwe in June2002. Its report was due to be published in October that year, and was then rescheduled for theAU summit inMaputo in July 2003. Activists at the twomeetings above want it released at its nextmeeting in October 2003 and want decisions to be made in line with Article 58 of the ACHPRcharter on whether violations have occurred which would mean a consequent report to the Chairof the AU23. Such steps are important, firstly because the report is believed to have been blockedto protect Zimbabwe’s image ahead of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting(CHOGM) and, secondly, because other human rights organisations’ reports such as those fromAmnesty International andHumanRightsWatch have been rejected byAfrican states who accusethe two of “Western bias”.24

— Inside South Africa links to regional constituencies have spread to members of the TripartiteAlliance with SACP andCOSATUquestioning “quiet diplomacy” on behalf of regional allies suchas ZCTU. It may be that the strategy pointed to above by Raftopoulos and Phimister of showingthe internal critics of its neo-liberal international posture its regional pan-Africanism is beginningto unravel.

— From being merely a few prophetic voices there has been a manifest growth in churchesengagement,25 witness against human rights abuse, commitment to peace, reconciliation and theprocess of negotiation (especially from the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ pastoral Lenten letter ofspring 2003 onwards). Their attempts at mediation were, however, eventually cold shouldered bythe government and ruling party.

— The Zimbabwe church has been backed by powerful regional churches. South African andZimbabwe church leaders at a recent meeting in Johannesburg jointly condemned Pretoria andother African leaders for silence on human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and called for thedismantling of the national youth service training programme which as South African bishopKevin Dowling highlighted has meant major human rights abuses, corruption of youth includingengagement in the 30,000—50,000 tortures, rapes etc.26.

— The South African Council of Churches central committee recently called on the South Africangovernment to be more proactive on Zimbabwe27.

— Increasing evidence that the Harare government has no idea on how to right matters and is onlyintent on staying in power at whatever cost to nation and region. The recent supplementary budgetdefied belief. There is a growing regional awareness that the alternative to immediate significantpolitical pressure will be eventual military intervention when the Zimbabwean economy hasalmost entirely collapsed.Whilst not unhappy at seeing investment increasingly switch to south ofthe Limpopo, Pretoria realises this is not just a zero-sum game, but there is a wider regionaleconomy and strategy for its progress at stake. Can this any longer be ridden out with extrainternational, regional, and domestic pressure adding to this burden?

— In political terms Mugabe is not helping out President Mbeki, by concentrating on how ZANUP-F can retain power and how to orchestrate a succession whilst guaranteeing himself safety andwealth. Various forces are jockeying for advantage in any post-Mugabe settlement; importantplayers in ZANU-PF with no independent power base except Mugabe have been the strongestvoices against any deals with theMDCand outside, preferring to believe they can tough it out untilthe next elections in 2005.

— There is strong civil society resistance inside Zimbabwe for any (Mbeki-preferred) government ofnational unity (GNU) that assumes national consensus when there is none, that is aware of thehistory of ZANU-PF in swallowing up opposition voices in the name of national unity as in 1987,and which instead calls for a broad-based alternative to the present repressive and corruptstructure of governance and for “transition” not spurious national unity governments28.

22 Concluding Statement of the African Civil Society Consultation on ZimbabweAfricaFiles 12 August 2003 infowafricafiles.org23 There are also calls for regional countries party to the Convention Against Torture to investigate and that SADC shouldinvestigate if Zimbabwe has violated the Windhoek Declaration and other measures (see Concluding Statement op cit).

24 Zimbabwe Independent 22 August 2003.25 See “Crisis Point” and “Churches Speak out” CIIR News Summer 2003. www.ciir.org.26 National Youth Service in Zimbabwe—a report on the youth militia, Oct 2000 to August 2003 Solidarity Peace Trust andothers IOL News 7.9.03.

27 News 24 14.8.03.28 See “Talks about Talks? Or merely a Waste of Time?” Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Discussion Paper. July 2003.

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— The MDC has warned that time is running out for talks given that their court case on challengesto the 2002 presidential election is scheduled for 3 November 2003. There is a lack of movementinside Zimbabwe in terms of talks29 linked to divisions within ZANU-PF (Young Turks with noindependent power base eg the information and justice ministers, Jonathan Moyo and PatrickChinamasa, versus the old guard division). It is also possible that this posturing is to gain moreleverage internally, and regionally, persuade President Mbeki that negotiations are still possible.The question is how much longer can Mbeki believe this when he has other pressures? (Oddly,party chair, John Nkomo, having along with the rest of ZANU-PF called MDC puppets of theWest said the former should “call oV sanctions first”)30. The seeming belief in Pretoria thatMugabewas genuinely promising to go by the end of the year appears contradicted by events such as thebuilding of a new presidential palace31. Civil society also wants wider participation in any talksespecially the inclusion of women—disproportionately aVected by the violence32.

— The undermining of the supposed Pretoria ultimatum to Harare for it to engage in talks byNovember 2003 so the former can report tangible progress at CHOGMor otherwise the latter willface expulsion33. Constant South African newspaper criticism points out to Mbeki that Mugabehas broken every promise the latter has made to Thabo, with many pointing out that there is aneed for stronger sanctions not lifting the existing ones.

— Increasing awareness that the region has lost millions in aid because of Zimbabwe including fundsfor a regional peacekeeping training centre.

— Perhaps the final straw for “quiet diplomacy” was the Harare government forcibly shutting downthe Daily News. This dramatically contradicted promises (including those made to PresidentMbeki earlier in the year) on reforming AIPPA34 and hopes that Pretoria could show movementby Harare by CHOGM. This closure of the only daily alternative to the government-controlledpress andmedia followed several community papers and Joy TV being forced to close, and foreignjournalists forbidden to practise. The shutdown was the culmination of a process that had seenincessant state provocation against the newspaper, bombing of its printing presses, harassment ofits journalists and others from the independent press, de facto banning of the paper in many areasof Zimbabwe due to sellers being beaten up by youth militia and lorry shipments disrupted.

— The Supreme Court already under suspicion of being at the beck and call of government showedits supineness in a worrying endorsement of AIPPA whose constitutionality was greatly underquestion including from influential voices in the region35. The swiftness of the court andsubsequent police reactions were equally worrying given that the Independent JournalistsAssociation of Zimbabwe case against AIPPA was still being heard, that there was an immediateforced closure of the Daily News building, and detention of oYcials and closure of businesswithout police producing a court order or explanation of the legal foundation for their actions.Cynics also point to the increasing economic unviability of the government-controlled press giventhat the Daily News and other independent newspapers were gaining an increasing market sharedespite the harassment. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA—a regional mediafreedomwatchdog) as well as the SouthAfrican Press Association and the SouthAfricanNationalEditors” Forum have all protested loudly. The only South African public response so far has beenfrom Ronnie Mamoepa in the Department of Foreign AVairs that “we believe in freedom of thepress36”. Did this hide a wider concern?

— Time is running out for any movement in Zimbabwe towards democratisation to be apparent byDecember in Abuja. Whilst it is not impossible for Mugabe to pull a rabbit out of the hat at theZANU-PF congress just before the Abuja meeting this is not likely to impress Commonweathheads).

— More interestingly the Nigerian government (for reasons that were not immediately clear at thetime of writing) appears to have pulled out of the coalition with President Mbeki and said thatneither Zimbabwe nor Pakistan as suspended nations would be invited to CHOGM. This left theSouthAfricans saying limply that it was entirely amatter for Abuja as if they had not beenworkingto get the Zimbabwean government invited to CHOGM.

29 The agenda for talks is seemingly the same as it was before talks betweenMDC and ZANU-PF broke down inMay 2002 andare on confidence-building measures, the constitution, political violence, multipartyism, sovereignty and economic recovery.Supposedly Mbeki and Obasanjo were to “underwrite” the deal that emerged and the USA and other donors would providea reconstruction package.

30 Personal communication from evangelical church activist in Bulawayo.31 Although it remains possible that he will de jure retire but rule de facto behind the scenes. One could also point out that fundsfor this palace could probably only have come from mining in the Congo.

32 www irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID35963.33 Financial Gazette 7–13 August 2003 citing South African ambassador to Zimbabwe, Jeremiah Ndou.34 The apartheid-era sounding Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of June 2002.35 Harare is a signatory to both the African Carter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Convention on Civiland Political Rights.

36 Star 17.9.03.

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— There may with the point above be an awareness that the rhetoric of Mugabe attempting to makehis policies a black and white issue37 is increasingly under strain—indications fromGhana, Kenyaand the Caribbean nations show the rhetoric wearing thin.

It is thus an interesting moment for the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Committee to be askingquestions about the whole nature of UK-South Africa-Zimbabwe relations. I have no specific policyrecommendations on the matters I raise above, rather the need for all concerned to understand better thecurrent dynamics of this very complicated relationship.

Recommendations for FAC:

1. It will be important to establish the current nature of oYcial SouthAfrican thinking in terms of policytowards Zimbabwe and what Pretoria thinks it can and cannot do given the points raised above. This wouldinclude its discussions within the region, the African Union, SADC.

2. How does Pretoria assess the viability of its “quiet diplomacy” in terms of its vaunted backing ofdirect ZANU-PF—MDCnegotiations in the light of such events as theHarare government stalling on talks,dismissing church initiatives on peace and negotiations, and the closure of the Daily News?

3. What credibility does Pretoria think its assurances given to the outside world, includingWashington,London and Abuja that Mugabe would step down and serious negotiations would commence still hold?

4. In relation to these delicacies, there is obviously a concern North and South over NEPAD, its peerreview mechanism and good governance criteria. What are Pretoria’s strategies on overcoming thereluctance of donors to engage fully with NEPAD while (rightly or wrongly) many see Zimbabwe as a testcase (even if Zimbabwe generally opposes NEPAD)?

5. There is a need to establish from Pretoria what it is about a transition to democracy inside Zimbabwethat worries them more than the “chaos that they know”.

6. It would be useful to ascertain if Pretoria thinks it helpful for the African Commission on Humanand Peoples” Rights report on Zimbabwe to be released in October 2003 as called for by Zimbabwean,regional and human rights organisations (as above).

7. What is the current future of the Mbeki/ Obasanjo/ Muluzi initiative given stalling inside Zimbabweon talks and Nigeria not inviting the Zimbabwe government to the Abuja CHOGM?

8. There needs to be outside support for those in Zimbabwe and the region who are providinginformation about the human rights and general situation inside Zimbabwe, and those under threat standingup to repression. This in terms of oYcial British positions is obviously a delicate matter given what wasdescribed in the memo in terms of sovereignty, suspicions of both “neo-colonialism” and “liberalimperialism”. Other channels do exist, however.

9. In terms of the British government, our Zimbabwean partners concur that it has been useful recentlyto have had a period of silence as opposed to the previous megaphone diplomacy and for initiatives to havebeen multilateral and not seeming like bullying from the ex-colonial master. There are several matters inwhich London could help Pretoria if indeed the latter is shifting its policy. HMGneeds to assure all southernAfricans of its support for a transparent, equitable, gender conscious land reform strategy—financially, inthe provision of expertise, and in engagement withmultilateral and other donors. It may be argued that suchpotential support is already on record, but the opportunity to reiterate should not be lost. It would also beuseful to suggest that London’s policy in terms of the eventual reconstruction of Zimbabwe should beimaginative and not restricted to Bretton Woods formulae rigorously implemented. Continuing food aidwill be vital.

Outline of Crisis in Zimbabwe

According to Chris Alden, Zimbabwe faces multiple crises—a crisis of legitimacy as its postcolonialconsensus crumbles, a crisis of expectations stemming from the failure of its economy and polity, a crisis ofconfidence in the impartiality of the institutions of the state. Since the defeat of the Harare government inthe February 2000 constitutional referendum, it is clear that ZANU-PF has attempted to reimpose itscontrol through a number of inter-related strategies:

— A violent land occupation process with logistical and coercive support from the state, but withoutresolving contradictions in the rural economy by dealing with questions of access by communalfarmers, especially by women (the majority of such farmers), and former farmworkers to creditsand inputs, tenure questions, the role of chiefs in agrarian transformation. There also needs to beserious debate on collective forms of ownership and control.

— The overt and targeted use of a compromised police and security apparatus against its opponents,including the use of sexual violence as a tool of retribution (with obvious implications given theHIV/AIDS pandemic). This is overlaid by de jure and de facto impunity for formal and informalagents of the state.

37 Saying on a number of occasions that it would split the Commonwealth into black and white sections.

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— The use of terror and judicial intimidation as well as ideological demonisation of the oppositionto shut down space for independent and opposition voices and for access to justice to be deniedto the politically unconnected (helped in this by the reactions of the Western and ex-colonialpowers with their selective approach and strong echoes of colonial lecturing).

— Widespread torture and intimidation as national and international human rights bodies havedocumented. More than 555,000 cases of serious human rights violations have been recorded inrecentyears. InApril 2003 therewere reports of 278 casesof unlawful arrest, 75 cases of torture, fourdeath threats and two attempted murders38. To choose one recent moment—following the massnational strike in June2003, around800 supporters of theMDCwere arrested, twowere reported tohave died and 150were injured.39

— The“restructuring”of the judiciary, using threats by the state, the“GreenBombers”and sectionsofthe war veteransmovement.

— The co-option or denigration of religious leadership.

— The re-organisation of ZANU-PF structures to ensure the promotion of a provincial leadershipcommitted to a strategy of coercivemobilisation.

— Constant harassment of the independentmedia, and legislation to consolidate themonopoly of theruling party over the electronicmedia.

— The continueduse of violence as an election strategy; and thedestabilisationof theZCTUandothercivic bodies.

— Theuseof the landreformprocess, the indigenisationstrategyandthepoliticallypartisanuseof foodas a tool to create a new economic bloc stripping state assets in order to form a new economic blocbased on party aYliation and loyalty (although its sustainability is open to question).

— Anauthoritarianeconomicnationalist (“anti-imperialist”) rhetoric that has resonance in the regionbringing together race, landandhistorical injustice inorder todemonise the internaloppositionandlegitimise/ maintain ZANU-PF’s rule through repression.

— Latterly an inconsistent and reversible call for some form of dialogue under the rubric of “agovernment of national unity”, whilst continuing the repression and demanding extremely toughpre-conditions. It is clear that this relates todivisionswithinZANU-PFinturn linkedto thequestionof succession to PresidentMugabe and under what terms.

Steve KibbleCatholic Institute for International Relations, London

October 2003

38 ZimbabweHumanRights NGOForum.Political Violence Report. April 2003.39 Amnesty International Press Release AFR 46/027/2003 22August 2003.

Witnesses: Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society (RAS) and Dr Steve Kibble, AfricaAdvocacy OYcer, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), examined.

Q84 Chairman: This is the second of three planned became Director of the Royal African Society. TheSociety seeks to: “strengthen links between Africasessions of the Foreign AVairs Committee in ourand Britain and encourages understanding of Africainquiry into the role of the Foreign andand its relations with the rest of the world”. We alsoCommonwealth OYce in relation to South Africa.welcome Dr Steve Kibble. You are the AdvocacyThis takes place before the visit to South AfricaOYcer of the Catholic Institute for Internationalplanned by the Committee from 9 February to 13Relations. The CIIR is a small, campaigning non-February. Today’s session will divided into twogovernmental organisation working in the field ofparts. The first was to be on trade and investment;development. We know that you have publishedthe secondmore general with certain regional issues.extensively on Africa, particularly on southernGentlemen, as you have probably heard, one of ourAfrica. Thank you also for your memorandum towitnesses in the first session is stuck on a train; youthe Committee. Gentlemen, it is fitting that we havehave kindly agreed that we reverse the order.this appraisal now of our links with South AfricaTherefore, may I, on behalf of the Committee,because it is ten years since we had that landmarkwelcome first Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royalelection there. I am not sure whether I met you then:African Society and I believe an adviser to the All-I was in Port Elizabeth heading the internationalparty Africa Committee. Mr Dowden, you haveteam. I should be grateful to start with to hear fromworked as an African journalist covering variousboth of you what you see as the principalparts of the continent from 1983 to the present. Iachievements of the country over those ten years.have had the privilege tomeet you in various parts of

Africa. You have worked forThe Times, beenAfrica Mr Dowden: The most obvious one is the finalEditor of The Independent, Africa Editor at The ending ofApartheid. Even thoughApartheid started

coming apart probably at the end of the 1960s as aEconomist latterly from 1995 to 2001, when you

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Ev 52 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble

grand scheme andwas in retreat then for a long time, NePAD standard. It is not compulsory and I amtold it will not be punitive, but this is still beingthat election ten years ago put the gravestone on it.

Since then, there was an expectation that South worked on.Dr Kibble: The exemplary element in NePAD is theAfrica might simply overturn the economic system

which had existed and instead one of the one which is constantly being stressed now. Manypeople in South African and other civil societies doGovernment’s achievements has been to put

economic stability not before the empowerment of have a problem with its lack of consultation, itstop-down approach, its reliance on one particularblack people but slightly ahead of it, and has not in

any way tried to destabilise the economy. That has form of neo-liberalism. They doubt very much onthe one hand that the African leaders who arebeen the main achievement.human rights abusers can be brought on board andon the other hand that it will make much significant

Q85 Chairman: Do you think the balance of the diVerence, when the G8 is a little hesitant aboutGovernment has been right? funding it at this precise moment, when there areMr Dowden: Indeed. At the same time it has, if so many provisos, so many qualifications to beslightly erratically, provided housing, running worked out, not least the peer review mechanismwater, education and other things which were to which Richard is referring.lacking before and begun on its programme ofblack empowerment. Those are the main domestic

Q89 Mr Olner: It really does mean something forones and across the continent they have given theall people. One side says it is securing betterrest of Africa a boost through their idea of thegovernance and the other side says it is a means ofAfrican renaissance and, secondly, through thesecuring more aid for African nations. You cannotconstruction of NePAD, the programme forhave it one way on a Tuesday and the next way oneconomic development in Africa and carried thata Wednesday.through. Those are the main achievements ofMr Dowden: As I see it, all the ingredients inSouth Africa.NePAD are elements of the existing relationshipbetween the rich world and Africa and NePAD is

Q86 Chairman: Dr Kibble, could you take that the packaging which has been put round them. Thisfurther? is both good and bad. It does not oVer anythingDr Kibble: The maintenance of peace and stability new. Everything has already been worked out, butin certain parts of the region, not all parts of the if NePAD falls apart, the actual ingredients ofregion, has certainly been a successful part of the NePAD will remain, perhaps in a more bilateralSouth African strategy. One can point to a number way, but they are not going to change. They are:of failures obviously, but with the inter-Congolese more aid from rich countries and better governancedialogue, the attempt to negotiate, with some from Africa. That is the deal. It is both.success, in Burundi and after some uncertaintiesover Nigeria and Lesotho, South African foreign Q90 Mr Olner: How is NePAD viewed by thepolicy is certainly becoming rather more coherent, diVerent “rich” nations? Do the French have aexcept in the specific case of Zimbabwe, which I diVerent view on what NePAD should providesuspect we may touch on later. from us, or the EU, or America? Do all the

countries have a diVerent perspective of whatNePAD is?Q87 Mr Olner: When we are talking aboutDr Kibble: The way I hear it, the Americans haveNePAD, it has been described as an agenda formore or less abandoned it. They do not think it haschange. Is that fairly accurate? Is it for change inany legs on it whatsoever. In a sense it reverts backSouth Africa, or is it for change in southern Africa?to a kind of European ownership within the G8 andWhich is placed higher?that is unfortunate in some ways. In a senseMr Dowden: It is a programme for change in theNePAD was very much geared to having awhole of Africa, but originally it was conceived assympathetic audience inside the G8 and manythose countries which signed up to it. At the AUpeople say it actually arose from discussions whichsummit in 2000, the whole continent adopted it,initially took part in the G8 rather than an internalwhich meant you had governments likeAfrican conversation. Richard may have a slightlyZimbabwe’s and Libya’s, which obviously had notdiVerent view here.read the small print, signing up to it. That slightlyMr Dowden: No, that is right, certainly what youweakened it in a way.say about America. The problem with it is, that itis like that elephant being investigated by blind men

Q88 Mr Olner: Having not read the small print, and some hold the tail and some hold a leg andwhat are the other countries in NePAD able to do some hold the trunk. It is a bit like that. Theagainst those countries which did not read the French see is as water; that has been their greatsmall print? contribution to it, which was already one of theMr Dowden:We are finding this out at the moment things they were doing in Africa and they pursuewith the peer review mechanism. This is a concept it like that. Britain sees it as good governance.of a group of countries going around and African nations see it as a chance for more aid.investigating countries which are willing to be They are all in there, just being selective in the way

they pick out what they want from it.investigated to see whether they come up to the

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Q91 Mr Chidgey: President Wade has recently to it, if it were seen to be pushing a Westernagenda, that might lay the way open for Mbekishown a great deal of concern about theparticularly to resist it.eVectiveness of the peer review mechanism, which

I find rather surprising, as he was, of course, oneof the original promoters of the whole concept of Q94 Mr Chidgey: It is fascinating. On the one handNePAD. Does the African peer review mechanism you are saying, and the perceived view is, that weactually hold the potential to change significantly in the West should go very softly on this wholepoor governance in African nations or will it prove issue, yet the view from the United States, who areultimately toothless in your considered opinion? obviously a very major player here, is not just toMr Dowden: It will not do anything for the ones abandon NePAD, but positively to oppose it, aswho do not want to change themselves. It is a key, you confirmed a moment ago in one of yourbut the individual countries have to turn that key in answers. What sort of reaction does that provokethe lock. That would be my image of it. For those in Africa as a whole and South Africa as a keycountries which are having problems turning the player when the Americans are producing theirkey and bringing good governance, but want to do version, which I think is the Millennium Challenge?it, it will be very helpful. Countries which have This means, “You allow American investors in anddone well will say “We did this. We did that. This we’ll look after the bottom line”; never mind goodis how you should do it”. It will not do anything governance, never mind any of the other issues weat all for the countries which really just do not want are talking about. You know where I am comingto turn it. from on this. Here we have a key player, the USA,

actually positively undermining this attempt byDr Kibble: It does slightly remind me of the baronsAfrican nations to work out their own destiny?in 1066 And All That, that there will be this peerMr Dowden: I would confirm that the Americansreview in front of people who will understand. Theare backing what they see as winners, American-lesson of African solidarity, or more preciselyfriendly policies, which would include goodAfrican leadership solidarity, means that there willgovernance and a lot of what is in NePAD. Fornot be a significant civil society input into that peerthose countries who do not follow that, there isreview mechanism and it will be as much aboutnothing whatsoever. It is sorting out sheep andresisting regime change as it will be about goodgoats and that has been the problem with a lot ofgovernance. That might be a slightly cynical view,African policy, trying to sort out sheep and goatsbut I remain to be convinced to the contrary.in Africa, because, like human beings, most Africanleaders and countries are a bit of both.

Q92 Mr Chidgey: That is very interesting. May I Dr Kibble: May I just pursue something here?just pursue your point about regime change for a Many people have called for a twin approach,moment? One of the Western viewpoints on which is on the one hand addressing issues of globalNePAD and its enthusiasm for it is good inequality, debt, trade and the rest of it, which is agovernance and tackling corruption, which is not kind of positive, at the same time as stressing good

governance and democratisation on the other hand;necessarily the same thing as preventing orto be absolutely equitable in both kinds of ways,encouraging regime change. How do you see thatboth human rights and democracy, but alsodichotomy?economics.Dr Kibble: In a sense I was being slightly

mischevous by talking about regime change. If Iwere going to be more precise, I would probably Q95 Chairman: How would you answer those whosay changing the patterns and economic say that NePAD was in essence a contract? Thereaccumulation strategies, the corruption of certain were reciprocal obligations. We, the Africans,African leaderships, not necessarily changing the deliver good governance: you, the West, delivergovernment in power in whatever culture it might trade investment and aid in various forms. Thebe, Kinshasa, Harare, Mogadishu. The good degree of delivery on either side will coincide. Thatgovernance aspect is still something where people is that if we deliver one to that extent the other sidesay “Come on board and there are benefits”. There will deliver. Manifestly, by certain actions in certain

parts of Africa, Africa is not delivering andare no sanctions, no ways by which you can forcetherefore cannot expect that same full-heartedpeople to change except by saying “If you go down,response from the West, the other party to thewe go down” and there is a kind of regional inputcontract. How would you answer that?into that. I think those mechanisms are very, veryMr Dowden: I would agree that it is not written intounder-strength.the NePAD document, but there is a sort of dealthere. Do not forget that the donor countries are

Q93 Mr Chidgey: Is there anything we, Western also held to account in NePAD, in that therenations, could do to make this aspect of NePAD should be a peer review of the donor policies,more eVective, the peer review mechanism? getting them co-ordinated and so on. Frankly, IMr Dowden: We may come onto this a bit later on, have not seen a great deal of that. If Africans saybut the character of Mbeki is such that anything he “Well, if you fulfilled your side of the bargain”,is told to do, or he thinks the West is telling Africa they have a point. To some extent, if you look atto do, he resists quite vehemently. Therefore, while countries like Botswana, like Malawi, which is a bit

more complicated but the president has not goneWestern governments could help provide assistance

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for the third term and tried to change the to tell him to put the knife into his old colleagueand he simply will not do it. I think that is what itconstitution, there is some progress in parts of

Africa on these. Kenya is now on a completely is about.diVerent track; Ghana. They could say that therehas been quite a lot of movement in Africa. The Q97 Richard Ottaway: It is that bad, is it?problem is that the only sanction is that nothing Mr Dowden: It is not bad, but we see it ashappens and that is what I fear: nobody is actually contradictory in relation to what he is trying to dosaying “Come on. Let’s keep it rolling. Let’s get on NePAD and what he is trying to do on Burundion”. and Congo and we see it as crazy and inconsistent.Dr Kibble: There is always a great concern in Africa If you actually understand the character of theabout Western selectivity and certain human- man, it is not inconsistent at all.rights-abusing governments are not sanctioned1

and others are. We are not naıve enough to believeQ98 Richard Ottaway: Is there anything we couldthat human rights always take a primary part inbe doing to change it?any foreign policy dialogue, but it is certainly aMr Dowden: I am told that he will not say this inhandle for those who wish to use that to berate thedialogue with Britain but he is very, very critical ofWest. From that stems the mere ability to have theZANU-PF and Mugabe. He is not as totallyconversation, particularly with rural Africans, as tosupportive as he appears to be. How do you movewhat NePAD could possibly give to them. Whathim to try to change things? It is ironic that he diddoes it mean in terms of trickledown or endingapply incredibly powerful levers on all the othercorruption or developmental economics,SADC countries at the CHOGM to vote in favourempowering women, combating HIV/AIDS andof re-admission. He was quite prepared to usethe rest of it? I do not think that conversation haslevers brutally on them, but he says when it comesreally even started yet.to Zimbabwe that he has no levers, there is nothinghe can do, what do we want him to do, invade? HeQ96 Richard Ottaway: This Committee has taken just simply will not apply any pressure. What can

quite a close interest in Zimbabwe. President Mbeki be done from the outside? Britain keeping quiet washas quite consistently not criticised Zimbabwe. A probably a good policy and should remain so,number of reasons have been given: solidarity, because Mugabe was so clever at turning roundshared history, Western double standards. Why has every time Britain spoke and playing the oldhe taken it? Given that the relationship with imperial colonial race card. That means thatZimbabwe is costing his country money, why has Britain should do things quietly rather thanhe taken this line when countries like Botswana are publicly.quite prepared to criticise Zimbabwe?Mr Dowden: There are several reasons, some of

Q99 Richard Ottaway: Tony Blair, Jack Straw,them to do with his personality, some of them toracist, imperialist?do with his politics. He fears a broadly “Africanist”Mr Dowden: I agree.group in South Africa, the rhetoric which Winnie

Mandela has used on occasions and others. Inaddition, because of his own history, that he was Q100 Mr Hamilton:May I just explore this slightlynot involved in the struggle, but was a diplomat further? I accept what you say about Mbeki andand here in Britain much of the time, he feels his role in the struggle against Apartheid andvulnerable to that, that he was not as much part of oppression and that he was very much a diplomat. Ithe struggle as others. He is therefore very accept also that Mugabe was helpful to the strugglevulnerable to attack from that side. That is one against Apartheid and was a great ally of the blackthing. There is an issue of land in South Africa as majority and the black majority leaders. However,well and he did not want to exacerbate that. There ordinary South Africans must be seeing an awfulis a feeling about Mugabe. Mugabe supported them lot of the refugees streaming across the border. Onevery strongly over the years and it is hard to put estimate is that it has cost over £1 billion so far tothe knife into someone who has been one of your look after Zimbabwean refugees. Surely, whenmain supporters. That is another reason. What somebody who, like Mugabe, has been a very goodseveral people told me it came down to at the recent friend, has turned the way he has against his ownCHOGM was that he just did not want to be told people, black people, who have been oppressed bywhat to do in Africa by outsiders and it came down the white regime under Ian Smith, who are nowto that. If you read the letter which he published supposedly in control of their own destinies yet areon the ANC website the following week—I think opposed to Robert Mugabe and are beingit is called An Upside-down View of Africa2—all that murdered, beaten, arrested and starved to death, Ibitterness; the words “kith and kin” are repeated cannot understand why, in spite of everything youover and over again. Basically, he sees racist have said, Mbeki cannot show some leadership, notBritain, which protected Ian Smith for so long and under pressure from the West or from the UK, butprotected Apartheid for so long and is now trying simply against that kind of oppression of a black

majority. This is the very thing, the very tyranny he1 Sanctioned as in “subject to sanctions” rather than fought against now being practised by somebody“approved”.

whom he regards as a brother. I just wonder2 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2003/at49.htm£preslet whether you can comment on that.

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Dr Kibble: South Africa had initial problems in the South African Government that they may splitoV into some kind of populist new alliance. Theretrying to break from seeing Zimbabwe within the

prism of its own experience of negotiations, of the are both domestic worries and regional worries andthe South African government do not, as theMandela miracle and the rest of it. It took quite

some time to transform perceptions that way. At Zimbabweans do, make the kind of analogybetween their separate struggles, which thethe same time there is undoubtedly a populist

constituency inside South Africa which does see the Zimbabweans say is just like the struggle againstApartheid. The South African ruling party sees nocoincidence of white economic interests and

Western desires as being congruent. All that is a analogy whatsoever and sees that the two liberationmovements have always been historically unitedbackdrop and there is an historical context as well,

which one has to take into account, of colonialism and thus they should remain.and expropriation and the rest of it. To someextent, the way that Mugabe transformed the Q103 Sir John Stanley: Do you have any views asdebate from one of human rights and governance, to what more the British Government couldinto a very significantly charged debate inside reasonably do in terms of exercising pressure orsouthern Africa with the resonances of land, applying pressure on President Mbeki to get himhistoric injustice and race, then it became very hard to be more proactive in relation to Zimbabwe? Wefor people we work with in South Africa to say to are all very, very conscious, indeed there was apeople that this is not about land, this is about report on the news today, that something like sixgovernance, it is about democracy, it is about million Zimbabweans are going to be dependent onpeople being killed. The perceptions we have are external food aid.that significant sections of the southern African Mr Dowden: Eight million and a grain shortage incivil society are moving. There have been meetings southern Africa generally this year. The answer isin Gabarone in the last year, there have been that I think the personal break between the Primemeetings in Johannesburg, there has been pressure Minister and President Mbeki was so deep at Abujafrom the churches both in Zimbabwe and solidarity that several people have said to me that it is notfrom South African churches and to a lesser extent recoverable, which is very worrying both forsome of the other regional churches. That has been NePAD and other aspects of British policy onoccurring. If you want a rather provocative Africa.viewpoint, some people, particularly those insideZimbabwe and far Left critics of Mbeki, say that

Q104 Sir John Stanley: Do you think that breakMbeki is not actually interested in peace. What hewas avoidable?is interested in is picking up the ZimbabweanMr Dowden: Up until now I have simply tried toeconomy and Zimbabwe skilled labour veryexplain the way it seemed, I was not makingcheaply. I am not saying I agree with that, but thejudgments. I declare my hand and say that I thinkfact that people think that inside southern AfricaMr Blair was absolutely right, but the way Britainin response to Mbeki’s failure to move, is quitehandled it there was not very sensitive. I was insymptomatic of some of the breakdowns inAbuja and found that the British had managed torelationships which have occurred withinalienate a lot of allies, who were in favour ofsouthern Africa.maintaining the suspension of Zimbabwe, butMr Hamilton: I hope that is not the cynical whitefound themselves being ordered around by themedia which is putting that view forward.British in a way they found unacceptable, not beingtreated as equals as the Commonwealth likes to

Q101 Chairman: Is the attitude of President Mbeki maintain. In the end, no, it was not avoidable.to the Movement for Democratic Change perhaps Mbeki was not going to move, but the intensity ofcoloured by the fact that it might be a precedent it, the almost make or break attitude from bothfor trade unions in South Africa and the role of sides, may have been preventable. Fortunately ICOSATU? think the relationship between Britain and NigeriaMr Dowden: My understanding is that while things now is strong enough to make up for that in thathave gone a little better recently Mbeki and President Obasanjo has supported the BritishMorgan Tsvangirai do not get on at all— position quite strongly and within the

Commonwealth as well.Q102 Chairman: So it personal.Mr Dowden: It is personal. He does not rate him Q105 Sir John Stanley: Could you just elaborate?

Who do you feel was doing the ordering around atas a potential leader. He is very suspicious of thefact that the MDC was bankrolled by the white Abuja which was causing such resentment?

Mr Dowden: I do not know. As a journalist I havefarmers and yes, there is that precedent thatCOSATU in South Africa could produce a leader certain names which were mentioned to me oV the

record, but I think the British team there were notlike Tsvangirai who was formally a trade unionleader. as well prepared for the Commonwealth summit as

they might have been and they did not spend asDr Kibble: There were also concerns when theZambian Movement for Multi-party Democracy much time as they might have done in trying to

woo their allies or just “schmooze” them, which iscame in. There are worries that COSATU at somepoint down the road may well become so what the Commonwealth summits are all about.

They are about heads of government meeting anddisenchanted with the kind of neo-liberal thrust of

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getting to know each other better and not enough freezing out of the Zimbabwean leadership wouldbe a start. You are not welcome here, if you cometime was put into making sure that at least Britain’s

allies were happy and had had their five or ten here you come for talks and you are met veryformally rather than with the warm solidarityminutes, half an hour, talking to the Prime

Minister. which is what is shown at the moment. That wouldbe a start: a public disapproval of what isDr Kibble: The concentration still needs to be on

democracy, good governance, it needs to be happening there, the breaking of the rule of law,the human rights abuses. That would go quite amultilateral, it needs to be through institutions

which have respect inside Africa and it needs to long way. Yes, there are levers. They do not evenhave to turn oV the lights, just remind them thatinvolve things like citizen to citizen relations,

strengthening civil society organisations which are all their electricity comes from South Africa byturning them oV for an hour in the evening fromtalking about human rights, laying open human

rights abuses. To some extent there needs to be a time to time. There are 1,001 ways: they couldtighten the border, they could put patrols on themuch stronger push to internationalise this

situation inside such organs as the United Nations. border to pick up the Zimbabweans coming across.There are 1,001 ways in which neighbouringWe keep hearing that the UN would not accept

something on Zimbabwe. I think the time is coming countries, where one is very big and powerful cansend messages very simply.when there needs to be a much stronger push on

trying to internationalise it in that specificdirection. We just need to be aware, in the words

Q108 Sir John Stanley:May I now turn to the veryof Desmond Tutu, that South Africa needs to act,important issue of land reform inside South Africa?because if it does not act for its neighbours, whenCould you help the Committee to try to get to anis it going to act if things happen at home. It is aobjective assessment of the significance of the newstark kind of comment, but Desmond Tutu oftenproposed amendments to the land restitution law,puts things in a context one can respond to.which President Mbeki has come forward with? Weunderstand, as reported in The Independent on 12

Q106 Sir John Stanley: When you talk about the January, that this is going to empower the Ministerinternationalisation of it, particularly inside the for Land AVairs to expropriate land without aUN, who do you feel should be taking a lead in court order and without the land owner’sthat? Obviously Britain has some historical agreement. The South African Government hasbaggage of considerable variety, but it appears suggested that this is basically beneficial and ispretty clear to us in this Committee that Zimbabwe designed to head oV the sort of situation which hasis a pretty low priority against the totality of issues occurred in Zimbabwe: whereas others have takenaround the world, for example in the EU. The US completely the reverse view and said this is just theadministration has quite a degree of focus on it, but start of a Zimbabwean type process. Could youit does not score very highly in the EU, it does not help the Committee? What is your judgment as toscore very highly elsewhere in the rest of the world. the implications of these particular legislativeDr Kibble: I admit that is a problem and I think amendments?that is why there has not been the push which might Dr Kibble: I thought it was interesting that thehave helped earlier on. Whether the time is not yet Financial Mail, which might be said to be the houseright or whether we can start to put some pre- organ of South African capital, was extremelyconditions together with sympathetic African states relaxed about it and said that this was a measureis something to be seriously considered. I am not which would actually help speed up, that it wouldsaying that I think it would work immediately, but provide equity along with restitution. That is quitethere needs to be a slightly paradigmatic shift in interesting. There certainly is a danger that thethat sense, from saying that the UN is not going to political economy of South Africa will notdeal with this, to saying let us pursue it with rather necessarily see a land grab such as ZANU-PF havemore vigour than we have done, inside the EU, undertaken, but will see continuing local violence.with a number of Scandinavian states who There are far more South African farmers killed inhistorically have been big allies of some of the “criminal violence” than there are Zimbabweansouthern African states and do not have the farmers for instance. All deaths of course are to becolonial baggage. There are various options to regretted. The landless movement inside Southpursue in that way. There is a “Third-Worldist” Africa has the potential to create a stir, but isoption possibly as well. nowhere near anything like the state-sponsored,

informal, violent, third force kind of violence wesaw in Zimbabwe. That is not to say that does notQ107 Chairman: If South Africa chose, what areremain as one of a number of options, but movingthe principal levers it could use to bring pressureto a situation where you can speed up the historicto bear? Presumably there are substantial debts anddispossession of the black majority in South Africaamong those would be the debt to Eskom andcan only be advantageous. The procedure for theenergy generally. South Africa, if it wanted, couldministry to intervene is only a last resort, as Ipresumably turn oV the energy taps.understand it. South Africa, having proclaimed itDr Kibble: That is true.would transform 30%, has only managed to processMr Dowden: But so far they have not even publiclyland claims for 2%. Something needed to happencriticised them. Every time Mbeki and Mugabe

meet they embrace, there are big smiles. Just a and this legislation is probably not perfect and

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there are constitutional implications with the South everybody knowing about them. I also disagreethat even countries which have an Islamic issue likeAfrican constitution which would stop a wholesale

expropriation anyway, assuming that South Africa Nigeria or Kenya or Somalia can somehow bebrought into the al-Qaeda agenda. When I havestill continues to follow the legal and constitutional

route, which I have every expectation it will do. spoken to people there, they say no, that this is aMiddle East thing, it is about Palestine, it is aboutMr Dowden:A lot of white farmers have been killed

there, but that was not part of a land grab in any Saudi Arabia, it is nothing to do with Africa. I havenot met many Africans who have any sympathy orshape or form: it was for whatever was in the safe.

Whilst there is a land movement in South Africa, anything but condemnation for what is going on.Dr Kibble: I think they would find it diYcult, givenit in no way has any oYcial sanction and is not

supported by the government, which seems, on the the criminality of some of the African elites, toprovide a basis for any form of internationalcontrary, rather than breaking up the land and

giving everybody a little piece of land, which is the terrorism. There are certain areas of instabilitywhich do involve an Islamic element; very few inemotive feeling in Zimbabwe, to be much more

wanting to empower black commercial farmers, southern Africa, with the possible exception of theCape Flats. What we are looking at here is a verywho would farm in a similar way to the way the

farming has been done up until now. It could, localised situation in South Africa and the mainfocus is undoubtedly across into the Middle East.however, build in the long run, depending on how

South Africa goes, into quite a big issue and it is Africa’s problems have very little to do withterrorism, except possibly as a kind ofone which we would do well to keep a close eye on.marginalisation, because so much eVort of theworld is concentrated on those areas where there isQ109 Sir John Stanley:What is your view as to theterrorism, or thought to be the potential fordegree of fairness of the compensation which isterrorism. Africa suVers, but indirectly and not byoVered when land is taken compulsorily? What isengagement.your view as to the adequacy of the safeguards for

the employment and the houses of those who arethe existing farm workers in white farms which are Q112 Mr Hamilton: So you do not feel that thethen transferred to black ownership? global terrorists of the kind represented by al-Mr Dowden: If it is a straight transfer from a white Qaeda, who want to destroy the West, will havecommercial farmer to a black commercial farmer, any comfort or home anywhere in Africa, especiallypresumably he would also need the workers. I in southern Africa?would have thought there was far more threat from Dr Kibble: I cannot see why al-Qaeda would gomodernisation and mechanisation to the there rather than more congenial places, to belivelihoods of rural South Africa and the general honest.process of globalisation than there would be from Mr Dowden: I fundamentally disagree with the ideataking over farms in the way it has been done in that because people are poor, they will therefore beZimbabwe, where the farm workers are just driven anti-West. My experience in Africa is that they tendoV. In terms of compensation, I do not know the to identify local elites, diVerent ethnic groups, asdetails, so I am not really qualified to speak on the source of their problem, not the West.that. Obviously Somalia was diVerent and they ended up

very, very angry with the Americans, but even therenow, there is no . . . A Somali summed it up theQ110 Sir John Stanley: Dr Kibble, can you help usother day when he said “If al-Qaeda is about Islam,on compensation?then we are all al-Qaeda. But it is not: it is aboutDr Kibble: I am afraid I cannot either. I havean Arab cause and we are not Arabs. It is nothingstudied some of the broad outlines of this bill andto do with us”.I must admit that it is still in my reading pile.

Q111 Mr Hamilton: Susan Rice, the former Q113 Mr Hamilton: Do you think South Africaitself has the resources, the police, the intelligenceAssistant Secretary of State under Bill Clinton,

once referred to Africa as the world’s “soft and the wherewithal to deal with internationalterrorism in the unlikely event, from what you say,underbelly” for global terrorism. Do you think the

West’s war on terrorism has paid insuYcient of those terrorists wanting to use South Africa asa base for any particular reason? Do they have theattention to Africa in general and South Africa in

particular? resources? Do they do enough to help the struggleagainst international terrorism globally?Mr Dowden: Not really. I think she is very

mistaken. If you think of all the liberation Dr Kibble: They had a large problem in the post-independence period where lots of militarymovements right across Africa, some terrible things

happened, but they were never involved in the type spending was downgraded, where they had toreconcile six diVerent kinds of forces, where thereof terrorism that al-Qaeda pursues and even when

things have been extremely bad, for example was a desire for the military and security forces toreflect the population groups as they were. Untilhijacking planes and killing civilians has never been

part of political opposition in Africa. Even in the Jackie Selebi came in to the DFA, until there weresignificant moves, the South Africans wouldHorn of Africa, in Somalia, which is an amazingly

open society, it would be extremely diYcult for certainly have been on the back foot if those kindsof threats had existed, as they are now. I still thinkforeign movements to work there without

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that southern Africa is not the site for future Q116 Mr Illsley: Should we be giving that expertise,that resource to South Africa?terrorist operations, although one could say that

the Gulf of Guinea, which is coming up as a major Dr Kibble: There was an interesting recent speechby Jacob Zuma, the Deputy President, saying thatoil producer to the West, could possibly fill that

role sometime in the future. For the moment, I do expectations on South Africa—and I think he wasimplying internal as well as external and regional—not consider that a high priority. South Africans

have been buying arms; they are a major arms were so high from 1994 in moral, economic andpolitical terms, that they got a bit carried away.supplier. Of course they are also in a region which,

whilst awash with small arms, is certainly not This speech was last September. He said that therereally has to be a downgrading of their expectationsgeared up to security considerations and to military

operations outside their borders. The South and other people’s expectations of them. In a sensethat is probably the answer.Africans have probably stretched themselves

enough in terms of the kind of peace-keeping areasin which they are already involved, the DRC and

Q117 Mr Illsley: What role does the Southernother places.African Development Community (SADC) play inpromoting regional economic and political

Q114 Mr Hamilton: Does either of you feel that developments?South Africa could have a role in helping the rest of Dr Kibble: SADC has certainly attempted to movethe world fight international terrorism? Especially forward in a number of ways: free trade area,when you mention its role in arms production and agreements on human rights, on gender, on apurchase. number of diVerent aspects. The overwhelmingDr Kibble: They have not shown that they have the impression is that they have a capacity problem.expertise to deal with it, because they have not had Even when the EU was funding possibly more thanto deal with it really. The only terrorists they had it does now, there has never been any sign that theto deal with was the white Right in South Africa nation states have really accepted a form ofand some of the horrible things which went on regionalism which moves SADC forward. It hasthere. In terms of that being terror, yes, but it is been very much a nation state and bilaterals, ratheralso true that the ANC was not a particularly than necessarily SADC consciousness. In facteVective military organisation whilst quite eVective SACU has probably worked rather morepolitically. To be honest, the answer to your coherently and consistently than SADC which wasquestion is no. probably opposite to the hopes of many of us in

1994. That is history for you.Q115 Mr Illsley: A couple of quick questionsfollowing on from what you have just mentioned Q118 Chairman: You mentioned the quality of theabout South African defence policies and a foreign policy direction in South Africa. Can youquestion about South Africa in its own region. The comment on the quality of the diplomaticCommittee has received evidence in written form personnel? Blacks were eVectively excluded fromsuggesting that South Africa has been able to the diplomatic service until the change ofpunch above its weight and has been able to do so government. Many of those in the ANC hadbecause it had the momentum of the past, in experience only in the non-aligned movement andparticular figures such as Mandela. In the same opposition-type work, hence the link with Libyaevidence we have also been warned that there is a and others; clearly the Soviet Union as a sponsorrisk that we are perhaps asking too much of South faded from the picture in the early 1990s. Many ofAfrica, and the West is expecting too much of those who were put in high positions were thoseSouth Africa. Given that the country is who were owed debts arising from the liberationundoubtedly the principal regional power, do you struggle. Is that a constraint on the ability of Southbelieve there is that danger that the UK and others Africa to play a greater role overseas, the training,are over-estimating South Africa’s ability and the quality of the personnel in the diplomaticwillingness to act as the regional policeman? service?Mr Dowden: I would make two points here. One is Mr Dowden:My experience here and visiting Souththat because Mbeki was Mandela’s foreign minister African embassies and high commissions in Africaand now Mbeki is his own foreign minister, the is that sometimes you meet extremely good, hard-foreign aVairs department of South Africa is weak. working, well-informed diplomats who are doing aThe second point is that the military expenditure, brilliant job and the South Africans have many likethe recent huge arms purchases, seem to me to be that. At a secondary level, they do not have thetotally inappropriate for anything other than systems in place to provide the backup which isfighting a conventional war. Exactly who is South needed for a really serious diplomatic eVort. TheyAfrica going to fight? It seems the wrong sort of are weak in that department and that may beequipment for the peace-keeping role which is the something Britain could help them with, withonly one South Africa could be called upon to do. training them how to run a foreign service.They have spent their money, in terms of thatintervention as a peace-keeping role, very badly. Ido not think they have the diplomatic and Q119 Chairman: Would they be reluctant to look

for such training in the UK, or would they lookintelligence clout sometimes to fulfil that other roleof knowing how to go into a place in the first place. elsewhere?

