Social Constructivist and Discursive Approaches to European Foreign Policy

9Social-Constructivist and Discursive Approaches to European Foreign Policy

S e n e m A y d ı n - D ü z g i t

IntroductIon

Social-constructivist and discursive approaches to European foreign policy have gained momentum since the changes in the security architecture following the end of the Cold War and the steps taken towards a more integrated foreign policy in the EU. Before outlining the main contributions of these approaches, analysis and research to European foreign policy in the following sec-tions, certain theoretical caveats need to be underlined. All of the approaches that are subsumed under the ‘social constructivist and discursive’ label in this chapter share an emphasis on the role of norms, values, ideas, identities and discourse in the constitution of the social world. They underline that, just like human agents, states do not exist inde-pendently from their social environment and its shared systems of meanings (Risse 2009: 145) and thus reject treatment of states as strictly rational and self-interested actors pursuing strategic preferences geared towards

maximising self-interest. They are also united in the way in which they do not treat language as a simple mirror of social reality, but point to its constitutive dimensions of social reality. Despite these common grounds, there can be substantive variations between the approaches under this umbrella in their outlook on the ways in which identities, ideas, norms, values and discourses play a role in the construction of social reality.

In line with Steve Smith’s (1999; see also Checkel 2007: 58) proposition, this chap-ter identifies not a single but many social-constructivist (and discursive) approaches that range along a continuum from a ‘thin’ social constructivism to ‘thick’ or ‘radical’ social-constructivist (hereafter referred to as poststructuralist) approaches to European foreign policy. The former is an explanatory theory closer to rationalism that can debate with rationalism due to its similar ontological assumption of the existence of a social reality ‘outside’ discourse, where identities, norms, values, ideas and discourses can shape states’

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Social-conStructiviSt and diScurSive approacheS 137

interests and hence influence their actions. States as agents interact and constitute the social structure of international politics, which in turn shape their identities and pref-erences (Wendt 1999). Poststructuralism stands at the opposite end of the continuum to rationalism by conceptualising social real-ity as constructed through discourse, where there is no social reality outside language. Foreign policy, in this framework, is con-ceptualised as a discursive practice that con-structs particular subject identities for states, positioning them vis-à-vis one another and thereby constructing a particular reality in which certain policies become possible (Doty 1993: 305). While the former approach asks the ‘why’ questions, the focus of the latter is on the ‘how possible’ questions (Checkel 2007: 58).

The overview in this chapter covers both thin and thick social-constructivist/discur-sive approaches to European-foreign-policy studies. Scholars adopting a thin version of social constructivism mainly focus on cer-tain policies at the EU level or at the national level towards the EU that can not solely be explained by rationalist reasoning, such as the EU’s enlargement policy (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sjursen 2002, 2006a; Fierke and Wiener 1999; Sedelmeier 2005) or the devel-opment of the CFSP and the ESDP (Tonra, 2001, 2003; Aggestam 2004; Meyer 2006; Howorth 2004; Mérand 2006; Edwards 2006; Wong and Hill 2011). In dealing with the latter, the interplay between national and EU-level foreign policy has been a subject of inquiry in this version of social constructiv-ism. These approaches have also taken up the questions of the type of actor that the EU constitutes regarding its policies towards the rest of the world and whether this actor-ness is constituted by certain norms and values (Manners 2002, 2006; Manners and Whitman 2003; Sjursen 2006b; Bicchi 2006). Thicker, poststructuralist versions emphasise the possible effects of the European foreign-policy discourses of politicians, policymak-ers and other epistemic communities in the construction of Europe’s borders and identity

(Diez 2005; Rumelili 2004; Neumann 1998, 1999; Aydın-Düzgit 2012), in the constructed projection of the European self to the rest of the world (Larsen 2004; Diez 2005, 2014; Merlingen 2007; Cebeci 2012; Rogers 2009) as well as in the construction of national narratives towards European foreign policy (Larsen 1997, 2005, 2009).

A variety of methods have been employed in these studies. While those closer to ratio-nalism have tended to focus on language as an ‘act of persuasion/justification’, often using speech acts (Fierke and Wiener 1999; Sjursen 2002), they did not refrain from using more rationalist methods such as process tracing or statistical data (Schimmelfennig 2001). Those further distanced from ratio-nalism took a more linguistic turn, focus-ing on the interplay of discourses from a Foucault- and Derrida-inspired standpoint, where discourses were analysed in further depth (Merlingen 2007). The following sec-tions of this chapter are organised along three thematically grouped areas of study to which these approaches have made the most substantive contributions in the field of European foreign policy: enlargement policy and EU identity, the EU’s actorness in inter-national politics and the relationship between the national and the European levels in the institutional and substantive development of European foreign policy.

