SelfhoodandtheMetaphysicsofAltruism

ADISSERTATIONSUBMITTEDTOTHEGRADUATEDIVISIONOFTHEUNIVERSITYOFHAWAI¢IATMĀNOAINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOF

THEREQUIREMENTSFORTHEDEGREEOF

DOCTOROFPHILOSOPHYIN

PHILOSOPHY

MAY2017By

KevinPerryMaroufkhani

DissertationCommittee:

ArindamChakrabarti,ChairpersonRonBontekoeGeorgeTsai

PeterHershockSaiBhatawadekar

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSIamindebtedtomyfamily,particularly,RosannePerry,DariushMaroufkhani,andRoyaDennisfortheirmoralsupportandstubbornbeliefthatIcouldaccomplishthisprojectdespitealltheobstaclesIcreatedformyself.Iwouldliketoacknowledgemychair,Dr.ArindamChakrabarti,forthebreadthandvivacityofhisphilosophicalimagination,whichhascontinuedtochallengeme,andnudgemeoutofcomplacencyandinevitablephilosophicalnaps.Hisanalyticalrigor,teaching-presence,andfacilityinworldphilosophyisatestamenttowhatispossibleinthefieldofglobalphilosophicaldiscourse.Iamgratefulforthemanyhoursofselflessinstructionheprovided,andthefertileideascultivatedinhisclassrooms.IwouldliketoacknowledgeDr.RonBontekoe,whohasalwayschallengedmeinthetruespiritofaphilosophicalfriend.Dr.Bontekoehasbeenacarefulandcaringacademicadvisor,and,inthecoursesI’vetakenwithhim,hasneverletmeoffthehook.Hedoesnotmincewords,andbecauseofthebackgrounddepthhehasprovidedinhermeneutics,biology,andtheoreticalethics,hehasgreatlybenefitedthisproject.IwouldliketoacknowledgeDr.PeterHershock,whocontinuallyremindsmethatahermeneuticallenscanmakeorbreakthecredibility,rigorandsensitivityofcross-culturalconversation.Dr.Hershock’sinnovativeworkhasinspiredmetodevelopfutureprojectsinwhichmyworkcanmorecompellinglytouchgroundandgetabitgrittierindetailandmuch-neededapplication.Hispatientanddetailedfeedbackonthisprojectdeservestobeaddressedanddevelopedinamuchlargerwork,repletewithprimarysourcematerialandchallengestotaken-for-grantedparadigmsthatlimittheimaginativescopeandfertilityofBuddhistthought.IwouldliketoacknowledgeDr.GeorgeTsai,whoserigorinanalyticethicsandwhosepersonalandprofessionaladvicehaskeptmyconversationfromveeringoff(toodeeply,Ihope)intometaphysicalrabbitholes.IamalsoindebtedtoDr.RajamRaghunathan,whoseshortstayattheUniversityofHawai’iatMānoaprovidedmewithmuchneededseminarsinMadhyamakaBuddhism,Sanskrit-Buddhistmetaphysics,andthoroughgoinganalysesofthekṣaṇabhaṅgavādinsindialoguewithcontemporary,analyticmetaphysics.ShealsotooktimeoutofherbusyscheduletohelpmesharpenmySanskritskills(which,I’mafraid,areneverquitesharpenough).IwouldliketothankDr.SaiBhatawadekarfortacklingthisprojectonsuchshortnotice.Herreputationforacademicexcellenceandcarefulanalysisexceedsher,andIamgratefulthatshehasdevotedhervaluabletimetothesomewhatonerousconcoctionI’veproducedhere.Finally,IwouldliketoacknowledgethephilosophydepartmentanditsinnovativefacultyattheUniversityofHawai’iatMānoa.Byspearheadingglobalphilosophicaldialogue,andinnovatinginthisfieldwhenitwasinitsinfancy,thedepartmenthascultivatedintellectualpossibilitiesthatthehumanitieswouldbesurelyimpoverishedforlacking.Particularly,theinnovativeworksofDr.EliotDeutschandDr.RogerAmes,amongothers,havebeenstandouts,andnooneinthisdepartmentmovestoofaroutoftheirshadows.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................................iii INTRODUCTION: AN ETHICAL DEFENSE OF SELFHOOD AS OTHER-CENTRICITY………………….... iv-xxiv CHAPTER 1 SELFHOOD AND ETHICAL AGENCY: OWNING MORAL SELFLESSNESS 1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-7 1.2 Self-talk and Practical Deliberations: The Gap Between Self and Other.. 8-20 1.3.1 Conceiving Moral Selflessness: Unselfish Egocentricity…………………….... 20-33 1.3.2 Non-egocentricity, Unselfishness, and Other-regarding Considerations..34-37 CHAPTER 2 SELFLESSNESS AND NORMATIVITY: ŚĀNTIDEVA AND EMPTINESS ETHICS 2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..... 38-47 2.2 Ownership and No-Self Views………………………………………………………...... 47-55 2.3 Ownership and Individuation: Varieties of Selflessness……………….......... 55-62 2.4 Bodhicaryāvatāra: Altruism, Egoism, and Utility………………………….......... 62-67 2.5 Bodhicaryāvatāra: Altruism and the Anātman Dilemma………………......... 67-89 2.6 Toward Ownership and Other-centricity………………………………… .............. 89-92 CHAPTER 3 BEING OTHER THAN MYSELF: DEFENDING AN ETHICS OF SELFLESSNESS 3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...... 93-98 3.2.1 Anticipating My Future: How to Treat Myself as Other…………………......... 98-101 3.2.2 The Continuant Other:

Good Reasons to Care About My Surrogate (Non)-Self.................................. 102-107 3.3.1 Ego-Tunnels and Madhyamaka:

The Ethics and Consolation of Simulated (Non)-Selves................................. 108-120 3.3.2 Madhyamaka, Ego-Tunnels, and Altruism:

Seeing the World as a Spectrum of Graded Concerns for the Other.......... 120-132 3.4 Does the Existence of a Self Make Any Practical Difference?........................ 132-147 3.5 Madhyamaka as Borderless and Constructed Care for the (Non)-Self..... 147-155 CHAPTER 4 EXALTED ALTRUISM AND MEREOLOGICAL HOLISM 4.1 Introduction........................................... ........................................................................... 156-162 4.2 The Normative Self........................................................................................................ 162-168 4.3 Selves as “Ownerless” Owners:

Revisiting Sidgwick’s Ethical Dilemma.................................................................. 168-181 4.4 Two Chief Claims to Defend........................................................................................ 182-190 4.5.1 The Practical Inadequacies of the Anātman Thesis:

Critique of Chapter 3...................................................................................................... 190-192 4.5.2 Numerical Distinction and the Egoist’s Strategy................................................ 193-196

4.5.3 Motivating Ethical Egoism................................................................... .........................197-208 4.5.4 A Rationally Reconstructed Buddhist Response........................ ........................ 209-220 4.6 Momentariness and the Problem of Other Persons in Dharmakīrti:

An Advaita-Śaivite Response...................................................................................... 220-229 4.7.1 The Problem of Inferring Other Minds,

And the Possibility of Sharing a World................................................................... 229-232

4.7.2 Mereological Holism and Other Minds: A Metaphysical Solution to the Problem of Unity in Diversity (Bhedābheda)..................................................................................................................... 232-242

4.8.1 Self and Other Minds…a Bridge to Motivated Altruism................................... 242-248 4.8.2 “Guessing” the Existence of Other Minds:

A Śaivite Account of Reaching Common Ground................................................ 248-256 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................ ........ 257-265 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................ 266-269

iii

ABSTRACT

Altruisticandgreater-goodconsiderationsarenotonlyfundamentalaspectsofethicalmaturity,

butalsoabasicmeansforcomingtoknoweachother.Rationalegoism(theviewthatpractical

rationalityrequiressomeformofpersonalpay-offforthegoal-drivenagent)isnotsoeasilysnubbed,

norhasitfallenterriblyoutoffashioninthesocialsciencesandeconomics.Iarguethatitisnotatruism

thataltruismislessnaturalthanegocentrismforanordinaryself.Itisfalse.Iaimtoreconceivethe

problemthataltruisticconsiderationsseemlessrationalthanjustified,egocentricconsiderations.I

concludethattheselfcanidentifywithsubjectivityassuch,andtherebyadvancetheinterestsofa“we-

self.”Whileepistemicallydistant,the“we-self”isontologicallypriortotheego.

IconceivetheproblemintermsofacentraldistinctioninIndianphilosophy;thedistinction

betweenanego-self(ahaṅkāra)andeitherabundleofpropertytropes(aswefindinschoolsof

Buddhistphilosophy),orapersistingsynthesizerofexperiencesthatisnotsolelyidentifiedas“this

body”(aswefindinMonistic-Śaivism).ForMādhyamika-BuddhistthinkerslikeŚāntideva(c.8thcentury

C.E.),anerror-theoryofselfprovidesgoodreasonsforaltruism.Iarguethatthisislogically

unconvincing.Inchapter3,IappropriateLevinas’sdiscussionoftheOther/othertodevelopaBuddhist-

inspired,EmptinessEthics.However,Idismantlethisinchapter4,whereIappealtoaspectual

metaphysics,particularly,thenotionofcompositionasidentity(CAI),toclarifynotonlytherational

statusofother-centricconsiderations,buttheverypossibilityofactingonsuchconsiderations.

Inchapter4,IofferaŚaivist-inspiredsolutiontotheproblemofotherminds.Borrowingfrom

Abhinavagupta(c.10th-11thcenturyC.E.),Icontendthatthepossibilityofidentifyingwithandactingfor

alargerwholeliesinrecognizingourselvesasbothindividualsandothers(bhedābheda).Idevelopthis

byshowinghownormativityandaconceptofselfhoodgohandinhand;and,furthermore,thereflexivity

ofconsciousnessallowsustorecognizeaselfthatisnotlimitedtoonlypracticalandnarrativeidentities,

buttoselfassuch.

iv

INTRODUCTION: AN ETHICAL DEFENSE OF SELFHOOD AS OTHER-CENTRICITY

It is not a truism that altruism is less natural than selfishness, or has less

normative authority—for an ordinary self. It is false, or so I shall argue. The self can

be naturally unselfish, and by that, I mean at least two things: self-regarding desires

are not primary in any sort of ethically relevant sense, and the self is in large part

constituted by its commitments to others. Moreover, the self can act as and for

another, a metaphysical point I will develop throughout the entirety of this essay,

but especially in my final chapter.

As early as Plato’s Republic, the Greek and Euro-American traditions have

grappled with the rationality of morality construed in terms of a potential conflict

with prudence and rational self-interest. When Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge

Socrates with the Ring of Gyges scenario, Socrates argues that it is better to be

seemingly unjust (or, falsely perceived as exclusively pursuing egocentric

considerations), but actually just, than to be seemingly just, but actually unjust. By

the final chapters, Plato, through the mouthpiece of Socrates, argues that it is to our

advantage to be moral. More specifically, he argues that it is to the individual’s

advantage to maintain moral integrity. For even Thrasymachus—the moral rascal

and antagonist of Book I—would admit that there is obviously some benefit to

society operating within a moral framework. However, the clever egoist will readily

take advantage of that very framework, and, when possible, act amorally (and

perhaps even immorally) to further his own advantage. To the contrary, Plato argues

that it is always advantageous for the individual to lead a just life (in the sense of

adequately promoting the greater good). Still, Plato’s driving premise is construed in

v

self-regarding terms; the just person will enjoy the benefits of a healthy mental life,

and the unjust person will not.

The problem is that a socially acceptable egocentric consideration sometimes

comes into direct conflict with considerations for the greater good. For those of us

who are unconvinced by Divine Command Theory, we do not want to be forced

between sensible, reasonable action, and a moral command that runs against the

grain of what it would otherwise make sense to do. More precisely, self-interest and

prudence are eminently rational; it makes practical sense to advance one’s own

interests and to seek the best life possible for oneself in terms of personal rewards

and achievements.

The first, and most obvious, question here is, “What sort of self-interest are we

talking about?” I will limit the conversation to commonsense interests that operate

within a legally and socially sanctioned framework. For example, say Mr. Price has

been a law-abiding, and for the most part, good-natured citizen and neighbor. He

has amassed considerable wealth in the health industry. He does not endorse a

health mandate requiring healthy individuals to pay into a coffer that would cover

the expenses of lower cost health insurance for the most vulnerable and poorer

citizens. If Mr. Price has a legally sanctioned choice between keeping more of his

salary or keeping less (by way of taxes), and he sees no personal reward in keeping

less (it will not directly improve his life-standard), we would need to provide some

good reason for him to keep less. Improving his own life-standard within a legally

acceptable framework makes immediate sense. It makes so much sense that Mr.

Price might argue that this mandate is an unjustified “penalty” for those who reap

vi

no benefits from it. While those who disagree with Mr. Price might claim that moral

incentives provide him with a good reason to pay into the coffer, they must either

show him how moral incentives make rational sense, or convince him that morality

in some instances overrides rationality (say, “rationality” understood as

instrumental reason). But if they insisted on the latter claim, then they would be

committed to the view that morality (specifically as it relates to altruistic and

unselfish behavior) is either sometimes extra-rational or irrational. In other words,

it represents either an entirely different order of practical motivations that

(hopefully) encompasses calculative and instrumental reasoning, or somehow

transcends it, or simply makes no material sense. We can safely rule out the last

option here.

So, if we want morality to be reasonable, then we must assume that the following

is true: altruistic and unselfish behavior are eminently rational; it makes sense not

to always pursue what would secure the best life possible for oneself in terms of

personal rewards and achievements.

Now, a parent might not want to sacrifice her time and personal goals to

improve her child’s situation, but she often feels not only compelled to do so, but

justified as well. However, like Mr. Price, she might not want to sacrifice a portion of

income she could otherwise spend on her child (say, as an added boost that would

allow her to send her child to an academy for gifted science students) to help secure

services for her neighbor’s or a complete stranger’s child. The bone of contention

lies in this seemingly innocuous statement. When exactly does the greater good

override self-regarding and mildly hedonistic considerations? Perhaps there are

vii

extra-practical reasons to endorse altruistic considerations and considerations for

the greater good, but if we believe we can provide an answer to the question, “Why

should I do that,” and if one serious answer is, “Because it is morally right to do so,”

then morality is practical, in the broader sense that it has a right to be taken

seriously, and sometimes followed at the sacrifice of one’s own good. Perhaps, then,

we do not want to limit our sense of practicality to only instrumental reasons. If it is

obvious that we have a moral reason to contribute to a coffer that prevents 24

million people from being uninsured, and if it is obvious that health care is a right

and not a privilege, then we’d better have reasons to provide those who disagree,

and fist-pounding moral declarations will not usually do the trick.

What sort of argument could one provide to Mr. Price? Mr. Price might offer his

own moral argument: “Forcing me to give up some of my legally earned income to

help others get along is a Robinhood scenario, and it is wrong to forcefully take

from the rich simply because they are rich; allow me to decide when and to whom I

provide charity.” We might counter with a utilitarian argument, to which he might

counter with a rights-based argument: “I have a right to opt-out of maximizing

total good when it directly harms me.” We’ve reached an impasse here.

Mr. Price insists that he is not a moral villain; if he could have it his way, the

poorest and most vulnerable would be cared for, but not on the premise that he

must be forced to participate through regulations and taxation. Why would he

make such a claim? Perhaps, autonomy takes moral priority over equitable wealth

distribution. In any case, he would be arguing that providing affordable services to

the most vulnerable is a worthy goal. However, that does not mean that it should

viii

be directly his problem, and that he should not have ultimate say in how and when

he chooses to participate in that endeavor. The problem then becomes this.

I. Prudential, egocentric considerations are eminently rational (within a

framework of accepted legal and social sanctions).

II. There are normatively-binding altruistic reasons and greater-good

reasons that it sometimes makes sense to pursue.

III. But there is no arbitrating principle that allows us to definitively settle a

principled conflict between reasonable, egocentric considerations and

altruistic and greater-good considerations.

I know that I would do better for myself not to contribute to the coffer, and I

appreciate that doing otherwise would be good under some description, but there

is no self-certified principle that says I should sacrifice my egocentric pursuit for

the greater good in this case. Moreover, no one doubts the obvious fact that self-

care is both justified and consists of a dynamic set of personal concerns that we

must balance in nearly all situations. To better reflect this, I need to add the

following claims.

IV. Unless we have knowledge of an arbitrating principle, it would make

more sense for us to pursue what benefits us personally (when in doubt,

and all things being equal, self-care is the obvious choice.).

V. We do not have knowledge of such a principle.

VI. Conclusion: when in a conflict of principles, self-care is the obvious

choice, which leads to the damning conclusion that:

ix

VII. The altruist and do-gooder acts irrationally when confronting a conflict

of principles between self-interest and altruistic and greater-good

considerations.

We want to reject (VII). Why? Say a man hurls himself in front of a car to

protect a stranger from being hit. This seems to be a clear case of potential conflict,

and we want to say that his heroic deed is morally good. However, based on the

points above, this forces us to accept the conclusion that the act is both morally

good and irrational (or extra-rational). This implies that, to this extent, morality is

irrational. But even if we reject (VII), we still do not know how or when we are

justified in acting on those considerations when they conflict with egocentric

considerations. This might motivate endorsing some form of ethical egoism (the

view that we are morally sanctioned to always pursue an egocentric principle).

However, aside from it being a flawed theory, it does not make immediate sense of

our intuition that altruism and greater-good considerations are not always

irrational (and certainly not morally bad). It rejects the moral worth of sincere

altruism altogether. Another option is rational egoism (the view that other-

regarding considerations are justified by improving our own situation in the long

run). This is more promising, because we can certainly show how greater-good

considerations can benefit us in the long run, but we would need some

complicated principles to show how it accommodates altruism. However, an

attenuated form of rational egoism might work. This would take the form of a so-

x

called harmonizing strategy.1 If we can show that advancing our own practical

interests can advance a maximally better state of the world, then both self and

other are served. We would still need to show how altruism fits into this picture.

But harmony seems to be the best bet.

Some of the thinkers I will assess pursue versions of this strategy. For

example, Samuel Scheffler2 argues that it is partly constitutive of value-driven

creatures like us to include relationships and the good of others in the scope of our

goals. My account of the so-called normative self (particularly in chapter 4) similarly

argues that how we constitute our values, projects, and our own practical identity

includes a primary acknowledgement and appreciation for the independent value of

others; the self remains an underdeveloped notion without an appreciation for how

it constitutes its own worth by coordinating with others, and by taking their needs

seriously. Psychological egoism—the view that we are always and only driven by

self-interest—is simply unconvincing when we consider how much our own self-

interest is bound up with the good of our neighbors, our social peers, and our

nearest and dearest. The ruthless or brazen egoist is simply an aberration, and more

of a philosophical bogeyman than a standard (though he can materialize as a real

President of an apparently real country!). Hobbes was wrong (see Leviathan, Part

1 Caspar Hare, On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 2. Hare describes this as the “peacemaker’s” strategy. Harmony consists of a situation in which: whenever a mild egocentric hedonist favors a situation in which she suffers less, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs. 2 Samuel Scheffler, “Potential Congruence,” Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2008). Also see, Samuel Scheffler, “Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory (New York: Oxford, 2010): 41-76.

xi

VII.1), and, bracketing the cogency of his argument, Plato’s conclusion was mostly

right.

On the other hand, the South Asian philosophical traditions provide an

important distinction that considerably nuances the problem. For the early Pāli

Buddhist texts, the ego-self—the historical, culturally situated, and practical self—is

bound to cycles of suffering, because it “craves” existence, and attaches itself to the

fruits of the world, while desperately trying to avert what it finds to be unpleasant.

This is one sense in which the ego-self is always a “duḥkha-self” (a suffering-self).