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Mr Dowden: I do not see why they should be. It explicitly a bone of contention between SouthAfrica and Britain, although Britain is quite criticalis simply training. It is just the sort of thing,

with the language and so on, that they might of the way the government has handled it.pick up. Dr Kibble: There are several key problems here.

South Africa aspires to a leadership of the non-Dr Kibble: You are pointing to two things here:one is a personal thing about the diplomats’ aligned movement and places a lot of emphasis on

multilateralism, on the reform of global architectureexperience and quality and education; the otheris a structural inheritance from when the ANC like the IMF and WTO. Whilst the UK is probablycame into power of debts from people who had one of the good guys inside the G8 in terms ofhelped the liberation struggle and an ambivalent receptivity, at least listening about debt, trade, aid,relationship with the West, but knowing that etc., it finds it diYcult to break from that kind oftheir economic future lay with the West. This solidarity. There is a kind of symbiosis in that theykind of much vaunted idea that South Africa is a need each other, but they do not necessarily have tobridge between the developed and undeveloped like each other. There are obviously historic links;world, or the developing world, is an interesting there are links between people who emigrated toone to pursue. I am not sure that it completely South Africa and the liberation movement,works all the time, but the diplomats in a sense emotions which still continue. There is the bedrockare geared towards that kind of bridging end in there for good relationships, but they need totheir minds, of trying to bring African discourse understand that each comes from a diVerentinto the West and to some extent western ideas perspective, that South Africa is still finding its wayinto Africa. I, like Richard, have met some and that it is only ten years since the first democraticextremely capable ANC or black diplomats, elections. Sometimes we expect rather a lot too soon,many of whom were of course involved in the whilst at the same time forgetting to remember theliberation struggle abroad and cut their teeth on whole of the history which has preceded it. Therehow to wheel deals in a number of international are diYcult shoals to negotiate and some arefora, where the ANC was rather more widely ideological, some are political and some arerecognised than the then South African structural to deal with the prestige and the viewpointGovernment. of each, of their particular place in the world.

Q120 Chairman: Here is an area where you thinkQ122 Mr Chidgey: You both touched on thethe UK would be able to help.multilateral issues such as the reform of the CAP.Dr Kibble: I think so; it would be extremely useful.I am not quite sure whether you are saying to usthat South Africa recognises that we are one of thegood guys, in your words, or whether they areQ121 Mr Chidgey:May I take us a little further onexpecting more from us. Do they accept that weUK/South African relations, if I may? In some ofonly have a limited amount of control over thethe written evidence we have had from the FCO,CAP, for example, and the WTO? Or do they thinkthe relationship between the UK and South Africawe should be batting more strongly for them andhas been described as broad and deep and the twois that souring the relationships in any way? Or arenations have shared diplomatic aspirations. Inthey being very mature about it and acknowledgingother memoranda, we have seen the highlighting ofthat we are doing our best?the detrimental eVect that the failure of recent trade

negotiations between the developed and developing Dr Kibble: I would say that South Africa learned agreat deal from the negotiations with the Europeanworlds has had. In our last evidence session all of

us agreed that this is a major issue aVecting UK/ Union over the Free Trade Agreement from 1995onwards. It was horrified at how hard-nosed theSouth African relations and there was a need to

create more even terms, an even field—I hate to use southern Europeans were inside the EU anddesperately looking for allies in the north. To somethe phrase level playing field, but that is more or

less what we were talking about—in trade terms. extent Denmark, Germany, Britain did rally roundand try to push through a rather more liberal andWith that background and given your experience,

how would you assess the state of UK/South accessible agenda, but were obviously handicappedby the CAP, by the particular agriculturalAfrican relations at present?producers inside the European Union. ThatMr Dowden: I think they agree on a great deal, evenexperience has still stayed with them in terms ofon the issues which caused the breakdown ofwhat they expect from the West, from theCancun. Britain was on the side of the good guys,European Union, which is not that much, to bebut maybe did not speak out loudly enough at thehonest.time. Maybe they should almost have crossed the

floor and joined the group of 20. Obviously they Mr Dowden: I certainly think next year, withBritain being chairman of G8 and the EU at thecannot do that for other reasons, but support for

that position was very strong. Alec Irwin is a major same time, an extraordinary position of influencein the world, that they could use that to make someplayer in the group of 20, so in that sense Britain’s

connections to South Africa are going to be of these points and pick up the issues of agriculturalsubsidies and trade and debt and really push themimportant there. The issues which have created the

problems are Zimbabwe and AIDS, which is less in both those fora.

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Q123 Mr Chidgey: That leads quite neatly onto my Mr Dowden: That is a very unfortunate term. Onthe contrary, recognising Africa’s independencefinal question. What should the FCO be doing toand its strengths and treating them as equals farstrengthen the UK’s political, cultural andmore would be a better way of helping them.economic relationship with South Africa? Do you

see the coming presidency in terms of being theQ126 Mr Olner: The UK has done a large amountroute by which we could do much more, or arein leading the international community in reducingthere other issues?some of the debt of southern Africa and otherMr Dowden: The route being through South Africa.developing countries and if other countries came onboard as far as we have come on board, then the

Q124 Mr Chidgey: To South Africa, yes. Are the situation might be a little diVerent. Could youpositions coming up as president of the Union and briefly tell us how South Africa plays with thechairman of G8 the most opportune positions in United Nations and bigger global packages whichwhich we could strengthen our relationships with are on oVer from the UN?South Africa. Mr Dowden: My understanding is that the SouthMr Dowden: Yes, indeed. It is partly that, but it is Africans are very strong supporters of the UN and

players there. I am trying to think of any areaalso being the voice of countries like South Africawhere they have any problems with the UN. Iin the other fora. That is really what South Africacannot think of any.and other African countries would like to see usDr Kibble: One of their beefs about the Iraq wardoing: Britain being a much stronger voice in favourwas the fact that they very much took the illegalityof a better deal on debt, on reducing agriculturalview on that. The UN is in a sense a protector forsubsidies, allowing Africa and other countries toa middle level nation and when they feel that theearn their place rather than have to wait on aid. Allstrong nations may be ganging up, there is not athose sorts of issues are the things which Britainlot in this forum which provides any form of legalshould do as chairman of the G8 and the EU.protection to nations and groupings like the SouthDr Kibble: And be sympathetic on achieving theAfricans and they find the UN a bulwark in amillennium development goals and, if I may addtroubled world. They were very, very upset whenone note, helping South Africa to stage its bid forthe constitutionality of the United Nations wasthe World Cup in football.under threat, or so it would seem to them.Chairman: May I say on behalf of the Committee

Q125 Mr Chidgey: So making sure that we really that you have used your expertise for our benefit?do recognise that South Africa or Africa generally Thank you very much indeed. We will now move

on to the second group of witnesses.should be a scar on our conscience.

Witnesses: Mr Christopher Paterson, Executive Director,Macmillan Publishers Ltd, and Mr Ashley Roe,Business Development Director, Severn Trent Water International Ltd, examined.

Q127 Chairman: Mr Paterson and Mr Roe, I Mr Paterson: Thank you very much for thiswelcome you on behalf of the Committee; the first opportunity. As Macmillan we have been tradingshall be last. Mr Paterson, we understand you had in southern Africa for more than 25 years. Duringa problem with the train today. Mr Roe, we thank the Apartheid years we set up a regionalyou for being understanding and waiting on. To organisation based in Swaziland and set upintroduce the both of you, Mr Christopher curriculum publishing organisations in all countriesPaterson, you are the Executive Director of around South Africa. We did publish EnglishMacmillan Publishers Ltd, the Oxford publishing language teaching courses for South Africa at thathouse, Chairman of Macmillan Education, time, but did not enter into the general curriculumChairman of Macmillan’s southern Africa business. Since change in 1994, we have investedcompanies in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, very heavily in South Africa and have become aMozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe major player in that South African educationalsince 1983. You are also Deputy Chairman of the market. We have been developing books for theSouth African Business Association (SABA) and a new curriculum over ten years now and we aremember of the Royal African Society. Mr Ashley involved in all aspects of education in everyRoe, you are the Business Development Director, province in South Africa.Severn Trent Water International Ltd. You are alsoChairman of the British Water Overseas Forum

Q128 Chairman: Any particular obstacles special toand a Director of British Water, the UK’s waterSouth Africa which you could draw to our attention?industry trade association. You have worked in aMr Paterson: There were enormous obstacles at thenumber of relevant fields. Gentlemen, we welcomebeginning. I suppose historically there was fierceyou both. May I ask whether you could state whatcompetition in the market in any case and the largeinvolvement your respective companies haveAfrikaans press groups were dominant players inrecently had in South Africa and what particularthat market with sometimes rather old-fashionedobstacles, perhaps peculiar to South Africa, you

have met in your business operations? school books. With the new curriculum, the market

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became open. Our biggest problems have been is about 40 per cent—it is a huge market. For agauging the pace of curriculum reform and long time it was under-funded because the historyeducational funding. Huge promises were made at before 1994 was to fund more pupils, but not tothe beginning and we, like other publishers, made fund them to a very great amount. The fundinghuge investments and then the funding collapsed total has now caught up with the 1994 levels andfor a while and we slowed down. We probably got that makes it a market for publishers of perhapsa better result in the end but we had huge problems £100 million, compared with the UK which variesin those years and the educational publishing between £200 million and £300 million. It is aindustry as a whole had to lay oV perhaps half its substantial market for us.staV from 1996 through to 1998.

Q132 Mr Illsley: Would you say that is the sameQ129 Chairman: Are you back on track and into not just for educational publishers, but for otherprofitability? companies as well? Would the same advantages beMr Paterson: Back on track and the governance there for anybody who wished to sell any productstandards on which educational publishing depends which would appeal to that population?are improving. Although books are approved

Mr Paterson: I would think so. It is a substantialnationally, the buying is a provincial business.economy and British companies, because ofBooks are bought at provincial levels so there arehistory, the long establishment of British businessesdiVerences locally.and the high level of British investment historically,Mr Roe: Severn Trent have been involved in Southcan make it a very large market in almost anything.Africa since about 1999. We are involved in a veryMr Roe: I would concur with that, although wesmall way compared with Macmillan and we haveviewed it as more of a hub for our business intaken the view that we are going to continue to besouthern Africa and we saw the fact that there wassmall until such time as the market opens up. Wea workforce there which we could tap into assaw opportunities in 1999–2000 in the developmentsomething we could use to go into other parts ofof private sector involvement in delivery of waterAfrica. In terms of a market for water services,supplies. They have not really come about. Onethere are 50 million people and over the next 10 tosignificant contract has been let.20 years there is going to be considerableinvestment. We see that as a good opportunity

Q130 Chairman: Is this a privatisation project? for us.Mr Roe: No, not necessarily. It is private sectorinvolvement in the delivery; it is not privatisationas we would know it here. It is more like an Q133 Mr Illsley: What sort of timescale are youoperating-type arrangement. The contract we were looking at in terms of that? I know you just saidlooking at was for Johannesburg. We decided not you were waiting and you have been there sinceto bid for that but since that time we have stayed 1999 waiting for the market conditions to be rightthere undertaking small consultancy work. We for you to bid for certain contracts. What is thehave managed to utilise that to fund our oYce in timescale you are looking at before you get into aSouth Africa and we will continue to do that until system where you can take advantage of thewe see the opportunities beginning to arise. In opportunities there?terms of the reasons why those opportunities have Mr Roe: We believe that the projects are going tonot come about, there has been some reluctance start moving in the next three or four years,from the union side, in terms of getting large something like that. When I talked to the MinisterWestern businesses involved in service delivery. for Water about this time last year, he was sayingThere has been a change in the way in which service that they needed to develop the water sector, theyis being provided, from a centrally directed could not do it all and the government needed thearrangement through the Department for Water private sector to be involved in that. TheAVairs down to the municipalities, who have municipalities were at a point where they should bebecome responsible for service delivery. That has looking to the private sector to help them. That hastaken nearly two and a half years to work through. not come about yet, but it will do in maybe the nextThey now have a serious lack of capacity at the three or four years.municipal level in terms of service delivery.

Q134 Mr Illsley: What do you see as the biggestQ131 Mr Illsley: The Foreign OYce have givenchallenges or problems facing any inwardevidence to the Committee to suggest that the UKinvestment or training within South Africa?is one of South Africa’s largest trade andMr Roe: From my point of view, the thing whichinvestment partners and that South Africa is oneis taxing me most at the moment is black economicof the largest investors within the UK. How largeempowerment. As an international business with aa market is South Africa for UK companies at thebrand, we clearly cannot have shareholders in apresent time and potentially and should some of thecompany which is managing that brand who areproblems you have just been outlining be removed?not ours, if you see what I mean, somebody inMr Paterson: For educational purposes, Southcontrol. We have to find a structure we can workAfrica is a very large market. Because a very largewithin. We probably are slightly diVerent from theproportion of its population is of school age—I

forget the exact proportion under 18, but I think it companies who are going into more of a consumer

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market in that we are bidding for government and with them; they have provided us with leads, withcontacts and been very supportive in terms of themunicipal contracts where that is an extremely

important element of our delivery mechanism. British water trade association with trade missions.Last year I was involved in a trade delegation: veryMr Paterson: Would you like me to say a few

words? well put together by BTI and the people out inSouth Africa. So I will say that they have been very,very good.Q135 Mr Illsley: Yes; I am thinking in terms of the

private sector as against the public sector.Mr Paterson: We have overcome a lot of obstacles Q138 Mr Chidgey: Thank you for the informationin the last ten years and we feel that the thing is about the specific help you have received for yourplateauing out. We feel that there are huge company. My question was: to what extent doeschallenges in the educational system which have to the FCO meet the key objective of helping tobe addressed; a lot of them have been addressed advance the competitiveness of companies in theunder the very capable Minister of Education. I UK through overseas sales and investments? Canthink the challenge in future is going to be when the you look a little broader than just your ownpoliticians decide to gear up educational funding to experience with your own company and take aa higher level, because the standard is not as good mature view across the piece?as it should be, and I am sure everybody is aware Mr Roe: Certainly. I believe that they do create anof that, despite very good expenditure on teachers’ environment which enables us to get access to keysalaries and on books. Can we rise to that challenge decision makers within government, from myof the change which will be needed? I think there business’s point of view, which enables us towill be a political challenge in future, which will influence the way in which those governments buyapply to all publishers. One thing to say is that goods and services. They do play a key role in that.South Africa is, like many investment markets, a

Mr Paterson: For us—in South Africa we havecountry where we have to act local; it is particularlybeen able to plough our own furrow without muchso in publishing and school books are a politicalhelp, because we decided, as we were incorporatedbusiness in many ways. British companies willin all the countries round about by 1994, that wesucceed if they can embrace local employment andknew the South African market pretty well fromlocal shareholding where possible, because therebeing regionally based. We were able to go inare so many capable people around.quickly with local people helping us. When I havecome across DTI or Trade Partners UK or

Q136 Chairman: One question on distance learning. whatever, they have been extremely helpful and inI seem to recall that the equivalent of the Open South Africa very knowledgeable. From a limitedUniversity in South Africa had a very successful point of view, they have been really helpful. Theretrack record. Is that still the case? To what extent would be some questions in territories round aboutare you able to work with organisations like that? as to how Foreign OYce help actually works inMr Paterson: The University of South Africa is a practice, but in South Africa it has been good.huge organisation which has been going for manyyears and is not only a South African institution interms of its enrolment but people are taking Q139 Mr Chidgey: Are there any areas where youUNISA degrees throughout southern Africa and feel that the FCO and DTI could be more helpful?further afield. It has an extremely good faculty. We You said that the service they do provide is goodsupply UNISA, like other publishers do, on an and worthwhile, but let us look a little to the future.arm’s-length basis, just as you would supply the We live in a highly competitive world and both ofOpen University or a big university in this country you are working in a highly competitiveand occasionally we have published textbooks for marketplace. To try to concentrate one’s mind onprofessors at that university. It is a normal arm’s- what more one could do as a government, let uslength relationship and a good opportunity with make a comparison between what other countriesthat number of students. are doing to try to break into what are traditionally

Anglophone British markets. I often hearthroughout Africa about the amazed looks on theQ137 Mr Chidgey: I should like to pursue with youfaces of British companies when they see the eVortsboth the supporting role of government institutionsbeing made by the French Government to promotein terms of your business in South Africa. You willFrench industry, French business, in areas whichbe aware that one of the duties of the FCO is tohave traditionally been British. We seem to thinkpromote British business overseas, usually throughthat Francophone Africa is just a territory on theagencies such as British Trade International (BTI).other side of the moon. This must be causing youI am just wondering, bearing in mind that one ofsome concern, because you are therefore meetingthe FCO’s key objectives is to help enhance themuch more competition, I suggest, which is fromcompetitiveness of companies in the UK throughareas and countries which you previously did not.overseas sales and investment, to what extent youDo you feel our government agency should behave found from your experience that the FCOlooking more closely at how you can retain yourmeets that key objective.competitiveness in what have been traditionallyMr Roe: We are probably both a bit too polite.British markets, when they are no longer beingFrom our point of view they have been very, very

supportive in South Africa. We had a lot of contact considered that by our competitors?

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Mr Paterson: In terms of South Africa, where the for school books, it comes in and out on a bit ofa whim. In general it is providing the books, but itBritish knowledge of the local scene is very strong,

a good job is being done. The threat I have seen is is not encouraging capacity building in thosecountries, because the private sector is not workingmore in the printing industry, where you have seen

a lot of German investment coming in. It is not so together with the aid sector. I have seen in all sortsof countries in Africa the bad eVects of this and itmuch the French as the Germans who are really

quite aggressive. You see that in other areas as well. is something which, with a little eVort andcompromise, could give a huge improvement in theIn the media as a whole, because the South African

industry itself is so strong, we are not really seeing quality of UK input to those countries.Mr Chidgey: That is very helpful; thank you.inroads from other European competitors or

American competitors.

Q142 Mr Olner: I agree with you, but have youQ140 Mr Chidgey: Mr Roe, you must be in a actually told the FCO that?particularly interesting position there with the Mr Paterson: From time to time over the yearscompetition from other European companies which we have.are very strong, even stronger than your own.Mr Roe: Yes; very much so, though they tend to

Q143 Mr Olner: Is this a polite chat or have youhave a rather diVerent focus. One of the thingsturned round, UK businesses which are trading inwhich does concern me is the linkage between tradeAfrica, and said you are not playing on a leveland aid. That is something which has been veryplaying field and some of your competitors globallymuch split apart at this time. More could be doneare doing things which would perhaps advantageto link those two things together. I am not sayingyou, if you were able to do them?that they should be linked in such a way that if youMr Paterson: We have to do more of that.are given aid you have to buy British goods and

services. What I am saying is that at the momentwe have gone a little bit too far compared with our Q144 Mr Olner: All I am asking is whether youcompetitors. have told them.

Mr Paterson: Yes, but perhaps too mutedly.Mr Roe: Yes, we have told them.Q141 Mr Chidgey: Many northern European

countries have ceased to have trade tied for manyyears now. I do not think one could reasonably say Q145 Mr Olner: I know Severn Trent reasonablythat in general this is a retrograde step by Britain to well because of my past experience on the executivetry to free trade from aid, unless there are specific there and I know of the very good work you doexamples where you feel that this is disadvantaging in promoting water industries abroad. One of theyou with major competitors from countries which queries I have is whether you tie in with UKhave a major aid programme tied to aid. If there academic institutions in getting the water engineerswere, then I should like to know which they were. of South Africa and southern Africa trained in theI am not aware that there are any nowadays. UK? It seems to me that when the engineers areMr Roe: From our point of view the French do link trained in the UK with UK equipment, they thenthat still and the Americans, as we have seen with transfer that back to their own country. Where arethe Iraqi things where they have linked that quite we in those stakes? Are the Americans or thea lot as well. No, I am not saying that it is a bad Germans doing more than we are?thing. It is a very good thing to have done and we Mr Roe: Yes. We do not do an awful lot of that.and the northern European nations are leading Most of our work is actually going out intothat. It is just from a trade point of view at this southern Africa and helping people change andtime that there are odd disadvantages here and providing them with expertise and knowledge. Wethere. are looking at setting up training arrangements inMr Paterson: This is not a specifically South South Africa with a couple of South AfricanAfrican comment, but trading across the world as companies at this time, mainly for the Departmentwe do, a great opportunity is missed by DfID3. of Water AVairs in terms of the operation andEducational publishers like us—and we are not maintenance of their treatment plants. In terms ofunique—have lots of pairs of feet on the ground, academic institutions, Severn Trent works with awe have 300 or 400 in Africa, and we have number of them: Loughborough, Cranfield and sorepresentatives and seminarists going out to on. They run a series of courses which people canschools in the poorest parts. We have great come on, but we do not get involved inknowledge of publishing conditions locally. If there promoting that.is a poverty agenda, which DfID has—and it oftendoes cover educational needs, there are great areas

Q146 Mr Olner: Do you think it would be moreof knowledge which British companies have on theadvantageous if you did?ground which could be shared. If there were moreMr Roe: It could well be. The only thing in whichco-operation (not particularly directed atwe see a lack of capacity is the on-the-groundcontracts), UK Plc, talking in the round, would dotraining which is necessary; not necessarily thea lot better. In African countries where there is aidacademic side of things but from our point of view,the water side.3 Department for International Development.

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Mr Paterson: We have a lot of training contact activities and the British Council? Do you feel thatthey are engaged in productive use of taxpayers’going on all the time. The educational possibilities

in South Africa are enormous and you could put funds in South Africa? Are there things you wouldlike to see them doing which they are not doing atany amount of input into them at this stage. I do

have the feeling that if there were more contact at the moment?Mr Paterson: The first thing to say is that we doall levels with the higher level institutions and this

was properly funded, it would pay huge dividends not actually see a lot of them. We have a hugebusiness and it is spread all round the country andto the UK in the long-term.the British Council has a limit in resources. Thesecond thing is that we are trying to say thatQ147 Mr Olner: I know that a lot of the emergingalthough we are an international company, we aimindustrial development in China is going down theto be local. So we often try to form links with localjoint venture route. I wondered whether you couldacademic institutions rather than the Council. Thatgive us a snapshot of what the joint venture routesaid, the Council has programmes in a number ofis looking like in South Africa and in southernprovinces for teacher training. I think it couldAfrica in particular. Are UK firms and UKpossibly do more. I should like to see more Britishbusinessmen seeking joint ventures? Is that not theinput into helping educators at a provincial level,way forward?because that is where the resources are. It is very,Mr Roe: From our point of view yes, we havevery easy to talk to the Department of Educationlooked at it and talked to a number of companiesin Pretoria and to meet the minister and all thatin South Africa and in southern Africa with a viewsort of thing, but it is on the ground where you seeto forming joint ventures. The diYculty has been—the shortage of resources; that is where you see theand this may go away as time moves on—a lack ofeducational administrators having great diYcultycapacity in South Africa in terms of focusing onand need training. I believe that with South Africa’screating that joint venture, rather than focusing onmultilingual education policy, although the choicewhat they are currently doing.is clearly English and the parental choice inparticular is generally English, the Council has aQ148 Mr Olner: Do you think the FCO can haverole to fulfil in reinforcing the use of good Englishany input into making those joint venturein the educational sector. It could do more, but itproposals a reality, if you see that as the wayis doing pretty well within the resource it has.forward?

Mr Roe: It is a possibility, but they cannotnecessarily do much more than make the Q153 Sir John Stanley: Do you have any interfaceintroductions and try to help develop the with the British Council in terms of trying to seenetworking arrangements; bringing together the whether they can help promote the educationaltwo parties and trying to knock them together materials, books and teaching aids which youwould not happen. I do not think that would be produce?something which could happen. Mr Paterson: Not on a regular basis, because we

have at the most busy times of year in thepromotional season between 200 and 300 people inQ149 Chairman: The conventional wisdom is that

if we train water engineers in the UK with UK schools promoting our books and materials. It isalmost as much as we can do to keep up with themplant and expertise, they are more likely to order

from UK firms in future. If that were the case, have and we tend to do it in our own way. Certainly, asthings calm down, when the market is lessyou trained any water engineers from South Africa

in Cranfield, Loughborough or whatever? Have expansionary, there is lots of room for publishersto co-operate with the Council. The Council’syou considered this?

Mr Roe: No, we have not considered this. reputation is very good in South Africa, so itsreputation could be used to greater eVect.

Q150 Chairman: Why?Mr Roe: Mainly because we are oVering our Q154 Chairman: I should like to turn you now toknowledge in country and we would be linking into some more general questions on the South AfricanCranfield and Loughborough’s arrangements there. economy, but one little question first. You gaveI think we would leave it to them to attract those good marks to our trade work aVecting yourengineers. company in South Africa, but you seemed more

hesitant about the work in some of theQ151 Mr Olner: Are our competitors oVering neighbouring countries. Would you like to expandplaces in their universities to the young people of on that?South Africa? Mr Paterson: We inevitably come back toMr Roe: I am not aware of that. Zimbabwe. Talking about business and trading in

Zimbabwe, we have been publishing in Zimbabwesince 1981, we publish more than half the booksQ152 Sir John Stanley:Mr Paterson, this is one for

you, with the huge involvement of your company in published in Zimbabwe for schools, we aremanaging to hold things together and we have athe educational area. Could you give us your own

perspective on how the British Council are viable operation. More cognizance need to be takenof the fact that Zimbabwe will come out of itsperforming in South Africa and what sort of

interface do you have between your educational current woes; just through the passage of time

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe

things will change. Historically, the largest minimum level required. The fact that those growthrates have not been achieved has meant that theinvestments in Zimbabwe by any overseas country,

whether held directly or through South African market expansion just simply was not there.subsidiaries, have been those of the UK. We havea huge commercial stake in that economy and I do

Q159 Chairman: A final thought from me on blackbelieve that people need to be thinking about whateconomic empowerment policy. Is it your view thatis going to happen after change—how there is tothe generality of British business accepts this as abe re-investment in that country. For sure, whenworthy objective? Or is it something which isthings change there will be more aid, I have noviewed negatively as a brake on investment?doubt of that, but there needs to be more planningMr Paterson: A large number of companies regardfor the overall situation. I know it is not a priorityit negatively. However, a good number are comingcountry. South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt are muchto terms with it and certainly as far as our ownbigger countries in Africa but after thoseoperation is concerned, we will espouse thoseZimbabwe has one quarter of the population ofpolicies and work out what to do. We are espousingSouth Africa, the economic structure is still there,them already of course but there is more work toand we have quite big investments there. I do notdo.see anything happening to try to work out what

should happen in the longer-term.Q160 Chairman: Mr Roe, you are not perhaps as

Q155 Chairman: Are you getting paid there at the directly involved as a consultancy, but what is yourmoment? perception of the eVect on business and investmentMr Paterson: Yes. arising from that policy?

Mr Roe: The policy is right, it is the only way theycan move forward, but they have to do it in theQ156 Chairman: Is the attitude of the Southright way. It causes us some diYculty in terms ofAfrican Government to Zimbabwe in any waydeveloping our operation in South Africa, but weaVecting your company’s investment? Perhaps towill have to come to terms with it if we are goingMr Paterson, with your Association hat on. Do youto expand and we will find a way of doing it.find that the UK companies with whom you deal in

the Association are put oV from investing in SouthAfrica and its region because of Zimbabwe?

Q161 Chairman: As you know, our CommitteeMr Paterson: I think not directly, in that most ofmakes recommendations to government. Where dothe people in our Association are experiencedyou see any failings which might be improved? Ifinvestors. However, indirectly, that is surely so,you were making recommendations to the Foreignbecause the background business climate is badlyOYce in respect of their own operation in SouthaVected by what is going on in Zimbabwe.Africa, where do you think improvements mightbe made?

Q157 Chairman: I recall meeting a serious investor Mr Paterson: Having dealt with the Foreign OYcewho argued that there is great world competition for over 20 years in terms of conversations aboutfor scarce investment. Africa starts oV with an our business environment, the thing which worriesimage problem in any event. That can only be me is not the quality of advice and the helpfulexacerbated by Zimbabwe and by South Africa’s attitude of the Foreign OYce, it is that peopleattitude to it. How would you respond to that? change their jobs so often. I know the reason forMr Paterson: That is undoubtedly true. We invest that is that the Foreign OYce traditionally fearedsuccessfully in all of the countries of southern that people would go native if they stayed on oneAfrica, but the reason we can do it with confidence patch too long, but I do think that some of theis because we have long-term knowledge and know problems we have got into over the Zimbabwe issuewhat we are doing. We have German have been the result of the general memory beingshareholders—they are our owners since the rather short. I just find it amazing, when one talksMacmillan family disinvested some time ago. to the Foreign OYce, that every three years thereWhilst they are committed to what we do, they do is another face and this is in a position of somequestion it. The climate in Germany towards the power and some influence over what policy shouldsituation was very benign some years ago, but is a be on the ground. I just wonder whether this oldgreat deal less so with the Zimbabwe experience in practice is really helpful in the modern world—the background. when one is spending a lot of energy on a part of

the world like southern Africa, which has a historyQ158 Chairman: I suppose for some the general but is changing rapidly, if you lose that history, youlevel of foreign direct investment in South Africa lose a lot of your advantage.has been disappointing. Can you, either from yourown company or from your contacts within the

Q162 Chairman: I suppose they would answer thattrade association say what the negative factors arelocally engaged employees provide a degree ofwhich discourage such FDI?continuity.Mr Paterson: One has to say when Alec IrwinMr Roe: Yes, you are right, locally engagedannounced the GEAR policies five or six years agoemployees do. However, there is also the fact thatit was all dependent on a high growth rate. I think

he was talking then about six per cent being the the change is disruptive. On our side we have to get

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe

to know somebody else and they have to get to last year on black empowerment in co-operationwith the South African High Commission. Thatknow the government people in South Africa andwas a persuasive conference; it was very wellthat continuity is broken.attended and in fact it was over-booked. We hadseveral ministers there from the South African

Q163 Mr Olner: That is an excellent point and a Government and I think many of us who werepoint it might well be worth the Committee making there were impressed by how benign the policywhen we write our report. It does not only apply actually is when you get to describing how it isto South Africa of course. I know Severn Trent’s going to work in practice. We are planning to havecore business is water and water management. another one, because we were not able to cover theSevern Trent also have a plethora of portfolios financial services charter at that time and one isunder the counter. Do you have discussions and planned for after the election. I do think that, givendebates on them in southern Africa or other that there are diYculties with the South African/countries with which Severn Trent are involved? British relationship at the moment, if the ForeignMr Roe: No, we do not. The reason for that is that OYce felt that it could be more involved in thisthey have their own focuses. Severn Trent Water kind of initiative it would pay dividends in termsInternational are there to take the expertise we have of the relationship with the South Africanin the water industry in the UK outside the UK. Government.Mr Paterson: One thing I should like to say, if I Chairman: That is a helpful suggestion and themay, about black empowerment is that our Committee will bear that and your other comments

in mind. Thank you both very much.Association did have a very successful conference

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Tuesday 2 March 2004

Members present

Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr Bill OlnerMr Fabian Hamilton Richard OttawayMr Eric Illsley Mr Greg PopeAndrew Mackinlay Sir John StanleyMr John Maples Ms Gisela Stuart

Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

UK-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

1. The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce responds to a request from the House of Commons ForeignAVairs Select Committee for amemorandum in connection with the Committee’s inquiry into SouthAfrica,including reference to South Africa’s role in the region, and within relevant regional and internationalbodies; the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the G8 Africa Action Plan; and South Africa’scontribution to the war against terrorism.

2. The memorandum opens by setting out the areas where the UK and South Africa are workingtogether, and summarises South Africa’s influence within Africa and within international organisations.There are five annexes: joint UK-South Africa communique, June 2003 (Annex A); details of the UKdiplomatic presence in South Africa (Annex B); Entry Clearance and Visa operations (Annex C); Consularactivity (Annex D); and UK-South Africa trade figures (Annex E).

Introduction

3. South Africa is a parliamentary republic. President Mbeki took oYce in June 1999. The AfricanNational Congress (ANC) has been in oYce since the first fully democratic elections in April 1994. Nextelections are due in 2004.

4. South Africa is an important partner for the UK across a broad spectrum of international issues, butespecially those aVecting Africa. Since 1994, South Africa has been fully involved in the internationalorganisations to which it has been admitted or re-admitted. For example, it was Chair of the Non-AlignedMovement from1998–2003; Chair of theCommonwealth from1999–2002; Chair of theAfricanUnion from2002–03. South Africa has also been one of the main drivers behind the creation of the New Partnership forAfrica’s Development (NEPAD). The Foreign Secretary visited South Africa (Johannesburg, Pretoria andCape Town) in May 2003 (a copy of the joint UK/South Africa communique issued at the end of the visitis attached atAnnexA), and held talks with the SouthAfrican President andForeignMinister in themarginsof the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2003.

5. The UK’s and South Africa’s shared history mean that there are close personal links between the twocountries. An estimated 750,000 UK nationals live in South Africa. During 2002, 420,000 Britons visitedSouth Africa, and 282,000 South Africans visited the UK.

UK-South Africa Relations

6. The UK-South Africa relationship is broad and deep. We have mutual interests in a range ofinternational issues. With South Africa, we share:

— a strong interest in working together for long-term stability in Africa, supporting South Africa’speace-making eVorts, through diplomatic and practical measures (a British Peacekeeping SupportTeam is based in Pretoria);

— a strong interest in ensuring progress in Zimbabwe;

— a commitment to eliminating poverty in Africa, including through NEPAD, and support for theInternational Finance Facility (a joint DfID/HMT lead) proposal to help meet the MillenniumDevelopment Goals by 2015;

— agreement on key NEPAD priorities (eg conflict resolution, better governance, trade, increasedeVectiveness of development assistance);

— a strong interest in ensuring progress in the Middle East Peace Process;

— a commitment to trade liberalisation in the Doha trade round;

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— an interest in sustainable development issues, including those addressed at the World Summit onSustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002), eg the Renewable Energy and Energy EYciencyPartnership (REEEP), and the Sustainable Tourism Initiative (both FCO leads); and theExtractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI—DfID lead);

— a commitment to work together on crime prevention within South Africa, and to combatinginternational organised crime, drug traYcking, money laundering and terrorist financing;

— a commitment to work in partnership to combat communicable diseases, notably HIV/AIDS,malaria and tuberculosis; and

— a commitment to developing strong business partnerships and increasing two way trade.

7. Successful UK-SouthAfrica bilaterals atHead ofGovernment level have been held in 1997 (UK), 1999(South Africa), and 2001 (UK). There have also been recent State Visits: Her Majesty The Queen to SouthAfrica in 1995 and 1999. PresidentMandela visited the UK in July 1996; and PresidentMbeki in June 2001.

8. The oYcial resources deployed to promote UK interests and achieve the above are outlined inAnnex B.

Development Partnership

9. The UK and South Africa have a substantial development partnership, focussed on povertyelimination in South Africa, and partnership with South Africa in addressing poverty issues across thecontinent. The Department for International Development is investing £30 million a year to support SouthAfrican partners’ work in four broad thematic areas—poverty strategy and analysis; governance,democracy and service delivery; growth, jobs and equity; and HIV/AIDS. The UK and South AfricanGovernments agreed a new five-year strategy in October 2002. The EU development budget for SouthAfrica is set at around ƒ120 million per year until 2006. DfID will contribute some £16 million per year tothe EU’s programme in South Africa.

Peace Support Partnership

10. HMG is involved in helping to build the South African armed forces’ own peacekeeping skills. Aftereight years of assisting South Africa to integrate seven pre-democratic armed forces into a single NationalDefence Force, the BritishMilitary Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) has now been re-mandated asa smaller British Peace Support Team. This aims to prepare SouthAfrican troops for regional peace supportoperations.

Support for Law and Order in South Africa

11. High crime levels negatively aVect all South Africans and are a disincentive to domestic and foreigninvestment.With strong support from the UK, the British High Commission andDfID Southern Africa arehelping to tackle these. Our partnership includes a twinning arrangement between British and SouthAfricanpolice to explore community/police relations; assistance with oversight and accountability; training oYcersto combat financial crime (which also helps in the joint eVorts on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics);assistance to the elite counter-corruption “Scorpions” force; and a programme to assist in redesigningcorrectional services in South Africa. These activities are funded, in part, by the Foreign andCommonwealth OYce’s new Global Opportunities Fund, to complement and augment DfID programmes.

EU/South Africa Trade Agreement

12. On 11 October 1999, the European Union signed a bilateral Trade, Co-operation and DevelopmentAgreement (TDCA) with South Africa. Most of the Agreement’s provisions came into force on 1 January2000. The remainder will come into force when all 15 EUMember States and the Republic of South Africaratify the Agreement. To date, 11 EU members have ratified; South Africa has not yet done so. The UKratified the Agreement earlier this year. The TDCA has an unspecified duration.

13. The TDCA governs trade relations, financial aid and development co-operation as well as a range ofother fields, such as socio-cultural co-operation and political dialogue. The Agreement is supplemented byfour additional agreements: the Science and Technology Agreement, the Wine and Spirits Agreement, theFisheries Agreement (still in dispute) and by the existing Cotonou Agreement between the EU and theACP states.

14. The TDCA contains provisions on, inter alia: establishing a Co-operation Council to oversee theAgreement and to conduct regular political dialogue; creating a free trade area over a transitional period;liberalising trade in services and the right of establishment; liberalising current payments and capitalmovement; preventing public aid distorting competition; promoting and protecting investment; anddevelopment co-operation.

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South Africa’s Role in Southern Africa (Including Zimbabwe) and the Continent moreWidely

15. South Africa plays a significant role on African peace and security issues. It contributes troops forpeace support operations, and is emerging as the most influential peace broker on the continent. SouthAfrica was a primary architect of the peace and security principles in NEPAD, and helped to ensure thesewere adopted by the African Union—NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda.

The Region

16. In February 2000, and again in February 2001, Mozambique suVered from flooding that causedwidespread devastation. TheMozambican Government issued an appeal for international support. In bothyears, South Africa provided military forces to rescue people from flooded areas and to fly in humanitarianaid supplies. In addition, South Africa provided food and medical supplies, and medical personnel.

Zimbabwe

17. South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth Troika that took the decision in March 2002 tosuspend Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth for a year. On 16 March 2003, theCommonwealth Secretary General announced that Zimbabwe would remain suspended from the Councilsof the Commonwealth, pending discussions by Heads of Government in Abuja (5-8 December 2003).

18. Following Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth in 2002, South AfricaandNigeria appointed facilitators in April 2002 to encourage inter-party dialogue between the Governmentof Zimbabwe and the Opposition. South Africa continues to encourage the resumption of dialogue betweenZANU(PF) and the MDC. South Africa is also providing humanitarian support to Zimbabwe.

The Continent

19. South Africa has been instrumental in brokering peace in the Great Lakes Region. As well as leadingthe diplomatic initiative, South Africa has provided peacekeeping forces in the Democratic Republic ofCongo and is leading and commanding the first African Union multinational force, which is deployed inBurundi.

20. As President of the African Union, President Mbeki attended the January 2003 Paris summit onCote d’Ivoire.

21. He also travelled to Liberia in August 2003 to attend the ceremony organised by Charles Taylor tomark the latter’s departure from the country. South African forces helped to secure the airport.

South Africa’s Role within Relevant Regional and International Bodies, most Notably the

African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations

22. Following the holding of the first free and fair elections under universal suVrage in South Africa inApril 1994, South Africa was admitted or re-admitted to a number of international organisations. Sincethen, South Africa has played its part within those bodies in promoting internal restructuring in order tomake them more eVective.

23. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 and currently has14members1. SouthAfrica joined in 1994, and has played an active role, with its partners, in the formulationof SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, which was adopted by SADC Heads at itsSummit in Dar-es-Salaam in August 2003. The Plan is geared to enhance regional economic development.

24. The African Union legally came into being in May 2001 but its formal launch took place in Durbanin July 2002. The last Assembly of Heads of State from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was heldon 8 July 2002. It was immediately followed by the Inaugural Summit of the African Union from 9-10 July2002. The Constitutive Act of the African Union puts greater emphasis on good governance, democracyand constitutional rule than did the Charter of the Organisation for African Unity. Again, South Africaplayed an active role in taking forward change. President Mbeki was the first President of the new Union.

25. South Africa assumed the Chair of the Commonwealth at the Heads of Government Meeting inDurban in November 1999. The meeting established a ten-country High Level Group (chaired by SouthAfrica). The Group’s mandate was to review the role of the Commonwealth and report to the next Headsof Government Meeting (Coolum, Australia, March 2002) on how best the Commonwealth could respondto the challenges of the new century. South Africa remains a member of the Commonwealth Troika.

1 Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland,Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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26. Recently, South Africa has hosted two major United Nations conferences. In 2001, the WorldConference Against Racism (WCAR) was held in Durban. In 2002, the World Summit on SustainableDevelopment (WSSD) was held in Johannesburg—the biggest meeting ever. As host on both occasions,South Africa played a key role in the pre-conference preparation, chairing the meetings and producingconference documents.

27. South Africa is a major player in the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement. As Chair of the NAM from1998 to 2003, they played a key role in guiding the input of that movement in multilateral fora. In 2003, theywere co-ordinator for the African Group at the UN Commission on Human Rights, which voted against anumber of EU initiatives, including a proposed resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe.

South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

28. South Africa is a founding nation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)initiative and continues to play a leading role in its development and implementation. At its Summitmeetingin July 2003, the African Union agreed that the NEPAD Secretariat should continue to be based inSouth Africa.

29. NEPAD is a long-term strategy for Africa’s sustainable growth and development. It evolved fromearlier African strategies and was further developed by a small group of African leaders2. Working withothers, President Mbeki has mobilised political support for NEPAD among African and internationalleaders.

30. President Mbeki’s contribution to NEPAD’s development came from his own initial strategy forAfrica’s regeneration, theMillennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP). MAP wasinspired by President Mbeki’s concept of African Renaissance3, which features in South Africa’s domesticand foreign policies. As such, President Mbeki is regarded as one of the chief architects of the NEPADstrategy and a leading proponent of a regenerated African Union, Africa’s primary continental body.

31. Endorsed by the OAU (nowAfrican Union) in 2001, NEPAD is African owned and led. It recognisesAfrican responsibility for creating the conditions for the continent’s development. It also calls on developedcountries to enter into a new partnership with Africa, based on mutual responsibility and trust, withcommitments and obligations on all parties.

32. South Africa is a member of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government ImplementationCommittee. The Committee sets NEPAD policies, priorities and programmes and reports to the annualsummit of the African Union Assembly (at Heads of State and Government level).