EnlargEmEnt polIcy and Eu IdEntIty

Enlargement policy has generally been defined as an EU foreign policy due to its transforma-tive impact on the candidate states’ domestic and foreign policies through the prospect of accession (Sjursen 1998) – and it is one of the main foci of the social-constructivist and dis-cursive approaches to European foreign policy. Thinner social-constructivist approaches that are closer to rationalism with their emphasis on explanation took up the


The SAGe hAndbook of europeAn foreiGn policy 138

question of why the EU decided to enlarge despite the political and economic costs and the initial reluctance of some of its member states. These scholars have generally argued that certain norms have played a part in the EU’s decision to enlarge (Schimmelfennig 2001, 2003; Fierke and Wiener 1999; Sjursen, 2002; Sedelmeier 2000).

Fierke and Wiener (1999: 725) were among the first to develop a social- constructivist understanding of the ‘dialectical relationship between context, speech acts and institutional transformation’ that made both NATO and EU enlargement possible. They have argued that the normative ideals constructed during the Cold War, as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, posed a challenge to these Western institutions’ identity following the change of the international context with the end of the Cold War and bound them to act in consistency with their earlier prom-ises. In other words, the enlargement of the West’s institutions was prompted not only by the West’s fear of instability in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) if these countries were excluded from Western insti-tutions in the aftermath of the Cold War, but by the fear that breaking its promises would jeopardise the West’s identity (Fierke and Wiener, 1999: 737).

Focusing solely on EU enlargement, but also relying on speech acts, Schimmelfennig’s (2001, 2003) highly influential work went further in theoretically and empirically refin-ing the argument that norms have played a role in the EU’s decision to enlarge by com-bining insights from both liberal intergov-ernmentalism and social constructivism. He highlighted that, while the initial bargain-ing stages of enlargement can be explained by Moravcsik’s (1993) liberal intergovern-mentalism in that states’ positions were determined by their self-interest, the actual decision to enlarge was driven by a process he called ‘rhetorical entrapment’. This con-cept refers to the ways in which those states that wished to see the EU enlarge, as well as the CEECs themselves, made ‘strategic use of norm-based arguments’ by appealing to

the liberal-democratic identity of the EU that legitimates EU integration, hence ‘entrap-ping’ those states that were initially reluctant to enlarge but were now bound by the con-straints of legitimacy and the fear of ‘sham-ing’ by others (Schimmelfennig 2001: 63). This is to say that state preferences had not changed, but that states now refrained from expressing explicit opposition to enlarge-ment due to the fear of losing credibility and reputation.

One of the main differences between Schimmelfennig’s (2001, 2003) and Fierke and Wiener’s (1999) approaches centres on the type of EU identity from which the norms are drawn. Whereas for Schimmelfennig (2001, 2003) this is taken as the EU’s overall identity as a community of liberal democra-cies, for Fierke and Wiener (1999) it refers to a specific EU identity comprising normative commitments and promises to the CEECs. Another major difference concerns the mechanisms through which state actors com-ply with the norms. In Fierke and Wiener’s (1999) account state actors comply with the norm-based arguments because they have internalised them as a part of a European identity, which has in turn shaped their inter-ests. Schimmelfennig (2001, 2003), on the other hand, conceptualises norms as tools that states use in pursuing their interests, thus bestowing on them a more instrumental role. Sedelmeier’s (2000) account of enlarge-ment allows for the possibility of both, where norms could be used for strategic ends as well as an end result of genuine internalisa-tion, depending on the policy actors.

