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Transcript of Sexuality - PhilArchive
Sexuality
ByJohnDanaher(forthcomingintheOxfordHandbookofEthicsofArtificialIntelligence,editedbyMarkusDubber,FrankPasqualeandSunitDas)Abstract:Sexisanimportantpartofhumanlife.Itisasourceofpleasureandintimacy,andisintegraltomanypeople’sself-identity.ThischapterexaminestheopportunitiesandchallengesposedbytheuseofAIinhowhumansexpressandenacttheirsexualities.Itdoessobyfocusingonthreemainissues.First,itconsiderstheideaofdigisexuality,whichaccordingtoMcArthurandTwist(2017)isthelabelthatshouldbeappliedtothose‘whoseprimarysexualidentitycomesthroughtheuseoftechnology’,particularlythroughtheuseofroboticsandAI.Whileagreeingthatthisphenomenonisworthyofgreaterscrutiny,thechapterquestionswhetheritisnecessaryorsociallydesirabletoseethisasanewformofsexualidentity.Second,itlooksattherolethatAIcanplayinfacilitatinghuman-to-humansexualcontact,focusinginparticularontheuseofself-trackingandpredictiveanalyticsinoptimisingsexualandintimatebehaviour.TherearealreadyanumberofappsandservicesthatpromisetouseAItodothis,buttheyposearangeofethicalrisksthatneedtobeaddressedatbothanindividualandsocietallevel.Finally,itconsiderstheideathatasophisticatedformofAIcouldbeanobjectoflove.Canwebetrulyintimatewithsomethingthathasbeen‘programmed’toloveus?Contrarytothewidely-heldview,thischapterarguesthatthisisindeedpossible.IntroductionInearly2017,theworldborewitnesstoitsfirsthuman-robotmarriage.Zheng
Jiajia,aChineseengineerandAIexpert,hadn’talwaysintendedtomarryarobot.
Hehadspentyearssearchingfora(female)humanpartnerandgrewfrustrated
athislackofsuccess.1Sohedecidedtoputhisengineeringskillstothetestand
1AnotuncommonprobleminChinagivenitsskewedgenderratios.SeeWorldEconomicForum,GlobalGenderGapReport2018,p63,availableathttp://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf;andalsoViolaZhou‘Chinahasworld’smostskewedsexratioatbirth–again’,SouthChinaMorningPost,27thOctober2016,availableathttps://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2040544/chinas-
createhisownroboticpartner.Hemarried‘her’inasimple,traditional
ceremonythatwaswitnessedbyhismotherandfriends.2Jiajia’srobotwasn’t
particularlyimpressive.Accordingtothereports,‘she’wasahuman-sizeddoll
withalimitedabilitytorecognizeChinesecharactersandspeaksomebasic
phrases.ButJiajiaplannedtoupgrade‘her’inthenearfuture.
NotlongafterJiajia’snuptials,AikikhoKondo,a35year-oldJapaneseman
livinginTokyo,marriedHatsuneMiku,aholographicvirtualrealitysingerwho
floatsinsideadesktopdevice.3Kondotoofeltunluckyin(human)loveand
plumpedforanartificialpartner.Indoingso,Kondowantedtoberecognisedas
amemberofasexualminorityofpeoplewhoarenotinterestedinhumanlovers.
NeitherJiajianorKondoisalone.Thereisanactiveonlinecommunityof
‘iDollators’whofavourintimacywithartificialdollsoverhumans.Andthereare
nowseveralcompanieseagerlyracingtocreatemoresophisticatedroboticand
artificialcompanions,capableofprovidingtheiruserswithbothsexualintimacy
andemotionalsupport.Weshouldnotbesurprisedbythistrend.Sexand
intimacyareimportantpartsofhumanlifeandtheyhavealwaysbeenmediated
andassistedbytechnology.Sextoysandsexdollscanbefoundgoingback
demographic-time-bomb-still-ticking-worlds-most
2KristinHuang,‘Chineseengineer‘marries’robotafterfailingtofindahumanwife’,SouthChinaMorningPost,4thApril2017,availableathttps://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2084389/chinese-https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2084389/chinese-engineer-marries-robot-after-failing-find-human-wife3AFP-JIJI,‘Loveinanotherdimension:Japaneseman'marries'HatsuneMikuhologram’,TheJapanTimes,12November2018,availableathttps://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/12/national/japanese-man-marries-virtual-reality-singer-hatsune-miku-hologram/#.XFm9vs_7TOQ
thousandsofyearsbackinthearchaeologicalrecord.Thefactthatthelatest
waveoftechnologiesisbeingleveragedtowardsexualendsispartofthislong-
standingtrend.4
Thischapterexaminestheethicalopportunitiesandchallengesposedby
theuseofAIinhowhumansexpressandenacttheirsexualities.Itdoessoby
focusingonthreemainissues.First,itconsidersthequestionofsexualidentity
andasksifweshouldapplyanewsexualidentitylabel–‘digisexuality’–tothose
whoexpressordirecttheirsexualitiestowardsdigital/artificialpartners.5While
agreeingthatthisphenomenonisworthyofgreaterscrutiny,thechapterargues
thatweshouldbeverycautiousaboutrecognisingthisasanewformofsexual
identityasdoingsocanhavestigmatisinganddivisiveeffects.Second,itlooksat
therolethatAIcanplayinfacilitatingandassistinghuman-to-humansexual
intimacy,focusinginparticularontheuseofself-trackingandpredictive
analyticsinoptimisingintimatebehaviour.Itaskswhetherthereissomething
ethicallyobjectionableabouttheuseofsuchAIassistance.Itarguesthatthere
isn’t,thoughthereareethicalrisksthatneedtobeaddressed.Finally,it
considerstheideathatasophisticatedformofAIcouldbeanobjectoflove,
despiteithavingbeen‘programmed’toloveus.Contrarytothewidely-held
view,thischapterarguesthatthisisindeedpossible.
4KateDevlin,TurnedOn:Science,SexandRobots,(London:BloomsburySigma,2018);andHallieLieberman,Buzz:TheStimulatingHistoryoftheSexToy(NewYork:PegasusBooks,2017)5NeilMcArthurandMarkieTwist,‘Theriseofdigisexuality:therapeuticchallengesandpossibilities’(2017)SexandRelationshipTherapy32(3-4):334-344
AIandSexualIdentity
Identityiscentraltohumanexistence.Weallseektodefineandunderstand
ourselvesandothersintermsofdifferentidentitylabels.6Sexualidentitylabels
areanimportantpartofthispatternofclassification.Homosexuality,bisexuality
andhetereosexualityareallnowrecognisedand,forthemostpart,toleratedas
distinctformsofsexualidentity(thoughitwasnotalwaysthus).