33. South Africa chairs the NEPAD Steering Committee, which comprises personal representatives ofthe initiating Presidents of the five founding NEPAD countries4. The Steering Committee is responsible fordeveloping terms of reference for programmes and projects and for overseeing the NEPAD Secretariat.South Africa also chairs the NEPAD sub-committee on Peace and Security, and has been instrumental inconverging the African Union (AU) and NEPAD peace and security objectives into what is now referredto as the AU—NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda (APSA).

34. The centrepiece of APSA is the AU Common African Defence and Security Policy. Implementationat regional and continental levels should lead to a defence and security architecture, including theestablishment of an African Standby Force. At the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003, President Mbeki(the outgoing Chair) urged AU members to ratify the protocol that will enable the Peace and SecurityCouncil to be legally established. So far less than 20 countries have done so.

35. The Democracy and Political Governance Initiative includes the establishment of an African PeerReviewMechanism (APRM), a voluntary process to review and raise governance standards inAfrica. SouthAfrica was among the first countries to volunteer for the APRMand seeks to encourage other African statesto do the same. The UK welcomes the development of the Review Mechanism. Sixteen countries have nowagreed to be reviewed. The first reviews are expected to start in autumn 2003.

36. South Africa contributes to the development of NEPAD policy and programmes in other priorityareas by supporting studies and hosting seminars. To popularise the African Union and NEPAD withinSouth Africa, President Mbeki initiated an AU/NEPAD Outreach Programme in 2002.

37. The importance attached to NEPAD by South Africa is also reflected in its foreign policies. TheDepartment of Foreign AVairs Strategy Plan for 2003–05 lists implementation of NEPAD as a priority.

2 Presidents Bouteflika of Algeria, Mubarak of Egypt, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Wade of Senegal, and Mbeki of South Africa.3 African Renaissance can be described as a social and economic development agenda for the revival and renewal of Africa,recognising the continent’s culture and history while setting out a path to address the challenges of globalisation.

4 South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt and Algeria.

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NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan

38. The United KingdomGovernment strongly supports NEPAD.We recognise that NEPAD is a long-term agenda requiring sustained engagement and political commitment. The Government played an activerole in developing the G8 Africa Action Plan, announced at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, as aresponse to support NEPAD. The Action Plan sets out G8 commitments in a range of areas such as peaceand security, governance, trade, health and education. The Government is implementing its commitmentsthrough its wider development programme.

39. NEPAD and G8 leaders and representatives have met regularly to discuss NEPAD and the G8’sresponse since the G8 Summit in Genoa 2001. South Africa has played a key role in these meetings.

UK Support for NEPAD

40. British High Commission oYcials, with their DfID colleagues, have been in regular contact with theNEPADSecretariat to oVer support and to gauge progress. Similarly, there has been constant dialogue withSouth Africa at political and senior oYcial level.

South Africa’s Contribution to theWar Against Terrorism

41. South Africa responded swiftly to the attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. The Governmentcondemned terrorismwithout equivocation, oVering theUS humanitarian support and the full co-operationof its security agencies. In a follow-up statement, the South Africans said they recognised the right of theUS Government to track down the culprits and bring them to justice, though this should be coupled witha longer term response of isolating terrorists through international co-operation “to eradicate poverty andunderdevelopment”.

42. South Africa has just joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental bodythat sets the global standards in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. South Africa is alsoa member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the onlyFATF-style regional body in Africa.

Domestic Terrorism

43. The South African Government’s intentions and actions on countering terrorism are laudable. TheCounter Terrorism Bill is working its way through Parliament, but faces obstacles over the detentionwithout trial of suspected terrorists, owing to objections to similar repressive Apartheid-era legislation. Thework of South African agencies involved in countering terrorism is not always fully co-ordinated, but isimproving. The South African Police Service is confident that it is on top of recent domestic terrorist threatsfrom domestic groups, including People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and the Boermag (awhite far-right organisation).

UK/South Africa Co-operation

44. The British High Commission has worked with the South African authorities to mutual benefit,particularly in anti-money laundering activities. It has been active in supporting South Africa in the creationof a Financial Intelligence Centre to monitor and police money-laundering activities by both terrorist andorganised criminal groups. Further co-operation continues and is aimed at jointly encouragingneighbouring countries to strengthen their anti-money laundering regimes.

UK-South Africa Trade and Investment

45. The UK is one of South Africa’s largest trade and investment partners with over £5 billion in two-way trade in goods and services and £12 billion of UK investment in South Africa (see statistics at AnnexE). Strong business ties are an important element of the overall bilateral relationship. The UK Trade andInvestment operation is headquartered in Johannesburg, with additional commercial coverage in CapeTown and Durban. Collectively, we see over 500 visiting UK business people a year, and assist 12–15 trademissions and 4–5 exhibition groups visiting South Africa.

Trade

46. Following the end of apartheid and the opening up of South Africa’s economy, a major campaign,“Britain and South Africa: Partners in Opportunity”, ran from 1998–2000, to raise UK awareness of theopportunities in the market. This has evolved into a sector-focused approach, with strategies currentlydrawn up in 12 sectors to help UK companies take advantage of specific opportunities. There has been astrong emphasis on those expected to arise from the privatisation programme and the promotion of PublicPrivate Partnerships (PPPs). These include opportunities in the water, airports, ports, healthcare,

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telecommunications and railways sectors. Education and training, IT, tourism, creative industries,agriculture and automotive are also key areas. Since 1999 UK trade in goods and services with South Africahas followed an upward trend, with the latest figures (2002) showing UK exports of goods at £1,597 million.This is an increase of 25% over 1999. The UK share of world exports to South Africa is 9.1% (up from 8.7%in 2001).

Investment

47. The UK is the largest foreign investor in South Africa, estimated at £12 billion and covering a widerange of sectors. Nine of the top 20 foreign employers are British, and UK companies employ more than40% of those working for foreign firms. Lonrho is the largest foreign employer, while BP, Shell, GSK,Barclays, BAE Systems, Unilever, HSBC, British Airways and Rio Tinto are other important investors.

48. South Africa is the 18th largest investor in theUK in net book value, with investments of £757millionrecorded in 2001. Over 200 South African companies are in the UK, with ICT, light engineering, creativeindustries, financial services and consultancy being the most prominent. Large investors include OldMutual, SAB Miller, Investec and Sasol. Several companies have listed on the London Stock Exchange inrecent years.

Defence Package

49. Following a 1996 Strategic Defence Review of post-apartheid South Africa’s changing defencepriorities, the South African Parliament agreed in 1997 to a comprehensive Strategic Defence ProcurementPackage. Primary contracts for the aviation element of the package were subsequently awarded in 1999. Thelion’s share went to a BAe Systems bid (with SAAB Aeronautical alongside) to supply 24 Hawk trainersand 28 Gripen light fighter aircraft. The value of the Hawk/Gripen contract to BAe Systems wasapproaching £1.5 billion, with an overall “oVset” commitment to generate additional investment in SouthAfrica of nearly £5.5 billion.

50. Other purchases included Agusta A109 helicopters (from 2004), four German corvettes (2004–05),three French submarines (2005–07) and 15 domestic Rooivalk attack helicopters (delivery underway). Thetotal value of the package was £3.3 billion. The UK’s share of the package has recently been increased byan order for four Lynx helicopters.

51. The UK oVset commitment of £5.5 billion was split between Defence Industrial Participation andNational Industrial Participation (NIP). The oVset programme has to be achieved over eleven years. MODoYcials are keeping a close eye on BAE Systems eVorts and form part of the Joint Monitoring Team thatoversees the oVset obligation.

Black Economic Empowerment and Commerce

52. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is the strategy initiated by the South African Government in1995 to improve black participation in the ownership and management of the economy and the highlyunequal distribution of wealth inherited from the apartheid era. The South African Government hasattempted to drive BEE by encouraging the private and public sectors to demonstrate an increase in blackparticipation in ownership, management, employment equity, skills development, aYrmative procurementand income levels. Following concern over the way that the Mining Charter was handled before agreementwas reached with industry last year, other sectors have been given the flexibility to decide how to take BEEforward.UKTI staV urgeUK companies to consider BEE as a competitive advantage and provide advice onhow this can be done well, including identifying local partners with access into the previously disadvantagedcommunities.

The UK-SA SME Partnership Programme

53. In 1999 Trade Partners UK launched the pilot UK/SA Small and Medium Enterprises (SME)Partnership Programme, which aims to develop long-term business partnerships between UK and SouthAfrican small and medium sized companies, with particular emphasis on SMEs in South Africa owned andmanaged by previously disadvantaged groups. Thirty-two partnerships were achieved in 2002.

The Southern African Commercial Hub

54. Southern Africa oVers significant business opportunities—from huge infrastructure projects toregional distribution networks—and South African-based companies are well placed to take advantage ofthem due to their location, cost, structures, local knowledge and access to donor funding. Since 2001, theSouthern African Commercial Hub, located in the Johannesburg oYce, has worked with colleagues inregional posts to help UK companies, both in the UK and the region, trade and invest in Southern Africa,

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often in partnership with companies based in South Africa. This has included introducing companies thathave formed a consortium to bid for infrastructure projects. This approach also provides a good fit with theNEPAD agenda.

ECGD

55. The full range of ECGD export credit facilities is available to support UK exports of capital goodsand services to South Africa, including financing in Rand. Total ECGD exposure to South Africa stands atabout £1.78 billion which largely reflects the cover agreed for the large defence deal won by BAE Systemsand SAAB of Sweden. South Africa is regarded as an acceptable risk, and theMediumTermCase Indicatoris £80 million. Along with 10–15 of its most concentrated markets, ECGD is introducing its Active PortfolioManagement (APM) programme to South Africa. This aims to hedge or transfer risks through reinsurance,credit derivatives or structured instruments.

Effectiveness of the Foreign Office’sWork in South Africa

56. The United Kingdom Government’s policy towards South Africa is to create a strong partnership,building on our shared history and major commercial links. This paper demonstrates the wide rangingagenda addressed by the two Governments, and sets out in detail in the annexes the way the Foreign andCommonwealth OYce, with its partner Departments, engage with the SouthAfricanGovernment, and withBritish and South African nationals.

57. The Foreign Secretary’s visit to South Africa inMay 2003 confirmed agreement on the broad agendathe two governments will pursue together.

Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

September 2003

Annex A

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE OFFICIAL VISIT OF THE RT HON JACK STRAWMP,SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, TO SOUTH

AFRICA FROM 13 TO 14 MAY 2003

At the invitation of theHonourable Dr. NkosazanaDlamini Zuma,MP, andMinister of Foreign AVairs,the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs, paid an oYcialvisit to South Africa from 13 to 14 May 2003.

Minister Dlamini Zuma was accompanied by Deputy Minister of Foreign AVairs, Mr A Pahad. TheBritish Secretary of State, Mr J Straw was accompanied by Mr Michael Meacher, Environment Minister,Department of Food and Rural AVairs (DEFRA) and Mr Stephen Twigg, Schools Minister, Departmentfor Education and Skills (DfES). Ms Joyce Mabudafhasi, Deputy Minister of Environmental AVairs andTourism and Mr Michael Meacher as well as Mr Mosibudi Mangena, Deputy Minister of Education andMr Stephen Twigg held bilateral meetings.

Consequent to the bilateral discussions the overall political relationship between South Africa and theUnited Kingdom have been strengthened with the agreement to enhance and formalise the Joint BilateralForum (JBF). In addition oYcials will meet frequently to take forward a common agenda agreed to by theprincipals.

In the political sphere the Ministers discussed issues such as: the African Union (AU) and NEPAD;Conflict resolution in the Middle East and Iraq; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and theGreat Lakes as well as other African issues; Co-operation within multilateral fora of the United Nations(UN) and the reinforcement of the UN as the primary multilateral organisation responsible for world peaceand security.

Minister Dlamini Zuma provided an update of developments relating toNEPAD and the AfricanUnion.Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw congratulated South Africa on the establishment of the NEPADSecretariat and on the leadership of President Mbeki up to and following the launch of the African Union.The United Kingdom remains committed to supporting NEPAD, the African Union, and South Africa. Itwas agreed that both countries will work together to look for ways in which to implement the NEPADAgenda and to meet the targets set out in the G8 Africa Action Plan as agreed on at Kananaskis.

The Ministers welcomed the invitation extended to the leaders representing the South to the G8 Summitin Evian, France. Furthermore, the Ministers expressed their hope that the Agreements expected to bereached at Evian on NEPAD’S Africa Action Plan be implemented equitably as agreed upon by all partiesat the Summit. It was further agreed to pursue meaningful discussions post-Evian.

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Foreign Secretary Straw reiterated that the United Kingdom remains firmly committed to supportingSouth Africa’s democratic transformation. He stated that the United Kingdom’s Department forInternational Development (DFlD) has recently finalised a new strategy for development co-operation onSouthern Africa.

This strategy is closely alignedwith the achievement of the UNMillenniumDevelopment Goals, and withSouth Africa’s own development priorities. It commits the British Government to increasing co-operationwith South Africa on global and continental issues such as conflict resolution, trade and NEPAD as well asto supporting South African eVorts in four thematic areas:

(i) poverty strategy and analysis;

(ii) growth, jobs and equity;

(iii) democracy, governance and service delivery; and

(iv) HIV/AIDS. An annual amount of 30million pounds for a period of three years, has been allocatedfor the four thematic areas.

Both Ministers acknowledged the burden and challenges facing Africa in the form of communicablediseases such as Malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS etc. The United Kingdom supports South Africa’s National2000–05 Strategic Plan through its development assistance programme at government to government level,in partnership with civil society, and aiding small, grassroots community organisations. It was agreed thatthe United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) and South Africa’s NationalTreasury should work together to bring forward new co-operation programmes for consideration, whichwill include local government, communicable diseases, land reform, and justice.

The Ministers also noted the continued recruitment of skilled South Africans to the UK, and undertookto work together to ensure such recruitment does not undermine the economic and social development ofSouth Africa.

The Ministers welcomed the appointment of Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as Prime Minister in thePalestinianNational Authority and the appointment of a newCabinet, as well as the consequent publicationof the Quartet’s Road Map. They agreed to share with the parties to this conflict the relevant experiencethat their respective Governments gained in the democratic transformation process, in the case of SouthAfrica and in Northern Ireland in the case of the UK.

The Ministers discussed the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Long-term peace, security, development, anda sustainable solution in Iraq can only be achieved with and by the full participation of the Iraqi peoplethemselves. In this regard it was agreed that the first priority now is to address the humanitarian situationand to work towards the stabilisation of Iraq.

In addition to the bilateral discussion held by the ForeignMinisters, twoWorking Groups met on Africaand Multilateral issues:

On the Great Lakes Region, the Working Group on Africa concurred that both South Africa and theUnited Kingdom share a strong interest in the long-term stability and prosperity of this Region,acknowledging that development and poverty alleviation can only come about through stability and thetotal cessation of conflict. The United Kingdom warmly welcomed South Africa’s success in July 2002 inbrokering a Peace Agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was noted thatthe United Kingdom has provided practical support for South Africa’s commitment of troops in supportof MONUC operations in the DRC. The United Kingdom expressed their government’s readiness toprovide further assistance, if requested.

TheWorkingGroupwelcomed the signing of the Final Act of the PeaceAgreement on 2April 2003 at SunCity, as well as the endorsement of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in theDemocraticRepublic of Congo and the Transitional Constitution. The Working Group welcomed the sterling eVortsof the Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, MrMoustapha Niasse, and the spirit of reconciliation displayed by the Congolese parties, which havecontributed to this important step towards a united, peaceful and prosperous Democratic Republic of theCongo. Both expressed their concern on recent developments in eastern DRC. They underlined theirsupport for eVorts to stabilise the situation and protect the civilian population.

On Burundi the Working Group strongly supported South Africa’s continuing eVorts to narrow thediVerences between the protagonists. The Working Group welcomed the smooth transfer of power andcongratulated all the parties for taking the peace process forward. The Working Group welcomed the planto deploy the Africa mission to Burundi and noted that this was the first African Union multinational forceof Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa.

On Angola theWorking Group shared a strong commitment in ensuring that the progress in the Angolanpeace process is maintained and strengthened. Both countries are aware of the development challengesfacing Angola in the post-war phase and support policies and programmes aimed at alleviating the suVeringof the people and ensuring the long-term stability of the country.

OnZimbabwe, theMinisters welcomed the visit of President BakiliMuluzi ofMalawiOlusegunObasanjoof Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, to Zimbabwe on 5 May 2003. While in Harare, the threeleaders held discussions with both President Robert Mugabe and the MDC leader, MrMorgan Tsvangirai,

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in an attempt to remove all the remaining obstacles towards the resumption of Inter-PartyDialogue betweenZANU-PF and theMDC. Both countries agreed on the need to encourage the parties to commit themselvesto removing the obstacles to the negotiations. They underlined that the longer the problems in Zimbabweremain unresolved, the more entrenched poverty will become. They stressed their commitment to anoutcome in which the people of Zimbabwe enjoy independence, freedom, peace, stability, democracy andprosperity. The Working Group noted unequivocally, that no lasting solution to the challenges that faceZimbabwe can be found, unless that solution comes from the people of Zimbabwe themselves.

On Cote d’Ivoire the Working Group expressed concern about the continuing unstable situation in Coted’Ivoire, and the delay in the full implementation of the provisions of the Marcoussis Agreement. Theywelcomed the mediation eVorts undertaken by President Kufuor of Ghana on behalf of the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS), which has the support of the African Union.

Furthermore, they expressed concern at the ongoing reports of continuing violence in the western partsof Cote d’Ivoire. In this regard, the Working Group stated that all parties to the conflict should desist fromviolent actions, including the recruitment of mercenaries, which could lead to further suVering and committhemselves to a process of negotiation.

The Multilateral Working Group stressed their commitment to and the importance of, the multilateralsystem of governance for peace, sustainable development, and strong and equitable growth. The WorkingGroup had a helpful exchange on the British proposal for the International Financing Facility (IFF), whichaims to promote enhanced aid flows to the poorest countries. Both sides agreed to keep in close contact asthe idea is taken forward. TheWorking Group agreed that the United Nations has an indispensable role toplay, not only in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in post-conflict situations, but also inassisting with the full range of peace-building, reconciliation and reconstruction activities.

On the WTO and International Trade the Working Group noted that the United Kingdom and SouthAfrica share a good understanding of each other’s perspectives on international trade issues andglobalisation enhanced by the close interaction between our respective Trade and Finance Ministers andCentral Bank Governors. The Ministers agreed that the lack of progress in talks at the WTO in Geneva isof concern. It was agreed to continue to engage each other at all levels to make progress on the negotiationsahead of Cancun, particularly in the areas of agriculture and TRIPS to meet the mandate of the DohaDevelopment agenda.

Both countries noted with approval that the United Kingdom remains the largest foreign investor inSouth Africa and welcomed the steady stream of inward trade missions from potential British investors.Over 200 United Kingdom companies have now endorsed the principles behind NEPAD as they see SouthAfrica as a country where good governance, transparency and sound business practice thrive. TheWorkingGroup welcomed the South African Government’s release of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)strategy. It noted that the strategy had been broadlywelcomed by investors as key to providing both a strongframework and greater certainty for social transformation and economic growth.

In order to enhance further co-operation and to promote two-way trade and tourism, theWorkingGroupagreed that air services and other transport issues will be discussed at senior political level in the near future.

TheWorking Group remained committed to theKimberly process in order to help promote internationalpeace and security. It was agreed that the active co-operation between South Africa and the UnitedKingdom has contributed to the success of the recently held meeting of the Kimberly Process inJohannesburg.

On theWSSD theUnitedKingdom is targeting its development assistance programme towards achievingthe goals set out in Johannesburg regarding access to water, energy and sanitation as part of an overridingobjective to alleviate poverty.

During the bilateral meeting between Deputy Minister Mabudafhasi and Junior Minister Meacher, thetwo Ministers agreed to work together to find a satisfactory solution to serious environmentalcontamination in Kwazulu-Natal concerning Thor chemicals.

On Climate Change the two Ministers discussed an urgent need for action to tackle the threat of climatechange and emphasised the positive role that new technologies, as well as the business sector, could play inthe process. The Ministers also emphasised the need of all countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

The two ministers agreed that South Africa and the UK could each play a vital role in ensuring that theinternational community delivered on commitments made in Johannesburg on water and sanitation. Theministers emphasised the importance of mobilising all possible resources at all levels to ensure adequateinvestments in these sectors, in order to provide the necessary infrastructure, technology and capacity-building.

Stephen Twigg, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Schools, participated in an extendedprogramme in Pretoria and Cape Town. Mr Twigg held warm and productive meetings with EducationMinister Kader Asmal and Deputy Education Minister Mosibudi Mangena, sharing experiences andidentifying a number of areas for follow-up and further co-operation including: IT, tertiary educationreform, prompting high learning achievement regardless of race, and the incorporation of sound values andcitizenship ideals into education policy.

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On behalf of Secretary of State for Education Charles Clarke, Mr Twigg welcomed Mr Asmal’sparticipation in the meeting later this year of Commonwealth Education Ministers in Edinburgh, andinvited Mr Asmal to take part in a further series of bilateral discussions during his visit to the UK.

At the invitation of both National and Provincial Education Departments,Mr Twigg also visited schoolsin Soshanguve and Mitchells Plain, experiencing first-hand the issues facing education in South Africa. Atthe invitation of both National and Provincial Education Departments Mr Twigg took part in further in-depth discussions of these issues, and the common ground between the UK and South Africa in how theseissues are tackled.

In conclusion the two parties agreed that the next meeting of the Joint Bilateral Forum will be held inSouth Africa during 2004 to coincide with South Africa’s 10th Anniversary celebration.

The Rt. Hon. Jack StrawMP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs during his visitalso had the opportunity to pay a courtesy call on H.E. Mr Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic ofSouth Africa.

June 2003

Annex B

UK PRESENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. UK interests in SouthAfrica are dealt with by four principal oYces: our High Commission in Pretoria,Consulate General in Cape Town, British Trade and Investment OYce in Johannesburg and ConsulateGeneral in Durban, plus two Honorary Consulates in Port Elizabeth and East London. In managing theseassets, the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce has sought to meet high standards of value for money.

Estate in South Africa

2. In Pretoria, the main part of the High Commission is located in a listed building which was gifted tothe British Government by a local businessman, of British origin, in the 1930s. Since then extensions havebeen built to accommodate the High Commission’s management and press and public aVairs sections. Visaand consular services are run out of a separate leased building in Pretoria. UK staV in South Africa arehoused in 31 owned and 13 leased properties. The High Commissioner has residences in Pretoria andCapetown. Annual estate expenditure in Pretoria alone is £305,000.

3. The former High Commission buildings in Cape Town, located within the South African Parliament’scompound, were sold earlier this year to the South African Government for R6,350,000 (£530,000). TheBritish Consulate General in Cape Town is located on one floor of a leased oYce block. The BritishConsulate in Durban will shortly take on a purely commercial role funded by British Trade International.

StaV in South Africa

4. A comparative summary of staYng is contained in the table below.

UK-based StaV Locally Engaged StaV

Pretoria 36 122Jo’burg 6 29Cape Town 4 17Durban 1 10UK Total 47 178

France 30 20Germany 47 39USA 250 450

5. Since 1994 considerable eVort has gone into increasing the diversity of locally employed staV so thatit is more representative of SouthAfrica’s population. A number of initiatives have been employed to ensurethat this diverse mix works as an eVective team. All staV attend an employment equity course which aimsto give an overview of new employment laws. Specialist trainers from the UK ran a “Managing Inclusion”course in 2002. Team building sessions, mentoring, staV Away-days and induction training for new staVhave all been introduced in the last two years.

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Annex C

THE ENTRY CLEARANCE AND VISA OPERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. All UK Entry Clearance and visa work in South Africa is centralised in Pretoria. The Visa Sectioncurrently consists of one Entry Clearance Manager, 5 Entry Clearance OYcers and 22.5 Locally EngagedstaV. 29,335 visa applications were received in the financial year 2002-03, an increase of 28% on the previousyear. 93.1% of all the applications received were approved.

Performance against PSA Targets

2. In the financial year 2002–03, the visa post in Pretoria met all three PSA targets:

92% of Tier 1 and Tier 2 (straightforward non-settlement applications) were resolved within 24hours (target was 90%)

average waiting time for a Tier 3 (non-settlement applications) interview was one working day(target was 10 working days)

average waiting time for a Tier 4 (settlement applications) interview was one week (target was12 weeks)

General

3. Visa work has increased year on year since South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth in 1994. Sincethen South Africans have benefited from two categories of entry clearance previously denied to them:working holidaymaker and permit free employment on the grounds of UK ancestry. One-half ofapplications are submitted in person at the Visa Section, One-third through commercial visa agents of theapplicant’s choice. The rest are sent by post or courier.

4. Although they do not need prior entry clearance to visit theUK, approximately 85–90%of applicationsare from South Africans. Most of them are employment or settlement related.

Category Percentage %

Working holidaymakers 66Permit free employment on the grounds of UK ancestry (plus accompanying dependants) 11Visitors (mainly third country visa nationals) 8Settlement 6Work permit dependants 5EEA family permits 1Students 1Other categories of permit free employment 2

Waiting Time

5. The waiting queue for a tier three interview currently (September 2003) stands at 12 working days, butis usually below the PSA target of 10. The queue is mainly composed of applicants who have not submittedtheir application in person. Personal callers are usually interviewed on the same day, if this is required.

6. There is no separate queue for tier four settlement applications. Most of these can easily be resolvedon paper, as they are usually from long established couples.

EU Residence Permits Scheme

7. From 13 November 2003, South African nationals will be aVected by the UK Government’simplementation of the EU-wide Residence Permits scheme, ie those who wish to stay in the UK for morethan six months will need to apply for Entry Clearance before arrival.

8. Based on IND statistics for the number of South African nationals admitted to the UK in 2001–02 formore than six months, we estimate that this change in policy will generate around 19,000 visa applicationsin the first year following its introduction. UKVisas have agreed the additional deployment of three LocallyEngaged staV (one of them will be an Entry Clearance OYcer (ECO) on a six month contract initially) andextra funding to pay for new application forms, furniture and oYce equipment (such as computer terminals,cash-tills and printers).

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Working Holidaymakers (WHM) Scheme

9. The recent revisions to the Working Holidaymakers Scheme are expected to generate a considerableincrease in the post’s workload. For the last financial year, 64% of visa applications received by the postwere for WHM visas. As the changes only started from 25 August 2003, UKvisas are monitoring thesituation closely and maintaining close contact with post. Additional staV and resources will be deployed,if necessary.

Annex D

UK CONSULAR WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. Consular work in South Africa is split into three consular districts. The Consulate General in CapeTown covers Northern, Western and Eastern Cape Provinces. KwaZulu Natal is currently covered by ourDurban oYce, although in early 2004 the oYce will handle trade matters exclusively. Straightforward oremergency consular work will then be covered locally by an Honorary Consul but assisted, where required,by consular staV from Pretoria. The remaining five provinces are covered from Pretoria.

2. Pretoria’s consular staYng consists of the Consul, Vice Consul (Passports and Nationality), an LE IIConsular Protection OYcer, an LEII Nationality OYcer and 17 other Locally Engaged staV. Cape Town’sconsular staYng comprises an LE II Vice Consul and three Locally Engaged consular assistants. There arealso Honorary Consuls in Port Elizabeth and East London, mainly to provide assistance to the largenumbers of British nationals (including many retirees) residing in the Eastern Cape. The total number ofBritish nationals living in South Africa is estimated at around 750,000, of which 500,000 reside in the Capeprovinces. Many of these are dual nationals.

3. Approximately 420,000 British citizens visited South Africa last year. Most visit the coastal areas(notably Cape Town), although South Africa’s tourism authorities estimate that a third of all tourists visitMpumulanga, primarily to see the Kruger National Park.

4. The last annual return shows approximately 50,000 personal callers to our consular oYces (includingcollection and delivery of applications), 200,000 telephone enquiries, and 17,000 postal, fax or e-mailenquiries. Over 500 received advice or assistance in respect of financial assistance and repatriation, andassistance was given to 23 detainees (either serving sentences in prison or having been held for more than24 hours). Twenty nine hospital visits were recorded, although this figure does not fully record the numerousvisits made by a number of High Commission staV to the victims of the Piet Retief bus crash over a periodof several weeks. Seventy eight deaths were recorded, involving varying degrees of assistance from our staVto the families and relatives.

5. Last year around 23,000 passports were issued, over 90% in less than 5 working days. Documentationanomalies and form filling errors account for nearly all the delayed issues. However, in the recent monthsPassport Section has achieved a near 100% issue within five working days.

6. Despite the best eVorts of the South African authorities to address the problem, the country’s highcrime rate cannot be denied or ignored. This, allied to the large number of British residents and thesubstantial (and growing) volume of visitors, some, inevitably, become victims of crime.

Annex E

UK—SOUTH AFRICA TRADE IN GOODS & INVESTMENT—KEY POINTS

£ Million 2000 2001 2002 Jan-Jun2003

Exports of Goods 1,413 1,558 1,597 851Imports of Goods 2,553 2,861 2,673 1,399Balance in Goods –1,140 –1,303 –1,076 –548Exports of Services 952 1,004 n/a n/aImports of Services 516 520 n/a n/aBalance in Services 436 484 n/a n/a

Trade in goods

UK exports to South Africa increased by 2% in 2002

UK imports from South Africa fell by 7% in 2002

South Africa is the UK’s 21st largest export market (2002)

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South Africa is the UK’s 16th largest source of imports (2002)

UK is South Africa’s largest export market (2002)

UK is South Africa’s 3rd largest source of imports (2002)

UK share of world exports to South Africa increased from 8.7% in 2001 to 9.1% in 2002.

Main UK exports to South Africa by value during 2002 (with changes over 2001)

Non-Metallic Mineral Manufactures (primarily diamonds) £286 million (!29%)

Road Vehicles £149 million (!25%)

OYce Machines & ADP Equipment £100 million ("24%)

Power Generating Equipment £96 million (!83%)

Around 91% of UK exports to South Africa aremanufactured goods.

Main UK imports from South Africa by value during 2002(with changes over 2001)

Non-Metallic Mineral Manufactures (primarily diamonds) £853 million ("12%)

Road Vehicles £310 million (!38%)

Coal, Coke £269 million ("24%)

Vegetables and Fruit £223 million (!13%)

South African Investment into the UK

South Africa is the 18th largest investor in the UK in net book value, with investments of £757 millionrecorded in 2001. Over 200 South African companies are in the UK.

LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT,FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFCE, FROM THE SECOND CLERK OF THE

COMMITTEE, 29 JANUARY 2004

At its meeting on Tuesday, the Committee discussed the South Africa inquiry and its forthcomingevidence session with Mr Mullin. Given the time that will have elapsed between the session and the receiptof the Foreign OYce’s memorandum for the inquiry (30 September), the Committee agreed that it wouldgreatly value a supplementary note from the OYce to bring the submission up-to-date. There would ofcourse be no need to repeat any of the details provided in the original memorandum, although it would behelpful if the information could be set out under the same headings.If the submission could be received byMonday 23 February, to allow time for circulation to all Members prior to Mr Mullin’s session, theCommittee would be grateful.

GeoVrey FarrarSecond Clerk of the Committe

January 2004

LETTER TO THE SECOND CLERK FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS ANDDEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, 23 FEBRUARY 2004

Thank you for your letter of 29 January asking for a supplementary note in relation to the Committee’scurrent inquiry into “South Africa,” ahead of Mr Mullin’s appearance before the Committee on 2 March.

I enclose the memorandum herewith. It should be read in conjunction with our earlier memorandum onSouth Africa, which we submitted in September.

Matthew Hamlyn

23 February 2004

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Update to FCO memorandum on UK-South Africa Relations

This document refers to the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s memorandum for the inquiry of 30September 2003.

Paragraph 3. Elections

President Mbeki announced on 9 February that the 2004 general election would take place on 14 April.A short sitting of Parliament will follow the election to appoint the President and his Cabinet. The newPresident will be inaugurated on 27 April, ten years to the day after the end of apartheid and the 1994general election.

Paragraph 9. Development Partnership

Hilary Benn announced in January 2004 that DfID’s programme of work in the middle-income countriesof Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland) would reduce from £35 million in2004–05 to £25 million in 2005–06, in compliance with DfID’s commitment to spend 90% of its resourcesin low-income countries by that year. TheEUdevelopment budget for SouthAfrica is set at aroundEUR120million per year until 2006. DfID will contribute some £16 million per year to the EU’s programme inSouth Africa.

Paragraph 10. Peace Support Partnership

Exercise AFRICAN SHIELD, a UK/South Africa joint Command Post Peace Support Operation tookplace from 6–26 November 2003. Around 850 personnel drawn from both countries participated and it wasthe largest ever bilateral military exercise on South African soil. The objective of the exercise was to practisethe command and control of a peace support operation in Africa. The exercise scenario concerned a fictionalcountry abutting South Africa, riven by civil war, needing a Chapter sevenmandated coalition of the willingto turn a fragile cease fire agreement into a permanent peace. For the British side it was a chance to honeskills developed in Sierra Leone, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq and to share these skills with a SouthAfrican military which has already conducted peace support work in Lesotho, the DRC and Burundi. Theexercise was a model which aVorded scope for the South Africans to provide a reciprocal transfer ofexpertise.

Paragraph 12. EU/South Africa Trade Agreement

Since the original memorandum, three more European Union members have ratified the bilateral Trade,Co-operation and Development Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, bringing the total to 14. SouthAfrica has not yet done so. The UK ratified the Agreement in early 2003. The TDCA has an unspecifiedduration.

Paragraph 18. Zimbabwe

The issue of Zimbabwe’s continued suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth dominated theagenda of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Abuja between 5 and 8 December 2003.PresidentMbeki argued strongly in favour of Zimbabwe’s readmittance, but was supported by only a smallnumber of other countries. CommonwealthHeads of Government finally agreed, by consensus, to maintainindefinitely Zimbabwe’s suspension. The decisionwasmade after a committee of six Commonwealth leaders(Australia, South Africa, Jamaica, Canada, India and Mozambique) had considered the Commonwealth’sapproach to Zimbabwe.

The Prime Minister and President Mbeki had discussions during the Commonwealth Heads ofGovernment Meeting.

Following Zimbabwe’s decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth, President Mbeki visited Harareon 18 December. He had two meetings with Mugabe and one with opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.Following those discussions, President Mbeki indicated that a formal process of dialogue between ZANU(PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would shortly start and that anagreement between the parties could soon be announced. According to the MDC, that process of formaldialogue has yet to begin.

Paragraph 34. AU Peace and Security

The centrepiece of the AU-NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) is the AU Common AfricanDefence and Security Policy. Implementation at regional and continental levels should lead to a defence andsecurity architecture, including the establishment of an African Standby Force. The protocol to establishthe AU Peace and Security Council came into force in December 2003 after being ratified by 27 of the 53

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member states. Its mandate will include promotion of peace and security on the continent, peace-makingand peace-building interventions, co-ordination of eVorts to prevent international terrorism, developing acommon defence policy and promoting democratic practices as part of eVorts for preventing conflicts.

Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

February 2004

LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT,FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FROM THE SECOND CLERK OF THE

COMMITTEE, 25 FEBRUARY 2004

South Africa

Thank you for the supplementary memorandum on South Africa, which has now been circulated to theCommittee. Following its visit, the Committee have asked me to request clarification on two further issuesrelated to its inquiry:

1. Could you provide further details of the BRUF scheme?2. What will be the implications of DfID’s re-prioritisation of assistance to middle-incomecountries in SouthernAfrica for the two projects seen by the Committee in Soweto andAlexandra.

Were it possible to receive a reply to these two points byWednesday 10March, I would be most grateful.

GeoVrey FarrarSecond Clerk of the Committee

February 2004

LETTER FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, FCO, TO THESECOND CLERK

South Africa

Thank you for your letter of 25 February seeking clarification of two points that arose during theCommittee’s visit to South Africa.

The British Undergraduate Fellowship Training Scheme (BRUFS) began in 1987 with the aim of sendingyoung, disadvantaged black South Africans to theUK for their final year of schooling, followed by a degreecourse. Unlike the present Chevening Scholarship Scheme, which sends South Africans for a maximum ofone year (on a post-graduate course or to gain a post-graduate qualification) beneficiaries of BRUFStypically stayed in theUK for four to five years. The last scholars under this scheme returned to SouthAfricain 1994. The scheme was a programme which aimed at giving training to those disadvantaged underapartheid.

On the question of future funding for two projects visited by the Committee, I will deal with eachseparately. UK support to the HIV/AIDS Hospice in Soweto is funded from the Small Grants Scheme(DfID funding administered by FCO). Funding has been in place for the past five years, and will continuein the coming financial year. But the future of the Small Grants Scheme beyond March 2005 is uncertain.We will be working with DfID to look for funding and will encourage the project to look for other sourcesof funding to achieve sustainability.

The twelve-month secondment of Detective Superintendent Steve Dennis to the South African PoliceService will end as planned this month. DfID is re-examining its approach to work in the justice field, withinthe wider context of involvement in Middle Income Countries. However, DfID is planning to continueworking in the justice field in South Africa, and will be working, inter alia, on violence against womenand children.

Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

March 2004

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Ev 82 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Witnesses: Mr Chris Mullin, a Member of the House, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State,Mr Andrew Lloyd,Head of Africa Department, Southern, andMr Andy Sparkes, former UK Deputy HighCommissioner, South Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce examined.

Q164 Chairman:Good morning and welcome to the Mr Mullin: Yes, I think there is and it arises partlyfrom the enormous goodwill that I think existsCommittee. Mr Mullin, will you please introduce

your colleagues? among people of all shades of opinion in thiscountry towards South Africa, especially for whatMr Mullin: On my left is Andy Sparkes, formerthey have achieved in the last ten years. I doDeputy High Commissioner at Pretoria. On mynot think any of us sitting here, certainly twelveright is Andrew Lloyd, Head of Africa Department,or fifteen years ago, could have predicted that thereSouthern.would be a smooth transfer of power fromthe earlier regime that existed there before to a

Q165 Chairman:As you know we are conducting an modern, responsible, democratically accountableinquiry into South Africa and our bilateral relations government that exists there today.ten years after the landmark elections of 1994. Thisis your first time before the Committee in formal Q169 Chairman: If there is a special relationship, insession. As you know, the Committee has been to what way does that manifest itself compared, forSouth Africa from 8 to 13 February and we thank example, with the relations between South Africayour colleagues and the diplomatic staVwho looked and France or Germany?after us sowell during that visit, which, I believe, was Mr Mullin: I think the scale of our historical interestsuccessful. Just to set the scene a little, could you there dictates that under almost all circumstancesbegin by telling us a little about your assessment of even if there was not this great good will—which Ithe current state of UK/South African relations? think extends to France andGermany as well—mostMr Mullin: They are pretty good. We have a large outside observers are greatly heartened by theway incommon agenda which cuts across a whole range of which the first ten years of democratic governmentissues: conflict resolutions, poverty reduction, have gone in South Africa. I have been readingcombating organised crime, money laundering and recently Anthony Sampson’s biography of Nelsoncounter terrorism. We have good relations with our Mandela1 and he quotes what our newspapers—andopposite numbers on all those issues. In addition no doubt other people’s newspapers—werethere are enormous bilateral trading links, as I am predicting in the immediate run-up to the change ofsure you are aware, about £6 billion worth of trade power (bloodbaths, etc). It is easy to forget all thatin both directions each year. Britain has about £12 now, but if one reads what much of our press wasbillion worth of investments in South Africa and predicting—and, indeed, some more seriousthere are about 750,000 British citizens living in observers—some of the assessments were extremelySouth Africa. In addition we have strong sporting, pessimistic at that time.tourism and cultural links. I would say our relationsare pretty good and comprehensive. Q170 Chairman: I believe Alistair Horne’s book on

Algeria,ASavageWar of Peace,2 was widely read bythe whites.Q166 Chairman: We will be coming on to some ofMr Mullin: Indeed, and none of it has come to passthe irritants between our two countries in foreignand that is really a great achievement on the part ofrelations particularly Zimbabwe, Iraq and Cancun.those who managed the transition in South Africa. IWhat are the diYculties which you see in thethink that is one of the reasons for the good will.bilateral relations between ourselves and South

Africa?Q171MrOlner: Perhaps we could not turn to one ofMr Mullin: I think one of the strengths of ourthe irritants: South Africa probably takes arelationship is that where diYculties do arise—therediametrically opposed view to ours on the war inis obviously a diVerent set of tactics, for example, inIraq. I just wondered whether that has done anyrelation to Zimbabwe (which no doubt we will getlong-term damage to our relationship.onto at some stage)—we can talk about themMr Mullin: Not that I am aware of. It is certainlyfrankly. It is quite a mature relationship. There is atrue that there have been some robust exchanges ofdiVerence of opinion over Iraq, for example, butviews on that issue, but we do not, by and large,again it is one we can talk about later.address each other through megaphones which is asign of amature relationship. Of course, we have had

Q167 Chairman: I would like to focus now on the disagreements with other countries as well on thatdomestic matters, particularly bilateral UK/South issue. I do not get the impression that it hasAfrica relations where there are, in your view, irretrievably damaged our relations with SouthdiYculties. Africa.Mr Mullin: I am not aware of any, but try me.

Q172 Mr Olner: Having recognised that there arethese diametrically opposing views, have you doneQ168 Chairman:We do not want to raise diYculties anything special to help to explain the UK position

which do not exist. Moving on, we have heard much in Iraq better?about a special relationship between the UK andSouth Africa. Do we still believe there to be a special 1 Mandela, by Anthony Sampson, (London 1999).relationship and in your judgment do our South 2 A SavageWar of Peace: Algeria 1954–62, by Alistair Horne,

(London 1987).African colleagues believe there to be such?

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Mr Mullin: I would not say that we have done billion a year that we put into Africa were put intoanything special, but I think no day goes by both at South Africa it still would be a relatively small sumhome and abroad without us, for one reason or compared with the size of their economy. Theanother, we have to explain our views on Iraq. reduction as you, yourself, mentioned have mainly

to do with the fact that it is DfID’s policy toconcentrate on the poorest people in the poorestQ173 Mr Olner: Could we turn to another irritantcountries and South Africa is a middle-incomethat we perhaps get a little blame for—although it iscountry. However, one thing that we donot bilateral, we deal with the EU—and that is theacknowledge—and it is a point that the Southcollapse of the reform of the CAP3 and the talks atAfricans make—is that South Africa is a middleCancun. There was a lot of very deep feeling whenincome country and if you divide Gross Nationalwe were over there a couple of weeks ago.

Mr Mullin: It is certainly an issue that South Product by the population you get quite a highAfricans feel strongly about. On the other hand, I figure, but that disguises an enormous gulf betweenthink there is a recognition that we played a fairly the rich and the poor. The poor of seven or eighthonourable role. At Cancun we have been pressing million live at third world standards. All of that isvery hard for trade liberalisation and the fact there quite true, but actually the reduction in our aidwas a failure was no fault of ours. I think that is budget is quite modest, down from £35 million towidely recognised. Similarly, within the EU we have £30 million over a period.played a leading role in campaigning for doing awaywith the CAP and reforming the agricultural

Q177 Mr Hamilton: That was a source of somesubsidies.irritation and clearly, while we were there, we learntthat a third of Africa’s entire GDP is accounted forQ174 Mr Olner: Do you think our position is asby South Africa’s economy. They have four and awidely known as it should be? Does it get fudgedhalf per cent of the population; I think Mr Sparkeswith the other EU countries alone the line?told us that when we were in Pretoria. Given thatObviously we have an allegiance to both.you, yourself, acknowledge that some damage hasMr Mullin: You would have to ask the Southbeen done here—even though it is a relatively smallAfricans but in my view it does not and I do thinkamount—what are you doing to repair and reversethey recognise thatwe have played a fairly good role.that damage?I have to say that there is an EU and South AfricaMr Mullin:One of the reasons I think it proved to beTrade and Development Corporation Agreementa slightly larger irritant than it might otherwise havewhich will come fully into eVect in April this year. Itbeen was because some of the media insisted onincludes a free trade area, financial assistance andlinking it to Iraq which, of course, opened updevelopment cooperation; it has a range of trade-another front. However, when you calmly explain torelated measures in it and I am told that by 2010people what the figures are and the size of our95%—by value—of all South African export to therelationship with South Africa, I think it is actuallyEU will be free of tariVs. If so, that is quite a big

step forward. a fairly minor irritant and it will pass.

Q175 Mr Olner: Perhaps we ought to be saying it a Q178 Mr Hamilton: Can I move onto a diVerentbit more loudly. subject, which is the brain drain from South Africa.Mr Mullin: I say it now and no doubt you will reflect When Professor David Simon gave evidence to thisthat in your Report.