Other substantive social-constructivist studies followed in these footsteps. Sjursen (2002) later concurred with the line taken by Fierke and Wiener when she argued that norms can constitute preferences of actors and used Habermas’ communicative-action theory not only to understand why the EU enlarged but also to explore why the EU pri-oritised certain applicants. Identifying three types of reason given by EU policymakers to justify enlargement – namely, ‘pragmatic’, ‘ethical-political’ and ‘moral reasons’ – she



proposed that, while all three were present in the EU’s decision to enlarge, ethical-political reasons were particularly important in the EU’s decision to enlarge to the CEECs and their prioritisation vis-à-vis other applicants, such as Turkey. Hence she diverged from Fierke and Wiener (1999) in her conceptu-alisation of enlargement as based not only on liberal-democratic norms but also on a ‘com-munity based identity’ that rested on a ‘kin-ship based duty’ (Sjursen, 2002: 508). Other scholars have used this Habermasian frame-work to explore the dynamics behind the Greek enlargement (Verney 2006) and EU policies on enlargement to Turkey (Lundgren 2006), as well as justifications of enlarge-ment policy in specific EU member states (Sjursen 2006a).

While all the works covered above treat enlargement as a dependent variable, Sedelmeier’s (2005) later work did the oppo-site by focusing on the impact of enlargement on the EU’s identity. He underlined that the democratic conditionality entailed in the east-ern enlargement of the EU created in turn an EU identity as a defender of democracy and human-rights norms, which also had ramifica-tions for European foreign policy at large, an argument that can be connected to the works on the actorness of the EU outlined below.

While these thin social-constructivist approaches in general have theorised EU norms and identity as a variable in EU for-eign policy, poststructuralist studies have argued that, just like any identity, EU iden-tity cannot be conceptualised as a variable in foreign policy since representations of identity are in fact constitutive of foreign policy. Thus, enlargement in this frame-work is treated as a foreign-policy tool that is constitutive of European foreign policy. Taking EU foreign policy as a discursive practice, these scholars have focused on the deeper analyses of discourses instantiated by EU foreign-policymakers, which ‘produce meanings and in so doing actively construct the “reality” upon which foreign policy is based’ (Doty 1993: 305). Another major dif-ference that sets these approaches apart from

those social-constructivist approaches that are closer to the rationalist camp is the role of difference in identity formation (Hansen 2006; Rumelili 2004). While the thin social-constructivist approaches have argued that identity does not necessarily have to be con-structed through difference (Wendt 1999: 224–228), others have highlighted that iden-tity is unthinkable without difference, ‘no matter how miniscule’ the difference(s) may be (Neumann 1999: 35).

Developments such as the prioritisation of Eastern enlargement in the 1990s, followed by the increasing prospects of Turkey’s EU accession in the first half of the 2000s, led to a rising interest in self/other relations among scholars of EU foreign policy in general and those of the enlargement policy in particu-lar. This interest was bolstered by develop-ments in European integration that triggered the characterisations of the EU as a ‘post-modern’ and ‘post-Westphalian’ collectivity (Wæver 1998; Ruggie 1993; Buzan and Diez 1999), which was ‘moving beyond the hard boundaries and centralised sovereignty char-acteristics of the Westphalian, or “modern” state towards permeable boundaries and lay-ered sovereignty’ (Buzan and Diez 1999: 56).

Poststructuralist scholars often disagreed with the description of the EU as a postmod-ern polity by looking at the EU’s relations with the outside world. Neumann (1998, 1999) was among the first to focus on self/other relations in European foreign policy, pointing out that the EU’s relations with its outside rested on a ‘modern’ mode of differ-entiation, where its identity was discursively constructed through a process of othering in which its outside is designated as a dan-ger or threat to the identity of the self. By analysing the historical representations of Turkey and Russia in the European discourse he concluded that, despite the importance of the Russian other in the construction of European identity, ‘the constitutive exclusion of the Turk was central to the becoming of the European’ (Neumann, 1999: 60), the discur-sive repercussions of which have continued in the EU’s enlargement policy towards Turkey


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(Neumann and Welsh 1991). Similar modern differentiations were also found in the studies that analysed the EU’s discursive representa-tions of the Mediterranean (Pace 2002, 2006). Diez (2004) has also pointed to increasing geopolitical othering in the EU’s discourse towards Turkey, Islam and the US from the late 1990s onwards. Rumelili (2004), on the other hand, has contested a strictly modern construction of European identity by argu-ing that self/other interactions in the EU’s relations with outside states may vary along multiple dimensions. Basing her empirical analysis on the cases of the EU’s relations with Morocco, Turkey and the CEECs, she has pointed out that the degree of othering in the EU’s relationship with its outside is dependent on the nature of the (constructed) identity and difference, the responses of the other and the ‘social distance’ constructed by the self towards the other. She has concluded that the more the EU moves away from con-structing the others as a threat to its identity, the closer it gets to resembling a postmodern collectivity that does not rest on modern – and thus strict and threat-based – differentia-tions between the self and the other.

