SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE no 5

SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSESCIENCE MAGAZINE IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Year III, No. 5

Banja Luka, june 2013.

Th e Publisher:Th e association of sociologists - Banja Luka,Bulevar Vojovode Petra Bojovića 1A, 78 000 Banja Luka, Serbian Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the Publisher:Ivan Šijaković, Ph.D., Full ProfessorChairman of the association of sociologists - Banja Luka

Scientifi c Editorial Board:Ivan Šijaković Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Banja Luka Braco Kovačević Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Banja LukaLazo Ristić Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Banja LukaNenad Suzić Ph.D., Full Professor, Philosophical Faculty, University of Banja LukaBožo Milošević Ph.D., Full Professor, Philosophical Faculty, University of Novi SadDragoljub B. Đorđević Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, University of NišSergej Flere Ph.D., Full Professor, Philosophical Faculty, University of MariborGabriela Klein Ph.D., Full Professor, Philosophical Faculty, University of HamburgChris Baldry Ph.D., Full Professor, University of Stirling, Scotland, UKSlavo Kukić Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of MostarDželal Ibraković Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo

Secretary of the Editorial Board:Nemanja Đukić PhD., Senior Research Assistant

Executive Editorial Board:Ivan Šijaković Ph.D., Full Professor (Chief Editor)Braco Kovačević Ph.D., Full Professor (editor)Lazo Ristić Ph.D., Full Professor (editor)Nemanja Đukić PhD., Senior Research Assistant (editor)Saša Laketa MSc., Teaching Assistant (technical editor)Milovan Tatić (operational editor)Tamara Straživuk (translator)Jelena Vignjević (translator)Maja Došenović (translator)Mirjana Tomaš-Đukić, prof. (lector)

Editorial Contact information:Bulevar Vojovode Petra Bojovića 1A, 78 000 Banja LukaE-mail: [email protected]: www.socioloskidiskurs.comPhone: +387 65 456-169

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Decision of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Srpska No.: 07.030-053-85-6/11 from 12.05.2011. year, “Sociological Discourse” Banja Luka was entered in the Register of the media numbered 616th

CONTENTS

TODOR KULJIĆ

Th anatopolitics and thanatosociology – draft of the theoretical and conceptual framework ........................................................................................ 5

NEMANJA ĐUKIĆ

Th e society of anxiety .............................................................................................. 21

JELENA VUKOIČIĆ

Radical feminism as a discourse in the theory of confl ict ......................................... 33

GOJKO PAVLOVIĆ

Development of the idea of security ........................................................................ 51

GORAN STOJANOVIĆ

Morality and mysticism (Ethical research of ethics and religion) .............................. 67

MAJA ISOVIĆ

Th e age of (omni)policy .......................................................................................... 79

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS ..................................................................... 87

INSTRUCTIONS TO REVIEWERS..................................................................... 90

5

Todor Kuljić1

Faculty of [email protected]

Original scientific paperUDC 393:[316.75+141.7]DOI 10.7251/SOCEN1305005KAccepted: 02.06.2013.

Th anatopolitics and thanatosociology2

– draft of the theoretical and conceptual framework –

Abstract

Th e aim of the appendix is to show the directions of sociological re-search of political use of death. Th ere are two related Social Science discourses on death: (1) thanatos sociological, which deals with social inequalities in mortality, and (2) thanatopolitical, in which center is the political instrumentalization of death. It is shown the historical evolution of these relations to death and are considered diff erent the-oretical and methodological starting points that explain the political side of death and its symbolic capital. Th e vision of death has changed, as well as political use of the death. Th e most attention was devoted to a class-tier thanatological diff erences. Classes do not show only eco-nomic inequality, but also the symbolic and cultural inequality, and so they also diff er in relation to the death. It is presented a draft for the sociological framework for the study of historical class interests that determine the ideological use of death.

Key words: death, the symbolic capital of death, thanatopolitics, thanatos sociology.

From the dead do not live only gravediggers, but also power. Th is does not only apply to the use of legally punishable death penalty, but also on various ideologisations of dying of unconvicted that are regulating the historical diverse normative thanatology. Th e problem would have been easier if a colorful use of the death is only recognizable part of the hegemonic ideologies which prescribe those socially integrative values with which we should frame the meaning of life

1 Full Professor at the department of Faculty of Philosophy. E-mail: [email protected] Th e article was written as part of the project “Social Actors and Social Changes in Serbia 1990-2010” No.149005 funded by the Ministry of Science and Environmental Protection of Republic of Serbia

Sociological discourse, year 3, number 5 / june 2013. 5 – 20

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completion. Th ings are, however, complicated by the fact that the aforementio-ned contents are always a part of less intrusive values that underpin the broader moral order. Death, in fact, is not used only by politicians but it has an impor-tant place in the general structure of symbolic communication and justifi cation of diff erent authorities. It is therefore important that dead ones are often claimed as integrative symbols of various segments of the system, and their direct and indirect political role should be explored. Th is is the essence of critical thanato-logy investigating the social inequalities in mortality and ideological use of the death. Are the cultural patterns of relating to death, and regulating the expres-sion of mourning and piety, supertime rituals that are beyond the justifi cation of inequality of living ones? Not at all. Th e attitude towards death is politically and ideologically very useful, despite that the ruling are also mortal beings. We are not only unequal in life, but the prescribed norms and coping with the death are also the part of ideology that justifi es the inequality of living ones. Hence the justifi cation for criticism of various thanatological ideologies, ie. the research of standardizing the death by the living ruling groups. Th e aim of this paper is to show the directions of sociological research of the political use of death.

1.

Just like any other, no sociologist can speak about the recent death because this fact is not in his experience. And his theme is only an indirect relations-hip of the living to the dying ones, the dead and the beyond. Sociological and Political inference of this relationship lies in the related approach of separate disciplines of thanatos sociology and thanatopolitics. Th e names are derived from the Greek word Th anatos which in Hesiod’s theogony means the god of death, the cruel son of the night and brother of Hypnos, the god of sleep. Th ere are two related Social Science discourses on death: (1) thanatos sociological, which deals with social inequalities in mortality, and (2) thanatopolitical, in which center is the political instrumentalization of bodies. Both are linked be-cause the political funeral rituals and various ideologisations of death can not be considered outside the real historical conditions of death. In the form of a simple formula we could say that thanatopolitics examines the political uses of death and thanatos sociology the deeper side of the ritualized death. Both eff orts are the study of social conditioning the symbols of death. To make this complex and historically variable activity investigated it is needed a wider tha-natos sociological framework. Th is means that in every age we should start from the hegemonic interpretations of death and the vision of a good death in which are directly or indirectly expressed interests of those groups that are capable to

Th anatopolitics and thanatosociology – Todor Kuljić draft of the theoretical and conceptual framework

7

impose them. Th e dead go to heaven or hell, their soul by the reincarnation moves to another bodily forms, or however, they become an eternal part of the collective memory of a nation or class. Although it draws on the ontological view diff erent historical hegemonic interpretations of death (mythical, religious, secular), in all versions the thanatopolitics is the practice of using death for the sake of political gain. Sociological part of death is the relationship between gro-up interests and the ways of their mobilization through dramatic ritualization of death. Th e narrower sociological cognitive aspect of the problem concerns the diff erent theoretical and methodological assumptions of explaining the social side of death and its symbolic capital. In other words, how the symbolic power as an instrument of domination imposes the meaning and the purpose of the termination of life?

Th anatopolitical literature is less famous than thanatos sociological. Th e po-litical death cult and political use of the dead rulers have been long defi ned wit-hin a specifi c understanding of the relationship of theology and politics, church and state. Th erefore, the history of this relationship could not be avoided. Book by Ernst Kantorovich “Two bodies of the King” is in many ways an unpreceden-ted historiographical attempt of interpretation of thanatopolitical connection of church and state in Western Christianity3. From authors that are also directly engaged in the political use of the death should be mentioned historical studies of Jean Delumeau, Philip Aries, Jacques Le Goff , Jan Asman, politicological Michael Blaine, Olaf and Peter Rader Berghof, anthropological Louis-Vincent Th omas and Katherine Verdery, sociological study of Klaus Feldmann and soci-omedical collection of Dominique Gros.4

2.

It is no cynicism if at the beginning we warn that the death for the sociologist is not primarily a tragedy of an individual but a factor of social development. In what way? First of all, death is functional from the standpoint of development of society. Social stability requires the change of generations, the disappearance and withdrawal of the older and breakthrough of the younger that not only are not burdened with the past experiences but also have diff erent expectations. With the disappearance of the older and their beliefs are also disappearing, and creating space for a new generational consciousness. Th us, as noted by Ameri-can sociologist M.Kerl in the U.S., gender and racial equality penetrated only 3 Ernst H.Kantorowicz, Die zwei Körper des Königs – Eine Studie zur politischen Th eologie des Mittelalters, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990.4 Th e titles of books and publications see in the list of references at the end of this article.


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with disappearance of the older. Th en, death does not relieve only a space for the emergence of new ideas, but also brings people together and creates new forms of solidarity. Various rituals around the victims and martyrs reinforce the value of the group and strengthen its homogeneity. In a sociological sense, it is also important to note that the social status of those who are more likely to die is always lower. Today, a new-born child can not leave the hospital without a name. And in the 18th century child was not given a name until sixth year since the infant mortality was high. Simply put, they did not count on children for very long, warns Kerl. Th anks to the medical progress early death, child morta-lity was gradually regulated, and, dying is increasingly narrowing down to the elderly. Changes to the economy and society, plural values and world views have changed standards and tolerance limits, class, ethnic and gender conventions, and thus dealing with the unpleasant and painful. Th e memory of the dead was changing and the use of the imperatives memento mori.

All in all, death was never a physiological cessation of life, but has always had a variety of important functions in the world of the living. Even we can talk about the system of the death. It is a term that was in 1977. introduced by Robert Kastenbaum and defi ned as “inter-personal, socio-cultural and symbolic network with which society mediates the relationship of the individual towards death”5. Th is complex system provides a more conceptual and institutional channels: hegemonic consciousness (ie, other-worldly images), regulation of the death (the hospital), the burial (funeral rites), determination of the place of burial (cemetery), spatial regulation of the memories of the dead (monuments), a time marking the date of death (Day of the Dead, Easter) and laws (the death penalty). Death systems are not static but historically very variable. For their study it is required a diff erentiated theoretical and conceptual framework.

Before defi ning it, it should be noted that at the deepest level, changes in society have always been a framework for the change in mindset about death. In other words, not so much thirst for knowledge encouraged individuals to gradually change death, but it was more contributed by organized interests of new groups that were bothered by monopoly of the previous groups over the interpretation and the use of the death. Christianity was legalized in the slavery era only when it was estimated to be more useful than paganism to the ruling circles, who wanted to centralize the empire using monotheism. In the Middle Ages without the Christian vision of judgment could not be controled the un-derprivileged. Th e monopoly of the same church over the political use of death was destroyed only when it disturbed strengthened bourgeoisie and the nation in the capitalism.5 Doka Kenneth, Death system, 2012. http://www.deathreference.com/Da-Em/Death-System.html (retrieved in September of 2012).


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It was always a new symbolism of death that was active conceptual content of the new revolutionary thought and communication. Th is happened on vari-ous ideological and social milestones, when the magic was replaced by religion as monotheism suppressed paganism, when the monopoly of the church was destroyed and when the offi cial atheism was introduced. Active class-ply factors were permeated with a variety of concrete historical cultural context. Even if at the same time they were in varying degrees active and visible, they were always present. Th e most visible were certainly at the detecting controller of symbolic capital of death. More immediate were expressed in everyday life. Th e daily co-ping with death was diff erent when life was shorter and child mortality higher. In the Middle Ages the death belonged to life, the living was not disappearing, but was passed over to death. Only the sudden death was a terrible death. It was not until the beginning of the new century when death began to be regarded as an interruption of life, as the defi nitive disappearance and destruction. Th is change suggested the crisis of the previous controllers of death. In the romance the death was dramatized, and with the progress of medicine it has been tran-sferred from the family to the hospital, which was also a consequence of major social change.

It is not, of course, enough to warn that every epoch is dominated by a cer-tain view of the causes of death and the after-death state, which is more or less organized monitored. It should be added that in the action there id diff erent seeing the meaning or meaninglessness of life interrupted. It is this ability to design the death that makes it the symbolic capital of the living. Th e mysterious and indefi nable state of death will not be simplifi ed and reductionist explained if you presume that the symbolization of death is not timeless, and things will be clearer if we add to this that the valuation of life and death is always more or less culturally conditioned by complex and changing social history. Like other hi-storical, and these changes have proceeded at a diff erent pace. When the Dutch historian J. Huizinga says that medieval division of society into castes deeply permeates theology and politics, because God himself has ordained that every social class has the function of holiness and glory6, he thus implicitly explains the fear of this existence of life in the Middle Ages in which the real goal was beyond this world. For the medieval men equality consisted of gender equality in death, not in equality in life7, and priority of otherworldly declined in We-stern Europe in the 18th century, when the fear of life gives way to courage and hope 8. Cultural norms and symbols that are directly or indirectly linked with death in particular have changed dramatically in the last two centuries. Moder-

6 Johan Huizinga, Autumn of the Middle Ages, Novi Sad: Serbian Heritage, 1991. p.74-75.7 Th e Same, p.81.8 Th e Same, p.46-47.


10

nization, the dissolution of the patriarchal society, the weakening of religion and medical advances are important incentives to change the attitude towards death. Th e disappearance of the fear of God’s judgment has not changed only the fear of death but also the use of the death. Th ere has been a change in the method of death, and mourning.

Th ere are even more complex class-ply elucidate diff erences. Classes do not show only economic inequality, but also the symbolic and cultural inequality, so they diff er in emotional dimension of social life. Th e emotional dimension of inequality is also refl ected in relation to the death. Simply put, it is a diff erent attitude of classes towards health, and unequal between them is the risk of di-sease. In addition to living longer and better than the poor, the expectations of life are diff erent in wealthier. Social class diff erences in the conditioned cultural practice of this kind are crucial and also exist in the face of death. Th e poor most likely less mourned dead, because of the high mortality rate of children in their ranks. As convincingly demonstrated by Parisian historian J. Delumeau the regret for the deceased children was long mingled with the fear of newborn children being unbaptized. Th is was sponsored by church because it considered that the baptized child dies free from the original sin and goes to heaven, while unbaptized wander.Saint Augustine wrote that died unbaptized children will be punished with everlasting fi re because of the original sin9. Because of that, as stated by Delumeau in France in the 14th century appeared temples for the baptism of children who died before baptism. Both Catholics and Protestants later spread the fear of dying without baptism, and catechism of the 17th cen-tury especially in the countryside heightened the fear of unbaptized children. Th ese prejudices were easily spread with an ignorant world, and the poor were more closer to death because in the lower classes, the death was more frequent and earlier than in the rich classes. Bloated aristocratic contempt for the people has been long defended by church apology of feudal feudalism by which God created the common people to work, the clergy to take care of religion, and the nobility to care about justice 10. Th erefore, the sorrow could long be strongly expressed only in the artistic monument of the upper class. Only in the 19th century scarce monuments and luxurious funerals could become a symbol of popular culture of death. It was at this ceremony and snobbery and hiding the status as in the Victorian culture of death where the middle and working class emulated the aristocracy. But all funerals were cathartic. If the way of life does not defi ne and the death situation the answers to death would be uniformed. But it is not like that. Th e diff erences are not only historical but also a political.

9 Jean Delumeau, Sin and fear - Creating a sense of guilt in the West from the fourteenth to the eigh-teenth century, Novi Sad: Literary community, 1986. p.418.10 Johan Huizinga, Autumn of the Middle Ages, Novi Sad: Serbian Heritage, 1991. p.75


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Physiologically individual lives are extinguished due to similar causes of action, but the group variously constructs and evaluates the death of “innocent vic-tims”, “hero” or “villain”. It is a diff erent symbolization of violent from natural death, so its action potential (revenge) is also diff erent.

3.

After the French Revolution as a key world-historical turning point in the new century arrived several new waves of change that changed the attitude to-wards death. Th us, in the second half of the 19th century in England began to decline the impact of the doctrine of heaven and the Last Judgment and the we-akening of the Christian vision of the good death. Changes were happening by atheists whose number has increased in England not long after the appearance of Darwin theory of evolution. Secularization followed by the growth and aging of the population has slightly changed the meaning and signifi cance of death. Th e average length of life, nature and scope of the deadly disease aff ected the use of death. Here are some historical data. According to the records of the Roman jurists Ulpian from the 3rd century in Rome only half of the births experienced 5 years, only 40% had experienced 20 years, and only 4% of generation was over 70 years old11. Th is demographic “normal state” was true with regional characteristics and social diff erences until the late Middle Ages. Child morta-lity was high until the advent of antibiotics, and because the Catholic Church allowed only believers to be buried with the faithful, the peasants even in the 19th century rushed to baptize their children because they were afraid that if the children die they will wander without rest12. Death of children and young people was more trivial than it is today. Between the 15th and 18th century the strong bias towards the child dominated, and the Renaissance only slightly changed it. Th ere was a diff erent collective sensibility. In an age devoid of pity were hardening the hearts for the children, and it was said, “For a small child, a little regret”13. Apart from the impotence of medicine, the high mortality was encouraged by disease, hunger and war. Striking are the diff erences between the 19th and 20th century. Th e population of Great Britain from 20 million in 1841 increased to 54 million in 1971 thanks to the progress of medicine. Th e widespread use of the more accessible penicillin has in the 20th century opened

11 Héctor Wittwer, Daniel Schäfer i Andreas Frewer, Sterben und Tod, 2010. https://www.metzler-verlag.de/buecher/.../978-3-476-02230-1 pdf (retrieved in October 2012). p.2.12 Jean Delumeau, Sin and fear - Creating a sense of guilt in the West from the fourteenth to the eigh-teenth century, Novi Sad: Literary community, 1986. p.415.13 Th e Same. p. 403.


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a new era of life extension. Th e reputation of the physician increased, which further weakened the faith in the miracle of religion and the church. Th e im-proved Penicillin was the fi rst antibiotic drug which was produced in suffi cient quantities to save millions of lives. It signifi cantly reduced the percentage of pre-mature death, and thus changed the culture of mourning. At the same time the advances in medicine slowly moved death from home to hospital. In Germany, in 2005 the 47.3% died in the hospital, in institutions for fostering 20-30%, and in their own homes or with relatives 20-30%14. Death was in the genera-tional view slowly and irrevocably becoming more and more a problem of the older people. Th e average life expectancy in the developed countries of the EU at the beginning of the 21st century is between 75 and 80 years, and a century ago it was only about 45 years. Th us, in 2005 in Germany from a total of 830 000 deaths the 47.6% were those of 80 years and older. Th e infant death was 0.39%. Th e enormous rise of the average expectation of life in the 21st century is the result of circumstances that in the developed world people do not die from infection, but from a degenerative processes15. Th at death indirectly infl uences policy are saying the following information. In the 20th century in the United States the proportion of elderly population has increased dramatically. In 1900 only 4.1% of the population had 65 years and over, in 1940 already 6.8%, in 1960 9.2%, in 2000 already 12.3%, for 2010 was overlooked 13.2%, for 2025 is calculated to be 18.2% and for the year 2050 is expected to be probably abo-ut 20.3%. With an aging of population mortality rates are also rising, so the industry related to death is more and more profi table16. Furthermore, the need for care of elderly is rising, voters are getting older, and the elections are decided by those who expect less from life, the elderly, not the young. Th erefore, it be-comes even more important, and even a political issue - how to regulate death? Everyday language registers the increasing expansion of words centered around death: cancer, oncology, metastasis, clinical death, memorials, remembering the dead, AIDS, virtual cemeteries, death industries. Th ere are more and more TV series about hospitals, and in economic terms, in addition to funeral practices, rituals, there is a funeral industry, funeral expenses and profi ts of burial. All in all, a natural death of the aging is more normal than dying young, and hence the relationship to death is today diff erent than for the example in the14th century, when a deadly plague epidemic was untamable and was massively taking young people’s lives. However, a period of elderly suff ering from dementia and weak-

14 Gerd Gockenjahn, “Sterben in unserer Gesellschaft - Ideale und Wirklichkeiten”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 4, 2008. p. 1015 Th e Same. p. 9. 16 Clifton Bryant, “Th e Sociology of Death and Dying”, 21st Century Sociology, Bryant, C / Peck, D, 2007. p. 163-164


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nesses in advanced age is prolonged. Th e fear of being old began to compete with the fear of death.

Th e public mourning culture was also changing. From the late 18th century civil mourning culture began to be expressed in newspaper obituaries, fi rst as a means of business leaders to announce changes after the death of the entre-preneur. In the early 19th century, the fi rst private funeral homes were appea-ring and burials were taken from the families. Since the late 19th century labor movement began to use the funerals of their leader for political events, such as social democracy during Bismarck. In parallel with this comes the death tech-nicalisation with the construction of crematoriums which culminated in the bureaucratic destruction of the people in Nazi concentration camps.

Active elucidate factors were the world wars of the 20th century. Mass kil-lings on the front have brought the new changes in coping with death. In paral-lel with the development of medicine has increased the number of young people (soldiers) who died. In wars, the children died before their parents. Th ey were the waves of the new unnatural terminations of life-like plague of the Middle Ages. Mass deaths in war have spurred development of a new culture of public mourning of fallen soldiers and opened a new space for state use of death. Death of the killed ones in the world wars overshadowed the death of the deceased in mass epidemics (such was the Spanish fl u from 1918 to 1919).