This pan-Buddhist belief is encountered in some key Mahāyāna texts as well. In fact,

barring the intricacies of Indian and Indo-Tibetan Tantrism, we could say that this is

simply a pan-Indian, religio-philosophical belief. In some sense, psychological

egoism is a basic state of the constructed ego (ahaṅkāra). However, I think this goes

too far. Oftentimes, our deep appreciation for the needs and well-being of others is

also an attachment that keeps us tethered to cycles of suffering. It’s not that we are

all psychological egoists. Instead, we are desperately attached to the agonies and

ecstasies that come out of our actions, which, in turn, constitute us and our loved

ones in this world. For those South Asian philosophers that endorse the belief in an

underlying self, the key to freedom and well-being lies in seeing through the veil of

the ego. The metaphysical self is more than just substance or Aristotelian

hypokeimenon (subject), but also an experiential ground that transcends the narrow

needs and values of the ego (ahaṅkāra). On the other hand, for Buddhists, who

reject the authority of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the key to freedom lies in

experiencing and understanding the illusion of the self without attaching to some

xii

reified entity like the metaphysical self (ātman). How a thinker makes sense of the

“essencelessness” or “emptiness” of self (nihsvabhāvatā or śūnyatā), will, among

other epistemological and ontological considerations, determine what sort of

Buddhist philosophy she endorses. In chapter 2, I cover, from a logical point of view,

a variety of No-Self views to help situate how one might reject belief in a real self.3

However, and to the point at hand, the distinction between an ego-reifier

(ahaṅkāra), and, either metaphysical selflessness or a transcendent subject, impact

how we think about self-interest. One South Asian thinker, Śāntideva (c. 8th Century

C.E.) seems to argue that seeing through the illusory persistence of the ego defuses

obsession with narrowly prudential reasons, thereby providing rational grounds for

altruism. However, as a Mādhyamika Buddhist (whose view is either deflationary or 3 Consider this a prolegomenon of sorts to an inter-cultural assessment of selfhood. I note this, because the No-Self, or, “without-Self” claim (anātman), and its practical and rhetorical uses, can take on decidedly distinct implications throughout the many “Buddhisms” that span the texts of the Pāli-Theravāda tradition, to first millennium Sanskrit texts, to the Indo-Tibetan and Chan and Zen texts. Much of what I have here is a rational reconstruction grounded more firmly in the robustly metaphysical debates of Indian-Sanskrit texts from roughly 6th century to 11th century CE. Dr. Peter Hershock, in a personal conversation, has pointed out that the early adoption of “without-self” for the Pāli tradition appears to have been more of a practical concept with minimal metaphysical commitment—especially because the Buddha was known to avoid deep metaphysical claims—and that an early adopter of Buddhist practice was enjoined to see the self as no-self; that is, to recognize that the self is not fixed or bound to Brahmanical caste (varṇa). Hershock suggests that given the large number of working class and agricultural (vaiśya) adopters of Buddhism, an existential crisis may have loomed for these early devotees, and anātman may have been a device for re-orienting the interpretive possibilities of selfhood, a call to author a self from outside the constraints of caste and Brahmanical society. While I do not have the space to explore this intriguing point through textual and historical analysis, one would do well in revisiting Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, a canonical Theravāda compendium that construes No-self in practical terms, and does seem to eschew a deeply metaphysical gloss of the concept. Much of how I treat what I call the Normative Self in chapter 4 is consistent with Hershock’s point that the “No-self” of Pāli texts is a practical self who must learn to author itself through its commitments and intentions.

xiii

radically dismissive of any metaphysical assumptions), Śāntideva does not endorse

the view that there is a transcendent self that supports universalizable and impartial

principles of justice and morality. Śāntideva believes that metaphysical selflessness

is tantamount to an admission that, all things considered, prioritizing our future

(non)-selves is really a matter of pragmatism and degree. Any reasons guiding us to

focus on our (non)-futures are reasons we can extend to all other present and future

(non)-selves. Like Derek Parfit after him, Śāntideva believes that recognizing

metaphysical selflessness, to some extent, deflates the rationale for obsession with

narrow self-interest. There is simply no persisting self in which to place too much

stock. On the other hand, Śāntideva offers a controversial positive claim: it is

precisely metaphysical selflessness that justifies impartial care and universalizable

reasons. When we can view all suffering as suffering as such—something unowned

and generalized—we can respond to it impartially and without concern for the ego’s

self-interest. In short, we can become altruists.

In chapter 2 (and more broadly in chapter 1), I examine this claim. I argue

that metaphysical selflessness is consistent with acts of omission and negligence,

and thereby consistent with some forms of practical selfishness. However, in

chapter 3, I develop my own version of what I’m calling, Emptiness Ethics, which is

inspired by Śāntideva's account. I ultimately argue that this account is deficient,

primarily because I believe that a more robust notion of self explains how altruism is

even possible. When we limit the conversation to the interests of the ego-self, we

ignore the fact that selves are emotionally porous (to be explained in the body of

this work), and they are porous as selves, not as bundles of psychophysical property

xiv

tropes. The metaphysical-ontological reasons that may support belief in the reality

of a substantive, metaphysical self goes beyond the scope of the present work.

However, as ethicists who believe that impartial standards describe an important

part of what we mean by morality, we must to some extent invest in a view of reality

that is not completely immersed in situation, historical context, and narrative self-

identity. Still, thinkers like Michael Sandel,4 to name a few, resist such a view, and

this is precisely why they take liberal thinkers like John Rawls5 to task. Whether

Rawls has invested in a metaphysical self, or, instead, has operated from an “as-if”

political model that makes better sense of the phenomenon of justice as fairness (as

I understand him to argue in Political Liberalism), he envisions the possibility of a

self both recognizing itself as self, and yet viewing itself as possibly anyone (hence,

Rawls’s “veil of ignorance”). Christine M. Korsgaard6 attempts to navigate the divide

between a radically situated, practical identity, and universalizable principles that

emerge from an impartial view of the self as sharing in a kingdom of rational,

universal ends. For Korsgaard, at the periphery of more local practical identities, we

each have the capacity to identify with the role of humanity (and this is an

exclusively practical rather than metaphysical consideration). As I point out in

chapter 1, she believes that the metaphysics of self and personal identity do not

4 In addition to Sandel’s numerous articles critiquing contemporary liberalism, a classic text that lays out his communitarian thesis is: Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 6 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2 (1989): 101-132. Also see, Christine M. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

xv

directly bear on practical, ethical questions. I also explain in chapter 1 why I

disagree, which brings me to the outline of my argument.

The problem centers on the conflict in authority between self-interest and

altruistic and greater-good considerations. My view is that thinking in terms of a

strictly personal set of ego-interests versus consideration for strictly distinct others

produces the problem; however, we do not need to limit our view of self to such a

distinction, and this is the key to solving the problem. Interests are not ultimately a

narrow band of outcomes that apply solely to an ego-self. But, as we’ve seen, not

seeking the best possible, first-order outcomes for oneself does not always mean

that one gives up self-interest and prudence; rather, it can also mean that at a

higher-order of analysis, one can also include the good of others as part of what

constitutes one’s self-interest in terms of personal rewards and achievements. I am

going to show how that is possible.

However, my solution should not be conflated with a similar, but importantly

distinct solution. The distinct solution I refer to might look something like this: I can

include the good of others as part of my personal value set. By “personal value set” I

mean that in serving these others, I am, by extension, serving my radically situated

self. Others come into the picture, but the rationale for caring about them is that I

advance my higher-order interests. This is bound up with my narrative identity, my

history, and my personal projects and goals. This does not mean that I do not care

about others; on the contrary, I learn to identify closely with their good, and their

good becomes part of my personal good. This is an oblique form of rational egoism,

xvi

because if I cannot personally identify with their good, I have no reason to promote

it. I believe my solution is not a disguised form of rational egoism.

HOW I CAN BE AN ALTRUIST IN A NORMATIVE SENSE

I can include the feelings, motivations, and concerns of others as intrinsically

valuable to the self as such; not the ordinary, ego-self, but the self that

identifies with selfhood and subjectivity as such. When I do so, I advance

the good of a “we-self” and not just a “me-self.” This is less an experience of

personal reward, and more an experience of acting “because it must be

done.”

To make sense of this, I must provide a view of subjectivity that distinguishes

between an ego-self (ahaṅkāra) and an experience of subjectivity as such. Thus, a

few preliminary points are in order. First, I believe our capacity to envision selfhood

as such is bound up with intersubjectivity. Contrary to Korsgaard (as I read her),

this is not a purely practical matter. In fortunate moments, we can radically share

our emotional lives with one another, and this is not just a matter of inference, nor is

it because the ascription of mental properties is strictly functional talk for physical

behavior (either in the subjunctive, as the logical behaviorist might have it, or solely

in the use of language, as one might read latter Wittgenstein). Rather, and secondly, I

believe we can be open to sharing subjective worlds, because self-awareness is basic

to consciousness, which is not to exclude the abundant unconscious thoughts and

feelings we harbor; to the contrary, the kind of self-awareness I’m talking about is

mostly an implicit sense of presence, and such background awareness is by its very

nature not represented as being delimited by context, situation, or body. I am not

xvii

making the ontological claim that background self-awareness is in fact free of

limitations, or unencumbered by a body. Rather, I’m pointing out how background

self-awareness remains attuned to a broader expanse of possibilities that are not

directly tethered to narrative identity and ego-hood; it relates to self as such, and

not only to self as “this body” or “this history.” Unencumbered by such

representations, it remains open to the experience of subjectivity in general, and

thus open to the expression and experience of other subjectivities. I also do not

believe that we experience things like suffering and joy as radically ownerless (or

something purely emergent from a selfless bundle of psychophysical property

tropes). In some sense, when shared and co-owned, suffering can show up as simply

suffering (and in this sense, there is a quality of ownerlessness), but that is only in

contrast with the mundane view of the radically private ego-self, who can only

indirectly experience another’s feelings.

This underlying sense of self supports our capacity to share our world with

others, and, at times, recognize that the individual ego supervenes over this larger

sense of “we-ness.” This is not so distinct from Buddhists like Śāntideva speaking (I

suppose, metaphorically?) of a collective, interdependent field of selfhood. However,

the point is not that we lose all traces of self, but rather, that the self does not always

delimit its sense of presence (and responsibility) to a single, embodied, and

historically situated entity. The self can identify with selfhood writ large, and when

it encounters other agents who suffer or act toward their valued ends, it can identify

with those purposive actions.

xviii

Whatever reason there is for a self to avoid needless suffering; whatever

reason there is to respect the dignity that comes with autonomy, and the power that

comes with agency and purposive action; such reasons apply to selfhood as such; to

the sense of delighting in pure presence. In this state of identification, we do not

recognize these reasons as being “only my” reasons; we can simply recognize them

as motivating forces, which are sometimes represented as explicit principles, that

extend to all those who share in selfhood. And this must mean that we recognize—

not infer—other selves who share in that general presence. We can sometimes act

purely for the sake of another as both other and as one’s self. The principle that

might arbitrate between strictly egocentric considerations and altruistic and

greater-good considerations emerges from an experience of suffering as such,

which, given the peculiar nature of suffering, simply demands action. That

experience shows up as “we who suffer, and must alleviate suffering.”

My argument is based on an analysis of selfhood within a normative and a

metaphysical framework. First, I argue that the everyday self is constituted by a

sense of relationality and social-embeddedness, which is articulated through the

capacity and urge to communicate and be understood. I expect you to honor my

wish not to suffer at the hands of cruelty, and I successfully communicate and

understand that need to the extent that I recognize the applicability of that wish to

you. It is therefore only natural that I recognize a reason to honor that wish,

irrespective of its advantage to my personal projects and immediate desires. The

normative framework this presupposes requires a self that recognizes reasons that

transcend self-regarding desires (and, perhaps, desires altogether). If this is true,

xix

then the concept of a robust divide between self and other—the sort of divide that

sets the egoism and altruism debate into motion—emerges out of an initial

experience of primordial relationality and porousness. The concept of self develops

in tandem with the concept of other, and ties many of the reasons one has for caring

about oneself to reasons applicable to caring about another. There are goods that

guide and motivate the action of a self that can only be understood as shared goods,

things like the value of avoiding needless suffering and cruelty, of caring and being

cared for, of enjoying respect and companionship, and having the space to pursue

projects free of arbitrary constraints. Such motivating reasons appear only to the

extent that they apply universally. Anytime one recognizes such reasons, and

thereby promotes the good of another—irrespective of personal desires—one acts

in a mundanely altruistic way, that is, one acts without immediate concern for one’s

own advantage. I say “mundanely,” because it is possible to help a stranger simply

because the stranger needs help, and this can be as simple as listening to and

allowing a person who needs companionship to engage you when it is taxing and

inconvenient. In other words, the other’s needs may become the sole target and

motivator of action.

Still, the talk of “reasons” remains somewhat empty without assessing the

nature of motivations; what theoretical ethics has referred to as the Problem of

Motivation. A theory of self also impacts how we make sense of empathic

identification and the experience of responsiveness to the demands others make

upon us. I believe that emotions like compassion, for example, serve important

epistemological functions. I come to know something about you and your needs

xx

through the contagion of how you feel and how that makes me feel. I come to know

your frustrations and the urgency of your needs (not only my private response to

your emotive behavior), because the self is also emotionally porous. The manifest

fact that we commit ourselves to various actions by way of a guiding good, enacts a

self that is mostly unthinkable outside of embodied normative constraints and

sharable, emotively-charged and motivating states. An entirely selfish self—or one

emboldened by the belief that its primary concern is with its own needs—does not

only challenge our ethical intuitions, but also fails to recognize the very elements

that constitute selfhood. Consequently, it fails to recognize the very elements that

support and constitute self-interest.

To help explain this shared emotional and normative framework, I likewise

contend that the self is sometimes recognized as expressing a real and larger whole.

I will directly address the term of art, “recognition” (pratyabhijñā) in my assessment

of the Kashmiri Monist-Śaivite philosophical tradition of c. 9th-11th century C.E.

India. For now, I basically mean that in clear and honest moments the other who

suffers does so as part of myself (or simply, as self), which is just to say that an

experiential space of co-owned suffering (something that transcends the limitations

of my immediate history and constellation of personal concerns) discloses itself and

calls for a response that I can only learn to ignore. Just as I can learn to ignore my

own suffering, I can learn to ignore the other’s suffering. However, the ordinary self

rarely remains completely blind to the presence of another’s suffering; we can only

learn to ignore what shows up to be dismissed, and I want to say that it shows up as

xxi

inherently motivational. So, let us not confuse ignorance with blindness, or the

irresponsive and irresponsible person with the blind, moral monster.

I am also proposing that our ethical experience shapes the metaphysics that

help organize our experiences, in the sense that the ethical attractiveness of a

framework provides a reason to endorse it. We construct the world through an

ethically salient and shared lens. When suffering occurs, in some sense, the whole

suffers (to be developed in my final chapter), which may provide me with the shared

motivation to thwart such suffering. Through shared feelings, we can sometimes

experience reality without solipsistically fixed partitions, or, an entirely singular

point of view. Ethical responsiveness and ethical responsibility—in the form of a

gripping call to action—disclose and shape the space of our experiences.

This is not Mill’s argument for utility. I do not assume that because each

person values their own happiness, that each necessarily values the happiness of all.

I find myself most pressingly concerned with a particular person’s suffering, and not

just an abstract principle or an abstract whole. On one level of description, I must

bridge a metaphysical gap between my immediate first-person experience and a

suffering that indirectly shows up as another’s. And from this level of description,

philosophy must contend with the epistemological and ontological problem of other

minds. How is it that I come to know what you need, and know what motivates you

or how to help you? How exactly do I come to recognize your needs as

independently valid? But on another level of description, the gap was never there to

begin with, which is just to say that the composite is not a fiction or conceptual

imputation, but rather a background presupposition that allows me to share a world

xxii

with you. The part and the whole are real. I call this Mereological Holism, and I will

describe this in detail in my final chapter. The upshot of this metaphysics is that it is

possible to act from something far deeper than a principle or duty or rational

constraint. This does justice to the manifest fact that we are motivated and

affectively charged to shape our concerns into something like a principle, and that

our concerns are often highlighted to a far richer degree in the face of our loved

ones and our neighbors, with whom we more closely share a world. In this way,

metaphysics finds its worth in its service to our basic ethical intuitions.

So, this is an essay about the nature of the self and the metaphysics of shared

disclosure at the service of our ethical experience. The possibility I wish to explore

is one that not only critiques what may seem attractive in ethical and rational

egoism; I wish to examine the possibility of altruism being grounded in how we

naturally constitute and share ourselves. The juggling act consists of developing a

model of selfhood that supports the possibility of being rationally compelled to act

solely for another’s sake, while making sense of how we can know the other, and

directly share an emotional life that grips us in the form of a motivating obligation.

The first possibility is grounded in what I call the Normative Self, which is

constituted by embodied participation in the authoring of one’s selfhood through

commitments and avowals and disavowals. These commitments run more broadly

than normatively rich social roles, or, what Korsgaard calls, “practical identity.”7

These commitments presuppose a complex and dynamic process of deliberation and

tacit appropriation, which forges a dynamic but unified and integrated self through

7 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity.

xxiii

speech-acts that partly constitute the introspective experience of having a point of

view. I develop this point more fully in my final chapter. I contend that the

normative self provides us with desire-independent reasons8 to take others

seriously, but it falls short of explaining how we directly experience and are

motivated by the affective life of another. In short, the normative self provides

reasons and obligations, while what I’m calling the Metaphysical View provides the

emotive channel that compels us to action. I do not believe these are ultimately

separate domains—the cognitive versus the conative—but, instead, argue that the

normative framework co-emerges with the metaphysical framework.

This last point speaks to the second feature of the juggling act; what I have

referred to as the metaphysical view. This self is not empirically observed, nor is it

entirely personal. Instead, it refers to a unity that supports an otherwise fragmented

and dislocated flow of psychophysical events. The unity and integrating synthesis

lies in something much broader than a historically located constellation of personal

experiences. This is an experience of direct connectedness, which at the level of

everyday empirical and embodied historicity looks like an ownerless event. This

may be reflected in the experience of losing a part of one’s self when another

perishes, or experiencing the collective guilt that comes with a terrible collective

deed, or the pride that comes with collective integrity.

8 John R. Searle, Rationality in Action (Hong Kong: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001).

xxiv

The task here is to bridge the metaphysical gap between self and other, a gap

that European ethicists like Henry Sidgwick9 viewed as an insurmountable obstacle

to deciding which sorts of reasons—self-regarding or other-regarding—hold

ultimate authority. For Sidgwick, both sorts of reasons hold equal authority, and

therefore ethics will always reach an impasse when it comes to principled conflicts

between egocentric versus altruistic and greater-good reasons.

In chapter 1, I lay out the landscape of this problem, and I develop a broad

overview of a strategy developed in 1st millennium, Indian Buddhism. I am referring

to various iterations of No-Self and Bundle-theory views of selfhood; basically,

error-theories about the self. The idea is that, first, showing how the self does not

exist can surmount the gap that fuels the problem, and, second, personal identity is

not what matters most when it comes to examining the reasons we have for doing

things. The usual critique of this strategy is that metaphysical non-commitments

(and metaphysical views in general) do not deliver robust ethical upshots. The

practical domain is as sharply divided from the ontological-metaphysical domain as

the self is from the other. In chapter 1, I argue against this view to motivate the

relevance of the No-Self and Bundle-theory options. I do so by arguing that speech-

acts—even theoretical assertions and beliefs—commit us to various sorts of actions,

particularly the adoption of further beliefs. In this sense, normativity is built into

our discourse, and theoretical assertions importantly contribute to shaping and

9 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981, republication of 7th edition, 1907).

xxv

guiding action.10 I also argue that the No-Self option—at least at its broadest level—

does not necessarily motivate unselfish and altruistic action; but this is not because

it attempts to derive an “ought” from an “is.” Instead, I argue that non-

egocentricity—that is, a self that no longer recognizes selfhood in the world—may

provide just as much reason to selfishly neglect required actions as it does to

sacrifice one’s own advantage for the sake of another. In short, we need a more

developed notion of selfhood to make sense of altruistic action.

In chapter 2, I situate varieties of the No-Self theory. I then examine a unique

No-Self option provided by the Mādhyamika-Mahāyāna thinker, Śāntideva.

Śāntideva is a target for study, because his work arguably comes the closest in the

Buddhist philosophical corpus to a worked-out, systematic ethical system. But more

importantly, Śāntideva coins an argument from ownerlessness that I wish to

appropriate in my final argument in chapter 4. I also engage some of the abundant

literature assessing Śāntideva's ownerlessness argument. I conclude that only more

robust metaphysical assumptions (in addition to a key normative claim) may allow

the No-Self and Ownerlessness views to entail an ethics of altruism. The problem for

Śāntideva is that he endorses the Madhyamaka (“middling”) view of Buddhism,

which eschews metaphysics altogether (or at least presents a deflationary view that

can hardly help itself to robust metaphysical claims). However, the value of his work

for my purposes lies in its emphasis on the ownerlessness of suffering. For

Śāntideva, suffering is inherently bad and ultimately ownerless. So, if there is any

reason under any circumstances to thwart suffering, then it applies to all equally. I 10 Or, as Searle argues, all discourse is fundamentally practical. See Rationality in Action, especially chapter 2.

xxvi

examine this line of argument thoroughly in chapter 2. The key fault I find with it

(and develop in chapter 4) is that ownerlessness does not have strong ethical

upshots without the support of a more developed notion of self. This sounds

paradoxical, but my argument is that we can share motivations and feelings with

others, and in this sense, they are “ownerless.” We could equally claim that

motivating feelings are co-owned when they are shared. However, I stress them

being ownerless, because these exalted experiences exist at a level of generality in

which we are motivated by suffering as such (for reasons I have already provided).