The possibility of different variants of self/other relations is valuable in the way in which it directs attention to insights that can be opened up through a detailed discourse-analytic treatment of texts on states with which the EU is interacting in order to dis-cover that there is more to the representa-tion of ‘different’ states than mere ‘threats’. Nonetheless, rigorous empirical/discursive analysis on such poststructuralist grounds has been rare and, where conducted, often rests on the operational tools of linguistics. Hülsse (2006), for example, has chosen to focus on a specific type of signification – metaphors – used in EU-enlargement dis-course to construct European identity. This is in the tradition of earlier works, such as that of Chilton and Ilyin (1993), who used meta-phor analysis in studying the articulation of the concept of the ‘common European house’ in several European states towards the end of the Cold War.

While discursive methods focusing on sys-tems of signification are particularly useful in tracing how subject identities are constructed through discourse, they do not sufficiently address the question of how discourses are naturalised in texts by the marginalisation of alternative interpretations or, for that rea-son, have a substantial impact on the general debates on European foreign policy (Wæver 2009: 167). Nonetheless, while genealogy, as in Neumann (1999), can be especially useful in showing how the dominant repre-sentations of the social world are naturalised in discourse, studies employing this method often pay very little attention to the linguis-tic dimension through which subject identi-ties are created. Hence it has more recently been suggested that methods such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Wodak 2011), bringing together an analysis of systems of signification together with a focus on broader representational practices consisting mainly of ‘events’ and ‘actions’, can also be uti-lised in the study of European foreign pol-icy (Wæver 2009: 167; Aydın-Düzgit 2014), although very few works on European for-eign policy have adopted this approach so far, and only with an exclusive focus on the EU’s enlargement to Turkey (Tekin 2010; Aydın-Düzgit 2012).

What kInd of IntErnatIonal actor Is thE Eu?

Debates on the type of actorness that the EU displays in international politics are not new to the literature. They go back to Duchêne’s (1973) characterisation of the EU as a ‘civil-ian power’, which uses civilian instruments rather than military means to exert influence in international politics, differentiating it from the US and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, particularly since 1999, there has been a surge of academic interest in the EU as an international actor due to the devel-opments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which has evolved into a



European Foreign and Security Policy through the Lisbon Treaty, as well as steps taken to bolster the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Diez 2014). Towards the end of the 1990s Manners and Whitman (2003: 390) posited that the construction and the repre-sentation of the international identity of the EU needed to be explored from a social-constructivist perspective, where it is ‘co-constituted by the interplay of polity perspectives and role representations’. Whereas the polity perspectives associated the EU with ‘a network rather than a hierar-chy of decision-making, an expanding mem-bership and agenda, and degrees of boundedness rather than clear-cut bounda-ries’ (Manners and Whitman 2003: 384), the role representations pointed at the existence of a ‘hybrid international entity’ enacting ‘civilian’, ‘military’ and ‘normative’ roles (Manners and Whitman 2003: 388).

It was the EU’s so-called normative role on which much of the social-constructivist and poststructuralist debate focused in the 2000s. Manners, in his highly influential article (2002: 239; see also 2000), argued that, rather than a ‘civilian power’ or a ‘mili-tary power’, the international role of the EU is best described as a ‘normative power’, which possesses the ‘ability to shape concep-tions of “normal” in international relations’. He highlighted, through a discussion of the EU’s role in the international abolition of the death penalty, that the EU norms that devel-oped out of the EU’s specific ‘historical con-text’, ‘hybrid polity’ and ‘legal constitution’ (Manners 2002: 241) are internationally dif-fused, making the EU a ‘normative actor’ that does not only act directly but has a normative influence in world politics by its mere pres-ence. Thus the EU constitutes a role model that diffuses its soft power through its being rather than doing.