All in all in the action were contradictory processes of the unsynchronized suppression and actualization of death. Despite the strength of indicated general trends of development, these processes of long rhythm were unevenly expressed in developed and developing countries and among diff erent classes and genera-tions. Th ere were the colorful cultures of the death use. Not only the same clas-ses, but also the same generations in diff erent countries had diff erent attitudes towards death. In this vast multitude is important to note that the winners on one side and the losers in war on the other side developed a diff erent cultures of mourning and remembrance of the dead. Th at is not only proved by silence abo-ut their own victims in Germany after the fall of fascism and mass politicization of the killed ones at anti-fascist winners during the Cold War. Asymmetric situ-ation happened after the collapse of the Cold War in the Balkans. Croatia and Kosovo gained independence in the civil war, in contrast to Serbia, which lost part of its territory, so here the memory of those killed in the liberation euphoria was diff erent than at the depressed losers. Suppressed regret and celebration of martyrdom was uneven, and the politicization of death also. Death is always a politically symbolic capital of the winners, but not of the losers.

Mentioned social changes should always be kept in mind because otherwise the approach to explore the political use of the death would be devoid of hi-storicity and remained static and sterile. Th is may be because the discourse on


14

death, coping strategies, and fi nally death instrumentalization make a dynamic conceptual, ideological and organizational unity that historically has been im-proving and so it was usually adjusted to the needs of the ruling circles. Not only that in diff erent historical encounters with death are dominated various forms of social consciousness (magic, religion, atheism), but the proportion of these consciousness is diff erent in the very rituals. French anthropologist Louis Vin-cent Th omas noted that the tomb shows the presence of the myth, the funeral demonstrates the power of magic, and only burial is a purely human process 17. When dealing with death homo sapiens has used mythical, magical, religious and secular content and rituals. Belief in the afterlife is just one of the ways of repression and overcoming death. Relationship to the corpse (burial, em-balming, burning, fl ooding) and various liturgical forms of glorifi cation of the deceased (religious and secular) are testimony to a variety of more general view on the relationship of natural and the beyond. What should be immediately noted is Weber’s sociology warning that the kind of rebirth after death, that was pursued as the highest good in a religion, was diff erent and always depended on the character of the class which was a key holder of the concerned religiosity18. Consistent with this and thanatos sociology is a branch of sociology that deals with the social conditionality of organization of culture of death, understanding the act of death and the state after death. Th is huge task refers to cooperation with other scientifi c disciplines, hence the use of the death investigation has necessary interprofessional character. With death are dealing ethnology, anthro-pology, social history and the history of mentalities. Although still in the early antiquity of the use of death testify archaeological research, thanatos sociology and thanatopolitics are relatively young disciplines. And since the dead always satisfi ed the various needs of the living, diff erent research approaches are requ-ired. In the politics, the use of death is particularly striking in two ideological forms: (1) Organized killing is usually justifi ed as returned violence. Blood is a symbol of revenge, and Lex talionis (debt in blood) is a common fi gure in justifying wars and various revolutions. Formally, a dramatization through the symbols of death is the dynamics of each thanatopolitics which while justifying violent rearrangement of social organization provides victims in compensation various versions of salvation; (2) Th e ritual use of corpses in funeral of rulers gives particular meaning and continuity of power, gives the identity to the un-derprivileged and justifi es the authorities of successor. Biological and cultural capital of the dead ruler is in the ritual converted into a political and economi-cal, and the usurpation of the dead ruler as authentic precursors opens up a fi ght

17 Th omas Louis-Vincent, Anthropology of Death I, Belgrade, 1980. p.349.18 Max Webwr, Collected writings on the sociology of religion, Volume I, Volume III. Novi Sad: Pub-lishing Bookstore Z. Stojanović, 1997. p. 205.


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about his symbolic capital (authority, prestige, fame and charisma). Of course there is always the attribution of meaning or construction and board of continu-ity between the ruler and heir, and then the creation of collective memory and the invention of tradition. Because of all of this said, in a variety of disciplinary approaches to death the critique of ideology is always more or less necessary.

4.

Th is approach is necessary because the minds of society have long been en-gaged in various schools of political usefulness of death and its place in the sym-bolic structure of political communication. It should fi rst be noted the French symbolist sociology, social anthropology and symbolic interactionism developed mostly in the United States. “Studies of death” exist in the U.S. as an academic discipline in universities since the 1960s, and is presented by the psychologists, sociologists and gerontologists 19. Sociological classics were also involved in so-cial integration role of death. Th e beyond salvation is in the center of Weber’s sociology of religion, while Durkheim by denying the Taylor’s thesis that the cult of death is the basis of religion, was trying to separate the death of religion, and to connect it with social solidarity. Bearing in mind the above mentioned conceptual heritage and dispersion of modern research of death in the thought about society, Hamburg thanatos sociologists Klaus Feldman noted that thana-tos sociology is interprofessional nomadic science visited by diff erent specialists, but they quickly leave it. Th is discipline is not institutionalized or professionali-zed. Much less is it thanatopolitics where also are not clearly defi ned subject, ap-proach or method. Both disciplines are still being treated as an inter-study of the usage of death (death studies). Probably from having to deal with a wide range of issues: withdrawal of social boundaries between life and death, the bond of death, life and power, rituals and institutions that regulate the attitude towards death and dying, moralizing, rationalizing, individualizing and naturalizing de-ath, death connectivity, social structures and economics of death.

In a variety of diff erent social scientifi c research of death can be identifi -ed three broad areas: 1. with description and interpretation of integrative and symbolic roles of funeral rituals and practices are dealing anthropology, ethno-logy and historiography by more or less developing symbolist, functionalist and constructivist approach, 2. with the integrative role of the transcendent vision of the use of death are dealing philosophy and sociology, 3. With the political

19 Clifton Bryant, “Th e Sociology of Death and Dying”, 21st Century Sociology, Bryant, C./Peck, D, 2007. p.159.


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use of death are also dealing several scientifi c disciplines (from historiography to the social psychology), which for sociology are the most interesting ones that the use of death connect with the interests of the ruling groups. In the colorful modern Social Science Research of death dominate the fi rst two approaches. Most described are the rituals and interprets, their integrative and symbolic role. At the heart of a variety of historical, ethnological, and sociological research is the role of death and dying in the integration of society and the symbolization of death. In the minority are studies that do not stop in front of the symbols, but they interpret them as parts of the ideological system that justifi es the interests of certain classes and strata. Th is does not remain on the formal level of explanation.

In order to retreat slightly clearer diff erence between these approaches we should shortly stop in front of the distinction between form and content. In for-mal terms for politicizing death is important to note the ways of the conceptual framing of continuity between the dead and the living, diff erent accent of the pattern death / rebirth and the degree of systemic sacralization of death. Th ere are in the centre of the research of the symbols of death that should always emp-hasize the immortality of order of living. In this sense, Durkheim anthropolo-gist R. Hertz noted that every society seeks eternity because it would not survive if it wasn’t emphasizing their own immortality over individuals. To do so we use funeral rituals that symbolically connect the living and the dead, again reinte-grate the living, equip them for continuity after the disappearance of members, thus linking the past and the future20. Hence, within the social integration is the dialectic of mortality and immortality. Death is the end of life of a member of company and the new start of society without it. Each political processing of death rests on the symbolic tension between death and rebirth. Symbols express feelings of the members of society, but also create and channel the same feelings. But one can not at the understanding the human ritual stop at the hermeneutics of tears. For the interpretation is not suffi cient only the description of planning emotionalization and moralization of the dead. It will not help a lot the aware-ness that symbols create us in the same extent as we create symbols21. It should be noted further material factors of planned regret. Hermeneutics of sadness and a description of its symbolism remain at the psychological and formal level unless they penetrate deeper and seize various historical class and layer of the elements that determine the attitude towards death. Only apparently is similar the symbolism of the various connecting the living and the dead, and death and birth. Behind the seemingly similar symbolism and rituals (the death of the king

20 Quoted Hertz according to, Michael Blain, Th e Politics of Death - A Sociological Analysis of Revolutionary Communication, Disertation Com. USA books: 2001. p. 9-10.21 Michael Blain, Th e Politics of Death - A Sociological Analysis of Revolutionary Communication, Disertation Com. USA books: 2001. p. 69


17

and the coronation of the prince, the death of the Pope and the enthronement of the new Pope, the death of the class leader and the choice of his successor) are concealed the interests of various groups.

Th erefore with explanations at the beginning we should closely defi ne com-pany through the asymmetric dominance of certain classes or elites, and only then explore the specifi c motives of political use of death. Each thanatopolitics is the political economy of death: from ancient slave trade to the exploitation of dental gold murdered in Auschwitz. In the stricter sense the term thanatopoli-tics is ambiguous. M. Foucault and G. Agamben under it understand the poli-tics of unpunished killing 22. Th is paper is more, however, about the politics that justifi es itself through death. It is, therefore, not about the exclusion and the suppression of another life which is not considered worthwhile, but a broader justifi cation of the privilege of living over the dead. It is a critique of justifying the inequality through natural or the violent death that is the subject of thana-topolitics as a scientifi c discipline. Th e condition of criticism is, of course, the quite convincing explanation of the use of death. We should not be confused by the three mentioned meanings of the term thanatopolitics (killing with impuni-ty, justifying the inequality through death and criticism of the ideologisation of death) are not identical. It is a phrase that indicates the practice of killing, ideo-logization of death and critical explanation of those activities. Th e meanings of the term are related, and can be seen as two sides of the same phenomenon: the use of the death on the one and critique of the use of death on the other side. So, thanatopolitics is an ideology, but it is also a discipline. Th ere is no doubt that the sphere of the thanatopolitics is everywhere where it is allowed to kill, and not to commit a crime. In this sense, according to the Vienna Cultural Studies Eva Horn, the essence of modern politics and all ideologies of war is death, and not life23. However, it is not about the ordinary use of death, but the complex political economy of death. In what sense?

To say that the use of death should be viewed in the broader context of the use of fear of death, we think about the fear of death recognized controllers. Th e fear of death is, however, fl uid and always an important part of the awareness of being, and we will not exaggerate if we say Timeo ergo sum. In this study, howe-ver, is not so much about the use of fear of the disease, but the use of the fear of the church hell and of the state punishable death (in Agamben’s and Marcuse’s sense of the state as the lord of death). Th anatopolitics is an institutional threat to an individual by punishment for his sin and heresy, and casuistry of these threats 22 Agamben, Giorgio, Sovereign power and bare life, Zagreb Multimedia Institute 2006. p. 12-13; Horn, Eva, “Sterbt, aber lernt - Th anatopolitik in Brechts Stücken”, Hebekus Uwe hg. Die Souverenität der Literatur. 2008. p. 313.23 Eva Horn, “Sterbt, aber lernt - Th anatopolitik in Brechts Stücken”, Hebekus Uwe hg. Die Souverenität der Literatur. 2008. p. 314.


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were varied according to whether God was more just or good. Th e reigning were directly or indirectly connected with God, and the possibility of redemption of sin opened the leeway of the ecclesiastical politics. Th e same threat was later used for the outcasts of immortal nations, states, or parties. In what way?

First of all, thanatos economy does not exist without thanatos ideology, religious or secular. Authority does not rely on ad hoc death threats, but on developed ideologisation of death. Of course the connection between the eco-nomics of death and a developed justifi cation of death is not always direct but is more mediated and often blurred by multiple facilities of hegemonic epochal consciousness. Th e problem of every theodicy was how to connect the fi ctitious divine providence and salvation after death with the mundane real social inju-stice. Not all attempts of this kind were equally compelling. When confronted with the horrors of the plague in mid-14th century infi rm priests in Europe at the end wondered if mass death is consequence of the ancestors sin, few people believed them? Not only the enlightening critics of religions wondered, but also Max Weber, why socially privileged classes of some people develop a religion of salvation 24? Roughly speaking, when the government frames the death then this is not about costuming common group interest but a close-class business. Funerals of British kings with the pompously organized grief and impressive ce-remonious integrate residents of Empire in pain, and solemnly hide interests of its narrow ruling circles. Or another example of class symbolism. At the funerals of the kings of France from the 14th century, all present were in black clothes appeal except for four presidents of the parliament of Paris, who were in red. Th e message of this costume was that the judges do not express sorrow because the death of the king does not stop justice25. Judges do not mourn for their dead king, and this is the eternal justice. Medieval canon law did not with this symbolic only protect continuity of the monarchy of disarray, but the anxiety of clutter was motivated by class fear of losing the common privileges of the clergy, the nobility and the king.

Even if we leave aside the question of whether the medieval and the modern societies in terms of class are uniquely defi nable conditions, to explore their funerary symbolism is certainly necessary an inclusive framework capable of integrating the cognitive fertile sides of symbolism, social constructivism (soci-ologism) and the critique of ideology. It is not enough to say that in research of social eff ects of symbols we should never forget the various class - ply interests. It should be borne in mind that the classes use rituals of death to delimit them-selves symbolicaly. Communists pushed the priest from the grave, and post soci-24 Max Weber, Collected writings on the sociology of religion, Volume I,. Novi Sad: Publishing Book-store Z. Stojanović., 1997. p.424-427.25 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Die zwei Körper des Königs – Eine Studie zur politischen Th eologie des Mittelalters, München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990. p.413-414


19

alist elite wanted him back again. Th erefore, the contemporary clerical funerals are not only naked religious rituals but also means of running from socialism.

Th us, the symbolization of social diff erences can be traced through the sym-bolization of death and it is an important side of its politicization. It goes witho-ut saying that social integration is impossible without symbolic framework that is part of the ideology of the ruling. Each power is symbolised and authority directly justifi es itself through the symbols (the crown, the cross, the hammer and sickle). Th e continuity of key symbols is important to society, but power-ful changes require discontinuity of symbols, including those related to death. Th us, for example, through new symbols associated with death (religious fune-rals and prayers) today are sharply delimited linguistically and culturally related ethnic groups. Funeral rites were suddenly separated by the structure of the ceremony and the transcendent vision of the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim, although in the recent past they were far more even in the secular socialist state. Because nowadays these rituals provide an identity, but not by inventing them, but only by coming to life, we can talk about thanatopolitical restoration, and not a revolution.

Literature

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Doka, Kenneth. Death system. 2012. http://www.deathreference.com/Da-Em/Death-System.html, (retrieved in September 2012).

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Gross, Dominik. Die dienstbare Leiche – der tote Körper als medizinische, soziokulturelle und medizinische Ressource. Kassel: Kassel University Press. 2009.

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Kantorowicz, Ernst, H. Die zwei Körper des Königs – Eine Studie zur po-litischen Th eologie des Mittelalters. München: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag. 1990.

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Le Goff , Jacques. Th e emergence of purgatory. Novi Sad: Publishing Book-store Z. Stojanović.1992.

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Nemanja Đukić1

Faculty of Poli cal ScienceBanja [email protected]

Review articleUDC 316.344.3DOI 10.7251/SOCEN1305021DAccepted: 20.5.2013.

Th e society of anxiety

Abstract

Starting from the analysis of the meaning of health and illness, the work fi nds the social role of medicine as a transposition of the medicalization from clinical to the the social realm of existence. Discovering the medicalization of social life as one of the indicators of postmodern rationality entropy, the analysis focuses on the diff usion and fl uid fear as a basic epochal experience of human existence in contemporary constellation world whose social shaping is named as the anxiety society.

Key words: health, illness, medicalization, the entropy of rationality, postmodernity, the future, experience, fear, anxiety society.

Introduction: Th e concept of health and disease

Health and disease are by origin and in basic philosophical concepts.2 Trans-lating these concepts to a much narrower fi eld of medicine has carried all the essential features of reductionism. Habitual reduction is demonstrated through a fundamental shift in the meaning of concepts of health and disease. Th is re-

1 Ph.D of Social Sciences. Senior Research Assistant in the group of theoretical subjects at the FPS, the study of sociology. E-mail: [email protected] Th e fi rst and the oldest understanding of health and disease as a model to explain the human body and its functions was philosophical equilibrium model that expressed a harmonious cosmic order of things. Th e individual was healthy if he was in homeostasis (oμοιόσταση) with the whole being (eίναι) and sick if this balance was disturbed. Th e balance of the whole being as substantial (aρχή) and universally applicable (νόμος) mind and the order of things (Λόγος), was appearing on a number of levels: 1. Cosmic balance of a whole being as the balance of matter and spirit (φύση - Λόγος) 2. Th e balance of nature and the state (φύση / Λόγος - pόλις) 3. Th e balance between man and the state (άνθρωπος - pόλις) 4. Th e balance of body and soul (ψυχή - σώμα) and 5. Th e balance of the organs in the body (υγεία).


22

duction occurred as a result of substitution of paradigm, which means that the wider philosophical discourse was replaced with narrower medical discourse, and therefore only the meaning of health and illness in the domain of praxis was translated into the domain of pragma. Th e concept of praxis means a com-municative rational (intersubjective) ratio which is typically without an interest and therefore is mediated with category of sense.3 Within such a practical se-mantical orientation of health and disease (as well as other phenomena, states and processes) are the events that receive their fi nal formulation of ideas from the standpoint of man himself. Th erefore, health and disease appear as diff erent types of experiences that get immanent meaning - given the role in the consti-tution of the person as an event, object and purpose. Health is emerging as a stable continuity of experience that leads to the constitution of personality and disease as a radical break in the continuity of experience that destroys persona-lity.4 Hence, health and disease are events of personality that their meaning and interpretation got in a way that has never been an instrumental (as a subjec-t-object relationship), but as an intersubjective problem of meaning, purpose and object mediated by culture. Th erefore, the culture as a realm of meaning emerges as the key to the social distribution of health and disease.5 In contrast, the term Pragma means instrumental rational relationship that is permanently utilitarian, and therefore mediated by category of function. Th e phenomena of health and disease therefore within the pragmatic semantic orientation do not appear as events of a person, but as events of a system. As a function of identity, health and disease are becoming problems of role playing and status within the existing structure of power of the social system. Hence they are not the types of experience that get their meaning immanent from its role in the constitution of the person as an event, object and purpose, but as socially sanctioned, valid and legitimate status of the head of social roles that receive their meaning trans-cendent, as they are expressing the level of (dis)functionality of reproduction of the system as the fi nal outcome of all possible goals and objectives. Th erefore, within the pragmatic semantic orientation, health and illness occur as a social condition that manifests itself on several levels: work, consumption, social space and nature, from which derive consistently and systematic interventions (inter-ventions of system) in this areas, which articulate phenomena (now statuses and roles) of health and disease as a function of maintaining the system.3 In fact, when it comes to praxis-as a communicative rational principle of relating personality which is mediated by the category of sense (unlike pragma as instrumental-rational principle of relating identity that was mediated by the category of function), it is necessary to point out that the only interest of personality can occur only in the interest for the other person expressed in the form of an intersubjective we-relationship.4 Alfred Schutz, Saggi sociologici, Torino: Utet, 1979.5 Ellen E. Idler, Salute, malattia e sociologia sanitaria, Roma: Sapere, 1982.

Nemanja Đukić Th e society of anxiety

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Th us, as a result of habitual reduction, resulted a systemic reduction - as the concepts of health and illness have become narrower in scope and in function more pragmatic, it was followed by the social construction of these phenomena. Social constructionism of this kind arises as a result of establishing a medicine as a social practice, which itself represents a pragmatic expression of the needs of the social system that structurally and functionally articulate the phenomena of health and disease and thus normatively arranges practical social relations towards the imperatives and principles of the system. As the medicine occurs as the practise within the economic and political subsystems (and no longer cultu-ral), so the medical discourse occurs as the part of the broader concept of power, from which it derives its authority that through the legal and social sanctions determines solely social validity of these phenomena. Proceeding from the prin-ciple of the ultimate functionality of the whole social system (Parsons), which is achieved through the binding constraints of social structure and its associated institutions and roles (Durkheim), the phenomena of health and disease are now defi ned as a social relationship that is socially standardized, sanctioned and regulated by structural categories and functional imperatives of the reproducti-on of the system. Th us, health becomes meaningful functional ability of indivi-duals to participate in the distribution system of social roles and status, and thus to actively and positively act towards the imperatives of maintaining the given social order. As a result of binding and coercive character of social structure and its associated institutions and roles, the health as the feature of the system comes from institutions of the system that provide an adequate level of integration and cohesion. Hence, the weakening of the repressive power of the system leads to the devaluation of social health in the form of eruption of uncertainty, the wil-lingness for perversion and decadence.6 Weakening or absence of a cohesive and integrative functions of institutions causes divorces, alienation, psychosomatic disorders and suicides which are in conditions of adequate internalization and socialization absent.7 Th us, the constraints character of institutions appears as a necessary factor in the internal social health, because the pressure of institutions, which are based on a long tradition, is eff ectively shaping the social behavior than rational principles. In that sense, social-anthropologically observed, the role of tradition and its institutional embodiment in the form of character is to reduce the openness to the world as a consequence of organic defi ciency that wakes up willingness for animalistic features that the biological nature opened to man. She needs to tame a man, discipline, and educate him, thereby reducing

6 Arnold Gelen, Th e man, Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1974, p. 448.7 Emil Dirkem, Suicide: a sociological study, Beograd: BIGZ, 1997.