Thegeneraltendencytoclassifyourselvesandothersinthismanner
createsatemptationwhenitcomestohowweunderstandthose,likeZheng
JiajiaandAikikhoKondo,whoexpressandenactasexualpreferenceforartificial
partners.Intheirarticle‘Theriseofthedigisexual’,NeilMcArthurandMarkie
Twistsuccumbtothistemptation.7Theyarguethattechnologyplaysan
importantroleinhowpeopleenacttheirsexualdesiresandthatwhenitcomes
tothosewhodisplayamarkedpreferenceforartificialpartners,weshould
recognisethattheyexhibitanewtypeofsexualidentity,namely‘digisexuality’.
Astheyputit:“Manypeoplewillfindthattheirexperienceswiththistechnology
becomeintegraltotheirsexualidentity,andsomewillcometopreferthemto
directsexualinteractionswithhumans.Weproposetolabelthosepeoplewho
considersuchexperiencesessentialtotheirsexualidentity,“digisexuals””.8
McArthurandTwistmakethisargumentwithcircumspectionandcare.
Theypointoutthatsexualorientationsandidentitiesoccuralongacontinuum.
6KwameAnthonyAppiah,TheLiesthatBind:RethinkingIdentity(London:ProfileBooks,2018);andFrancisFukuyamaIdentity:TheDemandforDignityandthePoliticsofResentment(NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,2018).7McArthurandTwist,n58McArthurandTwist,n5,pp334-335
Somepeoplewilloccasionallyusetechnologytogettheirkicksbutwillretain
strongpreferencesforhuman-to-humancontact.Theysuggestthatonlythose
wholiveprimarilyatoneextremeendofthespectrumdeservethelabel
‘digisexual’.9Theyalsorecognisethatpeoplebelongingtothisgroupwillalmost
certainlysufferfromstigmatisationasaresultoftheirpronouncedsexual
preference,butthencounterthatthissimplyneedstobeunderstoodand
combatted.10Insayingthis,theymakethecaseforusingthe‘digisexuality’label
fromalargelydetached,scientificperspective,suggestingthatthisissomething
thatneedstobeacknowledgedandstudied,notscornedandmaligned.
Iagreethatthereisaphenomenonhereworthyofgreaterscientific
scrutiny,butIthinkweshouldbeverycautiousaboutencouragingthe
widespreaduseofanewsexualidentitylabel,suchas‘digisexuality’,evenfor
suchscientificpurposes.Admittedlythisisnotsomethingthatisnecessarily
underourcontrolsince,aspointedoutabove,weareconstantlyinthebusiness
oflabelingandclassifyingoneanother.Nevertheless,totheextentthatwecan
controlourtendencytolabelandclassifyoneanother,weshouldavoidthe
temptationtorecogniseanewminorityofdigisexuals.Thisstanceisnot
motivatedbyanybigotryordesiretosuppressanewtruthabouthuman
sexuality.Itismotivatedbythedesiretoavoidpathologisingand‘othering’what
shouldbeviewedaspartoftheordinaryrangeofhumansexualdesire.
9McArthurandTwist,n5,p33810McArthurandTwist,n5,p338
Theargumentforthisviewhastwoprongstoit.Thefirstistoclaimthat
therecognitionofaparticularsetofsexualdesiresasadistinctiveidentityor
orientationisnotmetaphysicallymandated.Inotherwords,thereisnothingin
therawdataofhumansexualdesirethatdemandsthatweapplyaparticular
labelorclassificationtothosedesires.Thesecondprongistoarguethattothe
extentthatwedoapplysuchlabels,thereisatendencyforustoignore
importantnuancesintheactualrawdataofhumansexualdesireandforthisto
haveperniciousconsequences.Consequently,sincegroupingsomesetofsexual
desiresintoadistinctiveidentityisnotmetaphysicallymandated,norisit
sociallyorethicallydesirable,weshouldresistthetemptationtodoso.
Let’sexplorebothprongsoftheargumentinmoredetail,startingwith
theclaimthatrecognisinganewsexualidentityisnotmetaphysicallywarranted.
InmakingthisclaimIaminspiredbyatheoryofsexualorientationdevelopedby
SarayAyala:theconceptualacttheoryofsexualorientation.11Thegistofthe
theoryisasfollows.Humanshavemanydifferentphenomenologicalexperiences
intheirlifetimes.Inmanycases,theseexperiencesaremessyandnotfinely
differentiated.Thinkofourauditoryorcolourexperiences.Thoughwedo
perceivedistinctionsbetweendifferentshadesanddifferentmusicalnotes,the
realityofsoundwavesandlightwavesisthattheyblendorfadeintoone
another.Itisonlythroughtheuseofconventionallinguisticlabelsthatwebring
someorderandstructuretothephenomenologicalsoupofexperience.What’s
more,somepeople’sconceptualtoolkitenablesthemtomorefinelydifferentiate
11SarayAyala,‘SexualOrientationandChoice’(2018)JournalofSocialOntology,3(2):249-265.
theirphenomenologicalexperiencesthanothers.Iknowpeoplewhocaneasily
recogniseanddistinguishdifferentnotesandscalesinapieceofmusic.Idonot
havethisability.Ilumptogetherexperiencesthatotherscansplit.
ThepsychologistLisaFeldmanBarretthasarguedthatthissame
phenomenonunderliesouremotionalexperiences.12Theinitial
phenomenologicalrealityofemotionisarawfeelingthatgetsinterpreted
throughaparticularconventionalconceptualtoolkit.Wetranslateourraw
experienceintothefeelingof‘anger’,‘sorrow’or‘joy’(andsoon).Different
culturesparsethephenomenologicalrealityofemotionindifferentways,
groupingandorganisingfeelingsinwaysthatarenotimmediatelyrecognisable
toculturaloutsiders.
Ayalaarguesthatthesameistrueforhowweexperiencesexualdesire.