Committee, he told us of the concern about skilledlabour and professionals leaving South Africa to

Q176Mr Hamilton:As you will know, Minister, the come to the UK. What are the Foreign OYce tryingDepartment for International Development to do to tackle this perceived brain drain and, ifannounced two months ago—in January—that aid necessary, reverse it?would be reduced for the southern African nations, Mr Mullin: There are two brain drains, of course.the so-called middle income-nations. While we were

There is the one you did not mention which is thatin South Africa we saw projects in Soweto andSouth Africa, being by far the richest economy inAlexandra which are going to suVer from thesouthern Africa—and, indeed, in Africa—isreduction in aid and I was wondering whatdrawing in professional people from all over Africaconsultations took place between DfID and the(from as far away as West Africa) to work thereForeign OYce prior to the announcement beingbecause of the income available. It is a globalmade of the reduction.phenomenon; it is happening all over the world.Mr Mullin: I was actually in South Africa when theSouth Africa is both a beneficiary and, to someannouncement was made and I did talk to Hilaryextent, a loser as well. As you know, there was aBenn at the time. It is quite true to say that the Southparticular issue some years ago over health workersAfricans were irritated—you were looking forbeing attracted to this country by favourableirritants a moment ago—by that. It is possible toterms—indeed in Sunderland, which I represent inexaggerate the amount of aid we already giveParliament, we had some South African nurses—because South Africa, as you will know, is anand the Department of Health did reach aenormous economy and inevitably if the wholeMemorandum of Understanding (I will not read itout to you but I have it available if you are3 CAP—Common Agricultural Policy.

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interested) with the South Africans on that issue.4 generated so much antagonism and so much heattowards Britain and the United States in SouthIndeed, I think the NHS agreed to stop actively

recruiting from South Africa but, of course, that Africa.Mr Mullin:As it was explained tome duringmy visitdoes not stop agencies that supply the NHS from

actively recruiting. It is very hard to ban that there in November, it was the issue over the lack ofa second resolution for the invasion at the Unitedbecause, as I say, it is a feature of global economy.

We can certainly try to make sure that some ethical Nations. The South Africans, rightly, have a veryhigh regard for theUnitedNations and they felt thatstandards apply and we can try to make sure that

there is a two-way fertilisation between our two the alliance should have received United Nations’endorsement before the actual invasion.health services, which is one of the things that this

Memorandum of Understanding attempts toaddress. I will just repeat the point I made at the Q183 Sir John Stanley: So they were taking the viewoutset, South Africa is, to quite a degree, a that the war was illegal.beneficiary of this trend as well as a loser. On Mr Mullin: No doubt you asked them and they arebalance, for all I know, it may be an overall better placed to put their case than I am. However,beneficiary. Certainly there are an enormous it had to do with the United Nations as Inumber of professional people—for reasons we can understood it.all think about—who come from Zimbabwe whonow work in South Africa.

Q184 Sir John Stanley: It is always diYcult whenyou have a very, very concerted view on a particularQ179 Mr Hamilton: It would be quite interesting topolicy issue, but are you disappointed at the lack ofknow whether that was the case and whether theysuccess which our own diplomatic representatives inwere a net gain or a net loser, but that is obviouslySouthAfrica have had—and no doubt theAmericannot for you. Moving on to my final point, whenrepresentatives as well—in trying to get SouthProfessor Simon from the University of LondonAfrican politicians and ministers to see the case thatgave evidence to us he suggested that there may bethe British and American governments made out forcuts in the number of Chevening scholarshipsgoing to war in Iraq?available to South African citizens. Is that true?Mr Mullin: I am certainly not disappointed in theMr Mullin:Not that I am aware of. No decision hasquality of our representation in SouthAfrica, which,been taken so far as I know. We had a goodas you will have seen for yourselves, is of the highest.Chevening programme with South Africa and,Of course, one is always disappointed when aoverall, Chevening is expanding rather thangovernment’s arguments are not getting across ascontracting so I am not aware of that.well as they should do and in relation to Iraq onecould argue that that has been the case domesticallyQ180 Mr Hamilton: So there are no cuts for South as well as internationally. The one thing I would sayAfricans envisaged so far as you are concerned. is that our relationship with SouthAfrica is amatureMr Mullin: I am not aware of that. one and I do not think that has actually clouded theMr Sparkes: The last information I had was that we generally good relationship we have with Southwould have about the same number of scholars Africa. I do not see it as any more than a—I wouldavailable to us this year as in previous years, which not say “blip” because that would trivialise it—is around twenty. temporary phenomenon.

Q181 Mr Olner:What was very, very obvious to usQ185 Chairman: You said that the South Africanswhen we visited South Africa a couple of weeks agomake the case in respect of our aid that they are bothwas the tremendous loss of skilled labour over therea first and a third world country. Clearly anyonedue to HIV/AIDS. I would hope that we are notwho has seen the northern suburbs of Johannesburgrecruiting from South Africa those people who areand Alexandra will see that very dramatically. Yougoing to do South Africa’s economy a lot of good. Itwent on to say that all of that is true. Can you give anis a tragedy that when people are at their mostassurance that that first and third world diVerence isproductive age in a society they are being taken awayreflected in the way that our aid policies respond tofrom that society with the scourge of this disease.the reality of South Africa?Mr Mullin: I cannot disagree with that.Mr Mullin: It is, but because our aid is focusedprimarily on the poorest people at the end of theQ182 Sir John Stanley: Myself and possibly otherday—and I know this is a very tricky issue, as themembers of the Committee were taken considerablySouth Africans themselves are the first toby surprise during our visit to South Africa by theacknowledge—the long-term solutions to Southextent and the intensity of the criticismwe ran into inAfrica’s problems are the redistribution of therelation to the British Government’s policy towardsconsiderable wealth that already exists within thatIraq. Given that Iraq is geographically far removedsociety. It is not something that can easily befrom South Africa and given the fact that theachieved from outside. We can oVer advice, whichMuslim citizens in SouthAfrica are a relatively smallthey can take or not as the case may be. I must say,minority, I wonder whether you could help us as toI think they have gone about it in a very sensiblewhy this particular foreign policy issue hasway during their first ten years in oYce.Expectations were inevitably very high when they4 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted

by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 95. were first elected and they have handled the

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inevitable disappointments extremely well. I think knowledge of discussions between our military andtheirs but it may be that Andy Sparkes can assistthe South African electorate is very mature as wellwith enquiries.and they understand that the huge gulf has to beMr Sparkes: Our commitment to assistance to thebridged and also the dangers of going too far tooSouth Africans in this area is on-going and veryfast and collapsing the whole economy.important to us. You know that the African Peaceand Security Council envisages an African peace-

Q186 Chairman: Are you confident that our aid keeping capability. What we want to do is to helppolicies reflect that great distortion and that we are Africa to develop that capability and SouthAfrica isnot reducing that volume of aid because we call it a one of the best vectors for this because, as has justmiddle-income country which shields these vast been said, they are already dealing with peace-diVerences? keeping operations in the DRC and Burundi.5 ForMr Mullin: It is undoubtedly true that the reduction eight years we had a British military assistance andwas in part because South Africa is a middle-income training team—40-odd strong—helping the Southcountry. You have to bear in mind that much of our African army to integrate itself. That has nowaid budget is directed towards countries where most focused down into a British peace support teampeople are living on a hundred dollars a year or less which looks at helping them with the capacity inwhereas the average in South Africa—and I do their own army to do a good job in Burundi, DRCunderstand the point about the huge gulf—is or wherever. The idea is that we should be able to usesomething like over three thousand dollars a year that assistance as a multiplier in the longer term, toper head. We all understand the issue and what hits assist in the region as a whole.any new visitor to South Africa is that a smallproportion of the population enjoy Californian—

Q188 Mr Chidgey: You made a very interestingnot European, Californian—standards of living andcomment there when you said that it was verythey live within a couple of miles of people whoimportant to us and I want to test that out if I can.enjoy, for practical purposes, a third world standardOne of the things that was confusing for us was thatof living.on the one hand we were being told by some peoplein the administration that SouthAfrica was—or was

Q187 Mr Chidgey:Minister, I would like to ask you becoming—amilitary super power in the continent’ssome questions in relation to peace-keeping in terms terms; on the other hand some commentators wereof South Africa’s role and the assistance the United saying that that was the last thing they wanted South

Africa to be (these were local politicians). I want toKingdom may or may not be giving. You sent us aput this in the context that this is important to us andmemorandum setting out details of our assistance toask you a bit more about that. I am interested toSouth Africa in helping them develop their peaceknow whether or not we provided advice to Southkeeping capabilities. While we were in South AfricaAfrica on its armaments, for example. If Southwe had a lot of diVerent messages about SouthAfrica is to fulfil a regional peace-keeping role, oneAfrica’s capability and its potential role. Just to givemight ask the question, why does it need a fleet ofyou an example, whilst we are obviously aware thatsubmarines? Why does it need to have an air forceSouth Africa has been instrumental in peace-with the latest up-to-the minute fighter aircraftkeeping in some of the neighbouring countries, wesupplied by this country? When you say that this isalso heard that out of 160 tanks only four wereimportant to us, I want to know whether it isoperable and that many of the armed forces—important in terms of exports or whether it isparticularly the army—were ridden by HIV/AIDSimportant in terms of how we see South Africa in itsto the extent that it actually made then unable toregional role. Obviously we supplied Hawk aircraft;operate.We have had a large interest in SouthAfricaI understand that. Can you tell me, did we actuallythrough our post there, through the Ministrybid to supply a fleet of submarines there? Did thepersonnel. Apart from the role that we know Southpost support the bids from a British organisation?Africa has fulfilled in recent years, what furtherDid we advise that, because I wonder what theassistance has South Africa asked us to provide andstrategic purpose of those submarines might be inhow much has that been tempered by theterms of a peace-keeping role? I do not understandprofessional analysis of ourmilitary personnel eitherhow they could be relevant to their needs.in post or attracted to these discussions?Mr Mullin: I do not think we are supplyingMr Mullin:As you know in November we had quitesubmarines, are we?a large joint exercise with the South African forces

and our forces have played a part in the past inintegrating the various branches of the South Q189 Mr Chidgey:We are not, but did we try? DidAfrican military that needed to be integrated. We we support the eVort? That is my question.have high hopes in the medium-term future that Mr Sparkes: I afraid I cannot remember whether weSouthAfricawill play—as it does already in a couple tendered for the submarines.of countries—a leading role in African peace- Mr Mullin: The fact is—and it may come as akeeping forces. You will know about the role they disappointment to you—we are not supplyingplay in Burundi and in the Congo. You are quite submarines.right to say that there are very serious problems withthe high incidence of AIDS. I do not have a detailed 5 DRC— Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Q190Mr Chidgey:Can we have a note as to whether Q193 Mr Pope: I appreciate that answer and I canor not British companies tendered for the see real merit in a proposition which says thatsubmarines and whether or not we actually advised Africans are going to take the lead. We are allthe South Africans on the need for that in terms of conscious of our colonial past and we do not want totheir strategic need as a regional peace-keeping be seen to be marching into these places and it reallyforce6. is an African problem andAfricans should be takingMr Mullin: I do want to make one general point the lead in solving it. I certainly agree with that, butabout defence in South Africa. South Africa is now is there not a danger in that approach we are oV-a democracy and they have a right to decide— loading the problem? It is politically expedient to saywhether we agree with them or not—what their an African solution to African problems, but itdefence priorities are. It is not for us to advise them really absolves us of any responsibility for takingwhether they need this kind of helicopter, this kind action and are we perhaps expecting too much of aof fighter plane or, indeed, this kind of submarine. country like South Africa? I am sure it has madeThat is a matter for them. It has been a controversial great strides and we all feel really warm about thematter within South Africa and being a vibrant tenth anniversary of democracy, but are wedemocracy that issue has been explored in their expecting too much too soon for a country likemedia and in their parliament as it properly should South Africa to take the leadership in, for example,be. It certainly is not for the British Government to a country like Burundi?start mouthing oV about what is appropriate for the Mr Mullin: I certainly agree with you that we shoulddefence needs of South Africa.

not expect too much and we have to recognise thatthere are limits, especially to the eVort that a young

Q191 Mr Chidgey: I did not suggest they did, nation like South Africa can cope with, but I do notMinister, I am merely asking if we gave advice on think the United Kingdom is simply walking awaywhat their needs might be. from this problem. We have contributed £2 millionMr Mullin: I will send you a note about that7. to the AU’s administrative trust fund that supports

the Burundi peace force and South Africa isQ192 Mr Pope: Minister, you mentioned Burundi receiving a proportion of this. I mentioned theand the seemingly intractable problems there. When funding of the Mozambique contingent a momentwe were in South Africa we heard that the burden of ago; we are contributing £3.7 million to the fundingsupplying and leading the peace-keeping mission of that. Those are quite substantial sums. Inthat South Africa has taken on under the auspices of addition, as I say, there has been cooperationthe African Union is really quite a diYcult burden between our military and theirs in training preciselyfor them to bear. My question is two-fold. Is there with a view to carrying out peace-keepingmore that we could do bilaterally as a nation to help?

operations, so I do think we have stepped up to theSecondly, if Kofi Annan is still speaking to theplate and it may be for other countries perhaps toBritish Government, could we raise with the UN ajoin us.greater UN involvement in peace-keeping in

Burundi to try to lift some of the burden that theSouth Africans are finding so diYcult to bear at the

Q194 Mr Pope: You mentioned the DRC and Imoment?think South Africa has about 1,500 troops in theMr Mullin: As you will know, we already make aDemocratic Republic of the Congo. Can you tellsignificant contribution to the cost of the Burundius what help Britain has been in DRC and how youpeace-keeping force. We pay for the entirethink things are panning out there at the moment?Mozambiquean contingent. Yes, I am sure that inMr Mullin: There is a very cautious stability therefuture it will be an issue for theUN. SouthAfrica hasand I would not put it any higher than that just atplayed a very valuable role in stepping in there andthe moment. It is a big step forward from wheretaking the lead in a situation which, as you say, waswe were, which was in a deep, dark hole. In thedire and remains very diYcult to this day. We areCongo, as you know, over the years in the regionanxious to get to a point—this is one of the reasonsof about three million people have died andwhy we value our relationship with South Africa—therefore it was a catastrophe of First World Warwhere increasingly, as is happening in West Africa,

Africans are taking responsibility. We are willing to proportions. There were also a lot of otherhelp and advise and also provide resources where countries meddling in the Congo. Without goingAfricans are taking primary responsibility for into the details I am glad to say that most of themresolving African problems. We welcome South are no long meddling. We now have to moveAfrica’s role in Burundi and in the DRC, just as we towards some kind of stability. President Kabilawelcome Nigeria’s role and Ghana’s role in West was here the other day. He has various viceAfrica. Indeed, the African Union is now talking presidents who represent diVerent factions, not allabout setting up its own African peace-keeping of whom are yet talking to each other so we needforce. That is another development that we welcome to make some progress on that front. Once again,and it is the way the future lies. the South Africans have made a very useful

contribution—as I believe have we—in the Congo.6 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted Going back to Burundi, let me just repeat what Iby the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94.

hinted at but perhaps did not say explicitly in7 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submittedby the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. answer to your first question. We do favour the

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United Nations taking over the mandate in continent by 2010. That is a pretty ambitioustimetable.What assistance arewe planning to give toBurundi and we think that will come to pass in

due course. the African Union as such in respect of this stand-by force?Mr Mullin: I cannot tell you oV the top of my head,Q195 Mr Illsley: Could I ask a couple of questionsbut I will send you a note8 about that. You are righton the Southern African Development Communitythat it is a very big development and it is one we willwhich, although it has been in existence since 1980want to encourage. The head of the African Union,and has had some substantial aspirations (forMr Konare is a very dynamic man who is busyexample, a free trade area, a common market andinjecting a bit of dynamism into that organisation,the idea of a customs union) we have received inwhich we welcome.evidence some suggestion that there is perhaps whatChairman: This Committee has produced a numberhas been described as a “credibility gap” as to whatof reports on Zimbabwe.We did askmany questionsthis organisation can achieve and what it is actuallyduring our visits. I would like Sir John to open nowachieving. Do you have any view on what role theon that basis.SADC is playing within southern Africa to promote

the political and economic development on thecontinent? Q198 Sir John Stanley: Minister, did you see lastMr Mullin: Let me speak in relation to some of the Sunday’s Panorama programme on Zimbabwe?9statements they have put out regarding Zimbabwe, Mr Mullin: I saw extracts from it; I did not see thefor example. We are rather disappointed; they whole programme but I am familiar with thebetray a level of ignorance that disappoints us. For contents.example, lastAugust they put out a statement callingfor the EU to end its economic sanctions against

Q199 Sir John Stanley: I think you might find itZimbabwe; there are no economic sanctions.valuable to see it in full. I am sure you will share theFollowing the Commonwealth Conference they putacute dismay—to put it at its mildest—that anybodyout another unhelpful statement which, again, didwho saw that programme will have experienced ofnot demonstrate a detailed knowledge of thethese youngmen and young women being sent oV tosituation. We are anxious to encourage SADC, Ithe training camps, the young men being subjectedhave to say, having said all that. We have oVeredto a kind of Hitler Youth type indoctrination andthem quite a lot of support over the years. Last yearclearly too many of the young women are beingwe gave them a quarter of a million to helpsubjected to rape as a means of intimidation.restructure their secretariat and from January thisAgainst that gross violation of human rights and soyear, over the next four years, we are going tomany others that have occurred, could you set outcontribute £11 million towards supporting thefor us now, so that we are completely up-to-date,secretariat’s regional trade and investment inwhat the British Government’s policy is towards theintegration work. We are also supplying for threeSouth African Government in dealing with theyears a senior advisor on tax policy.Wewere talkingZimbabwe issue? What are we saying to the Southa moment ago about the need to get world tradeAfrican Government in terms of what policy weright for poor countries, but actually there is quite awould want the South African Government tolot that African countries can do to remove tradefollow on this issue?barriers between themselves, not only in southernMr Mullin:We share the same objective; that is theAfrica but in eastern Africa.first thing. Both countries want a transition towardsdemocracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. We

Q196 Mr Pope: Are they likely to achieve any of have a tactical disagreement about how to get there,these goals they have set out? This idea of a free trade South Africa tending to argue for quiet diplomacy.area by 2008, a common market by 2015, is there a We have to listen to what they say because they arelikelihood of achieving those developments or do the the neighbours after all; they have enormous interestdivisions between the various countries that make in a peaceful outcome, rather greater than us andup SADC militate against that? they suVer greatly from living next door to a countryMr Mullin: It is too early to say whether they are which has caused such serious problems. They hadgoing to achieve them or not. You are right that the best part of two million refugees. I have to say,progress so far has been fairly slow. The issue that although there has been a lot of talk of quietpoisons the whole region is the problem of diplomacy and talks between Zanu-PF and themainZimbabwe and that does distract a lot of energy opposition party, we do not see much evidence ofaway from the kind of developments that the progress on that front so far.southern African countries need to be addressing—and we do too—but I would not like to say how far

Q200 Sir John Stanley: Is the British Government’sadvanced they are because, as you say it is 2008 andposition vis-a-vis the South African Governmentthere is still some way to go yet.that the SouthAfricanGovernment should abandonits quiet diplomacy policy altogether?Q197 Chairman:You mention the African stand-by

force. Over the weekend, meeting in Libya, the8 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submittedAfrican Union took a clear decision that they would by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94.

have, by next year (2005) such a force to be deployed 9 Panorama “Zimbabwe’s torture training camps”—broadcasted on BBC 1on Sunday, 29 February 2004.at five regional centres and to cover the whole

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Mr Mullin: I certainly think we would like to see the because many of their leaders have personallybenefited and they feel they would have a great dealSouth African Government being robust, given

what is going on in Zimbabwe. It is not our policy to lose were their monopoly on power to be broken.to engage in megaphone diplomacy with the SouthAfricans on this issue because there is a diVerence of Q203 Sir John Stanley: Two alternative views wereview and we do respect the fact that we are both put to us when we were in South Africa as to howaiming for the same things and it is a tactical Zimbabwe might evolve towards a properdisagreement rather than a disagreement of democracy. One was that the best route forward wasprinciple. We do acknowledge that President Mbeki going to be to form some form of government ofhas been trying quite hard; he has been to Zimbabwe national unity bringing Zanu-PF and the MDConmany occasions andmet not justMrMugabe but together and to have that in situ for a considerablealso opposition leaders. Even if we have a diVerence period. Equally, a completely contradictory viewof nuance we do not go engaging in any public was put to us which is that it would be a hugeargument with them. mistake to create another basically single monopoly

power basis in Zimbabwe and although it may benecessary to form some form of government ofQ201 Sir John Stanley: The case that was advanced

to us by the ANC in particular was that President national unity on a temporary basis, it wasprofoundly important that the country function as aMbeki had a unique possible degree of influence

with PresidentMugabe by virtue of the geographical multi-party democracy with an alternativegovernment being able to hold the existingproximity of the two countries, by virtue of the way

in which both have been involved in combating government to account. Does the BritishGovernment have a view between those tworacism in their respective countries and the

liberation of both countries, and if anybody in the alternatives and has the British Government beenputting either or both alternatives to PresidentAfrican continent is going to be able to bring

influence to bear on President Mugabe it was going Mbeki?Mr Mullin:Our view is that there has to be obviouslyto be President Mbeki. Do you believe that is a false

judgment by the ANC or do you think that has any a transitional government to get us over theimmediate problem followed as swiftly as can bedegree of resonance and credibility?

Mr Mullin: I think the key word is “if”; if anybody decently organised free elections which would resultin a government that enjoys national andhas influence overMrMugabe then PresidentMbeki

would be the one, butMrMugabe is a very stubborn international confidence which can then helpreconstruct that shattered country. I have no doubtman and he has brought his country to the edge of

ruin. There is cause to doubt whether he would listen at all that there will not be significant internationalhelp for Zimbabwe until there is a government into anyone: his former comrades in South Africa, let

alone advice that comes freely fromWestern Europe Zimbabwe which clearly cares about its people andenjoys a democratic mandate.or America or somewhere else. There is a degree of

disagreement within South Africa itself which hasbeen widely publicised as you will know. President Q204 Mr Illsley: One of the things that struck meMbeki has stuck to his policy, because they are during the whole of our visit to South Africa was thecomrades going back a long way, of hoping to extreme sensitivity of some South Africaninfluence Zanu-PF to quiet diplomacy. All I would politicians regarding our view that South Africasay about it is that we get to see a positive outcome might not be doing enough or perhaps not puttingand only this morning I was reading an interview out the right message in relation to Zimbabwe. Thisthat Mr Mugabe conducted on his 80th birthday in is probably best illustrated by a meeting we had withwhich he fairly brazenly said he had no plans for the South African Foreign AVairs Committee,talking to the MDC whom he described as the devil. where there were some lively exchanges in relation to

their view that we took the view that South Africaand President Mbeki were doing nothing in relationQ202 Sir John Stanley:Can you point to any specific

tangible results of President Mbeki’s quiet to improving the situation in Zimbabwe. They tookgreat exception to that, even though we explaineddiplomacy policy?

Mr Mullin: I certainly think there have been some that that was not our view, to the point of comparingtheir situation vis-a-vis Zimbabwewith our situationcontacts, probably at a very low level, between the

MDC and Zanu-PF but it is a bit hard to have regarding Northern Ireland. Is the BritishGovernment aware of this level of resentment thatconstructive dialogue when the leader of your main

opposition party is on trial for treason and when we might be trying to dictate to South Africa or tellthem that they should be doing more in relation toZanu-PF thugs are smashing up the only

independent newspapers. I cannot, at the moment, Zimbabwe?Mr Mullin: I am certainly aware of that sentimentpoint to any seriously positive outcome and previous

predictions that there would be a positive outcome and I would not want to make too much of theNorthern Ireland comparison, but we did used to gethave not so far born fruit, but I do not necessarily

put that down to any lack of eVort on President a bit shirty when outsiders—particularly inAmerica—told us how we should sort out ourMbeki’s part but to a particular stubbornness on the

part of Mr Mugabe and I would not wish to problems in Ireland. It is not only South Africanswho get sensitive when foreigners start oVering freepersonalise it there; I think Zanu-PF is a pretty

rotten party that has an interest in staying in power advice. It is certainly not our position—as I think I

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have made clear already—that the South Africans Q207 Mr Hamilton: I suppose we could not havebeen more impressed by the contrast between Southare doing nothing to help in Zimbabwe; they are.

The only thing I would say to any South African Africa and the transition to blackmajority rule thereand what has happened in Zimbabwe. I do not knowwho said, “It is none of your business at all and you

should stay entirely out of it” (not that they do whether you have read a book by Peter Godwin—whose sister gave evidence to us because she workednecessarily say that), is that “You were very happy

to have our help when you were fighting apartheid, for SW Radio Africa—about growing up inRhodesia and the transition to black majority rulewhich was freely given, and we were entitled to have

an opinion about the internal situation in South there, but I wondered whether you and any of yourcolleagues (and I think we had fairly good evidenceAfrica or the internal situation in Rhodesia when

theywere under those racist regimes, and sowe think when we were in South Africa from the people wespoke to) could imagine that what has happened inwe are entitled to have an opinion now about the

internal situation in Zimbabwe. You, of course, Zimbabwe—from the great hopes that everyoneplaced in the Mugabe regime and Zanu-PF being inhave a perfect right to reject our opinion, but we

have the right to oVer it.” I would say that in the power there to the dreadful tyranny, starvation,murder and disintegration of that country—couldspirit of a free exchange amongst democrats who are

used to hearing things with which they do not ever happen in South Africa?necessarily agree and can respond in a dignified Mr Mullin: I do not think it could. One must neverfashion without entirely going oV the handle. say never, but I see no sign that it could. I think that

the habit of democracy is becoming engrained inSouth Africa. It has a very vibrant free press, a veryQ205 Mr Olner: I am sure the Minister will knowstrong civil society and all the things that Zimbabwethat we were not all singing from the same hymnlacks and never really had on the same scale as Southsheet when we were opposing apartheid, but we didAfrica anyway. If you recall, in the early years ofeventually get there. Watching the Panoramamajority rule in Zimbabwe—the first four yearsprogramme on Sunday evening left me with the viewcertainly—the country was pretty well managed andthat I would not know what on earth was going tothey did not make the mistakes that some othertake place. Zanu-PF is so manipulative of the nextnewly-independent countries had made. If I had togeneration and to me it hinges around food. I justspot a moment when it began to go wrong it was thewondered how much thought you had given,massacres in Matabeleland in 1984/5. Again afterMinister, on food being used as a political weaponthat there was still a periodwhen things seemed to beby Zanu-PF and is there any hope of democracy inmore or less normal and it was not until the latethat country at the end of the day if so many of its1990s when, I think,MrMugabe’s economic policiesyoung people have been indoctrinated in theseand certainly his social policies were going badlycamps?wrong that he began to look around the world forMr Mullin: Certainly the longer this tragic situationscapegoats. Needless to say, he alighted upon us at agoes on the more diYcult it would be to resolve andfairly early stage.it will take more than a change of government to

repair the damage that has been done in Zimbabwe.You are right, Zanu-PF does use food as a political Q208 Chairman: I have a couple of questions on theweapon and it is a sad fact that the outside world is African Union before we move on. Latterly therenow feeding more than half the population of have been a series of initiatives with grand soundingZimbabwe each winter. If I were a proud titles. You will remember no doubt the AfricanZimbabwean nationalist I would be rather ashamed Renaissance. Then we went through a series of otherof the fact that this government that inherited what names, finally we have come to the African Union.was once the bread basket of southern Africa is now Are you surprised if there is a degree of scepticismreduced to a situation where it depends entirely on about this new initiative and that perhaps because itforeigners—like us and the Americans—to feed its means diVerent things to diVerent people, for manyown people. in Africa it is a means of channelling additional aid

from the west in their direction; for the west it is ameans of looking at human rights and goodQ206 Mr Olner: Do we need to keep supplying thegovernance? Do you understand why there is anfood? It seems to me that if there is going to be anelement of scepticism about the African Union?internal rebellionwithin Zimbabwe then it has got toMr Mullin: I think anyone looking at the recentbe those in Zanu-PF who are no longer being fedhistory of Africa would have to be modest in theirby us.ambitions, but I do think there has been a changeMr Mullin: The feeding is done by the World Foodfrom the OAU. One should not attribute it to anyProgramme and it is very carefully monitored toparticular personality; I do not think it is. It hasmake sure it goes to those in need. It is quite true thatchanged from an organisation that was mainlythrough the Zimbabwean Grain Marketing Boardconcerned with African solidarity and sweepingthey do manipulate food, but that is a Zimbabweanproblems under the carpet to an organisation thatoperation. So far as international aid is concerned,now genuinely acknowledges the problems on theirthat is done by the World Food Programme. It iscontinent and the recognition that Africans muststrictly monitored and we do not use humanitarianincreasingly take responsibility for resolving them. Iaid as a weapon because the only people we wouldthinkNePAD is a very good example. It is early daysend up hurting are those who are already in a dire

situation. yet; we will have to wait and see what it achieves, but

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this idea of peer review where the monitoring and Mr Mullin:You have me there, Mr Olner. There are191 countries in the UN and I am sure there are aanalysis is done by Africans themselves, the idea of

an African peace keeping force where they make a number of mighty vested interests to be reconciled,but I can only speak for Her Majesty’s Governmentcontribution—to which we would have to assist

because these are young nations and they do not and we do favour a reform of the composition of theSecurity Council and we do favour an African seathave the experience or the resources that we have—

and the idea of them increasingly taking the lead I on it.am mildly optimistic about.

Q214 Mr Chidgey:Minister, you touched briefly onQ209 Chairman: And the African Court of HumanNePAD a few minutes ago. I would like to ask youRights?a few more detailed questions to get a better feel ofMr Mullin: The jury is out on that one, I would say.the Government’s position. Firstly, you will beaware I am sure that there is a school of thought

Q210 Mr Illsley: I have a couple of questions on which believes that NePAD suVers from beingCommonwealth issues. To what extent have the diVerent things to diVerent people. For exampledisagreements over Zimbabwe damaged any inter- some feel it is seen as a tool for securing betterCommonwealth relationships that we have, governance by donors and, on the other side, as aparticularly between ourselves and South Africa? means of securing more aid for African nations.Mr Mullin: It is true there was a disagreement at Firstly, do you and does the Government subscribeCHOGM10 on the question of whether Zimbabwe to that school of thought? Secondly, whether you doshould be suspended or not. What I took heart from or not, do you feel that those two interests can bothwas that actually most African countries went be satisfied? Or do you have a diVerent slant,along—it was done by consensus in the end, as you perhaps, on that?know—with maintaining the suspension. However, Mr Mullin: I think it is an understanding—I will notthere were some fairly tough arguments and if it did say deal—that in return for a higher quality ofdo any damage, I think it was only temporary. It is governance, democracy, more transparency andyet more evidence of the extent to which, as I say, the proper economic management, the West, throughentire Zimbabwe issue poisons everything it touches. the G8, would have a responsibility for addressingThat is another reason for wanting to resolve it. issues like trade, debt, aid; both sides a partnership,

both sides having responsibilities.Q211 Mr Illsley: How would you respond to thecriticism—which I think was published inThe Timeson 9 December—that the British delegation breezed Q215 Mr Chidgey: But the emphasis perhaps isin, tried to dictate the game and then left early and partnership rather than donor and recipient of aid.that perhaps we could have achieved more had we Mr Mullin: Yes, and I think we all understand thesespent more time talking to some of our African days that there is no quantitative aid that can resolveallies?11 Do you accept that criticism? the problems we are talking about. You have to getMr Mullin: As a member of the British delegation, all sorts of other things right first of all.who breezed in early and spent a lot of time talkingto other African delegations (including a number of

Q216 Mr Chidgey: You also said a few minutes agoheads of states), I reject Mr Dowden’s analysis—Ithat you are hopeful—I am sure you are—and dothink you are quotingMrDowden—although I takeyou feel it is possible to say at the moment what inMr Dowden’s views seriously on other matters; he isconcrete terms NePAD has achieved so far?a serious journalist. I think he is just wrong on thatMr Mullin: At the moment they are putting in placepoint.a structure and the key test will come from the rigourof the Peer ReviewMechanism. I am told that so farQ212 Mr Olner: You mentioned earlier, Minister,17 countries—most recently Angola, I think—havethe United Nations. Would you personally—orsigned up to Peer Review. I think the first Peerwould the Government, do you think—support anyReviews will take place this year. I think the firstadditional seats on theUN Security Council, and docountry in line is probably Ghana, which is one ofyou think that South Africa ought to be a candidatethe better managed African countries so no doubtfor an African seat?they will get a fairly good report. I suppose the testMr Mullin: I can say that it is certainly our policy towill come when we get to one of the more diYcultsupport an African seat on the Security Council andcustomers, certainly when we get to Angola butit is not for me to say who would fill it, but Southprobably before that. There must be an intellectuallyAfrica would be an obvious candidate, one of therigourous exercise and I am sure that that is what theobvious candidates. “An”, not “the”.NePAD secretariat are aiming at.

Q213 Mr Olner: Are there any countries who aremember states of the UN that are opposing such an Q217Mr Chidgey:You will be aware, Minister, thatenlargement to the Security Council? President Wade of Senegal (who is one of the

instigators of NePAD) has recently expressed his10 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. disappointment on the slow progress of the African11 “We can’t just play boss in Africa any more, Mr Blair”—

Peer ReviewMechanism.Were you surprised at thatarticle by Richard Dowden in The Times on Tuesday,9 December 2003. and do you agree?

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Mr Mullin: It is very often that new initiatives— and the diYculty will be spending it, not finding themoney. I think those are areas where the G8 has—including many in this country—get oV to a slow

start. I think what counts is not so much the speed to use theAmerican phrase—stepped up to the plate.as the robustness of what is put in place and that aproper mechanism is set up and is seen to work, not Q221 Mr Chidgey: I am glad you mentioned thein fits and starts but in a sustained way. We remain United States because that features in my lasthopeful of NePAD; I know the Prime Minister does question. It is interesting that you make the pointand he has taken a close personal interest in this. As that the USA has been very generous relativelyI say, we will have to wait and we do not have that speaking in approaching HIV/AIDS. My reflectionlong to wait because the first Peer Reviews will take on the meetings we had recently in South Africa didplace this year and then we will have a better idea. I not give me any impression that the US had muchdo not feel qualified to pronounce just yet. credit for doing anything in that regard. I am sure

they have done but in the sense that we had quite alot of criticism about our position on Iraq, it was aQ218 Mr Chidgey: Would it be reasonable to

summarise from what you are that the Government mild rebuke compared to the comments that havebeenmade about relations with theUnited States. Inis reasonably happy; you are not disappointed, you

are not frustrated and you are recognising that it is relation to NePAD and the way that the UnitedStates has almost been seen to abandon the NePADdiYcult and it takes time, but so far so good sort of

thing. Is that a fair summary on the Peer Review process—certainly they favour their ownMillennium Challenge rather than NePAD—I haveMechanism?

Mr Mullin: Yes. It is all moving in the right heard American ambassadors say that they just donot support NePADand I wonder whether you havedirection. I think there is a capacity question about

NePAD and we have been helping out in that regard a view on this. It is rather worrying actually that onthe one hand we have NePAD which is an Africanand there is no harm in outsiders enquiring from

time to time about progress and keeping up a little initiative in which we are supporting Africa takingcharge of its own issues, problems and destiny; onpressure. I am sure the NePAD Secretariat would

welcome that. Certainly we must not let this the other hand the Millennium Challenge seems tobe a retrograde step where funding and finances arepotentially worthwhile initiative drift into the sand.tied into trade with a particular funding nation.Rather than letting Africa free it seems to be tyingQ219 Mr Chidgey: One of the things that has comeAfrica in to the major trading partner in the world,up in our evidence sessions on this issue has been thetheUS. I think that is a retrograde step and I wonderreaction of the G8. We are getting the message thatif you have a view on it.there is now growing disappointment in the lack ofMr Mullin: I cannot speak for whoever you havecommitment that G8 is apparently showing after aspoken to, but it is not my impression that there isgreat deal of initial enthusiasm. Would you agreeany lack of enthusiasm for NePAD by thethat G8 is guilty of failing to respond adequately toAmericans. As I say, the jury is still out. If it is seenNePAD? There is not enough enthusiasm from theto be pursuing rigourously I think it will find a lot ofG8; too much stick and not enough carrot, perhaps?support amongst members of the G8, including theMr Mullin: I am sure there is a great deal more weAmericans.could do. Cancun has been mentioned and that was

definitely a disappointment. I am sure there ispossibly some concern that all members are not Q222 Mr Chidgey: Do you have any views on the

Millennium Challenge?pulling in the same direction at the same speed. Ithink everyone is pulling in the same direction but Mr Mullin: I cannot help you there. Youwill have to

discuss that with the Americans, I think.not necessarily at the same speed. We certainly,before too long, will have the chairmanship of the Chairman:Minister, a key feature of our work as a

Committee is the focus on the work of yourG8 and we intend to make full use of it to boost ourcommitment to Africa. I would not like to think that Department in South Africa and I would now like to

ask Mr Hamilton to begin and then Sir John toanyone who was not so keen on the governanceaspects of NePAD was using any alleged failure by continue on that.theG8 as an excuse for not pursuing that. I hope thatis not the case. Q223 Mr Hamilton: I am always struck, when we

visit any foreign country, how good our diplomaticstaV are and certainly we would all have cause toQ220 Mr Chidgey: You did say a moment ago that

you felt there were things that theG8 could be doing. thank our superb staV in South Africa. I notice fromthe statistics that we employ 47 UK-based staV andCould you give us an example?

Mr Mullin: As I say, I think there is scope for a lot 178 locally engaged staV. Bearing in mind mycolleague David Chidgey’s previous commentsof progress on trade. I think there is scope for further

progress on debt. Although we played rather leading about the United States’ role in South Africa, I amsomewhat surprised to learn they have 250US-basedrole on the progress on both these issues, I think

there is the scope for greater bilateral aid. The big staV and 450 locally engaged staV. It makes mewonder what they do all day compared with theone, of course, where I think the G8—particularly

the Americans—have responded well is HIV/AIDS. productivity of our staV. Anyway, my questionreally is, do you envisage any changes to the workThe Americans in particular have made enormous

sums available for helping to combat HIV/AIDS that Foreign Commonwealth OYce does in South

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Africa in the near future, and do you expect to Q228 Sir John Stanley: In the original paper yousent to the Committee of 30 September last year, youmaintain the current levels of staV or, indeed,

increase them? say that one of the areas in which Britain and SouthAfrica are working together is, and I quote, “AMr Mullin: There is a review of all our operations

going on at the moment so it would be very rash of commitment to work together on crime preventionwithin South Africa,” and then at paragraph 11 ofme to make too many long-term commitments, but

I do expect our staYng in South Africa to remain that paper you start by saying “High crime levelnegatively aVects all South Africans and are abroadly as it is for the foreseeable future.disincentive to domestic and foreign investment”.12

Whilst we were in Johannesburg we sadly becameQ224 Mr Hamilton: That is very cautious and I canaware of the veracity of just that. There was aunderstand your caution. I hope that in consideringterrible murder of a white husband and wife andour work in South Africa that you do not considertheir two children prior to their home being robbed.selling oV the residence in Cape Town.We also positively saw the benefits of the partnershipMr Mullin: It is funny that you should mention that.between Britain and South Africa when we visitedWe have actually been awaiting thethe Alexandra Township Police Station and we sawrecommendation of ourHigh Commissioner on thatthere a senior oYcer from Lambeth who had beenissue and she has recommended that the Cape Townseconded there and was being a very substantial helpresidence to be sold. We have not made a decisionto the South African Police. There are limitedabout that, but we are thinking about it.resources, but that is demonstrably a highly eVectiveway in which the British Government can assistQ225 Mr Hamilton: Obviously I cannot speak forSouth Africa with this very serious particularlythe entire Committee, but certainly my view is thatrobbery and violence problem.Do you see any scopeit should not be sold. It is a huge asset to us there.Wefor being able to expand that sort of cooperation andsaw it ourselves and we saw just what extraordinarypartnership significantly?good eVect it had and how we were able to entertainMr Mullin: Firstly, let me say you are absolutelyvirtually half the Parliament there as well as half theright. The maintenance of the rule of law is aGovernment.prerequisite for stability and economic success,Mr Mullin: I think the Foreign OYce would be veryparticularly if you wish to attract foreigninterested to hear the Committee’s views on thatinvestment. The South Africans are as well aware ofissue.that as we are. Do I see any possibility of expandingthe assistance we already give? Modestly, I think.

Q226MrHamilton:While we were in Johannesburg We are talking about capacity building here, thingswe visited UK Trade and Investment (I think it is like training. Sir John Stevens, the MetropolitanMichaelMowlamwho runs that) andwe heard some Police Commissioner, I know has personally takenvery positive comments while we were there about an interest in the Met’s operation there and he is inthe role of UKTI and what they are doing to South Africa at the moment. At the end of the day itencourage trade and investment in South Africa. I comes down to providing them with eVectivewondered how the FCO intends to build on the training and resources, and perhaps bringing somesuccess—I know it is DTI as well—and strengthen of them over here to see how we do things. I can seethe commercial ties between Britain and South scope for modest expansion but, at the end of theAfrica. day it is the South Africans who are going to haveMr Mullin: They are already very strong and I was deal with this problem; it is a very serious problem.struck when your business witnesses gave evidence a We can just to our best to help and advise in allfew weeks ago, when someone tried to tempt them capacity.into saying that really wewere not doing a very goodjob, they both said that so far as trade andinvestment were concerned we were doing an Q229 Sir John Stanley: Can I go onto anotherextremely good job. They resisted all attempts to specific area which we witnessed but is not actuallytake them down another road. I would tend to stick referred to in the detail of the specific law and orderwith what they say about us. subjects and related subjects that we are dealing with

on this partnership. When we were in the AlexandraPolice Station we visited the victim support unit andQ227 Mr Hamilton: You cannot have a bettera striking feature for all of us in contrast to what youaYrmation than the people who actually benefitwould experience visiting the equivalent units in ourfrom it.own constituencies, is that in our own constituenciesMr Mullin: We do have an enormous tradethe overwhelming number of cases where victimrelationship with South Africa. I think that of thesupport units are used are invariably in relation totop twenty-foreign companies in South Africa, nine

of them are British-owned. There is quite a burglary and theft. It was quite diVerent in the unitconsiderable South African investment in this we visited; virtually all the cases they told us aboutcountry too, although not on the same scale as we were in relation to domestic violence. When wehave investments there. A large part of our thought about this, we could understand why, whenoperation is directed towards sustaining and you have a huge township with huge quantities ofexpanding that and it has been very successful up what is euphemistically called “informal housing”—until now, as I think is universally acknowledged.However, there is always scope for improvement. 12 Please refer to memorandum submitted by the FCO, Ev 67.

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes

which is single or possibly double room shanty-type orphans or in administering the anti-retrovirals ifand when they are available. I do not think there ishousing with large numbers of people living in very

close proximity—this can produce a serious level of a need for me to send you a note since I can tell younow what we are doing. Last year we spent aboutdomestic violence, abuse of children, abuse of

women and so on. As this particular area is not £30 million supporting HIV/AIDS work in SouthAfrica. We work with the Departments of Health,mentioned, could you give any form of undertaking

to the Committee that you will look at that area and Social Development, Education and Defence and anumber of provincial governments and, indeed, withsee whether we could provide any additional

expertise and help in that particular area for the some non-governmental organisations. The SmallGrants Scheme which is managed by the BritishSouth African Police if they should wish it?