24

his potential opportunities and turning externally imposed forms of behavior to normal, automatic, unconscious and natural.8

As the social structure of the system is not a priori correspondent to the structure of individual activity, therefore, from this opposition of the individual action towards the social structure, occurs disease as an expression of dysfunc-tionality of individuals towards the whole social system because it prevents the individual from performing their positive social role9. From this basic, natural and constant opposition of individual and social action, consistently derives fi nal determination of the social role of medicine - reproduction of individually normal as socially functional, and the control and sanction of individually pat-hological as socially dysfunctional. Performing the function of reproduction of normal, and control and sanctions of pathological as social that is socially dys-functional, medicine as an expression of instrumental social rationality becomes a technique of social control, which contributes substantially to the reproducti-on of a given structure of the system and thus makes a vital contribution to the functioning of modern society.

At the same time, thus institutionalized medicine becomes the greatest ene-my of the individual health, because it is as the instrumental social practice and technique of social control based on the imperative of the system rather than on the imperative of personality. Standardized by the category of function rather than the category of meaning, medicine as a social practice in general can not be ethically, but only socially responsible, since it draws its legitimacy from the authority, not the principle.10 Starting from the socially constructed phenomena of health and disease as categories of a system rather than events and personal experiences, medical liability could only be expressed through social develop-ment strategy of systematic health management in the dimension of work as a strategy of the medicine of work, in the dimension of consumption as a strategy of pharmacology, pharmaceutics and cosmetology, in the social space as a stra-tegy of eugenics and social ecology in the area of nature as a strategy of biotech-nology. By technology and industrialization of modern society it is provided the entry of medicine in the heart of the capital-based contemporary ideological production, allowed the general and binding transposition of medicalization as standard from clinical to social level of existence. Th erefore, the development of a social medicine had the shape of extension of social areas that are subject to the 8 Arnold Gelen, Th e Same. 9 Talkot Parsons, Th e Social System, Glencoe: Free Press, 1951. Talkot Parsons, Defi nition of Health and Illness in the Light of American Values and Structure, in: Patients, Psychicians and illness, Gartly Yago, New York: Free Press, 1972. Talkot Parsons, Th e Sick Role and the Role of the Psychi-cian Reconsidered, New York: Milbank Memorial Fundation Quarterly, no. 53, 1975. 10 Mirko Štifanić, Sociological approaches to health and illness, Zagreb:Social Studies, Year 7, Num-ber 6, 1998, p. 833/845.


25

imperatives of medical management. Always a wider and more intense medica-lization of social relations is based on the inversion of means and goals of a type that Berdyaev observed,11 and is interpreted as a “human ideal” of the increase of “balance” in the distribution of medical goods and services. However, it is this “human ideal” that will become a subtle indicator of the epoch implosion of the Western civilization.

Fear as a rational disease

Replacement of health with increasing number of medical-pharmaceutical interventions, as the main driving force of modern medicine, will prove to be an indicator of the fact that modern civilization owes its suicidal potential to those same characteristics (instrumental rationality) from which it draws its size and its underlying epochal supremacy.12 Th e modern age has, only when rationalism has emerged, promising introduced itself as a big emancipating step forward from the world of fear to the world of freedom. However, the time in which the science introduced us has not become the way of the exit. Five centuries later, the collapse of the modern will show that our time and the time before, are the times of fear.13 But unlike the pre-modern fear, postmodern diff use and fl uid fear as a basic experience of human existence in contemporary constellation of the world, are the result of the reactive entropy of rationality with which the modern secularized the time and opened the future as a place of anxiety. While the structure of the ancient and medieval world was closed and their horizon organized by categories of fate and providence, the structure of the Modern World is permanently open and its horizon organized by principle of practice.14 Opening the structure of the Modern World has started by the process of instru-mental rationalization with which modern rationalism secularized theological

11 As Berdyaev says: “Th ere can not be technical goals of life, there may only be the technical means, and the aims of life lie still in another area, in the spirit. Th e means of life now very often replace the life goals; those means can take up so much space in the life of man, that the goals of life are fi nally and even completely disappearing from the consciousness of man. And in our technical era it is happening in the majestic scale. “And there Berdyaev, notes the paradox. Culture is born with the technique, it is not possible without it, but the fi nal victory of the technique in the culture is symptom of its collapse. Th e victory of technique as a means of culture shows that the man as a goal has become an asset. View: Nikolaj Berdyaev, Man and machine, Proceedings of Works Man and technique, Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1944, p. 116,12 Zigmund Bauman, Fluid fear , Novi Sad: Mediterranean Publishing, 2010, p. 91.13 Zigmund Bauman, Fluid fear, Novi Sad: Mediterranean Publishing, 2010, p. 10.14 Časlav Koprivica, Th e Future of fear and hope, Banja Luka: Art print, 2011, p. 21.


26

principles of history.15 Opposing the ancient mentality of naturalistic and cyc-lical vision of the world and reinterpreting in secular terms the Judeo-Christian heritage, the Modern will fi nd history as a substance (basic law and order of all things), and thus give to the idea of the history the ontological scope.16 Appea-ring as a process of continuous and successive events, which implies a category of totality (Hegel) or the character of the teleological as immanent (Kant), modern rationalism will understand the history as the totality of time, or (to-wards the future) focused and purposeful process, intentional process which in itself is including and assuming the future as its constituent element.17 Howe-ver, that same, with the secularization revealed future, will appear as the idea of decay of now secular foundations of the Western civilization. While the weather in ancient and medieval structure of the world had a predetermined character, with the content and meaning-fi lled telos, the time structure in contemporary world has become open, emptied and homogeneous horizon which with human practice needs to be fi lled with meaning. Th us, the time has become history and future category of practice - dimension of human action and showing the human disposition of the world.18 Hence, from the transformation of tempo-ral habitus of Antiquity and the Middle Ages to the modern times teleological habitus, follows the transformation of a fear from a natural to the the historical phenomenon. Only secularization opens up the space for an indefi nite fear19. While the future in the ancient and the medieval times was generally known because it was joining them from the absolute and transcendent cosmic and the-ological principles, the future of the new century is a radical novelty because it emerges from the secularized inherent principles of human practice. Th erefore, the future of antiquity and the Middle Ages as a natural phenomenon could not become a source of unforeseen and therefore as such it could not be perceived as a source of threat and anxiety. On the contrary, when with the secularization of the time structure of the world has become open and the future primordial dimension of the human, it was created a theoretical possibility that fear appears as an immanent historical exposure of human to the consequences of his own actions. While pre-modern fear is natural and primal, the historical fear of the Modern will prove to be a “second fear” - social and cultural recycled fear which stems from the inherent limitations of the promised picture of the world. Such fear while changing people’s perception and expectations, and managing human

15 See: Karl Levit, World History and events of salvation, Sarajevo. Svjetlost, 1990, p. 46.16 Đani Vatimo, Th e end of the modern, Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2000, str. 7.17 More to see: Nemanja Đukić, Th e problem of objectivity in sociology of knowledge, Banja Luka: Th e Association of Sociologists - Banja Luka, 2011.18 Časlav Koprivica, Th e Future of fear and hope, Art print, Banja Luka, 2011, p. 18.19 Časlav Koprivica, Th e same p. 22.


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actions, appeared fi nally as an activator of the reservoir of the former repressed traumatic experiences. Hence, the diff use fear of the future (of the world) of the new century appears as historically accumulated crippling collective anxiety before the implosion of civilization level of reality.20 As modern civilization with development of technique as reifi ed rationality mediated attitude towards life, in the terms of the collapse of civilization paradigm of instrumental rationality, medicalised technical life support systems are now emerging as the main causes of postmodern constellation of the fear. Th us, from the modern epochal failure to provide “healthy society” as the basis of a rational view of the world derived fear of the consequences of its own activities, resulted in equally unsuccessful strategies of rational prediction of relating to the future. Th e emergence of risk as a risk whose probability haughty spirit of reason believes it can rationally cal-culate, marks yet another covert project of medicalised experience impotence of rational prediction of relating to the future. In this real-life framework combat against risks as medicalised strategies of dealing with the future (strategies of di-agnosis and therapeutics fi nancial, nuclear, environmental, social, bio-chemical, security, medical, humanitarian and other risks), is growing and developing the ideological awareness of manipulation of atrophied sense of rationality in front of the challenges “of post-historical zugzwang” which to the modern world in a rational progressive degradation should off er another illusion of power - in this case the power of the emancipation of their own (ir)responsibility.

Society of anxiety

Conceptually fear is a form of aff ective reaction to some traumatic experi-ence.21 In phylogenetic terms, the fi rst traumatic experience is the trauma of a birth that occurs as an individual model for each subsequent fear.22 During life, the individual comes into numerous confl icts with other individuals, the environment and the objects in it, that by preventing the realization of the vi-tal needs of personalities create frustration and dissatisfaction. Th ese confl icts, frustration and dissatisfaction that person successfully handles, have a positive psychological role because as developing and enhancing rational-explanatory potential of the ego corresponds to the development of protective disposition as a defense mechanism against external hazards that threaten the integrity of the person.23 Th erefore, fears that arise as a reaction to external danger, have a

20 Zigmund Bauman, Fluid fear Mediterranean Publishing, Novi Sad, 2010, p. 22.21 Sigmund Frojd, Autobiography. Th e new classes, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1981.22 Oto Rank, Th e Trauma of Birth, Dover Publications, 199423 Sigmund Frojd, Fear and Anxiety, Beograd: Riznica, 2011.


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real, positive and developmental character. However, those confl icts, frustration and dissatisfaction that person fails to solve, have a negative psychological role because suppressed and accumulated in the unconscious, form the reservoir of fear that under certain circumstances and stimuli can be (re)activated.24 If the confl icts in which the person is, are so strong that a person is not capable of constructively overcoming traumatic excitation with real fear, the mechanism of repression that does not solve the confl ict but it excludes it from the fi eld of consciousness so that it is pushed into the unconscious, takes place. Th e mecha-nism of suppression could strengthen to the point that it starts to function au-tomatically. After some time, automatically pushed content to the unconscious, or confl icts excluded from consciousness, accumulate their strength and their threatening potential, therefore they can easily again reach the mind and even easier if the defense forces of the person are weaker.25 Th us, it becomes possible with altered role of social media 26 to manipulate the fear with high-evocation of repressed traumatic experiences which act as a trigger of reactivation and mobilization of the reservoir of fear. At one point, in any way caused reacti-on of fear frees and plays old traumatic experiences from the reservoir of fear, which performs demolition of protective disposition of ego and loss of rational behavior as limited functions of the ego.27 Th e newly created trauma releases old traumatic experiences from the reservoir of fear which acting cumulatively directly redirect natural and straightforward process of implementation of libi-do, because of which the constantly emerging libidinally invested energy is no longer appearing as the sexual need, but it is converted into fear.28 Developing by the direct conversion of libidinally invested energy, the current event of fear is converted into a permanent state of anxiety as the primary features and basic existential condition of disintegrating personality. As anxiety is vague fear, and general feeling of insecurity29 its motivational potential as such does not exist anymore - a pathological fear of anxiety was acquitted of the real context and fl oats free and available for the mooring of any possibly a suitable content of representation imposed. Th us, dispersed fear any connection with the possible 24 Oto Rank, Th e Trauma of Birth, Dover Publications, 199425 Sigmund Frojd, Fear and Anxiety, Beograd: Riznica, 2011.26 In the traditional sense, the cultural function of the media is manifested as a symbolic power of discursive design of reality. However, in terms of global colonized (instrumental) culture comes to global colonization (instrumentation) of the Media: symbolic power as a cultural resource is transformed into a propaganda power as an ideological resource. Discursive creation of reality as a cultural power of the media, in conditions of globalization transformes into ideological activity of propaganda norms of social reality according to the parameters of ideologically constructed global future.27 Sigmund Frojd, Fear and Anxiety, Beograd: Riznica, 2011, p. 9, 36.28 Sigmund Frojd, Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Neuroses, Beograd: Kosmos, 196429 Žan Delimo, Th e fear in the West, Novi Sad: 1987, p. 25.


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structures can establish only through the symbolic relationship, because from the standpoint of an anxious personality it does not matter whether the danger really exists or not, but it is crucial that the individual is convinced that there is a danger that threatens from the outside world. As the body itself is the fi rst and basic physical assumption by which one becomes aware of himself, so within the existential experience of anxiety in front of the postmodern openness of the fu-ture, now only body appears as the main and the narrowest object of emotional connections. As the last bastion of safety and certainty, only the one’s body may appear as an object to which dispersed fear and attention can establish a sym-bolic relationship and thus off er their materialisation. Hence, the body appears primarily as an object of fear of anxiety, because as a basic feature of human beings that allows one to directly experience themselves, it represents the last and the only possible origin of the materialization of regressive and dispersed attention. Th us, the attention of anxiety narrows, focuses and personalizes into attention towards the body and the fear of anxiety is concretised in the fear of death and diseases of the body. Hence organized propaganda of manipulation by fear, which is the dominant factor in the structuring of the system of personal motivation of individuals, enables the attention, personal motivation, physical structure and ultimately social action of individuals and social groups to be or-ganized around excessive fear for the body and (or) environment. Socio forced fear for the body produces anxiety as indiviual hypochondria, and the socially forced fear for the environment creates ecology as a collective hypochondria. As a result of a pathological fear for the body it is caused increased consump-tion of drugs and cosmetic products, and as a result of a pathological fear for environment appears an ecological as ideological consciousness. Th erefore, the main social consequence of the ideology of healthy living as organized media popularization of medical problems, we can name the society of anxiety as the gathering of those social conditions that are characterized by a general feeling of insecurity and existential threat of individuals and social groups.

Conclusion

Ideology of healthy life as propaganda popularizing of the health and en-vironmental problems in the service of economic and ideological interests of certain subjects, is an instrument of social control in the sense that the organi-zed propaganda manipulation of fear for the body and the environment with individuals and social groups develops an increased sensitivity to the issues of health and environment, which directly intensifi es the evolution of health and environmental needs. Peaking the top of the system of values, health and envi-


30

ronmental concerns smoothly form consumer medical mentality, thus causing fundamental redefi nition of individual and group motivation of citizens. Th us by the fear forced individual and collective social action is directed towards the increasing consumption of medicines, medical and environmental services, which eventually becomes very effi cient instrument of the conservation of the modern consumer society. Simulating the problems of personal and collective health and producing personal and collective anxiety, the healthy living ideolo-gy transforms the motivational foundation of social action and establishes the society of anxiety as a fundamental medicalised experience of the postmodern existence. Producing the anxiety (the feeling of personal and collective health threat), unlimited social energy is directly transformed into fear, which establis-hes the quantity indefi nite and inexhaustible resource that acts as a permanent disorganizational potential of individual and social consternation. Anxious in-dividuals who form an anxious social groups become socially dysfunctional, because the media popularized fear of loss of personal and collective health re-activates previously established reservoir of fear and leads to blockage of ego functions, which manifests as a social-psychological regression of social acting on social behavior. By acting individuals become unable to work: social acti-on as an independent, free and intentional social action transforms into the social behavior as psychological and biological provoked reaction conditioned by fear. Because of this, fundamental and constitutive role in social relations has no more a healthy person, but the identity of the consumer on the market of medical goods and services. Hence, the motivational matrix for the social removal is no longer the need of personality, but the imperatives of economic reproduction subsystems. By cutting the naturally expressed fear, that appears as an individual, group, and general social mobilizer and organizer that results in a coordinated and impregnated, political, social and economic action, the society of anxiety as a social experience of overall vulnerability does not contain common (individually and socially constructive) mobilizing potential but it is manifested only as a positive economic and social-pathological phenomenon.

Hence the ideology of healthy living is the most eff ective strategy of epochal medicalization of social life, because in the most consistent way reproduces the fear inherently embedded in a valid picture of the world.

Literature

Bauman, Zigmund. Fluidni strah. Novi Sad: Mediteran publishing. 2010.Bauman, Zigmund. Fluidni život. Novi Sad: Mediteran publishing. 2010.Bauman, Zigmund. Fluidna ljubav. Novi Sad: Mediteran publishing. 2010.


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Berđajev, Nikolaj. Čovjek i stroj. Zbornik radova Čovjek i tehnika. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska. 1944.

Vatimo, Đani. Kraj moderne. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska. 2000.Gelen, Arnold. Čovjek. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša. 1974.Delimo, Žan. Strah na Zapadu, Novi Sad. 1987. Dirkem, Emil. Samoubistvo: sociološka studija. Beograd: BIGZ. 1997.Đukić, Nemanja. Problem objektivnosti u sociologiji saznanja. Banja Luka:

Udruženje sociologa-Banja Luka. 2011.Idler, I. Ellen. Salute, malattia e sociologia sanitaria. Roma: Sapere. 1982.Koprivica, Časlav. Budućnost straha i nade. Banja Luka: Art print. 2011.Levit, Karl. Svjetska povijest i događanje spasa. Sarajevo: Svjetlost. 1990.Parsons, Talkot. Th e Social System. Glencoe: Free Press. 1951.Parsons, Talkot. Defi nition of Health and Illness in the Light of American Va-

lues and Structure. In: Patients, Psychicians and illness. New York: Gartly Yago, Free Press. 1972.

Parsons, Talkot. Th e Sick Role and the Role of the Psychician Reconsidered. New York: Milbank Memorial Fundation Quarterly, no. 53. 1975.

Rank, Oto. Th e Trauma of Birth. Dover: Publications. 1994.Schutz, Alfred. Saggi sociologici. Torino: Utet. 1979.Frojd, Sigmund. Autobiografi ja. Nova predavanja. Novi Sad: Matica Srpska.

1981.Frojd, Sigmund. Strah i anksioznost. Beograd: Riznica. 2011.Frojd, Sigmund. Uvod u psihoanalizu. Neuroze. Beograd: Kosmos. 1964.Štifanić, Mirko. Sociološki pristupi zdravljau i bolesti. Društvena istraživanja,

Godina 7, Broj 6. Zagreb. 1998.

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Jelena Vukoičić1

[email protected]

Review articleUDC 141.72:316.66-055.2DOI 10.7251/SOCEN1305033VAccepted: 10.5.2013.

Radical feminism as a discourse in the theory of confl ict

AbstractRadical feminism represents one of the types of the feminist theory, founded on the attitude that the society is based on the patriarchal grounds, because of which women are marginalized and discriminated against. Th is theory can be defi ned as a confl ict theory because it is based on the assumption that a society consists of opposed fractions (sexes) whose relations are based on the domination of men over women, as well as the one that a society and diff erent relations within it can be best described by observing these relations and the attitudes of sexes toward them. Since the radical feminist movement had been founded on the principles of Marxism, which, as well, represents the most important confl ict theory, the comparative analysis of Marxism and this type of feminism is the key component of this research, in order to see similarities and diff erences between the two theories, and, based on those, defi ne some of the main characteristics of the radical feminism as a confl ict theory.

Key words: feminism, radical feminism, theory of confl ict, Marxism, patriarchy, power, repression, discrimination

Introduction

Feminism is a contemporary social and political movement, motivated by individual and collective experiences of women, which is based on the claim that a society is based on patriarchal principles, according to which men are pri-vileged over women, which results in discrimination against women in public and private life.2 Although feminism is often considered a unique ideology, this 1 Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. E-mail: [email protected] 2 Although feminism as well as other social theories generally provides a critique of all social relations, most feminist analysis are focused on the nature of inequality between the sexes, thro-ugh study of such areas as power politics, human rights and sexuality. Feminist political activism


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theory actually makes a large number of routes created under the infl uence of various factors that may be related to the historical and cultural specifi city, the legal status of women in certain countries or simply diff erent feminist approac-hes to solving the problems that female population faces. Although there are a number of specifi ed routes, the main diff erences between them are reduced to

represents the idea of social, political and economic equality between the sexes, and promotes women’s rights and interests, dealing with issues such as sexual and domestic violence, reproduc-tive rights, discrimination, sexual harassment and equal pay. At the same time, the most common areas of feminist analysis are: patriarchy, oppression, objectifi cation (especially sexual objectifi -cation), discrimination and stereotyping. Contemporary feminist theory is generally associated with Western civilization, especially highly educated middle class in the West, since most of the known feminist theorists come from these circles, but the feminist activism is the movement that knows no national, territorial and cultural boundaries. Certain issues, such as domestic and sexual violence are universal feminist spheres of interest, while some other are tied to specifi c cultural contexts of diff erent societies and include a wide range of discriminatory measures implemented against women from genital mutilation in some parts of Asia and Africa , to exercising their rights to equal pay and career prospects in North America and Western Europe. Although contemporary feminist theory has experienced its greatest expansion in the 70’s and 80’s of the last century, femi-nism as a movement has emerged in the nineteenth century, when the idea of repression against women in the patriarchy began to occupy more and more attention of intellectual circles in North America and Western Europe. Some of the earliest papers on “women’s issues”, though based on a criticism of the restrictive role of women, have not, however, those restrictions considered as the implication of the unfavorable social position of women within patriarchy and, accordingly, male responsibility and guilt. One of the earliest texts on this subject is the book by Mary Woll-stonecraft, entitled “A Vindication of the Rights of Woman”, written in the eighteenth century. Although by modern standards, the arguments presented in this book about women as a social elite, fragile and delicate creatures threatened by the intellectual and moral lethargy, does not sound feminist, social conditions of the period in which this work was created was such that it is justifi ably considered to be the forerunner of feminism. One of the most important works in the development of modern feminism is a book by anthropologist Margareth Maed called “Sex and Temperament in Th ree Primitive Societies”, written in 1935. Th is book deals with the dominant position of women in Tchambuli tribe, noting that relations between the sexes can function and according to this principle, which in Western circles sparked a review of the European idea of the diff erences between the sexes as a fundamental and, instead, led to the conclusion that these ideas are primarily cultural and socially constructed, which means that they are subject to change. Th e roots of the modern feminist movement originated from the reformist period of the nineteenth century, and as the offi cial date of the establishment of organized movement was taken the year 1848. when the fi rst Women's Rights Convention in Seneca Falls , the state of New York was held. Today, more than a hundred and fi fty years after this convention, feminism has grown into a broad movement that includes diff erent perspectives on what constitutes discrimination against women, and in what ways to fi ght for women's rights; more about the feminist movement and ideas look into: Hester Eisenstain, Contemporary Feminist Th ought, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983; Catherine Eschle, Global Democracy, Social Movements, and Feminism, Boulder: Westview Press, 2001; Susan Stanford Friedman, Mappings: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of En-counter, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998; Anne Phillips, Feminism and Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Sheila Ruth, Issues in Feminism: An Introduction to Women’s Studies, California: Maufi eld Publications Co., 1990.