Overthecourseofalifetime,peoplewillexperiencesexualdesire,arousaland
releaseinresponsetomanydifferentthings.Oftentimesthedesireswillbe
directedatotherpeople,butsometimestheywon’t.Peoplehavebeenknownto
experiencearousalinresponsetoallsortsofenvironmentalstimuli.Whatthen
happensisthatpeoplegrouptheirsexualexperiencestogetherinordertomake
senseoftheirsexualidentitiesandorientations.Indoingthis,someexperiences
areignored,suppressedanddiscounted,whileothersareaccentuated.Youwill
probablydiscountallthosetimesyougotarousedbythevibrationsofthe
schoolbus,butnotthosetimesyougotarousedwhenyoudancedwithyour
12LisaFeldmanBarrett,‘SolvingtheEmotionParadox:CategorizationandtheExperienceofEmotion’(2006)PersonalityandSocialPsychologyReview10(1):20-46
classmateattheschooldance.Youwon’tcallyourselfanautomotive-fetishistno
matterhowmanytimesyougotarousedontheschoolbus.Likewise,and
perhapsmorerealistically,Isuspecttherearemanypeoplewhoprimarilygain
sexualreleasethroughmasturbationandnotthroughintercoursewithanother
humanbeing.Nevertheless,Isuspectthatthemajorityofthosepeopledonot
classifythemselvesasavowedautoeroticists.Theydon’tinterprettheir
masturbatoryexperiencesthroughanidentity-label.Theyseethoseexperiences
asanimportantpartofthefullrangeofdesirablesexualexperiences,allofwhich
arestillbeingactivelypursued.
Thepointhereisthatthesameislikelytobetrueofthosewhogettheir
sexualkicksthroughtechnology,eventhosewhoprimarilydosowithartificial
partners.ConsiderZhouJiajiaandAikhikhoKondo,forexample.Bothofthem
claimtohavesoughtoutartificialpartnersafterfailingtofindloveamongtheir
fellowhumans.Thiswouldsuggestthattheyhaven’tcompletelylostthisformof
sexualdesire.Thedangeristhatifweapply,andencouragethemtoapply,an
identity-labeltotheirnewfoundsexualpreferences,wealsoencouragethemto
discountorsuppresstheotheraspectsoftheirsexualaffect.Theystart
exaggeratingpartofamorediverseanddifferentiatedphenomenologicalreality.
Thisbringsustothesecondprongoftheargument:thatapplyingidentity
labelscanbesociallyandethicallypernicious.Youmightbeprimedtobe
scepticalaboutthis.Youmightpointtootheridentitypoliticalmovementsin
supportofyourscepticismandarguethatowninganidentitylabelcanbeboth
politicallyandpersonallyempowering.Ifyoubelongtoagroupyoufeelless
aloneintheworld.Similarly,ifyouandothermembersofyourgrouparesocially
disadvantaged,bandingtogethercanhelpyoutostandupandagitateforlegal
rightsandprotections.Thishasbeentrueforthefeministmovementandthegay
rightsmovement.Butitisnoteworthythatbothofthesemovementsarosein
responsetopre-existingprejudiceanddiscriminatoryclassification.People
withinthosegroupswerealreadysubjecttoanoppressiveidentity-labelingand
hencesawtheneedtobandtogether,weartheirlabelasamatterofpride,and
workforsocialreform.Intheabsenceofthatpre-existingprejudice,thecasefor
identity-labelingismuchlesspersuasive.Identity-labelingtendstoencourage
divisivenessandothering–the‘us’against‘them’mentality.Peoplequickly
appointthemselvesastheguardiansoftheidentity,creatingcriteriafor
determiningwhobelongsandwhodoesnot.Furthermore,ifbelongingtoa
particularidentitycategorybringswithitcertainsocialbenefitsandlegal
protections,peoplemightbeencouragedtoover-interprettheirexperiencesso
thattheycanfitwithintherelevantgroup:theyforcethemselvesintoagroupso
thattheycanbelong,therebydoingviolencetotheiractualexperience.Inshort,
theidentity-labelingcanfoster,justasoftenasitcancombat,socialdivisionand
polarisation.
Tobeclear,theclaimisnotthatallidentity-labelsareperniciousor
scientificallyinaccurate.Somelabelshavesocialandscientificvalue.Theclaimis
ratherthatidentity-labelshavepowerandshouldbetreatedwithcaution.Sexual
phenomenologyisoftenmorediverseanddifferentiatedthanouridentitylabels
allow.Thismeansthatlumpingsomeoneintoaparticularcategoryisoftennot
warranted.Recognisingandvalorisingtheidentitylabelmayencourageand
incentivisepeopletoforcethemselvestofitintoacategorytowhichtheydonot
belong.So,unlesswearetryingtocombatsomepre-existingsocialprejudiceor
stigmatisation,weshouldveryreluctanttoclassifypeopleas‘digisexuals’.This
doesnotmeanthatwemustignoretherolethatartificialpartnersplayin
people’ssexuallives,orthatwecannotstudythevariousmanifestationsof
‘digisexualities’.Itjustmeansweshouldavoidlabelingpeopleas‘digisexuals’(or
anyothercognatetermlike‘robosexual’).Weshouldacceptthisasjustpartof
thenormalrangeofhumansexualexperience.