Mr Mullin: I will look at that and I will send you a High Commission—and this might be the answer tothe particular case that you referred to a momentnote13, but I have to say, at the end of the day, this

is a problem of which the South Africans are ago—focuses exclusively on supporting HIV/AIDSnon-governmental organisations in South Africa.perfectly well aware and which they are taking steps

to address as you have seen for yourselves. I have to Globally the UK is the second largest bilateraldonor for HIV/AIDS assistance. It is not enough ofsay, speaking as former Chairman of the Home

AVairs Select Committee, that this is an area in course, and it is never going to be enough. However,our assistance is substantial. The Americanwhich the British Police have underperformed in the

past, although we are gradually realising the scale of assistance is potentially very large indeed; it istargeted on 14 countries including South Africa. Sothe problem. It is still very patchy in Britain, so there

is probably some scope for a two-way exchange on there is money available, but one of the biggestproblems is going to be finding the infrastructure tothe subject.make eVective use of it. That will be easier in SouthAfrica than it will be in some of the other countries.Q230Sir John Stanley:Could I just turn to one other

area which is in this area of cooperation. In yourQ231Sir John Stanley:Can I just followup the pointpaper, you refer to a commitment to work inI made about accessing charitable funds. There ispartnership to combat communicable diseases,clearly a deep wish—not only by this Hospice butnotably HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Iprobably by others as well—to obtain informationthink it was, for each member of this Committee,about how best to access UK charitable funds andone of the experiences and memories which willpossible charitable funds more widely to help themalways remain with us when we went to the very,with the sort of projects that I have been referring to.very, small temporary building of the Soweto AIDSDo you agree that it would be most helpful—and itHospice and to see there people, including children,is easily obtainable—if the BritishHighCommissiondying of AIDS. Clearly the scale of the problem ishad available within it lists of appropriate charitableenormous; we were told there are some five millionfunds in the UK that it could at least make availablepeople in South Africa who are assessed as beingto those who are seeking access to that type ofHIV positive, but there clearly is an enormousfunding in this country?requirement to provide more adequate hospiceMr Mullin: I will check out that point. I agree itfacilities and that sort of help for those who aremight well be helpful.terminally ill dying of AIDS. I wonder again

whether you might be able to give a further note tothe Committee as to whether the British Q232 Mr Illsley: Following on from that, the AIDSGovernment feels able to do more. The very small Hospice that we visited was not, so far as I recall,but wonderful staV at that AIDS Hospice put to us recognised by the South African governmentthat they are in the process of trying to seek funds to because they will not accept that people are dyingexpand that Hospice and to create permanent from HIV/AIDS and so they will not recognise thebuildings for it. If, in a note to the Committee14, you hospices, and did not recognise that one. Are wecan oVer suggestions as to suitable sources of doing enough to try to persuade South Africa tocharitable funding—possibly even government look upon this problem with the seriousness that itfunding—that might be available in the UK I am really requires and to try to persuade them that theysure the Committee will be willing to forward that have to do more in terms of hospice treatment,information to the people concerned. medical treatment and anti-rectrovirals?Mr Mullin: I am not a DfID minister and I think I Mr Mullin: It is true there has been a debate in Southwould be in trouble if I started to spend DfID’s Africa on the extent of the AIDS problem, but it hasfunds in front of the Committee here. AIDS is a huge been resolved really in favour of recognising thatproblem in Africa; of the 42 million people in the there is a very serious problem and I think allworld who are HIV/AIDS positive, 30 million are in concerned now acknowledge that. I think it was justAfrica. The problem is actually a great deal worse in before Christmas that the South Africansome respects in some of the other African countries Government agreed its strategy for addressingbecause, unlike South Africa, they lack the AIDS so I am not sure that it is true to say that theyinfrastructure to be able to cope either with the do not acknowledge the problem because I am

confident that they do now acknowledge the13 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted seriousness of the problem. As regards what we areby the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94.

doing, I read out a moment ago the areas in which14 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submittedby the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. we are involved, the South African Government

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes

departments with which we are involved. Given that Mr Mullin: A lot of our aid is regional. A lot of ouroverseas aid goes towards capacity building of pan-the political will exists in South Africa—and I hopeAfrican institutions. We mentioned NePAD ait now does—for treating this issue with themoment ago; we mentioned SADC and, of course,seriousness that it deserves, then I think Southwe have major aid programmes in some of theAfrica, more thanmost countries, stands a chance ofcountries immediately surrounding South Africamaking inroads into it. Obviously had the problemand that actually has a knock-one eVect in terms ofbeen addressed earlier it would not now be so great.limiting the flow of refugees and migration intoSouthern Africa. We have major programmes inMozambique which is one of the poorest countriesQ233 Chairman: I have one sweep-up question.of the world and in Malawi. It is in South Africa’sAnyone who knows the region will recognise ininterest that those countries are brought up as wellSouth Africa a country which works: thebecause one of the problems is that there is a hugeinfrastructure is of a high quality; the people answerdisparity between South Africa and its neighbourstelephones; it is heavily biased to IT; there is a strongand the faster they succeed in closing the gulfcivic sub-structure on the social side which isbetween the wealthiest and the poorest, at theextremely important in terms of local democracy. present moment they are going to suck in peopleAny investment which is made will benefit not only from the surrounding economies because there is no

South Africa itself but that region which it shortage of impoverished people in that region. Thatdominates to a large extent. I hope when we label is why we have to try to bring the whole region upSouth Africa a middle-income country with the and not just one country.result that our aid is decreasing, that you can give an Chairman: The message is clear: in partnership weassurance to the Committee that we recognise that can achieve good things in the region of Southany aid which assists South Africa will also have Africa. May I, on behalf of the Committee, thankrepercussive eVects on the region as a whole and that you and thank your colleagues for a most helpful

session.aid policy should be given within that context.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM THE PARLIAMENTARYUNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

At the oral evidence session on 2 March, I promised to follow up certain points in a letter to you.

At the end of 1994, four Upholder class submarines were withdrawn from the Royal Navy service andbecame available for sales or lease. South Africa expressed an interest in the submarines and, for a while,was one of the countries in contention for them. In the event, South Africa chose not to purchase or leasethe Upholders.

HMG did, and does, support British commercial interests in South Africa. We did not seek to direct orinterfere in the decisions of the South African Government in their Strategic Defence Review.

The UK Government is supportive of eVorts by the African Union, African sub-regional organisationsand members of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to promote peace and securityin Africa. The African Union’s commitment to establishing an African Standby Force to carry out peacesupport operations mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council is welcome. The structure of the forceis still to be agreed. It is therefore diYcult to outline the exact size and nature of UK support. In recent yearstheUKhas provided long-termpeace support operations training inmany countries including SouthAfrica,Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria; all likely to be significant contributors to the African Standby Force. Thissupport will continue in future years. In 2005, when we hold the G8 Presidency, we will aim to encouragebetter international co-ordination in support of both the African Union and African sub-regionalorganisations such as ECOWAS.

The BritishHigh Commission in SouthAfrica has been involved in a programme of support to Alexandratownship police station for the last three years. This has culminated in the secondment of a MetropolitanPolice Service (MPS) oYcer to the station to advise on community policing issues, including the policing ofdomestic violence. Tackling the problem of domestic violence is a priority area for the South African Policeand the European Commission in Pretoria has also developed a programme to tackle it and crimes againstchildren. This programme is due to start this year and the MPS has oVered their help to the programmemanagers. The MPS secondee in Alexandra has already met with the team, who will be using the lessonslearned from our work to inform their own. Future work by the High Commission will be dependent onsecuring funds to continue the twinning project between Southwark Police and Alexandra Police stations.

Details of HMG’s funding are advertised on the High Commission and DfID websites(www.britain.org.za and www.dfid.gov.uk). There are a number of UK charities operating in South Africawhich have HIV/AIDS programmes. And there are several NGOs, eg the Southern African GrantmakersAssociation (www.donors.org.za) which already produce directories of available funding.

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 95

As requested, I enclose a copy of the UK/South Africa MOU on the Reciprocal Educational Exchangeof Healthcare Concepts and Personnel signed on 25 October 2003.

Chris Mullin MP

22 March 2004

Annex

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Reciprocal Educational

Exchange of Healthcare Concepts and Personnel

Preamble

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred toas “UK”) and the Government of the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as “South Africa”)and jointly referred to as the “Parties” and in the singular as a “Party”);

Desirous to consolidate and strengthen the friendly ties and reciprocal understanding between the Parties;

Conscious of the desirability of promoting to the greatest possible extent the mutual knowledge,experience and understanding of their respective human and development needs in the field covered by thisMemorandum of Understanding by means of friendly cooperation between them;

Considering the Parties wish to enhance their bilateral relations in respect of Public Health and HealthCare Policy;

Considering themutual interest of the Parties in exchange programmes for oYcials of each Party, and thatprofessionals selected to join the programme have an opportunity to enhance clinical/technical skills andexplore best experiences.

Hereby Agree as follows:

Article 1

OBJECTIVE OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

TheObjective of thisMemorandumofUnderstanding is to enhance clinical/technical skills and to explorebest practice in health care delivery.

Article 2

SCOPE OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Scope of this Memorandum of Understanding is as follows:

1. Giving cognisance to the existing commitment of the UK to ethical international workforce policiesand practices as clearly outlined in their Department of Health’s Guide to International Recruitment 1999,and the UK Code of Practice for National Health Services (NHS) employers 2001, both parties shallformulate an agreed plan whereby, South African healthcare personnel can spend mutually agreed periodof time on education and practice in organisations providing National Health Services;

2. The Memorandum of Understanding will also enable clinical staV from England to work alongsidehealthcare personnel in the Republic of South Africa, with particular emphasis on the rural areas; and

3. The Parties shall exchange information, advice and expertise in:

(a) professional regulation issues;

(b) public health and primary care;

(c) workforce planning and development, including the National Health Services and academicinterface;

(d) strategic planning;

(e) public-private partnerships, including private finance initiatives;

(f) revitalisation of hospitals, including governance (corporate and clinical) and re-engineering;

(g) twinning of hospitals to share best practices and strengthen management; and

(h) training in healthcare management.

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Ev 96 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

4. The Parties shall collaborate with the following institutions:

(a) National Institute for Clinical Excellence in Quality issues; and

(b) the Health Protection Agency.

Article 3

SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS

Activities described in this Memorandum of Understanding may be implemented by the Parties throughthe development of specific arrangements, programmes or projects between the appropriate agencies andoYces of the Parties. Such arrangements, programmes or projects should specify inter alia the objectives,activities, organisation, financial arrangements and other details relating to specific undertakings of allparticipants involved.

Article 4

COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

The competent authorities responsible for the implementation of this Memorandum of Understandingshall be:

(a) in the case of the UK, the Department of Health, represented in the Republic of South Africa by theHigh Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and

(b) in the case of South Africa, its national Department of Health.

Article 5

TRAINING

The Parties shall facilitate mutual access to universities, colleges and schools of training for the healthprofessionals during:

(a) scientific studies;

(b) specific training;

(c) postgraduate training;

(d) study visits.

Article 6

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any disputes between the Parties, which may arise in the course of the implementation and interpretationof this Memorandum of Understanding, shall be settled amicably through consultation or negotiationbetween the Parties.

Article 7

AMENDMENTS TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This Memorandum of Understanding may be amended by mutual consent of the Parties through anExchange of Notes between the Parties through the diplomatic channel.

Article 8

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

1. This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force on the date of its signature thereof.

2. This Memorandum of Understanding shall remain in force for a period of five (5) years but may beterminated by either Party giving three months written notice in advance through the diplomatic channelof its intention to terminate it.

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3. If deemed necessary, the Parties, by written mutual consent, may decide to extend the duration of thisMemorandum of Understanding.

4. The termination of this Memorandum of Understanding shall not aVect the validity and durationof any ongoing arrangements, programmes and projects undertaken under this Memorandum ofUnderstanding, until the completion of such programmes or activities.

LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT,FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FROM THE SECOND CLERK OF THE

COMMITTEE, DATED 17 MARCH 2004

High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town

You may have seen the following exchange in the Committee’s recent evidence session with Mr Mullin,during its inquiry into “South Africa”:

Q224MrHamilton: I hope that in considering ourwork in SouthAfrica that you do not considerselling oV the residence in Cape Town.

Mr Mullin: It is funny that you should mention that. We have actually been awaiting therecommendation of our High Commissioner on that issue and she has recommended that theCape Town residence to be sold. We have not made a decision about that, but we are thinkingabout it.

Q225Mr Hamilton: Obviously I cannot speak for the entire Committee, but certainly my viewis that it should not be sold. It is a huge asset to us there. We saw it ourselves and we saw justwhat extraordinary good eVect it had and how we were able to entertain virtually half theparliament there as well as half the government.

Mr Mullin: I think the Foreign OYce would be very interested to hear the Committee’s viewson that issue.

The Committee have asked me to seek clarification from you as to the exact status of the Residence atthis time, in relation to the asset recycling programme, and the timescale for any decisions on its futureretention or sale. It also wishes to know how the proceeds of any sale of this property would be used by theDepartment. I look forward to receiving your reply in due course.

GeoVrey FarrarSecond Clerk of the Committee

17 March 2004

LETTER FROM PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT TOSECOND CLERK OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Thank you for your letter of 17 March asking for clarification of the FCO’s intentions towards the HighCommissioner’s Residence in Cape Town. I apologise for the delay in replying to you.

We have noted the FAC’s interest in the Residence, and the views expressed during Mr Mullin’s oralevidence session on 2 March.

Wewill let the FACknowwhenwe have reached a decision on the future of theResidence, and the reasonsfor that decision.

Matthew Hamlyn

26 April 2004

Written evidence submitted by Dr Ian Taylor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies,University of Botswana

One of the main promoters of the NEPAD has been South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, who hastaken on an almost personalised stake in the NEPAD’s advocacy. As a result, the NEPAD has beencriticised as being overly dominated by South Africa. The implementation process for achieving theNEPAD’s goals might be said to reflect South African dominance of the programme, as well as the tensionsthat this has engendered, particularly as the Secretariat is based in Pretoria under the head of WisemanNkuhlu (a South African). Such a set-up has produced a degree of anxiety already within Africa, with theinterim president of the African Union, along with foreign ministers and members of the newly launched

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African Union’s secretariat “lambast[ing] South Africa and Nigeria for dominating the NEPAD process”,questioning why the African Union (AU) had been launched in South Africa instead of Addis Ababa andclaiming that the AU was “not being kept up to speed with developments on NEPAD”.5

This being so, most focus on the NEPAD has been aimed at the section on Political Governance and PeerReview, which sprang from the March 2002 Draft Report on Good Governance and Democracy and theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism. Unlike the now-defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), itappeared to some observers that the NEPADwas a qualitatively diVerent document from previous African“declarations”, perhaps for the first time advancing a promise to self-police African leaders and rein incorrupt autocrats. However, it now appears highly improbable that there will be any sanctions or counter-measures against those countries that fail to pass the governance muster. Yet without such measures anyreview mechanism is largely pointless as it will have no teeth.

Problematically, it was President Mbeki who unilaterally claimed that the African Review Mechanism(APRM) would not review the political governance of African countries. This marked a retreat from earlierpronouncements and came after an extended period of time when the NEPAD’s promoters (primarilyMbeki andObasanjo) not only consistently refused to criticise RobertMugabe of Zimbabwe and his party’sbehaviour but also supported him. Whilst Mbeki has sought to deny that there should be any link betweeninaction over Zimbabwe and the NEPAD’s credibility, virtually all observers have stressed the cruciallinkage. Mbeki’s position was—and is—is that the NEPAD is simply the AU’s “socio-economicprogramme”, and that there was never ever any suggestion that the NEPAD peer review process wouldconduct the work of the AU’s Commission on Human Rights. Such a position contradicts both one of themain selling points of the NEPAD and, what Mbeki had postured previously. It is a fact that when it waslaunched and in the run-up to its launch, NEPADwas sold to itsWestern partners on the basis that it wouldadvance democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance and that such principles wouldbe guided and monitored through the establishment of a “peer review” mechanism.

Now that this seems to have been abandoned, serious questions as to what exactly is the point of theNEPAD if all it is going to do is review economic progress in Africa are being asked. Innumerable reportsonAfrica’s economic condition are already regularly issued by the InternationalMonetary Fund, theWorldBank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, developmentagencies and non-governmental organisations, as well as departments and ministries within most Africanstates (as well as publications such as The Economist Intelligence Unit). What value can the NEPAD bringif it is simply going to duplicate such work? Whilst there is now a six-person supervising panel of the peerreview mechanism (appointed in May 2003), the whole process is entirely voluntary and lacks any muscleand there is now a suspicion that this panel will restrict itself to rubber-stamping governance reports ofcountries that were confident of positive evaluations by the panel in the first place. The point of such anexercise is obscure.

President Thabo Mbeki has in fact come out badly since the launch of the NEPAD, primarily becausemany saw him as one of the “new generation” of African leaders. But, his behaviour surrounding theZimbabwe issue and the NEPAD has served to question his leadership and diplomatic skills. Mbeki’s tacticof labelling anyone he is in disagreement with as “racist” has been particularly disturbing. For instance, inengaging with critics over his back-pedalling regarding the APRM, Mbeki labelled them “self-appointedchampions of democracy and human rights in Africa” who were apparently infused with “contemptuousprejudice” for Africans and who dared to suggest that “Africa’s political leaders cannot be trusted topromote and entrench democracy and human rights”.6 Mbeki has also been involved in an acrimoniousdispute within the Commonwealth when he labelled leaders within that organisation who expressed concernover Mugabe’s tyranny as racists who were merely “inspired by notions of white supremacy”. Such moveswere pursued because white leaders in the Commonwealth apparently felt uneasy at their “repugnantposition imposed by inferior blacks”.7 This type of rhetoric, aimed at Prime Minister Blair, is not the typeof language expected from an ostensible friend of the United Kingdom, nor from a country that demandsincreased investment from London.

Whilst it is recognised that the NEPAD is a long-term project of renewal, worthy of support,South Africa’s policies with regard to the NEPAD thus far reflect an unmistakable failure to act (or evenexpress overt concern) regarding governance failures on the continent. The debacle in Zimbabwe is perhapsthe most high-profile but the situation in Swaziland should also be noted. Both countries are within SouthAfrica’s immediate sphere of influence and a more proactive stance by Pretoria should be expected. Theinaction to date invites disappointment vis-a-vis the NEPAD and makes its more diYcult for its Westernpromoters (primarily Canada and the United Kingdom) to sell the document to other G-7 members as aserious initiative. The palpable cooling oV of the world community’s enthusiasm for the NEPAD can beseen in part as a result of this failure. The NEPADhas value in placing the question of Africa’s development

5 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 22 September 2002.6 Quoted in “Critics Ill-Informed About NEPAD Peer Review”, ANC Today, Vol. 2, No 45, 8–14 November 2002,

www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm7 “Letter from the President: Zimbabwe: ‘Two Blacks and One White’”, ANC Today: Online Voice of the African National

Congress, Vol 2, No 10, 8–14 March 2002, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at10.htm.

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firmly on the international agenda, but there is a real need for Mbeki to show some degree of leadership,even if this is uncomfortable. Failure to do so risks allowing the NEPAD project to ultimately fade awaylike other previous pan-African development initiatives.

Dr Ian TaylorUniversity of Botswana

Written evidence submitted by the Local Government International Bureau (LGIB), the international arm ofthe Local Government Association for England and Wales

Introduction

There have historically been strong links between South Africa and British local government, withsignificant anti-apartheid campaigns led by UK local authorities. Since 1994 South Africa has faced anunprecedented challenge in redirecting its resources to achieve equity for its very varied communities. Localauthority reform has been essential to this process. British and South African local authorities are workingtogether to develop representative services that tackle poverty, while at national level the South AfricanLocal Government Association is working with its British counterparts to expand the benefits of suchinternational links.

Local Government in South Africa

Since 1994 local government in South Africa has undergone a series of radical reforms. Its role isenshrined in the country’s 1996 Constitution which recognises it as an equal ‘sphere’ of government,working alongside provincial and central government with responsibility for the delivery of municipalservices. A series of Acts have set out new guidelines for municipal demarcation and structuralmodernisation, with the number of local authorities being reduced from 843 to 284 in 2000. These localauthorities are set out within nine provinces, each of which has a provincial sphere of government.

The SouthAfrican Local Government Association is recognised by the Constitution as the national voiceof local government. As such, SALGA is consulted on all legislation aVecting local government. SALGAitself has undergone substantial changes in response to the rapidly changing landscape of centralgovernment in the country. Core to its mandate is the transformation of local government countrywide tofulfil its developmental role.

Local Government Association Cooperation

While there is much international interest in South Africa, SALGA is not fully capitalising on theopportunities presented through international programmes and partnerships within South Africa. Inassociation with the UK’s Local Government International Bureau, SALGA is currently establishing a newExternal Relations Unit to map, coordinate and promote international activities for a beneficial impact onlocal development.

A memorandum of understanding has been signed between SALGA and LGIB in commitment to thisprocess of support. The initial phase of the programme saw SALGA and LGIB working together in 2002to assess the international needs for South African local government. The outcome of this research was thedevelopment of a plan for an External Relations Unit, the establishment of which began in April 2003. Overthe next three years LGIBwill particularly provide support in training a designated partnerships oYcer, andproviding technical assistance in communications and establishing new links.

Local Authority Partnerships

Avaried range of local authority partnerships exist between SouthAfrica and theUnitedKingdom.Whilethese centre around the sharing of best practice and joint projects for the development of local governmentcapacity, many involve a significant community element. It is recognised that each partner has uniqueexperience to share with the other in an environment of mutual learning. Current partnerships are:

6.1 Leeds—Durban

This technical link has brought together staV from the two cities on a series of projects which haveincluded security, tourism and regeneration, whilst promoting community-wide learning about eachcountry’s culture. Now in its fifth year, the partnership is increasingly active in extending beyond core citycouncil links to incorporate schools, universities, NGOs and community groups. A delegation from theLeeds Initiative, the city’s public-private partnership, will visit Durban in autumn 2003, alongside oYcersworking on a new programme of support for small businesses.

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Ev 100 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

6.2 Croydon—Kungwini

Kungwini municipality has developed an economic department using Croydon as a model. The twocounterparts are now exchanging best practice in local regeneration strategies in order to develop anintegrated economic regeneration strategy and cross-sector partnership in Kungwini with an emphasis onaddressing social and economic inequality. Croydon Council is working with the Borough’s Chamber ofCommerce on a second trade mission to South Africa following a successful mission in 2002 which wasnotable for its high ratio of female and ethnic minority delegates. Like its predecessor, the forthcomingmission will incorporate a wide range of businesses in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.

6.3 Birmingham—Johannesburg

A twin relationship acts as the foundation for these metropolitan city councils to work together onpractical issues. The councils, organisations and citizens of Birmingham and Johannesburg are committedto a process of learning from each other. Through the exchange of best practice, information, people andideas the two cities have become better able to tackle the problems aVecting large, constantly changingmultiracial and multi ethnic cities. Focusing on education, governance and job creation both councils continueto collaborate on delivering the vibrant, learning modern cities within which we all want to live and work.

6.4 Lewisham—Ekurheleni

This new partnership is in the early stages of identifying areas for council cooperation and communityinvolvement. Areas of interest at present include exchanges of information, skills and expertise amongcouncil employees, educational links—between schools and colleges and particularly the possibility ofinternships, citizenship with regard to young people, and aspects of economic development andregeneration. Lewisham recently hosted a successful study tour from councillors and oYcers of Ekurhuleniwho were focusing on the use of new technology for the provision of front-line services.

6.5 Oxfordshire—Nkonkobe

This established educational and arts-based partnership is currently expanding into economicdevelopment through a tourism and leisure programme.

6.6 Torfaen—Cape Town

A good practice partnership was developed in 2000 to assist Cape Town’s Oostenburg section to developa social exclusion strategy and action plan. A key objective was to develop the management capacity of keystaV. The strategy was formally adopted in 2002 and has contributed to the wider agenda being developedacross the city. The two partners seek to maintain their relationship through the ongoing exchange ofbest practice.

6.7 East Grinstead—Dundee

This twinning link is based around school partnerships between the two towns. Significant activitiesinclude staV exchanges and discussions of best practice in education.

6.8 Hackney—Alexandra

An informal link administered by Hackney’s International Association, this partnership focuses oneducational exchanges between schools in the two inner city areas.

6.9 London—Johannesburg

The Greater London Authority has established a “sister city” relationship with Johannesburg.

Building the Capacity of ElectedMembers: LAACTSA

The NGO Local Authority Action for Southern Africa is a forum for over 60 councils in the UK with aninterest in South Africa. Founded upon Local Authorities Against Apartheid, LAACTSA was establishedin 1995 to promote democracy and development throughout southern Africa by working with localcommunities and their local authorities. In South Africa, activities centre around training placements andcapacity building programmes for councillors.

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Now hosted by Croydon Council, LAACTSA is promoting a scheme for the development of businessentrepreneurship in partnership with local government. This initiative sets out to support local womencouncillors in rural South Africa, and women entrepreneurs in setting up small businesses, throughmentoring and training progammes.

Building the Capacity of Officers and Officials: SOLACE and I&DeA

The UK’s Improvement and Development Agency (I&DeA) has been central in assisting SALGA in thedevelopment of their initial three year business plan and strategic review, funded byDfID. I&DeAmaintainssupport for local and provincial government in South Africa through initiatives such as a recent study tourfor South African oYcials to the UK on the theme of local government modernisation.

The Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE) has developed an advisory relationship withits South African counterpart, the Institute for Local Government Management. The current focus of thisrelationship is support for the establishment of a commercial wing of ILGM, which will be a company builtalong the lines of SOLACE Enterprises in the UK. An exchange programme for senior local governmentoYcials is also under discussion.

A Commonwealth Perspective: CLGF

The Commonwealth Local Government Forum, based in the UK, seeks to build the capacity of localgovernment in Commonwealth countries with an emphasis on the exchange of best practice betweeninternational partners. CLGF’s current approach in South Africa takes the shape of the Good PracticeScheme, a DfID programme of support for strengthening local government.

The Scheme aims to build the capacity of local authorities in South Africa in devising and implementingplans for local economic development in relation to South Africa’s mandatory Integrated DevelopmentPlans. Nine international partnerships between South African municipalities and Commonwealthcounterparts are designed to share good practice and develop appropriate solutions. Overarching theseprojects is a programme for developing SALGA’s capacity to exploit such international resources for thedevelopment of local government in the country. This programme is involving the LGIB in supportingSALGA in tracking and promoting international input into local government and directing this for strategicimpact (see paragraph 4 above).

Funding

Asof 2003 there is a designated fund for the development of local government partnerships between SouthAfrica and the Commonwealth in the field of economic development, in the shape of the DfID-fundedCLGF Good Practice Scheme, to which South African local authorities can apply, requesting partnershipwith the UK where appropriate. This scheme will fund nine partnerships, some of which will be with UKpartners.

Individual schemes have also been supported by DfID, the British Council andWestminster Foundationfor Democracy.While local authorities are legally authorised to use domestic resources overseas, in practicethey favour external funds or community fund-raising for smaller scale projects.

Future Strategy

As the body constitutionally responsible for the development of local government in South Africa,SALGA aims to ensure that the resources to which it has access are directed towards its own strategicobjectives. These resources increasingly include local government expertise, experience and commitmentfrom practitioners worldwide. The LGIB will therefore continue to work with SALGA to build capacity foran increasingly strategic approach to international input into local government in SouthAfrica, in order thatindividual projects and partnerships might reap the most eVective benefit for the country’s development.

In the domestic context, the LGIB and its sister local government organisations will work together toencourage the coordinated and strategic input of UK local authorities in accordance with SALGA’s plansfor local development in South Africa.

Local Government International Bureau

September 2003

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Written evidence submitted by The British Council

THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Council’s Purpose in South Africa

The Council’s purpose in South Africa is to:

— Enhance the UK’s reputation with the authority generation by supporting their transformationagenda.

— Demonstrate UK creativity and innovation to the young South Africans who will influence thecountry’s future.

— Strengthen civil society though developing access to information and through developingleadership.

Operating through a main oYce in Johannesburg and three smaller oYces in Pretoria, Cape Town andDurban the Council uses the following income to achieve its purpose, (using 2003–04 figures).

— Grant in Aid £2.35 million

— Higher Education Grant £0.224 million

— Other income £0.881 million

— Total £3.45 million

These resources include income from our enterprise activity, our income from managing developmentcontracts for clients and sponsorship or partnership funding. They exclude the operational value of thedevelopment contracts we manage on behalf of clients, which adds a further £1.7 million of expenditurethrough our accounts. Our overall impact in financial terms is therefore £5.15 million. It is important torealise however that the South Africa operation works with four other countries in a unified regionalstructure.

The Council’s Programme in South Africa

These resources support the following programmes in education and training, governance and the artsand science, organised under three thematic campaigns. Each campaign will use all types of Council activityto achieve its goals.

Training for change

We work in partnership with South African organisations to support education and skills developmentat all levels to meet the challenges of our changing societies and work at all levels of educational provision.

We manage a framework agreement with the Department of Education and the Colleges CollaborationFund (a private sector social investment mechanism) to support national reform in Further Education &Training which accesses Rand 40 million of private sector resource and which has developed long termrelationships between South African and UK colleges.

The school-linking programme has brought more than one hundred and fifty UK and South Africanschools together and focuses directly on curriculum development and good practice in schools.

We also manage thirty two university links under the Higher Education Links Scheme, funded by theDfID Higher Education Grant (that will terminate in 2005–06).

Other areas of activity include assistance to the merging of South African higher education institutions,the development of school leadership and assisting with the institutional development of the South AfricanHigher Education Quality Council and the Qualifications Authority.

We include in this campaign the oVer of UK examination opportunities in South Africa, oVering careerchoice and internationally recognised qualifications to South Africans on a fee-paying basis.

Finally but prominently we manage the Chevening Scholarships on behalf, and in conjunction with theFCO, to identify and oVer postgraduate training to young South African future leaders.

Building our democracies together

We work in partnership with South African institutions to strengthen and promote good governance, ahuman rights culture and to generate better democratic participation in our two countries.

This includes the Strategic Leadership Training Programme for Southern Africa providing leadershiptraining to the South African successor generation, drawing participation from civil society and non-governmental organisations.

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An annual high profile event is UKUZA (United Kingdom Unites with South Africa), a bilateral forumstrengthening networks of young politicians, artists, academics and influential personalities from the public,private and civil society sectors, who engage in debate around such issues as identity. The programmeachieves a degree of profile that does not target specific sector interests but engenders mutual understandingand common values between people of influence.

We also manage a Child Rights Project contributing to research dialogue and capacity development inthe areas of the rights of the child. This project specifically draws on experience and expertise from Walesthrough their Children’s Commissioner.

The Access to Information andWhistleblowing Project links South African, UK and Indian civil societyand watchdog organisations to promote a more transparent, open and accountable South Africa. Theproject focuses on two new items of legislation, the Protected Disclosures Act and the promotion of Accessto Information Act.

Partners in innovation

The campaign focuses on showing UK creativity and innovation in the Arts and Sciences, and is thechannel through which we achieve wide spread impact on young people in South African society by directexposure to events, performances and other interactions that bring the vibrancy of UK cultural life to theirnotice. Examples of such activity follow.

We send young aspiring South African scientists to the London International Youth Science Forum tomeet their UK counterparts and in 2003 are circulating an exhibition celebrating the Discovery of DNAthroughout the country.

We ensure at least one performing arts tour each year focusing particularly on young audiences and havein the last two years provided access to some of the most innovative performers from the UK music scenein rap, hip-hop and other types of product.

We manage the New Writing Workshops for Radio Drama in partnership with the BBC and thePerforming Arts Network of South Africa, developing skills and opportunities in radio drama. In 2003 wealso worked with the Encounters Documentary Film Festival to showcase cutting edge UK work.

Sport

Three years ago we started to build a profile in Sport, beginning with the mass appeal Football NationExhibition, our participation in the multilateral Dreams and Teams project (developing young people’sleadership and coaching skills, including life skills, in several countries) and forming a relationship with keysporting personalities in the country.

Coincident with the first ever onshore England-South Africa football match in early 2003 we establishedand mounted an exhibition on sporting relations between the UK and South Africa, documenting inparticular the UK role in the anti-apartheid campaigns of the 70s–90s. At the same time we co-ordinatedthe presentation of over 5,000 diVerent football strips, all donated by English football fans, for distributionto young footballers in disadvantaged communities.

Fan ambassadorship is now an increasingly important part of our South African programme andwe havedeveloped a number of relationships between UK and South African fan groups. As the universal sportfootball oVers a powerful means of building contemporary relationships based on common understanding.Sport is likely to play an increasing role in our programme and will hopefully develop into a full campaign.

Development services

We manage a varied portfolio of projects on behalf of major donors in South Africa, including DfID,which contribute directly to the social and economic development of the country. Some examples are:

A seminal pilot project to support HIV/Aids prevention in the penal system in South Africa. Starting withWestville Prison, the largest prison in Southern Africa, and the Kwa-Zulu Natal Correctional Servicesdepartment we used our global network to access expertise and experience form theUganda Prisons Service,providing capacity development and skills transfer to South Africa. The evaluation determined the projectto be highly successful and it is now expected that the programme will roll out nationally under the auspicesof DfID’s Safety, Security and Access to Justice programme.

For 10 years we have managed the British Investment Scheme, funded by DfID and targeting small andmedium sized enterprises in the UK and South Africa to promote successful investment and joint venturesto encourage local economic development, income generation and employment in South Africa.

The Support to EconomicReformProgramme also invests in high level capacity development in three keyMinistries, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Public Enterprises and the NationalTreasury, making available international experience and expertise to review, assess and reform servicedelivery within these key institutions.

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The British Council’s Strategy in South Africa

In 2000 the British Council corporately implemented a strategy to redistribute its resources according todefined geographical priorities and to transform its impact overseas. In Africa this meant a concentrationof resources in two key priority countries, South Africa and Nigeria. In the former our strategy has set outto improve eYciency but also to provide a modern and eVective approach to delivering cultural relationsimpact for the UK. Its key characteristics are the following.

Integration

There are two aspects to integration. The first is how we relate to other UK agencies including oursponsoring department, the FCO, and secondly how we organise ourselves.

Through the BritishHigh Commission, the Council participates in two structures that provide for “joinedup” government. The first is the Director’s membership of the High Commissioner’s regular Board ofManagement ensuring information transfer and co-ordination among UK agencies working here. Thesecond is participation in the task forces established to keep in touchwith priority policy issues for theUK inSouth Africa. A rewarding consequence of this process is increasing levels of collaboration at activity level,enabling wider exposure of UK HMG staV to South African networks and better understanding by SouthAfricans of the UK presence in the country. Equally important is a growing understanding the of thediVerent organisational cultures we work in.

Internally we have reorganised our team around activity managers who drive an action plan related toeach campaign. The team are distributed across the four oYces as we believe this enables us to use talentmost eVectively where we find it and to ensure good communication facilities are available. Central teamsin Johannesburg operating the programme are supported in the smaller oYces by activity deliverymanagerswho support local delivery as needed. The eVect has been to create a single integrated South African (andregional) programme, in contrast to our earlier dispositionwhich entailed three separate and usually distinctprogrammes in each of our three oYces (prior to the opening of the Pretoria oYce).

Regionalism

The British Council in South Africa operates as the central component of a regional Council networkincluding our activity in Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique and Mauritius. This provides for a network ofeight oYces working as one operational unit. The process has several advantages in terms of eYciency andeVectiveness. Feedback from our partners has been universally supportive and enthusiastic for theopportunities it aVords them.

On the former we have been able to remove duplicated support services by centralising accounting,personnel and other services to free up resource for programme delivery. Our goal was to improve the ratioof spend between programme and overhead costs programme from around 35% to 50%. By the end of2003–04 this goal will have been achieved.

On eVectiveness we operate a regional programme that enables nationals from all five countries to interactwith each other through regional, cross border activities. This enables economies of scale, better use of ourhuman resource talent across the five countries and an increase in impact as our target groups appreciatethe enhanced access they enjoy toUKnetworks as well as their professional peers in neighbouring countries.This enriches the content, builds trust and exploits the unique capacity the Council has to build andmaintaincross border, multilateral networks of professional interest. The gain in trust is palpable and enables theCouncil to support the NEPAD agenda in a very direct way. It also presages and builds good practice inadvance of the pan African activities we have received new funding for in Africa. The capacity to operatemultilaterally is an increasing criteria for success in building positive cultural relations among professionalgroups and we are developing best practice in this regard.

Human resources

The Council in South Africa has changed its staV culture. We reduced the number of UK appointed staVwe expatriate to South Africa and increased the number of senior South African staV that manage ourprogrammes. Five years ago there were no South Africans in our senior team whereas now 60% of itsmembership comprise local staV.

Our motives have been first and foremost to comply with Equity of Employment legislation and todemonstrate our support to transformation through our own employment practice. Additionally we haverecruited local professionals to manage all our programme activity, bringing with them not only localexpertise but access to existing professional networks. Employing a full time professionalHumanResourcesDirector we focus considerable attention and resource on good employment practice and skillsdevelopment. We have five UK staV in South Africa and thirty seven South African staV. Of the total fortytwo more than half have regional responsibilities.

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Programme strategy

The Campaign structure of our programme has also brought benefits, both to staV and how they workbut also to external stakeholders and target groups.

Firstly it enables us to focus resources on a controlled spread of activities that support broader messagesabout UK culture, ideas and achievements. There are approximately sixty units of activity spread across thethree campaigns in our current year action plan. We aim to reduce the number in future years in favour offewer but larger units of activity achieving higher profile and impact.

Secondly it enables interested parties to understand our programme in a more open and transparent way.

Thirdly it facilitates the sharing of resources and expertise in such away that we are able to enhance impactin the smaller countries in our region beyond the level of budget they are able to access. We can get morebang for our buck. The coherence and continuity of message also enable a better marketing platform forextending impact to wider society through communication activities, through themedia, through events andthrough products we disseminate through programmes.

A key part of our development is the commissioning of primary market research into our target groups.As a transitional society, South Africa is raising a new generation of adults whose characteristics are notthat well understood. They are from the former disadvantaged communities but in the post apartheid periodhave emerged as well educated, economically powerful consumers with diVerent habits, tastes and intereststo their parents who did not enjoy the opportunities they have grown up with. They have not had UKexposure during the exile and scholarship era. They will become the leaders of the future but do not havewell formed views about the UK. We need to find out about them and cater to their interests.

In this regard there is a superb case study of the BRUFS (British Undergraduates Fellowship Scheme)graduates, a group of about 150 black South Africans who were trained to degree level in the UK in theearly 90s. The scheme was funded by DfID and managed by the Council. They have now re-emerged as aself-sustaining, dynamic alumni group who are forming strategically important relationships with TradePartners International and other FCO colleagues. The relationship provides key access to an importantsegment of African society through a group of Africans who have an intimate understanding of the UK andits people.

Infrastructure

Three million of Africa’s seven million internet users are in South Africa. The country has an eVectiveelectronic infrastructure and associated services enabling us to concentrate on using virtual services fordelivery. Consequently we do not provide the public access facilities one would typically associate with aBritish Council oYce in Africa or Asia. Over 85% of enquiries received are virtual.

We have invested in video conferencing, IT, web based and call centre based facilities that enable us toachieve economies and to stand at the cutting edge of communication services in Africa. Our enquiry serviceis outsourced as is the management of our web services freeing up capacity devoted to better bespokeresearch services by our information team in support of product and service development in our campaigns.We increasingly invest eYciency savings in bandwidth to cater for increasing communication requirements.These will increase steadily as the Council introduces new online management systems, products andservices.

A clear priority for the next five years is to build and deliver a sophisticated information and servicedelivery system that will enable our customers to access information about theUK rapidly, and increasinglyto access services directly through our electronic network, whether registering for an examination or directlyaccessing study material through the internet.

Evaluation

We are now working with a Balanced Scorecard to build up a clear picture of the impact of our workactivities and the performance improvements we can achieve year on year. In addition individual projectspecific evaluations are carried out to ensure achievement of objectives and to ensure we capture goodpractice for transfer to other activity. In 2003–04 we will produce baseline data covering a number ofindicators which will inform future planning and delivery.

Conclusion

The British Council is a crucial element of the UK public diplomacy agenda in South Africa. We workwith our HMG partners to overcome a distinctly dated perception among South Africans of UK society.The large British passport holding community are not a key target group and often not supportive of theideas we espouse. Diversity, innovation and modernity are not values they necessarily associate with theBritain of their imagination. The new emerging blackmiddle class equally do not share this perceptionmuchbeyond the icons of Beckham and Buckingham Palace. They are however a group who are amenable to theculture we wish to promote and are a sophisticated customer. Our challenge is to assist their elders to

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Ev 106 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

progress post-apartheid transformation and to ensure as the next generation inherit themantle they will turnto UK for opportunity, experience and expertise. Our challenge is to understand their needs and to respondwith services that attract and retain their interest.

The British Council

September 2003

Written evidence submitted by Mr Keith Somerville

SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Continental and Regional Context

South Africa is the dominant military and economic power in southern Africa and the most influentialnation (in global and continental terms) in sub-Saharan Africa. In the nine years since the election of NelsonMandela as president of a post-apartheid South Africa, the country has outstripped Africa’s stumblinggiant, Nigeria, on the world and African stage.

The moral force of Mandela and of the reconciliation/Rainbow Nation message from South Africa as awhole, the power of a developed and diverse economy, the sophistication of its politics and the potential ofits armed forces have all contributed to this position.

But commentators, opinion-formers and critics of the ANC within and outside South Africa haveexpressed disappointment with the lack of engagement and positive results which have characterisedregional and continental policy since 1994. Greg Mills, director of the South African Institute ofInternational Relations, has pointed to the “controversy and confusion” which has surrounded thecountry’s foreign policy since 1994.

While he says that this to an extent is a result of unrealistic international and domestic expectations ofthe role that South Africa could play in the short-term, it is clear that foreign policy has not been clear,consistent or eVective.

In southern Africa, Pretoria has veered from the rather precipitate and clumsy intervention in Lesotho in1998 (in concert with Botswana and Zimbabwe) to “quiet diplomacy” and non-intervention in Zimbabwe’spolitical/civil unrest problems and little if any ovious role in Angola (either before or since the death of JonasSavimbi in February 2002).

This inconsistency has a number of sources but sits uneasily with South Africa’s foreign policy rhetoric—as the leading force in Nepad and given President Mbeki’s views on the African Renaissance.

When SouthAfrica’s ForeignMinister in an annual address to the SAIIR declared rather pompously that“South Africa, together with its partners, has made remarkable progress in preparing the groundwork forthe revitalisation of Africa and prevention of the further marginalisation of the continent”, but was unableto prevent its partners in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) from active and partialmilitary involvement in the DRC (not to mention the looting of DRC resources that accompanied this) andplayed no meaningful role in supporting democracy in Zimbabwe, then you know that the rhetoric bearslittle relation to the reality of policy implementation.

Similarly, South Africa has declared its support for the UN, international peacekeeping eVorts andmultilateral approaches to conflict resolution, but has declined to provide personnel for UN operations (inBosnia, for example), has acted unilaterally or in combination with one or two other states in some cases(Lesotho) and has been non-existent as a player in regional crises in which it could have had a major andpositive role.

Constraints

It is fair to say that South Africa’s regional and continental failures have been due partly to entirelyunderstandable constraints.

The priorities for the country in 1994 were reconciliation, economic redistribution but also continuedeconomic growth and the building of a non-racial defence force.

This inhibited concerted action on the foreign policy front in the first few years of ANC government—theMandela government quite rightly and understandably declined amilitary role post-genocide inRwandawhen this was being suggested within days of the ANC’s election victory in 1994.

The country was alsomade cautious regionally by the role of the country, its armed forces and intelligenceservices during the apartheid era. South African forces had carried out raids against or intervened militarilyor in support of rebels in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe—as well being anoccupying power in Namibia.

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Robert Mugabe has been quoted as saying that with the end of apartheid in South Africa, countries inthe region did not want to swap being victims of apartheid aggression for being treated by the newgovernment as a province of South Africa—this has inhibited Pretoria’s willingness and ability to exerciseinfluence regionally. Some have described it as leading to a situation of Pretoria being damned if it doessomething and damned if it doesn’t.

As member of SADC, South Africa has wanted to act multilaterally, but SADC, as a report from theCentre for Africa’s International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand points out, has no realhistory of multilateral action and its members have generally opted for unilateral or bilateral action. Thismade things diYcult regionally and led to South Africa acting with Zimbabwe and Botswana in its clumsymilitary intervention after a coup in Lesotho in 1998.

The ability to act in a military capacity regionally or in global UN operations—to restore or maintainpeace or as part of a multilateral force—has been reduced by the declining power, cohesion and funding ofthe armed forces.GregMills of SAIIR has said that SouthAfrica is now far less able to act in those capacitiesthan it was seven years ago.

While denying that the South African army is in crisis and is able to field only small units for limitedoperations, South Africa’s military chiefs have admitted major problems in the integration of the armedforces, continuing racism, a poor command structure, major issues with the health and age structure of thearmy and poor maintenance of weaponry and support equipment. A leaked SA Department of Defencedocument in July 2002 indicated the following as among the major problems:

— Only 3,000 of 76,000 troops can be deployed operationally.

— Only four out of 168 tanks are operational.

— The air force usually runs out of fuel in September.

— Seven out of 10 deaths in the army are Aids-related.

— Training has been stopped.

Defence Minister Lekota denounced the publication of the leaks but was able to provide little or noevidence to refute the details published in South African newspapers and by BBCNews Online (links to thereports at the end of this paper).

Detailed studies have shown that operational spending in the SANDF has dropped to disastrous levels—the defence budget has declined by more than 50% in real terms in the last 13 years; less than 40% ofhelicopters are available for deployment; less than 10% of armoured vehicles are deployable and less than50% of military units could be available for operational use at short notice (http//www.global-defence.com/2001/RSpart4a.html).

This low-level of readiness has meant that barely 1,200 South African troops could be available forregional or international peacekeeping and logistical support is almost non-existent. South Africa’s smallmilitary role in the Burndi peace process has only been made possible by external logistical help and fundingfor medical support for its troops.

This situation explains why despite its vocal role in support of the Liberia peace process and pledges toassist with peacekeeping operations, it has not been able to send troops—Lekota had to decline requestsfrom West African states to send troops to support the peace agreement.

The lack of readiness of the armed forces results from budget cuts, slow and poorly implementedintegration of ANC, PAC and former SADF personnel and the lack of support for South Africa’speacekeeping capability from the developed world—typified by the suspension of US military aid to SouthAfrica because of South Africa’s diVerences with the US administration over the operations of theInternational Criminal Court.

South Africa’s declining military capabilities, lack of major logistical capacity and cuts in the militarybudget have led to the SANDF being a declining asset in SA foreign policy.