Jelena Vukoičić Radical feminism as a discourse in the theory of confl ict

35

the extent to which relations within the patriarchal society are considered to be the cause of all forms of discrimination against women.

Radical feminism is a feminist theory course that starts from the idea of confl ict between the sexes as a fundamental confl ict, and oppression against women as a direct implication of patriarchy. Th is theory rests on the assump-tion that all social activity is the result of certain restrictions and coercion, and although every social system contains specifi c forms of interactive constraints, they do not have to cause repression. Under patriarchy, however, interaction and communication are limited in a way that creates and maintains rigidity which is seen as oppression, while patriarchy takes a central place where, and why, a fundamental power struggle between the sexes takes place. Considering that a starting point of radical feminism is the view that inequality between the sexes is the foundation of all other inequalities and oppression, it is possible to defi ne it as part of the (discourse) theory of confl ict.3

1. Basics of radical feminism

Analytically, the main diff erence between radical feminism and other di-rections of this theory lies in the extent to which the social system based on the power struggle between the sexes - ie patriarchy, the rule of men in which women are subordinate category - is considered to be the root of all further oppression, inequality and injustice. Th e view that the patriarchal society is ge-nerally unjust system in which women are categories of people exposed to va-rious types of discrimination and exploitation, is a universal feature of feminist thought and the starting point for all routes within feminism, which, however, diff er in the further formulation of this paragraph, its implications and desirable methods for the solution of problems of the female population. Radical feminist theory is based on the fact that gender inequality is the foundation of all other inequalities and oppression. Repression against women takes place in the patri-archy that is a hierarchical system of male domination over the female gender, which consists of, and is maintained due to the characteristics which include:

I. Th e obligatory motherhood and limiting the reproductive freedom;II. Th e social construction of femininity and female sexuality through the

creation and presentation of subordinative image;4

3 Th eories of confl ict assume that society is made up of opposing factions whose relationships are based on the shape and balance of power, and then analyze the social relations in line with the above mentioned factions in the fi ght for power4 Look into: Bonnie J. Dow, Television, Media Culture, and the Women’s Movement since 1970, Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press, 1996.


36

III. Violence against women;IV. Institutions that favor the dominance of men over women, such as the

church and the traditional family models.Th e unique position of radical feminism is formed of the idea that, in order

to end the oppression of women, the patriarchate has to be abolished, which potentially includes:

I. Incitement and rejection of traditional gender roles and the ways in which women are presented / constructed in the language, the media, as well as in their personal lives;

II. Anti-patriarchal constructions of female sexuality by banning pornograp-hy and rejection of traditional models of relations between the sexes;

III. Achieving the reproductive freedom.5

In the development of radical feminism one of the basic concepts of Ma-rxist theory, such as confl ict, class, production, exploitation, revolution played a signifi cant role, as evident in the works of some feminist authors where stated concepts serve as a kind of theoretical pattern in which by the “cut and paste” principle, individual, typically a Marxist, defi ned terms are replaced by their fe-minist equivalents, so that, for example, instead of the word “class” is used “sex” instead of “production”, “reproduction”, and the like.6 On these basis has been created an extensive feminist literature in which this theory was given its specifi c forms and directions that separated it from other sociological trends, including Marxism. Radical feminism is a specifi c feminist conceptual framework that can not be derived from Marxism or any other theoretical perspective, which expla-ins the world from the fi rst cutting blade on the sexual analytical axes, instead of explaining the repression of women and relations between genders in some other way. Th is approach assumes that the patriarchal society is the repressive system in which male individuals behave and think as “men,” but, at the same time, it claims that patriarchal tendencies are neither ideal nor inevitable for men who also suff er from limitations due to patriarchy and for them therefore, as for women, feminism would represent a liberating movement. Th e main fea-ture of this feminist attitude lies in the study and the need for reconsideration of the source of power and desire for repression, which is attributed to the complex social factors which are constructed and not innate and essential.

5 For a detailed overview of the relationship of feminism, the Catholic Church and the pro-choice movement for the right to abortion look into: Germain Kopaczynoski, No Higher Court: Contemporary Feminism and the Right to Abortion, Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 1995.6 Look into: Shulamith Firestone, Th e Dialectic of Sex: Th e Case for Feminist Revolution, New York: Morrow, 1970.


37

1.2. Basic concepts of radical feminism - the power, patriarchy and oppression

Th e theoretical framework of radical feminism, for the most part, consists of three key, interrelated concepts, or patriarchy, power, and oppression. In ra-dical feminism, like in feminism in general, the patriarchal society7 occupies a central place where, and why, the fundamental power struggle between the sexes takes place. Patriarchy requires power, causes repression and maintains control systems without which its existence would loose purpose.

7 In an attempt to explain the origins and roots of patriarchal society radical feminists are faced with a very diffi cult task, since it seems that patriarchy exists as long as recorded history. Th is fact implies that any analysis of historical events and the reasons that have led so far for society to become a patriarchal society, can only be hypothetical, and beyond the information with which it would be possible to verify the obtained information. Despite this lack of data to analyze the origin of patriarchy, and given the importance of this type of social system for feminist thought, a theoretical models that explain the phenomenon of patriarchal society have an important place in the work of radical feminists. Th us, in their theoretical models, Elizabeth Fisher and Marilyn French assume that before the creation of patriarchy people existed and made the interaction in a way that did not cause the repression of women, or anyone else. Th e roots of patriarchal society, the authors put in the context of a set of historical conditions under which were held social pres-sures of material necessity that emerged during the “Neolithic Revolution”, due to the transition from hunting to agriculture and animal husbandry. Th e social change that led to the patriarchy is described by hypothetical reconstructions involving social reactions and interpretations of real gender diff erences - the reproductive capacity - woman. Th ese changes have led to control play-back replacing reproductive capacity and getting, symbolically and materially, into the hands of men. According to this model, at a practical level limiting sexuality directly aff ects the process of reproduction, or key fi eld that controls the society that is faced with the threat of survival, given that any fl uctuations in the birth rate in either direction, or in the social circumstances of birth, could create crisis for small and unstable society. (Look into: Elizabeth Fisher, Women’s Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society, New York: McGraw – Hill, 1979; Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985.) Th e roots of patriarchy, in the radical feminist analysis, are explained, in addition to reproduction, and a number of other reasons related to the relations between the sexes. Elizabeth Janeway the reason for patriarchy sees in the psychodynamics between the child and the mother, in which the patriarchal society is seen as a male response to women's power that comes from childhood. (Look into: Elizabeth Janeway, Powers of the Weak, New York: Knopf, 1980.) Robin Morgan in her analysis highlights the importance of women’s role in the creation of social arrangements that have infl uenced the formation of patriarchy, while noting that at the time of creation, these social relations were not so destructive and repressive. (Look into: Robin Morgan, Th e Anatomy of Freedem: Feminism, Physics and Global Politics, Garden City New York: Anchor / Doubleday, 1982.) It can be concluded that the verifi cation of the origin of patriarchy is diffi cult, if not impossible, which, however, does not aff ect the theoretical denial of the inevitability or positivity of this type of social system. In line with that, there is a higher degree of agreement between radical feminists when it comes to form and the eff ects of a patriarchal society, than when it comes to its roots.


38

Once established, the patriarchal system gets its own equilibrium. Deprived of the impact on the social processes, women 8 spend their whole lives without regard to their ability to come to their own conclusions about a number of things that aff ect them; this situation is accepted as normal, and even those women who pay attention to their intuitive sensibility have a problem with its interpretation. Patriarchy, at the same time, within its own system of rules and values, allows the use of physical and other forms of societal violence against all those who violate the conceptual norms and rules of conduct. Patriarchy as a control - obsessed reaction,9 to certain forms of stress 10 maintains a specifi c social analogy of reality, limiting interaction to eliminate individual perception, which enables the smooth functioning of the repressive system; On the other hand, the reduction or elimination of these restrictions would lead to a wea-kening of control and unpredictable reactions of individuals whose behavior would be motivated by the perception of the individual, rather than by a strictly defi ned standards, which would be a threat to the continued functioning of the entire system.11

8 Although there is a widely shared belief that the patriarchal system adversely aff ects a large number of men, feminism as the direction is basically dedicated to women, and is based on women’s experiences; For this reason, in this paper we talk in the feminine gender, when it comes to the subordinate category within patriarchal system.9 Look into: Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985.10 Look into: Elizabeth Fisher, Women’s Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society, New York: McGraw – Hill, 1979.11 An illustrative example of this situation are the military attitudes toward the role of free will and individual thinking. (Look into: Philip Slater, A Dream Deferred: America’s Discontent and the Search for a New Democratic Ideal, Boston: Beacon Press, 1991.) In fact, as the military way of maintaining order and control is considered to be more appropriate than democratic in the fi eld, and patriarchy can be defi ned as the ratio of the crisis, which is necessary to establish order and control, and whose benefi ts during the crisis go beyond the benefi ts of fl exibility and freedom. Control requires inequality and hierarchical stratifi cation that is useful in emergencies, since the centralization of power is the means to achieve short-term effi ciency at the expense of fl exibility, creativity and long-term eff ectiveness. Accordingly, Marilyn French and Elizabeth Fisher in their analysis take into account the possibility that the rigidity of patriarchy can be useful within the limited context of scarcity and condition of physical force. (Look into: Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985; Elizabeth Fisher, Women’s Cre-ation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society, New York: McGraw – Hill, 1979.) Patriarchy, therefore, can be understood as the relationship of human beings to a situation where there is a threat to survival, resulting in the necessity of evaluating reactive control and maintenance of the same state. At the same time, however, it can be concluded that these reasons could be valid in certain historic periods, but also that the patriarchal society has long overtaken the context, and continued to exist regardless of the natural and social conditions, as well as requirements that they place upon human beings.


39

Th e concept of power, which is located in the center of radical feminist ana-lysis, is defi ned as the essence of patriarchy and the central concept of abstract enemies that feminism has to face.12 Marilyn French conceptualizes power in interactional terms, describing it as follows: “Th e power is the process of the dynamic interaction. To have the power, in fact, means having access to the network of relations in which an individual can infl uence, threaten, or persuade others to do what he wants or what he needs. Although no other syntax is ava-ilable, in fact it is wrong to talk about the ‘ownership’ of power. Th e individual has no power. It is awarded by a large number of other people to the one that dominates and such allocation is irrevocable.”13

Th e author emphasizes that the illusion of ‘possession’ of power can still be transferred to the belief in the longevity and effi ciency of its eff ects, which, however, is not true, as the “coercion just seems simpler and shorter method of creating order than any other, but in fact, it is just so monotonous and lon-g-term, and far more expensive than a personal encounter, persuasion, listening and participating in the process of harmonization of the group.”14

In order to create and explain a radical - feminist model of confl ict theory, which is based on the fundamental confl icts and power struggles between the sexes, this movement theorists pay particular attention to the analysis of interac-tive processes that can be identifi ed as repressive as well as all types of commu-nications that are part of struggle for power, instead of just studying the eff ects that relationships based on unequal distribution of power have on interaction.

Th e fi rst aspect of the patriarchal society that represents the subject of femi-nist analysis on power is the process of parenting children of diff erent sexes in accordance with the basic characteristics of patriarchy, which contributes to the traits and behavior patterns upon which this system is maintained. Although fe-minist theory for the most part is made up of stories and perspectives of women, arising from their own experiences, its specifi c analysis are related to the very strong social pressure to which male children are exposed in order to achieve ‘masculinization and socialization’ in accordance with the requirements of the patriarchal system, especially the fact that this pressure starts much earlier than the corresponding pressures on girls to internalize and accept the constraints and obligations of women.15 Th e logical question that arises in the light of this

12 Look into: Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985.13 Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985. p.509. Look into: Elizabeth Janeway, Powers of the Weak, New York: Knopf, 1980.14 Th e same, p.509.15 Look into: Ruth E. Hartley, “Sex-Role Pressures and the Socialization of the Male Child”, in: Joseph H. Pleck and Jack Sawyer (eds.), Men and Masculinity, New York: Prentice Hall, 1974. p. 7-13.


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analysis is: if patriarchy is a means of expression of men whose selfi sh, self-satis-fying goals can only be achieved through repression against women, why a huge eff ort to impose certain behavior patterns to boys are necessary, if this behavior should be natural in the absence of constraints and balances?

Another important aspect of feminist research of concept of power is the very idea of its desirability, or the fact that many feminists, athough were often accused that they have the desire to be (like) men, in fact, never showed any jealousy towards men because of their repression roles, nor it considered those roles to be desirable and worth fi ghting for.16 Although the need for domination over the other people is considered to be an essential aspect of patriarchy within radical feminism, this aspect is generally not seen as a 'natural' state, but as a fac-tor of human interaction or as a principle of social organization. Anne Wilson Schaef states that belief that the domination is desirable state, and that power operates by uniform distribution - for someone to have more, someone else must have less - is just one of the myths of the patriarchal system.17 As already stated in paragraph by Marilyn French, the establishment of power over other people is a process that takes time and requires the same amount of energy as well as other ways of directing others to cooperate, which negates the belief that repression is in the short-term interests of the one who performs it. Accordingly, if the position of hegemony and domination gradually loses its appeal after it is established, the idea that power is fundamentally preferred over others beco-mes hard to defend. Finally, given that the patriarchal hierarchies by feminists are blamed for many social problems such as the deliberate destruction of the natural environment, inadequate systemic reactions to individual and collective problems and political attitudes that at the international level lead to permanent confrontations, the idea that this kind power in any meaningful, functionalist way serves the interests of society, also seems indefensible.

Th e third key concept of radical feminism is the repression , which in this direction is explained with the help of a specifi c system of common beliefs and concepts that describe the patriarchal society. Radical feminism is based on the assumption that all human activity is the result of certain social restrictions and coercion, and although every social system contains specifi c forms of interactive constraints, they do not have to cause repression. Under the patriarchal system, however, interaction and communication are limited in a way that creates and maintains the rigidity that is perceived as repression.

16 Look into: Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985; Anne Wilson Schaef, Women’s Reality: an Emerging Female System in the White Male Society, Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1981.17 Look into: Anne Wilson Schaef, Women’s Reality: an Emerging Female System in the White Male Society, Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1981.


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Th e focus of patriarchy is on the sexuality, and it operates on the principle of gender polarization of society in which the poles are rigidly defi ned based on competitive - or uncompetitive conduct that is related to the intensity of sexu-ality determined by certain specifi c restrictions. Th e value system of patriarchal society constructs experience and meaning of emotions diff erently for men and women, focusing sexual expression in diff erent patterns, so that the desire to express one’s sexuality fi ts into polarized concepts of sexual restrictions.18 Th e concept of sexuality in a patriarchal society has profound eff ects on the structure of sexually specifi c, appropriate models of thinking, personality, behavior and mood. Th ese patterns are complex and complicated, but among them, the core model is the one in which the restrictions placed towards women are associated with the processes of analytical thinking. Th is model operates by discouraging and deterring women from analytical thought process on the grounds that they are less able than men to understand complex concepts or to have ideas that are worth of attention. On the other hand, men are also placed restrictions on the recognition, expression and interpretation of emotions. Women are, therefore, emotionally exploited as a source of empathy and intimacy, or feelings detached from meaning, power and self-assertion, and, at the same time, are methodically discouraged from analytical thinking. Encouraging women to emphasize feelin-gs without meaning and emotional interactions in a patriarchal society is seen as a duty and moral behavior, which contributes to the retention of pleasant emotional aspects of existence that are both ‘safe’ and harmless for the survival of the repressive system. Advantages of emotional intimacy and interpersonal communication are, therefore, partially retained, but are separated by diff erent mental processes. Th us, feelings, along with sexuality and reproduction, in the radical - feminist analysis take place of typically women qualities, from wich they are, however, alienated. On the other hand, men, who are less constrained in the models of behavior and cognitive processes suff er from signifi cant limi-tations in the sphere of emotions. Given the important epistemological role of emotions, these limitations prevent a full understanding of many processes, that

18 Sexuality is a powerful force that sometimes can be used to help individuals to overcome social barriers. When it is, however, very strictly limited, it can also function as a conservative force whose role is to maintain the constraints that consist of the fact that access to sexual experience is socially organized to be easily accessible only to those who adapt their behavior to defi ned roles. Patriarchal patterns of sexuality on the example of subordinative image of women in the West, explains Catherine A. MacKinnon stating that “sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is socially constructed so that it leads to us wanting to start our own self-destruction. Th at is, our subordination is eroticized as a female, in fact, something like that, to some extent, and attracts us, although not nearly as much as it attracts men. Th is is our part in this system that is not in our interests, our share in this system that is killing us.” (Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodifi ed: Discourses on Life and Law, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. p. 54.)


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among other things, require observation from emotional angle. Due to the lack of a large amount of information necessary for understanding the certain situ-ations, the use of power and responsibility for deciding on the procedures, are opposing the power of men to their lack of understanding of exactly that area on which they have the authority. Frustrations arised from this situation cause a desire for control - because what you can control can apparently be understo-od, allowing the reaction to certain circumstances. When the patriarchal value system, in which the emphasis is placed on having the power, exists in parallel with the above stated dynamic situation, the desire to control intensifi es. Men, therefore, function as agents of the main guidelines of the patriarchal system: the establishment and maintenance of control for its own sake. Under these conditions, the ability to limit the extent to which norms can be extended or abolished, are becoming signifi cantly less, and instead strongly regulated rigidity of the social processes can be achieved at the expense of fl exibility.19 Th e end result of this process is the oppression of women that most radically - feminist theorists consider for the basic model of the male quest for power over other pe-ople, as well as the fundamental form of confl ict between the sexes. Th e process of domination over women is spreading to many men; desire for domination, therefore, exists as the eff ect of patriarchy to men, as women’s liberation of syste-matic oppression makes a fundamental prerequisite to free all people from the universally destructive social model.

After listing the main characteristics and analysis of concepts of patriarc-hy, power and oppression within radical feminism, it can be said that, in the perspective of feminist direction, patriarchy is seen as a multidimensional phe-nomenon in which the control of individuals is possible because of their own co-operation with the system. According to the radical feminists, oppression under patriarchy does not benefi t anyone, but, instead, it is damaging all the inhabitants of this planet. At the same time, however, although individuals are becoming objective victims of this repression, its immediate source is not exter-nal but internal. In other words, the social structure to the fullest extent are a common conceptual structure, located in the human mind, in spite of their real existence and reality of repression they cause.

Radical feminism does not predict extreme methods of changing the patri-archal system. Th e reasons for this attitude, besides the fact that feminist theory the concept of power over other people generally consideres problematic, main-ly lies in the real constraints in the prospect of working women, due to lack of numerical and physical strength, just have to be limited to relevant, applicable methods.19 Look into: Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985.


43

Th e most important place among these methods takes an individual “awa-reness” in which members of oppressed populations begin to make conclusions and decisions based on their own feelings and thoughts, regardless of whether they are consistent with the patriarchal norms or not. Only with this individual development of consciousness, it is possible to change the nature of social re-lations embedded in the patriarchal system. Th e “revolution of ideas” in which there will be a replacement of one model of thinking with other, is the only way to break down the patriarchy and to establish a social system based on humane relations among people, which will not be characterized by subordination and repression. In this way, considered by the radical feminists it would come to im-proving the status of not only women but also men, whose self-assertion would no longer depend on the degree of inferiority of other groups.20

2. Comparative analysis of Marxism and Feminism

Th eories of confl ict21 assume that society is made up of opposing factions whose relationships are based on the shape and balance of power, and then

20 Th is kind of change describes and Marilyn French in her comparative analysis of patriarchy and feminism, saying: “Th e only true revolution against patriarchy is the one that removes the idea of power from the central position, and instead raises the idea of pleasure. Despite the contempt which existed in relation to this quality during thousands of years, satisfaction, happiness ... in its broadest and deepest sense - is in fact, the greatest human good. In order, however, “for happiness to replace the power”, it is necessary to change the collective consciousness in which is deeply rooted the idea about inequality or inferiority of one category of the population as a measure of personal success and social position of the other, which French describes with the following words: “In order to restore satisfaction at the central position it is necessary to restore the value of beings, and, therefore, the nature ... If men and women were seen as equal, if male self-assertion would not depend on the inferior groups, other stratifi cation would also become unnecessary.” Th e author further points out that this idea is just a sketch of feminist beliefs, and that the goal of the feminist movement is not the overthrow of any government or certain structure, but the re-placement of one way of thinking with another. Feminism increases the welfare of all its support-ers, which may attract those who initially do not consider this movement close to them. Personal well-being as a result of the application of feminist principles, according to French, is caused by integration of personality and the use of the entire range of talent that an individual possesses. Th e author emphasizes the fundamental diff erences between patriarchy and feminism, as competing ideas about social relations, and observes that “patriarchy, which in all its forms requires a kind of self-sacrifi ce, denial or repression in the name of some higher good that is rarely (if ever) achieved in reality, focuses on the superiority, victory and satisfaction because of the fi nal triumph,” while feminism, on the other hand, “requires a whole being in the name of the current well-being, and focuses on the integrity, community and enjoyment of this experience.” (Marylin French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals, New York: Ballantine, 1985. p. 444-445.)21 Sociological theories, according to their general analytical approaches can be divided into: the functionalist (or structural - functionalist or structuralist), theories of confl ict and interactionist


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analyze the social relations in accordance with the position of the factions fi gh-ting for power. Since, as already noted, radical feminism is based on the basic assumption that the poles are confronted, that men in the patriarchal system, have power and carry out repression against women, as well as company and various relations within it may be best explained by just watching the sex ratio towards this situation, this line can be defi ned as a theory of confl ict.22 In order to establish radical feminism into the context of general sociology and sociologi-cal theories, and according to its defi nition as a theory of confl ict, it is important to compare the similarities and diff erences of radical feminist with theory of confl ict on whose basis this kind of feminism arose, or Marxism. In the begin-ning it is important only to point out that the similarities between Marxism and feminism are generally numerous, which, among other things, led to the formation of direction known as Marxist feminism. Th is theory, as its name tells it, was created in the ranks of the female members of the Marxist organization of the United States, such as, for example, “Students for Democratic Society”. Th ese women dissatisfi ed with their marginal status within letftist groups used the Marxist theory in order to defi ne the political situation of women in capitalist society and on the criticism of the limited Marxist perspectives have develo-ped new direction of feminism, which, in fact, is the improvement of Marxist dialectical conceptualization of repression against women. Th ese materialistic conceptualization, although previously recognized in Marxist literature, until the emergence of the aforementioned feminist directions were generally ignored as an analytical topic.23 Th e starting point of Marxist feminism is the claim that capitalism, with its emphasis on the creation of economic dependence, and the root of repression carried out against women and inequalities between the sexes are ultimately determined by the capitalist mode of production, while the ge-neral social divisions are related to the class. Women’s subordination is seen as a form of oppression that is held because it serves the interests of capital.