By recognizing integrated unity—both at the level of individual, sentient life-

streams, and at the level of the whole—recognition of “ownerlessness” in terms of

shared fields of consciousness provide motivating and emotively-charged reasons for

action. My argument falls under a harmonizing strategy, with the caveat that both

the individual and the whole are real. When we recognize this, we recognize

ourselves acting as and for another: we achieve identity amidst difference.

In chapter 3, I attempt to provide a more worked-out and palatable version

of Emptiness Ethics. I do so by appropriating the post-modern concept of “the

Other” that we find in Levinas.11 Basically, I try my best to develop a No-Self ethics

by drawing from a deflationary-minimalist reading of Madhyamaka Buddhism in

tandem with a general reading of Levinas. I examine the argument that self-

regarding considerations are only attenuated forms of other-regarding

considerations, which collapses the metaphysical distinction altogether. I try to

show how in the practical domain, this amounts to a kind of harmony between self- 11 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, transl. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1969).

xxvii

regarding and other-regarding considerations, a harmony that would justify and

motivate altruism. However, in chapter 4, I point out where I think this version of

the view goes wrong.

Altruism operates in more mundane ways, and it plays a foundational role in

ethical maturity. Moreover, emotional states, like compassion, are bound up with

the reasons we have for doing things. Without the sort of empathy that moves me to

take up your cause as my own, I would not be attuned to the experience of ethical

responsibility. It’s not enough to say that when I’m egoistic and selfish I am

primarily or only bound to myself, as though that were the experience of principled

responsibility for myself. Such blind egoism is mostly not experienced as

responsibility, but rather as impulse and natural inclination; it’s purely motivational

without a developed sense of the experiential modality of justification, which always

requires a public world and an experience of otherness. The selfish person may

know better, but nevertheless make morally bad and self-serving choices. But I

believe that consistent and pathological selfishness betrays a muddled view of what

is generally operative as a background presupposition for consciousness, namely, an

integrating sense of general selfhood. Thus, recognizing justified motivations for

altruism is a kind of gnosis. Extreme and pathological selfishness is both the amoral

inability to experience ethical phenomena, and a distracted or delusional state

(moha) that covers over what is operative in the reflexivity of consciousness.

xxviii

In chapter 4, I’ll develop an aspectual metaphysics that views the universe as

multivalent,12 which means its individuals are, under one aspect, distinct and

singular, but under another aspect, simply an expression of the whole; and this

means that we can describe the universe in distinct but equally true ways. As one

aspect, the person I witness on the news leaving pipe-bombs in New York City is

other, and the whole does not bear his sins. Under another aspect, the whole is that

very act of aggression. This sort of metaphysics supports a phenomenology in which

an individual identifies with the suffering of others, and experiences their needs as

overwhelmingly motivational. According to this metaphysical model, the experience

of overcoming egoistic considerations may reach an exalted pitch. Out of the

experience of exalted fullness, we can overwrite egocentricity. The outcome

amounts to what I call, Exalted Altruism. This refers to a state in which our

deliberations take on an exceedingly other-centric tone, one that may be viewed as

supererogatory from the everyday state of transactional reality.

12 The classic paper in aspectual metaphysics is Donald Baxter, “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense,” Mind 97 (1988): 575-582. See also, D. Baxter, “Many-One Identity,” Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 193-216. For a recent publication that provides thorough analysis and clarification of what is at stake in such a metaphysic, see Jason Turner, “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity” in Composition as Identity, eds. D. Baxter and A.J. Cotnoir (New York, Oxford University Press, 2014): 225-243. Turner captures the key thesis of Baxter’s position as follows: “Baxterian CAI [composition as identity] …holds that each part is identical to an aspect of the whole—which aspect is identical to the whole itself” (225-26). Thus, existence would be “count-relative” (226). This amounts to the claim that Leibniz’s Law under certain counts can fail. So, Kevin-as-a-father may spend too much time traveling away from home, but Kevin-as-an-itinerate philosopher may not spend enough time away from home (on work related trips), or might spend an adequate and expected amount away from home. In some sense, then, a thing can be different from itself under aspects (not properties) which, taken as properties, would be contradictory.

xxix

To bolster this view, I assess the problem of other minds, and critique the

view that we come to know the other through indirect inference rather than shared

psychophysical states. As this problem was richly developed in the work of the

Buddhist logician, Dharmakīrti (c. 6th century C.E.), who provided a unique account

of the inference strategy, I will assess and critique his argument through the lens of

the Pratyabhijñā (“Recognition”) School of Kashmiri-Monism in the likes of

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (c. 10th and 11th century C.E., respectively). While,

for me, the metaphysics are mostly exploratory, I believe they are attractive from an

ethical standpoint, insofar as they provide an attractive account of how one’s sense

of self-identity may sublate narrative and normative identity (in the Hegelian sense

of an appropriative negation, or, aufhebung).

My key thesis is that altruism is not only a fundamental aspect of ethical

maturity, but also a fundamental aspect of how we come to robustly know each

other. By knowing each other, we simultaneously come to know ourselves. We

neither entirely transcend our individuality, nor completely lose sight of the whole

that is our individuality. We are identical as difference, and our difference expresses

our identity. Politically, in so far as we act collectively while respecting this

differential identity, we can make a difference.

1

CHAPTER1.SELFHOODANDETHICALAGENCY:OWNINGMORAL

SELFLESSNESS

1.1Introduction

Wemakeplans,pursuegoals,andfretovertheoutcomesofouractions.Even

ifchoiceisagrandillusion,weholdotherstotheirpromisesandobligations,and

sometimesletourselvesdown,believingthatwecouldhaveandshouldhavedone

better.Wealsostruggletoactonwhatwebelieveitmakesbettersensetodo,andin

thisway,wearesensitivetotheaction-guidingforceofreasons.Thispresupposes

thatinoureverydayconceptionofwhatitmeanstobeaperson,weassumethatwe

aretheownersofouractionsandourbodies.Weatveryleastnaturallybelievethat

wemusttakeresponsibilityforsomeofthefeelingsweexperienceandsomeofthe

motivationsthatimpelustoact.Wearticulatethisinourexpectationsandour

relationships.Beingresponsibleandforward-lookingpersonsdriventomake

specificchoicesthatarematerialtoouraimsrequiresconceivingoftheagentiveself

assomethingthatpersistsbeyondtheephemeralmoment.

Theseeverydaypresuppositionsareenactedthroughsocialrelationships,

whichrequireadeptsensitivitytotherequirementsofreciprocity,mutuality,and

cooperation.“Reciprocity”meansthatwearemotivatedtocooperatewiththose

whocooperatewithus,andwearelikewisemotivatedtoactnastytothosewhoact

nastytous.Overall,cooperationrequiresthatwecareaboutandtaketheplansof

othersseriously.Weevensometimestakestepstopromotethoseplansatourown

individualexpense.Infact,experimentshaveshownthatwhengivenanoptionto

punishfree-riderswhotakeadvantageofasymmetricalpowerrelations,thatis,

2

thosewhobehaveinwaysthatareperceivedtobeunjustornon-egalitarian,we

frequentlyoptforpunishmentatconsiderableexpensetoourownadvantage.1We

alsosometimesvoluntarilyactagainstourownperceivedself-interesttorewardor

providecareforothers.Soonthesurface,itseemsthatrationalself-interestisnot

alwaysaprimarymotivatingforce,andsincereconcernforjusticeandthewell-

beingofothersmaymotivateactionevenatthepriceoftheagent’sown

disadvantageorundoing.

Makingsenseofthissortofagencyrequiresacompellingaccountof

selfhood.Thereseemstobelittlemysterywhenitcomestoexplainingself-

interestedactions:survivalandgeneticreplicationaccountfortheadaptivesuccess

ofself-interestedmotivations.Butknowinglyactingagainstone’sownperceived

self-interestremainspuzzling.Howdowemakesenseofsuchaltruisticaction?

Whilebiologyandthesocialscienceshavegrappledwiththisquestion,I’m

interestedindevelopingaphilosophicalinterpretationofselfhoodthatmakessense

1FrancescoGuala,“Reciprocity:Weakorstrong?WhatPunishmentExperimentsDo(andDoNot)Demonstrate,”BehavioralandBrainSciences,35(2012):1-59.Inthisarticle,Gualaassessessomeoftheupshotsofexperimentsdesignedaroundthe“UltimatumGame,”whichisagametheoreticalconstruct.Aisgivenalargesumofmoney,buttoldthatshehastosharesomeofitwithB.IfBdeclinestheoffer,thenneitherAnorBgetstokeepthemoney.Inamajorityofcases,whenAgiveswhat’sperceivedbyBtobeanunfairamount,Bdeclinestheoffereventhoughshewouldhaveearnedsomethingratherthannothing.Inallfairness,Gualacautionsusnottoconflatetheresultsofartefactual—orhighlycontrivedexperiments—withnaturalfieldexperiments.Thepointofthearticleistoassessthemethodologicalconstraintsandmeritsoftwocompetingtheoriesthatsocialscientistshavedevelopedtomakesenseofactionsthatarenotonthesurfacedrivenbyrationalself-interest.“Weakreciprocity”theoryclaimsthatthisisdoneinaforward-lookingway,andisultimatelyderivativeofprudentandself-interestedconsiderations.“Strongreciprocity”theoryclaimsthatwehaveevolvedcertainsocialpreferencestowardequitableandjustrelationships,andwilloftenforfeitself-interestinordertosecuresuchrelationships.

3

ofthisdynamicrangeofmotivations.Indoingso,Iwilldrawfromclassical(1st

millennium)Indianphilosophy,whichhasprovidedatroveofnovelanalysesof

selfhood,someofwhichradicallyreviseoureverydayconceptions.Forsome,like

theIndianBuddhists,suchrevisionsarethoughttomakesenseofhowanagentcan

bemotivatedtoactunselfishly.Infact,throughoutthecorpusofbothBuddhistand

BrahmanicalSanskrittexts,emphasisisplacedoncultivatingagreaterrangeof

motivationsthattranscendthenarrowlimitsoftheego.FortheMahāyānaBuddhist,

successfullytranscendingperpetualcyclesofanguishandsufferingrequirescurbing

self-interestedactions,andcultivatingcompassionandaltruisticmotivations.

Iwanttoassessconceptionsofselfhoodthatcompellinglymakessenseof

unselfishagency.Whileradicallyreductiveorrevisionaryviewsofselfhood,thesort

wefindinIndianBuddhistphilosophyandDerekParfit’swork,mayleadoneto

viewagencyandownershipasauseful,conventionalfiction,westillneedaviewof

selfhoodthatmakessenseofresponsibility,desert,commitment,andtheshared

practicespresupposedincarryingouttheintentionsinvolvedinlinguistic

communication.2Afterall,Buddhistphilosophyisdevelopedintandemwitha

practicalcurriculumdesignedtoachieveenlightened,compassionate,andethically

attunedagency.TheBuddhawantedtochangebothwhatyouthinkandwhatyou

do.Likewise,Parfitbelievesthathisrevisionarymetaphysicshasatransformative,2SeePaulGrice,“Meaning,”PhilosophicalReview66(1957):377-388.CitedinRichardSorabji,Self:AncientandModernInsightsAboutIndividuality,Life,andDeath(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2006),28.Sorabjiwrites:“IfIamrightthat‘I’-thoughtsenterintointentions,theywillenteralsointomuchelsethatisessentialtohumanlife.Muchofouragencyinvolvesintention.Sotoo,Ibelieve,doesourlinguisticcommunication.ForIacceptPaulGrice’sfurtherviewthatforaspeakertomeansomething,exceptinthespecialcaseofsoliloquy,istointendtoproduceaneffectinthehearer.”

4

ethicalupshot.3Inthisregard,boththeBuddhistsandParfitseemtoarguethatwe

notonlycanreviseourviewofselvesasownersofexperiences,butweethically

oughttodoso.Revisingthiseverydayconception,andendorsingtheviewthatwe

arecomplexstreamsofconnectedandcontinuouspsychophysicaleventsismeant

tocurbtheobsessivefocusonrationalself-interest,andproduceamoreutilitarian-

leaningconcernfortheoverallquantityofsufferingandgoodintheworld.

Butevenifwerevise(oreliminate)first-person“I-thoughts”withan

impersonaldescriptionofstreamsofconsciousness,weneedaclearersenseofhow

non-egocentricconsiderationsforthegreatergood—arguably,abasicingredientin

moralconsiderations—arebettercultivatedbyembracinganimpersonal

descriptionoftheselfasacomplexstreamofpsychophysicalevents.I’minterested

inexamininghowsuchaviewmotivatestheethicallyattunedagent.What

conceptionofselfhoodcompellinglymakessenseofaselffeelingrationally

motivatedorimpelledtowardunselfish,non-egocentric,other-regarding,and

altruisticagency?

Tobesure,thesefournotionsarenotsynonymous,buttheyareallrelevant

tomakingsenseofsociability,mutuality,andmoralconsiderations.So,in1.3,Iwill

analyzethesenotions,andlaythegroundworkforaconceptionofselfhoodthat

makessenseoftheiremployment.Indoingso,Ihopetobetterclarifywhatwemight

meanbymorally“selfless”action.In1.2,Ilayouttheproblem—famouslyidentified3DerekParfit,ReasonsandPersons(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1984,correctededition,1987),281.Parfitwrites,“WhenIbelievedthatmyexistencewassuchafurtherfact,Iseemedimprisonedinmyself.Mylifeseemedlikeaglasstunnel,throughwhichIwasmovingfastereveryyear…WhenIchangedmyview,thewallsofmyglasstunneldisappeared…Thereisstilladifferencebetweenmylifeandthelivesofotherpeople.Butthedifferenceisless.Otherpeoplearecloser.”

5

inSidgwick4—oftheconflictinauthoritybetweenself-regarding,prudential

concerns,andother-regarding,altruisticconcerns.Thegoalhereistoshowhowthe

BuddhistandParfitianrevisionofself-talkismeanttoaddressthisproblemby

collapsingthemetaphysicallydeepdistinctionbetweenselfandother.Igoonto

consider—andcritique—counter-argumentstotheviewthatanimpersonal

revisionofselfhoodhasimportantethicalupshots.Mymainargumentisthat

structuralbeliefs,particularlymetaphysicalbeliefs,canhaveimportantnormative

upshotswhenweconsiderhowdescriptivefactsingeneralcommitlanguage-users

tobasicsortsofactions.Descriptivestatementscanstructurewhatitmakessense

towant,prefer,ordo.However,IdonotultimatelybelievethattheBuddhist

revisiondoestheethicallyrelevantworkitaimstodo.Nevertheless,in1.2,Iam

mainlycounteringtheargumentthatourpracticalidentity—the“who”ofagency

ratherthanthe“what”ofselfhood—istheonlylevelofdescriptionthatcarries

normativeweight.Thischapterlaysoutthegeneralprobleminbroadstrokes.Ithen

goontoexamineinmoredetailthroughoutthewholeofthisworkhow,andifatall,

aBuddhistorParfitiantheoryofselfhasanyespeciallypracticalorethicalupshot

thatmightmotivateendorsementoftherevisionaryview.Inthissense,Iamasking

whethertheethicaloutcomesofsuchaviewareattractiveenoughtomotivateour

metaphysicalposition.Myconsideredviewisthattheydonot,andIwilloffera

differentpositioninchapter4thatIbelievecarriesenoughethicalweightto

motivatetheendorsementofthemetaphysicalpositionthatIcall,“mereological

4SeeHenrySidgwick,TheMethodsofEthics,(Indianapolis:HackettPublishing,1981,republicationof7thedition,1907).

6

holism”(seechapter4).Ibuildthisviewbyfusingitwithanormativeaccountof

selfhood.

However,Iamonlyaskinginbroadstrokesherewhatitmeanstoact

selflessly,andwhatitmeanstoactselfishly.Howaretheseconceptsrelatedto

viewsaboutthenatureoftheself?Variousphilosophical-spiritualpracticesenjoin

ustopursue“selfless”behavior.However,inBuddhistthought—asI’vesaid,

construedbroadly—anambiguityexistsbetweenacting“selflessly”inamoralsense,

andactingfromthebeliefthatnorealselfexists.Forthe1stmillenniumIndian

Buddhist,nothingmetaphysicallyunifiesthepsychophysicaleventsthatconstitute

theflowofanindividualstreamofconsciousness.AccordingtotheBuddhist

philosopher,thesetwosensesof“selflessness”areintimatelyrelated.5However,the

debateaboutmetaphysicalselflessnessseems,atleastonthesurface,notonly

morallyneutral,butalsoirrelevanttopracticaldeliberation.Whatimpact,ifany,

doesmetaphysicalselflessnesshaveonourpracticaldeliberations?Whatdoesit

matterifwe’renot,astheBuddhistandParfitargue,persistingselves?Iwillsetthe

stageinthischapterforansweringthatquestion,whileclarifyingsomeambiguities

surroundingmoralandmetaphysicalselflessness.Ihopetoprovidesome

preliminaryconceptualresourcesformakingsenseoftherelationshipbetween

thesetwosensesofselflessness.Iwillargueinthenexttwochapters,and,inmore

detailinchapter3,thatmetaphysicalselflessnessisnotthemostimportantconcept5ParticularlyemphasizedinŚāntideva’sBodhicaryāvatāra,trans.KateCosbyandAndrewSkilton(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1995,reissuedversion,2008),8.134:100(henceforth,BCA):“Thecalamitieswhichhappenintheworld,thesufferingsandfears,manyastheyare,theyallresultfromclingingontothenotionofself,sowhatgoodisthisclingingofmine?”IuseCrosbyandSkilton’sEnglishtranslationunlessotherwisenotedortranslatedbyme.

7

aNo-Selfviewbringstothetablewithrespecttoethics.Instead,thisviewhas

importantethicalandpracticalramificationswhenitseekstoclarifythe“senseof

self”thatweexperience.MadhyamakaBuddhistthinkerslikeCandrakīrti(c.600

CE)wantedtoclarifythesenseofself,thatis,thephenomenological“mineness”and

“what-it’s-likeness”offirst-personexperience—thatis,ownershipand

appropriation.Thisfocusprovidesaviewofselfandidentitythatforgesapractical

link(notnecessarilyadeductiveentailment)betweenthetwosortsofselflessness.

However,I’llarguethatwhilethisisthestrongestreadingwecanprovideforthe

linkbetweenthetwosortsofselflessnessinclassicalIndianBuddhism,itdoesnot

compellinglymakesenseofsomeofourmostineluctableethicalintuitions,nordoes

itprovidearobustenoughaccountofagency—theverysortofagencythatwould

allowustomakesenseofbeingunselfishethicalagents.So,IwillexaminewhatI

thinkwemeanwhenwecallsomeone“selfish”andwhenwecallsomeone“selfless”

inanethicallyrelevantway.Indoingso,I’llmakeanimportantdistinctionbetween

egocentric,non-egocentric,andselfishconsiderations.Butfirst,andasapreliminary

measure,Iwanttoclarifyinaverygeneralway(tobeassessedfurtherinthenext

chapter)whattheBuddhistmightbeuptowhenshecritiquesself-talk,andtriesto

makeitrelevanttopracticaldeliberation.ThiswillhelpmotivatetheBuddhistand

Parfitianclaimthatradicallyrevisingourcommonsensenotionofselfhoodwillhave

anethicallyrelevantupshot.