AIandSexualAssistance
Sextoysandothersexaidshavelongbeenusedtoassistandcomplement
human-to-humansexualactivity,andAIsandrobotsarealreadywidelyusedto
assistandcomplementnon-sexualhumanactivity.Itshouldbenosurprisethen
tofindAIbeingharnessedtowardsexuallyassistiveends.Wealreadyseesmart
sextoysthattrytolearnfromuserdatatooptimisesexualpleasure;‘quantified
self’appsthatenableuserstotrackandoptimiseaspectsoftheirsexual
performance;andsimpleAIassistantsthathelpwithintimatebehaviour,
includingappsthathelptoautomateorassistwithsendingintimate
communicationstoyourpartner.13DoestheuseofsuchAI-basedsexual
13Fordiscussionsofthedifferentappsandservices,see:DeborahLupton,‘Quantifiedsex:Acriticalanalysisofsexualandreproductiveself-trackingusingapps’,(2015)Culture,HealthandSexuality17(4):440–53;KarenLevy,‘Intimatesurveillance’(2014)IdahoLawReview51:679–93;JohnDanaher,SvenNyholmandBrianEarp‘TheQuantifiedRelationship’(2018)AmericanJournalofBioethics18(2):1-19;JohnDanaher,‘TowardanEthicsofAIAssistants:AnInitialFramework’(2018)PhilosophyandTechnology31(4):629-653;andEvanSelinger‘Today’sAppsareTurningusIntoSociopaths’WIRED26February2014-availableathttps://www.wired.com/2014/02/outsourcing-humanity-apps/;andEvanSelinger,‘Don’toutsourceyourdatingLife’CNN:Edition2May2014-
assistantsraiseanysignificantethicalconcerns?Inpreviouswork,I,alongwith
mycolleaguesSvenNyholmandBrianEarp,analysedeightdifferentethical
concernsonemighthaveabouttheuseofAIinintimaterelationships.14Inthe
interestsofbrevity,Iwilldiscussfourkeyethicalconcernshere:
ThePrivacyConcern:Thisisthebigone.Thisistheconcernthattheuse
ofAIassistantsinintimatesexualrelationshipsconstitutesamajorassaulton
personalprivacy.Thiscouldbebecausepartnersuseservicestospyonone
anotherwithoutconsent.Thisisalreadyaprobleminabusiveintimate
relationships.15ItcouldalsobebecauseAIassistantsareownedandcontrolled
bythirdparties(e.g.companies/corporations)whocapturesexualdatafrom
theirusersandusethistooptimiseandmarkettheirproductsandservices.
Sometimesthisisdonewiththeconsentoftheusers;sometimesitisnot.Indeed,
severallawsuitshavealreadybeensettledbetweencompaniesandusersof
smartsextoysduetothefactthatdatawascollectedfromthosedeviceswithout
theusers’consent.16Ofcourse,violationsofprivacyareageneralconcernwith
digitaltechnology,extendingfarbeyondthesexualorintimateusecase,17but
onemightarguethattheethicalconcernsarehigherinthiscasegiventheunique
importanceofsexualprivacy.
availableathttp://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/01/opinion/selinger-outsourcing-activities/index.html(accessed29/11/2016).14Danaher,NyholmandEarp,n1315Levy,n1316AlexHern,‘VibratormakerorderedtopayoutC$4mfortrackingusers'sexualactivity’,TheGuardian14March2017,availableathttps://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/14/we-vibe-vibrator-tracking-users-sexual-habits17WoodrowHartzog,Privacy’sBlueprint:TheBattletoControltheDesignofNewTechnologies(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2018);andShoshanaZuboff,TheAgeofSurveillanceCapitalism(London:ProfileBooks2019)
TheDisengagementConcern:ThisistheconcernthatAIsexual
assistantsmaydistractusfrom,orencourageustodisengagefrom,sexually
intimateactivityandtherebycorrodeorundermineacorepartofthevalueof
thatactivity.Theargumentwouldbethatalotofthegoodofsexualintimacy
(andotherformsofintimacy)stemsfrombeingpresentinthemoment,i.e.
enjoyingthesexualactivityforwhatitis.Butcanyoureallybepresentifyouare
usingsomesex-assistanttotrackthenumberofcaloriesyouburn,orthedecibel
levelreached,orthenumberofthruststhattakeplaceduringsexualactivity?
(These,incidentally,areallrealexamplesofsomeoftheusestowhich
descriptiveandpredictiveanalyticshavebeenputinintimateapps.)18Similarly,
butinanon-sexualcase,EvanSelingerworriesabouttheuseofautomatedand
AI-assistedintimatecommunicationappsonthegroundsthattheycreatethe
impressionthatsomeoneisthinkingaboutandcaringaboutanotherpersonina
particularmomentwheninfacttheyarenotandarelettingtheappdothework
forthem.19Thedisengagementconcernis,onceagain,ageneralconcernabout
digitaltechnology–thinkofallthosecomplaintsaboutthe“anti-social”useof
smartphonesatpartiesandmeetings–butwemightworrythatitisparticularly
problematicintheintimatecasebecauseofhowimportantbeingpresentisto
intimacy.
TheMisdirectionConcern:Relatedtothepreviousconcern,thisisa
concernaboutthekindsofthingsthatAIsexualassistantsmightassistpeople
18Danaher,NyholmandEarp,n13.19Selingern13
with.AIassistantsingeneraltendtoprovideuserswithinformationorprompt
themtodocertainthings.ThesameislikelytooccurwithAIsexualassistants:
theymightgiveusersinformationabouthowtooptimisetheirsexual
experiencesorpromptthemtotryparticularactivities.Oneworryisthatthe
assistantscouldencourageactivitiesthatarenotconducivetogoodsexual
experience.Thisis,indeed,alreadyanexpressedconcernaboutthevarioussex
trackingappsthathavebeencreated.20Asnoted,thoseappsoftenencourage
userstofocusonthingslikethenumberofcaloriesburnedduringsex,the
numberofthrustsduringsex,andthedecibellevelreachedduringsex.One
reasonforthisisthatitisrelativelyeasytotrackandmeasurethesethings.But
thereisnoreasontothinkthatanyofthemiscorrelatedwithgoodsex.Onthe
contrary,focusingonthosemeasuresmightactuallyunderminegoodsex.This
worryisdistinctfromthepreviousonebecauseitisnotabouttheuserbeing
takenoutofthemomentbutratheraboutthemdoingthingsthatarenot
particularlypleasurable/valuableinthemoment.