In addition to Marxist feminism, feminist direction largely inspired by Ma-rxism, is also a radical feminism. Since the focus of this paper is radical femi-nism as a theory of confl ict, it is important to compare the similarities of this and the Marxist theory of confl ict.

I. As already pointed out, radical feminism, like some other feminist ap-proaches, is basically inspired by Marxist political theory, and is based on

theories; Look into: Jože Garičar, Th e Overview of Sociological Th eories, Belgrade: Publishing com-pany Work, 1969; Randall Collins, Confl ict Socilology, New York: Academic Press, 1974.22 Look into: Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Th ought, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983.23 Look into: Robim Morgan, Th e Anatomy of Freedem: Feminism, Physics and Global Politics, Garden City New York: Anchor / Doubleday, 1982.


45

the Marxist assumption that it is not enough just to study society, but it is necessary to completely transform it.

II. Both theories are based on the basic assumption that society is made up of opposing factions defi ned by relationships based on the distribution of power, and then analyze the society and all its processes from the per-spective of fundamental power struggle.

III. Social conditions which allow the maintenance of specifi c power relati-ons, the long-term repression of a faction in the confl ict, represents the next fundamental similarity of Marxism and radical feminism. In both cases, the process of repression is the result of two distinct but mutually dependent and complementary factors, where the fi rst represents the di-rect use of force by the dominant populations against ‘recalcitrant’ mem-bers of subordinate categories, and the second is the internalization of the worldview of subordinate category, which is based on the belief in the accuracy and naturalness of subordination, and, therefore, in fairness of socio - political system in which the processes of repression are going on. Th e function of this internalized worldview or ideology, is the creation and maintenance of a system of rules and values through which members of subordinate populations themselves believe in the 'naturalness' and 'natural tradition' of their inferior position in relation to members of ot-her categories. In other words, although the members of the subordinate class are aware of diff erences of their social class position as individuals in the presence of individuals from the other categories, they have a belief that this categorical distinction is the 'natural' and 'fundamental' division and not the social construction based on injustice and inequality. It is this system of 'justice illusory' that minimizes the possibility of real large-scale confl ict in a society based on oppression of certain categories of people who, consciously or unconsciously, accept their inferior position, and live in illusion of 'natural' division of roles, rights and power. Th ese psycho-logical and cultural basis of values enable the functioning of repressive societies based on gender and / or class distinctions, and lead to fourth common characteristic of Marxism and radical feminism.

IV. Both theories have stated that the weak point of the repressive system is the fact that the success of repressor depends on whether or not they will forever have to use repressive methods to subjugate subordinate groups.24 Radical feminism solution for repression sees in erosion of ideology and

24 Look into: Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, in: Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Th e Marx-Engels Reader, Th e Second Edition, New York: Norton, 1978. (Th e Original Edition pub-lished in 1872 ) p. 469-501; Carol Hanish, “Th e Personal is Political”, in: Jerome Agel (ed.), Th e Radical Th erapist, New York: Ballantine, 1971. p. 152-155.


46

raising the awareness of subordinates, or the termination of the partici-pation of women in the repression that is performed on them.25 Within Marxist theory, there are also less radical directions 26, based on the pro-pagation of non-cooperation and discipline of subordinate populations, that would lead to paralysis and inability of repressive system to function in a way that the repressors would be forced to either accept the need for negotiations in order to gain the voluntary cooperation by subordinates, or that every time they resort to lengthy and exhausting violent methods of coercion.

In addition to the fact that between radical feminism and Marxism are signi-fi cant similarities, the two theories also diff er on the following key issues:

I. Although Marxism and radical feminism are based on the basic assump-tion that society is made up of opposing factions defi ned by relations-hips based on the distribution of power at this point, however, theories diverge on the issue of defi ning the opposing faction, respectively the opponents in the struggle for power. On the one hand, Marxism is cros-sing its formative relationship with fi ghting forces for the accumulati-on of material goods, regarding ownership and control of the means of production in order to further their accumulation, and describes two opposing classes - the working class and the class of owners of the means of production - as the opponents in the struggle for power. On the other hand, radical feminism is based on the relations between the sexes as a fundamental social confl ict from which they arise and upon which other social processes are based on, and which is defi ned by the dominance of the male over the female sex, in the system based on the subordination and exploitation of women.27

II. In the case of Marxist analysis there is a belief that a violent confrontation of vastly superior subordinate members with the ruling class, provided that participation in this confrontation take the masses of the oppressed population, would mean their certain victory, which led to the results that within the Marxist tradition was directly suggested a violent revo-lution of the working class as an ideal solution to the problem of re-

25 Carol Hanish, “Th e Personal is Political”, in: Jerome Agel (ed.), Th e Radical Th erapist, New York: Ballantine, 1971. p. 152-155.26 Marxism is generally based on the idea that a violent confrontation of numerically superior subordinate members of the ruling class would mean their victory, which led to the fact that, as a solution to the problem of repression, was directly suggested a violent revolution of the working class.27 Look into: Alice Echols, Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975, Minnea-polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.


47

pression.28 Radical feminism, on the other hand, only provides methods of undermining the patriarchal ideology of “raising the awareness” and failing to cooperate with the system.

III. Within radical feminism there is no theorizing equivalent to material wealth and what it represents in Marxism, that is one particular thing that is, and for what, parties fi ght. Instead, much more common is the observation that men exert repression over women from ultimately un-necessary,29 or pathological irrational reasons.

IV. Due to the radical feminist theory, there is not a “thing” for which the struggle for power becomes inevitable, theorists of this route often con-sidered the evaluation of power of some people over others theoretically problematic, whereas Marxism generally accepts this kind of power as a desirable, explaining the repression through the possibility of performing the same. Th is, fundamentally diff erent, approach to the distribution of power is one of the most important diff erences between the two theories.

Conclusion

Radical feminism is one of the directions of feminist theory, formed on the view that the social system is based on a patriarchal basis, resulting in the margi-nalization and discrimination against women in all spheres of society. Th is route starts from the idea of confl ict between the sexes as a fundamental social con-fl ict, which classifi es this theory as a sociological theory known as the theory of confl ict. As feminist theory generally originates from Marxism, which is also the most famous theory of confl ict, the comparison of the two theories is one of the best ways to set up a radical feminist theory in the context of theory of confl ict. Analyzing these two theoretical directions can be pointed out that the simila-rities between Marxism and feminism are mainly related to the defi nition and characteristics of the forms of society and social conditions within which there is a confl ict and repression carried out, as well as potential ways to combat the repressive processes. As part of its general characteristics, both theories are based on the common assumption that society is made up of confl icting elements engaged in a power struggle. Following common characteristic is related to the social conditions that allow repression, which consist of the use of force by

28 Look into: Karl Marx,“Manifesto of the Communist Party”, in: Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Th e Marx-Engels Reader, Th e Second Edition, New York: Norton, 1978. (Th e Original Edition pub-lished in 1872) p. 469-501.29 Look into: Robin Morgan, Th e Anatomy of Freedom: Feminism, Physics and Global Politics, Gar-den City New York: Anchor / Doubleday, 1982.


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the repressor and the simultaneous cooperation of subordinates in this process, which comes from their belief in the ‘naturalness and inevitability’ of their sub-ordinate position. Marxism and radical feminism share the belief that the main problem is the fact that the repressor, in order to maintain a repressive system requires constant application of force, and as a way to change this system, both theories propagate the non-cooperation by subordinate populations with the system. Besides the indisputable similarities between these two theoretical direc-tions, there are also signifi cant diff erences. Both theories are based on the idea of social relations based on a fundamental confl ict between opposing factions, but they diff er in their defi nition: on the one hand, Marxism opposing sides defi nes as a diff erent class, while, in the case of radical feminism there are various poles. While Marxism, however, in order to overthrow repressive system, among other things, proposes the methods of violence, feminism is held on a peacefull way to bring down the system by raising awareness and mental undermining the foun-dations of a patriarchal society. A signifi cant diff erence between these directions is linked to the case of confl ict, which in Marxist theory represents material wealth, while in radical feminism this case simply does not exist. Relationship to power, as the main reason for continuing the confl ict, is also diff erent in these two directions. While, on the one hand, Marxism considers power as desirable, radical feminism in most cases does not hold the view that the power over other people is necessary for the functioning of society. Th e essence of the feminist direction lies in the study and the need for reconsideration of the source of po-wer and desire for repression, which are attributed to the complex social factors which are constructed and not innate and essential. Although radical feminists consider patriarchal system to be oppressive, in which women are victims of male portage for power, they, also, generally argue that patriarchal tendencies are neither inevitable nor ideal for men, who also suff er from limitations due to patriarchy, and for which, therefore, as well as for women feminism would represent a freeing movement.

Literature

Agel, Jerome (ed.). Th e Radical Th erapist. New York: Ballantine. 1971.Collins, Randall. Confl ict Socilology. New York: Academic Press. 1974.Dow, J. Bonnie. Television, Media Culture, and the Women’s Movement since

1970. Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press. 1996.Echols, Alice. Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1989.


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Eisenstain, Hester. Contemporary Feminist Th ought. Boston: G.K. Hall & Co. 1983.

Eschle, Catherine. Global Democracy, Social Movements, and Feminism. Bo-ulder: Westview Press. 2001.

Firestone, Shulamith. Th e Dialectic of Sex: Th e Case for Feminist Revolution. New York: Morrow. 1970.

Fisher, Elizabeth. Women’s Creation: Sexual Evolution and the Shaping of Society. New York: McGraw – Hill. 1979.

French, Marylin. Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals. New York: Ballantine. 1985.

Friedman, Stanford Susan. Mappings: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of Encounter. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1998.

Goričar, Jože. Th e Overview of Sociological Th eories. Belgrade: Publishing Ho-use Work. 1969.

Janeway, Elizabeth. Powers of the Weak. New York: Knopf. 1980.Kopaczynoski, German. No Higher Court: Contemporary Feminism and the

Right to Abortion. Scranton: University of Scranton Press. 1995.MacKinnon, Catherine A. Feminism Unmodifi ed: Discourses on Life and Law.

Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 1987.Maed, Margareth. Sex and Temperament in Th ree Primitive Societies. New

York: Morrow. 1963. Marx, Karl. “Manifesto of the Communist Party”. in: Robert C. Tucker

(ed.), Marx-Engels Reader, drugo izdanje, New York: Norton, 1978. Morgan, Robin. Th e Anatomy of Freedem: Feminism, Physics and Global Poli-

tics. Garden City New York: Anchor / Doubleday. 1982.Pleck, Joseph H. and Jack Sawyer. (eds.) Men and Masculinity. New York:

Prentice Hall. 1974. Phillips, Anne. Feminism and Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.

1999.Ruth, Sheila. Issues in Feminism: An Introduction to Women’s Studies.

California: Maufi eld Publications Co. 1990.Schaef, Anne Wilson. Women’s Reality: an Emerging Female System in the

White Male Society. Minneapolis: Winston Press. 1981.Slater, Philip. A Dream Deferred: America’s Discontent and the Search for a

New Democratic Ideal. Boston: Beacon Press. 1991.Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the rights of Woman. New York:

W.W.Norton and Company. 2009.

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Gojko Pavlović1

Internal Affairs CollegeBanja [email protected]

Review articleUDC 351.759.4/.5(091)DOI 10.7251/SOCEN1305051PAccepted: 24.5.2013.

Development of the idea of security

“Security is the only one which necessarily embraces the future: subsistence, abundance, equality, may be regarded for a moment only;

but security implies extension in point of time, with respect to all the benefi ts to which it is applied.

Security is therefore the principal object.”Jeremy Bentham

AbstractHistorically, the concept of security has been understood, interpreted and de-fi ned in diff erent ways. In addition, it is a notion that has been, unlike any other, mentioned and studied in all branches of science, natural and techni-cal, as well as social and humanistic ones. It is exactly due to the utilization of the concept of security in diff erent areas of life, that it has been much more diffi cult to defi ne it uniformly. Furthermore, it is the fact that the changes occurring on the international scene since the end of the Cold War caused the changes in ideas related to the security in general, and all its concepts. With referral to the previous, this paper points out that traditional concepts of security are no longer able to explain and deal with the complex nature of contemporary security challenges, risks and threats. Th at is why nowadays, when considering the security issues, there are numerous perplexities, such as the question whom the security needs to be provided for, who is responsible for security, who are those who impose the security threats, and what are the procedures, means and methods to have, preserve and enhance the security. Th e aim of this paper is to show how the concept of security has developed throughout the time and the diff erent views and ideas of security occurring throughout the history.

1 PhD candidate, an assistant lecturer at Th e Police and Security Department of the Internal Aff airs College in Banja Luka


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Keywords: security, historical notion of idea, war and peace, personal goal, natural right, common good, the privatization of security.

Introductory remarks

Th e concept of security has been capturing the attention of humans and the-ir community since the existence, but in modern times it has started being used in almost all areas of human activity. However, there are authors who warn that, at the same time, the concept of security has been one of the least of discovered and defi ned notions, and therefore, in order to acquire the full understanding of this notion, it is necessary to study the basic categories of this concept.2

Mid last century Arnold Wolfers pointed to the multidimensionality and complexity of the concept of security defi ning it as “an ambiguous symbol” which may or may not have any meaning.3

Th e security, as a condition for the existence and activity of the individual, society, the state and the international community, is one of the fundamental social, i.e. state functions, as evidenced by the ever-going preoccupation thro-ughout the history of mankind to achieve the security. However, multi-dimen-sional and complex concept, as it is security, has not had the same meaning throughout history.4 Namely, for centuries, the security has been studied as a very complex social phenomenon from various perspectives: philosophical, le-gal, political, social, economic, and so on. It is exactly that “…the study of the history of human society suggests that the issues of security of human life and property are among the oldest problems which a man has been confronted with and has tried to solve.”5

First ideas on security

Th e fi rst ideas on security can be found in the ancient philosophy, although the security at the time was not considered as a separate category, but instead

2 Siniša Tatalović, „Koncepti sigurnosti na početku 21. stoljeća“, Međunarodne studije, year 6, No. 1 (2006): p. 60-80.3 See: Arnold Wolfers, „National Security as an ambiguous symbol“, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (1952): p. 481-502.4 Siniša Tatalović, „Koncepti sigurnosti na početku 21. stoljeća“, Međunarodne studije, Year 6, No. 1 (2006): p. 60–80.5 Dušan Davidović, Alternativni činioci bezbednosti (privatni polising) - Hrestomatija, Beograd: Fakultet bezbjednosti, 2006. p. 3.

Gojko Pavlović Development of the idea of security

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was deduced from more general concepts, primarily from war and peace, i.e. the use of force, as well as the relationship between territorially organized and struc-tured social communities (states)6, and afterwards from the concept of freedom and its importance for the man and society.7

Of the ancient thinkers who discussed the notion and causes of the war should be pointed out Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. In his discussion of the establishment of a state8, Plato tackled the causes of war by correlating it with the concept of the so-called “unhealthy state”. In fact, unlike so-called “healthy state”, where it is produced only what is needed, the unhealthy state is the one where not only needed things are produced and consumed, but also the luxury, unnecessary ones. Th is creates the need to have a new group of producers of those unnecessary things, and the land being suffi cient to feed the citizens of the healthy state suddenly becomes insuffi cient for the citizens of the unhealthy one. According to Plato this is exactly where the cause of the war lies, that is, wars break out due to need to acquire the new land. Plato viewed the war as a law of nature, as a natural way of resolving disputes.9

According to Aristotle states should strive to achieve the happiness of their citizens, which should be a primary national goal. A state’s attempt to subjugate the neighboring country is in opposition to the state’s law, and the conquest must not be set as one of its goals. On the other hand, each country must be ready to defend if attacked. State government must do everything to make the country inaccessible to the enemy and to be ready to defend itself if attacked. Aristotle argued that the military forces are not needed to the country in peace, but in times of instability and in war eff orts should be made to make that milita-ry force as organized as possible.10 Also, Aristotle divided nations into barbarians and the civilized ones, and based on this division he defended the view that

6 Anton Grizold, Međunarodna sigurnost, Teorijsko-institucionalni okvir, Zagreb: Sveučilište u Za-grebu – Fakultet političkih znanosti, 1998. p. 62-63.7 Namely, having perception of the freedom as the highest human ideal and versatile determinant of the development of man and society, ancient and medieval philosopher noted the connection between the freedom, security, and the state, according to which the state has two main objec-tives: common security and freedom as the freedom as putting limitations to violence that society or state may execute over individuals. Cited from: Mladen Bajagić, Osnovi bezbednosti, Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, 2007. p. 2.8 See: Platon, Država, V izdanje, Beograd: Beogradski izdvačko-grafi čki zavod, 2002.9 Th ere were confl icting views that rejected and condemned the war. Such views were represented in ancient Chinese philosophy (Taoism), and among some Greek thinkers (Aristophanes, Pythagoras, the Stoics) who condemned the war because of its destructive nature, violations of moral and human-istic principles, incompatibility with sense and nature, and due to prevention to achieve universal hu-man unity and harmony. Cited from: Dejana Femić Vukčević, „Razvoj ideja vezanih za bezbednost države i međunarodne zajednice“, Politička revija, Year (XVI) IV, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005): p.159-172.10 Radovan Vukadinović, Teorije međunarodnih odnosa, Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2005. p. 8.


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civilized nations can submit the barbarians. Hence, Aristotle is considered the oldest colonial ideologue.11

Furthermore, in the period of medieval Christianity one can diff erentiate so-called just and unjust wars. Only just wars are the ones that can be undertaken since they lead to peace. Th e fi rst who developed by the Christian doctrine of the right to lead a war is considered to be St. Augustine, who made a distinction between the off ensive and defensive wars. While defensive war is justifi ed, given that it is natural to suppress the violence with violence, the war of aggression must meet certain requirements to be considered for a just war (bellum iustum). Th us, the decision on off ensive war can only be brought by a legitimate go-vernment, and it should be initiated only for just cause and for establishing the peace.12

Furthermore, Th omas Aquinas also discussed the issue of war and peace. Discussing the concept of the peace, he compared the peace with harmony, stressing that peace includes harmony, but diff ers from it. Th e concept of peace involves “mutual adjustment of our own aspirations with the ones of another people” while harmony makes closer the aspirations of diff erent individuals. When considering the question if the peace is wanted by all human beings, Th omas Aquinas’ answer is affi rmative, and he also adds that even those people who seek war actually want peace since they do not have it, and start wars to change the present state of harmony and turn it into a real peace. Examining the nature and issue of the war, he believes that three conditions must be met in order to considered war fair: the war should be conducted only upon the master’s command, there should be present a just cause of war, and there should exist the just intentions of those who wage wars - and that is to promote good and avoid evil.13

Further considerations on war and peace were replaced by the ideas and the-ories in which state’s security is conditioned by its relations with other countries at the international scene. Two diff erent directions may be noticed within this idea: the fi rst one is based on the idea that the cooperation among states is the only eff ective mean to ensure the security of the state and to establish lasting peace, and the second, which is based on the idea of the need to strengthen national security through military power or force, states that only a strong and independent state can ensure its safety.14

11 Vojin Dimitrijević i Radoslav Stojanović, Međunarodni odnosi, Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1996. p.22.12 Dejana Femić Vukčević, „Razvoj ideja vezanih za bezbednost države i međunarodne zajednice“, Politička revija, Year (XVI) IV, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005): p.159-172.13 Toma Akvinski, Država, Zagreb: Globus, 1990. p. 213-220. 14 Dejana Femić Vukčević, „Razvoj ideja vezanih za bezbednost države i međunarodne zajednice“, Politička revija, Year (XVI) IV, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005): p. 159-172.