The conception of the EU as a normative power has become a reference point in the academic debate on the actorness of the EU in international politics by going beyond the policy-oriented studies of EU foreign-policy

analyses that focused more on the institu-tional set-up of EU foreign policy and its policy ramifications (Sjursen 2006c: 170). Although the EU has also been branded by other scholars in various ways such as an ‘ethical power’ (Aggestam 2008), which entails a broader definition of power encom-passing civilian, military, social and mate-rial elements, or, more recently, as a ‘market power’ (Damro 2012), which projects its power through externalising its market poli-cies, these definitions have not so far had the impact of the discourse on the normative power of the EU. Scholars have for a long time discussed the theoretical relationship between the concepts of ‘civilian power’ and ‘normative power’ (Diez 2005; Diez and Manners 2007), the uniqueness of the EU as a normative power (and whether the US also constitutes a normative power) (Diez 2005; Lucarelli and Manners 2006), the mecha-nisms through which normative power is exercised (Forsberg 2011), including the question of whether the use of military power would contradict normative power (Manners 2006; Orbie 2006), and its exercise in differ-ent regions and through various policy prac-tices (see most recently Whitman 2011).

In conceptual terms Manners’ work rests on social-constructivist grounds by the way in which he conceptualises an EU identity that is based on normative premises, which in turn cause the EU to act in normative ways in international politics. His argument also has a normative dimension in the sense that it sets out the type of international actor that the EU should be (Diez 2014). While the social-constructivist claim to explain EU foreign policy made Manners’ arguments vulnerable to criticism by more rationalist scholars, the normative claims were critically taken up by other social-constructivist and poststructural-ist scholars.

From a rationalist standpoint the argument can be challenged on empirical grounds that the EU does not always act in accordance with norms, e.g. in cases where its interests are at stake (see Hyde-Price 2006). This has also been Youngs’ (2004) main argument,


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highlighting how strong economic inter-ests can trump a concern for international human rights in EU foreign policy. Studies that critically approach the normative-power Europe (NPE) argument from a similar angle have been conducted over a variety of pol-icy areas (Whitman 2011), including arms exports (Erickson 2011) and the EU’s poli-cies towards the western Balkans (Noutcheva 2012) and the Mediterranean (Haddadi 2006; Pace 2007). Even Manners (2010) himself has recently contended that in the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), EU foreign policy has both normative and interest-driven aspects.

From a social-constructivist perspective, in addition to its weak empirical foundations the vague theoretical underpinnings and nor-mative claims of the NPE thesis can be prob-lematised (Sjursen 2006c). This is deemed all the more necessary given the way in which EU policymakers themselves make use of the NPE discourse to present themselves as a ‘force for goodness in international society’ (Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2004: 15). Sjursen (2006c: 172), for instance, has questioned how the term ‘power’, which denotes coercion, can be co-articulated with the notion of nor-mative, which entails legitimacy in the NPE discourse. She has proposed the establishment of ‘critical standards’ based on Habermasian discourse ethics and legal principles to assess the legitimacy of the EU’s normative power in particular cases to prevent a certain type of Eurocentric imperialism (Sjursen 2006b), which would otherwise constitute the EU as a ‘civilising power’ that lacks inclusiveness and self-reflexivity (Bicchi 2006). Some scholars have also called for self-reflection by under-lining the need to consistently check the way in which norms are adhered to by the EU not only in its relations with the outside, but also with respect to its inside, the current lack of which weakens the normative power of the EU (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002). Social con-structivists, however, do not in general take into account the political effects of the NPE discourse or, more precisely, what the NPE discourse does (Diez 2005). Poststructuralism,

on the other hand, with its central tenet being the discursive construction of social reality, paves the way for the handling of normative power as a discursive representation that con-structs both the EU’s identity and its various others (Diez 2005).

While sharing most social-constructivist approaches’ concern for self-reflection, a poststructuralist take on normative power goes further to ‘call for systematic discourse analysis of the construction of the EU as a normative power’ along the nexus of self/other relations, to enable the self-reflection that would rescue the EU from becoming a Eurocentric project as well as from being undermined by the discursive construction of the EU as a ‘military power’ (Diez 2005: 615). Such an analysis would also display the limits imposed by the NPE discourse on legitimate EU foreign policy by enabling and disabling certain policy options rather than causing them (Diez 2014).