TheIdeologicalConcern:Afinalconcern,whichisalsorelatedtothe
twoprecedingones,hastodowiththeideologicalimpactofAIsexualassistants
onintimaterelationships.Theconcernisthattheseassistantsmightimposea
certainmodelofwhatanidealintimate/sexualrelationshipisonthepeoplewho
makeuseofthem.Theymight,forexample,recreateandreinforcegender
stereotypesaboutsexualdesireandpreference.KarenLevy,forexample,has
arguedthatmanyintimatetrackingappsreinforcetheviewthatwomenarethe
20OnthiscriticismseeLupton,n13andLevyn13
subjectsofsurveillanceandsexualcontrol.21Othersarguethattheappsmight
encourageaneconomicorexchange-basedmodelofintimaterelationsovera
moreinformal-reciprocationmodel.Thisisbecausethedevicesmightencourage
userstotrackwhodoeswhatforwhomandencouragethemto
optimise/maximisecertainmetrics,alltothedetrimentofwhatatrulyvaluable
intimaterelationshipshouldbe.22
Whatcanbesaidinresponsetotheseconcerns?Well,theprivacyconcern
isprobablythemostserious.IfpartnersuseAIassistantstospyononeanother
ormanipulateoneanother’sbehaviourinanon-transparentway,thenthis
wouldbeamajorworry.Itcouldprovideassistanceandcoverfordominating
andabusiverelationships.Suchrelationshipswillexistintheabsenceof
technologicalassistance,butthetechnologymightmakeiteasiertoimplement
certainformsofdominatingcontrol.Itseemsuncontroversialthentosuggest
thatanyapporservicethatmakesiteasyforoneintimatepartnertospyon
anotherwithouttheother’sconsentshould,ifpossible,bebanned.Spyingby
thirdpartiesshouldalsobelimitedbutistrickiertomanage.Itdoesseemtobe
inherenttodigitaltechnologythatitfacilitatessomekindoftrackingand
surveillance.Wecantrytomitigatetheharmthatisdonebythistrackingand
surveillancethroughrobustlegalprotectionofindividualprivacy.Thislegal
protectionwouldforcethecompaniesthatprovidetherelevantappsand
servicestoputinplacemeasuresthatpreventnon-transparentandnon-
21Levy,n1322Danaher,NyholmandEarp,n13,pp7-8
consensualusesofindividualdata.TheEU’sGeneralDataProtectionRegulation
isastepintherightdirectioninthisregard.
Butitmaywellbethatpeoplearewillingtowaivetheirprivacyrightsin
ordertomakeuseofassistivetechnologies.Thisappearstobethecaseformany
peoplealready.Howmanytimeshaveyouconsentedtodigitalsurveillanceout
ofconvenience?Privacyadvocatescancounterthatthisissimplybecausepeople
donotfullyappreciatethedamagethatcanbedonebythemisuseoftheir
personaldata,butevenstill,formanypeople,convenientaccesstodigital
servicesisoftenfavouredoverprivacy.Thissuggeststhatwhetherornotpeople
arewillingtoforegosomeprivacywhenusingAIsexassistantsmightdependon
whethertheyfindthoseassistantsusefulintheirintimatelives.Iftheydo,then
sexualprivacymightbesignificantlyeroded.
Thisiswheretheotherthreeobjectionscomein.Theyprovidesome
reasontoquestionwhetherAIsexassistantswillinfactbeuseful,highlighting
thevariouswaysinwhichtheymightundermineorcorrodeintimate
relationships.Althougheachofthethreeconcernshassomemerit,theycanbe
overstated.Therearethreereasonsforthis.First,itisimportanttobearinmind
thatthereisnosinglemodelfortheidealintimaterelationship.Different
relationshipmodelsworkfordifferentsetsofpeopleatdifferenttimes.Appsand
assistiveAIthatseemuseless,distractingormisdirectedtosomepeople,might
beuseful,engagingandfulfillingtoothers.Eventheseeminglycomicalexamples
ofsextrackingappsthatgetpeopletoquantifycertainaspectsoftheirsexlife
might,forsomepeople,leadtoamorepleasurableandfulfillingsexlife.Aslong
aspeoplearenotforcedorcompelledtouseparticularAIsexassistants,their
useneednotleadtotheideologicalimpositionofaspecificmodeloftheideal
relationship.Adiversityofappsandassistantscouldprovideroomforpartners
toexploredifferentpossibilitiesinaccordancewiththeirownneedsandwishes.
Second,whilesomeoftheearlyattemptstoprovideAIassistancemightseem
crudeandunsophisticated,theyarelikelytoimproveovertimeandprovide
moreusefulguidance.Thisisbecausethereisreasontothinkthatthetracking
andquantificationmadepossiblebysexandrelationshipappscanbeusedto
goodeffect.Togiveoneexampleofthis,theresearchcarriedoutbytheGottman
Instituteonsuccessfulrelationshipssuggeststhatrelationshipscanbeimproved
ifpartnersexplicitlyrecorddetailsoftheirintimatelives,andfollowcertain
ritualsofconnection.23Theserecommendationsarebasedonextensive,
longitudinalresearchonwhatmakesforasuccessfulintimaterelationship.
Digitalassistantscouldmakeiteasiertoimplementtheserecommendations.
Indeed,theGottmanInstitutealreadyoffersafreesmartphoneappthathelps
couplesimplementsomeofthem.24Onecaneasilyimaginemoresophisticated,
AI-basedversionsofthisappcomingonstreaminthefutureandprovidingfar
moreeffectiveandpersonalisedassistance.Third,totheextentthatworries
remainabouttheeffectofthesetechnologiesonsexualintimacy,theseworries
canbemitigated(toalargeextent)byencouragingmorethoughtfulengagement
withthetechnology.Theproblemsoutlinedaboveareattheirmostsevereif
peopleuseAIassistantsasasubstituteforthinkingforthemselvesandnotasa
complementtothinkingforthemselves.Iftherecouldbeonemajor
23Seehttps://www.gottman.com/24Availableathttps://www.gottman.com/couples/apps/
recommendationmadetothedesignersofAIintimateassistantsitwouldbeto
includeclearwarningstousersthattheservicesandrecommendationsoffered
bytheseassistantsarenotapanaceatoalltheirsexualwoes.Theycanbe
beneficial,butonlyiftheuser(s)criticallyreflectsontheroleoftheservicein
theirownintimatelives.Includingpromptsforsuchcriticalreflectioncouldbea
focusfordesignerswhowishtoencouragetheethicaluseofAIsexassistants.
Thebottomlineis,then,thatalthoughAIassistantscouldundermineand
corrodeourintimateandsexuallives,thereissomereasonforoptimism.The
careful,criticalandnon-dogmaticuseofsuchassistantsmightcomplementand
improveourintimatebehaviour.
AIandLove
Let’scloseoutthischapterbyreturningtothetwomenwhosestoriesI
toldintheintroduction:ZhengJiajiaandAikikhoKondo.Bothofthem‘married’
artificialbeings.Anobviousquestiontoaskiswhattheethicalorphilosophical
statusofthosemarriagesmightbe?Aretheymanifestationsofgenuinelyloving
relationshipsoraretheyslightlyunusualsexualfetishes?Attheoutset,Iwould
emphasisethatanyanswertothisquestionshouldnotbetakentostigmatiseor
shamethosewhoprefersuchrelationships.Butthequestionisworthasking
sinceweattachalotofvaluetolovingrelationshipsandifwecouldhaveloving
relationshipswithAIsandrobots,itmightprovidereasontocreatethem.