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Th us we see that even in the middle ages some philosophers, lawyers, theo-logians and diplomats dealt with the issue of organizing the international com-munity in order to consolidate peace, and the thing in common for them is the eff ort to achieve a lasting international peace by educating the supranational authority which could regulate relations between states.15

It is assumed that the fi rst work related to the establishment of states at the international level, with the aim to ensure universal peace, and where we fi nd developed the idea of the so-called world state-monarchy, which stands opposite the kingdom, as a country with a limited area, is Dante’s “Monarchy”. In it, Dante points out the necessity to have a world state, a monarchy, which would be able to secure world peace16 and which would unite all other countries/states. For Dante, the highest goal of mankind is the peace as “the best of everything that has been given for our bliss.”17

In the late fi fteenth and early sixteenth century in his famous book “Th e Prince”, Machiavelli says that the security is the fi rst and most important human concern and therefore a state should be governed by the one who is brave and who is able to fi ght for their own safety and that of community. In Machiavelli’s opinion, it was normal that each state aspires to rule over the others ones, which creates a permanent rivalization with the aim to maximize their welfare.18 All states are won by own or foreign weapon, through happiness, or courage.19 Ana-lyzing military relations, Machiavelli argued that the civil army is much better than the privileged elite or mercenaries.20 Machiavelli puts the main focus on the power and the issue of its acquisition and maintenance. He provides the

15 Ibidem.16 Anton Grizold, Međunarodna sigurnost, Teorijsko-institucionalni okvir, Zagreb: Sveučilište u Za-grebu – Fakultet političkih znanosti, 1998. p.66.17 Dante Aligijeri, Djela, Knjiga 1, Zagreb: Liber, Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1976. p.482. Cited from: Dejana Femić Vukčević, „Razvoj ideja vezanih za bezbednost države i međunarodne zajednice“, Politička revija, Year (XVI) IV, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005): p.159-172.18 Radovan Vukadinović, Teorije međunarodnih odnosa, Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2005. p.10.19 Nikolo Makijaveli, Vladalac, Beograd: Dereta, 2005. p. 13.20 Machiavelli wrote: “Th e two most essential foundations for any state, whether it be old or new, or both old and new, are sound laws and sound military forces. Now, since the absence of sound laws as-sures the absence of sound military forces, while the presence of sound military forces indicates the pres-ence of sound laws as well. A prince can either have his own forces or rely on mercenary or auxiliary forces. Mercenary and auxiliary forces are useless and dangerous: and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither fi rm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fi delity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. Th e fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the fi eld than a trifl e of stipend, which is not suffi cient to make them willing to die for you.” Cited from: Nikolo Makijaveli, Vladalac, Beograd: Dereta, 2005. p.54.


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ruler with clear advice on how to ensure internal and external security of their country using the available funds therefore.21

Furthermore, Jean Bodin proposes the hypothesis that a stable government and order represent the largest social needs. In his book “Les Six livres de la République” Bodin identifi ed the conditions necessary to ensure the state order, stating that a basic prerequisite for the state order is the state’s sovereignty which is the highest authority and does not depend on the subjects.22 All sovereign rulers are equal, and their power is unlimited since it is subject to divine law, natural law of reason and the law of nations. Bodin is the fi rst author who defi -ned sovereignty as a kind of absolute power in a state community. For him, the sovereign power of one state is limited by the sovereign power of the other ones. In terms of international relations, Bodin talked about two major rules: power and trust. In addition, he also advocated for strict obedience of international agreements. (pacta sunt servanda).23

Th e idea of security from XVII to XX century

Th e idea of security was also the heart of European political thought of the seventeenth century. It is an idea whose political signifi cance, as well as the me-aning of the word “security”, continually changed throughout history, mostly implying a condition and the goal of the individuals, groups and states. Th us, the most consistent idea of security at the time was that it was a condition or goal which creates a special relationship between individuals and the state.24

Th e position that the state is seen as a main provider of the security25 can be traced back to Hobbes’s concept of legitimate government that is created by the consent of the people through the social contract, all the way to Weber’s idea of the state’s monopoly to have the legitimate use of physical force. Together these attitudes represent the basic philosophical pillar of the state’s role in cre-ating and maintaining a monopoly over the means of force. In fact, since the Westphalia peace agreement,26 signed in 1648, it has been adopted the idea that

21 Radovan Vukadinović, Teorije međunarodnih odnosa, Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2005. p.10.22 Compare to: Bogoljub Milosavljević, Uvod u teoriju ustavnog prava, Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union i Javno preduzeće Službeni glasnik, 2011. p.56.23 Radovan Vukadinović, Teorije međunarodnih odnosa, Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2005. p.11-12.24 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 3, (1995): p.53-98.25 Alyson Bailes, “Th e Private Sector and the Monopoly of Force”, In Revisiting the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force: Policy Paper – №24, Ed. Alyson Bailes, Ulrich Schneckener, Her-bert Wulf, Geneva: DCAF, 2007. p.1-9.26 See more: Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice And Gover-nance Of Private Military And Security Companies, Geneva: DCAF, 2005. p. 1.


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the state the one that must ensure and provide security to its citizens. Th e two main principles arising from this agreement are the sovereignty and equality of the nations. Th e state has, therefore, taken a monopoly on the use of force, in order to make its citizens secure and to ensure its sovereignty against internal and external threats.27

Th omas Hobbes, called “the theoretician of the security and order”28, in his Leviathan, states that the purpose of the state is to enable the individual securi-ty.29 In contrast, Leibniz (Gottfried Wilhelm - Leibniz) writes: “My defi nition of a state is that it is a great society with a goal to ensure common security.”30 While Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu) sees the security both as a refl ection of the defi nition of the state and the defi nition of freedom: “political liberty consists in security, or at least in the opinion of someone’s security.”31

According to the stated, the security is the goal of an individual. In its in-terest, individuals are willing to give up other goods. In other words, it is a wellbeing that depends on the feelings of individuals, i.e. the view one has on someone’s safety, which in turn enables the other feelings, including the ability of individuals to take a risk or to plan for the future. Also, Adam Smith, in his work, identifi es the freedom and security of individuals as the most important prerequisites for the development of the public wealth. In his opinion, security means being free from the possibility to suff er a sudden or violent attacks on someone’s personality or property.32 In other words, in his “Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth”, Adam Smith pointed out that the only duty

27 Gojko Pavlović, Pravo privatne bezbjednosti – uporedna studija, Banja Luka: Defendologija cen-tar za bezbjednosna, sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja, 2011. p.5.28 See: Bogoljub Milosavljević, Uvod u teoriju ustavnog prava, Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerz-iteta Union i Javno preduzeće Službeni glasnik, 2011. p.57.29 “I give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condi-tion; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. Th is done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. Th is is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.” See: Th omas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, London: George Routledge and Sons, 1885, Cited from: Branko Bošnjak i dr., Antologija fi lozofskih tekstova s pregledom po-vijesti fi lozofi je, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1954. p.194-195.30 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 3, (1995): p.53-98.31 Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, De l`esprit des lois, (1748, bk. XII, chap. II), vol. I, Paris: Gamier, 1973. p.202.32 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 3, (1995): p.53-98.


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of the state is to ensure the safety of the population.33 Th erefore, the safety of individuals in terms of freedom from fear and personal injuries, was crucial to liberal political thought.

Th e term “security” gained a new public prominence in the early, liberal period of the French Revolution. Natural rights of man consisted of liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression.34 Th us, security was still the condition of an individual, but now, also, their natural right. In addition, the security, as one of the basic natural and imprescriptible rights of man, was poin-ted to in the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen from 1793.35 Article 2 of the Declaration states that the purpose of the society is to provide the happiness of all. Government exists for the sake of guaranteeing the enjoyment of human nature and imprescriptible rights, such as equality, liberty, security and property. In Article 8 this Declaration emphasizes that security lies in the protection that society provides to each of its members in order for them to protect their personal integrity, rights and property.36 Th us, the security is conceived in terms of freedom from personal threat, which was to be provided by the civil society. It means that the individual, or personal safety, in the liberal thought of the enlightenment, represents the personal and collective good. It is also the condition and goal of an individual, which can be achieved only in a kind of collective endeavor. Th is point of view is quite diff erent from the per-ception of security as an internal state of the individual in the Roman political thought.37

Th e new idea of security primarily as a collective good, which should be enabled by military or diplomatic means, is an idea that came to Europe during the period of revolutions and the Napoleonic Wars, and was diff erent from previous concepts. Th us, the concept of security of the state, in terms of the protection from external military attacks, took a commonplace in political di-scussion in Germany (Sicherheit or assecuratio pads) in the eighteenth century,

33 Evgenije Vasiljevič Spektorski, Država i njen život, Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu – Centar za publikacije, 2000,. p.49.34 Article 2 of the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of the National Assembly of France, 26/08/1789. (fr: La Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen).35 Th e Constitution from 24 June 1793 or so-called Th e Second Declaration. In fact, after the abo-lition of monarchy in France, the Convent created a new constitution called Montagnard Consti-tution, whose introductory part consisted of a separate declaration of rights, so-called Declaration Jacobine. Th e Jacobin declaration kept the basic positions of the Declaration from 1789, but also added some signifi cant updates, so the number of articles increased from 17 to 35. See more: Dragan Stojanović, Osnovna prava čoveka, Niš: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu – Institut za pravna i društvena istraživanja, 1989. p.26–27.36 Gojko Pavlović, „Zaštita ljudskih prava kao imperativ bezbednosne funkcije države“, Strani pravni život, No. 3 (2011): p.284–299.37 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 3, (1995): p.53-98.


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while in France, as well as in England, the collective sense of the word “siirete”, “sécurité” and “security” represented an innovation which appeared at the end of the eighteenth century.38

Later on, the safety of individuals was subsumed, as a political epigram, under the security of the nation. Th us Rousseau, like Locke and Montesquieu, described a social contract as a consequence of a desire of individuals to enjoy secure life39 and liberty, and pointed out to it as a basic problem that state insti-tutions should provide the solution to.40 For Jeremy Bentham, security is seen as a condition for the general welfare, as a fundamental social goal, a political joy consisting of subsistence, abundance, equality, and security, of which security is the most important one.41

Th e fi rst major public use of the word security in these new, i.e. national terms can be found even before the Congress of Vienna in 1814. Th e Allies initially signed for the Paris Peace Treaty, under which France once again was supposed to become the warrant of “security and stability” (un gage de sécurité et de stabilité) for Europe. One of the goals of the upcoming negotiations at the Congress of Vienna was to enable peace in the world, in other words, a new era was introduced when the great powers joined to restore the security of the throne (la sûreté des trones).42

According to the abovementioned, the period of European history from the treaty of Westphalia until the outbreak of World War II is considered the golden age of diplomacy, balance of power, alliances, and international law. Most of political thinkers in this period were focused on the sovereign nation-state, or its origins, functions, limitations of government, the rights of individuals within states, etc.43 In the period between the world wars, appear the fi rst considerati-ons of the security within research and teaching disciplines and become known as security studies. After the world wars, the attention was paid to the theoreti-cal considerations of democracy, national self-proclamation, disarmament and

38 Ibidem.39 For Kant (Immanuel Kant), both individuals and states seek “calmness and security” in the law, or when speaking country, it’s about public safety (öff entlichen Staatsicherheit) of the cosmopolitan system. See: Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. p.47-49.40 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Du Contract Social”, In: Oeuvres Complètes, vol. III, Paris: Gallimard, 1964. p.290.41 Jeremy Bentham, “Th e Principles of Civil Life”, In: Th e Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, Editor John Bowring, London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1837. 302. Cited from: Anthony Burke, “Aporias of security”, Alternatives, Vol. 27, Issue 1 (2002): p.1-27.42 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?”, Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 3, (1995): p.53-98.43 Anton Grizold, Međunarodna sigurnost, Teorijsko-institucionalni okvir, Zagreb: Sveučilište u Za-grebu – Fakultet političkih znanosti, 1998. 68.


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arbitration44 as defi ning instruments for the promotion of international peace and security. From that period the security of the state has been traditionally referred to as national security45, regardless of the distinction between the terms state and nation. It is believed that it was fi rst used by Walter Lippman in 1943, in his book “American foreign policy” citing that “the nation has security when it does have to sacrifi ce its legitimate interests to avoid war, and when it is able to maintain them by war if provoked”46, which again became the standard term for this concept of security after the Second World War, tying it to the integrity of sovereign states.47

Th e period of Cold War was a period of great nuclear confrontation between East and West, and was fi lled with fear of nuclear catastrophe. At the same time, during this period, it became notable the weakening of the citizens’ security. Th e attention of the police and judicial system was often focused on preventing and combating political crime and actions of so-called the internal enemy of the state. Human rights and freedoms were not only ignored in many countries, but were the object of the structural violence48, i.e. a systematic and ruthless endangerment and violation. Th us, it happened that the security of the state strengthened at the expense of that of people.49

It can be concluded that, from its inception, throughout the period of the establishment of the modern international system of states, as well as during the entire period of bipolarism, the reality of security was conquered by almost exc-lusively military terms, while the main object and the subject of security become a sovereign state. A key to achieve, preserve and improve security at any level

44 Siniša Tatalović, „Koncepti sigurnosti na početku 21. stoljeća“, Međunarodne studije, Year 6, No. 1 (2006): p.60-80.45 From this distance we can say that “its use is not entirely correct, given that it marks the security of the state. Th erefore, the term national security, which was less used, was actually more appro-priate because it marks the security of national values and interests, primarily sovereignty, state existence and that of society, the constitutional order and the public order. Th is is because the phenomenon nation is most often wider (geographic) than the notion state, and due to the fact that a country does not have to be national, or to coincide with the territorial propagation of na-tions.” Cited from: Saša Mijalković, Nacionalna bezbednost, Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, 2009. p.79-80.46 Zoran Keković, Teorija sistema bezbjednosti, Banja Luka: Univerzitet Sinergija – Fakultet za bezbjednost i zaštitu, 2009. p.130.47 Zoran Dragišić, „Sistem nacionalne bezbednosti – pokušaj defi nisanja pojma“, Vojno delo, No. 3 (2009): p.162-176.48 See: Bogoljub Milosavljević i Aleksandar Resanović, Državno nasilje nad građanima u Jugo-slaviji, Beograd: Centar za antiratnu akciju, 2001.49 Saša Mijalković, Nacionalna bezbednost, Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, 2009. p. 81–82.


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and of any subjects of security was, consequently, in the hands of the state.50 Th e idea of security during these three centuries was observed through the state security, that is, as a concept of national security, whose central part implies an existence of a sovereign state, its survival, territory and sovereignty as vital values and interests protected through its military capacity.51 Th erefore, this concept is referred to as a state-centric and orthodox. Th e primary tool of protecting the state lies in its power. Th is power was generally considered the military one, but also the economic power. One part also referred to the joining to certain asso-ciations thus gaining the possibility to overcome the size and destructiveness of active and potential threats imposed on the state or its allies. In fact, security is identifi ed with the so-called the external security of the country.52

Modern notions of security

Modern comprehension of security is dominated by two concepts, namely: universality - implies respect for the integrity of the term security, and demilita-rization - which allows overcoming the idea of the state security being exclusive-ly connected with the military force.53

Namely, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarism aff ected the understanding of the concept of security, and particularly important discussion was conducted on the nature and signifi cance security. One group of authors insisted on the extension of the concept of security suggesting the integration of new, broader potential security threats, such as economic development, environ-mental degradation, human rights violations and large migratory movements, as well as other wider potential threats. Another group of authors, starting from the wider dimensions of security, insists on deepening the agenda of security studies, including a number of segments such as individual security or human security, national security or the society security, all to way to the regional, in-ternational and global aspects of security issues. On the other hand, the third group of authors, staying faithful to the traditional state-centered approach to security issue, identifi es new aspects of defi nition of security (common security, 50 Dragan Simić, „Savremene teorije bezbednosti“, u: Antologija tekstova sa Škola reforme sektora bezbednosti: zbornik radova, urednik Pavle Janković, Beograd: Centar za međunarodne i bezbed-nosne poslove – ISAC, 2007. p.165-193.51 Saša Mijalković, „Nacionalna bezbednost – od Vestfalskog do posthladnoratovskog koncepta“, Vojno delo, br. 2 (2009): p.55-73.52 Saša Mijalković, Nacionalna bezbednost, Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, 2009. p. 79.53 Anton Grizold, Međunarodna sigurnost, Teorijsko-institucionalni okvir, Zagreb: Sveučilište u Za-grebu – Fakultet političkih znanosti, 1998. p.15-16.


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collective security, cooperative security, etc.), creating new theoretical models of multilateral interstate security relations, which could lead to resolution of the security issues in international relations.54

In addition, the end of the twentieth century was marked by global changes that have contributed to the actualization of the process of transferring traditio-nal power which only state was entitled to on the private sector. In other words, nowadays it has been spoken and written more about the privatization of securi-ty55 as a widespread and accepted phenomenon, than it has been the case in any other previous period in the history of the modern nation-state. Peter Singer, one of the most famous authors dealing with this subject, points out that it is clear that the trend of privatization of security has gone too far, too fast.56 We are witnessing that various companies, individuals, international organizations, NGOs and even the government use the services and put the increased confi -dence in the private sector, allowing it to take care of their security.57 So, after nearly four hundred years the state and its institutions are no longer the only actors entitled to take care of the external and internal security of the citizens.58 Westphalian system of nation-states, as the undisputed pillar of the interna-tional order, has been now replaced by much more complex reality where we are faced with the privatization of the war and confl ict59, while security system acquired a new sector, a private one, which was established and operates on commercial basis. Th e theory states that this new model of providing military and security services enables the governments and public institutions to increase effi ciency by concentrating only on the most important tasks, while the respon-sibility for the performance of less important tasks is transferred to the private security sector.60 Th erefore, nowadays we have, besides the state, some other

54 Siniša Tatalović, „Novo razumijevanje sigurnosti i sigurnosno okruženje na jugoistoku Europe“, u Demokratski nadzor i kontrola nad bezbjednosnim sektorom u regionu, zbornik radova, urednik Branko Vignjević, Banja Luka: M-impeks, 2004. p.45-55.55 See more: Robert Mandel, “Th e Privatization of Security”, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 28 Issue 1 (2001):129-151; Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising security: law, practice and governance of private military and security companies, Geneva: DCAF, 2005.56 See more: Peter Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contrac-tors and Counterinsurgency, Policy Paper, Number 4, Washington D.C: Th e Brookings Institution, 2007.57 Gojko Pavlović, Pravo privatne bezbjednosti – uporedna studija, Banja Luka: Defendologija cen-tar za bezbjednosna, sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja, 2011. p.6.58 Predrag Petrović, „Privatizacija bezbednosti u Srbiji“, Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana, No. 4 (2007): p.13-21.59 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising security: law, practice and governance of private military and security companies, Geneva: DCAF, 2005. p.1.60 Anna Richards, Henry Smith, Addressing the role of private security companies within security sector reform programmes, London: Saferworld, 2007. p.3-5.


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subjects which are signifi cant for the security and which operate internally, but also on the international scene, whether as individuals, social and private gro-ups, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and so on.61

Concluding Remarks

Since the beginning of human society, the war, due to its consequences, has been considered the greatest danger and threat to human society, and therefo-re, the security was observed, all the way to the end of XX century, as a goal that is realized by combining military and diplomatic means. Th erefore, the problem of security was only restricted to military matters, and was tackled through military activities, while other types of security were ignored. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, the man became more aware of other dangers that come from the natural and social environment, which also threaten every man. Finally, at the beginning of the XXI century, the security started being seen as a determinant of survival, i.e. as a condition that creates a relationship between the individual, society and state.62

Given that security is a dynamic phenomenon, the changes can be noticed regarding the values to be protected, the sources and forms of threats that jeo-pardize these values, the subjects that are threatened, as well as operating ways and means of the agencies responsible for guaranteeing security.

Th erefore, the security of the individual, society and the state has been given a new meaning in modern civilization. Th e current relations and changes wit-hin modern states, but also relations among states, require a new approach to security that will take into consideration all of its aspects as equally important, primarily including non-military means and mechanisms in security-related ac-tivities. In the current cultural and civilizational relations security has universal signifi cance, which is clearly expressed in the necessity to have integrity and inclusion of all areas of life in a certain state or society (economic, political, social, environmental, military, defense, etc.), as well as to reach increased con-nectedness and interdependence of global society.63

61 Saša Mijalković, Nacionalna bezbednost, Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, 2009. p. 79.62 Siniša Tatalović, „Koncepti sigurnosti na početku 21. stoljeća“, Međunarodne studije, Year 6, No. 1 (2006): p.60-80.63 Anton Grizold, Siniša Tatalović i Vlatko Cvrtila, Suvremeni sistemi nacionalne sigurnosti, Za-greb: Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Hrvatska udruga za međunarodne studi-je, 1999. p.7-8.


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Goran Stojanović1

Faculty of PhilosophyBanja [email protected]

Review articleUDC 316.74:[2-67+2-42]DOI 10.7251/SOCEN1305067SAccepted: 01.06.2013.

Morality and mysticism (Ethical research of ethics and religion)

AbstractIn classical ethical theory it is a customary to base morality with: revelation, evolution, utilitarianism, deontology, intuition and mystical experience. Th is article considers only the last foundation of morality, in a mystical experience. In doing so, mysticism is understood broadly, and it represents the identical experience, though diff erently expressed in the esoteric tradition of diff erent religions. Th e ethical problem is that such experience does not necessarily lead to morality. Looking mysticism in general, it is not justifi ed to use it for ethi-cal foundation of morality.