Despite their potentially wide scope for both theoretical and empirical reflection, poststructuralist analyses of the NPE dis-course or the EU’s international actorness in general have remained limited (Diez 2005; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Merlingen 2007). One exception is research that undertook a Foucauldian reading of the NPE discourse in the cases of norm diffu-sion to Macedonia and Bosnia within the scope of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Merlingen 2007). This highlighted the ways in which the NPE dis-course can have positive effects on the lives of local populations as well as a negative effect by empowering ‘patterns of arbitrary domi-nation between internationals and locals’ in conflict-ridden societies (Merlingen 2007: 449). This negative impact is made possible by the imposition of best practices on the par-ties to the conflicts, marginalisation of their participation and restriction of their right to express difference (Merlingen 2007; see also the discussion in Nunes 2011: 7).

Another exception to the rarity of post-structuralist research in this area is the recent


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poststructuralist work on the EU’s actorness, which has highlighted that the discursive con-struction of the EU as a civilian and/or norma-tive power in the EU is now giving way to the discursive construction of the EU as a ‘global power’ (Rogers 2009). The global-power dis-course constructed the EU along the lines of a unified Westphalian state surrounded by a variety of geopolitical competitors and with an increasing propensity to use military power (Rogers 2009: 847–8). Despite its focus on discourse, however, the extent to which such analysis can be characterised as poststructur-alist is debatable (Diez 2014). This is largely due to the work’s conceptual foundations in the Essex School of discourse theory, as first articulated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and, later, most prominently by Howarth (2000, 2005), which not only analyses the construc-tion of discourses but attempts to explain policy outcomes. This can also be observed in Rogers’ (2009) study, in which the rise of the global-power discourse is attributed to the successful mobilisation of ‘euro-strategists’ who wish to ‘dislocate’ the civilian-power dis-course following the Yugoslav wars, although the mechanisms behind this ‘success’ remain unelaborated (Rogers 2009: 842–6; Diez 2014).

More recently, poststructuralist research has approached the general academic lit-erature on the EU’s actorness from a criti-cal perspective (Cebeci 2012). European foreign-policy research has been decon-structed to argue that an ‘ideal Europe nar-rative’ is being discursively constructed in the literature to present Europe as a power which acts in ‘ideal ways’ on the world stage to ‘colonise’/’influence’ others, which in turn empowers the sovereign state’s language instead of eroding it (Cebeci 2012: 583).

thE natIonal/EuropEan nExus In EuropEan forEIgn polIcy

Another subject area in which social- constructivist and discursive scholars have substantively contributed is the relationship

between national foreign policies and European foreign policy. One strand of this research has focused on national foreign poli-cies and how they impact on European for-eign policy. Although European foreign policy is generally taken to denote the foreign policy of the EU as a whole rather than the separate foreign policies of the EU member states, member states’ policies towards Europe are relevant insofar as they have repercussions for the formulation of foreign policy at the EU level (Larsen, 2004: 63).

Scholars associated with the Copenhagen School (Hansen 2001; Holm, 1997; Larsen 1997, 1999; Wæver 1990, 1998, 2005) have followed this line by focusing on the configu-ration of core concepts such as the state, nation and Europe in national foreign-policy dis-courses to explain member states’ European policy. The main argument is that each mem-ber state has more or less fixed meanings of these key ‘we concepts’ in their national foreign-policy discourses (as in the French state–nation or the German power state) that shape their policies towards Europe. Having been inspired by Waltz’s concept of inter-national structure, this idea rests on a struc-tural discourse theory of foreign policy in which an analysis of layered structures – the first being the concepts of state and nation, the second being the relational positioning of the concepts of state and nation vis-à-vis Europe and the third consisting of the differ-ent concepts of Europe – explains national foreign-policy decisions towards Europe as well as accounting for change and stability in these national positions over time (see also Wæver 2009: 171). The main problem with this approach stems from the way in which it treats ‘discourse as explanation of foreign policy’ (Wæver 2009: 173), where discourses themselves are drawn from policy articula-tions, thus leading to a tautological argu-ment (see also Diez 2014). Another problem, acknowledged by the pioneer of this model (Wæver 2009: 173), is the way in which discourses are treated as more or less fixed variables, which largely leads to the exclu-sion from the analyses of both the national



and the transnational discursive struggles, as opposed to poststructuralist accounts, where discursive struggles are taken as a constant.