Thereis,however,noshortageofoppositiontotheideathatonecouldbe
inalovingrelationshipwitharobot.DylanEvans,forexample,hasarguedthat
thereissomethingparadoxicalabouttheideaofroboticlover.25Hisargument
focusesontheasymmetricalnatureoftherelationshipbetweenahumananda
robot.Presumably,anyroboticloverwillbeprogrammedto‘love’theirhuman
partner.Iftherobotcouldchoosetheirpartnerthenwhatwouldbethepointin
creatingit?Theadvantageofhavingarobotloveroverahumanloveristhefact
thattherobothastoloveyou:thatyouhaveultimatecontroloveritsresponses
toyou(thisdesireforcontrolseemstobeoneofthemotivationsbehindZheng
JiajiaandAikikhoKondo’sactions).Butthiscontrolcomesatacost,accordingto
Evans,becauseacorepartofwhatpeoplewantinalovingrelationshipisa
partner(orpartners)whofreelychoosestobewiththem.Asheputsit,people
wanttheirlover’scommitmenttothemto“bethefruitofanongoingchoice,
ratherthaninflexibleandunreflexivebehaviorpatterns”.26
MichaelHauskelleralsoarguesagainsttheideaofaroboticlover.
Althoughheconcedesthatitmaybepossibletocreatehuman-likerobotsthat
‘appear’tobeinlovewithyou,hecountersthatsuchaloverwouldneverbeas
satisfyingtoyouasahumanlover.FollowingEvans,hearguesthatoneofthe
mainreasonsforthisisthatnomatterhowgoodtheillusionofloveis,there
wouldalwaysbesomereasontosuspectordoubtwhethertherobotreallyloves
you,givenitsorigins.27
25DylanEvans,‘WantingtheImpossible:TheDilemmaattheHeartofIntimateHuman-RobotRelationships’inYorickWilks(ed)CloseEngagementswithArtificialCompanions:KeySocial,Psychological,EthicalandDesignIssues(Philadelphia,PA:JohnBenjaminsPublishingCompany,2010).26Evans,n25,p74-7527MichaelHauskeller,‘AutomaticSweetheartsforTranshumanists’inJohnDanaherandNeilMcArthur(eds)RobotSex:SocialandEthicalImplications(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2017),p213.
Inamoreextensiveanalysisoftheconceptoflove,SvenNyholmandLily
Frankalsoexpressdoubtsaboutthepossibilityofbeinginalovingrelationship
witharobot.28Exploringdifferentconceptionsofromanticlove(including,the
claimthattobeinloveistobea‘goodmatch’withyourpartner,ortobe
attractedtothe‘distinctiveparticularity’ofyourpartner)theyarguethatwhileit
isnotimpossibletocreatearobotthatmeetstheconditionsneededforaloving
relationship,itwouldbeexceptionallydifficulttodoso,requiringtechnologyfar
inadvanceofwhatiscurrentlyavailable.Inmakingtheircase,theyusethe‘hired
actor’analogytoexpressthebasicproblemwithcreatingaroboticlover:it
seemslikethebestwecanreallydowitharoboticloveristocreateanentity
that‘playsthepart’ofbeinginlovewithyou,butneverquitegraduatesfrom
actingtogenuinelove.29
Thesecriticismsareintuitiveandattractive,buttheyhavesome
problems.Toseewhattheyareitisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwofears
articulatedbythecritics.Thefirst–whichwemightcallthe‘nodepth’fear–is
thatrobotloversareallsurfaceandnodepth.Theyact‘asif’theyloveyoubut
thereisnothingmoretoitthanperformance:theydon’treallyfeelor
consciouslyexperiencetherelevantemotionsthatweassociatewithbeingin
love.Thesecond–whichwemightcallthe‘programming’fear–isthatrobot
loverscannotfreelyandautonomouslychoosetoloveyou.Theywillalwaysbe
28SvenNyholmandLilyEvaFrank,‘FromSexRobotstoLoveRobots:IsMutualLovewithaRobotPossible?’inJohnDanaherandNeilMcArthur(eds)RobotSex:SocialandEthicalImplications(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2017).29NyholmandFrank,n28,pp223-224.
programmedtoloveyou.Thesetwofearsarerelatedtooneanother–most
allegedrobotloversprobablylackdepthandfreechoice–buttheyarenotthe
samething.Arobotmightbeprogrammedtoloveyouevenifithastheright
kindofexperientialdepthandviceversa.
Arethesetwocriticismsofrobotloversvalid?Let’sconsiderthe‘no
depth’problemfirst.Theeasyrebuttaltothisistosaythatevenifrobots
currentlylacktherequisiteexperientialdepthitispossible,someday,thatthey
willhaveit.Whenthatdayarrives,wecanhaverobotlovers.Themajorproblem
withthisrebuttal,however,isthatitkicksthecandowntheroadandfailsto
grapplewiththephilosophicalissueattheheartofthe‘nodepth’argument,
namely:doesexperientialdepthactuallymatterwhenitcomestodetermining
whetherornotaparticularrelationshipcountsasalovingone?Idon’tthinkit
does.Ifarobotappears,onthesurface,tobeinlovewithyouthenthat’sallit
takesforyoutobeinalovingrelationshipwiththatrobot.