Key words: mysticism, moralism, amoralism.

Introduction

Two basic positions of the relationship of mysticism and morality are mu-tually opposed. For one position that is an unsolvable confl ict: the inner qu-est leads to a complete neglect of the outside world. Neither eff ect can touch an unchanging ultimate reality, and so, no action is important. Confl ict arises between the moral and spiritual freedom - morality is also as amorality, the product of ignorance. As enlightened prisoner who returns to Plato’s cave, the mystic does not consider the value or the shadow from the world of any signi-fi cance. Th e best-known authors who advocate this view are: Arthur Danto, Martin Buber, Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. Opposing to this is the only position that sees mysticism as compassionate and moral. Only with mystical experience we can avoid natural egocentricity, thus freeing the space for others. Th e lack of personal attachment provides mysticism an honest and equal care 1 Senior lecturer of ethics and a PhD of Faculty of Philosophy, University of Banja Luka. E-mail: [email protected] Web page: www.etika.rs.ba


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for all people. Th is group includes authors such as Evelina Underhill, Th omas Merton and Vera Brit.

In order to demonstrate that the current situation is more complex than eit-her side wants to accept, it is necessary to briefl y defi ne the concepts of morality and ethics, and more closely defi ne the notion of mysticism. Th e term ethics in general we will call any system of values that infl uences the behavior towards ot-hers. And morality we will narrowly defi ne as specifi c actions aimed at genuine concern for others. In this context, one can be ethical because it formally adhe-res to social norms, but not moral. Mystic always has ethics, but the question is: is it a genuine concern for others, or just a tool for their own development? If all is One, why does good or bad actions even matter? If mystic with no self, spontaneously let things be, nothing accepting or rejecting, how is it possible to care for each other? And why mystical experience with exactly the same trans-cendental reality makes some extremely moral and the others immoral?

Th e defi nition of mysticism

Etymologically, the word mysticism comes from the Greek word μυστικός which directly translated means hidden or mysterious.2 Mysticism is an attempt to experience the unity and awareness of the ultimate reality, spiritual truth, or God through direct intuitive experience. It is important that mysticism involves only direct experience rather than faith. A person who is trying to achieve, or is in such experiences is called mysticism. Th e common goal of all mystical prac-tices is restoring the lost unity that has diff erent names in diff erent traditions: the illumination, the Unity (Christianity), Irfan (Islam), Nirvana (Buddhism), Moksha (Jainism), Samadhi (Hinduism), are some of the most known names. Th e term mysticism is often used to denote an esoteric learning in the religi-ons of the world, being an integral part of the traditional dogma. Th us, the Kabbalah and Hasidizam are the Jewish mysticism, Sufi sm belongs to Islam, Gnosticism and Hesychasm to Christian. Every mystical tradition accepts lots of apocryphal texts as well as the Canon itself, but the hermeneutical interprets it metaphorically.

Mysticism explains that there is a more fundamental reality than the situ-ation that appears to us in our daily experience. For authentic mysticism, the

2 Mystery religions do not necessarily include mysticism. Th e current meaning comes from neo-Platonic representatives who have done comparison with mystery religions as a metaphor for eso-teric initiation into spiritual truths. Arcane (Latin esotericos - internal) is called tacit knowledge that is secretly transmited only to the choicest devotees, unlike esoteric learning which is public. Not every esoteric teaching is mysticism.

Morality and mysticismGoran Stojanović (Ethical research of ethics and religion)

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search for the truth about themselves, respect for others and the Reality is ori-ented introvert.3 Th rough a process of spiritual purifi cation, through prayer, meditation and contemplation, the mystic seeks to overcome any obstacles of the direct experience of Reality. Th is process, which means exactly the same transformation is variously named as: the road, fakr, fana, enlightenment, trans-cendence, the fourth track, salvation in the Christ, satori, djana or bhakti, vu-vi, etc.. Th e experience of unity with the Absolute is the same phenomenon in all mystical traditions and it is experienced as death, rebirth, raising awareness, or the disappearance of the ego. As an experience, the unity always happens here and now, never demanding faith in the past or hope for the future.

Academic debates on mysticism are usually closely related only to the religi-ous context, forgetting that it is happening inside and the outside. Such natural mysticism is often experienced by artists or athletes as inexplicable connection with the existence or loss of ego accompanied by a feeling of euphoria. For sci-entists it occurs as a spontaneous ecstatic inspiration, amazement and a sense of fl ow. Mystic goes beyond the perspective of religious dogma in its teachings, usually coinciding in important matters of spirituality with the mystics of other traditions. William James 4 fi rst pointed out that the mystic sees the world with diff erent eyes. Experience of his world is noetic and is beyond the capacity of our language. Mystical experience transcended the commonplace perception and reality is seen in full. Evelyn Underhill5 will specifi cally mark the universal process through which towards the way to the Absolute go all the mystics. She identifi ed the fi ve stages of this process. Th e fi rst phase in which occurs a higher awareness of the Reality is called awakening. Th e second, where the self-critical and disciplined attempts to overcome the imperfections are happening is called purifi cation. Illumination as the third phase is generally known to visionaries and artists, and was mistakenly by some mystics marked as a fi nal stage. Th e fourth stage is named “dark night of the soul” because it is characterized by con-fusion, helplessness, apathy, abandonment of the divine presence. It is complete purifi cation and it is described as death of fi gures. And the last, the phase of the enlightened, is the spiritual resurrection which establishes the transcendent self. Enlightened and aware of the far Reality mystic returns to the cave, bringing light which destroys the shadows.6

3 Vladeta Jerotić, Mystical states (visions and diseases), Children’s novelty, 1992. 4 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, , London: Touchstone, 1997, chapter XVI, XVII. 5 Evelyn Underhill. Mysticism: A Study in Nature and Development of Spiritual Consciousness, New York: Grand Rapids, 1999. p.126-278.6 Evelyn Underhill. Practical mysticism, New York: Dutton&Compani, 1915. p.35.


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Words of mystics are as poetry often confusing and opaque, simultaneously so simple and subtle, full of hidden meaning that has an existential meaning. Th us, in the Tao Te Ching we can read: “My teaching is easy to understand and easy to follow, but a multitude understands it hard and follows it hard.” In the absence of expression of mystical experience, language must be strained to the limit through poetry and aphorisms, koans, riddles, contradictions, humor, pa-rables and metaphors.7 Because of its proximity to religion and art, mysticism is generally seen as the opposite of science, although quantum physics is at present increasingly turning towards it 8, transpersonal 9 and neuropsychology. Apart from religious, artistic and scientifi c sides, mysticism is also largely present in the philosophy. Philosophy of East nations can almost be fully equated with mysticism. In our philosophical tradition, its infl uence is implicitly or explicitly visible at the great philosophers, such as Pythagoras, Heraklio, Socrates, Plato, the Christian philosophers, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, the late Sartre, Heidegger, James and Levinas. Pantheistic philosophy of mysticism, with which epistemological-ontological ideal is achieved - true realization of being in itself, can be simply expressed: “God is Love”, “All is one”, “Atman is Brahman”, “Tat tvam asi”.10

In addition to the academic agenda, the public of the West in the late ninete-enth and early twentieth century began to be more interested in mysticism. Th e central fi gure who is responsible for popularizing the mysticism of the Th eosop-hical Society was Helena Petrovna Blavatsky. Under her infl uence, integrating a number of religious, philosophical and scientifi c teachings was formed the New Age movement. As much as it popularized mysticism, the New Age Movement also quite wrongly evened it with the occult. Occult means any teaching or beli-ef based on such things as talking of the media with dead spirits or angels, exor-cism of demons, magical and telepathic transference of thought, levitation, ma-terialization, astral projection, astrology, numerology, alchemy, the miraculous healing and even hypnosis is considered to be the supernatural phenomena. Th e word occult for us usually has a negative connotation infl uenced by Christianity that with this term will mark all the wonders that are not the product of God’s but Lucifer’s will. Th e occult has never become a subject of serious scientifi c debate but it remains to live as a part of folklore. Mystic is not an esoteric, he does not hide his discoveries, but he publishes it to everyone. Occult attributed 7 Louis Dupre and Peter Moore, ’’ Mysticism’’, in: Lindsay Jones, Encyclopedia of Religion, Th om-son Gale, USA,2005. part XI. 6341 - 6360 8 Fitjorf Capra. Tao of Physics - (exploring the parallels between modern physics and eastern mysticism), Zagreb: Business Jakić, 1998.9 Ken Wilber, Without borders, Belgrade: Babun, 1980. 10 Dusan Pain and Mirko Gaspari, Mysticism of the East and West, Upper Milanovac: Children newspapers, 1989. 29.


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to him does not come from him but it is a projection of the ego’s desires. While the very opposite mystic is preaching the annihilation of the ego. In our defi -nition of mysticism11, it is important to repeat and emphasize once more that mysticism is not faith (motive for spiritual quest is seen as a prerequisite that needs personal experience), not occult (although it has elements of the occult, so the mysticism is pure Zen , Th elma pure occultism, and theosophy a mixture of both), not philosophy (although it comes from a mystical experience), and not even art (although it has the most similarities with it and it is often expres-sed with it)12, and not even the classical religion (as it exists outside of religious traditions, and can be considered heresy) 13.

Mystical experience and morality

Th e role of meditation and mystical experiences in the life of practitioners raises questions that are not present in other forms of religiosity. For example, if the mystical experience is morally neutral? If the experience is ineff able how come there are beliefs, values, and the action itself arising from it? If the emp-hasis is on the personal experience does it mean that the mystic is then amoral, asocial and apolitical? Morality is a horizontal relation to others, and the mysti-cism is a vertical relationship to the battle. How does their encounter look? How is in this context the eternal good passing transient good?14

Life stages of mystic can be divided into preparation, path, experience and enlightened state.15 Preparation consists of disciplined cultivation of desire and selfi shness restrictions due to respect for traditional religious ethics. Th e path consists of rigorous exercises that next to contemplation requires some practical action. Th e only question is whether if that action is selfi sh, because it focuses only on its development. Th e road leads to the experience that itself can not be defi ned as a moral or immoral. But when you experience it and turn into an enlightened state, there are a number of ethical issues that are raising up. Even if he is the practitioner and the virtuous on the path, will he be like that when he reaches his goal? Or is morality part of the illusion which is left in the en-lightenment? Th ere are four possibilities: 1. practitioner is amoral, selfi sh being

11 For the problem of defi ning look: William, Ralph Inge. Christian mysticism, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1912. p.3-39. Appendix A. 335. 12 Caroline Spurgeon, Mysticism in English Literature, London: Th e Echo Library, 2004. 13 Edward J. Mercer, Nature Mysticism, London: Georg Alan & Compani, 1913.14 Walter Terence Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, London: MacMillan, 1961, chapter VIII. 15 Arthur Danto, Mysticism and Morality Oriental Th ought and Moral Philosophy, New York: Co-lumbia University Press, 1987. p. 25.


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oriented to himself until he attains enlightenment, and then he becomes an explosion of love and morality, 2. mystic is amoral or immoral on the road, but as the enlightened he can not be self-centered, so instead he prefers the system of values of tradition to which he belongs, 3. Mystique is formally moral on the path,but only when he transcends the self, he realizes that that morality was only an illusion, and 4. Morality is part of the way that reality is, and so is cultivated on the path in order for the enlightened state to be completely introjected and spontaneous.16 Th e danger we face in the West, because we value so highly mo-rality, however, is that we can immediately see the fourth option as correct, and conclude without research that the enlightened must be moral. If the contrary is the case, then the mystique often nullifi es the legitimacy of mystical experience. It is not so easy to conclude that the path to illumination, and only its condition must be moral, just as it is not simple to foreshadow the shortcut compatibility of morality and mysticism. Instead, it would be necessary to examine each indi-vidual mystic of all traditions, and in their personal context, ask them the two main questions: a.) Whether enlightenment is in confl ict with the assumptions of morality and b.) Whether such system of values is genuine concern for others or mechanical meet of standards. Th is is certainly a goal of far more comprehen-sive and inclusive work. We here are ahead of modest and short answer to these questions by looking at the entire major mystical traditions.

After a century of studying the entire East on the West, we still have to point out to the philosophers and theologians that Advita Vedanta is not an “offi cial” philosophy of Hinduism.17 Even greater mistake is when it is declared as the only school, and when are neglected the theistic schools of Vedanta in India that are far more popular. With this in mind, and within this metaphysical framework, the indiff erence to other people can be declared as justifi ed moral attitude. Th ere are no other realities or other people who could be helped and which benefi t could primarily be considered. Our very own desire, and even attempt to care for each other are just an expression of ignorance. In the dream, no action is essential. Th ose who have realized Brahman know that nothing is worth doing in our dream world. Nothing that we can do does not touch the essence of reality - nothing is accomplished or changed. Caring for others is so impossible, because the otherness does not exist. Sankara’s Advita Vedanta does not represent moral system of values, but equalizing self and nature. Values are concentrated exclusively on achieving enlightenment and not on the others. Moreover, non activity in Hinduism is the only real relationship with each ot-her. For the Greeks knowledge leads to the formation of virtue and character,

16 Richard Jone, Mysticism and morality (A New Look At Old Question), Oxford: Lexington, 2005. p.72.17 Alan Watts, Th e Philosophy of Asia, Boston: Tutle Publishing, 1999. p. 31.


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while here the knowledge of Brahman supersedes all previous sins and justifi es immoral for those who possess it. Th ose who do not have that knowledge, such behavior is wrongly seen as a criminal, forgetting that the only value and purpo-se of the work of guru is the revival of its students.

In Jainism, unlike Hinduism or Buddhism, every body creates karma even in awakened (Jivan-mukta). In it there is just as much karma as needed to keep the body living a life of nonviolence and non-violence. But there remains a perception, even when they extremely respect all the rules, stop bathing, eating meat, or when they reduce the number of breaths that still creates bad karma. Regardless of whether they are animals or insects they are no diff erent than a man because all things possess a soul. In the daily activities without direct intent to harm other human beings it is created karma that keeps us bound in the world of material until we experience the enlightenment. Here are the passivity and denial at the highest level. Jainistic ascetic will not even be gracious because doing so would impact someone’s life. Of course, asceticism is not a goal to itself. Renunciation and detachment are only tools to achieve moksha. Th e only motive is its own enlightenment, because of which this path is selfi sh and im-moral.18 It is true that the realized teacher is deciding for altruistic motivation to remain in the world and helps others but in doing so in general he will not even get in contact with them. Even the central virtues of non-violence are practiced on the path, not because of the positive impact on others, but utterly selfi sh to destroy his own bad karma. Killing and violence is avoided, but not because it hurts the other person, but the person who makes it. Because of that, jainistic path and state of enlightenment can be described as selfi sh and immoral, despite the formally supporting positive social eff ects.

Th eravada Buddhism does not see that enlightenment must necessarily be moral - morality is a matter of personal choice.19 Th ere are many cases when spreading the faith was taken as a pretext for war and when the killing the infi dels was considered by killing demons. Self-absorption on the path causes mostly amoral and in the enlightened state a moral act. Buddha’s fi rst sermon after the enlightenment reveals that problem: there is no mention of compassi-on, but it is only talked about self-development, as a way to end suff ering. No one can be helped not to suff er, he has to do for itself through certain practices. So theravada Buddhists after selfi sh path in the enlightened state mostly become moral. Th is criticism against theravada by Mahayana is not new in the traditi-on. It is because of this selfi shness that they are called Hinayana (small road). Mahayana in the center of their religious life sets the Bodhisattva, teachers who

18 Richard Jones, Mysticism and morality (A New Look At Old Question), Oxford: Lexington, 2005. p.143. 19 Th e same, p.150.


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primarily live for others, although they will not agree among themselves about their doctrine. And on the spiritual path and in the enlightened state, Bodhisat-tva puts the interests of the others in front of their own desires and goals of en-lightenment. Moreover a complete waste of ego in the service of others as a path of salvation for themselves and others, allows us to say that this is an example of a fully moral mysticism.20 On the other hand Tantrism reverses the orthodox values and rules of behavior - the desire is now becoming an essential tool for the enlightenment..21 Every kind of asceticism, tantric sees as running away from life, which should be taken in all its fullness. Th rough desire, we are most attached to this world and through it we will fi rst set us free. Because this path of enlightenment is considered to be the fastest it is also called varjana (path of lightning). But being the quickest means it is the least sensitive to others, furt-hermore others in Tantrism are openly exploited in achieving their own desires. Th eravada followers also use others for their own purposes on the condition that they are not knowingly infringing them, and a tantric often does this with the conscious intention just to show his power, so we have to declare Tantric Budd-hism on the path and in the accomplished state amoral. In Japan was formed a separate school of Buddhism, Zen. Burning down the texts, smashing statues, saying that the Buddha should be killed on the spiritual path, completely passio-nate, screaming and hitting students, this course is considered immoral beyond good and evil.22 Unlike other directions, here is not the question of what it is is done, but how. So everything becomes a meditation where doing everyday tasks does not separate the actor from the act. Tea ceremony, ikebana, sumije pain-ting, no drama, rock gardens, and Martial Arts23 su najočigldniji primjeri da zen postoji u svim aspektima japanskog života. are the most obvious examples that Zen is present in all aspects of Japanese life. It is the mind that imposes values to be real instead of spontaneously being left to love and compassion. As there is a reality beyond the mind, mind values of good and evil must be transcended. 24 Th is kind of life is not going to lack of interest and meditation. Moreover, zen is according to that part of the Mahayana tradition.

Taoists see nature as a dynamic play of opposing forces that are in harmony. Man is not automatic in unity with nature, for a fully developed life that is in harmony with nature it is required cultivating the path. You must consciously and systematically work for the harmony that exists in nature to be transfered on the personal and social life. Th is is the only way to reach meaningful and happy

20 Th e same. p.207.21 Satyananda Saraswati. Tantric meditation, Belgrade: Goragraf, 1999. p.60.22 Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, Zagreb: Quantum, 1998. p.51. 23 Taisen Deshimaru, Zen and the martial arts, Belgrade: Babun, 1999.24 Watts Alan, Th e Path of Zen, Belgrade: Knjizevne novine, 1984. p.105.


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life. Th e path does not require only spiritual practises, but is equally important and social service. Of course, this raises the question: is the Taoist service to others motivated by their own selfi sh purposes? In classical texts, we do not fi nd confi rmation of this view. Th e Tao Te Ching says that the sage is free from all desire and yet that exactly being without the desire is the way to get everything he wants. Th e more sage does for others, the more he gets for himself. Lao Tzu suggests that both goals are inseparable, his own and other people’s, and that they are achieved at the same time, with the same deed. And that the sacrifi ce for others does not really exist. Enlightened teacher and a student who is trying to be, are entirely commited to the Path. And a service to others is the essential part of the Path. Consequently it can be said that the Taoist mysticism is on the path and in the realized state moral.

When we turn from the East to Western Christianity, religious views are radically changing. In the core of Abraham’s religion is the belief that there is one personal God who created the world and published ethical codes. So God is the only reality that gives the value to this false world, which is nothing but a temporary purgatory of our souls. Yet most theists see this world as a favor, well worth, precisely because it is God’s creation. Everything is considered good and evil is seen as the absence of the light of divine will. Such a view allows Christians to be more preoccupied with material things than Hindus. Suff ering is no longer something to be avoided, but to live out as part of the tuition. In mysticism ti is a way to see how ego is not central and that only with its release we inherit the eternal life. Quite contrary, Christian theists believe that ego is not lost, but it survives and on the other world as a “healed person”. Th eists do not need any internal transformation, it is suffi cient to respect God’s command-ments and to believe in his plan. Mystic will always remind you that it would be in God’s mercy, and that “I no longer live, but Christ lives in me”25 requires a diff erent approach to spirituality than an empty formal religion. Church leaders have always been suspicious towards the mystic insistence on the inside search, even when he was not against the institution. Mystic who rests in God does not look at what he will gain from his actions, either in this or the next world, his love for the neighbor is not compulsory monitoring the rules. Such is the love of the cross, which requires the dying of the old and the new birth. It means the direct relationship of man with God, as the institution as a mediator is not in favor. Christian mysticism teaches us that the easiest way to come to God is through the grace of extinction of ego, help and love to others.26 Advocating openness, surrender and love which is God, Christian mysticism is fully moral in the enlightened state and largely on the path to it.25 Bible, translation Đuro D. and Vuk K, Belgrade: Bible Society, 1996. pp. 195. (Gal. 2.20)26 Ramacharaka, Yogi. Mystic Christianity,Th e Yogi Publication Society. 1908.


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Conclusion

From the above it can be concluded that the relationship between mysticism and morality is far more complex than it is presented by a classic stereotype of peace, love, celibacy and infi nite gentleness in contemplation. Self-develop-ment, which is essentially promoted on any spiritual path is a problem, altho-ugh morality can be a part of that development. Mystic can be moral (such as the example of the Buddha, Bodhisattvas, Spileotis) or amoral (Tantra). Furt-hermore, it can be amoral on the path mostly appreciating his quest for enligh-tenment but not hurting consciously the others and moral in the enlightened state (theravada). Mystic can go in a completely passive and indiff erent relati-on to others (as in Jainism and Advita Vedanta) as in the active, or aggressive (Krishna) or non-violent relationship (whose policy is implemented by Taoists). It can be oriented to the material world (Christianity) or running away from it as an illusion (Hinduism).