A second strand of social-constructivist and discursive research on the interplay of national and European foreign policy has cen-tred on the impact of European foreign policy on national foreign policies. The first major breakthrough in this field was Tonra’s book The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy (2001), which assessed the impact of the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the national foreign policies of Denmark, Holland and Ireland (see also Chapter 12). The social-constructivist approach – what Tonra (2003) refers to as the cognitive approach – devel-oped in the book has set the theoretical back-ground for the demonstration of a reciprocal relationship between national foreign poli-cies and the CFSP in which each has changed the other (Tonra 2001: 279). While the CFSP constrained national foreign policies since the national foreign policymakers were now paying due attention to what their colleagues from other member states were thinking, hence the coordination reflex (Tonra 2001: 285), it also empowered them by providing a wider political space within which their policies could be more effective (Tonra 2001: 286). This was largely made possible by the ‘socialisation’ of national foreign-policy practitioners, who referred to the emergence of intersubjectively shared understandings that shaped their interests/identities and thus led to a key role for the EU in the national foreign policies of these three member states.

Tonra’s explicitly articulated theoretical framework and empirical data thus took for-ward the earlier debates on the existence of an ‘automatic reflex of consultation’ (Nuttall 1992; Glarbo 1999) and the emergence of a European ‘diplomatic republic’ (Jørgensen 1997). Nonetheless, it has also been criti-cised for not paying due attention to the EU’s impact on the substantive dimension of national foreign policy (Larsen 2005, 2009) in the sense that the analysis remained lim-ited to emerging European intersubjective

understandings only at the procedural level (Larsen 2005: 31). Larsen (2005, 2009, 2014) sought to remedy this lack through adopting ‘an issue area approach’, first in the analy-sis of Danish foreign policy (Larsen 2005), then as the basis of a ‘distinct foreign policy analysis’ for Europe (Larsen 2009), where he looked for the degree of ‘fit between the strength of EU policy and the national con-structions of agency in specific foreign policy areas’ to observe ‘whether national foreign policy is conducted within, partly within or outside the EU’ (Larsen 2009: 548–9). In doing so, however, he relied on a structural understanding of discourse in line with the Copenhagen School, where articulations of agency of the nation/state in the form of the ‘we’ were analysed to explain actors’ choices in substantively different foreign-policy areas. Hence, although it can be considered as a discursive analysis, this emphasis on the structured nation of discourse sets it apart from poststructuralist work that would look deeper for discursive struggles of meaning.

Other scholars sought to develop the con-cept of the Europeanisation of foreign policy from a more eclectic theoretical background, combining rational institutionalism’s focus on interests with social constructivism’s focus on identities (Wong 2005, 2006; Wong and Hill 2011). Drawing from the larger Europeanisation literature on European gov-ernance, Wong adopted a three-dimensional model of the Europeanisation of foreign policy that consisted of national adaptation and pol-icy convergence, projection of national foreign policy on to Europe and construction of com-mon identities (Wong 2005: 142). Wong and Hill’s (2011) most recent study covered ten country’s cases and concluded that all national foreign policies have been Europeanised to some extent and that some degree of socialisa-tion has occurred among the political elites of even the largest member states.

Europeanisation of national foreign poli-cies and, more specifically, the process of socialisation became a focal point of research for also other social- constructivist scholars in the 2000s. Aggestam (2004)


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used role theory to explore whether national role conceptions referring to the conception of ‘political influence’, ‘depth of feeling for the EU as a security community’ and ‘independence of the state as an actor in foreign policy’ (Aggestam 2004: 91) had changed due to the participation of the UK, France and Germany in the CFSP. While she found a certain degree of convergence in role conceptions (particularly around the perception of the EU as an ‘ethical and restrained power’), socialisation and con-vergence seemed to be generally uneven and limited across the three member states (Aggestam 2004: 97). A certain degree of socialisation across national foreign-policy practitioners was found in later social-constructivist works focusing on groups of individual professionals, such as national representatives and officials in the Council Working Groups and Council Secretariat General (Juncos and Pomorska 2011), the COREU network (Bicchi 2011), the COREPER (Lewis 2005) and the Political and Security Committee (Meyer 2006; Juncos and Reynolds 2007).

The evolution of the CSDP since the mid 1990s led also to the emergence of social-constructivist research on the emergence of a ‘strategic culture’ in the EU. One group of constructivist scholars drew attention to the impact of national strategic cultures in the development of the CSDP, highlighting that a focus on national strategic cultures was of fundamental importance in understanding the developments in security and defence poli-cies in the EU (Longhurst 2004; Miskimmon 2004; Rasmussen 2005). Another group of scholars examined whether socialisation through institutional mechanisms was lead-ing to the development of a European stra-tegic culture (Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005) or whether a gradual convergence of the national strategic cultures around a European strategic culture was emerging (Meyer 2006). Howorth (2004) and Edwards (2006) focused particularly on the role of discourses and their relationship with institu-tions and policy practices in the evolution of

a European security culture, albeit acknowl-edging the constraints imposed by national discourses on its emergence.