Thismightsoundalittlecrazy,butIdefendthispositiononthegrounds
thatwemust,asapracticalmatter,bebehaviouristswhenitcomesto
understandingtheethicalstatusofourrelationshipswithotherbeings.30In
otherwords,wehavetoapplythemethodologicalbehaviourismofpsychologists
andcomputerscientists(e.g.thebehaviourismattheheartoftheTuringTestfor
machineintelligence)toourethicalrelationshipswithotherbeings.Thecentral
tenetofthis‘ethicalbehaviourism’isthatwhenyoutrytodeterminethemoral
30JohnDanaher,‘ThePhilosophicalCaseforRobotFriendship’(2019)TheJournalofPosthumanStudies2(2)
qualityofyourrelationships(includingyourdutiesandresponsibilities)with
otherbeingsyoucannotuseunobservable,innermentalstatestomakeyour
assessment.Youhavetorelyonexternallyobservablebehaviouraland
functionalpatterns.Youmay,ofcourse,hypothesisetheexistenceofinner
mentalstatestoexplainthoseobservablepatterns.Butanyinferenceyoumake
astothepresenceofthosestatesmustultimatelybegroundedinorguidedbyan
externallyobservablepattern.Theproblemwithmanyofthephilosophical
accountsofwhatittakestobeinalovingrelationshipisthattheyfocus,
implicitlyorexplicitly,onunobservableandinherentlyprivatementalstates
(e.g.feelingsofcommitment/attachment,sincereexpressionsofemotionsand
so).Asaresult,itiseffectivelyimpossibletohaveanyconfidenceintheexistence
oflovingrelationshipsunlessyouacceptthatobservablebehaviouraland
functionalpatternscanprovideepistemicwarrantforourjudgmentsaboutthe
presenceoftherelevantprivatementalstates.Inotherwords,ethical
behaviourismisalready,ofnecessity,theapproachwetaketounderstandingthe
ethicalstatusofourrelationshipswithourfellowhumanbeings.Thismeansthe
‘nodepth’argumentdoesn’twork.Sinceweareunabletoplumbthedepthsof
ourhumanlovers,wecannotapplyadifferentstandardtoroboticlovers.
Thispointhastobefinessedinordertoavoidsomepotentiallyabsurd
interpretations.Forstarters,itisimportanttorealisethatinordertoprovidethe
basisforalovingrelationship,theperformanceand‘illusion’fromarobotwill
needtobeequivalenttotheperformanceandillusionwegetfromahuman
lover.It’sunlikelythatanycurrentlyexistingrobotorAIachievessuch
performativeequivalency.Sothisremains,tosomeextent,afuturepossibility,
notapresentreality.
Similarly,therearesomecounterargumentstoethicalbehaviourismthat
areworthconsidering,ifonlytodeepentheunderstandingofwhatethical
behaviourismentails.Forexample,somepeoplemightarguethatwedorelyon
somethingotherthanbehaviourtodeterminethemoralqualityofour
relationshipswithothers.Perhapsitisbecauseweknowthatourloversare
madeoftherightstuff(biological/organicmaterial)thatweareconfidentthey
canloveus?Orperhapsitisbecauseweknowtheyhavetherightkindof
developmental/evolutionaryhistory?Ifso,thensomeonemightarguethat
robotsandAIwouldstillnotcountas‘proper’loverseveniftheywere
performativelyequivalenttohumanlovers.
Butitishardtoseewhythepresenceorabsenceoftheseotherfactors
shouldhaveshouldhavethateffect.Whatistherationalconnectionbetween
beingmadeoftherightstuff(orhavingtherighthistory)andthecapacityto
formalovingrelationshipwithanother?Supposeyourspousebehavesinaway
thatisentirelyconsistentwiththehypothesisthattheyloveyou.Butthen
suppose,oneday,youlearnthattheyare,infact,analienfromanotherplanet
anddon’tsharethesamebiologicalconstitution.Theycontinuetobehaveasthey
alwaysdid.Shouldyoudoubtwhetheryouareinatrulylovingrelationshipwith
them?It’shardtoseewhy.Therevelationoftheiralienorigins,inandofitself,
shouldnotunderminetheclaimthattheyareinalovingrelationship.The
consistentbehaviouralevidenceofloveshouldtrumptheotherconsiderations.
Thesameshouldholdforaroboticorartificiallover.
Somepeoplemightcomebackandarguethattherearecaseswhereour
faithintheexistenceofalovingrelationshipwouldbeshakenbylearning
somethingabouttheoriginsorhistoryofourhumanlovers.Suppose,for
example,youlearnthatyourhumanloverwas,indeed,ahiredactor,orthatthey
havebeenhavinganaffairforyearswithoutyourawareness.Surelythatwould
undermineyourconfidencethattheyareinalovingrelationshipwithyou?And
surelythatismoreakintowhatitwouldbeliketohavearobotlover?Butthese
counterexamplesdonotwork.Forstarters,itisnotclearthateitherofthese
revelationsshouldshakeourfaithintheexistenceofalovingrelationship.It
seemsplausibletosuggestthatahiredactorcouldgrowtolovethepersonwith
whomtheyhaveaninitiallyfakerelationship,anditalsoseemsplausibleto
suggestthatlovecansurviveinfidelity.Ifthepersonstillbehavesandappearsto
loveyouthenperhapstheydo,despitetheserevelations.Butevenifthat’sa
stretchforsomepeople,Iwouldsuggestthatwhatreallyshakestheirfaithinthe
existenceofalovingrelationshipinbothofthesecasesisthefactthattheywill
acquire(orhavereasontosuspecttheexistenceof)somenewbehavioural
evidencethatcontradictstheoldbehaviouralevidencethatconvincedthemthey
wereinalovingrelationship.Forexample,theymayhavelearned(orstartto
suspect)thattheactorsaysbadthingsaboutthemwhentheyare‘off’thejobor
thattheirpartnerhasbeenplanningtoleavethemforthepersonwiththeyare
havinganaffair.Thisnewbehaviouralevidencemightcompletelyundermine
theirbeliefinalovingrelationshiporatleastpromptthemtoseekoutfurther
behaviouralevidencetoconfirmwhethertheirpartnerstilllovesthem.Either
way,itisbehaviouralevidencethatwilldothedamage(orrepair).Inanyevent,
neitheroftheseexamplesisagoodanalogywiththeroboticlovercase,where
presumablytheroboticnatureandoriginsoftheloverwillbeknownfromday
one.
Whataboutthe‘programming’fear?Evansisrightthatwewant(or,at
least,shouldwant)ourloverstofreelychooseus.Ifarobotisprogrammedor
conditionedtoloveusthenitseemslikethereissomethingsuspiciousorinferior
aboutthekindof‘love’theycangive.Butweshouldn’toverstatethisfeareither.
Itisconceivablethatwecouldcreateroboticloversthatbehave‘asif’theyfreely
chooseus(and,remember,behaving‘asif’theychooseusisenough,following
ethicalbehaviourism).Theroboticlovermightactinficklewayortestitshuman
companion’struecommitment,muchlikeahumanlover.Thiscouldevenbean
attractivequalityinaroboticlover,becauseitmakesitmorelikethehuman-to-
humancase.Thedesireforthisisn’tasbizarreorunfathomableasEvansmakes
out.