8

1.2Self-talkandPracticalDeliberations:TheGapBetweenSelfandOther

TheBuddhist,likeHenrySidgwick,6mightbelievethatthedistinction

betweenoneselfandanotherproducesametaphysicallydeepriftinnormative

perspectives.7Ontheonehand,asdistinctandseparateselves,wearefacedwith

thepersonaltaskofsecuringourownwell-beingbyadvancingourindividualself-

interests.“Self-interest”mightbeunderstoodbroadly,andfromthefirst-person

perspective,aswhateveronebelieveswillmakeherlifegoaswellaspossible.While6Sidgwickandthereductionist-mindedBuddhist(thesortofBuddhistphilosopherwhoseviewpre-datesandparallelsHume’sfictionalistaccountofself)havediametricallyopposedviewsabouttheself.Thelattertakestheselftobeaperniciousfiction,whiletheformertakesittobeinescapablyandontologicallybasic.Yettheysharethisconditionalassumptionthatifoneretainsastrictboundarybetweenselfandother,thencertainmomentousmoralandmotivationalconsequencesfollow.SidgwickentertainsandthenquicklydismissestheHumean-empiricistviewasfailingtomakesenseofegocentricprudence.SeeMethods,419:“GrantthattheEgoismerelyasystemofcoherentphenomena,thatthepermanentidentical‘I’isnotafactbutafiction,asHumeandhisfollowersmaintain;why,thenshouldonepartoftheseriesoffeelingsintowhichtheEgoisresolvedbeconcernedwithanotherpartofthesameseries,anymorethanwithanyotherseries?” WecancomparethistoMadhyamaka-MahāyānaBuddhistslikeŚāntideva,forwhomSidgwick’sreductiobecomesapremiseforanargumentpromotinguniversalcompassionandaltruism(BCA,8.97-98:96):“IfIgive[others]noprotectionbecausetheirsufferingdoesnotafflictme,whydoIprotectmybodyagainstfuturesufferingwhenitdoesnotafflictme?Thenotion‘itisthesamemeeventhen’isafalseconstruction,sinceitisonepersonwhodies,quiteanotherwhoisborn.”Whilewecanreadthisintermsofafuture,reincarnatedself,wecanalsoreadthisintermsofafuture“surrogate-self”thatreplacesitspredecessorinasinglelife-time.Śāntidevapointsoutthatwecareaboutourfuture-selves,eventhough,strictlyspeaking,wearenotthesame(oridenticalto)thesefutureiterations.Whynotextendsuchcarestostrangersinourcurrentfieldofinteractions?Insomeimplicitsense,wearealwayscaringforwhatisother.Soinsteadofdismissingthisasincoherent,wemightincorporatethisdeliberatelyintoourmotivations.Iwilldevelopthislineofthoughtinchapter3.7Methods,498.Also,seeSamuelScheffler,“PotentialCongruence,”MoralityandSelf-Interest,ed.PaulBloomfield(NewYork:OxfordUniveristyPress,2008):117-136.Scheffleraimstorevisethetermsunderwhichwespeakofconflictsbetweenmoralityandself-interest,andtakesissuewithconstruingtheseconceptsasmetaphysicallydistinctdomains,or,“distinctnormativeperspectives.”

9

theremayormaynotbeanobjectivelistofwhatthosethingsare,thisisimmaterial

tothediscussionathand;8mybroadconstrualisadequateformypurposeshere.

Now,concernforadvancingone’sself-interestovertimehasbeencalled

“prudence.”Thisalreadyhighlightsanimportantfeatureofagency,namely,it’s

forward-lookingnature.Weeachanticipateourindividualfuturewelfareand

sufferinginawaythatwesimplycannotwithrespecttoanother’sfuture.EvenifI

amhighlyempathic,asimpleburnIincurfromaccidentlytouchingahotkettlewill

presentitselfmuchmorevividlyandviscerallythanwatchingorhearingabout

thousandsofothersburningthemselves.9Myownpainisdirectlypresentinaway

thatyourpaincanneverbe.Icansaythatmypainisdirectlyexperiencedbyme,

whileyourpainisvividlyimagined—or,onlyindirectlyexperienced—byme.Tobe8Forthoroughanalysisofplausibletheoriesaboutself-interest,seeParfit’sReasonsandPersons,Appendix1.9SeeCasparHare,OnMyself,andOther,LessImportantSubjects(NewJersey,PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),35.Hareinspiredthisexample.Hare’snotionofinsulatedandprivate“presence,”orthemanifestlyimmediateandun-shareablefirst-personexperienceinformsmuchofmyworkinchapter4.Harearguesthatperceptionsbeing“directlypresent”(versusindirectlyimaginedinthecaseofother,“lessimportantsubjects”),arerelevanttothetaskofharmonizingegocentric-hedonisticconsiderationswithconsiderationsofthegreatergood.Hecallshisview“EgocentricPresentism.”Basically,hearguesthathisconsiderations,whetherself-regardingorother-regarding,cannaturally“harmonize,”becausehisconsiderationsaretheonlydirectlypresentgoodsheisprivyto.ForHare,theproblemofothermindsisempiricallyintractable.However,wecanimagine,andinthatsense,expandourconstellationofconsiderationsandmotivationsthroughafictionalist-semanticsofotherminds:theotherisalwaysonlyindirectlypresent.Thepointisthategocentricconsiderationsarenotalwaysinconsistentwithconcernfor(fictional)others,andthiscancollapsethedistinctionbetweenrationalegoismandaltruisticconsiderations.Inchapter4,Ipursueasimilarstrategy,butultimatelypartwithHareinarguingthatataconceptual(andmetaphysical)level,wedosometimesdirectlysharefeelings.LikeHumeandtheBuddha,Hareistetheredtotheconceptuallimitationsofempiricism.Butconsciousnesscanbewitnessedintheconceptualrequirementsofperceivingagency,orbetter,indistinguishingbetweenanagent-subjectandanordinaryobject.ThiswillbeamajorfeatureoftheviewofselfIdevelopinchapter4:thenormativeandmetaphysicalview.

10

sure,emotionalcontagionandempathycantriggeradeepconnectionbetween

anotherandme.However,myactionsaremoredirectlycausallyrelevantto

securingmyownwell-beingovertime.TheintuitionisthatIcanmoredirectly

controlthevariablesinvolvedinsecuringmyowngoods,whichincludes

psychologicalgoods,thanIcaninsecuringyours.Finally,Iamnaturallymotivated

tosecuremyownwell-being,and,moreimportantly,IbelievethatIoughttosecure

myownwell-being.WhileImayalsobemotivatedtotendtoandcareaboutothers,

Icannotsoeasilydeterminewhichmotivationsandreasonshaveauthorityinacase

ofconflict.SomethinglikethisseemstobepartoftheintuitiondrivingSidgwick’s

famousclaim:

ItwouldbecontrarytoCommonSensetodenythatthedistinctionbetweenanyoneindividualandanyotherisrealandfundamental,andthatconsequently“I”amconcernedwiththequalityofmyexistenceasanindividualinasense,fundamentallyimportant,inwhichIamnotconcernedwiththequalityoftheexistenceofotherindividuals:andthisbeingso,Idonotseehowitcanbeprovedthatthisdistinctionisnottobetakenasfundamentalindeterminingtheultimateendofrationalactionforanindividual.10

Inmostcases,wearenaturallymotivatedtoprioritizethethingsweare

directlycapableofdoingtodirectthesuccessfulunfoldingofourownlives,andthis

isboundupwitharealandirreducibledistinctionbetweenpersons.Presumably,

then,mybeingdistinctfromyouandfromyoursufferinghasnormativerelevance

withrespecttorationalaction.Somethingaboutmypain(andwell-being),andits

beingmine,privilegesitinanormativelyrelevantway.This,inturn,determines

reasonsthatIhaveforaction.So,myheadachegivesmenormativelyrelevant

10Methods,498.

11

reasonstoactthatarenotnecessarilypresentformewhenyourheadhurts.This

passage,andahostofotherargumentspresentedinSidgwick’sMethods,aimsto

pointouthowrationalegoism—theviewthatthemostprimaryrationalconstraint

onactionisthatweeachsecureourownself-interest—cannotbesoeasilysnubbed.

Rationalegoismaccommodatesthecommonsensedistinctionbetweenselfand

other,anditaccommodatesthevividdistinctnessofthefirst-personexperience,

whichunderliestheordinaryprivilegewegivetoourownindividualsuffering.11If

Sidgwick’sclaimiscompelling,thenwhatthetoken-reflexive“I”denoteswhenused

byme,andwhatitdenoteswhenusedbyyou,givesusbothgroundstobe

concernedwithourownwelfareinaverypersonal,andtherefore,partialway.

Ontheotherhand,wecanalsoviewourselvesmoreobjectivelyasselves

situatedin,anddependentupon,aworldofotherselves,wholikewisepursuetheir

individualinterests.Werecognizethatnothingobjectiveprivilegesourownvalid

needsaboveothers.Sidgwickcallsthisthecommonsense“axiomofpersonal

irrelevance.”Heargues,“Thegoodofanyoneindividualisofnomoreimportance,

fromthepointofview(ifImaysayso)oftheUniverse,thanthegoodofany

other.”12Atleastinthisveryabstractsense,wetaketheneeds,values,anddesires

11Sidgwickgoessofarastosaythatrecognizingarationalgroundforbenevolencedoesnoteffectivelysupplantthisverybasicandegoisticrationalconstraint:“…evenifamanadmitstheself-evidenceoftheprincipleofRationalBenevolence,hemaystillholdthathisownhappinessisanendwhichitisirrationalforhimtosacrificetoanyother;andthatthereforeaharmonybetweenthemaximofPrudenceandthemaximofRationalBenevolencemustbesomehowdemonstrated,ifmoralityistobemadecompletelyrational.Thislatterview…appearstome,onthewhole,theviewofCommonsense”(Methods,498).Thus,Sidgwickleavesethicistswiththetaskofsecuringaharmonybetweenprudenceandother-regardingandbenevolent,or,altruisticconsiderations.12Methods,382.

12

ofothersseriously;weappreciatetheindependentvalidityofother’sinterests.We

canimpersonallyrecognizethatifanyone’swelfarematters,theneveryone’s

welfarematters.Nothingmakesmypainsouniqueandimportantthatina

utilitariancalculationitshould,inprinciple,supersedethepainofothers.Butwhen

thisimpartialviewcomesintoconflictwithrationalself-interest,wesometimesfind

ourselvesinaporia,becausebothperspectivesappeartohaveequalauthorityover

action.AndthisiswheretheBuddhistandParfitmightclaimthatwe’vemistakenly

investedtoomuchinthenotionofdistinctness.Ifthereisnometaphysicallydeep

distinctionbetweenselfandother,thentheverypremisethatdrivesSidgwick’s

worryisfalse.Theassumptionthatsomesortofpersistingselfunderliestheflowof

psychophysicalevents—likepleasureandpain—drivesustocarveoutprivileges

betweenselfandother.Whenwecometorevisethisviewoftheselfasanownerof

mentalandphysicalstates,weobsesslessonwhoenduresthesestates.Instead,we

focusontheoverallquantityofsuchstates.Asthec.8thcenturyIndianBuddhist

philosopher,Śāntidevaargues,“Withoutexception,nosufferingsbelongtoanyone.

Theymustbewardedoffsimplybecausetheyaresuffering.Whyisanylimitation

putonthis?”13

Butinresponse,onecaneasilyclaim,metaphysicsnotwithstanding,that

conventional,transactionalrealitystillproducesconflictsbetweenself-interestand

morality.I’llusethecatch-allphrase,“morality”tobroadlyincludeanynormative

stricturesandrecommendationsplacedonaction,whichpresupposebothother-

regardingconsiderationsfortheindependentlyvalidinterestsofothers,and

13BCA:8.102:97.

13

sensitivitytowardrulesofconductthatenjoymorefar-reachinggeneralitythanthe

normativeconstraintsarisingoutofcontingentsocialrolesandoccupations.Again,I

donotuse“self-interest”hereinanysortofnarroweconomicsense.NordoI

downplaythecomplexityinvolvedincashingoutjustwhatsortsofthingscountas

“self-interest.”Inmybroadconstrual,“self-interest”willincludeeudaimonistic

considerationforone’smeaningfulprojectsandaims—thatis,concernwithleading

afulfillingandgoodlife.Theresponsehereisthatwedonotneedmetaphysically

robustdistinctionstofindourselvesinphilosophically,notjustpsychologically,

significantmomentsofconflictandcontention.So,contratheBuddhistandParfit,

metaphysicalrevisionofwhatconstitutesselfhoodwillnotplayasignificantrolein

defusingconflictwhenthatrevisionisbasedonthecontentionthatmetaphysical

selvesdonotexist.AsI’veinterpretedChristineM.Korsgaard,thequestionofwho

weare—ourpracticalidentitiesthatbothshapewhatitmakessensetodointhe

practicaldomain,andunifyouragency—supersedestheimpersonalquestionof

whatweare.14Metaphysicalinsightsnotwithstanding,one’sconceptionofthegood

lifemightbeseriouslyjeopardizedbytherequirementsofmorality(whateverthose

turnouttobe).15So,asSamuelSchefflerhaseffectivelyargued,itisworthassessing

14ChristineM.Korsgaard,“PersonalIdentityandtheUnityofAgency:AKantianResponsetoParfit,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs18,no.2(1989):101-132.“Iarguethatfromamoralpointofviewitisimportantnottoreduceagencytoamereformofexperience.Itisimportantbecauseourconceptionofwhatapersonisdependsonourconceptionofourselvesasagentsinadeepway”(103).Shefurtherclaims,“Yourconceptionofyourselfasaunifiedagentisnotbasedonametaphysicaltheory,noronaunityofwhichyouareconscious.Itsgroundsarepractical…”(109).15SeeScheffler,“PotentialCongruence.”Schefflerarguesherethatthedistinctionbetweentwopresumablydistinctandconflictingnormativedomains,“morality”and“self-interest”arenotmetaphysicallydeepdistinctions,anddonot,whenviewedinSidgwick’smanner,accountforvaluepluralismandahostofother

14

howthoseconflictsaremitigated,andwhataspectsofmorality,mutuality,and

humanpsychology,allowsuchconflictstoremainexceptionsratherthanrules.16

However,theBuddhist(andParfitian)mayhavestrongerreasonsfor

believingthatmetaphysicalselflessnessbothtakesthewindoutofSidgwick’ssails,

andalsoremainsrelevanttotensionsbetweenmoralityandthegoodlife.

TheBuddhistmaintainsthat,underanalysis,thepersistingpersonsand

agentswebelieveourselvestobearefictionsreducibletoanimpersonal

description.Thus,normativeandmoralconsiderationsoughttobetterreflectthat

fact.ContraKorsgaard,whoweareshouldbetemperedbywhatweinfactare.In

spiteofourpsychologicalproclivitiesandpracticalidentities,arationalassessment

ofourindividualmoralworthsupportsanimpersonalandegalitarian,ratherthan

partialisticaccountofethicalconsiderations.17Ifmyownwelfareandsuffering

oughttobeconsideredindeliberation,butunderanalysis,Irecognizethesestatesoperativemotivationsdrivingrationalaction.However,hearguesthatwhenwesufficientlyaccountforthecomplexityofmotivatingvaluesandmoralmotivations,andthevariouswaysinwhichmoralconstraintsinteractandintersectwithpsychologicalproclivities,thequestionofmoralitycomingintoconflictwithone’smeaningfulprojectsandvaluesremainsaphilosophicallysignificantone.Hedescribesthisaspotentialconflictbetween“moralityandthegoodlife,orbetweenmoralityandthestandpointofeudaimonisticreflection,ratherthanasaconflictbetweenmoralityandself-interest”(133).16Scheffler,“PotentialCongruence.”Also,seeSamuelScheffler,HumanMorality(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992).17PeterSinger,“Famine,Affluence,andMorality,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,Vol.1(3),April(1972):229-243.Singer,asI’veinterpretedhim,drawsasimilarconclusion,withoutcommittinghimselftoanysortofviewaboutthenatureoftheself.Singerpointsoutthatpartialismhighlightsthewayinwhichcertainpsychologicalfactsinfluenceourmoralconsiderations.However,thesedonotnecessarilyoverridetherational,moralconstraintsthatwewouldpresumablyendorseinhisfamousthoughtexperiment.Someone’ssufferingbeingmoreorlessdistantfromourown(physicallyandpsychologically)doesnotoverridetheintuitionthatwhensomeoneissuffering,andweareinamaterialpositiontohelp,thatweoughttohelp.

15

ofpleasureandpaindonotreallybelongtoanyone—thatis,theyarenotreally

ownedbyanysortofpersistingentity—then,pragmaticconsiderationsaside,

anyone’swelfareandsufferingoughttobeconsideredequally.Anythingthatcounts

asultimatelygoodorbadcannotbelimitedinscopetowhat’sgoodorbadforme,

sincethereultimatelyisno“me.”Onthisreading,theNo-Selfviewofselflessnessis

meanttomotivateanegalitarianthesisaboutimpartialconsiderationsconcerning

whatismorallygoodorbad.Wemightallagreethatinjusticeandundeservedand

pointlesssufferingareinherentlybadthings.However,persons,or,ownersof

mentalandphysicalstates,areonlyusefulandultimatelydispensablefictions.So,if

mysufferingprovidesmewithareasonforaction,thenanyone’ssufferingoughtto

providemewithareasonforaction.18

Justtorecap:Sidgwickarguedthattwomotivatingforces—rationalprudence

andimpartialconsiderationofother’sinterests—produceapracticaldilemma.The

BuddhistandParfitianarguethatrevisingtheeverydayviewofself,aviewthat

entrenchesdifferenceandpartiality,candefusethedilemma.However,if

metaphysicaldifferencebetweenselfandotherisimmaterialtopractical

deliberation,thenrevisingourmetaphysicsshouldnotdefuseSidgwick’sproblem.

Norshoulditdefusetheconflictsandtensionsthatmayarisebetweenmoralityand

ourpracticalidentities.18SeeMarkSiderits,PersonalIdentityandBuddhistPhilosophy:EmptyPersons(Burlington:AshgatePublishingCompany,2003),102-103.ThisismyinterpretationofSiderits’sglossonŚāntideva’sfamouspassages,101-103,inchapter8oftheBodhicaryāvatāra.TheupshotofŚāntideva’sargumenthereisthatpainandsufferingexist;theseareinherentlybadthings;butownersofsuchsufferingdonotexist.Therefore,ifownershipiswhatjustifiesprivilegingonequantityofsufferingoveranother,thennoreallimitjustifiespartiality(otherthanpragmaticconsiderations).

16

However,asacounter-argument,theBuddhistmightclaimthatmetaphysical

revisioncandefusetheproblem,becausewecanderivenormativeconclusionsfrom

descriptiveandfactualstatements.I’lldevelopthiscontentiouspointbelow.Butfor

now,considerthepointthatastatementdeducedfromacceptedpremisescommits

onetoacceptthederivedstatement.Thismeansthatwhatisthecaseispertinentto

whatoneoughttodo(namely,acceptanewbelief,andthereforeactfromthisnew

belief).19Likewise,whenonerevisesthebeliefthatametaphysicallydeep

distinctionexistsbetweenselfandother,thiscommitsonetorecognizethatfroman

impersonalpointofview,nothingdistinguishesoneinstanceofsufferingfrom

another.Ofcourse,conventionandourpracticalidentitiescanstillproduceconflict

andpartialevaluations.Butifweacceptthatanimpersonalpointofviewis

somethingwecanhold,thenwearecommittedtoacceptingbeliefsderivedfrom

suchaview.Moreover,ifwebelievethatcertainnormativeconstraintsarenot

purelyderivativeofpsychologicalfacts,but,instead,playaroleinstructuringsuch

facts,thenthenormativeconclusionswederivefromanimpersonalpointofview

maybejustifieddespiteourpsychologicalproclivities.Thesewouldoperateasvery

generalbackgroundconstraintsonwhatsortsofdesiresandpreferencesweought19SeeJohnR.Searle,RationalityinAction(HongKong:MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2001),136-137.AsIunderstandhim,Searlearguesthattheoreticalrationalitypresupposesvariousspeech-acts,andthisdefusesthepresumedriftbetweendescriptiveandnormativeclaims.Whenwededuceaconclusionfromasetofacceptedpremises,wearecommittedtoacceptingthederivedconclusion.Soanactoftheoreticalrationalitypresupposescommitmentsthatarenormativelybinding:“Ihavebeenemphasizingthesenseinwhichtheoreticalreasonisaspecialcaseofpracticalreason:decidingwhatbeliefstoacceptandrejectisaspecialcaseofdecidingwhattodo”(136).Searleadds,“Tosaythatsomethingistrueimpliesthatyououghttobelieveit.SupposeIhaveconclusiveproofthatpistrue.Sincebeliefinvolvesacommitmenttotruth…Ioughttobelieve(accept,recognize,acknowledge)thatp”(137).

17

toendorse.Granted,thesetwopointsarecontroversialtosaytheleast.However,I

amsimplytryingtomotivatehowtheBuddhistviewmightwithstandtheobjection

thatmetaphysicalconclusionshavenobearingonourconventionalandpractical

lives.Abitmoreformally,theargumentwouldlooklikethis.

1. Descriptivestatementscommitustoothernormativelybindingstatements.

Forexample,whenwederiveaconclusionfromacceptedpremises,we

oughttoacceptthederivedconclusion.That’spartofwhatitmeanstobe

rational.

2. Fromanimpersonalpointofview—thatis,revisingourbeliefthatpersisting

subjectsaretheownersofpsychophysicalevents—werecognizethat

sufferingandpleasuredonotstrictlyspeakingbelongtoanyone.

3. However,sufferingandpleasurearenotjustconventionalconstructs—as

talkofpersonsand“I-thoughts”are.