In The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, which constitutes probably the most theoretically and empirically elabo-rate social-constructivist account of the emergence of a European strategic culture, Meyer (2006: 185) has found that there is increasing convergence among member states (namely the UK, France, Germany and Poland) on the de-prioritisation of ter-ritorial defence, the preference for the use of civilian rather than military foreign-policy instruments, a stronger role for the UN and the necessity and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. He has argued that this conver-gence was due to three causal mechanisms: socialisation among the elites, changing threat perceptions after the end of the Cold War and normative shifts within the media discourse (Meyer 2006: 6). However, his approach has also been criticised for its lack of conclusive evidence on cultural change as well as for a tautological argument, in which his stated causal factors, i.e. changing threat perceptions, could well be causes for normative convergence rather than the other way around (Krotz and Maher 2011: 567–8). Meyer (and Strickmann 2011) later revised this initial approach by bringing in neoclas-sical realist insights (which focus on the interaction between systemic pressures and domestic processes) to explain the relation-ship between material and ideational factors in the context of European defence policy. Hence they have postulated that:

economic growth and spending, distribution of military capabilities between allies and potential antagonists, and the ability of existing capabilities to deal with emergent problems, can help us to understand … when epistemic communities are likely to arise, when norm entrepreneurs will be influential and when parties change their positions about key strategic issues’. (Meyer and Strickmann 2011: 77–8)

Yet it is debatable whether such an approach would fit better with rationalism rather than social constructivism.



concludIng rEmarks

This chapter has sought to provide an over-view of the main social-constructivist and discursive approaches to European foreign policy. In doing so it has focused on modern, or thin, constructivist approaches as well as poststructuralist accounts that approach European foreign policy from three main subject areas: enlargement and EU identity, the actorness of the EU on the global stage and the relationship between national and European levels in the development of European foreign policy. While enlargement and EU identity seem to have received rela-tively less attention in the literature in the last few years, the type of actor into which the EU is evolving and the national/international nexus in European foreign policy still seem to receive wide coverage.

It can be argued that two developments in particular – namely, the Eurocrisis and the transformation of the EU’s southern neighbour-hood after the Arab Spring – pose new areas of research for social-constructivist and discursive scholars working in this field. What will the ideational implications of the Eurocrisis be for European foreign policy? How will it impact on national perceptions of Europe and in turn on the foreign and security policies of the EU? The Eurocrisis also poses challenges to the broader institutional design of the EU, which may have important ramifications for European foreign policy for these scholars to explore. Potential steps towards differentiated integra-tion in the EU may imply different degrees of integration also in the foreign-policy field. The ideational reasons or the ideational repercus-sions of further integration in the core (if one develops) may be worthy of further investiga-tion. One may also argue that the Lisbon Treaty arrangements in the field of foreign policy may over the longer run be approached from these perspectives, particularly with respect to their impacts on socialisation, which may take lon-ger to emerge.

The shortcomings of the ENP and the transforming dynamics in the EU’s southern neighbourhood following the Arab Spring

have demonstrated the necessity for change in the EU’s mode of engagement with the Mediterranean. There is emerging scope for new research on the EU’s actorness in the region following the Arab Spring, both from a social-constructivist perspective on the type of actorness and a poststructuralist perspec-tive on the identities that are discursively constructed and the policies that are thus delimited. The question of the EU’s recep-tion as a normative or ethical actor, which also relates to its legitimacy and effective-ness, in the countries outside, including those that are still in the enlargement queue, is also an area that is still underexplored despite the research that has been conducted so far.

A final point concerns methodological rigour. Both social-constructivist and discur-sive approaches have for a long time been criticised for their lack of a systematic meth-odology. Although important advances have been made in the literature in this regard, it may still be useful for scholars in this field to engage more in constructive dialogues with rationalist approaches (in the case of thin constructivist works) as well as more recent linguistic approaches (in the case of poststruc-turalist studies) to counter such criticisms.

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Social Constructivist and Discursive Approaches to European Foreign Policy

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