Regional Involvement

In DRC, South Africa, along with SADC members Mozambique, Tanzania and Botswana, favourednegotiations and diplomatic means to end the civil war, but other SADC members (Angola, Namibia andZimbabwe) became involved militarily in support of the Kabila government and its allies and also usedinvolvement to gain lucrative access to diamond, mineral and timber resources. South Africa stuck to thediplomatic path and tried repeatedly to forge agreement between the government and rebel groups. This waspartially successful with the Pretoria agreement of 2002, but the lack of any strong, neutral AfricanUnion orSADC presence on the ground and the inability to deter Uganda and Rwanda from continually meddlinghas meant that however constructive Pretoria’s role on the diplomatic side, the situation on the groundremains fluid and unsupportive of reconciliation and reconstruction.

Pretoria seemed unable to influence its SADC partners (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) overCongo and having failed to influence them would not criticise them publicly over military interventionin the Congo.

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In Burundi, South Africa supported Tanzania and Botswana in seeking a solution to Hutu-Tutsi violenceand has committed some 750 troops and some civilian personnel but has not had any great success inachieving real progress—but that might be too much to ask any outside mediator. This has been the onlymajor SouthAfrican commitment of forces to peacekeeping (apart from the short-lived Lesotho operation).At one point, the problems within the SANDF flared up in its force in Burundi—resulting in the death ofa soldier during a violent row within the South African peacekeeping force.

In Angola, SouthAfrica has not been an open player since 1994. Its history of direct military involvementand support for the UNITA rebels makes this diYcult as does the Dos Santos government’s pre-1994support and provision of bases for the ANC.

In the mid-1990s, SouthAfrica failed to prevent the private military company, Executive Outcomes, fromdirect military involvement on both sides of the conflict, was unable to mediate eVectively between thegovernment and UNITA and seemed to play a wait and see role, hoping that as the government gained theupper hand in the late 1990s, the situation would resolve itself.

Since the defeat of UNITA and death of Savimbi, South Africa appears to have played little open rolein assisting with reconciliation, humanitarian work or economic reconstruction—although South Africancommercial interests, such as the electricity giant Eskom, have extensive plans for energy and waterutilisation involving resources in DRC and Angola to create a regional power and water grid—mainly tomeet an expected growth in demand for power and water in South Africa in the coming decades.

When it comes to Zimbabwe, South Africa has disappointed many domestic opinion-formers as well asmajor western and Commonwealth countries. Mbeki’s stress on quiet diplomacy has gone down badly withthe USA, UK and EU, its non-Agfrican partners in the Commonwealth, put it at odds with its neighboursBotswana and Mozambique and appeared in stark contradiction to the aims, principles and rhetoric ofNepad.

South Africa has been critical of the declaratory policy of opposition to Mugabe’s land and politicalpolicies emanating from the UK, the USA, the EU and non-African Commonwealth members and hasopposed criticism of Zimbabwe that has come from Botswana’s government.

The SA Foreign Minister’s comment in March this year that under an ANC government there would“never” be criticism of Mugabe and his policies let alone pressure on him to resign or hold new electionsmade clear the lack of common ground.

The strong South African stand on this has been criticised not just byWestern governments (even thoughBush bowed to it during his visit to Pretoria in July and left the field open for South Africa’s version ofdiplomacy—perhaps more an indication of Bush’s lack of real interest in Zimbabwe than of his willingnessto listen to Mbeki’s arguments) but also by international human rights organisations such as AmnestyInternational and domestic groups such as the Helen Suzman Foundation.

The HSF said in an editorial comment on its website criticising the Mbeki stand on Zimbabwe that“African Renaissance is nothing if it is not built on human rights, democracy and the rule of law”. TheFoundation says Mbeki has made a huge error in his policy on Zimbabwe. The Foundation accuses thePresident of concentrating too much on the land issue and putting himself in a position where any criticismof Zimbabwe would appear to be “a sell out to white interests”.

The South African stance and its eVective role as an international voice opposing intervention andrepeating Mugabe’s line on the land issue, has also been criticised by the business community, touristoperators and others who see the Zimbabwe crisis as a major obstacle to regional economic development,foreign investment in the region as a whole and investment in and trade with individual countries.

One problem for South African policy is that criticism of President Mugabe’s policies from the UK inparticular have often seemed to concentrate on the land issue, the protection of white farmers and to havebeen too obviously pro-MDC rather than eVorts to protect the rule of law and freedom of speech per se.This has then put South Africa in the position of appearing to support such a stance if it criticises Zimbabweand backs any western sanctions or other means of putting pressure on Mugabe.

But, crucially, South Africa has failed to support the principled stand in support of democracy, the ruleof law and the general economic well-being of the region taken by Botswana and is believed by many inBotswana to have put pressure on President Mogae to tone down his public criticism of Mugabe.

Conclusion

South Africa has disappointed as a regional political/diplomatic player, failing to punch its weight inAfrica. While understandable in the years immediately following the end of apartheid, this is lessunderstandable now given Mbeki’s very public championing of Nepad and the African Renaissance.

Domestic pressure and the sensitivity of the land issue have led to a position of eVective support for theMugabe government in Zimbabwe—alienating South Africa’s friends in the West, angering those insideSouthAfrica whowant an ethical foreign policy supporting human rights and democracy and disappointingthe business community and neighbours such as Botswana and Mozambique who see Zimbabwe as anobstacle to regional economic progress.

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South Africa’s own military problems, budget cuts and ambivalent attitude to regional policy haverendered it surprisingly weak as a diplomatic and military force in its own region and sub-Saharan Africaas a whole and prevented it from taking a lead in regional or continental peacekeeping eVorts. Globally, itis in the bottom ten contributors to UN peacekeeping.

Keith Somerville is currently Training Editor (News) with the BBC World Service. He has worked as aprogramme editor, producer, reporter and documentary maker for the BBCWorld Service and BBC NewsOnline, specialising in African military and political aVairs. A long-time member of the now defunct RIIASouthernAfrica StudyGroup, he has published four books onAfrican political andmilitary issues and beena contributor to other authors’ collections on these topics and to academic journals on African aVairs. Theviews expressed in this short paper are his own and do not represent the views of the BBC.

Web sources used:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2129563.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2131914.stm

http://www.sairr.org.za/wscpstory.htx?storyID%162

http://www.hsf.org.za/focus18/editorfocus18.html

Mr Keith Somerville

Written evidence submitted by Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies

Key issues for the Committee’s inquiry include South Africa’s:

— role in the region, particularly with respect to Zimbabwe;

— engagement in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU)and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD);

— contribution to the war against terrorism.

In the 10 year’s since South Africa’s transition to democracy, the country has emerged from political andeconomic isolation to become the dominant power in the region. After five years of domestic transformationat all levels of government and society, foreign policy was placed centre-stage after ThaboMbeki’s electionto the presidency in 1999. The level of commitment, energy and resources dedicated to multilateraldiplomacy, in Africa especially, has been substantial. How long the South African Government can sustainthis policy focus, in the face of national crises of unemployment, crime and HIV/AIDS, is an importantconsideration for the ambitious plans of the African Union, SADC and NEPAD.

NEPAD, with its secretariat based near Johannesburg, has been driven by President Mbeki behind thescenes, even as it is publicly presented as a continental initiative and a subordinate programme of the AU.The success of this grand vision for Africa’s recovery has largely been as an external marketing strategy tokeep Africa on the international agenda of organizations such as the EU, the G8 and the UN. In addition,by competing for “brand recognition” with the AU, NEPAD has given momentum to the institutionaldevelopment of the AU.

Under South Africa’s leadership in 2002–03, the AU made progress towards the creation of a Peace andSecurity Council, drafting a Common African Defence and Security Policy and an African Standby Forcefor Peace Support Operations, a Pan-African Parliament and an Economic, Social and Cultural Council,amongst other changes. The Ministry of Foreign AVairs, Parliament, the Presidency and South AfricanNGOs and think tanks have been closely engaged in this process.

South Africa’s involvement in conflict resolution, including troop commitment to the DemocraticRepublic of Congo and Burundi, has made a significant diVerence to the security dilemma of Africa, wheredemand far outweighs the UN’s capacity or will to supply peacekeeping. This influence is likely to movecloser to home next year, as South Africa has been elected the incoming chair of the SADC Organ forPolitics, Defence and Security Co-operation from August 2004. The potential security structure of SADChas not yet been fully realized or implemented, since it was paralyzed by divisions between PresidentMandela and President Mugabe in the late 1990s. The current leadership troika of Mozambique, Lesothoand South Africa could finally breathe life into this forum.

The experience thus far has not been encouraging, however, in that under South Africa’s influence theSADC has yet to take a principled position on the abuse of power in Zimbabwe and another crisis in themaking, the impact of the monarchy in Swaziland on national and regional stability. The formal structuresof intergovernmental organizations in Africa have provided little more than vehicles for building solidarityin defence of the abuse of power. Leaders within the AU have also taken their cue from President Mbekion the issue of Zimbabwe.

South Africa’s kid glove handling of Zimbabwe’s governing elite has served as a reality check for manyof Africa’s development partners, in terms of their expectations of NEPAD and prospects for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism. The ANC Government has repeatedly rallied to the cause of ZANU-PF, for

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example, when the EU tried to host a follow-up meeting in Lisbon to the 2002 Cairo meeting betweenAfrican and European leaders, without inviting PresidentMugabe, or when Australia objected to PresidentMugabe’s attendance of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held in Abuja, Nigeriain December 2003.

Africa’s weak states have been both a safe haven and a stage for terrorist activities long before the eventsof 11 September 2001. For example, thousands of African lives were lost in the bombing of Americanembassies inNairobi andDar es Salaam in 1998. The South African security services have successfully actedagainst a wave of terror attacks in Cape Town in the late 1990s, linked to radical Islamic elements withinthe vigilante organization, PAGAD, and against white right-wing extremists known as the Boeremag,responsible for the Soweto bombings of October 2002. SouthAfrica’s contribution to the global war againstterrorism lies primarily in passing on this experience in intelligence-driven policing operations to theircounterparts in Tanzania, Kenya and other neighbours, for example, through the Southern AfricanRegional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and Interpol Southern Africa.

The South African Government has recently ratified the OAU Convention on the Prevention andCombating of Terrorism and has supported the AU’s eVorts to implement the Convention. Nationallegislation has been drafted to comply with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Thedraft Anti-Terrorism Bill is currently before Parliament, and has elicited rigorous public debate on itspotential to curtail freedoms of speech, association and the right to fair trial. Minutes of the public hearingsand deliberations by the Safety and Security Committee are available on the website of the ParliamentaryMonitoring Group: www.pmg.org.za

For further information, the following publications are available on the ISS website: www.iss.co.za

Cilliers, J “From Durban to Maputo: A Review of the 2003 Summit of the African Union”, ISS OccasionalPaper 76, August 2003.

Cilliers, J “Peace and Security through Good Governance: A guide to the NEPAD African Peer ReviewMechanism”, ISS Occasional Paper 70, April 2003.

Kagoro, B, Makumbe, J, Robertson, J, Bond, P, LahiV, E and Cornwall, R (ed) “Zimbabwe’s Turmoil:Problems and Prospects”, ISS Monograph 17, June 2003.

BoshoV, H and Schonteich, M “‘Volk’, Faith and Fatherland: The Security Threat Posed by the WhiteRight”, ISS Monograph 81, March 2003.

Cilliers, J and Sturman, K (eds) “Africa and Terrorism: Joining the Global Campaign”, ISS Monograph74, July 2002.

BoshoV, H, Botha, A and Schonteich, M “Fear in the City: Urban Terrorism in South Africa”, ISSMonograph 63, September 2001.

Institute for Security Studies

Written evidence submitted by Dr Greg Mills, National Director, SA Institute of International AVairs

SA-UK RELATIONS

Introduction

SA-UK relations are currently defined by four concentric issues:

— Trade and Investment Ties.

— The UK and SA Diaspora.

— The Wider African Role including NEPAD.

— Shared International Concerns.

Although this short memo will focus on the latter two areas, a number of observations will be made inconclusion with regard to trade and investment concerns and the diaspora, and in so doing will identify anumber of areas where the UKFCO and related diplomatic/cultural entities might focus their activities.

TheWider African Role

In this, both SA and Africa have focused their activities on Africa in four areas.

— First, partnership in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

— Second, political, technical and financial support for NEPAD.

— Third, aid and assistance towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

— Fourth, support for democratisation, the rule of law, economic liberalisation and management,and human rights.

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Comment

The bilateral relationship has been, in the Mbeki presidency (1999–), defined to a great extent by publicdisagreement over “what to do” with Zimbabwe. South Africa has preferred to see the crisis in its northernneighbour in terms of its colonial legacy; while the UK (especially Minister of State Peter Hain) hasemphasised the rule of law and human rights as key factors in the turn of events. While every eVort shouldbemade to distinguish bilateral relations fromwider regional andAfrican issues, such disagreements shouldnot, however, dilute the need for a more active British African diplomatic role. British diplomats have madeevery eVort not to have the wider relationship held hostage to diVerences over Zimbabwe, and this has beenachieved by the UK’s de facto withdrawal from the Zimbabwe debate. This has, however, not assisted inarriving at a resolution of the crisis, and indeed, may well have served to stress the “colonial dimension” tothe problem, which is not in British (and African democratic) interests.

Paradoxically the shift in South Africa’s foreign policy focus to become African-centric has seen a muchmore proactive SA role in regional peacekeeping (notably in Burundi and theDRCongo), oVering a numberof avenues for partnership.National security apparatuses haveweakened inAfrica because the internationalcommunity has ended military assistance, because additional spending on defence is carefully monitored byinternational organisations, and because domestic financial crises have caused a general weakening of thestate. Two types of agencies have suVered particularly during the overall decline in security: the police andintelligence agencies. Most African police forces are extremely weak and cannot combat day-to-day crime,much less be the front-line forces in combating instability. Intelligence collection is also very poor in mostAfrican countries. It is particularly hard for leaders to evaluate changing threat environments and thebreakout of armed violence often comes as a surprise to national authorities. Aiding police agencies, inparticular, so that they can fight crime, deter criminals, and be viable “first responders” to those who mighteventually threaten war is absolutely critical. More has to be done so that the African countries that arepotentially viable will actually be able to police their territories. A similar strategy would also assistintelligence agencies, particularly important in the light of the war on terror.

Finally, the ability of African countries to benefit from wider regional and continental economicintegration eVorts remains to an extent dependent on their ability to establish, negotiate and manage tariVreduction schedules, and to facilitate trade through eVective customs agencies. These are important areasfor UK aid engagement.

Shared International Concerns

These hinge around the EU-African relationship, the war on terror, the war in Iraq, the provision of moreequitable and eVective global trading and financial architecture (such as in the progress of the WTO DohaRound), and environmental issues.

Comment

The divergent positions of the South African and UK governments on the war on Iraq is illustrative that,first, the “old” African National Congress (ANC)-Labour Party ties no longer have the irreducible valuethey once might have possessed. Indeed, as the SA political leadership progresses in generational termsbeyond a core group of exiles, this sentimentality may further dissipate.

The failure of the Cancun round of trade negotiations is also a setback for SA trade policy, bothdomestically and in terms of its wider ambitions. This will remain a key objective for Pretoria, and will toa great extent shape the nature and focus of its foreign relations, notably with the G20! and the CairnsGroup where ties will likely be deepened and strengthened. This could be at the cost of a chilling in ties withthe EU over the CAP, and more emphasis will also likely be placed on concluding bilateral free tradeagreements notably with the US and Mercosur, and possibly India, Japan, China, Nigeria and Australia.However, there are shared SA/UK concerns over the liberalisation of agricultural trade, and conversely overthe CAP and the failure at Cancun. While the UK should continue to make the case for reform of the CAPwithin the EU, SA will need to take the lead on emphasising the need for reform in terms of Africandevelopment and EU-African relations.

TheCommonwealth has, since 1994, been an important body for Pretoria in terms of providing a platformfor North and South to meet on an equal footing. However, while its coherence has suVered over theZimbabwe issue, it will remain an important platform for SA not least due to President Mbeki’s widerambitions for African development.

Conclusion: Policy Recommendations

A number of policy recommendations are made in conclusion in the four identified areas:

— Trade and Investment Ties: The UK is SA’s third largest trade partner (with a total flow of R42billion in 2001 comprising R18 billion in SA imports, R22 billion in exports). There is, however,a need to encourage trade and investment ties partly by facilitating business contact, mentoringbusiness ties, and, in so doing, ameliorating the current perception of a high investor risk premium,

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which currently contributes to low investment growth in the Republic. Conversely, there has beena substantial outflow of SA capital mainly via London listings. The largest single investment in SAby UK companies has, since 1994, been around the arms deal. This will remain a controversialissue, and indeed may create a number of political problems not least those around perceptions ofenrichment associated with the oVset element of these packages.

— The UK and SA Diaspora: The importance of this group in shaping perceptions about bothcountries cannot be understated. EVorts should be made, in particular, to draw the SA expatriatesin the UK (around 350,000) into a constructive Dialogue involving both governments; and usingthe UK group in SA (around one million) as a source of information and possible avenue forpartnership with incoming businesses.

— The Wider African Role including NEPAD: NEPAD is the key policy programme for the SAgovernment. As such, a great deal has been staked on its continued roll-out and success. However,there is little doubt that it has met with resistance in much of Africa where its good governancemessage is seen as a threat in some quarters. Also, its programmes remain focused overwhelminglyon process rather than the delivery of key priorities. The UK government should identify one ortwo key areas for involvement such as providing technical assistance for trade negotiations (a keyelement of NEPAD) and in support for local policing initiatives as identified above.

— Shared International Concerns: There is a need to focus diplomatic eVorts on concludingsuccessfully the Doha Round of world trade negotiations, and in establishing tariV reductionprocedures and strategies within African countries, an absence of capability which has constrainedeVorts to create meaningful African regional economic communities.

Summary

In the nearly 10 years since South Africa’s political transition, the UK-SA relationship has normalised.Beyond the goodwill and warmth of the Mandela period (1994–99), the extent of this normalisation isarguably most evident in the degree of rhetorical disagreement around the war on Iraq and over Zimbabwe.Short of London disengaging from African issues as diYcult (yet as important in human rights terms) asZimbabwe, this normalisation trend will likely continue.

In these circumstances, the UK-SA bilateral commission (and related diplomatic eVorts) should focus ona number of key areas, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming yet another commission (of which there arean increasing number with South Africa, stretching thus its foreign policy capacity) with limited rewardsbeyond providing a framework for interaction. As a start, the bilateral commission should focus onfacilitating bilateral business opportunities, and finding ways of linking the SA diaspora residing in the UK.

Institute of International AVairs

September 2003

Written evidence submitted by Dr Anthony Lemon

I would suggest that the following issues be addressed by the inquiry:

1. South Africa’s role in Southern Africa in relation to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Western and UKfrustration concerning the reluctance of ThaboMbeki to go beyond quiet diplomacy needs to be understoodin relation to the regional dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis. South Africa has a strong motivation tomaintain stability in relations with Zimbabwe, given that a high proportion of Zimbabwean migrants go toSouth Africa and much of South Africa’s trade with the rest of the region traverses Zimbabwe. SouthAfrican reluctance to impose sanctions needs to be understood in terms of the possibility thatMugabewouldrespond by seeking to isolate South Africa within SADC, thereby gaining leverage within the region.

2. A second critical element of regional dynamics concerns the need for neighbouring countries to retaineVective working relationships with Harare. This demands understanding of the impacts of the situationon each country in the region and individual stances of each sovereign government towards Zimbabwe. InBotswana, for example, key issues that inform foreign policy towards Zimbabwe include cross-border crime,refuges, illegal immigrants, HIV/AIDS, poverty and small arms traYcking. The Botswana President, FestusMogae, has characterised the crisis in Zimbabwe as a result of a “drought of governance”, but said that“Botswana does not have the inclination or the capacity to impose [its] will on other people”.

3. The impacts of UK foreign policy in other areas, especially the Middle East, on how the UK isperceived and characterised by governments in Southern Africa needs investigation. This may be beyondthe remit of the inquiry, but arguably has a fundamental impact on the eVectiveness or otherwise of UKpolicies in the region. Specifically, it may help to explain why SADC leaders, despite the NEPAD andAfrican Union ideals of peer review, have refrained from public criticism of Zimbabwe despite mountingcriticism from theUK and otherWestern governments. UK foreign policy options are severely constrained,and the case for quiet rather than ‘megaphone’ diplomacy with governments in Southern Africa is strong.

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4. The UK-South Africa bilateral trading relationship, and the regulatory environment governing therelationship, is frequently confusing formany SouthAfrican civil servants. The Inquiry should consider howthe FCO and the High Commission could do more within South Africa to promote a better understandingof the trade competencies of both the European Union and the United Kingdom.

5. The NEPAD partnership needs a more honest and critical evaluation on behalf of the G8 and OECD,with a peer review of G8 states and the approaches and achievements of those states in relation to thepromotion of NEPAD goals. Constructive engagement in this critical area could lead to improvedperceptions of Western governments, which could (gradually) give them more influence in promoting goodgovernance and regional stability.

Anthony Lemon

Mansfield College, Oxford

Written evidence submitted by Save the Children UK

SOUTH AFRICA

Summary

1.1 The major obstacle to fulfilling South Africa’s promise, especially for some 11 million poor childrenof whom 3% are living in child headed households, is the policy implementation gap on socio-economicissues. Save the Children believes that a concerted eVort by government, donors and civil society is neededto close this policy implementation gap, especially at district level on tackling child poverty andHIV/AIDS.There is a huge need for capacity building measures with governmental and non-governmentalorganisations and their human resource on project management and co-ordination functions to ensureeVective delivery of assistance to vulnerable children in desperate need of support in the communities wherethey live.

1.2 South Africa has one of themost progressive human rights Constitutions in the world. In the 10 yearsof transformation immense strides have been made towards a more equitable welfare system such asintroducing child support grants, unlike other countries with similar wealth in Africa. However the legacyof apartheid remains apparent in the deepening disparities of wealth and opportunities between racialgroups and urban and rural areas since 1994. In South Africa one in five live on less than $1 a day and onein three adults are unemployed. Poverty is the dominant reality for 22 million South Africans, of whom atleast 11million are children. The extent of poverty is itself undermining social service delivery, utility servicesare rolled back by disconnections due to lack of income security.

1.3 In South Africa Save the Children works with government and NGOs on addressing the needs ofvulnerable children, especially on mitigating the impacts of HIV/AIDS. For example In ThaboMofutsanyana district of Free State SC is developing community support for children and families aVectedby HIV/AIDS. Working with the District Aids Council we are helping to co-ordinate and enhancegovernment initiatives at local level, helping children access their entitlement to government grants anddeveloping community support groups to identify and assist orphans and vulnerable children. Using thisexperience SC is engaging with policy makers at provincial and national level on improved service deliveryand replicating eVective community assistance to vulnerable children.

Poverty Alleviation and Donor Response

2. South Africa does not have a co-ordinated and integrated poverty reduction strategy. The State hasrelied heavily on social assistance provisioning as its primary response to child poverty. Indeed some 85%of the Department of Social Development budget is allocated to social assistance grants, and only 15% topoverty alleviation programmes. The Interventions appear uncoordinated and fragmented and there hasbeen limited evaluation to determine impact and improve eVectiveness of such poverty alleviationprogrammes.

2.1 South Africa is categorised as a middle income country. DfID’s development policy for South Africaand for SouthAfrica within the southernAfrican region is aimed at policy development and implementationwith government, with a focus on developing eVective national poverty reduction and employmentstrategies and at a regional level—pro-poor regional trade agreements. DfID seeks broad rangingengagement on poverty rather than a highly focused programme of sector specific interventions. It is notclear how DfID views the role of South Africa within the southern africa region as a whole.

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The Committee could enquire:(a) How is DfIDmeasuring success of this approach in terms of poverty reduction in South Africa?(b) How is DfID helping the Government of South Africa prioritise and develop a national poverty

alleviation strategy?(c) What pro-poor outputs have resulted from DfID intervention or support to regional trade

negotiations?

Social SecurityMeasures for Children

3. The Social Assistance Act and Regulations govern the provisioning of social security grants forchildren. Non-contributory cash transfers aimed at children and “families” include the Child Care Grantwhich goes to the primary care giver of the child; the Child Disability Grant for severely disabled childrenrequiring home care and the Foster Care Grant. There have been impressive increases in the uptake of theCCG and a very welcome extension of this grant to children under 14 years. Despite this only 2.2 millionof the 14.3 million children living in poverty in 2002 were receiving the CCG and it does not meet the needsof children between 14 and 18 years old.

There are several legislative processes in place concerning child welfare, of which the following remainthe most significant and unresolved to date:

3.1 The Taylor report (Consolidated Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive SocialSecurity System for South Africa) released in March 2002 argues for a combined approach to improvingincome, asset security and services security at household level, through a range of measures including arevenue replacement strategy and extending the existing government welfare provision system of grants tothe elderly, disabled and children. The Committee has also made recommendations for improving access togrants for children without adult caregivers, such as those living in child headed households. Mostsignificantly, it estimates that a grant of R100 (Basic IncomeGrant) to all South Africans including childrenwould close the poverty gap by 70%. The Government of South Africa has yet to formally respond to theReport’s recommendations.

3.2 In October 2002 the review of all child-related law by the South African Law Commission resultingin the draft Children’s Bill was completed. The Children’s Bill, gazetted on 19 August 2003, when passed,will replace the 1983 Child Care Act and will regulate the child care system. However since formerconsultations the Bill has undergone many changes resulting in a reduction on essential social securitymeasures for children, the scrapping of provisions for children in especially diYcult circumstances and theremoval of local authorities duties to monitor and address the needs of children. Provision of free educationand health services for children unable to live at home have also been scrapped and the proposed children’scourt structure has been downgraded.

The Committee could enquire:(a) When will the Government of South Africa formally respond to the Taylor Report

recommendations?(b) Will the Government of South Africa give urgent priority to consulting other government

departments and NGOs each of whom provide the bulk of services to children, on the gazettedChildren’s Bill?

HIV/AIDS

4. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is one of South Africa’s biggest challenges. The entire demographic andsocial structure of South Africa is rapidly changing as a result of HIV/AIDS. Estimates of the currentnumber of orphans varies from 885,000 down to 660,000. In 2010 the figure is estimated to rise to more than1.7 million. A study by the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa in 2002 found that 13% ofchildren aged 2–14 years had lost one or both parents. In addition 3% of households were found to bechild headed.

4.1 The National Integrated Plan for children infected and aVected by HIV/AIDS was developed earlyin 2000, giving eVect to a unique collaboration between three government departments—Education, Healthand Social Development. Its stated aim is to ensure access to an appropriate and eVective integrated systemof prevention, care and support services for children infected and aVected by HIV/AIDS. It encapsulates avery specific set of activities on lifeskills education, home based care including voluntary counselling andtesting and poverty relief. The main funding mechanism is by conditional grants to the provinces. There is astrong child rightsmovement in the country yet children and young people are not given the space to activelyparticipate in policy decisions at all levels. This will become vital as child headed households become oneof the significant family units in the economy.

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4.2 Some 2.6 million women of child bearing age (15–49 years) are HIV positive. The recent Departmentof Health annual antenatal seroprevalence survey estimated 90,000 infants contracted HIV from theirmothers in 2002.Women continue to be the hardest hit population group, approximately 34.5% of pregnantwomen between 25 and 29 in South Africa were HIV positive in 2002. HIV transmission from mother tochild can be reduced substantially through mother and child taking anti-retroviral treatment and ensuringthat the mother exclusively breastfeeds or uses infant formula milk. Although South Africa has acontroversial history of delaying access to anti-retrovirals, recent policy to make PMTCT (Prevention ofMother to Child Treatment) and HIV anti-retrovirals available to all is to be welcomed. However to whatextent the government health and social welfare services can meet this demand is of serious concern. To givean example a district clinic in Limpopo province serving some 30,000 population had just four nevirapinetablets for last year.

The Committee could enquire:(a) Building on commitments made by the Government of South Africa at the Windhoek Orphan

andVulnerableChildrenMeeting inNovember 2002, will theGovernment support and resourcethe Department of Social Development to take a lead on developing a National Orphan Policy?

(b) Will the Government of South Africa create a mechanism to inform stakeholders of targets andprogress against the National Integrated Plan for Children aVected by HIV/AIDS, especiallyensuring that Districts can engage with the NIP?

(c) What provision is the Government of South Africa making to ensure PMTCT treatment can bemade available through all district clinics?

5. South Africa in the Regional Food Crisis

South Africa occupies a crucial position in influencing the politics and economy of the southern Africaregion. During the course of the current food crisis South Africa has been a centre for the co-ordination ofthe humanitarian response, and the grain surplus that the country generates is an important source of bothprivate sector and humanitarian relief cross border flows.

South Africa should be central to any regional analysis of food security, both in terms of tracking thecommercial flows of staple food surpluses out of the country and in recognising the food needs that existwithin the country. The eVorts that have gone into understanding and analysing vulnerability in othercountries in the region need to be replicated in South Africa and included in the regional early warningsystem.

5.1 Food security is a growing concern in South Africa households, with approximately 30% of thecountry’s population experiencing food insecurity. Price stability is fundamental to food security. Foodinsecure households are risk-averse households; risk-averse households do notmake the investments neededto move beyond subsistence. SADC has a role to play that involves the state and the private sector in theregulation of staple food markets. Though it is not clear what sorts of systems might be able to deliver bothprice stability at appropriate levels, and the coordination and protection needed to nurture fragile marketdevelopment, appropriate institutions need to be put in place to ensure that suYcient maize is available atprices which the poor can aVord.

5.2 HIV/AIDS itself is exacerbating food security in South Africa and in the region as a whole, ashouseholds aVected by HIV face diYculties in producing or purchasing their food needs. Food insecurityand poor nutrition accelerates AIDS—thereby creating a vicious cycle.

The Committee could enquire:(a) What plans theGovernment of SouthAfrica is putting in place to address food security amongst

poor communities?(b) What is DfID doing to ensure that agriculture is not neglected by governments in southern

Africa?(c) How will DfID ensure that South Africa is included in regional vulnerability analysis, both

within SADC and the UN, so that both South African grain surpluses and relief requirementscan be tracked.

Impact of NEPAD and G8 Action Plan

6. The role of South Africa’s leadership is setting up NEPAD is exemplary, and South Africa remainsthe major driving force in this initiative. The move to agreeing a voluntary peer review systems acrossgovernments is to be welcomed and supported. To what extent NEPAD can progress the tenets of goodgovernance, transparency and accountability within the inclusive structures of the African Union remainsto be seen.

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6.1 NEPAD requests for additional aid, removal of agricultural tarriVs and debt relief are being met withdemands from the G8 for accountable governance and macro-economic reform in accordance with the neo-liberal agenda. There is a danger that setbacks on the part of African countries in terms of governance andmacro-economic reform is leading to excuses by rich countries not to ensure that vital policy changes forAfrican development aremet. TheWSSDandCancun trade talks highlight a continued disjuncture betweenAfrican and “northern” priorities and may further marginalise prospects for large scale growth in Africanagriculture sector.

6.2 Whilst NEPAD, especially through its South Africa representation, is active on the internationalstage, there is a need for it to engagemore with local civil society interests, and particularly those of children.Given some 40% of the populaton of Africa is under 18 years of age, and in parts of Africa hit by the HIVepidemic this proportion is growing, the need forNEPAD to understand the challenges facing young peoplein Africa is vital.

6.3 African leaders could build on the start made at the March 2003 NEPAD Civil Society Forum onBuilding Stronger Partnerships with Civil Society and support practical measures to implement the Forum’srecommendations, with a particular focus on consultation with young people. The African YouthParliament convened in March 2003 called for youth to be involved in NEPAD.

The Committee could enquire:(a) What initiatives have been taken by Nepad since March this year to involve and consult young

people, particularly young people from poor communities.(b) In terms of G8 and Nepad engagement the Committee could inquire as to what progress has

been made on the NEPAD conflict prevention and management and reconciliation initiative.

Save the Children UK

October 2003

Written evidence submitted by VisitBritain

1. VisitBritain

1.1 VisitBritian is pleased to submit a memorandum to the Committee as part of the inquiry intoSouth Africa.

1.2 VisitBritain was launched in April 2003 and is formed out of the merger of the British TouristAuthority and the English Tourism Council. VisitBritain is a Non-Departmental Public Body, sponsoredby the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and is accountable to the UK Parliament, the ScottishParliament and the National Assembly for Wales. VisitBritain has two principal roles; to promote Britainas a tourist destination overseas, and to promote England as a tourist destination within Britain to thedomestic market. VisitBritain has oYces and marketing teams based in 27 countries throughout the world;our oYce in South Africa is in Johannesburg.

2. The South African TravelMarket to Britain

2.1 South Africa continues to be the dominant force politically and economically in sub-Saharan Africaand is still playing a leading role in the new African Union after providing the inaugural Presidency.

2.2 The country’s economy is the strongest in Africa although growth at 1.5% (year on year, quarter 12003) fell well short of the 3.4% target. Steady progress had beenmade as a result of the government’s carefuleconomicmanagement, which also sought to achieve an inflation target of between 3–6%by the end of 2002.Inflation was almost halved to 7.7% in the six months to May 2003, paving the way for interest rate cuts of2,5% to 14.5% by July with a further 1% cut in September. The Rand has continued to strengthen in 2003,steadying below 12 to the pound by August. The Rand’s weakness had inevitably aVected South Africans’purchasing power in Britain, but only in 2002 did it reverse the steady growth in South Africans’ travel toand expenditure in Britain, which had persisted despite FMD and 9/11 in 2001.

3. Travel and Tourism Trends

3.1 The trend for South Africans to travel outside of South Africa in ever increasing numbers wasresumed (after a drop in 2001 due largely to political unrest in the region) in 2002 when 5.8 million SouthAfrican residents travelled outside South Africa compared with 3.7 million in 2001.

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3.2 In recent years, Europe has lost market share to North America, Asia and Middle East as newdestinations have established themselves in the emerging new South Africa. There are now 16 NationalTourist OYces in South Africa compared to nine in 1992. Britain’s main competitors are the USA,Australia, Germany and France.

4. The TravelMarket to Britain

4.1 According to Statistics South Africa, Britain accounts for 39% of all overseas departures (ie thoseoutside Africa) by South Africans in 2002, and 78% of their departures to Europe. This makes Britain byfar the most popular long-haul destination for South Africans, followed by the USA, Australia, Germanyand France. Our market share has been challenged in recent years as new destinations have come on stream,but Britain has so far maintained its lead.

4.2 Domestic travel remains a powerful competitor, despite the strengthening of the Rand againstSterling, theEuro and theUSdollar, as development of the domestic product continues andmarketing eVortis maintained.

4.3 Just under one-half of South African visitors to Britain come from the province of Gauteng, the hubof the South African economy. A significant part of the population lives in Gauteng and this is also wherethe travel trade is most heavily concentrated. The Cape Town and Port Elizabeth areas account for justunder one-third of traYc and the Durban area about 16%.

4.4 In 2002, 276,000 South Africans visited Britain, spending £198 million. Average spend per visit onlydropped 2.5% to £713.60 in spite of the much weakened Rand. Source: International Passenger Survey,OYce for National Statistics (IPS) 2002.

4.5 For many young South Africans, a working holiday to Britain is now seen as an essential part of thegrowing-up process. This trend is creating a new Visiting Friends and Relatives (VFR) market as theirfriends and relatives—often themselves first-time visitors—go to Britain to visit them. The number of SouthAfricans taking working holidays in Britain is likely to increase from September 2003 as regulations forapplicants are relaxed, increasing the potential for resulting VFR traYc.

4.6 Business travel by South Africans to Britain is strong, as Britain remains a major trading partner.This segment accounted for 20% of South African visits to Britain in 2002 and 29% of their expenditure.

4.7 South Africans’ average length of stay has grown from 14.4 days in 2000 to 18.5 days in 2002, 10 dayslonger than world average, as has the incidence of Visiting Friends and Relatives (VFR) as a means ofmaking a holiday aVordable.

4.8 South Africans’ average spend per stay of £713.60 in 2002 was substantially (45%) greater than worldaverage of £489.50, but was £23 down on 2001 due to the weak Rand. (In Rand terms, average spend bySouth Africans was up by 23%). The Rand recovery and stability in 2003 (25% up year on year in August03) shouldmore thanmake good the sterling deficit of 02, but VisitBritain will need to maintain its emphasison Britain’s aVordability. This is an opportunity for focusing on good value products, particularly out ofLondon which will further enhance the regional spread of South Africans’ visits.

4.9 The South African is also adventurous and travels around Britain more than the average overseasvisitor. Scotland and Wales have both become popular destinations for South Africans in recent years. 9%visited Scotland (8% nights) and 3% visited Wales (1% nights) in 2002.

4.10 The South African market to Britain has proved highly resilient, with a steady increase in spend pervisit to Britain in Rand terms since 1998. The market is also resilient in times of crisis, one of only twoVisitBritain markets to show visits growth in 2001despite the globally-publicised outbreak of Foot andMouth Disease in the UK and the eVects on international travel of the events of 11 September. With theaftermath of war in Iraq and terrorist threats a persistent reality, this resilience oVers VisitBritain a relativelylow risk scenario in SouthAfrica. This, coupledwith the stronger, stable Randwill provide VisitBritain withan opportunity to use Customer Relationship Management, focusing on a good value message, to rekindlethe interest of “frustrated” visitors lost to the exchange rate in 2002.

5. Latest figures (International Passenger Survey: 2002)

South Africa 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Visits (000) 262 284 300 304 319 276Nights (000) 4,542 4,587 4,971 4,381 5,482 5,100Spend £ million 202 216 257 215 237 198

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6. Examples ofMarketing Activity Undertaken in South Africa

6.1 January, June, October 2003Destination Britain—Beginners TRAVEL AGENT TRAININGInside Britain—Advanced TRAVEL AGENT TRAINING

VisitBritain organises six training sessions annually for tour operator and retail travel agency staV fromall areas of South Africa. The sessions are implemented to address a shortfall in destination awarenesstraining within the industry. Our primary aim is to increase the agents’ knowledge of Britain’s touristproduct, boost their confidence in selling Britain and ultimately, increase their sales of British products.Training modules feature subjects ranging from transportation to and within Britain, detailed productpresentations on London, Scotland, Wales and regions of England, advice for working holidays visaapplicants and the importance and value of business travel. All training sessions involve partnerpresentations by eg. airlines, car hire operators and other tourism related services and public diplomacypartners. In 2002 almost 250 agents attended the sessions. The benefits to Britain, identified by independentresearch conducted by A C Nielsen, are that on average, each consultant attending the courses generatedan additional 28 clients to Britain, with a total spend of £5 million.

6.2 July 2003Robbie Williams Promotion—Radio/Internet CampaignPartners: EMI, 5FM (national youth radio station), Virgin Atlantic Airways

Visitbritain planned and executed a national radio competition with 5FM (1.5 million listeners 14–30years old) for two winners to see Robbie Williams at one of his Knebworth Park concerts in the UK.VisitBritain acted as the catalyst to drive the competition to the benefit of both tourism and non-tourismpartners within South Africa. The benefit to tourism partners is still yet to be fully realised, but our airlinepartner Virgin Atlantic Airways’ objectives was to increase its share of sales of economy tickets locally inSouth Africa. The target audience of listeners at 5FM fit ideally with their objectives. EMI, the local musicdistributors of Robbie Williams material throughout South Africa paid for flighting competitionadvertisements and provided tickets for the concert, as well as consolation prizes for runners up. They alsoused the competition to drive sales of the Robbie Williams “Escapology” album, which did in fact improveits chart (sales) position during this period of awareness. 5FM also promoted visitbritain.com as thecompetition entrymechanism.Over 5,000 entries were received during the three days of the competition andsubstantially increased VisitBritain’s youth database.

6.3 Ongoing Activity 2003Public Diplomacy PromotionsPartners: British High CommissionVISA PACKS

VisitBritain: With the co-operation of the British High Commission, a VisitBritain information pack isdistributed to all successful applicants forWorking Holiday Visas, currently being issued at a rate of 15,000per annum. The pack encourages the young South Africans to visit Scotland, Wales and the regions ofEngland while they are in Britain and to invite their friends and relatives in South Africa to visit them inBritain during their stay.

7. Collaboration with the British High Commission

VisitBritian and our predecessor body, the British Tourist Authority, have enjoyed and continue to enjoygood working links with the British High Commission, the Consuls-General and the other UK publicdiplomacy partners in South Africa. We would like to place on record our particular appreciation of thecurrent HM High Commissioner, Ann Grant. The High Commissioner is widely regarded in South Africaas a “breath of fresh air”, and her style, exceptional political contacts and pro-active networking haveproved to be exceptionally useful for furthering VisitBritain’s (and BTA’s) marketing opportunities.

VisitBritain

September 2003

Written evidence submitted by Cofesa (Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa)

I only received notice of your inquiry this morning. Please accept my memorandum.

Relations with the UK is of the utmost importance for us and your inquiry is necessary and highlyappreciated.

Cofesa was registered at the Department of Labour as Confederation of Employers of Southern Africaon 6 November 1990. Presently we assist our 4,000 employer members with all aspects of labour relations-employment contracts, disciplinary hearings, conciliations, arbitrations, court cases, union negotiations etc.(www.cofesa.co.za)

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In 1990 South Africa had 10.8 million job opportunities. Today only 4.6 million jobs are left while morethan 300,000 people enter the job market every year. This is a result of rigid labour legislation. The resultis 60% unemployment, rampant crime levels and socio economic problems including HIV Aids.

We actively support the African Economic Renaissance vision of president Thabo Mbeki. To realise thisvision we need to create more entrepreneurs. We did extensive research on the establishment ofentrepreneurs and actively promote entrepreneurs. We presented papers at various conferences on thissubject in (Stockholm, Malaysia, Dublin and Grenoble).

Research indicated that their production is between 60% and 300% better than that of employees.

At the recent session of the ILO, South African trade union representatives launched a campaign toextend the definition of “employee” to include dependent contractors.

This will seriously aVect the establishment of entrepreneurs, micro enterprises and incubators.

Our Minister of Labour, Mdladlana and trade union spokesmen launched this campaign.

If this campaign succeeds it will stop development in many Third World countries and will harm theAfrican Economic Renaissance.

It will be appreciated if you will take this up at the international forums to make the development ofentrepreneurs a priority.

Malaysia appointed a minister for entrepreneurship. We need your support for the establishment of aminister of entrepreneurship in the RSA and in every state in Africa.

Our countrywide network of advisors established more than 1.5 million micro enterprises forentrepreneurs in support of government policy of black empowerment and our policy to establish microenterprises.

For many years the contract between parties determined the nature of the relationship between them.

In 2002 our Parliament (on initiative of the Department of Labour) added clause 200A to the LabourRelations Act. The amendment is in the form of a presumption to regard contractors as “employees”.

“200A Presumption as to who is employee:

(1) Until the contrary is proved, a person who works for, or renders services to, any other person ispresumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an employee, if any one or more of the followingfactors are present:

(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another person;

(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person;

(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that organisation;

(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month overthe last three months;

(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or rendersservices;

(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other;

(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any person who earns in excess of the amount determined by theMinister.

(3) If a proposed or existing work arrangement involves persons who earn amounts equal to or below theamounts determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act,any of the contracting parties may approach the Commission for an advisory award on whether the personinvolved in the arrangement is an employee.

NEDLAC (a national forum of government, labour and employers) must prepare and issue a Code ofGood Practice that sets out guidelines for determining whether persons, including those who earn in excessof the amount determined in subsection (2) are employees”.

Cofesa is not represented on NEDLAC and was not invited to the ILO.

Our legislationsmust be interpreted 1(b) to give eVect to obligations incurred by theRepublic as amemberstate of the International Labour Organisation and in terms of our Constitution section 27 which is theChapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution entrenches the following rights:

(1) Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices.

(2) (2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall have the rightto form and join employers’ organisations.

(3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively.

(4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining.

(5) Employers’ recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not beimpaired . . .

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Section 3 of the LRA provides for the interpretation of this Act Section c: in compliance with the publicinternational law obligations of the Republic. (including the Convention on Freedom of Association).

This presumption violates a number of our constitutional rights:

1. Equality—people are regarded as employees and not as contractors/entrepreneurs and thereforemiss the opportunity to be developed as entrepreneurs who are equal in status. Employees areregarded as subordinate persons who are under supervision.

2. Freedom of association: Our freedom of association is curtailed since we cannot recruit thesepresumed employees as members.

3. The concept of a presumption is unfair and unconstitutional in itself.

4. Freedom of trade: Section 22 provides: “Every citizen has the right to choose their trade,occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or professionmay be regulatedby law”. In terms of the presumption, the contractors are now presumed as employees withouttheir choice.

5. Persons contracting with these presumed employees are unfairly presumed “employers”. They aresuddenly liable to pay minimum wages, (catch up with arrear payments), leave, sick leave, familyresponsibility leave, maternity leave, etc. Compliance orders and court orders may be issuedagainst them.

6. This presumption discriminates against new entrants, unskilled, untrained, inexperienced peoplewho are excluded from the labour market and excluded from doing contract work.