4. Pointlesssufferingisinherentlybad,andthereforeoughttobealleviated.

5. Therefore,(by2-4),ifareasonexiststoalleviatesuffering,thennoperson’s

sufferingandpleasurehasanyultimateprivilegeoveranyotherperson’s.In

otherwords,thereasonholdsforallsuffering,andweoughttoalleviate

suffering.

6. Normativeconclusionsfromanimpersonalpointofviewarenotjust

derivativeofpsychologicalfacts;instead,theycanstructurewhatitmakes

sensetodesire,want,orprefer.

7. Thus,(by5-6),ifwecanachieveanimpersonalpointofview,itmakessense

todesireorpreferthatsufferingshouldbealleviatedimpartially.Inshort,

18

wehavegoodreasonnottoprivilegeanyone’ssufferingandpleasureover

anyoneelse’s(pragmaticconsiderationsaside).

Onemighttakeissuewithanyofthesepremises,butthemorecontroversial

premisesare(1)and(6).However,withindependentandcogentargumentsfor(1)

and(6),wecandenytheclaimthatmetaphysicalconclusions(and,byextension,

metaphysicalrevisions)arealwaysnormativelyandmorallyneutral.Ifwecan

achievetheimpersonalpointofview,andthenormativeconclusionswederive

fromsuchapointofviewcanstructurewhatitmakessensetodesire,want,or

prefer,thendespitecertainpsychologicalproclivities,metaphysicscanhavea

bearingonwhatitmakessensetodo.

Finally,metaphysicalselflessnessaside,theBuddhistmightcontendthatwe

eachhaveasenseofselfthatcannotbeexplainedawayaspurefiction.Eventhe

Buddhistmustprovideanaccountofhowwedevelopaconceptionofselfhood.The

Buddhistmaygoontoarguethataradicallyrevisedwayofviewingtheselfinterms

ofthesenseofself(withoutrecoursetoarealmetaphysicalentity)curesusof

existentialsuffering.Thistransformativeviewismeanttoplayanimportantrolein

practicaldeliberation,sinceitimpactsthemotivationalresourcesthatdriveaction.

Initially,thevoluntarypursuitofthissortofexistentialtransformationmaystartout

fromanentirelyegoisticconcernforone’sownwelfare.20Thepractitioner-

philosopheraimstoputanendtoherownanguishonceandforall,andthisisthe

mostimportantconcernthatdrivesheractions.Assheprogressesinthepursuit,

20BCA,8.108:97.“Thosewhobecomeoceansofsympatheticjoywhenlivingbeingsarereleased,surelyitistheywhoachievefulfillment.Whatwouldbethepointinaliberationwithoutsweetness?”

19

sherecognizesthatradicallyappropriatingtheneedsandvaluesofothersintoher

ownsenseofselfisconstitutiveofthistransformation.Thisrequireseffacementof

thelimitedegothroughanexpansionofwhatitincludesinitssenseofself.21The

selfis“selfless”byexpandingitsself-identitytoincludetheconcernsofallsuffering

creatures.Expandingitsconcernsandself-identitybroadlyenough,itcomesto

recognizethatthereisabroaderandunifiedfieldofpleasuresandpains,whichit

learnstocareaboutinamotivatedway.Admittedly,thisisaprocess,andnotaone-

offgestalt-switchinperspective.Soitrequirespractice,andahostofother

cultivatedvirtuesthatsupportthatpractice.Iwilldevelopthisfurtherinthenext

chapter,andassesswhatmayormaynotbecompellinginsuchaview.

Butfornow,it’sfairtoaskwhatexactlymotivatesthispractice.Itmaynotbe

something“selfish,”sincethepracticeultimatelyfreesoneupformore

compassionateother-regardingconsiderations.However,Icontendthatitis

ultimatelyegocentric,andinthenextchapter,I’llexplainwhy.Tosetthisdiscussion

up,IwillconcludethechapterbyclarifyingwhatIthinkwecanmeanbycalling

someone“selfish,”“unselfish,”“egocentric,”and“non-egocentric.”I’llalsoassess

howthisinformswhatisinvolvedinaltruisticmotivations,andhowitinformsthe

distinctionbetweenself-regardingandother-regardingconsiderations.These

conceptsarecrucialbothformakingsenseofwhatisinvolvedinunselfishagency,

andfordevelopingaconceptionofselfhoodthatwouldsupportsuchanaccount.

21BCA,8.115:98.“Inthesamewaythat,withpractice,theideaofaselfarosetowardsthis,one’sownbody,thoughitiswithoutaself,withpracticewillnotthesameideaofaselfdeveloptowardsotherstoo?”Also,see8.112:“WhycanInotalsoacceptanother’sbodyasmyself…sincetheothernessofmyownbodyhasbeensettledandisnothardtoaccept?”

20

Moreover,disambiguatingtheseconceptswillhelpsupportmyfurthercontention

thatrevisingourbeliefintheunityandpersistenceofself—theviewwefindin

BuddhismandParfit—doesnotprovidetheunselfishandaltruisticpayoffthinkers

whoendorsetheviewbelieveitdoes.

1.3.1ConceivingMoralSelflessness:UnselfishEgocentricity

Iwanttoprovideanaccountofselfishnessthatcanhelpmakesenseofwhat

morallyrelevant“selflessness”lookslike.Bydoingso,Iwanttoprovideabetter

senseofwhattheBuddhistmightbeuptowhenclaimingthattheNo-Selfview

(whateverthatamountsto)supports“selfless”action.

Now,I’vebeencalledselfishmanytimes.IsthatbecauseI’moftenconcerned

withoutcomesthatbenefitme?Atfirstglance,Imaybeconsidered“selfish”whenI

amsolelymotivatedbythegoodthatanactionaffordsmealone:iftheactiondidnot

affordmethatgood,thenIwouldn’thavepursuedtheaction.Butthiscouldbe

called,moreneutrally,an“egocentric”actionratherthanaselfishaction.Icook

myselflunchsolelybecausetheactionaffordsmeagood,andifcookinglunchfor

myselfdidn’taffordmethatgood,Iwouldn’tdoit.Butthishardlywarrantscalling

meselfish.Nordoesitwarrantcallingtheactionselfish.IntheveryblandwayI’ve

describedthings,cookingmyselflunchisnotselfish,butit’scertainlyegocentric,

becauseI’mentirelyconcernedwithsatisfyingmyselfinpursuingthataction.

Butletmegetabitmorespecificaboutmywholesomelunch.Let’ssayI

preparemyselfsomechicken.Ibuyamajorcorporatebrandofchickenbreasts,say,

Tyson®chicken.Idosobecausethissortoffleshismostaffordableformybudget,

andTyson®hasperfectedtheartofproducingunnaturallyplumpandwhitemeat.I

21

knowthatananimalsuffersformetoenjoyitscookedcorpse.Butlet’ssayI’vecome

totermswiththat(ordevisedaprinciplethatjustifiesmyeatingthefleshofa

sentientcreature).Still,Idonotrelishunnecessarysuffering,andI’meven

squeamishwhenitcomestotheideaofkillingandprocuringmeatbyhuntingit

myself.However,thecorporatemeatI’veboughtrequiresthattheanimalsuffer

morethanitwouldhavetoifbottomlineprofitsdidnotsolelydictatetheirchicken

farmingpractices.Moreover,Iknowthatpoliciesofthecorporatemeatindustry,

whichoutsourcesitschickenfarmingtolocalfarmers,causesharmtothosefarmers.

Thefarmersoftenremainpoor,becausethepaymentschedulesaredraftedto

maximizeshareholderprofits,whichrequirespayingthefarmerssubstandard

wages.Also,thefarmersoftensufferfromterriblehealthconditionsbecauseof

corporatelymandatedfarmingpracticesthatcouldbeadjustedattheexpenseof

shareholderprofits.Whenfarmerscomplain,thecorporateentitiesthreatentopull

supportandsupplyfromthem,thusdespoilingtheirlivelihoods.Whenthefarmers

decidetochangefarmingpracticeswithoutcorporatesanction,theyarefired,and

leftsaddledwithdebtforthemachinerythey’vebeenmandatedtopurchaseon

credit.Corporatepoliciesaredraftedandenforcedattheexpenseofboththe

farmersandthechickens.Iknowthis,butIcookthemeatanyway,becauseittastes

good,anditmakesmefeelgood.IknowthatIhaveotheroptions,andIknowthat

I’mcontributingtoformsofunnecessarysufferingandinjustice,butIdecidethat

myhedonisticdesiresandmybudgetoutweightheseconcerns.Icannotaffordcage-

freeandorganicchicken,andIlikethetasteandfeelingofmeattoomuchtogiveit

upaltogether.ThishighlightsamorespecificfeatureembeddedinwhatIcall,

22

“selfishness.”IamselfishwhenInotonlypursueanegocentricconsideration,butIdo

soknowinglyattheexpenseofothers,andIdosowithoutmotivatingconsiderationfor

theirvalidneeds,desires,andvalues.Icanactegocentricallywithoutbeingselfish,

butIcannotactselfishlyandnon-egocentrically.Ifthisistrue,thennon-egocentric

actionentailsthatIamnotactingselfishly,sinceegocentricityisanecessary

conditionforselfishness.22Theremaybeotherrequirementsforcallinganaction

selfish,butegocentricityisafundamental,althoughnotsufficient,ingredient.

AgeneralbeliefinBuddhistphilosophy,basictoTheravādaandMahāyāna

texts,isthatthesenseof“I”(ahaṅkara:the“ego-making”componentof

consciousness)perpetuatescravingdesire,whichinturn,leadstocyclesofsuffering

and“thirst”(triṣṇā).Breakingfreefromthehedonictreadmillrequirescultivated

detachment.But,accordingtotheBuddhist,detachmentisnotpossiblesolongas

onebelievesinthepersistenceofthe“I.”Evenattheconventionallevelofpractical

identity,ifweremainfixatedwiththeroleswe’vecarvedoutforourselves,we

22Thisraisesthequestionofomissions.SupposethatIapatheticallyrefrainfromactivitiesthatwillclearlybenefitme.Gofurther,andsaythatIengageinself-destructivebehavior.Insomesense,Iamnotactingegocentrically(certainlynotwithprudence,anyway).Now,Imayverywellignoredoingmuchforanyone—it’sallthesamegraypaletteasfarasIamconcerned.Butifsomeonewereinneedofhelp,andIknowthatIaminapositiontohelp,butinmyapatheticstate,Isimplyignorethem,thenitseemsmyomissionandneglectisselfish.However,knowingthatsomeoneisinneed,andnotraisingafingertohelpwhenIaminagoodpositiontodoso,meansthatIknowinglyignoreanother’sneedwithoutanymotivatingconsiderationforthoseneeds.Moreover,thefactthatI“cannotbebothered”meansthatmyapatheticequilibrium(or“obliviousequanimity”)ismorevaluableformethananother’sneeds.Sointhisproblemcase,whatseemslikeanon-egocentricstateisdictatedbysomethingotherthananobviouslypositiveconcernwithmyownperceivedself-interest:Iamselfishtotheextentthatanimportantomissionhighlightsaself-regardingvaluethat,throughneglect,Iobliquelyprioritizeovertheother’sneeds.MyapathyshowsupasselfishnesstotheextentthatIaminapositiontohelpanotherwhorequireshelp.

23

remaintetheredtothewhimsofneedsandpreferencesthatperpetuatesuffering.

Beingmoreflexibleandlessdogmaticwithone’spracticalidentity,whichmaybe

supportedbyrevisingtheeverydaybeliefinapersistingsubject,producesasortof

agencythatislessblindedandburdenedbyegocentricandhedonistic

considerations.Considertwodistinctpairs:“ego-centric/other-centric”and

“hedonistic/ascetic.”Isthereaproblemwithbeinghedonisticandother-centricin

one’smotivationswhilebeingcommittedtotheBuddhistmissiontoachieve

impersonalandaltruisticmotivations?Now,Imaybeother-centricinmy

motivationtodeliverhotmealstoshut-insonThanksgiving:Igainnomaterial

advantagefromthisvolunteerwork,andIlosetimethatIcouldhavespent

acquiringgoodsthatprovidemewithpleasure.Butit’snotasthoughIviewmy

volunteerworkasonlygoodforothers.Iderivepleasurefrommyvolunteerwork.

Isthereaproblemwithmederivingpleasurefromvolunteerwork?Myinstinctive

responseis,“No,”becauseotherwisemyvolunteerworkwouldbeaverygrimand

colorlessendeavor.However,thedangeristhatpleasureisalwaysself-regarding.

FromtheBuddhistperspective,itmayfurtherentrenchtheviewthatIama

persistingsubjectwhopursuesactionswiththehopeofachievingsomeemotional

andmaterialbenefitfromtheconsequences.That’snottosaythatderivingpleasure

fromtheactionmakesmeselfish,butwithoutsomeemotionalandmaterialbenefit,

Imaybehard-pressedtopursuetheaction(itatleastrequiresmoreconvincing

thanrecognizingthatpursuingsomeactionwillleadtoa“win-win”outcome).

Moreover,myhopetoachievecongruencebetweenself-regardingrewardsand

other-regardingrequirementsorvalues,mayleadtofurtherfixationontheselfby

24

cloudingtheother-directedmotivationwithmyemotionalandmaterialgains.After

all,thesegainsareimmediatelypresenttomeinawaythattherelieforhappinessI

produceinanotherisnot.Wemaybothshareinpleasure,butwecannotshareeach

other’spleasure,andthisseemstofurtherpunctuatethegapbetweenselfand

other.Therefore,theadvancedBuddhistpractitionerstresseseffacingtheegoand

vanquishingthethoughtofagiverandareceiver.Bydoingso,thegapisnolonger

highlighted,andnolongermaterial.

However,doesself-abnegationandasceticismnecessarilyproduceamore

other-centricsetofmotivationsandconcerns?IfwhatI’vesketchedaboveisatall

correct,thenanegocentricactiondoesnotdirectlyentailselfishbehavior.Whether

itperpetuatessufferingisadifferentissue,butactingunselfishlydoesnotseemto

requireabandoningegocentricconsiderationsenmasse;nordoesitseemtorequire

deprivationofpleasureintheactofgiving.So,ifBuddhistphilosophyisrelevantat

thelevelofappliedethics—notonlysoteriology—itneedstoshowuswhythe

principleofanātman(No-Self)isespeciallyrelevanttounselfish,altruistic,and

other-regardingconsiderations.

Moreover,selfishnessandegocentricityarerathercrudeconceptsthatdonot

adequatelyencapsulatenuancedconflictsofloyaltyandreciprocity.Twopeople

maybedeservingofajob.Oneisafriend,andtheotherisastrangerwhomightbea

betterfitfortheorganization.Ifeelboundtoofferthejobtoaslightlyless-qualified

anddearfriend.I’mpartialtofriendsandfamily,andifIwasnot,youmightthink

I’m“cold,”anddonotunderstandtheloyaltyandreciprocitythatcomeswith

sincerefriendship.Partialismisathornyissueinethics,andbuildingandnurturing

25

partialisticobligationsseemsbasictothehumancondition.Bolderarguments

contendthatsensitivityto—andappreciationfor—normativeandethical

considerationsarederivativeofthesortofpartialismcultivatedinintimate

relationships;itisthroughpartialisticrelationshipsthatwelearntocultivateand

embracemoregeneralethicalconsiderations.Thus,themorallifemay

fundamentallyrequirepartialism.23Partofwhatitmeanstobealovingfather,say,

isthatIfavormychild.Imightlamentthelossofanother’schildinahorriblefire,

butifit’sbetweenmychildandherchild,andIhavethecapacitytorescueonlyone

person,I’llhavetorescuemyownchild.ThecareIshow,andthecommitmentthatI

actupon,mightbebasictomycapacitytodevelopmorefar-reachingandless

partialisticcommitments.Thisisalargeleap,anditrequiresindependentargument

andsupport.However,thevirtueofmyglossonselfishnessisthatitdoesnot

requiretakingadefinitepositiononpartialismandthemorallife.Imayentera

burninghouse,andrescuemychildwhileknowingthatotherchildrenwill

inevitablyandtragicallyperish,andinthisverybroadsense,Iknowinglyactatthe

expenseofothers.Savingmychildmeansallowinganother’schildtoperish.But

whenIdothis,Idonotnecessarilydosowithoutregardfortheindependentlyvalid

needs,desires,andvaluesofthoseotherchildrenandtheirparents.Iam23SamuelScheffler,“MoralityandReasonablePartiality,”inEqualityandTradition:QuestionsofValueinMoralandPoliticalTheory(NewYork:Oxford,2010):41-76.Schefflerentertainsthispossibility,andwhileitmaybeastretchtosaythatmoralitypresupposespartiality,Scheffleraimstodefendtherationalnecessityofpartiality:“ThegeneralaimofthislineofthoughtistoestablishthatwhatIwillcallreasonsofpartialityareinevitableconcomitantsofcertainofthemostbasicformsofhumanvaluing.Thismeansthat,forhumanbeingsascreatureswithvalues,thenormativeforceofcertainformsofpartialityisnearlyunavoidable.Ifthatisright,thenformoralitytorejectpartialityinageneralorsystematicwaywouldbeforittosetitselfagainstournatureasvaluingcreatures”(43).

26

egocentricallyboundto“meandmyown,”butI’mnotnecessarilyselfish:partialism

isnotequivalenttoselfishness.Partialisticandegocentricactionismotivatedby

reasonsthatmakeessentialreferencetotheagent’sownneeds,desires,andvalues,

andthisrunsmorebroadlythanselfishaction.IfIdidnotfeeltheweightofthe

house-burningtragedy,thatis,ifIdidnotevenviewitasatragedy,thencallingme

selfishwouldbewarranted.Iwouldshownoregardfortheindependentlyvalid

needsanddesiresofothers.Andwhenwe’redealingwithchildrenandburning

houses,thisdisregardwouldrevealalotmorethanselfishness—itwouldbe

borderlinesociopathic.Thissortoftwistedpartialismallowsagangstertosobover

hisdeadsonwhileunrepentantlycommittingatrocitiesagainstsomeoneelse’s.

Butinothercases,say,inawarcampaign,asoldierorcountrymayremain

partialtotheirown,withoutnecessarilybeingselfishinthenarrowersense.Still,

selfishnessdoesnotlingertoofarbehindpartialism.Forexample,duringtheearly

phasesofGeorgeW.Bush’swaragainstIraq,alltheAmericannewsstations

highlightedtheU.S.deathtollwithoutmuchmentionofthehundredsofthousands

ofIraqiciviliandeaths.Ihadtomakeconsiderableefforttodeterminethe

devastationanddestructionexactedupontheIraqicivilian.Forsome,itwasnotso

difficulttoviewIraqideathsasanecessaryevil,andperhaps,inthatsense,they

werenotentirelyselfish—afterall,theysincerelyconsideredIraqideathsa

necessaryevil.Butwhenmilitarycommandersprefertheuseofdrones,which

minimizeAmericandeaths,butleadtogreaternumbersofciviliancasualties,they

believeanAmericansoldier’slifeisworthmorethananinnocentIraqicivilian’slife.

Again,thismaybeacaseoftragedyandpartialism,andnotacaseofpure

27

selfishness.Andperhaps,byappealingtoanuanced“JustWar”theory,biased

supporterscansleepeasieratnight.Butifsecuringmoreoilfieldstosustainour

petroleum-richinfrastructureispremiseduponsomethinglikehundredsof

thousandsofIraqicausalities,thenit’shardtochalkthisupto“necessary”evils.

Whenwelosesincereinterestinthevalidneedsanddesiresofothers,and

knowinglypursueactionsattheirexpense,weexhibitbothpartialismand

selfishness.There’salotofworktodotoclarifyanddistinguishthevariousshades

ofpersonalandcollectiveselfishnessfromjustifiedformsofpartialism,butthe

basicpoint,Ihope,isclear:selfishnessisnotonlyaformofpartialism,butit’s

partialismwithoutsincereregret,andwithoutsincereconsiderationforthe

independentlyvalidneedsanddesiresofothers.

Withthatsaid,Iwillclarifywhat’smeantbymorally-relevant“selflessness.”

Inthecaseofeatingunnecessarilyharmfulchicken,Icanadjustmyhabits.After

somepractice,whenInolongerdesirechicken,thatis,whenthere’snostrong

desiretoeatchicken,Imaybeleadingalessselfishlife.ButamIacting“selflessly”

inamoralsense?Afterall,Inolongerfretovereatingchicken,becauseIsimply

don’tdesireeatingchicken.ThisseemsdifferentfromacaseinwhichInever

desiredtoeatchickeninthefirstplace.Doesamorallyselflessactionrequirethat

whileIdoA,IhaveamorethantrivialinclinationnotdoA,oratsomepointtook

thisinclinationtobeamotivationallyliveoptionforme?Imightbeinclinednotto

eatchicken,whichseemsstructurallynodifferentthanmyinclinationtoeatlunch.