Butbeyondthat,thereisalsoreasontodoubtwhetherthepresenceor
absenceof‘programming’shouldundermineourbeliefintheexistenceofa
lovingrelationship.Humansarearguably‘programmed’toloveoneanother.A
combinationofinnatebiologicaldrivesandculturaleducationmakeshumans
primedtofindoneanothersexuallyattractiveandformdeepandlastingbonds
withoneanother.Indeed,peopleoftentalkaboutloveasbeingsomethingother
thanafreeandautonomouschoice.We‘fall’intolove;wedon’tchooseit.We
findourselvesattractedtoothersdespiteourbetterjudgment.Theheartwants
whatitwants,andsoon.Furthermore,insomecultures,arrangedmarriagesand
relationshipsarecommonandwhiletheyseemunusual,maybeevencruel,from
someperspectives,thepartnersinsuchrelationshipsoftengrowtoloveone
anotherandreporthighlevelsofrelationship-satisfaction,sometimeshigherand
oftennoworsethanthesatisfactionofthosein‘autonomous’marriages.31Soitis
notthatunusualtobelievethatlovecanblossomfromsomepre-programming
andpre-arrangingofunions.
Criticsmightdisputetheseexamplesandarguethatthekindof
programminginvolvedinhumanrelationshipsisverydifferentfromthekind
thatwillariseinhuman-robotrelationships.Humansareonlyloosely
programmedtoseekattachment.Theyarenotbrainwashedtoloveaparticular
person.Also,eveninthecaseofarrangedmarriage(wherethereisgreater
restrictionanddirectionofchoice)thepartnersarenotcoercedintothe
relationshiponanongoingbasis.Theycanexercisetheirautonomyafterthe
unionhasformedandescapetherelationshipiftheydesire.
Butitisnotclearthatthedisanalogiesareallthatstrong.Itistruethat,
classically,robotsandAIswereprogrammedfromthetop-downbyparticular
humanprogrammerstofollowhighlyspecifiedinstructions,butthisisnolonger
thenorm.RobotsandAIsarenowprogrammedfromthebottomup,tofollow
31RobertEpstein,MayuriPanditandMansiThakar,‘HowLoveEmergesinArrangedMarriages:TwoCross-culturalStudies’(2013)JournalofComparativeFamilyStudies,44(3):341-360;andPCRegan,SLakhanpal,andCAnguiano,‘RelationshipoutcomesinIndian-Americanlove-basedandarrangedmarriages’(2012)PsychologicalReport110(3):915-24.
learningrules,andtoadapttonewchallengesandcircumstances.Theflexibility
ofthisadaptivelearningisstillratherlimited–weareyettocreateageneralised
formofartificialintelligence–butasthisapproachproliferatesandgrowsthe
allegeddisanalogiesbetweentheprogrammingofhumanloversandrobotlovers
willnarrow.Itwillnolongerbeabsurdtoclaimthatrobotloverscommittous
onthebasisofafreeandongoingchoice,nortoimaginethattheymightfallout
oflovewithusthroughcontinuedlearning.
Noneofthistosaythatpreferringarobotloveroverahumanloverisa
goodthingorthattherearenoethicalproblemswithcreatingrobotlovers.
Thereare.Worriesabouttheobjectificationanddominationofrobotpartners,
aswellasthesocialconsequencesthatthismighthave,havebeenvoicedby
severalcritics.Ihavediscussedtheseworriesatlengthinpreviouswork.32
Similarly,NyholmandFrankarguethatthecreatorsofroboticloversandsexual
partnersmaybeunderanobligationnottomisleadusersastothecapacitiesof
therobotsinquestiontoformlovingrelationships.33Theyworrythat
manufacturersmightbetemptedtoexploittheemotionalvulnerabilityofsome
consumersinordertomaketheirproductsmoreattractive.Whilethisisa
problemwithallconsumerproducts(tosomeextent),itseemslikeaparticularly
acuteproblemforroboticlovers,giventhecentralityandimportanceofsexand
32JohnDanaher,‘RoboticRapeandRoboticChildSexualAbuse:ShouldtheybeCriminalised?’(2017)CriminalLawandPhilosophy11(1):71-95;JohnDanaher‘TheSymbolicConsequencesArgumentintheSexRobotDebate’inDanaherandMcArthur(eds)RobotSex:SocialandEthicalImplications(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2017);andJohnDanaher,‘RegulatingChildSexRobots:RestrictionorExperimentation?’(2019)MedicalLawReview,forthcoming.33SvenNyholmandLilyEvaFrank‘ItLovesMe,ItLovesMeNot:IsitMorallyProblematictoDesignSexRobotsthatAppearto“Love”TheirOwners?”(2019)Techné,forthcoming
loveinhumanlife.Arelativelystrictsetofrulesmayberequiredtoguard
againstabuse.But,ofcourse,whatisandisnotpermittedbythissetofrules
depends,crucially,onwhatwethinkittakestoformalegitimateloving
relationship.ThisiswhyIhavefocusedonthephilosophicalnatureofloveinthe
precedingdiscussion.IfIamcorrectinmyanalysis,itwillsomedaypossibleto
formalovingrelationshipwitharobotiftherobotcanconvincinglyand
consistentlyperformthepartofbeingalover,andhenceanyrestrictions
imposedtopreventexploitationwillneedtotakethatintoconsideration.
Conclusion
Towrapup,AIandroboticsarebeing,andwillcontinuetobe,usedto
augmentandcomplementhumansexuality.Inthischapter,Ihaveaddressed
threeissuesthatmightariseasaresultandmadethreemainarguments.First,I
havearguedthatweshouldbecautiousaboutrecognisinganewformofsexual
identitythatappliestothosewhoprimarilyexpressandenacttheirsexualities
throughthesetechnologies.Doingsoisnotmetaphysicallymandatedandmay
contributetosocialstigmatisation.Second,IhavearguedthatAIcanbeusedto
assisthumansexualandintimaterelationships.Suchassistanceposesanumber
ofrisks–particularlytoprivacy–buttheserisksshouldnotbeoverstatedand
shouldnotpreventthebeneficialuseofAIsexassistants.Finally,Iarguedthat,
contrarytoanumberofcritics,itispossibletoformalovingrelationshipwitha
robotorAI.It’sabravenewworldintowhichwearestepping.Let’smakeita
sexuallyenrichingone.
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