7. The presumption jeopardises our governments’ policy and eVorts to empower the disadvantaged,to promote micro enterprises, entrepreneurs and to create opportunities. Our Department ofTrade and Industry and of Finance have projects in place to promote micro enterprises.

It is important that your government support Mr Trevor Manual, Minister of Finance, and Mr AlecErvin, Minister of Trade and Industry to stop this campaign against contractors and entrepreneurs.

With your support Mr Manuel will be able to convince the Minister of Labour to discontinue thecampaign.

Strategy

We are doing our utmost to protect these entrepreneurs by helping them with the contracts and with theimplementation of the concept of entrepreneurs.

Some bargaining councils persecute these entrepreneurs. We need a strong independent lobby to curbthese campaigns and to focus on the establishment of entrepreneurs.

PS: The ILO debate is to be seen on www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc91/records.htm

Our Australian friends summarised this issue on their website www.contractworld.com.au

Hein van der WaltCofesa (Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa)

October 2003

Written evidence submitted by Professor Gerrit Olivier

Professor Extraordinary, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa andDirector, Centre for European Studies, RAU University, Johannesburg, South Africa.

I will not try to assess UK foreign policy on specific SA issues in this brief memorandum. Rather I willrestrict my input to some broad comments on the intellectual, political and strategic framework that seemto guide UK foreign policy towards SA. Particular aspects I will mention include UK foreign policy styleand posture, quality of diplomacy and diplomatic strategy and tactics in the context of its bilateral relationswith South Africa. I will also make some introductory comments on the unique SA foreign policy milieuand how it may influence UK diplomacy.

1. Among western countries, the present SA government seems most comfortable with the UK.Historical, cultural and economic relations mainly account for this attitude. Although this is a plus factorfrom theUKpoint of view, the impact of these factors are declining and the convergence of interests betweenthe UK and SA have narrowed since the new beginning in 1994. Presently the relationship can becharacterized as friendly and cordial rather than special or close, competitive rather than co-operative.Economic interdependence has become main determinant of continuing amicable bilateral relations,replacing erstwhile sentimental or emotional determinants. However, in this interdependent relationship SAis the more vulnerable one, a situation which UK diplomacy has been unable to exploit meaningfully.

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2. In general, UK influence on SA foreign policy decisions is limited and even declining. South Africa’sforeign policy priorities these days are guided more by ideological interests and predilections than byobjective interests measured in the concrete terms of national welfare and security. It is a case of precedenceof “permanent friends” over “permanent interests”; it is an uneasy mix between friends and interests andidealism and pragmatism. Solidarity politics play a major role as confirmed by SA’s stance on thecatastrophe in Zimbabwe, its refusal to confront president Robert Mugabe.

3. President Thabo Mbeki’s role perception as champion of Third World causes and Prime MinisterTony Blair’s own philosophy and public stance on Africa and poverty, could be used as basis for developinga more productive partnership that could also spill over into other areas. Blair could use his leverage andperhaps leanmore strongly onMbeki to deliver on human rights and good government [Nepad Peer ReviewMechanism] in Africa in return for his promotion of Nepad in the EU and G8 context.

4. It has become diYcult to influence SA foreign policy decisions by way of orthodox diplomacy. Someof the reasons are the decline in the quality of South African professional diplomacy, with the exception ofMbeki’s own role of course. Professional diplomats play a minimal role in the policy-making process andthey are, generally speaking, not eVective brokers of policy or influence in their country of accreditation andat home they have but limited access to the higher echelons of government. This malaise is partially beingcompensated by the fact that Mbeki and senior oYcials in the presidency’s inner circles have all butmonopolized foreign policy; Mbeki and the Foreign Minister S. Dlamini-Zuma are personally close, butdue to her diplomatic incompetence and lack of gravitas , her role ismainly ceremonial and supportive ratherthan creative and innovative. Foreign policy on important issues can only be influenced by way of directaccess to Mbeki, perhaps using ministers like Zuma as messengers, or by way of access through influentialworld business leaders. This calls for a revise of UK diplomatic tactics in regard to SA, as it seems that theHigh Commission mainly engage bureaucrats as interlocutors.

5. The question is, given the above parameters or constraints, how could UK diplomacy towards SA bemore eVective [ie maximise beneficial relations]? Is there any scope for improvement? The UK HighCommissioner in Pretoria generally keeps a low profile, and is mostly invisible to the public eye perspective.Prudent, inobtrusive, low profile, absence of presence and leadership, are terms one could use to characterisecontemporary UK diplomacy in SA. This characterization seems to confirm a resignation on the part of theUK to loss of influence or inability to make any diVerence in political decision-making process in SA. It is,of course, not an uncommon for diplomaticmissions these days tomake prudence the lode star of diplomaticexercises. They are afraid to “rock the boat” and, therefore, away in the background so to speak. It couldbe Whitehall’s brief to the local HC to behave in this way. If so, the HC’s diplomatic task in SA is basicallyto maintain a “holding action” with minimalism the guideline.

6. Obviously, as Zimbabwe has demonstrated theUK’s experiment with “hard diplomacy” did not work.“Soft diplomacy” seems the better option, but this strategy could also become an alibi for practically doingnothing.Minimalism is not necessarily the only strategy one can follow under the heading of soft diplomacy.However, eVectiveness depends mainly on the quality of diplomacy and the eVective use and orchestrationof the array of instruments of soft or subtle diplomacy. The UK have ample soft diplomacy instruments toits disposal, but fail to apply them or orchestrate them in an eVective manner. The big issues of SA politics[and elsewhere in Africa], domestic as well as foreign, seem to be immune to UK influence. Here I think ofSA government policy on Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS policy, criminality, unemployment, corruption, inabilityto create wealth to combat unemployment and poverty, and the obvious flaws in the NEPAD initiative. Ofcourse, it is well understood that the HC cannot interfere in SA domestic aVairs. But for a major countrylike the UK to punch so far below its weight in the SA context is diYcult to justify. In the last days ofapartheid the UK had an ambassador [Renwick] in Pretoria who understood the influence of his high oYceand achieved remarkable results. At the same time he was highly respected by the government of that time.

7. The UK has to its disposal an array of influential bilateral as well as multilateral instruments[Commonwealth, UN and EU] of foreign policy. Bilateral action could be supported or augmented bymultilateral action and vice versa. The question is how these instruments could be combined and applied tothe best eVect [ie to enhance as far as possible diplomatic influence, to promote economic/commercialinterests and to maximise good relations in general].

8. Some suggestions:

(a) In dealing with South Africa UK policy makers and diplomats should, as far as possible,distinguish between sensitive political and moral issues on the one hand, and hard economic andstrategic interests on the other hand, and pursue diVerent strategies and tactics in each case. Onpolitical/moral issues the UK should avoid acting as a lone crusader because of the risk of beingisolated. Preferably the UK should assume a more high profile leadership role [in regard to Southand Southern African matters such as human rights, good governance, rule of law, etc] inmultilateral organizations, particularly the UN, the Commonwealth, and the EU.

(b) On economic and strategic issues a multidisciplinary or eclectic approach could be followed in aneVort to intensify and diversify diplomatic eVorts, inter alia by: reaching out more purposefully tocertain non-governmental sectors in South African Society by way of developing greater contactand rapport with leadership [elite elements] in the private sector [business, academia, science,culture]; heightening the UK profile in the media; participating in seminars and conferences on

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topical issues to put across the UK point of view [I cannot recall having seen any newspaper ormagazine article or heard radio or TV commentary by theUKHigh Commission the last five yearsor so]; issue a regular newsletter and circulate press statements; develop rapport with bright post-graduate university students and research institutions; informing the public generally moresystematically on the present and past UK ties with South Africa; informing South Africans onUK role in global matters such as the UN, the G8, the EU, and issues like globalisation, ThirdWorld poverty, the north/south divide, terrorism, trade patterns, etc.

(c) The lack of a public debate on issues aVecting both theUK and SA is rather glaring. There should,therefore, be a greater qualitative dimension in the bilateral relationship. Also the UK’s economicdiplomacy in South Africa should be beefed up and rendered more active and more engaged.

(d) Alternatively, the present low-risk, minimalist, reactive, holding action could be maintained.Then, of course, UK image will become increasingly remote on the SouthAfrican radar screen andits role and status will continue to decline and perhaps wither away.

Gerrit Olivier, Pretoria

October 2003

Written evidence submitted by the Campaign Against Arms Trade

1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) is working for the reduction and ultimate abolition ofthe international arms trade, together with progressive demilitarisation within arms-producing countries.Recognising that its aims will not happen overnight, CAAT’s campaigns often focus on particular countriesor deals. One of the latter is the huge deal between European military companies and South Africa.

2. It is for many reasons in the interest of the United Kingdom that the Republic of South Africa shouldbe stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous. It is therefore rather surprising that the Committee’sagenda appears to omit consideration of two major impediments to these objectives: the HIV/AIDSepidemic and the diversion of South Africa’s resources from health and other developmental programmesto military expenditure.

Resources Needed to Tackle HIV/AIDS

3. HIV/AIDS in South Africa is not only a human tragedy of huge proportions but a grave blow to thecountry’s economic prospects, in that it kills or incapacitates large numbers of people in their mostproductive years and burdens it with very many sick or orphaned children. Whereas Uganda, one of theoriginally worst aVected countries, has succeeded in halving the rate of infection, the government of SouthAfrica has been notoriously slow to take eVective action, which would include the provision of drugs,especially those which inhibit the transmission of the virus to the unborn, the distribution of free condomsand a massive campaign of public information.

4. The South African government has undoubtedly been badly advised about the nature and causes ofthe disease; but one main reason why it accepted that advice and has only reluctantly changed course is thevery high cost of the necessary measures. It is all the more regrettable that it should have embarked on aprogramme of expensive arms procurement from UK and other European suppliers. The UK governmentmay not be able to domuch about HIV/AIDS, but it can and should refrain from encouraging South Africato spend large sums of desperately needed money on irrelevant and unnecessary purchases. South Africa isof course a sovereign democracy which must set its own priorities, but it should be allowed to do so withoutexternal, self-interested persuasions and inducements.

The Arms Deal

5. In 1994 the incoming South African government inherited a military budget of about R10 billion ayear (then worth about £1 billion). For some years this was held steady, but in 2001 projections forecastexpenditure of R17.667 billion in 2003–04. If realised, this would represent an annual increase of 15%, ofwhich only one-third would be due to inflation. By contrast the health budget would go up by only 6%annum.

6. The actual budget for 2003–04 was R20.05 billion. Of this, R8.844 billion was allotted to a “SpecialDefence Account”, much the greater part of which was devoted to a package of arms purchases from theUK and other European countries. When the package was negotiated in 1999 it was priced at R30 billion,or £3 billion, but by 1993 the estimated cost had risen to R52 billion, spread over 14 years. In 2003–04 theprogrammewould cost the South African taxpayer R3.9 billion—nearly 12 times as much as would be spenton combating HIV/AIDS.

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7. The 1999 deal comprised the following items:

four frigates and three submarines to be supplied by German shipbuilding consortia forR11.2 billion;

28 Gripen fighter aircraft from the Anglo-Swedish company SAAB for R10.875 billion;

24 Hawk lead-in trainers from BAE Systems for R4.728 billion;

four Super Lynx naval helicopters from the UK company GKNWestland for R0.787 billion;

40 utility helicopters from the Italian Agusta company (in which GKNWestland has an interest)for R2.168 billion.

8. No persuasive military case has been made for these purchases, apart from the utility helicopters.South Africa has no enemies and there is no power within thousands of miles that could do it harm. Itsmilitary needs, by common consent, are for border control and possibly regional peace-keeping operations.These activities call for light weapons, transport, radio, not state-of-the-art fighters or large warships. Butthe Army’s requirements were deferred from the original package, and the follow-up package now underconsideration focuses on armoured fighting vehicles, including 95 main battle tanks (to be deployed againstwhat opposition?) and ground-to-air defence systems (to shoot down what enemy aircraft?).

9. UK companies, mainly BAESystems, stand to receive a little over £1 billion from the contracts alreadysigned: £300 million from the Hawk sales, about £700 million from a half share of the Gripen sales, and £78million from the Lynx helicopters. In addition, Alvis plc (now the owners of Vickers), having acquired a75% stake in the SouthAfrican armoured-vehicle makerOMC, is well placed to secure the prospective orderfor tanks; and it is likely that the air-defence system will be built round the Starstreak missile, manufacturedby Thales in its Belfast plant.

UK Government Promotion

10. None of these present and future orders would have been possible without the support of the UKgovernment.Ministers like to present their role in arms-trading as amerely permissive one; they issue exportlicences when there is no compelling reason not to. In reality, however, the Government plays a much moreactive part than that. In addition to the work of the Defence Export Services Organisation, there is thesupport given to arms contracts by the Export Credits Guarantee Department. The ECGDAnnual Reportfor 2000–01, listing guarantees issued during the year, shows that the trainer/fighter aircraft for SouthAfricawere covered for £1,679.9 million. This is 49% of the total for all the guarantees issued in that financial year.Although there is no oYcial confirmation, the amount of the cover seems to indicate it covers all 52 aircraft.

11. The arms deal was at first strongly resisted by the South African Treasury, but it was won over in partby exceptionally favourable financial terms. Not only are payments to be spread over 14 years, but they arebeing financed by loans from European banks, mainly Barclays and Commerzbank; and thanks to theECGD cover Barclays has been able to charge only half the normal commercial rate of interest.

12. Even more important has been the political and diplomatic eVort. Like the Al-Yamamah deals withSaudi Arabia and the recent sale of Hawks to India, the UK’s military exports to South Africa are the resultof aggressive selling by ministers, from the Prime Minister downwards. In the years of the new regime inSouth Africa there was strong resistance to arms exports and arms imports, both on moral and on financialgrounds. Themilitarists gained the upper hand during 1996 and 1997, and it is believed that discussions heldby ThaboMbeki, thenDeputy President, with ChancellorKohl in 1996 and TonyBlair in 1997were amajorfactor in this shift. The press was told that the UK deal was “clinched” by Tony Blair during his visit toPretoria in January 1999. In eVect, like Al-Yamamah, the deal is government-to-government.

13. The procurement package is heavily skewed towards UK interests. The South Africans originallyintended to buy a single kind of plane, either a dedicated fighter or a fighter-trainer. They ended up buyingboth the Hawk and the very expensive Gripen, although the Hawk has, or could be given, a combatcapability that would make the Gripen redundant. Moreover the Italians and the Czechs have dual-purposeplanes much cheaper than the Hawk.

Against the UK Government’s Criteria

14. In July 1997 the new Labour government announced criteria against which it would assessapplications formilitary export licences and this was followed by the EUCode of Conduct onArms Exportswhich was adopted in June 1998. (In October 2000 the two similar sets of criteria were brought together asthe Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.) These criteria include a commitmentby the UK government to look at the adverse eVects on development when deciding whether or not to issuean arms export licence.

15. This should have prevented the UK government from licensing the arms deal with South Africa, letalone encouraging it. Although the development criteria have never yet been used to refuse an export licence,there was surely an open-and-shut case for applying it here. With a per capita GDP of $2,530 in 2001, SouthAfrica is not among the poorest countries in the world, but it is far from being among the aZuent either,

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and it has massive problems of unemployment and disease which should take precedence over the build-upofmilitary power. No good purpose will be served by diverting resources needed for tackling these problemsand by casting on a fragile country burdens that it cannot bear.

Offset Programme

16. The arms deal has been defended on the ground of the “oVset” programme that accompanied it, andthat programmewas certainly amajor factor in winning support for it within the SouthAfrican government.In January 1999 Tony Blair promised that in return for its purchases from the UK South Africa wouldobtain “up to £4 billion in associated investment and trade”. The negotiated package included oVsets of R70billion in return for R30 billion of sales, and held out the prospect of 65,000 jobs. The R70 billion comprisedR38 billion in counter-purchases, including the work to be done by South African subcontractors on theimported ships and planes, andR31 billion in investment, or “industrial participation”, both inmilitary andnon-military projects.

17. OVsets are in general contrary to international law. A loophole has been provided for those relatedto military sales, but they are inherently ambiguous and suspect. The investments linked to sales are notnecessarily the ones the purchaser would have chosen. In this case the biggest single item, a German projectfor a steel plant and deep-water harbour in the Eastern Cape was dropped after a storm of protest, as beingenvironmentally damaging and economically redundant. It was replaced by plans for a condom factory,which would have been genuinely useful; but this does not seem to be materialising either. Moreover, if thepurchases and investments were an optimal use of capital, they would presumably have been made anyway,and so are not genuine oVsets. If they were not optimal, why were they made? It can only be assumed eitherthat the companies have been leaned on by their governments or that they have some ulterior motive. Mostprobably they hope to secure long-term benefits from the control of South African industry that theirinvestments will bring.

18. This is especially clear in the case of investments by arms companies. On the face of it, there is nosense in a bargain which commits the companies to outlays of more than double the prospective receipts.But by taking a stake in the indigenous arms industry they could look forward, among other things, to theeconomies to be achieved from transferring production to low-cost countries. SouthAfrica is said to be nearthe top of the list in the MoD’s plans for outsourcing of military procurement, and BAE Systems and othercompanies will want to be in a position to control and profit from that process. Contradictions have alreadyappeared. South African sales of ammunition threaten the income of BAE Systems’ subsidiary RoyalOrdnance, and thus constituency interests in Scotland and northern England.

Developing South Africa’s Arms Industry

19. Foreign investment was also seen as the salvation of the South African arms industry. The incominggovernment in 1994 made the decision to preserve the large, and in some fields highly proficient, industrybuilt up during the apartheid era, in the hope of developing a profitable export trade. It soon found,however, that the industry did not have the capital needed to break into the international market in anymajor way, and so would have to go into partnership with foreign companies. The oVer of investment byBAE Systems and others was thus a major inducement. Again, however, the linkage with arms purchaseswas not really necessary. Companies such as Alvis, Thales and EADS have been taking large stakes in SouthAfrican arms companies without any direct reference to sales.

20. Part of the deal was that BAE Systems would take a 30% share in the state-owned arms companyDenel. Negotiations over this transaction were long drawn out, and in April this year they were abruptlyterminated by the South Africans. It is not clear whether BAE Systems was oVering too low a price, orwhether there has been a fundamental shift of policy. Perhaps it has been realised that “partnership” withsuch a giant as BAE Systems would be a very unequal aVair.

21. The programme of arms purchases negotiated in 1998–99 became contractual between November1999 and May 2000. It might now be diYcult to cancel or alter it, although a legal challenge by TerryCrawford-Browne is currently going through the court system. TheUK government could, however, refrainfrom supporting the second round now under discussion and involving tanks and air-defence systems.Moreimportantly, the whole episode highlights the need to give greater prominence in future—in fact, decisiveprominence—to social and economic criteria for the evaluation of arms sales.

Wider Trade Implications

22. The arms deal undoubtedly had wider political aspects, which may link it with themes set out in theCommittee’s agenda. In the first place, what South Africa wants more than anything else is easier access tothe European market for its products; and it was said that, in his discussions with Mbeki, Tony BlairproVered his good oYces in that matter, with some tacit linkage to arms purchases. It would be interestingto know what progress has been made.

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Recommendations

23. The UK government should never again allow the demands of the arms manufacturing companiesto be given precedence ahead of adherence to its own criteria when considering arms export licences.Criterion Eight of the Consolidated Criteria clearly states that the Government will consider: “Thecompatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, takinginto account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence withthe least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.”

24. The UK government should end Export Credit Guarantees for goods being purchased by overseasmilitary or security forces, or armaments-manufacturing bodies. This would include cover for theconstruction of military bases.

Campaign Against Arms Trade

October 2003

Written evidence submitted by The Royal Institute of International AVairs

This memorandum highlights key areas that we think the Committee should focus upon.We also providethe Committee with a list of the Royal Institute of International AVairs’ (Chatham House) Africaprogramme experts available for consultation and a select bibliography of articles, books, and monographsfor background information.

Issues to Focus Upon

— To assess how South Africa’s new parliamentary institutions are functioning. It would beilluminating to focus on the Portfolio Committees, particularly the Standing Committee on PublicAccounts, which scrutinised the defence contracts and the corruption charges arising there from,which involved some foreign companies.

— Britain’s role in facilitating a reduction/elimination of trade barriers for African goods, especiallyagricultural commodities, within the EU. To what extent might this benefit small-medium blackfarmers, in the light of the South African Government’s renewed commitment to landredistribution and agricultural development?

— To what extent is Black Economic Empowerment being reoriented to tackle mass poverty, ratherthan (as some critics claimed) to nurture a small black elite? And what mechanisms are beingcontemplated for job creation?

— Focus on the land issue in South Africa. How are events in Zimbabwe influencing debates andpolicies in South Africa, such as the ANC’s Youth Commission policy on land?

— Look at the South African policy towards HIV-AIDS and the impact of this policy.

— South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Does South Africadominate NEPAD, and how does this influence its diplomatic eVorts? What is the impact ofNEPAD outside Southern Africa?

— SouthAfrican diplomatic initiatives in Africa. How has SouthAfrican foreign policy been decidedand who makes the decisions? What influence has the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, UK,over this and what are the successes and failures?

— Expansion of South African business and investment in Africa. How does this compare with UKpenetration of emerging markets. What are the lessons for the UK?

— What is the role of South Africa in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) andwhere is SADC going?

— What type of support is the UK giving to civil society, particularly grass-root groups working oneducation, health-care and public order issues?

The 2003–04 South Africa Series at Chatham House

FromOctober 2003, the Africa programme at RIIA will hold a series of meetings and workshops to markthe 10th anniversary of South Africa’s transition to majority rule entitled “South Africa’s role in Africa:engine of development and/or emerging regional hegemon?” The series is convened by Merle Lipton andwill be launched on 27 October with Essop Pahad,Minister in PresidentMbeki’s OYce, speaking on “SouthAfrica’s global and African political strategy”. On 29 October, JeVrey Herbst, Professor of African Studiesat PrincetonUniversity will provide and assessment of “International responses to South Africa’s strategy”.Members of the Committee are welcome to attend these and other meetings. Details or this series areavailable from the Africa programme at Chatham House: Liz.Hornwriia.org

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Expertise Available From the Royal Institute of International AVairs, Chatham House

Chris Alden, Associate Fellow, RIIA

Chris Alden is a specialist on South Africa’s foreign policy and co-author of the forthcoming Adelphipaper: “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: Africa’s Last Best Hope?” He is also a lecturer atthe London School of Economics and Political Science and from 1990 to 1999 was a Senior Lecturer in theInternational Relations Department, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Heather Deegan, Associate Fellow, RIIA

Heather Deegan is a specialist on democratic change in South Africa and author of the book “Politics ofthe New South Africa: Apartheid and After”. She is also a Senior Lecturer at Middlesex University.

Merle Lipton, Associate Fellow, RIIA

Merle Lipton is a South Africa expert and published widely on various issues including on land, labour& livelihoods in rural South Africa and the State & Market in post-Apartheid South Africa. She is also aresearch fellow at the School of African & Asian Studies, Sussex University.

Alex Vines, Head of Africa Programme, RIIAAlex Vines is a specialist in regional security and light weapons proliferation. He has published widely onthe proliferation of light weapons in southern Africa and has also researched South Africa’s foreign policyin Africa. He is a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch.

The Royal Institute of International AVairs

Written evidence submitted by BBC World Service

BBC WORLD SERVICE AND GLOBAL NEWS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Summary

South Africa is home to many of the continent’s major media companies, and its broadcasters andpublications reflect the diversity of the population as a whole. The BBC operates its Africa newsgatheringco-ordination centre for radio and TV from Johannesburg. The Africa Bureau was established in the early70s, and is one of the BBC’s seven major newsgathering “hubs” located around the world. The Bureauprovides news coverage for World Service radio, BBC World television, the BBC’s International FacingOnline News Site and the domestic channels.

Although the impact of the World Service has, in recent years, been limited in South Africa for reasonsdetailed below, the BBC recognised the need to adapt to the changing market following deregulation. It hasestablished a good relationship with SABC, the home broadcaster, which has enabled the World Service tobe heard by a wider audience than previously reached.

The reach of BBC World has been enhanced through a digital TV agreement, and a rebroadcastingarrangement with SABC.

The BBC is also making inroads into the emerging internet market—it has headline syndication deals inplace with the largest Internet Service Provider in the country, and with two leading websites.

The strong regional programming produced for World Service radio and BBCWorld television has beena key factor in reaching new audiences through these recent negotiations.

Market Overview

The South African constitution provides for freedom of the press, and this is generally respected inpractice. Laws, regulation and political control of media content are considered to be moderate and thereis little evidence of repressive measures against journalists.

Newspapers and magazines publish reports and comment critical of the government and the state-ownedSABC is far more independent now than during the apartheid era.

Radio

Post-apartheid the South African government has been keen to decentralise control of the radio and TVmarket. Deregulation in 1996 led to a proliferation of private radio stations to compete with theoverwhelmingly state-oriented broadcasting system. Listeners in Johannesburg alone can now choose fromamong some 40 radio services, from the national broadcasts of the reformed state-owned South AfricanBroadcastingCorporation (SABC) to community stations targeting local neighbourhoods or ethnic groups.

Prior to deregulation, the apartheid government made great eVorts to deliver pro-government radioservices through high quality FM networks, and as a result, short wave listening did not develop as in otherparts of Africa, where domestic services were, and to some extent still are, delivered mainly via shortwave.

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South Africa represents a large radio market with 22.9 million adults listening in a typical week. Just over16 million of these radio listeners can understand at least some English. In comparison with television, withprint media, radio remains the most powerful medium.

TheWorld Service delivers its programmes via SABC (through a recently signed new agreement with thecorporation—further details are given below), by shortwave, through partnerships with some local FMstations, and via audio channels on Multichoice.

Television

Well-established state-run and commercial TV networks broadcast nationally, and hundreds ofthousands of viewers subscribe to pay-TV services operated by the major cable and satellite companyMultiChoice. SABC operates three national TV networks and two pay-TV channels. 13.4% of thepopulation have access to television.

BBCWorld is available on digital television and there are also morning and evening rebroadcasts of BBCWorld news sequences every day on SABC 3 TV.

Internet

In June 2000, President Thabo Mbeki set up an international information technology council to helpAfrica bridge the “digital divide”. Africa has only 0.6% of the world’s internet users and two-thirds of themare in South Africa, which amounts to just over 7% of the population. 10% of the population have mobilephones. The BBC is making headway into this market with deals recently struck with M-Web, the largestInternet Service Provider in the country, amongst others. It is also exploring the possibility of a mobilephone deal.

Full details of the BBC’s radio, TV and online oVer to SouthAfrica, and its newsgathering strength there,are set out below.

BBC World Service Radio

Output

The World Service broadcasts in English to South Africa 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Specialregional programmes forAfrica are broadcast on theEnglish Service for over five hours a day everyweekdayand over two hours on Saturdays and Sundays.

African news features daily in the well established and respected news and current aVairs programmes,Focus on Africa, (broadcast three times a day during the week, one edition at weekends) that oVers eveningnews and analysis from the region, andNetwork Africa (broadcast five times a day weekdays) that producesa morning mix of rolling news, analysis, sport, features and music.

Africa Live, launched in June this year, is an interactive programme that gets to the heart of Africa andthe continent’s issues, and encourages listeners to phone in, email and text the programme with comments.This programme was set up using extra Grant-in-Aid funds allocated to theWorld Service for broadcastingto Africa in the Spending Review 2002—it aims to tackle grassroot problems specific to Africa and oVerspositive solutions and guidance on the way forward. The programme has discussed development issueswhich have resonance for South Africa such as the Brian Drain, the treatment of refugees and foreigners,Africa’s Airline industry, the drug industry and the politics of Water. The programme has ensured thatSouth Africans are very much part of the discussion. One such example was when Africa Live discussed themerits of African inventions. The programme linked up with Don Pilkington, Managing Director, SouthAfrican Institute of Inventors, who was able to oVer advice to inventors across the continent on how to getpatents etc.

Africa Live was also invited to go global as part of the World Service’s 70th anniversary celebrations.Table Mountain in Cape Town, the location of World Service’s first Outside Broadcast in 1933, was thevenue for Global Live. From the top of the mountain World Service presenters linked live to callers aroundthe world for a 14-hour broadcast.

Other regional programmes include African Perspective, a weekly programme which takes an in-depthlook at life in Africa. Fastrack is a popular sports programme that reports on Africa’s sports results, andprovides analysis and interviews—it recently interviewed the South African winner of the women’s highjump competition at the World Athletics in Paris.

Talking Point—theWS global phone-in programme that gives listeners and internet users the opportunityto put questions to guests—was joined from the Aids Conference in Durban in August by South AfricanMinister ofHealthMantombazana Tshabalala-Msimang and StephenLewisUNAIDS envoy forHIV/Aidsin Africa.

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The African Service also strives to reflect South African culture on its airwaves. Each year the WorldService holds a playwriting competition and this year the second prize winner came from South Africa.Soldier Boy, was a powerful drama set in South Africa during the Angola border war and recorded entirelyon location in Kwazulu Natal. The plays companion programme heard from two ex-combatants, one fromthe SADF, the other from MK the armed wing of the ANC.

Coming up in November this year, as part of the HIV/Aids programme season, the World Service hasbeen granted rights to broadcast the Nelson Mandela Foundation concert from Cape Town which aims toraise awareness about HIV and to help South African victims of Aids. The programme will feature anaddress by Nelson Mandela, as well as world-class musical performances and contributions from keycelebrities and political figures.

Transmission

The World Service can be heard 24 hours a day across South Africa via short wave.

In 2002 the BBC signed a new agreement with SABC, which allows SABC to use news items from theWorld Service in their own output—properly credited. In addition to news items, sports and features arealso relayed on the English FM network of SABC.

SABC also has an extensive network of FM stations broadcasting in local languages—World Servicenews items and despatches are used on these African language FM networks, with an appropriatetranslation in to the relevant local language.

TheWorld Service has several local partner stations: Radio Khwezi in Kranskop (Zulu Natal) and GoodNews Community Radio in Durban are community stations that run some BBC output. Bush Radio inCape Town also takes World Service programming, including some English teaching.

World Service can also be received 24 hours a day via Multichoice (satellite TV) as an audio channelthroughout South Africa.

In April 2001, MultiChoice Africa and the BBCWorld Service renewed their long-standing agreement tobroadcast the BBC throughout the continent of Africa. This agreement extended the broadcast rights ofBBCWorld Service for an additional five years, and included the 50 countries in whichMultiChoice Africawas currently operating. The service enables subscribers to MultiChoice Africa’s premium DStv bouquetto listen to BBC World Service 1, 2 and 3 channels via their decoders.

Additionally, World Service is available as a 24 hour service on the digital satellite channel Worldspace.

Michel Lobelle, BroadcastingManager for the Africa/Middle East Region, has been based in Cape Townfor the last two years, and has made significant progress in developing rebroadcasting opportunities inSouthern Africa.

Audiences

BBC has traditionally had very small radio audiences in South Africa compared to the rest of Africa. Inlate 1995, when the World Service last commissioned a survey, BBC World Service on short wave wasreaching approximately 310,000 weekly listeners (2.4% of the population).

In addition, the weekly audience on SAFM in English is about 700,000. All SABC African networksrepresent cumulative weekly audiences of about 30 million. TheWorld Service does not include any of thesefigures in its estimated audience for the BBC because the news items are usually short and the BBC specifiesa minimum duration before counting the listeners in to its figures. However, the arrangement clearly helpsthe BBC with its profile in South Africa.

The BBC does not have recent audience figures for listening to BBC via individual community stations.

Audience research carried out by Roper Starch in 1998 revealed that most people associate the name“BBC” with TV.

Johannesburg Office

The Johannesburg Bureau, run by Bureau Chief Milton Nkosi, is the BBC’s radio, television and onlinebureau for Africa. Three correspondents, two main producers, a television crew, two African servicestringers and occasional casual staV operate from the bureau. There is a small but very busy radio studio,and one of the busiest television edit suites amongst international bureau in Africa. A lot of the workproduced is for World Service radio and domestic news. Local translators, fixers and technicians areemployed for teams coming out from London.

The bureau, established in the early 70s, has seen many well-known correspondents come through it—Michael Burke, Fergal Keane, Jeremy Vine, George Alagiah, Rageh Omar, Allan Little, Jane Standleyamong them.

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A range of freelance crews work closely with the Africa bureau—its coverage stretches throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In recent weeks teams have covered the Liberia civil war and the subsequent departure offormer president Charles Taylor, and the Africa tour by President Bush was covered in all the countries hevisited. A year ago the bureau, with the help of colleagues from London, covered the biggest conference onearth, the World Summit on Sustainable Development.

The bureau has also been the base for BBC reporters previously working in Zimbabwe. Since early 2001when new media laws were introduced in that country, and the BBC’s own correspondent was expelled, theBBC and all foreign journalists have been prevented from having a permanent reporting presence there.However, as Zimbabwe continues to be a major story, the BBC has sought to ensure that it is covered in thedepth and breadth that it warrants, making use of the facilities available at the Johannesburg oYce.

Productions range from day to day news coverage to Newsnights, Panoramas, documentaries andCorrespondent. The popular BBC World magazine programme, Africa Direct, is produced from thebureau—it shows a diVerent Africa from the usual newsmaterial. Short films about what Africans are doingto improve their lives are also produced from the bureau.

The countries reported from in the last year include: South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,Angola, Mozambique, Dem Rep Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya,Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, Ivory Coast, Senegal,Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Niger, Liberia, Gambia, Malawi and Djibouti.

BBC World Television

BBC World is available as a full 24# 7 service on the DSTV digital pay service to 880,000 subscribers.

A late night and early morning BBC World News bulletin is rebroadcast on SABC3, who also carry aselection of BBC World programmes overnight—taken from the previous day’s output. The arrangementwith BBC World to rebroadcast simultaneous News Bulletins and selected programmes, replaced theagreement that SABC previously had with competitors CNN. An agreement is also in place for SABC tosimultaneously use BBC World’s Breaking News, on any of their terrestrial channels.

BBC World and CNN are equally popular on the DSTV line up.

Online/BBC International Facing Site

The BBC has a headline syndication deal in place with M-Web, the largest Internet Service Provider inthe country, which provides access to the BBC’s online services. Headline syndication deals are also in placewith iAfrica.com, which is the biggest portal, and Ananzi.com, which is the biggest search engine.

These three websites display continually updated headline feeds from BBC News Online. Each headlinelinks to the full story on the BBC website.

Data gathered for August this year indicated that traYc from South Africa for theWorld Service and theBBC’s International Facing Site amounted to about 1.17 million page impressions. That figure does notinclude traYc from South Africa for other parts of the BBC site.

The BBC is also exploring the possibility of a mobile phone deal, which would enable mobile phone usersto receive BBC news bulletins via text messages directly to their phones.

BBC World Service

October 2003

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE BBC WORLD SERVICE

As you may be aware, the Foreign AVairs Committee recently visited South Africa as part of its currentinquiry into UK–South African relations. During the visit we had the pleasure of meetingMrMilton Nkosiand some of his staV at your bureau in Johannesburg. We were, as ever, very pleased to see the valuablework being done by the Service’s staV.

Following our visit, the Committee had a number of questions concerning the BBC World Service’sbroadcasts in Swahili:

1. What is the estimated number of speakers of Swahili as a first language in Africa?

2. For how long does the BBC World Service broadcast in Swahili each day at present?

3. What is the estimated number of listeners to the BBCWS’s Swahili service?

4. Could you provide details of the Swahili service provided by other national radio services,particularly those of the USA, France, Germany and China?

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5. Does the World Service have any plans to make changes to its Swahili service in the near future.

Were it possible to receive an answer to these points by Friday 12March, I would be very grateful. If yourstaV would like any clarification on these matters, please do not hesitate to contact the Second Clerk of theCommittee, GeoVrey Farrar (020 7219 3309 / farrargwparliament.uk).

Rt Hon Donald Anderson MPChairman of the Committee

24 February 2004

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM BBC WORLD SERVICE

Thank you for recent inquiry. I am delighted to hear that you enjoyed your meeting with Milton and theother staV in our Johannesburg bureau and that the Committee could see that part of the World Service’swork first hand.

The answers to the Committee’s five questions:

1. What is the estimated number of speakers of Swahili as a first language in Africa?

A. There are approximately 100 million Swahili speakers, of whom about 25 million speak itas their first language.

2. For how long does the BBC World Service broadcast in Swahili each day at present?

A. Presently BBC Swahili transmits five programmes a day.

— Two half hour current aVairs programmes in the morning;

— Five minutes lunch time news bulletin;

— 60 minutes of current aVairs in the afternoon; and

— 15 minutes of African news in the evening.

A total of two hours and 20 minutes everyday on a week-day (Monday—Friday)

On Saturdays we broadcast for two hours and on Sundays for 2 hours and 30minutes.Weekendprogramming includes 45 minutes each weekend devoted to programming about learningEnglish.

3. What is the estimated number of listeners to the BBC WS’s Swahili service?

A. The current weekly measured audience for Swahili is 18.4 million which includes listeningin—DR Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda.

4. Could you provide details of the Swahili service by other national radio services, particularly those ofthe USA, France, Germany and China?

A. International Broadcasters in Swahili include Voice of Germany (DeutscheWelle), Voice ofAmerica, Radio China, Radio Japan, Radio Iran, Radio Egypt, RadioNigeria and ChannelAfrica (South Africa Broadcasting Corporation). DeutscheWelle and Voice of America arethe twomain traditional competitors. The Kenya Broadcast Corporation broadcasts on SWand also has a sizeable audience. Radio China, Voice of Nigeria and Radio Cairo alsobroadcast in Swahili but have niche audiences. The others mentioned would also haveminimal audiences.

By way of comparison the respective weekly measured listening figures in the three maincountries are as follows (some of those surveyed would listen to more than one service):

Tanzania

World Service 59.8% listening weekly (11.5 millions)

Deutsche Welle 57%

Voice of America 28%

Kenya

World Service 31% listening weekly (5.6 millions)

Deutsche Welle 8%

Voice of America 7%

Uganda

World Service 7.5% listening weekly (0.9 millions)

Deutsche Welle 1%

Voice of America 1%

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5. Does the World Service have any plans to make changes to its Swahili service in the near future?

A. TheWorld Service is planning to improve its audibility still further by increasing the numberof FM transmissions in most of the target areas especially Southern Tanzania and othermajor towns in Kenya. I appreciate that the Committee’s agenda has been particularly busyof late and that the Easter Recess is fast approaching but I am keen that the Committee bekept fully abreast of the World Service’s activities and plans. With this in mind I waswondering if the Committee would like to visit Bush House after Easter so that I can briefthem about the challenges facing the World Service and our exciting plans to meet them.

Nigel ChapmanActing DirectorBBC World Service

11 March 2004

Written evidence submitted by The Corner House

Introduction

1. The Corner House is a UK NGO that works for environmental and social justice by carrying outanalysis, research and advocacy. The Corner House has worked on corruption issues from a developmentand human rights perspective for a number of years.

2. The Corner House notes that the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce (FCO) is one of the departmentsinvolved in delivering the UK government’s commitment to support NEPAD. With suYcient civil societyinvolvement and consultation and real local ownership, it is clear that, as some African NGOs have said,NEPAD has potential to improve political governance and decrease corruption in Africa. However, in thecontext of NEPAD, there is a tendency byG8 and donor governments to emphasise corruption and politicalgovernance as an African problem, and ignore the significant role played by the business communities ofG8 and other Western countries in exacerbating corruption in Africa through bribery and money-laundering. Unless G8 and other Western governments fully address the institutional failures in their owncountries that allow such activities by their business communities to go undetected and unpunished, theirsupport for NEPAD will be seen as at best equivocal and at worst hypocritical.

3. Under the G8 Africa Action Plan of 2002, the UK government has committed itself to “intensifyingsupport for the adoption and implementation of eVective measures to combat corruption, bribery andembezzlement”. The G8 committed to do this, among other things, by assisting implementation of theOECD Convention on Bribery, which criminalizes bribery of foreign public oYcials, and intensifyinginternational cooperation to recover illicitly acquired financial assets. In the UK, the FCO plays a lead rolein implementing the UK legislation that enforces the OECDConvention on Bribery: under aMemorandumof Understanding between UK government departments and law enforcement agencies, the FCO isresponsible for reporting corruption allegations from overseas to law enforcement agencies and monitoringall investigations by these agencies of bribery oVences. The Corner House therefore suggests that the ForeignAVairs Committee inquiry on South Africa would be an excellent place to examine how the FCO isimplementing the UK government’s commitments under the G8 Africa Action Plan to take action on briberyand recovery of assets in its own back yard.

4. A recent test case of the UK government’s commitment to address the UK’s role in exacerbatingcorruption in Africa, and to implement the OECD Convention on Bribery is presented by the corruptionallegations surrounding the South African government’s defence procurement package of September 1999.These allegations, some of which involve a UK contractor for the package, arose just two years after theUK government signed up to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery in 1997 and one year after itcame into force. The Corner House notes that given the considerable involvement of the UK government inhelping negotiate the South African defence package and in facilitating the industrial participation (or oVset)arrangements that accompany the package, and given the potential for controversies surrounding the defencepackage to impact upon the UK’s diplomatic and political relations with South Africa, the Committee shouldgive some time and space to examining the defence package, and the corruption allegations that have dogged it.

Background to the Corruption Allegations in South Africa’s Defence Procurement Package

5. In September 1999, the South African government signed a $4.8 billion defence procurement packagewith European contractors from Germany, Italy, France, Sweden and the UK. BAE Systems (then BritishAerospace) in a joint venture with SAAB from Sweden had been chosen as preferred bidder to provide 24Hawk trainers and 28 Gripen fighters in November 1998 as part of this package.

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6. Corruption allegations first surfaced in June 1999, when ANC intelligence operatives approached aSouth African NGO, the Coalition for Defence Alternatives, stating that they had evidence of corruptionby senior politicians and government oYcials in connection with the defence package.8 In September 1999,amemo addressed to the PanAfricanist CongressMP, PatriciaDeLille, from“concernedANCMPs” raisedsimilar concerns of corruption in the package.9 The allegations centred on claims that senior members ofthe South African government had taken bribes from foreign defence contractors and that they hadpressured these contractors to award subcontracts to South African firms in which either they or theirrelatives had substantial stakes. In November 1999, De Lille forwarded the allegations to South Africa’sforemost anti-corruption body, the Special Investigating Unit, headed by Judge Willem Heath. De Lillesubsequently received death threats.

7. As a result of the allegations, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts of the South AfricanParliament (SCOPA) called for an oYcial enquiry. Heath’s Special Investigating Unit was on the verge oflaunching a full-scale investigation, when the Auditor-General of South Africa announced its own enquiry.The Auditor-General concluded in September 2000 that there had been “material deviations from generallyaccepted procurement practice” particularly for the trainer jet component of the package and that “theexplanation provided by DoD (Department of Defence) for this material deviation does not appear to besatisfactory”. In addition the Auditor-General recommended a full forensic audit of subcontractingprocesses.10

In response, SCOPA issued a resolution in November 2000 calling for an investigation to be carried outby South Africa’s Special Investigating Unit, the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the NationalDirector of Public Prosecutions. In January 2001, President ThaboMbeki refused permission for the SpecialInvestigating Unit—widely seen as the most independent and vigorous of the country’s anti-corruptioninstitutions—to take part in the investigations. An investigation involving the Public Protector, theAuditor-General and the National Director of Public Prosecutions went ahead as a Joint Investigation Team.

8. In November 2001, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) report cleared the South African governmentof “any improper or unlawful conduct” in connection with the package and concluded that “there are nogrounds to suggest that the Government’s contracting position is flawed”.11 However, there were severalserious flaws with the JIT report that have led to accusations of whitewash and political interference, notleast by the former head of the Special InvestigatingUnit, JudgeWillemHeath. These flaws havemeant thatthe controversy surrounding the package has not gone away. They are as follows:

Firstly, as the Auditor General himself noted before a hearing by SCOPA in August 2003, the exclusionof the Special Investigating Unit from the enquiry created mistrust and speculation from the start.12

Secondly, credible SouthAfrican sources have claimed that theAuditor-General’s oYcewas given a directsteer by the President as to who and what it could investigate. The recent allegations that the DeputyPresident, Jacob Zuma, requested a bribe from a French company to ensure it was not subject toinvestigation have only increased speculation as to political interference.

Thirdly, suggestions were raised inMay 2003 that the JIT report had been heavily edited by the executivebefore being submitted to Parliament, following a court action by a subcontractor who lost out in thebidding on one part of the package led to the draft report being made available to the subcontractor.

And finally, the report appears to have only looked at a very limited number of the 50 or so allegationsof corruption that were raised. Allegations involving BAE Systems included in an annex to this submissiondo not appear to have been investigated and it is not clear whether they are subject to a continuing criminalinvestigation by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP).

9. New allegations of corruption, meanwhile, continue to emerge in the South African press, and thereis little sign that they will go away. This has led to calls by respected South African NGOs such as theInstitute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) for the Joint Investigation Team to re-open itsinvestigation to answer all outstanding questions, and for the National Director of Public Prosecutions toclarify which allegations it has investigated and which are still under investigation, and to ensure that allallegations of criminal activity are swiftly dealt with.13

8 Terry Crawford-Browne, “A Betrayal of the Struggle Against Apartheid: a summary of South Africa’s R48 billion weaponsacquisition programme, related oVsets and allegations of corruption”, 28 September 2000.