Certainly,there’snothingselflessaboutmysatisfyingthedesiretoeatlunch.Foran

actiontocountas“selfless,”mustIperformaHerculeanfeatofthewilltooverride

28

anopposingandgnawingbackgroundpreference?Doesmoralselflessnessrequire

internalstrifeortension?Ifso,thenmoralselflessnessseemsmuchtoodemanding,

becauseitrequiressomethingmostofuswouldconsiderinherentlybad:persistent

internalconflict.

Surely,amorepromisingsetofmoralrequirementsallowsonetoleadalife

thatisbetteroverall,andnotmarredbyinternalstrife.24Wewanttoavoidmoral

stricturesthatareoverlydemanding.IfIagreethateatingfactoryfarmedchicken

perpetratesinjustice,thenmyhavingthecharactertraitstoresisteatingfactory

chickenwithouthavingtopersistentlygrapplewithinternalconflictisbothmorally

laudableanddesirable.Moralrequirementsoughttosufficientlyalignwithour

motivationalresources.25Soperhapsmoralselflessnessissimplyawayof

characterizingmorally-relevantunselfishaction,andby“unselfish”actionImean

anyactionthatisatleastpartlymotivatedby—andtakesintostrongandmorethan

trivialconsideration—thevalidneedsanddesiresofothers.Whenoneactsina

morallypraiseworthyandunselfishway,oneacts“selflessly.”Onemaybepartly

motivatedbyegocentricconsiderationsandcultivatedinclinations,butthatdoes

notmeanoneactsselfishly.Tobeselfless,oneisnotrequiredtoalwaysfeelthe

pressureofopposinginclinationscomingupagainstnormativeconstraints.And24Scheffler,HumanMorality,6:“…althoughmoralconsiderationsandconsiderationsofself-interestcandiverge,andalthoughmoralitysometimesrequiressignificantsacrificesofus,neverthelessthemostdemandingmoraltheoriesaremistaken.”Scheffleraddsthat“Takentogether,theseaccountsofmorality’scontent,scope,authority,anddeliberativerole…willprovidesupportforthe[claim]thattherelationbetweenthemoralandindividualperspectivesisoneofpotentialcongruence”(7).25Scheffler,HumanMorality,7:“…itisinpartasocialandpoliticaltasktoachieveameasureoffitbetweenwhatmoralitydemandsandwhatpeople’smotivationalresourcescansupply.”

29

selflessnessdoesnothavetopresupposeinternalstrifebetweenopposing

normativeperspectives;itdoesnotrequireovercomingadilemmabetweenself-

interest(inthebroadwayI’veconstruedit)andmoraldemands.

However,whenviewingselflessnesssobenignly,werisklosingsightofits

subtlerandmoreexaltedfeatures.Theproblemmightlieinfixatingonthe

motivationsbehindsingleactions.ImaynoteatthechickenbecauseIdon’teat

chicken—thatis,I’mthetypeofpersonwhodoesn’tflinchatabstainingfrommeat.I

seamlesslyavoideatingmeatwithoutanysortofstruggleorsecondthought.Idon’t

havetoconsciouslyendorsevegetarianismeverytimeIcookameal.Inthatsense,

myvaluesbecometransparent:myinclinationsandmyvaluesreinforceeachother.

However,bybeingabletojustifythiswayoflivingwhenaskedwhyIendorseit,I

recognizethatIamimportantlymotivatedbythevalidneedsanddesiresofothers.

Mychoiceisnotjustamatterofinclination,alone,norisitamatterofrigid

adherencetoamoralduty.Icouldeasilylearntolikechicken,butIstrivenottofor

reasonsof,say,promotingjusticeandrespectingthevalueofsentientlife.Thefact

thatIcouldeasilylearntolikechickenshowsthatselflessactionisinsomeway

connectedtothematerialpossibilityofstrifebetweenwhatIdesireandwhatI

believeIoughttodo.Atsomepointinmycareerofdecision-making,I’llhaveto

deliberateandjustifythispracticetomyself.Atsomepoint,I’llhavetodecisively

determinethatImustdoAratherthannotdoA,regardlessofanyopposing

inclinations.Butthe“selfless”componentcomeswithweighingthevalidneedsof

othersandcaringaboutthegreatergood.Viewingselflessnessinthiswayhighlights

thefactthatIhavebeendirectlymotivatedbyconsiderationforthevalidneedsand

30

desiresofothers.Moreover,deliberation,andamorethanabstractpotentialfor

strifeismaterialtotheactionthatIcommit.What’skeyisthatconsiderationfor

othersplaysanimportantroleinshapingmycurrentmotivations,however

transparentandfluidtheybecome,andthisiswhatdistinguishesmorallyrelevant

selflessnessfromgardenvarietyinclinationsthatImayacquirebyhappenstance.

Justtosummarizethingshere,I’veillustratedhowegocentricconsiderations

arenotnecessarilyselfish.I’vealsoarguedthatselfishnessisnecessarilyegocentric.

“Selflessness”referstoactionsmotivatedbythenormativeweightofother-

regardingconsiderations,which,inanon-trivialway,comeupagainstpotentially

opposinginclinations.Withtime,Iintegratetheseconsiderationsintomybasic

practices,andsoIdonotneedtoexperiencestrifebetweenwhatIwantandwhatI

thinkisrequiredofme.Atsomepointinthehistoryofmydeliberations,the

primarysourceofaselflessactionhastobetherecognitionthatIoughttodoA,

becauseAistherightthingtodowhenItakeanother’svalidneedsinto

consideration,despitepotentiallyopposinginclinations.Irecognizethe

independentnormativeforceofA,andthisispremisedonconsiderationforothers.

Buddhismadoptstheviewthatwemustviewsufferingandpleasure

impersonally,andthisispresumablysupportedbytheviewthatsuchstatesdonot,

strictlyspeaking,belongtoanyone.FortheBuddhist,whenthereissomelingering

senseofownershipinvolvedinone’sself-conception,therewillbe“clinging”

motivationsthatdisruptourcapacitytoexhibitmoralselflessness.Thus,viewing

theselfasanownerlessstreamproducesnon-egocentricmotivations,thereby

supportingunselfishaction.However,ifwhatI’vesketchedaboveisatall

31

convincing,thenwecanbeselflessactorswithouthavingtopurgeourselvesofall

tracesoftheego.WhilethesoteriologicalambitionsofBuddhismmightrequire

achievingadeeperrevisionaryviewoftheselfasanownerlessstream,fromthe

standpointofappliedethics,suchaviewissupererogatory,andevenovershootsits

mark.Achievinganimpersonalviewpointdoesnotrequirejettisoningtheviewthat

weareownersofourmentalandphysicalstates.Andgiventheimportance

ownershipplaysinourconceptionofagency,itmaynotonlybesupererogatory,but

alsocounterproductive.Here’swhy.

Viewingyourneeds—andpleasuresandpains—asownerlessstatesmay

erodemyappreciationfortheuniquepersonthatyouare(conventionally

speaking).Byfocusingtoomuchontheoverallquantityofstates,ratherthanthe

ownerofsuchstates,Imissthenuancesthatcomewithpainandpleasurebeing

yourpainandpleasure.Imaybecomelessinterestedinthespecificplightof,say,

youandyourfamily,andmoreinterestedinplightasitpertainstoanabstract

whole.WhenIempathizewithyou,andIviewyourplightwithcompassion,Itake

aninterestinwhatitmeanstobethesortofcreatureandpersonthatyouare,

whichwillpartlydeterminethesortofactionsIshouldpromoteforyourbenefit.

Whilethemoreabstract,impersonalandnon-egocentricapproachmaynotamount

toselfishness,itbecomeshardertounderstandwhatthetargetofmycompassion

andconcernis:itbecomeshardertobetrulyselflessinthewayI’vesketchedthings

above.Sincetosomeextentyourpainisoccluded,thatis,Icannotcompletelyknow

whatit’sliketobeyousufferingrightnow,Imusttakeintoconsiderationwhether

myactionsaresuitabletotreatingyou.Icannotviewthingssoabstractlyasmere

32

“pain-instances”thatmustbevanquished.Imustfocusonyouruniquerelationship

tothepainrightnow.Inshort,Imustfocusonyourpersonhoodaswellasyour

selfhood.AndthismeansthatImustviewyouasauniqueownerofyoursuffering—

auniquebearerofpersonalitytraitsstrungtogetherbyapersonalhistory.Granted,

BuddhistslikeŚāntidevaadmitthatforthesakeofethicalagencyImustembrace

theconventionalunderstandingofpersonsaspersistingownersoftheirmentaland

physicalstates.26Butifthat’sthecase,it’shardtoknowwhatthepayoffoftheNo-

Selfviewis.Infact,itseemsthatthemoreItreatyouasarealpersonwhoownsher

mentalandphysicalstates,themoreIcanhelpalleviateyourveryspecificand

contextually-groundedsuffering.

TheBuddhistmightrespondthatalastingwayIcantreatyoursufferingisby

helpingyourevisetheviewthatyouownmentalandphysicalstates.Anātmanis

supposedtobealiberatingview,anditissupposedtospecificallyliberateyoufrom

suffering.Byestablishingthereasonablenessofthisview,Ihelpyoubecomeless

fixatedonyouranguishandpain.Butthentheproblemisthatmotivationbecomes

lessintelligible.Ifyou,thatis,thisveryspecificpersonwhoissuffering,willnot

actuallybenefitfromthisrevisedview,thenwhat’sthepointinyouendorsingit?If

fixationonanguishandsufferingistheproblem,thensurelyyoucanbecomeless

fixatedwithoutabandoningthebeliefthatyouareapersonwhoownsmentaland

physicalstates.Infact,thepayoffinbelievingthatyoudoownsuchstatesisthatyou26BCA,9.75-76:122-23:“Ifyouargue:forwhomistherecompassionifnobeingexists?,[sic][ourresponseis]foranyoneprojectedthroughthedelusionwhichisembracedforthesakeofwhathastobedone.[Objection]Whoseisthetasktobedone,ifthereisnobeing?[Mādhyamika]True.Moreover,theeffortismadeindelusion,but,inordertobringaboutanendtosufferingthedelusionofwhathastobedoneisnotprevented.”

33

canexperiencethebenefitsofbecominglessfixatedonanguishandsuffering.This

canmotivateyoutotakeproperaction.Granted,ifoneweretodispensewithbelief

inareal,persistingperson,onemaybelessmotivatedtofixateonself-interest,

whichinturnmightdeflateselfishambitions.However,thismaynothavethepayoff

aBuddhistmighthopefor.Onemightnotseeanyreasonwhatsoevertopursue

eitherself-interestedconsiderationsorother-regardingconsiderations.“Non-

egocentricity,”understoodasactingontheviewthattheselfisadispensablefiction,

doesnotnecessarilymotivateunselfishaction,evenifithelpsdeflatethemotivation

topursueselfishactions.27ThewaythatI’vesketched“selfless”actiondoesnot

requirethissortofnon-egocentricity.Theremaybeotherreasonstoendorsethe

No-Selfview,butit’shardtoseewhyethicalconsiderationsshouldmotivatethat

endorsement.

SonowthatI’vesketchedmyviewofwhatisinvolvedinnon-egocentricity

andunselfishor“selfless”behavior,I’dliketofinishthechapterbyprovidingabasic

schematicoftheseimportantconcepts.Idoso,becausetheywillbeamplyemployed

throughoutthewholeofthiswork.Inchapters2and4,Iwilldevelopamore

thorough-goingcritiqueoftheviewthatreducingthepersontoanownerless

streamofconsciousnesshasimportantethicalupshots.Iwillmorethoroughly

examinedistinctversionsoftheBuddhistNo-Selfargument,the“reductionist”vs.

the“emptiness”(deflationaryandminimalist)schoolsofthought,andexpose

variousproblemsIbelievethesehaveinaccountingforethicalagencyandunselfish,

altruisticaction.27Infact,itmayevenpromoteadeeper,disguisedselfishnessthatcomeswithneglectandactsofomission.Seefn.22.

34

1.3.2Non-egocentricity,Unselfishness,andOther-regardingConsiderations

Non-egocentricitycanbeviewedinapurelynegativemanner.Inthecontext

ofBuddhistthought,itmayrefertotheviewthatthemachinationsoftheego,and

theinfluenceofone’spracticalidentityaretemperedbytheviewthattheselfis

either“empty”(whollynon-existent)orreducibletoacomplexandimpersonal

psychophysicalstream,unifiedbyvariouscausalconnectionsandrelationshipsof

contiguity.TheBuddhistwhonolongerrecognizeshimselfasa“self,”mayinferthat

thereisnoreasontobeeitherobsessedwithrationalself-interestortofeardeath.

Forexample,MadhyamakaBuddhism(the“emptiness”schoolIwillfurtherdiscuss

inthefollowingchapters)rejectstheviewthatanysortofrealreductionbase—like

thebody,orthesubstratumofunanalyzablepsychophysicalevents—underliesthe

conceptionofselfhood.ThisiswhatI’mcallingthe“emptinessschool.”Adoptingthis

viewmayreduceone’sfixationonthenotionofselfhood.Butthismeansthatone

comestoviewallownership,and,asI’llargue,agencyas“empty.”Thismayormay

notamounttonihilism.Butwecaninferthatsuchapersonislessinclinedtohorde

orthinkonlyofhimself—there’sverylittlereasontofretovertheinterestof

somethingthatsimplydoesnotexist!So,inthissense,theviewsupportsnon-

egocentricity.Butthisdoesnotofferanypositivereasontoemphasizeother-

regardingconsiderations.There’snodirectreasontolinkother-centrismwith

metaphysicalself-abnegationorpracticalasceticism,especiallywhenself-

abnegationcanleadtoactsofomissionthatdisguiseobliqueformsofselfishness.

Thelossofselfmaycomeatthepriceofalossofconcernforothers.I’mremindedof

theTroglodytesinBorges’s,TheImmortal.ThequestingRomansoldier,Rufusfinds

35

himselfhorriblywoundedinthecityoftheimmortals.Theimmortals,having

achievedtranscendencebeyondthemortalpiningoftheego,andremainingin

meditativeequipoisewhilecontemplatingtheinfinite,arenotmotivatedtohelp

Rufus.Noraretheyparticularlyconcernedwithself-care.Fromsuchatranscendent

andimpersonalvantage-point,whybothernursingthewoundedsoldier?Neither

selfnorother-regardingmotivationsplayaroleinthisinfinitelystretched-outstate

oftranscendence.Theupshothereisthatnon-egocentrismdoesnotdirectlyentail

compassionoraltruistic-minded,other-regardingconsiderations.What’sworseis

thataseeminglynon-egocentricpatternmightsimplydisguiseaperniciousformof

apatheticegocentrism,whichprizesthepersonalstateofapathyovermorally

relevant,other-centricactionsthatonemaypursueorpromote.Whileunselfish

actionsdonotplaceundoimportanceonself-interest,andinthisway,theyare

“non-egocentric,”non-egocentricagencyisnotasufficientconditionforaltruism.

Thisbecomesabundantlyclearwhenconsideringhow“non-egocentricity”cancut

acrosstheintegrityofselfandotherinthebeliefthatnoone,strictlyspeaking,owns

mentalorphysicalstates.

However,unselfishness,asI’veconstruedit,isamorepositivenotion:itis

commissive.Wedonotcallsomeone“unselfish,”becausesheneitherobstructsnor

contributestosomeoneelse’swell-being.NothingaboutBorges’sTroglodytesis

unselfish.Bywithdrawingandremainingdetached,onemaynotbeveryegocentric

inherconcerns.Sheattainsasortofnon-egocentricitybynotbeingoverlyobsessed

withherselforothers.Butourethicalintuitions,atleastbymylights,view

“unselfishness”assomethingpositive,andcharacterizedbyexemplarydeeds.When

36

oneappreciatesandcaresforthevalidinterestsofanother,andwhenoneactively

putsanother’sconcernsaboveherown,ordoesnotmakeherownintereststhe

primarymotivatingfactor,thenoneisactinginanunselfishway.Farfrombeinga

detachedstate,thisrequiresthatonerecognizesandplacessomevalueonanother’s

interests,andallowsconcernforthoseintereststomotivateheractionwhile

downplayingtheimportanceofherown.Thismaynotbesynonymouswith

altruisticaction,butitisanecessaryconditionforaltruism.

Finally,I’dliketoclarifywhatImeanwhenIspeakof“other-regarding

considerations.”Thisisatermofart,and,asemployedbySturgeon,itsimplymeans

recognizingthat“someone,namelyX,hasareasontodoorwantorstriveto

promoteA.”28WhenIrecognizethatsomeone,namelyX,hasareasontodoorwant

topromoteA,thenIamexhibitingan“other-regardingconsideration.”Likewise,

whenIrecognizethatI,myself,haveareasontodo,want,orstrivetopromoteA,I

exhibita“self-regardingconsideration.”Thisdistinctionhelpsusarticulateatavery

generallevelreasonswehavefordoingthings.Somethingspertainsolelytothe

self,andsomethingspertaintoothers.Consideringtheintricateminutiaeof

motivatingreasonsforaction,theseconsiderationsoftenoverlap.However,the

distinctionhelpshighlightanimportantlogicalstructurethatrendersBuddhistnon-

egocentricity(asI’veglosseditherewithouttoomuchattentiontothevarietyof

Buddhistschools)problematictosaytheleast.WhenIvalueanother’sinterests,say,

inanunselfishaction,orwhenIsacrificemyowngoodforthegoodofanotherinan

altruisticaction,Icanmoreformallybesaidtorecognizethat“someone,namelyX,28NicholasL.Sturgeon,“Altruism,Solipsism,andtheObjectivityofReasons,”ThePhilosophicalReview,Vol.83,No.3(1974):374-402,cf.376.

37

hasareasontodoA.”Icometoseethatsincethisisanacceptedandgeneral

rationalstructure,itappliestoanyone.Thus,Ihaveareasontopromotethis

person’saim,andpromotingorfulfillingtheaimdoesnotneedtonecessarily

benefitme.ButifBuddhistnon-egocentricityhasthepotentialtoamounttoa

transcendent,andforthatreason,potentiallynihilisticoutlook,thenachievingsuch

astatemayleadmetolosegriponwhyanyonehasanyreasonstodoanything.Ican

nolongerformulatemymotivationsintermsofeitherself-regardingorother-

regardingconsiderations;nordoesanysortofoverlapcomeintoplay.Ratherthan

resonance,Iseemtoencounteracancellationpattern:Iamnolongerdrivenbyego-

thoughtsandself-interest,butneitherdothevaluesandinterestsofothersdrive

me.ThethreatisthatBuddhismcollapsesthedistinctionbetweenselfandother,

andtherebycollapsesthedistinctionbetweenself-regardingandother-regarding

considerations(andtheiroverlap).Thisthreatenstorendercompassionateand

altruisticaction,aswellaspositiveformsofunselfishness,formallyunintelligible.

Moreover,ithasthedangerofdisguising—andinthissense,perpetuating—amore

pernicious,becausetransparent,formofselfishness,namely,apatheticactsof

omission.

38

CHAPTER2:SELFLESSNESSANDNORMATIVITY:ŚĀNTIDEVAANDEMPTINESS

ETHICS

2.1Introduction

MycentralthesishereisthattheNo-Selfviewfailstoprovideuswithaclear

accountofagency,particularly,ethicalagency.Inchapter1,Iarguedinavery

generalwaythatourintuitionsregardingwhatitmeanstobeanethicalagentare

betteraccommodatedbyaconceptionoftheselfastheownerofitsmentaland

physicalstates.Furthermore,Ipointedoutthatinfluentialearlyandlate20th

CenturythinkerslikeHenrySidgwickandDerekParfitargued—albeitfromtwo

differentstandpoints—thatnormative,rational,andethicalconsiderationsare

importantlyshapedbyourconceptionofselfhood,particularlywithrespecttohow

weconceiveofthedistinctionbetweenselfandother.Ialso,inaverybroadway,

reconstructedaversionoftheBuddhistNo-Selfview(anātmanornairātmyavāda),

whichlikewiseplacesconsiderableethicalweightonhowweconceiveoftheself.I

thenarguedthatentertainingsuchaviewinthepracticaldomainmightnotonly

provetobeunnecessaryformakingsenseofother–regardingconsiderationsand

altruisticmotivations,butmayevencollapseorgreatlydestabilizeavitaldistinction

thatunderliessuchconsiderations:thedistinctionbetweenself-regardingand

other-regardingmotivations.Themetaphysicalself-effacermayendupfailingto

distinguishbetweenbeingselfishandbeingaltruistic,andthusproveincapableof

beingaltruistic.PracticalunselfishnessmayturnouttobeincompatiblewithNo-Self

39

metaphysics.Whilethis,onitsown,mightnotbeahighlyoriginalclaim,1Iwanted

tobetterclarifywhatmorallyrelevant“selflessness”mightmean.Indoingso,I

showedhowegocentricconsiderationsmightinfactbeconsistentwith

unselfishness(justasabolitionoftheegocanbepracticallyconsistentwith

selfishnessofthesortthat,inpopularimagination,Yashodharamusthavecharged

PrinceSiddhartha,whowiththeaimofachievingenlightenment,abandonedher

andtheirbaby).