Th is raises the question whether the mystical experience in general has any infl uence on morality? It is obvious that during the deep meditation interperso-nal relationships are not possible, but the question is how this experience aff ects the way of mystic’s life outside the experience? William Vainvirg concludes that there is no logical or epistemological link between mystical consciousness and morality.27 One does not have to be a mystic to be moral, and vice versa. Mysti-cal experience takes us from the natural self-centeredness to a wider reality - a gap that is free from any value. In order to fulfi ll this gap caring for others requi-res one more step. Besides the mystical experience, the factors that are outside of it become essential to moral or immoral action. Th e focus of monitoring should be moved from the research of experience on the whole life of a mystic. Altho-ugh he will see his values as objective features of reality, a comparative study of various mystics will not produce the same results. Mystic lives by the same rules as any ordinary believer of his tradition. But it diff ers from it in the quality of internal motivation. Th e enlightenment changes the approach, but not the code of conduct. Th us, the vertical dimension of experience aff ects the horizontal ethical dimension, not by creating the new ones, but by a diff erent quality of the respect for the old commandments. Th e fact that mystic accepts ethics and canon of tradition that brought him to the mystical experience should not sur-prise us, since all of the great religions of the world have originally derived from the cult of mystical personality.

Our main objection is that mysticism has far less impact on morality, either in a positive or a negative way. Th e disappearance of the self that is characteristic 27 Wainwright, William. ’’Myisticism and morality’’, Journal of Religious Ethics 4 (Spring 1976) pp. 29-36.


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quality of all esoteric traditions, not necessarily means the caring for others, but it does not confront it. If you do not accept the morality, the power of transcen-dental dimension may cancel each value, and also take us to amoralism. With this every ethical theory formed on the justifi cation of morality with mystical experience can be declared problematic and open and not resolved issue.

Bibliography

Bahagavad gita. prevod i komentar Danijel Turina. Zagreb: Daršan. 2002. Besant, Annie. Th e Basis of Morality. Madras: Th eosophical Publishing Ho-

use Adyar, 1915.Biblija, prevod Đuro Daničić i Vuk Karadžić. Beograd: Biblijsko društvo.

1996.Danto Arthur. Mysticism and Morality Oriental Th ought and Moral Philosop-

hy. New York: Columbia University Press. 1987. Davy, Marie- Madeleine. Enciklopedija mistike. Zagreb: Naprijed. 1990.Deašimaru, Tajsen. Zen i borilačke vještine. Beograd: Babun. 1999. Evelyn, Underhill. Mysticism: A Study in Nature and Development of Spiritual

Consciousness. New York: Grand Rapids, 1999.Evelyn, Underhill. Practical mysticis. New York: Dutton&Compani, 1915.Fitjorf, Kapra. Tao Fizike - (istraživanje paralela između savremene fi zike i

istočnjačkog misticizma). Zagreb: Poduzetništvo Jakić, 1998.Hardy, Alister. Th e Spiritual Nature of Men (A study of Contemporary religious

experience). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.Horne, James, Moral Mystic, Wilfrid Laurier: University Press, 1983. Jerotić, Vladeta. Mistična stanja (vizije i bolesti), Dječije Novina, 1992. Jones, Edward. Nature Mysticism. London: Georg Alan & Compani. 1913.Jones, Richard. Mysticism and morality (A New Look At Old Question).

Oxford: Lexington. 2005. Krishnamurti, Jiddu. Th e First and Last Freedom. London: Aldous Huxley.

8. edit. 1961.Lindsay, Jones. Encyclopedia of Religion (II edition). USA: Th omson Gale.

2005. Louis Dupre (1987), Peter Moore (2005), ’’ Mysticism’’. In: Lindsay Jones.

Encyclopedia of Religion. Th omson Gale. USA.Načela Taoa (Tao te Ching), Beograd: Kosmos, 1985. Pajin, Dušan i Mirko Gaspari. Mistika istoka i zapada. Gornji Milanovac:

Dječeije novine. 1989.Ramacharaka, Yogi. Mystic Christianity.Th e Yogi Publication Society. 1908.


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Sarasvati, Satjananda. Tantričke meditacije. Beograd: Goragraf. 1999. Spurgeon, Caroline. Mysticism in Literature. London: Th e Echo Library.

2011. Stace, Walter Terence. Mysticism and Philosophy. London: MacMillan. 1961. Suzuki, Daisetsu Teitaro. Uvod u Zen Budizam. Zagreb: Quantum. 1998.Vasiljev, L.S. Istorija religija istoka. Beograd: Novo djelo. 1987.Vaskez, Manuel. New Age Putev. Bograd: Preporod. 2003.Vilber, Ken. Bez granica. Beograd: Babun. 1980. Wainwright, William. ’’Myisticism and morality’’. Journal of Religious Ethics

4 (Spring 1976). Watts, Alan. Put Zena. Beograd: Književne novine. 1984. Watts, Alan. Th e Philosophy of Asia. Boston: Tutle Publishing. 1999. William, James. Varieties of Religious Experience. London: Touchstone. 1997. William, Ralph Inge. Christian mysticism. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

1912.Zohar, Danah and Jan Maršal. SQ(Duhovna inteligencija, krajnja inteligen-

cija). Novi Sad: Svetovi. 2000.

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Maja Isović1

Banja [email protected]

ReviewUDC 316.334.4DOI 10.7251/SOCEN1305079IAccepted: 24.5.2013.

Th e age of (omni)policy2

Th e eff ects of human activity that concomitantly bring harm to nature, eco-logical balance and our very being, along with the extinction of particular ani-mal and plant species, no longer can be ignored. Th e state of peril that today’s society is in, with ensuant environmental challenges that scientists, analysts, politicians and humanity altogether have been faced with, is the thesis of the Jusuf Žiga’s book.

From the start, the author makes sure to eschew “preaching” any sort of ideology based on any isms, something also implied by the book’s very subtitle that foretels that the study which readers have in their hands shatters the wel-l-established ideologies of environmentalism. Th e irresponsible human actions toward nature and its resources are presented as burning issues not solely in ecology but also in economy and politics.

Due to the currency of the challenges that stem from the dire environmental straits humanity has found itself in, the topic tackled in this book-with respect to the last three decades-has become quite important to social analysts. A Ger-man philosopher Hans Jonas was warning in the early nineteen-eighties that what is needed in contemporary science is responsibility, because it (science) opens some dimensions it is incapable of coping with from the standpoint of et-hics, and, in so doing, overlooks the possible–future consequences of its agency. Concurrently, a German sociologist Ulrich Beck broached the issue of “invisible risks” in modern society, and today, as Žiga writes, we are bearing witness to all of that.

Good several decades have passed since the sounding of those clarion calls, yet nothing so far has been done to bring the destruction of the environment to an end, and those who argue for and excuse the destruction are still keeping the ball on the economy and material profi t’s side of the fi eld.

1 MA candidate in Contemporary Sociology at FPS. E-mail: [email protected] Jusuf Žiga, Vrijeme (sve)politike: Iluzije savremenog ekologizma, (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2012), p. 39.


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Th e leading elite and the market top brass who, for material gain, overexploit natural resources try to persuade us every day that good reasons exist for further human dictatorship over nature and the environment, and that man should not be seen simply as part of nature, but as a unit more important and crucial than anything else. With that kind of world understanding, the fact gets easily overlooked that every exploitation must in the end be paid for in some curren-cy. Somewhere deep under all the comforting, buried is left the fact that we do not have some other place to live, which we might keep in reserve and move to whenever upon this world here we bring total destruction.

Th e risk cannot be isolated: it presents omnipresence which all inhabitants of today’s, but also of tomorrow’s world must deal with; likewise, all parts of the world are aff ected by the consequences the sameas various impoverished coun-tries with no benefi t from the exploitation of natural resources, so equally those parts of the world that reap all the profi ts.

Žiga’s analysis, excepting introductory remarks and a concluding clarifi cati-on, comprises three sections, which from diff erent viewpoints examine attempts to solve the exigent environmental problems.

In the introductory part of the study, the underlying central theme is the idea that to request modifi cation of human attitude toward nature does not mean to advocate the end of scientifi c research and progress, but rather to insist on these processes to take modifi ed forms, such which will seek (more) respon-sibility, not exclusively to fellow human beings and their future off spring but also to Mother Nature. Th e problem par excellence of contemporary science is that chasing progress has become intertwined with chasing profi t; that kind of application of science must be stopped, for the well-being of humanity. Science must not bow to the interest of capital nor to that of politics.

Žiga takes under scrutiny the irresponsible modern man–him who objects to nothing and is ready for anything if it brings him closer to material gain, which conduct, alas, bears consequences that cannot be remedied and undone. Admittedly, it is but a logically apparent actuality that every economy as its prime objective has profi ts, but that objective should/must not be accomplished by sacrifi cing nature and its balance. Th e economic relations of today maintain a supportive climate for the human actions eff ecting natural imbalance and ove-rexploitation of natural resources–in an attempt to only fulfi ll what today is the dominant aspiration: maximization of profi t. Unfortunately, such economy is not capable of helping people in solving true problems, and what it eventuates in is merely a heightened desire for yet more material gain.

All the formal and informal agreements, agendas, declarations, resolutions and obligations the world’s leading countries have accepted in the past few deca-des notwithstanding, we still have sunk to a position of being witness to perhaps

Maja Isović Th e age of (omni)policy

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irremediable consequences of human population’s irresponsible actions. A cause for alarm undeniably exists, and it is high time we stopped deluding ourselves that environmental destruction can be justifi ed by profi t.

Following Beck’s theory, the author of this study approaches the risks that jeopardize modern society in which modern man has acted, and continues to act, as though there were no danger, and as though any consequences could be confronted successfully despite the fact that the exploits humanity prides itself on are getting out of control. In the far-reaching case, however, that humanity fails to urgently address the issue, the epilogue Žiga anticipates is the one in which “there will be no winners, for in the last act, all will be losers.”3

Žiga maintains that the solution to this problem is not to be found in hal-fway, fragmentary attempts to mitigate the environmental risks, but that the problem must be faced squarely–something achievable only through a necessary change in perception of the situation.

At the end of the introduction, a point is raised that what environmentalism promotes–isn’t the right answer, for those ideas, simply, are misconceptions that argue in favor of a partial solution. It is for that reason that in the book’s title, Žiga addresses the environmentalism as exists in the age of (omni-) policy, in which age the policies of parliaments and governments have come to permeate the gray zones of corporatism, whence the strings crucial to continuation both of humanity and nature are being pulled.

In raising important and crucial questions that challenge modern man, Žiga advocates renunciation of two myths modern man dearly holds on to, which are: the myth of nature’s ever-inexhaustible riches and the myth of nature’s limitless capacity to self-regenerate.

After the introduction, in a chapter titled “Factography’s fruitless forewar-nings,” Žiga writes that even though we are daily being served a plethora of information on the endangered ecosystems, the violated fl ora and fauna, the melting ice caps etc., it appears that all that factography actually amounts to naught. He analyzes the phenomenon of a so-called deceptiveness, better descri-bed as the self-deception of the current environmentalism that poses as though it procured rescuing solutions, whereas these, in fact, are but fractional ones. Accepting of the risk that his off ered approach be misunderstood, Žiga not only advocates “radical changes of and a departure with the modern man’s tenets of life philosophy”4, but he also conjoins that with the need that we change our under-standing of ecology.

3 Jusuf Žiga, Vrijeme (sve)politike: Iluzije savremenog ekologizma, (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2012). p.39.4 Ibid, p. 48.


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We must start living beyond horizons of the past, for changes have come about that have considerably impacted human life. Th ese changes have impin-ged on science, the human attitude toward nature, the ecosystem, the means of production and on life-style. Th e changes have been so rapid it sometimes seems as though it were impossible to stop and think about– let alone understand–the modern man’s life and the risks standing before him.

Th e threat, however, is no longer hidden. Th e topic cannot be kept behind closed doors of chambers and hush-hushed between ourselves anymore, because the stakes have been raised dramatically. Th e wager that has been placed on pro-gress and profi t is the very being of humanity–that what the human quintessenti-ally is. We have brought ourselves into a position at which we are holding in our hand the fragile secret of life: it was intrusted to us for safekeeping, nonetheless, not ever for possession.

Žiga goes to discuss seven points that urgently reveal to us the necessity of the change in life-style, for tomorrow it will be too late. Despite forest resources being on the brink of depletion, no one ponders their role (oxygen producti-on and carbon dioxide absorption). Drinking water is not inexhaustible; it is a gift of nature, but not an everlasting one, and irrational management of this natural resource has been causing its scarcity. Arable land is irrecoverably being poluted by waste, toxic waters, urbanization, urban sprawl and pesticide use. Limitations on the availability of energy resources such as oil, hydropower and coal are being ignored, yet there is still no readiness to invest in the utilization of alternative energy. Energy consumption is enormous, and in the future, the industry will have a hard time keeping up with these trends. We exist on the threshold of a possibly radical climate change that was, for the fi rst time, caused by humans. Th e ozone layer is being harmed, which, inter alia, leads to global warming and dangerous acid rains. We are struggling uphill with serious imba-lances in the world due to overpopulation-caused discrepancies sporadically (the countryside is dying out, certain species of animals ecosistems depend on are vanishing, rich-poor gap is not being closed). Unhealthy life-style is pervasive, as the experience of modern man, who fi nds alienation from nature and fellow human beings normal, because chasing profi t leaves him with no time to tend to his mental and physical health.

After analyzing the problems that ring alarm bells, Žiga underscores that the only alternative is to be found in harmony. Th e dramatic change can come into existence only if humanity starts living in harmony with itself, its environment and nature. Only if it turns its activity and behavior about and into an act of responsibility can humanity hope to preserve nature and itself. Th at ethic must be adopted by every person as well as by every community, being that without collective change there can be no real movement and turnaround.


83

Th e following chapter, “Th e (omni-) policy and environmentalism,” Žiga begins with an affi rmation that politicization is so omnipresent that it infl uences all areas of life, to the extent of even resorting to manipulation and surveillance of citizens. Politics no longer is the realm of government offi ces and parliamen-tary chambers, but rather it takes part in the management of natural resources and wields infl uence on civil activism. Th e presence of multinational corporati-ons and big capital makes that infl uence even stronger and more powerful. Th e author of this study agrees with the theories buttressing the position that for one part of humanity, neoliberalism has sanctioned the prospects of lavish life, while simultaneously spurring deep despair of the multitudes. It has created the possi-bility for the rich to become richer, but for the poor it has crushed any hopes of prosperity and better life, having taken all from them, even what little they had.

Globalization currents that have been shaping modern world are in the ser-vice of politics and capital, whose power yet serves to control all the human activity of today, from high-profi lie political measures, to small activist and hu-manitarian political actions, that it is hard to fi nd any activities immune to this political power’s ubiquitous sway. Under such circumstances, it is plainly obvio-us the politics is at the top of the power pyramid. Žiga writes that we live in the age of a crisis of democracy, and that the lobby groups are almost omnipotent, for they possess the capacity to impose their will and to “manufacture ‘consent’ of any sort, and even ‘convert the enemies into allies’ to fulfi ll their own goals, especially the capital–interests ones.”5

Despite the fact that this maelstrom of power is without exit and that life on this planet will unavoidably someday end, Žiga holds there still is a path leading out of this predicament, the only question being whether that path will ever be recognized–discovered. Th at is, it remains to be seen if humans will complacently keep on the well-trodden way of life or, conversely, decide to do a total about-face, fi nally changing their life-style, which as a consequence, would beacon the way out of this noxious sink-pit of mingled politics and power that corrodes everything that is dear to nature and to mankind.

Keeping in creed with the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author of this book emphasizes that the desire for survival and subsistence on this planet necessitates halting the ecocide and other neo-barbarian processes coming into view, and that every future endeavor must be undertaken with a consideration for collective security and staying in harmony with nature. Th e central problem of the ecological crisis that “bedevils” humanity is the fact that it cannot be controlled: the only way out of such quagmire is the radical para-digm shift Žiga proposes.

5 Ibid, p. 114.


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Th e radical shift entails the return to nature, which means a stance should be assumed toward nature that is protectoral, not occupational. In such a way, humanity will return to itself and bring to mind the forgotten old wisdom that admonished it about the need of cultivating peace, harmony and goodwill. Th is shift also outright entails a changed nature of politics at the global level and lessened profi t-chasing, lessened power. Th at, precisely, is what is contrary to the ruling (omni-) political elites’ values, for which reason every adjustment in the manner of operating and in life-style comes to be deliberately postponed.

Commenting on the delusions of contemporary environmentalism, Žiga examines the specious persuasions about the plausibility of the idea that huma-nity can liberate itself from its predicament notwithstanding it not cease ope-rating “in the old way,” a position at which, clearly, what comes to be at play is (self-) deception, because no one can prognosticate all possible consequences of a risk-laden behavior. Th e principal error of today’s humanity lies in its “focusing on ‘treating the consequences,’ inadequately to boot, instead of ‘coming face to face with the causes’ behind the contemporary ecological crisis and with their curtailing, i.e., with a continuous prevention.”6

In the book’s next chapter, titled “Is hope justifi ed?”, the author writes about the alternatives and prospects of humanity in the future. Living in a risk-taking society, the only things we can defi nitely expect are the consequences we cannot bear. Th ese consequences pertain to science, politics, technology; therefore, we need to face the entire constitution of the world if we are to render our removal from this situation possible. Th e advocated change of life-style, furthermore, must employ ethical perspective, and one necessarily providing an aspect of the future. In the new categorical imperative, there must be subsumed a responsi-bility toward the generations to come.7 Today’s generations are responssible to/should/must preserve the habitat, nature and an uncompromised existence for unborn generations–only along these lines can we deliberate the continuous human existence.

Technology has come to rule our lives, but technology by itself is not so potent as to be able to rectify the damage done, restore the natural resources dissipated and make the life of humans profoundly better. Now, everything hinges on the modifi cation of life-style, on humanity’s new outlook on itself and nature, and last not least on the new ethical perspective. Žiga is not a theoreti-cian who contemplates the fatalist end of life as we know it; he is characterized by being hopeful of a change/betterment, but on condition of a radical turnaro-und, as that is the only way to preserve nature and continuation of life. Finding

6 Ibid, p. 145.7 On new categorical imperative, Hans Jonas wrote in the book Th e Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age.


85

the way out of the situation humanity is in compels facing what is happening, in which process no weight should be attached to the science–technology myth that is accompanied by ontological “victims.”

Žiga is apprehensive that today’s humanity is not ready for the epochal (self-) facing that awaits it, because humanity fi nds the road already taken to be the more eff ortless and passable one. Although at this point it is still not too late for change, time is dwindling, and the alarm bells are ringing away. Humanity is holding in its hand herein examined ways of change, and now what only rema-ins, is to hope they will be taken.

In the book’s conclusion, Žiga underscore that we have found ourselves in a situation best described as “our own undoing borne of our own doing,” and in which the future opens the gates of its self that is not given for granted, but that should/must be fought for. As one of the conclusions of this study, there springs forth the need that humanity return to itself, to nature and to its being as a who-le. Humanity must do away with the anthropocentric, solipsistic worldview, for that sort of outlook on the “world of life” is the very thing that has brought hu-manity into its current position. Responsibility of humanity is contained in the need to keep up the natural order of things, not in doing something that tears it down. In order to succeed at this, Žiga holds, we must recover the balance and the harmony that makes it possible that humanity’s unifi cation with nature be without indications of leeching and abusing. All of that–compels a changed set of values to live by and diff erent ethics to follow.

Life is something that must remain untouched and undesecrated. To pre-serve/save life, it is necessary to reestablish ecological balance and not permit disruption of natural cycle. We must surrender the capital-interests ideas of an ever increased conquest and exploitation, which ideas are accompanied by a belief that nature and environment will, simply, renew themselves. Th at is an illusion proff ered by the contemporary politics and the environmentalist ideo-logy that follows in its steps.

Žiga examines in this study the risks standing before humanity. Th ese risks are the conseqence of human activity and of the exploitation of nature for profi t, whereas the irresponsibility in the fi eld of science has only opened the gates of areas too demanding for modern man’s own good. Th rough this study, the aut-hor reminds of the importance of life, of nature’s magnitude and vulnerability, and gives us the possibility of removing ourselves from our predicament. Th at removal entails a dramatic turnaround in life-style; responsibility before materi-al gain; and shattering of the myths that modern man lives by–with the ultimate question remaining, whether modern man is ready for that turnaround.

87

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INSTRUCTION FOR THE CATEGORIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORK

Th e works, by nature, must be scientifi c. Categorization of research papers is determined by the following categories:

a) Original scientifi c paper is one in which the work was fi rst published ar-ticle on the results of the research generated by applying scientifi c meth-ods. Th e text should allow recovery of research and that the facts can be verifi ed. Working as a rule should be organized according to the scheme IMRAD (Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion).

b) Review article makes a synthesis of views arising from recent works about a particular subject area, developed as compression, analysis, syn-thesis and evaluation in order to show the regularity, regulation, trend, or the causal relationship in connection with the phenomena studied - work that has genuine detailed and critical review of the research problem or area in which the author made a contribution.

c) Short or preliminary announcement is an original scientifi c paper but a full format of the preliminary small-scale or character in which some ele-

Instructions for reviewers

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ments IMRAD and can be omitted - it is a concise presentation of results of completed original research work or work which is still in progress.

d) Scientifi c criticism / debate / review is a discussion on a particular sci-entifi c topic based solely on scientifi c arguments, in which the author proves the validity of certain criteria / opinion, that confi rms or refutes the fi ndings of other authors.

SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE no 5

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