9 “Briefing to Honourable Patricia De Lille, Member of Parliament”, by concerned ANC MPs, September 1999.10 Auditor General of South Africa, 15/9/2000, “Special Review of the Selection Process of Strategic Defence packages for theAcquisition of Armaments at the Department of Defence”, para 4.

11 Joint Investigation by the Public Protector, Auditor-General and National Director of Public Prosecutions into Strategic Defenceprocurement Packages, Report to Parliament, 14 November 2001.

12 Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), 20 August 2003, “Special Report by the Auditor General on Arms DealReport: Hearing”

13 IDASA, “Democracy and the Arms Deal, Part 3”, A Submission to Parliament, 5 August 2003.

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10. The ongoing controversy and persistent leaking out of allegations risks undermining the credibilityof the defence package. As a recent submission on the defence package to the South African Parliament byIDASA observed, “the perception of corruption is often as harmful as actual corruption. While theallegations remain unanswered, the public will draw their own, often negative conclusions”.14 The lack ofclarity on the allegations surrounding the package furthermore threatens to have a negative impact on thereputation of the South African government both domestically and internationally, the UK company concerned,and even the UK government itself. The Corner House believes that the FCO has a potential role to play inhelping establish clarity on the allegations involving the UK company in order to restore credibility to at leastthe UK component of the defence package.

11. The UK government is of course aware of the corruption allegations. On 5 September 1999, theCampaign Against the Arms Trade, on behalf of a South African coalition of Churches and Human Rightsgroups, the Coalition for Defence Alternatives (CDA), referred allegations involving BAE Systems to theSecretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers (see annex). In December 1999, one of theconvenors of CDA directly informed the Export Credit Guarantee Department, which was then arrangingthe finance for the UK component of the defence package, of pending investigations by investigatoryauthorities in South Africa. In December 1999, the ECGD in a letter to CDA acknowledged the pendinginvestigations but stated that it was working to the timetable of the South African government forconcluding the financing arrangements.15 In April 2000, as Heath’s Special Investigation Unit was reportedto be on the verge of requesting presidential authority to launch a full-scale investigation,16 the ECGD issuedthe guarantee for BAE Systems’ sale of Hawk jets to South Africa.

In January 2000, according to a recent response to Parliament, the FCO had also received allegations ofcorruption against BAE Systems in January 2000.17 It is not clear whether these were the same allegationsearlier submitted to the DTI by CAAT or whether they diVered both in source and in substance. The FCOstated: “These, and earlier allegations to other Government Departments, were passed to the MOD Policeand Metropolitan Police.” Again in January 2000, the FCO told the CDA that “The Metropolitan Policehave confirmed that they found insuYcient evidence to substantiate the allegations”.18 Both the ECGD andthe FCO meanwhile in recent responses to questions in Parliament have focused on the fact that the oYcialinvestigation by the South African the Joint Investigation Team found BAE Systems’ contract to be sound,and found no evidence of wrongdoing.19

Recommendations to the Foreign Affairs Committee

12. The Corner House recommends that the Committee consider in its examination of the impact ofNEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan on South Africa, the role and record of the FCO in helping to meetUK government commitments to implement the OECD Convention on Bribery and to help recover illegalfinancial assets, made under the G8 Africa Action Plan. In so doing, the Committee may wish to considerasking the FCO to disclose to it:

— What steps it has taken together to raise awareness amongst British businesses operating in SouthAfrica and Africa in general that the payment of bribes is a criminal oVence, and to encourage theresponsible use of agents and intermediaries by British businesses.

— What steps it has taken to ensure that complaints of bribes received by the UK representative inSouth Africa are given due weight and forwarded to the appropriate authorities either in the UKor South Africa.

— What steps it has taken to ensure that its staV in South Africa and Africa in general are aware ofthe criminal nature of bribe payments and the necessity to pass such information on to the relevantlaw enforcement authority in the UK.

13. The Corner House urges the Committee to give time and space to considering the South Africangovernment’s defence procurement package, its associated industrial participation (or oVset) arrangementsand the corruption allegations surrounding it, given the strong role that the UK government has played inpromoting and facilitating the involvement of UK contractors in the package and in the industrialparticipation arrangements, and given the potential impact that the controversies surrounding the packagecould have on political and diplomatic relations between the UK and South Africa.

14. Specifically with regard to the corruption allegations in the South African defence package, theCorner House believes that the FCO could and should play a pivotal role in helping put an end to thedamaging speculation that has persisted about the role of one of the UK contractors in the package. It is inthe interests of both the South African and UK governments and of the UK contractor concerned for thisto happen. The Corner House believes that in order to play such a role:

14 Ibid.15 Letter from Chris Leeds, ECGD to Terry Crawford-Browne, 23 December 1999.16 The Star, 18/4/2000, “Heath Keen to Blow Open Arms Deal Probe”17 Hansard, 10/7/03, Column 985W, Response from Mr Mullin to Matthew Taylor MP.18 Letter from Peter Hain, FCO to Terry Crawford-Browne, 26 January 2000.19 Hansard, 10/7/03, Column 985W, Response from Mr Mullin to Matthew Taylor MP; Hansard11/9/03, Column 385W,Response from Mike O’Brien to Matthew Taylor MP.

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— the FCO should disclose advice it has given to other UK government departments such as ECGD,DTI and DESO on the scope and gravity of the corruption allegations;

— the FCO should clarify whether allegations it received in December 2000 were the same in contentand source as those received by other UK government departments in September 1999, and if not,what they were and whether they were separately investigated by the Metropolitan Police;

— the FCO should be encouraged to oVer the full support of the UK government to South Africanauthorities for any criminal or other oYcial investigation into allegations against BAE Systems orother UK contractors;

— the FCO should disclose what it has done so far to assist South African investigators examiningallegations involving BAE Systems or other UK contractors; and

— the FCO should disclosewhat steps it has taken tomonitor the allegations of corruption in relationto BAE Systems and any other UK contractors in the defence package.

15. The Corner House also believes that the FCO, in conjunction with other UK governmentdepartments, particularly theDepartment of Trade and Industry, theDefence Export Services Organisationand the Export Credit Guarantees Department, could play an important role in urging, indeed, requiring—given that taxpayers’ money has underwritten the UK component of the package—BAE Systems to helpput an end to the speculations and allegations. In particular, the FCO with other government departmentscould urge BAE Systems and its subsidiary BAE Systems Holdings (South Africa):

— to disclose the exact amount ofmoney it paid in commission fees to its SouthAfrican agentOsprey,for what services the fees were paid, on what dates, whether the payments were made into SouthAfrican or oVshore accounts, and to which company in the Osprey group the fees were paid;

— to disclose the grounds on which BAE Systems decided to use an agent given that it had asubsidiary within South Africa who could have performed at least some of the duties that Ospreyis said to have performed;

— to dislose audit reports of the donation given byBAESystems to theAirborneTrust, and a detailedaccount of how the donation was used;

— to disclose whether the former defence minister of South Africa, Joe Modise, met with anyonefrom BAE Systems or anyone acting on behalf of BAE Systems when he visited the UK in 1998,and to disclose what steps BAE Systems took to ensure that money it donated to the AirborneTrust was not used to fund this trip;

— to make public details of all gifts, payments and donations made or oVered to South Africangovernment oYcials, MPs, or organisations;

— to give a full account of members of the ANC, or relatives of members of the ANC that wereemployed by BAE Systems, BAE Systems Holdings (South Africa) or any company in receipt ofconsultancy or agency fees from BAE Systems, and on what grounds they were employed;

— to disclose details of any payments made to third parties in connection with the South Africanprocurement package; and

— to disclose whether John Bredenkamp or companies in which he is an investor, such as AviationConsultancy Services, played any role in negotiations between BAE Systems and the SouthAfrican authorities and if so what role he or these companies paid, how much commission fee hereceived, forwhat services andwhether that commission fee was included in the contract submittedto the ECGD.

The Corner House

October 2003

Written evidence submitted by Adriana Stuijt

(a) In regard to the testimony submitted by Prof James Barber and Professor David Simon,9 December 2004 in Public Questions 1–83: (New evidence submitted herewith)

(b) Video evidence: on unusually cruel nature of the farm attacks against owners of farm land;

I am submitting this video of a 2003 broadcast on the South African Broadcaster “Carte Blanche”programme; the contents of which were clearly unknown to Prof. Simon and Prof. Barber. Thisdocumentary by the award-winning documentary producer Susan Puren shows clearly that these farmattacks are not motivated by greed—frequently valuable articles such as jewellery are left behind on thescenes of these crimes. Their information that mostly “white” Afrikaner farmers were targeted also is highlyinaccurate; many black owners of farm land also are murdered, often with their entire families, over landdisputes mostly.

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Ourwebsite, http://www.censorbugbear.com, has collected a large body of evidence in this regard over thepast three years, submitted by journalists inside South Africa. The SouthAfrican police has also published anew report on their website, http://www.saps.org.za, from the “independent commission of inquiry into thefarm attacks” appointed by Pres.Mbeki. This information also seemed unavailable to your expert witnesses,even though it is freely available on the internet. Moreover, a complete list of names of farm attack murdervictims, provided by the SA Police, is updated regularly on the following website; also run by unpaidvolunteers in South Africa:

http://www.100megspop2.com/crimebusters/farmvictims.htmland alsohttp://groups.msn.com/crimebustrsofsouthafrica/farmvictims.msnw

Thus far, 1,591 farm dwellers have been killed in such armed attacks, people of all racial backgrounds whoare being targeted by organised groups of young African men who often steal nothing at all. This violence isbeing described by a leading world expert on genocide, Dr Gregory Stanton of “Genocide Watch” in theUS, as being in an advanced stage of genocide. Read his report on: http://www.genocidewatch.org/boersslain01.htm

*I am submitting these website addresses because I believe in not using to much paper. I hope that theMembers of your committee will access these websites and download these reports themselves—and thusview these reports as written evidence submitted to your hearing.

The “Carte Blanche” programme may be further highlighted by the journalist Susan Puren who did allthe interviews and research. Her email address is purenswlantic.net

The SA police farm attack report may be read online at: http://www.spas.gov.z2/farmat/index.htm

This investigation had also found that in certain cases, “the farm attacks are being carried out withconsiderably more violence than routine robberies elsewhere and that this is due to racial hatred”.Futhermore, the illegal land occupations by the Landless People’s Movement and other NGOs are on theincrease and also lead to farm attacks and murders and “this was a matter of large concern”, thisindependent report stated.

I apologise for this hand written submission but this is due to circumstances beyond my control.

Adriana Johanna Stuijt

January 2004

Written evidence submitted by TAU SA

1. Introduction

TAU SA, formerly Transvaal Agricultural Union, is the oldest agricultural union in the Republic ofSouth Africa having been established in 1897. Since its inception, it has been in the forefront to maintaincommercial agriculture in the interest of economical stability and food security in South Africa.

2. TAU SA’s Current Stance

TAU SA is ferverently in favour of:

2.1 The maintenance of RSA’s food- and fibre production capability.

2.2 The economical sustainment of commercial agriculture.

2.3 The willing seller—willing buyer principle as the only way in which property can exchange.

2.4 Ensuring a safe and secure environment within which commercial farmers, their families andemployees may live and work without fear of theft and violent criminality.

2.5 Respect for property rights and legal ownership of property.

2.6 Payment of taxes and levies based on provision and quality of services rendered by local-, provincial-and national government.

3. Current Reality

3.1 The Amendment Bill on the Restitution of Land Rights seriously threatens property rights andownership of land. Owners aVected by expropriation have no recourse to a court of law except to challengeremuneration.

3.2 Commercial agriculture, and thus SouthAfrica’s ability to produce food for the populace, is seriouslyjeopardised. Very few, if any, farms which have been transferred to land claimants, have been successfulcommercial enterprises. Many such farms have been utilised as squatting areas.

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3.3 Commercial farmers are faced with unprecendented crime in rural areas. Notwithstanding stock- andgame theft, theft of produce, fuel and equipment, more than 1,600 farm dwellers have been murdered since1991. This represents in excess of 8,000 attacks on rural dwellers.

3.4 The realities of South African history are deliberately extorted beyond recognition only toaccommodate a specific political parties ideology.

3.5 Commercial landowners have already been unilaterally deprived of original mineral and water rights.This in eVect constitutes alienation of property through a process of nationalisation.

3.6 Commercial farmowners are subjected to a range of local taxation for services not rendered. The scaleof such taxation by far exceeds viability of economic sustainable commercial enterprise of commercialfarming.

3.7 Notwithstanding Constitutional guarantees, citizens of European extraction are in the process ofbeing sidelined from general economic activity in the country of their birth.

3.8 The Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), aYliated to the National Land Commission (NLC) andsponsored by foreign donors, including British institutions, has openly threatened farmers through themedia with violence and death, but instead of being charged appropriately, received an urgent audience withthe Minister of Land AVairs, elevating the LPM in status to an unacceptable level.

3.9 In a documentary shown by the BBC, farmers are portrayed as barbaric racists, guilty of inhumanebehaviour. Irrespective of written complaints directed at the BBC, no supportive facts have been produced,in fact no response from the BBC has been received, and the clear incitement of racial anger and hatred goesunchallenged.

3.10 Countless, if not all of Government land reform projects have resulted in failure, poverty traps forthe people supposed to benefit from it and the total destruction of once successful business units, simply dueto untrained people being settled on developed land, without any assistance by Government, left to fend forthemselves. In many cases the former landowners has come to their rescue.

3.11 The land obtained from successful producers of food and fiber under the threat of expropriation andother forms of intimidation, lie fallow, whilst the previous owners are struggling to start a new career andthe claimants are left to fend for themselves.

3.12 Many farms are available on the open market at acceptable open market prices, whilst State ownedland are simply left unused, or under utilized. Government nevertheless insists on threatening andintimidating farmers with threats of expropriation if they do not co-operate within the Department of LandAVairs’ process of redistribution and resettlement.

3.13 The sweeping expropriation powers now obtained by theMinister of LandAVairs, reminds stronglyof Zimbabwe in 1991. The same powers were given to individual ZANU PF Party leaders and theconsequences are clear for all the world to see.

3.14 TAU SA intends avoiding a similar situation in South Africa, with or without Governmentassistance. That situation is not limited to the violent take over of agricultural land. It is neither the attackand murdering of farmers. South Africa has more experience of both since 1994 than Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwe situation is:

3.14.1 An inflation rate of well over a 1,000%;

3.14.2 Total collapse of the national economy;

3.14.3 A starving populace and collapse of health services;

3.14.4 Collapse of law and order;

3.14.5 State security forces applied to subdue the populace and keep the ruling party in control;

3.14.6 Food used to victimise the opposition party members, or even as a form of ethnic cleansing;

3.14.7 Total destruction of fauna and flora and infrastructure;

3.14.8 A dictatorship/one party state.

4. Revolutions in Africa has very distinct phases and is only completed once the final phase is in place.

These phases are:

(a) Destabilisation;

(b) Democratisation;

(c) Transformation;

(d) Domination.

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5. South Africa Today

Is at present a considerable way into the third phase.

5.1 Irrespective of what we envisaged and prayed for before and immediately after 27 April 1994, SouthAfrica is proving to be no diVerent from other African countries. There was considerable hope forZimbabwe prior to 1999, but cycle had to be completed.We know the outcome. Compare Zimbabwe before1999 with South Africa today and the parallels are distinctly clear. President Mbeki’s support of Mugabeis a contentious issue, here and in Britain and USA.

5.2 The recorded history of Southern Africa, albeit done by so-called colonialists and kept in Europeanarchives, are blatantly swept away. The land to which only the Khoi and San peoples can historically andrightfully lay claim, is now under siege of the so-called majority. They, the Koi and San descendants, areleft only a reservation in the Kalahari Desert, simply because they are a minority. All other ethnic groups,if the same rules apply, shall be regarded as “settlers” and the question that needs to be answered, is to definethe term “indigenous” or “endemic”.

5.3 Universally recognised treaties dating back to the nineteenth century are documented and kept inarchives and form part of the historical records in Britain and elsewhere. Nevertheless, land claims even onthat specific land has been instituted and such treaties are simply ignored.

5.4 The European descendants, the farming stock of South Africa are now to lose their property, theirfarms and only source of income. They are even labeled by President Mbeki as colonialists, invaders andlandgrabbers. They are continuously branded as thieves, racists and oppressors. They are made to feelextremely unsafe and unwelcome in their country of birth. They are slowly but surely driven out of Africa.They are a minority.

5.5 Would the same rules apply to the Caucasians of the United States of America, or the Australian andNew Zealand citizens of British descent?

5.6 If the same rules apply internationally, South Africans of European descent could lay claim to theland of their European ancestors. Would that be acceptable for the respective countries of origin?

6. Appeal

6.1 We need to avoid the stage where South Africa will become another (the final!) basket case of Africa.

6.2 The truth ofwhat is happening in SouthernAfrica needs to be told. Turning a blind eye, or supportingthe processes, has only one outcome. Extreme poverty, famine and destruction of a wonderful country,(developed to first world standards, with the assistance of western countries, especially Britain).detrimentally aVecting all who live in it.

6.3 TAU SA urgently requests the opportunity to raise these issues with yourselves and other influentialinstitutions.We need to influence ourGovernment to reconsider its actions and rather utilise existingmarketpowers to bring wealth and prosperity to Africa.

6.4 TAU SA has no political goals or intentions. It is an established agricultural organisation and believethat the answer to Africa’s dilemma lies in suYcient food and fibre, jobs and housing, a safe environment,law and order, eVective health care systems, equality and respect for all cultures and ethnic groups, thecreation of wealth through a free market system, with as nucleus, the protection of, and respect for privateproperty rights.

WE ARE STARTING WITH OUR OWN COUNTRY, SOUTH AFRICA, AND INTENDCONTRIBUTING TO THE SAME FOR THE REST OF OUR CONTINENT. WE NEED YOURASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE THAT.

TAU SA

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Written evidence submitted by Basil T Hone, USA, 23 March 2004

SOUTH AFRICA’S MBEKI AND ZIMBABWE’S MUGABE

PROLOGUE

May 2000

Mbeki Speech at Zimbabwe Trade Fair, 5 May 2000 (Bulawayo)

The first time I came to this city nearly forty years ago, it was as a detainee, our group travelling toTanganyika having been arrested by the Southern Rhodesian police who held us in a prison in the city fora number of weeks.

Whereas the white minority regime of Southern Rhodesia wanted to deport us back to apartheid SouthAfrica, where we would have been imprisoned for many years, members of this country’s liberationmovement worked hard and ensured that, instead we were sent back to the then British territory ofBechuanaland.

I stand here today as an elected representative of the people of South Africa thanks in good measure tothe fact that when the liberation movement of Zimbabwe acted practically to ensure that we too should gainour freedom.

I am pleased to take this opportunity publicly to salute President Mugabe, the rest of the leadership andthe people of Zimbabwe for what they did to ensure our liberation from apartheid tyranny.

I mention President Mugabe specifically because I had the privilege to accompany our late President,Oliver Tambo, when he and President Mugabe discussed what Zimbabwe could do to help expedite theprocess towards our own emancipation.

I can therefore say that whereas Zimbabwe’s liberation fighters saved our group from imprisonment onRobben Island, liberated Zimbabwe helped the entirety of our people to break down the prison walls behindwhich the apartheid white minority regime held the millions of our people in bondage.

And so here we are together in Bulawayo, during the month when all of us will celebrate Africa Day, onMay 25th, with both of our countries free of the yoke of white minority rule.

As neighbours and peoples who have shared the sameWenches in the common struggle for freedom, it isnatural that we must now work together to build on the victory of the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle.

Both of our countries, which experienced extensive land dispossession of the indigenousmajority by thosewho colonised our countries, are confronted by the challenge to address this colonial legacy.

CHAPTER 1

QUIET DIPLOMACY LIMITATIONS

May 2002

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 17 May 2002

Mbeki talks to Nordic Leaders

Mbeki’s message was that he and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo have brought ZimbabweanPresident Robert Mugabe to heel, and that NePAD’s pledge of African democracy for Western economicassistance remains on course.

News24 (SA), 21 May 2002

South Africa was not giving up on its strife-torn northern neighbour Zimbabwe, the presidency said onTuesday. “The question of cutting diplomatic ties has not even arisen,” presidential spokesperson BhekiKhumalo said. “It is not an issue being considered by the president [Thabo Mbeki]. We cannot turn ourbacks on Zimbabwe.” The European Union has reportedly called on Southern African DevelopmentCommunity governments to refrain from “normal diplomatic relations with the Mugabe Regime.”

Khumalo said South Africa’s envoy, African National Congress general secretary Kgalema Motlanthe,would continue to engage both parties. “There is no alternative to negotiations in Zimbabwe,” he said.“There is no alternative to Zanu PF and theMDCworking together. We will not give up on Zimbabwe.Wewill keep on talking and talking until we succeed, even if this takes very long.”

SABC News, 28 May 2002

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Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma

“We should work towards bringing the Zimbabweans back from the brink. We should not be the onesthat push them to the precipice.”

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 31 May 2002

Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel has said with regard to Zimbabwe: “They say quiet diplomacy hasfailed. Should we act like Ariel Sharon? Should we? Should we just go in there; kick butt; blow them up;drive over their cars; should we send in our tanks? If there are alternative solutions, let’s hear what they are.”

August 2002

SAPA Report, 22 August 2002

“There can never be a policy for SouthAfrica to replace any government.., to discuss with anybody abouthow to replace another government,” said Pahad (Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad)

October 2002

Sunday Times (SA) Mbeki Interview, 8 October 2002

And when people say: Do something, we say to them: Do what? And nobody gives an answer, becausethey know that when they say: Do something, what they mean is march across the Limpopo and overthrowthe government of President Mugabe, which we are not going to do.

So, if that (settlement of Zimbabwe land issue under UN auspices) does not happen, beyond theinterventions that we make, no one must walk in and overthrow the government.

So, I’m saying, it is suggested that the worst crisis point in the world is Zimbabwe. It does not help us tosolve the problem of Zimbabwe, because you can see that there is a particular agenda that drives thatparticular perception about Zimbabwe. The notion that South Africa can dictate policy to theZimbabweans, I think people must stop cherishing that. The notion that South Africa can walk across theLimpopo and remove that government—do what President Bush calls regime change in Zimbabwe—this isnot going to happen.

The Sunday Times (SA), 13 October 2002

South Africa will not dictate policy to Zimbabwe, neither will it be “dragooned” into overthrowingPresident Robert Mugabe’s government, President Thabo Mbeki said this week.

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 17 October 2002

President Thabo Mbeki has reaYrmed South Africa’s policy of constructive engagement towardsZimbabwe and again rejected calls to punish President Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zanu PF party. “Weare not going to act on the Zimbabwe question with a view to punishment . . . What we have got to do is toensure that the situation in Zimbabwe changes,” he told MPs during parliamentary question time onThursday.

However, it was perfectly clear that there were people within South Africa who had a diVerent objective,Mbeki said. “Other people think our task is to punish, to defeat, to crush Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF.”Mbeki said the way to ensure human rights and democracy was not to crush, “but to ensure that Zimbabwegets onto a diVerent path”. He noted that many of those calling for the “crushing” were putting theobligation on South Africa to do so. “If they want to crush, I don’t know why they don’t do so themselves,”Mbeki said to the amusement of ANC MPs.

January 2003

ZWNEWS, 6 January 2003

Does anyone ask why SouthAfrican ForeignMinister NkosazanaDlamini Zuma fails to salute the Swaziroyal family, as she recently did Mugabe’s Zanu PF party as a “progressive force”?

Zimbabwe does not need what Mbeki calls “megaphone diplomacy”.

February 2003

The Star (SA), 3 February 2003

Zimbabwean President RobertMugabe is to introduce legislation to increase press and political freedomsin his country. This is the message President Thabo Mbeki gave British Prime Minister Tony Blair duringa six-hour meeting on Saturday at Chequers, Blair’s weekend residence outside London.

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March 2003

The Sunday Times (UK), 2 March 2003

Last month he (Mbeki) used his presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement to steer its 115 members intogiving Mugabe a unanimous vote of confidence and voting through a motion that attempted to lay blamefor the “grave humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe” on drought, the InternationalMonetary Fund and theWorld Bank.

The Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2003

In a major rebuV to South African President Thabo Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy”, the government says itwill not under any circumstances amend the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) which it needs as itschief weapon to fight the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. After two months of speculation,mainly spawned by comments from Mbeki that Zimbabwean security legislation would be relaxed, Justiceminister Patrick Chinamasa on Wednesday said POSA would not be amended as it was serving a keypurpose He (Mbeki) told Blair South African cabinet ministers who had visited Harare learnt of Mugabe’splans to ease political restrictions.

The Sunday Times (SA), 30 March 2003

Mbeki said in Parliament this week that he would deal with Zimbabwe in a manner that sought to“produce results”. “We’re not going to deal with it in a manner that makes good headlines,” he said.

May 2003

BBC News, 3 May 2003

Aspokesman for SouthAfrican President ThaboMbeki has, however, said he strongly rejected the notionthat he would go to another country to bring about regime change.

The Times (UK), 5 May 2003

While he ruled out “regime change”, MrMbeki said last week that the key issue was to bringMrMugabeand Mr Tsvangirai to the negotiating table, but he gave no further details of the talks’ agenda.

Business Day (SA), 12 May 2003

In a signal that President Thabo Mbeki is intent on quashing speculation that pressure is about to beapplied to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, he stressed in his weekly letter on the African NationalCongress (ANC) website that Zimbabweans should determine their own future, and the country’s problemswere not the result “of a reckless political leadership”.

The Daily News, 17 May 2003

Sources told The Daily News that after the visit to Harare, Tsvangirai received an oYcial invitation fromthe Malawian government, through its Foreign AVairs Ministry, to hold talks with Muluzi. They said theinvitation was received last Friday morning but was cancelled on the afternoon of that day. They said onFriday afternoon, theMDC leadership received a message from theMalawian High Commission in Hararecancelling the invitation and saying that Muluzi and Mbeki were consulting on the matter. It could not beestablished yesterday why the Malawian and South African leaders still needed to consult overTsvangirai’s visit.

June 2003

The Financial Mail (SA), 27 June 2003

Pretoria remains unhelpful. Defense minister Misiuoa Lekota blames the opposition Movement forDemocratic Change (MDC) for the impasse over talks, but again this is not so. The sole precondition setfor negotiations was by Mugabe himself, who will not talk to the MDC unless and until it drops its courtchallenge to his presidential poll victory last March.

News24, 30 June 2003

Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad said on Sunday South Africa hoped to reach a commonunderstanding with the US on Zimbabwe during the visit. He reiterated South Africa’s stance that it couldnot impose a solution on Zimbabwe. Only the Zimbabweans themselves were able to solve their problems.Outsiders could merely assist. Pahad added: “I think all of us accept that we have to do something quicklyto assist the Zimbabweans to move forward. If there are technical diVerences, we have to discuss them.”

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 141

July 2003

Zimbabwe Independent, 9 July 2003

South African President Thabo Mbeki has assured his United States counterpart George Bush thatPresident Robert Mugabe will soon quit to make way for fresh elections, diplomatic sources said yesterday.

Reports from Pretoria yesterday said Mbeki indicated to Bush that Mugabe has promised to give up theZanu PF leadership in December during Zanu PF’s annual national conference. A fresh presidential pollwould then be held in March in tandem with a parliamentary election.

October 2003

Foreign Minister Dlamini Nkosazana Zuma Speech regarding Africa, 25 October 2003

The Zimbabwean problems are taking long to resolve. The Ethiopia and Eritrean situation is also fragile.A lot has been said about how South Africa should resolve the problems of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is anindependent, sovereign state and not the 10th province of South Africa. We firmly believe that theZimbabweans themselves, across party political and other divides have the responsibility to resolve theirproblems on the basis of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. Certainly all of us want Zimbabwe to succeedand have an obligation to help them move forward. On the primary problem of the land, we believe theredistribution of land is an attempt to correct an historic injustice and we support them in that.

January 2004

The Times (UK), 23 January 2004

Speaking at a press conference in Pretoria with Gerhard Schroeder, the German Chancellor, Mr Mbekisaid that he had mediated a deal last month that had been delayed only because of the Christmas holidays.“I’m happy to say that they have agreed now that they will go into formal negotiations,” the South Africanleader said. “I’m saying that I am quite certain that they will negotiate and reach an agreement.” Theannouncement drew a sceptical response in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

October 2002

Sunday Times (SA) Mbeki Interview, 8 October 2002

The Commonwealth observer’s team had a very interesting formulation—they said the outcome of thepresidential election was not fully representative of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. They did not say itwas unrepresentative; they said it was not fully representative because they think that some people did notget on to the voters’ role and, maybe, you should have extended the time on the voting day by a few hours,or something. (Note: The Commonwealth Mission wrote: “the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequatelyallow for a free expression of will by the Electors”)

New York Times, 17 November 2002

Referring to the penalties, Dr. Zuma, speaking as she stood next to Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge ofZimbabwe during the news conference in Pretoria, said, “We don’t think that’s a situation (Commonwealthsanctions) which should continue for a long time.”

December 2002

ZWNEWS, 26 December 2002

President Mbeki makes much of the apparent contradictions between the Commonwealth ObserverGroup’s report and that of the oYcial South African observers, but makes no comment on the fact that theconclusion reached by the South African observers was solely that of the ANC and was wholly repudiatedby the members from other South African parties. This piece of obfuscation is continued by Azziz Pahad.

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Ev 142 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

January 2003

The Sunday Times (UK), 19 January 2003

To Mbeki’s dismay the Commonwealth observers’ report made action against Mugabe inevitable. Theonly concession hewonwas that Zimbabwe’s suspension from the organisation was limited to a year.Mbekireturned to South Africa making furious comments about the “white Commonwealth” and declaring that“if the decision-making process within the Commonwealth is to be informed by this kind of thinking, it isnot worth maintaining the association”.

March 2003

The Sunday Times (SA), 30 March 2003

“Otherwise there is no consistency and the outcome is a consequence of a political and proceduraltravesty,” Mabuza (SA High Commissioner London) raged. Deputy Foreign AVairs Minister Aziz Pahadwent further to say that South Africa wanted a review of the decision. South Africa seems confident thatAfrica and other developing nations are willing to back Zimbabwe to the hilt, as South Africa does.

April 2003

The Guardian (UK), 10 April 2003

The Guardian has obtained a copy of the confidential report by Don McKinnon, the Commonwealthsecretary general . . . The report, which was commissioned in March 2002 when Zimbabwe was firstsuspended from the Commonwealth, categorically refutes assertions made last month by ThaboMbeki, thepresident of South Africa, and Nigeria’s leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, that the situation in Zimbabwe hadimproved.

September 2003

ABC News Australia, 16 September 2003

A spokesman for South African President Thabo Mbeki, Bheki Khumalo, says Zimbabwe should beincluded in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). “We are very disappointedbecause we don’t think that excluding Zimbabwe from CHOGM in Nigeria will achieve anything,” he said,“We would have hoped that Zimbabwe would have been invited to attend the meeting.” Zimbabwe wassuspended from the councils of the Commonwealth last year when it failed to contain political violence andintimidation.

The Times (UK), 17 September 2003

However, Bheki Khumalo, President Mbeki’s spokesman, insisted that there was nothing to be gainedfrom barring Mr Mugabe from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja.“We want to appeal to the Australians to understand that megaphone diplomacy will not produce results,”Mr Khumalo said. “Sanctions have been imposed against Zimbabwe now for a number of months with noresult at all, and we don’t think that using megaphone diplomacy will work.”

Business Day (SA), 19 September 2003

There was no additional sanction barring Zimbabwe from attending the Commonwealth summit to beheld in Nigeria in December, President Thabo Mbeki said yesterday. Mbeki reminded the NationalAssembly that Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth had been for a period of a year, which hadpassed in March. He said the decision to suspend Zimbabwe for a year was taken within a very specificmandate. “The troika decided to impose a maximum sentence of suspension for a year and that has beenserved. I am not aware of any additional sanctions.”

Mail and Guardian (SA), 20 September 2003

“Our view is that the Commonwealth imposed the maximum penalty on Zimbabwe by suspending it. forone year. We do not understand this business of Australia saying that Zimbabwe [should still be] excluded.You cannot impose a specific punishment on a country and then, because you don’t like it, simply decideto continue that punishment.”

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 143

October 2003

ZWNEWS, 1 October 2003

Nigerian President Obasanjo, the Commonwealth summit host, said in an. interview Monday withallAfrica.com. That only a sea change in Zimbabwe would get Mugabe an invitation. Of the ban on theDaily News he added, “I will say that if it qualifies as a sea change at all, it is a negative sea change.”

December 2003

Mbeki article in ANC Weekly Newsletter, 12 December 2003

During the Abuja CHOGM those accustomed to the practice of disinformation described as “spin” dideverything to communicate false reports to themedia. They campaigned and lobbied to ensure the continuedsuspension of Zimbabwe. We deliberately avoided engaging in any of these activities. We fed no stories tothe media. We did not campaign. We lobbied nobody. Yet the story is put out that we lobbied, blockedagreements, and dismally failed to achieve our objectives.

CHAPTER 3

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST

May 2002

News24 (SA), 21 May 2002

The European Union has reportedly called on Southern African Development Community governmentsto refrain from “normal diplomatic relations with the Mugabe Regime.”

November 2002

New York Times, 17 November 2002

The South African foreign minister. Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, said it was time for Western nations toconsider ending penalties they imposed on Zimbabwe for intimidating opposition party supporters, judges,journalists and white farmers, andmanipulating the presidential election. “We don’t think that’s a situationwhich should continue for a long time.”

Asked whether South Africa was condoning lawlessness, Dr. Zuma said it was important to look ahead.“Even if Zimbabwe made a mistake the point is that we need to move to the future,” she said.

Business Day (SA), 25 November 2002

EU: ACP at odds over exclusion of Zimbabweans

SA delegates to the conference want the Zimbabweans to attend. Last week ForeignMinister NkosazanaDlamini-Zuma said SA would seek to have international sanctions against the beleaguered state lifted.

October 2002

Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 13 October 2002

In an interview with the Sunday Times, Mbeki said the West’s suggestion that “the worst crisis in theworld is Zimbabwe” was not helping to solve that country’s problems.

CHAPTER 4

PLAYING THE RACE CARD

May 2002

SABC News, May 2002

“We should work towards bringing the Zimbabweans back from the brink. We should not be the onesthat push them to the precipice,” Dlamini-Zuma also expressed concern about the “fast-growing right-wingtrend in the developed world” that was being manifested through xenophobia, Islamaphobia and racistpolicies. South Africa’s hosting of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,Xenophobia and Related Intolerance to stem the tide of this rabid racism was correct, she said. “It is ourhope that the international community will implement without further delays the programme adopted atthe conference to push back the frontiers of racism,” she said.

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Ev 144 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

May 2003

Business Day (SA), 22 May 2003

In his weekly letter (ANC Today, May 9–15), Mbeki incredulously claims that “(c)ontrary to what somenow claim, the economic crisis currently aVecting Zimbabwe did not originate from the actions of a recklesspolitical leadership or corruption” and blames Zimbabwe’s ills on abstract historical forces and economicinevitability, not on Mugabe’s rotten leadership.

No, according toMbeki, Zimbabwe’s economic decline has to do with a racist negotiated settlement withLondon, that” quarantined the matter of land redistribution because of agreements reached” and that“sought to counterbalance the principle of black liberation with the protection of white property, insertinginto the settlement the racist notions of black majority rule and white minority rights”.

June 2003

SAPA News, 5 June 2003

Last week Mbeki defended Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in an article in The Guardian inBritain entitled “Don’t blame Mugabe for everything”.

Mbeki’s analysis of the crisis in Zimbabwe was full of evasions and half-truths. Nowhere in his article didhe ever mention abuses of human rights or the destruction of democracy. lie ignored Mugabe’s virulentracism and blamed London for any “racist notions” that might exist in Zimbabwe.

September 2003

The Daily Nation (Kenya), 18 September 2003

When it comes to Zimbabwe, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki seems determined to split theCommonwealth along racist lines by insisting that President Robert Mugabe be invited to the Club’sDecember summit in Nigeria. This is only the latest intervention by the South African leader on behalf ofthe Mugabe regime. Last year Mr Mbeki attacked “white supremacists” within the Commonwealth whodared criticise the collapse of law and order in Zimbabwe.

December 2003

Mbeki article in ANC Weekly Newsletter, 12 December 2003

In time, and in the interest of “kith and kin” (British), the core of the challenge facing the people ofZimbabwe, as identified by the Coolum CHOGM, has disappeared from public view. Its place has beentaken by the issue of human rights. Those who have achieved this miracle are not waiting passively for freeinstitutions to evolve.

The Sunday Independent (SA), 14 December 2003

President Thabo Mbeki has shocked foreign diplomats and some local observers by justifyingZimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s forcible seizure of white farmland as “perhaps inevitable”, Theyhave also reacted with dismay to what they called Mbeki’s “deeply oVensive” remarks written in his weeklyelectronic letter in his party’s website journal, ANC Today. These include the charge that Britain opposedZimbabwe’s readmission to the Commonwealth this week merely to protect its “white, settler, colonial kithand kin”. And that western powers are using the demand for Mugabe to respect human rights merely as atool for “regime change” in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 5

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

November 2002

New York Times, 17 November 2002

Referring to the penalties, Dr. Zuma, speaking as she stood next to Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge ofZimbabwe during the news conference in Pretoria, said, “We don’t think that’s a situation which shouldcontinue for a long time.”

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 145

Many African oYcials are also suspicious of all the Western talk about human rights in Zimbabwe whenthere is little talk about human rights in other African countries. “In other African countries where humanrights are ignored, it’s business as usual,” said Claude Kabema, the acting director of the Electoral Instituteof Southern Africa. “That’s why many people have failed to embrace the Western position. They see it ashypocrisy.”

April 2003

SABC News, 16 April 2003

Sudan and Zimbabwe escape censure at UN rights meeting

The United Nations top human rights body rejected an European Union motion condemning abuses inSudan today and blocked a bid to put Zimbabwe in the dock . . .

However, African countries led by South Africa voted to prevent any further action being taken on theEU call, a similar outcome to last year.

January 2004

Mail and Guardian (SA), 5 January 2004

But what is most revealing in Mbeki’s ANC Today commentary is his resentment of any foreign policythat is driven by concern for human rights.

CHAPTER 6

THE LAND ISSUE

November 2001

Justin Pearce—News Online November 2001

Instead Mr Mbeki- with the support of Namibia’s Sam Nujoma and Mozambican President JoachimChissano—aYrmed his support for the land reform process in Zimbabwe, without censuring Mr Mugabefor failing to stop the violence which accompanied the seizure of land.

May 2002

The Guardian (UK), 31 May 2002

He (Mbeki) declined to criticise Mr Mugabe and defended Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programmeas a “correction of a colonial legacy”, dismissing opposition assertions that the land seizures were a coverto crush political opponents.

“The land redistribution in Zimbabwe cannot be called an excuse,”MrMbeki said. “To turn around andsay the land redistribution is an excuse is very unfeeling. There are people in Zimbabwe who are very poor,who don’t have land.” He said the country’s crisis was the result of a century’s old wrong whichMrMugabehad been unable to address sooner because he was constrained by a constitution imposed on him by Britaintwo decades ago. The solution to Zimbabwe’s problems would take some time,”MrMbeki said, ‘just as thesolution to the Palestine problem won’t take just a day.”

November 2002

The Financial Gazette, 14 November 2002

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: Seized Farms

“We think it would be nice to end this matter in a neater way, in a way that does not leave a sector ofthe Zimbabwean population bitter and that all those who lose land are compensated,” she said, referring toMugabe’s land seizures. “We are looking to countries like Britain to try and assist (in compensation).” Shethen urged the international community to aid Zimbabwe regardless of the government’s mistakes. “Evenif Zimbabwe made a mistake, the point is that we need to move to the future,” she said. “No one can changeyesterday, no one can change today, but we can change the future.”

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Ev 146 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

January 2003

The Guardian (UK), 11 January 2003

The South Africa labour minister, Membathisi Mdladlana, said in Zimbabwe yesterday that his countryhad a lot to learn from President Robert Mugabe’s programme of land reform, The political opposition inSouth Africa denounced his remarks as “chilling”. Mr Mdladlana said during a tour of farms that it was“important that black people should also own land that they till, and know how to produce food and beself-suYcient and sustainable”. The South African Press Association also quoted him as saying that SouthAfrica had a lot to learn about land reform from its neighbour. His comments were trumpeted byZimbabwe’s state press as strongly supportive of Mr Mugabe’s land seizures, which are widely seen as theprimary cause of the country’s current famine.

December 2003

Mbeki article in ANC Weekly Newsletter, 12 December2003

With everything having failed to restore the land to its original owners in a peaceful manner a forcibleprocess of land redistribution perhaps became inevitable.

CHAPTER 7

MISCELLANEOUS

Elections

May 2002

Business Day (SA), 31 May 2002

The Zimbabwean authorities “inadequately adhered” to their country’s laws when conducting theMarch9–11 election that saw Robert Mugabe re-elected as the president, according to the SA observer mission’sfinal report. The report which was recently submitted to President Thabo Mbeki but not yet made publicalso says that the will of Zimbabweans was demonstrated by the poll only “to a degree”. The 50-membermulti-sectoral observer mission appointed by Mbeki and headed by businessman and African NationalCongress member Sam Motsuenyane declared the poll “substantially free and fair” when it announced itsverdict immediately after the poll. The finding was repudiated at the time by some members of the missionand other observer missions, such as the one from the European Union. After some damage control, themission then “clarified” the report, saying it was an interim one and that other members of the mission hadyet to make their input.

A more elaborate criticism of the election lies hidden in the mission’s 13 “recommendations” in whichvoices of dissent point out that there is an explicit acknowledgment of all the issues raised by other missions,and which led to other international observers raising questions about the credibility of the election.

“Without these fundamentals, allegations of fraud can easily be made resulting in a situation that castsdoubts and aspersions on the integrity of the elections,” the report notes, concluding nevertheless that theelection outcome represented “the legitimate voice of the people of Zimbabwe”.

March 2003

The Sunday Times (UK), 2 March 2003

Mbeki made strenuous eVorts to ensure that observers from both South Africa and the Organisation ofAfrican Unity declared the poll free and fair. Last month he used his presidency of the Non-AlignedMovement to steer its 115 members into giving Mugabe a unanimous vote of confidence.

January 2004

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 5 January 2004

When the team’s chair Sam Motsuenyane was asked why there had been insuYcient polling stations inHarare, an opposition stronghold, he replied that it was an “administrative oversight”.

Freedom of the Press in Zimbabwe

February 2003

The Star (SA), 18 February 2003

Last yearMbeki told the worldMugabe would scrap the new press restrictions. InsteadMugabe has seento it that they are tightened and the Daily News is out of business—to the delight of our foreign minister.

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 147

March 2003

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 3 March 2003

First was Minister of Foreign AVairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. “But what’s wrong with registeringjournalists?” was the bottom line of her message. Then came Minister of Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment Penuell Maduna. The gist of his theme: “Why assume that registration of the media isnecessarily bad?” Their mantra has been making many media people angry, because it whitewashesZimbabwe’s repression of the press via registration.

On the contrary, its ministers are now actively defending Zimbabwe’s violations of basic rights. “Weaccept the Aippa,” says Dlamini-Zuma.

Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2003

Mbeki has made a number of statements suggesting Zimbabwe would amend POSA and the Access toinformation and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the last as recently as this week. “We have agreed withthe government of Zimbabwe that they should attend to the pieces of legislation that are said to oVendhuman rights (and) the press,” he told African clerics meeting in Midrand on Monday.

Treason Trial

February 2003

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 18 February 2003

SouthAfrica’sDeputyForeignMinister, Aziz Pahad, has saidZimbabwean law should be allowed to takeits course, and that it would be premature to dismiss the charges against Tsvangirai as bogus.

EPILOGUE

December 2003

New York Times, 19 December 2003

On Thursday, Mr. Mbeki stood solidly with Mr. Mugabe in public. Speaking to about 200 supporters ofMr. Mugabe’s governing Zanu Party, MrMbeki emphasized their countries’ history of white minority rule.“In the African Revolution, we shared the trenches together,” he said, according to Zimbabwean state radio

The Sunday Independent (SA), 21 December 2003

Mbeki said: “Our countries have shared common problems. As they shared the common problems ofoppression, they share common problems today. President Mugabe can assist us to confront the problemswe have in South Africa so that we can assist you to solve the problems that face Zimbabwe.”

23 March 2004

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Oral and Written Evidence

The Decision to go to War in Iraq HC 1025-I and

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Session 2001–02 REPORTS

Twelfth Report FCO Annual Report 2002 HC 826 (Cm 5712)

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Ninth Report Private Military Companies HC 922 (Cm 5642)

Eighth Report Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny (Quadripartite Committee)

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