ThecrucialissuetoexaminehereistherelationshipbetweentheOwnership

viewofself,whichcompellinglyaccommodatesmanyofourfirmintuitionswith

respecttoagencyandethics,andthevarioustheoreticalprogramsthatreviseour

beliefinanownerofmentaloccurrences.Insection2.2,Iaddresssomeofthe

glaringchallengesNo-Selfviewsfaceintermsofprovidingbothacompelling,

generalaccountofagency,andaspecificallyconvincingaccountofethicalagency.I

arguethatNo-Selfviewsrequirere-descriptionofsomefundamentalfeaturesof

forward-lookingagencyandlanguage-use,andIshowhowsuchre-descriptionsface

formidableproblemsthatarebettermetbyanOwnershipview.

Ionlybroadlycoveredthisprobleminchapter1.Theproblemisthatagency

andethicscruciallyappealtonotionslikevolition,voluntaryaction,freedom,

1PaulWilliams,StudiesinthePhilosophyoftheBodhicaryāvatāra:AltruismandReality(Dehli,India:MotilalBanarsidass,1998).WhileWilliamsdoesnotdescribetheprobleminthisway,IamcapitalizingonakeyinsightinhiscritiqueofŚāntideva'sargumentforimpartialismandaltruism.Williamshasclaimed,moreorless,thatemphasisonanātmanisconsistentwithmoralnihilism.Ontheotherhand,adoptingtheconventionalbeliefinaselfmightmotivatealtruismandmakesenseofnormativeconsiderations,butconventionalconsiderationscanalsosupporttheethicalintuitionthatprioritizingone’sownfuturewelfareisnotimmoral.

40

intention,andpersistenceandduration.Theviewthatweareownersofourmental

livesnicelyaccommodatesthedeeplyheldintuitionthatwecanberationalor

irrationalagentswhoareresponsibleforourlives,andthatsomesenseof

endurancejustifiesprudenceandconcernforthewelfareofournearestand

dearest.Thesearebasicaspectsofthelived,humanexperience,andthesenotions

areineluctablystubbornorganizingprinciplesthathavebeenemphasizedto

greaterorlesserdegreesthroughoutthehistoryofcivilizedlife.Moreover,these

principlesmakesociallivingconceptuallyintelligible.Theoreticaladvancements,

ontologicallyrevisionaryinsights,andcompellingreductionistprogramseither

forceustoabandonsomeofthesebasicnotions,orproceedalonganinsulated

domainofdiscoursethatsimplyremainsneutraltotherealityofagencyandethical

phenomena.Theradicalimplicationsofsometheserevisionarymodelsforour

ethicalintuitionsandformodelsofagencyandpracticalrationalitycanbecrudely

comparedtothedifficultiesquantummechanicspresentsforNewtonianphysics

andRelativityTheory.Thesephysicalmodels,certainaspectsofwhicharemutually

inconsistent,areallindispensabletotheadvancementofphysics—nonehavesofar

beenabandonedfortheother.Similarly,thesocialaspectofthehumancondition

thatproducesethicscannotbe“transcended”ordispensedwithmerelyinorderto

accommodateontologicalmodelsthatdispensewithperson-involvingandethical

terms.AndthisispreciselywhyBuddhistviews,andtheworkofParfit,areso

attractive:theyprovidepossibilitiesofasortof“grand”or“unifyingtheory”in

whichthetheoreticallycompellingprojectofreductionismmaybeabletoprovide

41

uswithnormative-ethicalinsights.Thus,itiscrucialforethiciststotakethese

projectsseriously.

WhilevariousNo-Ownershipand/orNo-Selfviewsmightdistance

themselvesfromnormativediscourse,thoseviewsthatdoattempttodevelopan

ethicalorientation—ortoderivenormativeprinciplesfromtheirontological

commitments—wouldbeattractivetothosewhowanttoretainthenormative

gravityof“Ishoulddotherightthing”whilealsoadheringtoeliminativismor

reductionismthatconstrues“I”asanemptyterm.Theethicalorientationofthe

BuddhistandParfitianprojectsarejustthesortsofviewsthatwanttoderivemoral

conclusionsfromontologicalcommitments(or,ontologicalrevisionsintheformof

metaphysicalnon-commitments).Isketchedonewayinwhichmetaphysicalviews

abouttheself—especiallyrevisionarymetaphysicalviews—canimportantlyimpact

whatitmakessensetodointhepracticaldomain.Thiswasinresponsetotheclaim

thatmetaphysicallydeepcategoriesdonotmattersomuchinethicalquestionsas

doconsiderationsofpracticalidentity.Thecounter-argumentIofferedinchapter1

claimedthatifwecanachieveacertainimpersonalviewaboutselfhood,thensuch

descriptiveviewsmightinfacthavenormativeimplications.Moreover,wemight

achieveanimpersonalviewthroughtheoreticaldialoguewithmetaphysics.For

example,oneversionoftheNo–SelfviewinBuddhism,the“reductionistview”that

wefindinVasubandhu(c.4th-5thC.CE),whichisarguablyrehearsedinŚāntideva’s

argumentforrationalaltruisminchapter8oftheBodhicaryāvatāra(passages101-

103),claimsthatunderanalysiswecanviewthepsychophysicalstreamintotally

impersonalterms.Wecandothiswithoutappealingtoanysortoffurther

42

underlyingandunifyingthread.Theideahereisthatpsychologicalcontinuity,and

variousformsofcausalrelationshipsbetweenpsychophysicalevents,underliesthe

erroneousviewthatthereisapersistingselfthatownsitsmentalandphysical

states.Whenweunburdenourselvesofthebeliefthatwearepersistingownersof

ourexperiences,wenotonlyfreeourselvesupforother-regardingconsiderationsin

theconventional,practicaldomain,butalsorecognizethataltruisticmotivationsare

rationallyjustified.

Ialsobrieflydiscussedavariantofthisview.Acknowledgingthatweneeda

morerobustviewofhowwedevelopaconceptionofownershipand“mineness,”

BuddhistslikeCandrakīrti(c.6thC.CE)—onJonardonGaneri’sreading2—argued

thatthesenseofselfisforgedthroughanappropriativeactivityinthepractical

domain.Igloss“appropriativeactivity,”asinvolvingthecapacityforthestreamto

“grasp”or“takeownership”of(orfuelandfeeditself)varioussensations,volitions,

andphysicalobjects.Appropriationisaglossontheterm,“upādāna,”whichisa

wordforfuel.3Thepsychophysicalstreamis“fueled”bywhatitwantsanddoesnot

want,whichisreflectedinitspositivepursuitsanditsvariousaversions.Thestream

operatesrelationallyandfluidlylikeafuelappropriatingoxygen.Without

hypostasizingthestream,wecansaythatpsychophysicalelementsshowupas

intimatelyrelatedbythesortsofintentionalobjectsatwhichsuchstatesaim,andby

whichthestreamfeedsitself.Thefuelofdesiredeterminesthedirectionalityof

thoseaims.Desireproducesakindofclosurewhereinstatesofconsciousnessknita2JonardonGaneri,TheConcealedArtoftheSoul:TheoriesofSelfandPracticesinIndianEthicsandEpistemology(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),atPartIII,155-185.3Ganeri,TheConcealedArt,200.

43

seeminglyunifiedtapestryoutofthesentiment,“Iwant,thereforeIam.”The“I”

appearstobesingularandself-sameasitisatermthatarisesoutofdesirefor

existenceandforsensualobjects.Towantistomaketheobjectofwantone’sown,

andthisprocessholisticallyproducesthesensethat“thisismine,”and“Iam.”There

islustforthelover’sbody,ordesiretosmellandtastesomethingsweet.Thereis

prideinthesupplemovementsofthebody,andacertainexperienceofpowerin

exertingphysicalforceandmaintainingsocialequilibrium.Contiguityand

continuitybetweendesiresandvolitionsproduceafirst-personsenseofunity,

whichisneitherameresumofpartsnorarealwhole.Wemightthinkofthisin

termsofasortof“vortex”ofdesiresandperceptionsthatforgeasenseofunityamid

the“grasping”actionthatBuddhismbelievesfuelssentientexistence.

Whilethisproducesanegocentricclosure,Iindependentlysuggestedthata

moreother-centricmanifestationoftheappropriativeactivitycouldbeonewayof

creativelyglossing“selflessness.”Whenwelearntomoreconsciouslyviewtheself

asadynamicactivitywithporousborders(notasubstantivething),anddispense

withthebeliefthatthesenseofselfistheresultofareal,persistingentity,wemay

betterlearntoidentifywiththeneedsandsufferingsofotherpeople.We

understandthatnorealmetaphysicallimitssustainahardandfastindividuation

betweenthemoreintimateneedsweexperience,andtheneedsthatothersattestto

having.Theveryboundarybetweentheintimateandtheobjectified“other”grows

blurry,andtheresultisasenseof“exchange”anddynamicunitybetweenselfand

other.Onthepracticallevel,theso-calledappropriativeselfisonebuiltoutofthe

variousmentalandphysicaloccurrencesthatareeitherappropriatedandidentified

44

with,ordisavowedortranscended.Thissortof“self-activity”or“self-ing”ismoreor

lesscoherent,butalwaysporousanddynamicallyinflux,anditisfueledbythe

mentaloccurrencesandvaluesthatitendorses.Theideahereisthatwiththeright

practicewecanexpandtheviewofselftoradicallyincorporateothers(andby

“others,”Imeanotherconstellationsofmentalandphysicaloccurrencesavailable

forappropriation).WhenthisissupportedbytheBuddhistsoteriologicalgoalof

liberationfromcyclesofsuffering—whichtheBuddhistarguesarechieflyproduced

byattachment,egoism,andnarrowobsessionwithone’sowndesiresandprojects—

wecancultivateadeeplyother-centricorientation.Thisispresumedtobea

liberatingandsalvificorientation—an“enactment,”ifyouwill,ofnon-egocentric

being.Iwilldevelopaslightlydifferent,butIthink,moreattractiveversionofthis

argumentinchapter3.However,inchapter4,Iwillpointoutsomeofits

shortcomings,andarguethatamorenormativeglossonthe“appropriativeself”

offersacontemporaryandrespectablyembodied,naturalisticview.Theimportant

differencebetweenthetwoversionsisthatthelattersupportsthebeliefthat

authorshipofone’slifethroughpracticalidentityandembodiedavowalsand

disavowalsisnotanillusiontobeseenthrough.

Insection2.3ofthepresentchapter,Iwilllayouttheconceptualterritoryof

contemporaryviewsonselfhood.MygoalistobettersituateNo-Selfviews.I

specificallysetuptheconversationinlightoftheMadhyamaka-Buddhist

“emptiness”thesis—theviewthatnothinginrealityhasintrinsicexistenceor

inherentessence(svabhāva).IfocusonMadhyamaka,becauseitsethicalchampion,

ŚāntidevaprovidesoneofthemoresystematicethicaltreatisesintheMahāyāna

45

corpus.Moreover,IneedtosituateMadhyamakaandŚāntideva’saltruisticproject

intermsofcompetingBuddhistNo-Selfviews.

In2.4,Icoverwithgreaterdetailtheutilitarian-leaningethicswemayextract

fromŚāntideva'sBodhicaryāvatāraandhisŚikṣāsamuccaya.Śāntidevaprovidesus

withaversionoftheNo-Selfviewthatpresumablyaimstoderivemoralconclusions

fromontologicalinsights.Furthermore,astheoristslikeCharlesGoodmanhave

contended,Śāntideva'sworkaimstojustifyaversionofact-consequentialism,

whichpromotesaltruismandagent-neutralethics.4Thisshouldbetakenseriously,

becausethereareindependentlycompellingreasonstodisavowthebeliefinareal

selforarealownerofexperiences.Soifwecandevelopaworkableethicsoutof

suchinsight,thenwemayhaveanethicallycompellingreasontodispensewithour

beliefinrealselves.

Goodmanprovidesaniceoverviewofsomeoftheindependentreasons

Buddhistshaveforrejectingbeliefintheself.Forexample,Buddhistsarefondof

appealingtovaguenessarguments.Mereologicalvagueness,whichdrivesvarious

Soritesproblems,destabilizesarealistaccountofcompositeobjects,thereby

problematizingourcapacitytoindividuateobjectsandidentifypartsthatbelongto

awhole.Moreover,itimpliesthatidentifyingPasapartofWisafunctionof

conceptualconstruction,andnotanisomorphicdepictionoffixedstructuresin

nature.Thus,allcompositeitems—likethecomplexstreamthatBuddhistsbelieve

accountfortheself—areconceptualimputationsthatdisappearunderanalysis.As

Goodmanwrites,“Plantsandanimals,artifactsandnaturalobjects,allhavevague4CharlesGoodman,TheConsequencesofCompassion:AnInterpretationandDefenseofBuddhistEthics(NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,2006).

46

spatialboundaries;oncewelookatthemontheatomiclevel,theyarecloudsoftiny

particles,whichconstantlyexchangematterwiththeenvironmentinsuchaway

thatthereisoftennofactofthematteraboutwhetheraparticularparticleispartof

themornot.”5Andofcourse,atthenormativelevel,vaguenessdrivesmanyofthe

controversiesinvolvedintheabortionandassisted-suicideandeuthanasia

questions.Parfitfamouslycapitalizesonvaguenesstoarguethatthereisnotalways

afactaboutthematterastowhetherornotsomeonehassurvivedaprocessof

change.This,ofcourse,hasimportantimplicationsfortheoriesaboutpersonal

identity,andfortheethicsofpunishmentandresponsibility.So,ifŚāntideva's

revisionaryworkcanprovideuswithnormativeconclusions,thenit’satheory

worthtakingveryseriously.However,tobettersituateŚāntideva'swork—andshow

howitmaydifferinimportantwaysfromParfit’sproject—weneedamore

thoroughtaxonomyofviewsabouttheself,particularlyNo-Selfviews,sincenotall

Buddhistsmeanthesamethingbydenyingtheexistenceofaself.

Iwilltacklethis,asIsaid,in2.3.Indoingso,IwillutilizeGaneri’shelpful

taxonomy.6Accordingly,IwillassessŚāntideva'sworkinlightofthistaxonomy.

Finally,in2.5,Iwillalsoassesssomeoftheleadingreconstructionsofthecrucial

passages,101-103,inchapter8ofŚāntideva'sBodhicaryāvatāra.Inthesepassages,

Śāntidevaarguesthatwemustendorserobustaltruism.Iwillultimatelyconclude,

likeHarris,7thatdenyingtheexistenceoftheselffailsinanystraightforwardwayto

5Goodman,TheConsequencesofCompassion,101-102.6JonardonGaneri,TheSelf:Naturalism,Consciousness,andtheFirst-PersonExperience(NewYork:Oxford,2012),chapter1.7StephenHarris,“DoesAnātmanRationallyEntailAltruism?OnBodhicaryāvatāra8:103,”JournalofBuddhistEthics18,2011:93-123.

47

justifyanaltruisticmoralimperative.Theremaybebetterwaystoreconstruct

Śāntideva'swork.However,Icannotcurrentlydeviseastrategyforrescuing

Śāntideva'sargument(althoughIprovidesomeoriginaltakesontheleading

critiquesofhisargument,whileprovidingametaphysicaloptionthatmightbolster

Śāntideva’sthesis).ItseemstomethatthemostcompellingreasonImighthavefor

helpingsomeone—orforbeingcommittedtoaltruism—isthroughsomeformof

identificationwiththatperson.Atsomegenerallevelofempathicidentity,yourpain

mightaswellbemypain:thisissomethingwecanshare.Atsomelevelof

metaphysicaldescription“weareallone,”andsoanysufferingissufferingforall.At

somelevelofsocialgenerality,Iwouldwanttobefreeofpain,andIbelievethatthis

isarightthatanyonewhoissufficientlyunbiasedwouldhavetoextendtoeveryone

inaRawlsian-contractualistsortofway.However,inallthesescenarios—pacethe

Buddhistemphasison“emptiness”—theimportantdistinctionbetweenselfand

otherisalwaysmaintained.Thekeytoaltruism,Ibelieve,restssomewhereinthe

paradoxicalnotionofforgingrealidentityamidstaccepteddifference.

2.2OwnershipandNo-SelfViews

SouthAsianthought,fromitsrichphilosophicalinquiryintothenatureofthe

selfintheUpaniṣads,toearlyBuddhistpracticalphilosophy,andmedievalBuddhist

epistemological-metaphysicalspeculation,hasviewedthequestionoftheselfasone

ofthemostcentralphilosophicalandspiritual-religiousquestionstopursue.A

generalbeliefpervadingtheconstellationofdiversetextswemonolithicallycall,

“Indianphilosophy”(darṡana)isthebeliefthatunderstandingthenatureoftheself

isnecessaryforcommandingaclearersenseofwhatoneshoulddo,inboththe

48

social-normativesphere,andinone’sprivatelife.Moreover,andparticularlyinthe

caseofBuddhism,understandingthenatureoftheselfisthoughttobenecessaryfor

achievingmaximumwell-being,forunderstandingone’sdutiesandsocialroles

(dharma),andforfreeingoneselffromtheexistentialsufferingthatpresumably

arisesfromholdingmistakenviewsabouttheself.8Infact,onewayofviewingthe

Buddha’smission,andthephilosophicalthoughtthathasgrownoutofthatmission,

istoseeitasadeeplypragmaticlaboraimedathealingvarious“psychological

sicknesses”thatarise—notoutofaberrantmentaldisordersandneuroses,but

rather,outoftheordinaryexperienceoflivingundererroneous,butdominant

practicalandphilosophicalparadigms.SotheBuddhamaybeviewedasakindof

“psychologicaldoctor,”9or“philosophicalhealer.”Especiallywithsuchfoundational

MadhyamakathinkersasNāgārjunaandCandrakīrti,Buddhismbecomesa

philosophicaltherapeuticandcorrectiveinitscritiqueofthereifyinghabitsand

practicesoflanguage-users,amovewe’vetakenveryseriouslyintheEuro-

AmericantraditionfollowingWittgenstein’slead.Also,inamoveparalleledby

HumeinBritishphilosophy,theBuddha’sprojectmightbeviewedasakindof8SeeGaneri,TheConcealedArtoftheSoul,157.GaneripointsoutincitingRichardGombrich:“Weoughtnottoconclude,however,thattheBuddha’sinterestinpersonsismerelystatistical,andthisisbecauseofanotherclaimhemakes,namely,thatthepathtotheremovalofsufferingrestsinfreedomfrommistakenconceptionsoftheself,ormistakenideasaboutwhathavingthisconceptconsistsin.”GaneridrawsonGombrich’sclaimthat“‘themostfundamentaldoctrineofBuddhism[isthat]Enlightenmentconsistsinrealizingthatthereisnosoulorenduringessenceinlivingbeings.”SeeRichardGombrich,“ReviewofJ.T.Ergardt,”Numen26(1979):270.Ganeriaddsinhisnote(157:n.2):“Itisperhapsworthstressingthattheclaimisnotthatwelaborunderaself-deception.Self-deceptionhastodowithwillfulerrorsinmydesejudgmentsaboutmyownmotivationsanddesires;theerrortowhichtheBuddharefershastodowithmistakesaboutthepossessionofaconceptofselfassuch.”9Ibid.,157.

49

empiricalphilosophical-psychology,or,proto-psychology.Thisisespeciallyvisible

intheAbhidharmatradition,whichaimedtoprovidemetaphysicalsupportforthe

leadingconceptualtenetsofBuddhism:theteachingsofnonself(anātman),

impermanence(anitya),andsufferinganditshealing(duḥkhaandnirodha).10

Abhidharmaarticulatedwhatitbelievedwerethefundamentalbuildingblocks

(dharmas),or,matricesofbasicexperientialdatathatunderlieourmentallivesand

expressthestructuresofourconsciousness.Thus,Buddhistphilosophy,withits

pragmatic-empiricalandtherapeuticorientation,andtheequallytherapeuticbut

deeplymetaphysicalYogatradition,emergingoutofPatañjali’sc.4thcenturyCE,

Yoga-Sūtras,alongwiththeanalyticandlogic-drivendiscourseoftheNyāya-

VaiśeṣikarealistsallsetthestageforwhatGanericalls,“substantivetruth-directed

debateabouttheself”intheIndiantradition.11TheBuddhistswereparticularly

concernedwithlocatingthesourceoferrorthatperpetuateserroneousthinking

abouttheself.12Onedoesnotexaggerateinsayingthatallthemajorschoolsof

Indianphilosophybelievedthatgettingitrightabouttheselfisessentialfor

achievingafullyrealizedlife(construedinbothtranscendentterms,andwith

respecttosocialharmonyandtheproperviewofone’ssocialrolesandduties).

Mahāyāna-MadhyamakaBuddhism,inthelikesofNāgārjuna,Candrakīrti,

andŚāntideva’s9thchapteroftheBodhicaryāvatāra,“PerfectionofWisdom”10Nāgārjuna’sMiddleWay:Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,translationandcommentarybyMarkSideritsandShōryūKatsura(Somerville,Massachusetts:WisdomPublications,2010),4.SideritsandKatsuradonotmentionanyrelationtoHumehere,buttheygiveasuccinctoutlineofthemetaphysicalaspectsoftheAbhidharmaprojectthatMahāyāna-Madhyamakathinkerswouldlaterdeconstruct.Seetheintroduction.11Ganeri,TheConcealedArt,159.12Ibid.,159.

50

(prajñā-pāramitā),adoptsaradicalglobal-irrealismbyattackingepistemological

foundationalism,anddeconstructingsubstanceontologyaltogether.Ifthe

Sautrāntika-AbhidharmaphilosophyofVasubandhu(c.4th-5thC.CE)soughtto

locateandanalyzethebasicexperientialstuffoutofwhichourmentallivesare

constructed,theMadhyamakaSchool,growingoutofNāgārjuna’s

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā(“RootVersesoftheMiddlingPath”),soughtto

problematizetheepistemologicalassumptionsthatgroundedsuchapursuit.This

inspiredtheMādhyamikaphilosophertodeveloparadicallyrelationalphilosophy,

eschewinganyreferencestoeitherrealnaturalkinds,orfoundationalknowledge

obtainedthroughallegedlycertifiedandtruth-producinginstruments(pramāṇa).13

Thus,itisnecessarytoclarifythenuancediterationsoftheNo-Selfviewthatarise

outofthetroveofdivergingtextscalled,“Buddhism.”Itisalsonecessarytoprovide

abroaderscopeofthedifferentconcernsthatdrovetheevolvingcritiqueofbeliefin

apersisting,substantialself.Helpfully,Ganerihasdistilledtwobasicresearch

targetsrunningthroughoutthevariegatedstrandsoftheBuddhistproject:

1. Identifyfalseconstitutiveaccountsoftheconceptofself,andprovideinstead

atrueaccountofwhatourconceptofselfconsistsin.

2. Considerwhethertheconceptofself,correctlydescribed,hasanyplaceina

properlyconstitutedmentallife.14

13ForanupdatedinterpretationofNāgārjuna’sVigrahavyāvartanī(“TheDispellerofDisputes”),atextdevotedtocritiquingepistemologicalfoundationalism,particularly,therealismendorsedbytheNyāyaphilosopherswithrespecttotheexistenceofjustifiedknowledgeobtainedthroughuseofthepramāṇas,seeNāgārjuna’sVigrahavyāvartanī,translationandcommentarybyJanWesterhoff(NewYork:Oxford,2010).14Ganeri,TheConcealedArt,159.

51

No-Selfviewsmaybeorientedagainstthebackgroundofthesetwo

trajectories.First,onemustprovideaconvincingaccountofwhatisconceptually

constitutiveofselfhood.Second,onemustdeterminethepracticalandethical

upshotofemployingthiscorrect,or,correctedaccountofself.Withthatinmind,I’d

liketoarticulateseveralphilosophicallyrelevantiterationsoftheNo-Selfviewin

ordertomorecloselyassess,inlightofchapter1,whetheramorecompelling

accountofethicalagencyandjustifiedaltruismcanbedevelopedbydepartingfrom

theviewoftheselfasanembodiedownerofitsmentalandphysicalstates.Iwill

beginbyadoptingausefultaxonomyfromGaneri’swork.

Butbeforeturningtothattaxonomy,I’dliketoemphasizethatinorderfora

No-Selfviewtobeconvincing,especiallythoseviewsclaimingthatevenacorrectly

describedconceptofselfisamoralillthatsomehowimpedesonefromachieving

optimalethicalclarityandmaturity,ithastoovercomesomeformidableontological

andethicalobstaclessurroundingtheconceptofagency.AsI’veclaimedabove,

chapter1wasabroadandverygenericrehearsalofwhatisethicallyatstakewhen

weconsiderthemetaphysicsofselves.Buttheepistemologyofselvesisequally

importantwhenconsideringagency.HowIcometoknowthatcertainplansand

preferencesareinyourinterest,andhowIcometorelatetothevariousbeliefs,

desires,andintentionsthatfashionmyplansandinterests,asbeingmine,require

thatIemploysomeconceptionofselfhood.Ownershipandanattendantconception

ofselfarekeycomponentsthatmakeagencyandself-regardingandother-regarding

considerationsintelligible.AsGaneriargues,theconceptofself“isimportant

becauseitenablesmetothinkofmyideasandemotions,myplansandaspirations,

52

myhopesandfears,asmine—asbelongingtome,andtheproperfocusofmyself-

interest.”15Thediscussionofconflictsbetweenself-interestandconsiderationsof

thegreatergooddoesnotgetoffthegroundwithoutsomeworkingconceptionof

selfhood.Inchapter1,Ishowedhowthestrategyofcollapsingthedistinction

betweenselfandotherdoesnotnecessarilydefusetheconflictbetweenselfand

other.Itmayeither:(1)leaveuswithnomotivations,or,(2)disguiseadeeper

selfishnessthatcomeswithapatheticactsofomission.Moreover,lackingaconcept

ofaselfistantamounttolackingarobustsenseofagency:onewouldlackthe

capacitytoconsiderhowintentionsandinterestscoincideorconflict.Altruism

wouldnotmakesenseunlessonehadaclearsenseofwhoseinterestsareatstake,

andwhoseinterestsareeitheradvancedorimpeded.

Also,asMaryaSchechtmanhaspointedout,somesenseofdurationand

persistenceisconceptuallyessentialinaconvincingnotionofselfhood,andthisis

straightforwardlysupportedbyanOwnershipviewoftheself.Durationand

connectednessisrequiredformakingsenseoftalking,listening,working,acting,

havingbeliefs,desires,goals,intentions,andforthinking,andvacillating,andbeing

inconsistent.16Indeed,asArindamChakrabartihaspointedout,theselfhasbeen

usedtoconceptuallymakesenseoftheforward-lookingnatureofdesire,andto

makesenseofourcapacitytorecognizepersonsandthings,andtocommunicate

15Ganeri,TheConcealedArt,191.16CitedfromSorabji,TheSelf,270.SeeMaryaSchechtman,TheConstitutionofSelves(Ithaca:CornellUniversity,1996),137.Sorabjiwrites:“Thereisyetanotherdifficulty[forNo-SelfviewsandParfitianstylereductionism]:aperson’sactivitiesarelinkedtogetherinafargreatervarietyofcontextsthanthefewthatParfitconsiders,andnormallythelinkageinvolvestheideaofthesameowner,sothat,ifwedropthatidea,allthesecaseswouldneedtobere-described.

53

anduselanguage.17So,insummary,aNo-Selfand/orNo-Ownershipviewmust

addressthreegeneralproblems.

1. Intermsofethicalagency,theNo-Selfview,atleastonthesurface,threatens

todestabilizethedistinctionbetweenself-regardingandother-regarding

considerations,andthisisabasicdistinctionthatmakesaltruismintelligible.

2. Again,intermsofethicalagency,theequanimitythattheBuddhistbelievesis

achievedinfullyrealizingtheNo-Selfview,seems,atleastonone

interpretation,18toproduceadilemma.Ontheonehand,whenthe

importanceofconventionalselfhoodisstressed,thecloseandpersonal

conventionalrelationshiptoone’sownfuture-selfseemstojustifyatleast

moderateegoism(oraprivilegingofone’sownfuturewelfare).Ontheother

hand,byde-emphasizingconventionalselfhood,equanimitymaybe

achieved,butequanimityisnotlogicallyinconsistentwithapathyand

neglect;sode-emphasizingconventionalselfhoodisconsistentwithmoral

nihilism.Clearly,moderateegoismandnihilismunderminethedemanding

commitmenttoaltruismthattextslikeBodhicaryāvatāraendorse.

3.ThereareallsortsofproblemsfortheNo-Selfviewthatconcernbroader

notionsofagency.Forexample,everythingfromdevelopingafull-fledged

intention,toentertainingself-doubt,anticipation,repentance,orengagingin17AlsocitedinSorabji,TheSelf,295.SorabjicitesChakrabarti’stranslationofthe10thcenturyCENyāyaphilosopher,JayantaBhaṭṭa,whoarguedthatlinguisticcommunication,fromthesuccessiveapprehensionoforderedphonemes,totheholisticapprehensionofawholesentence,bolsterstheviewthatanenduringselfisoperativeinsynthesizingfieldsofdata.SeeArindamChakrabarti,“TheNyāyaProofsfortheExistenceoftheSoul,”JournalofIndianPhilosophy10,1982,211-38,at225.18Harris,“DoesAnātman,”102:Harrisreferstothisproblemas“Śāntideva'sdilemma,”anddevelopshisassessmentoutofPaulWilliams’scritiqueinStudies.

54

inconsistentorillogicalthinkingrequiressomesenseofpersistenceand

duration.Werequiresomesenseofpersistenceanddurationtoevenconnect

thephonemesthatmakeupwords,whichthenproduceintelligible

sentences.Inshort,thefuture-directed,orforward-lookingnatureofagency

requiresasenseofdurationandpersistencethattheOwnershipviewmore

easilyaccommodates.

SoI’vebasicallyboileddowntheproblemwithNo-Selfand/orNo-Ownership

viewstotwogeneralproblemsconcerningethicalagency,andonegeneralproblem

concerningtheforward-lookingnatureofagencyandlinguisticcommunication.

However,infairnesstotheNo-Selfview,whichhasseveralnuancedversions,we

cannotsimplyassumethatNo-Selfersdenytheimportanceofconventionalselfhood

andownership,especiallywhendoingsoproducesaglaringlyincoherentaccountof

everyday,transactionalreality.Andyet,asstatedin(2)above,itremainstobe

shownhowaNo-Selfviewthatemphasizesanimpersonalperspectiveescapesthe

egoism/nihilismdilemma.Moreover,itremainstobeshownjusthownormativity

canbederivedfromtherevisionarymetaphysicalassertionsvariousBuddhistNo-

Selfersendorse.AsHarrishasshown,19thisisaformidableproblem,andwe’veyet

toproduceasatisfactoryaccountofhowtheontologicalclaimofNo-SelfandNo-

Ownershipentailsthemoralimperativethatweshouldbecommittedtoaltruism.

Accordingly,IwilldevelopabroadsketchofOwnershipandNo-Selfviews,and

examinewherewemightplacetheargumentsforaltruismthatBuddhist

philosopherslikeŚāntidevaemployed.Iwanttospecificallyexaminehow

19SeetheconclusioninHarris,“DoesAnātmanRationallyEntailAltruism?”

55

Śāntideva’sargumentholdsupagainstsomeoftheconceptualrequirementsthatan

Ownershipviewofselfmoreeasilyaccommodates.

2.3OwnershipandIndividuation:VarietiesofSelflessness

Ganerihasprovidedoneofthemostsuccinctcontemporarytaxonomiesthat

organizetheintersectionandconversationbetweencontemporaryviewsofselfand

classicalIndianNo-Selfviews.Heemploysacrucialorganizingprincipleextracted

fromtheIndiantradition:thedistinctionbetween“place”(ādhāra)and“base,”or,

“restingplace”(āśraya).Thesearetermsofartthataddressboththeissueof

ownership,thatis,thequestionofwhoownsasetofmentaloccurrences,and

addressestheissueofmetaphysicaldependence,thatis,theissueofaccountingfor

thatuponwhichamentallifeismetaphysicallydependent.20“Place,”answersthe

ownershipquestion,and“base”answersthequestionofwhatindividuatingground

supportsanindividual’sexperiences.21Putstillanotherway,wecanaskwherewe

shouldplacementaloccurrences,likegleeoranxiety,andhowweshouldestablish

thebasisofindividuation.Ganeriorganizesviewsaboutselfintofourtypes,and

elevenbasicviews.

Figure1.22

20Ganeri,TheSelf,38.21Ibid.,48.22Ganeri,TheSelf,36-49.Thisschemaispulledalmostverbatimfrom40-47.Iincludeit,becauseIwilldrawfromitthroughouttherestofthisessay.Moreover,Iprovideindependentanalysis.

Type-I:One-dimensionalViews

56

1.CartesianView

§ Theselfisboththeplaceandthebase.§ Theselfisboththeowneroftheexperience,andthatuponwhichit

adjectivallydepends;justlikeaknotdependsadjectivallyupontheexistenceoftheropeoutofwhichitisaknot,somentalexperiencesarenotpossiblewithoutabasicsubstratum,orbareparticular,whichistheself.

2.MaterialistView

§ Thebodyisboththeplaceandthebase.§ Thisontologyismonisticwithrespecttotheunderlyingentitiesthataccount

formentalandphysicalproperties.However,materialismalsoaccommodatestype-identitytheoryandpropertydualism(forexample,Strawson’sMandPpredicates,andotherformsofnon-reductivematerialism).

3.ReductionistView

§ Thestreamofpsycho-physicaloccurrencesisboththeplaceandthebase.§ HumeandParfitprovideexamplesofthisview:astreamofexperience

collectivelyprovidesmentalstateswithbothanindividuatingidentityandanowner.

4.OwnershipView

§ Theselfisplace,andthebodyisbase.§ ConstitutionView:therelationbetweenbodyandselfisaconstitution

relation,likethatbetweengoldandaring;thatis,thebodyconstitutestheself.However,theselfisnotidenticalwithorreducibletothebody.

§ NaturalSelfView:theselfisthebasisuponwhichtherecanbeamentallife.ItisnotaCartesianrescogitans,thatis,itisnotsomethingwhoseessenceisthinkingandconsciousness.Ourmentallives,however,aremetaphysicallydependentuponabody.

§ MinimalOwnershipView:theselfismoreaptlycharacterizedasanembodiedandinvariantsenseofreflexivelyattunedpresence.

o Whatunitesallthesethreadsisthattheselfismetaphysicallydependentuponthebody,buttheselfisnotreducedtothebody.

Type-II:RealSelfViews

57

5.PhenomenalView

§ Theselfisplace,andthestreamisbase.§ Theselfmaybeemergentfrom,orconstitutedby,astreamofmental

occurrences,butitisneitheridenticalwithnorreducibletothestream,whichisitsindividuatingbase.

6.PureConsciousnessView

§ Theselfisplace,butthereisnobase.§ Selfispureconsciousness,self-owning,andmetaphysicallydependenton

nothing!Forexample,the“witnessconsciousness”(śakṣin)ofAdvaitaVedānta.

7.NP-1:Thebodyisbase,butthereisnoplace(Abhidharma).8.NP-2:Thestreamisbase,butthereisnoplace(YogācāraandSautrāntika).9.NP-3:Thereisnobase,andthereisnoplace(Madhyamaka).

10.TornadoView

§ Thebodyisbase,andthestreamisplace.§ Theselfisanemergentphenomenonthatarisesfromdynamicand

sufficientlycomplexsystems.Superveningoverthebody,itdisplaysautonomy.IntheTornadoview,“Wewouldthenthinkofthemindasatornado-likeoccurrencewithinadynamicflowofexperience.WhatcharacterizestheTornadoView,aboveall,isthethoughtthatmindisanemergentmacrostateofthenon-lineardynamicalbehaviorofaggregatedparticles,herementalevents.”23

23Ganeri,TheSelf,47.

TypeIII:NoPlace(i.e.,NoOwnership)Views:BuddhistSchools

TypeIV:StreamisPlace

58

11.FlameView

§ Thestreamisplace,andthereisnobase.§ TheFlameViewdispenseswiththeideathattheselfisemergentfroman

underlyingmicrostateofshiftingpatternsofaggregates.Instead,onthemodelofaflame,theselfemergesoutofaconstantfusionandmutationofnon-persistingparticulars.

Figure1.

Theadvantageofusing“place”and“base”terminologyisthatitnuancesand

complicatestheconversationaboutselves.Thenotionofanenduringself

disappearsintheMaterialistandReductionistviews.However,theseviewsembrace

theideathatsomesortofownership,or“place,”isoperativeintheprocessesthat

producethesenseofself.Inotherwords,“itisopentostipulatethatwhattheterm

‘self’reallymeans,inanyoftheseviews,iswhateveritisthattheviewtakestobe

theplace:thebodyorthestream.”24SoGaneri’spointclarifiestheradicalnatureof

theBuddhistNo-Selfviews.Itisnotjustareductionistprojectthatrevisesand

stipulatesadistinctplaceofownership.Theseviews,articulatedastheyareherein

termsof“place,”denythatitultimatelymakessensetospeakofanyownershipat

all.25However,notallBuddhistsmaintainedsuchaview.TheVātsiputrīya

Buddhistsarguedthatsomesortof“person”(pudgala)supervenesovermicro-

elements,andisemergentfrom,butnon-reducibletosuchmicro-states.Theywould

notembraceNP1-NP3.WhenVasubandhusummarilydiscountsthisview,ofwhich

wehaveapaucityoftextstodrawfrom,hedoesnotenvisionthemorecomplex

emergentist,systems-dynamicalviewsthatwouldgainsuchpopularitytoday.Like

24Ibid.,47.25Ibid.,47.

59

thereductionists,theVātsiputrīyaBuddhistswantedtominimizeontologyby

eschewingtheviewthatanimmaterialsoulexistsdistinctfromthebody.However,

theywerenotwillingtoreducementallifetojustafunctionalist-causalmodelof

impersonalpsychophysicaloccurrences.FortheAbhidharmaBuddhists,

particularlytheVasubandhuofAbhidharmakośabhāṣya,sequencesoftropes

superveneonthephysicalbody,26andthisaccountsfortheerroneousbeliefinan

enduring,Cartesianself.The“mind-only”(Citamātra/Vijñānavāda)schools,also

knownas“Yogācāra,”areinterpretedtobeidealistsofonesortoranother.Theyare

representedbyNP2,inthattheybelieveasenseofselfarisesoutofrelations

internaltoamentalstream,anddoesnotsuperveneonaphysicalbody.Finally,

MadhyamakaBuddhism,whichdeniesthatanythinghasindependentandintrinsic

existence(svabhāva),rejectsanysortofrealsupervenienceorrealdetermining

relations.27

Thislatterviewmaybereadinaneliminativistsortofway.Forthe

Mādhyamika,inorderforXtobemetaphysicallyindependent,itneedstobefreeof

anysortofcausalorontologicaldependenceonanythingelse.Showingthatnothing

conceptuallyfitsthebillofhavinganessence,or,havingmetaphysicalindependence

revealsthatallthingsareessentially“coreless”(asāra),andappearasco-relational

termsinaninterdependentfieldof“emptiness”(śūnyatā).However,ina

contemporarycontext,wecansaythattheChurchlandeliminativistbelievesthatwe

canabandontalkofthetheoreticalentity“eliminated”byacompellingreduction

discourse.Oncewefindanimpersonalandpurelyphysical-functionalwayof26Ganeri,TheSelf,47.27Ibid.,48.

60

describingthemind,forexample,weneednotspeakofmindsatall.Thatis,wecan

replacetalkofmindswithtalkofneuronsand/orfunctionalsystems.Idoubtthat

wecanreadtheMadhyamakaprojectinthisway.Infact,sometheoristshave

suggestedthatwecanreadMadhyamakaphilosophyasaformofdeflationary-

minimalism.28What’sniceaboutthisreadingisthattheradical,andoften

inscrutable,natureofMadhyamakaisreconstructedasaphilosophythatprizes

epistemichumility,whileeschewingtheneedfordeepmetaphysicstoprovide

justificationforourpractices.29FortheMādhyamika,allmetaphysicalviews,

particularlythebeliefinanenduringself,ensnareusindichotomousandangst-

inducingthought;thus,divestingourselvesofsuchmetaphysicalcommitmentsis

thekeytoliberation.Indeed,eventheclaimthatallis“empty,”or,interdependent

andwithoutessence,shouldnotbeentertainedasapositivemetaphysicalclaim.30

Thisclearlysupportsthedeflationaryreading.Wecanembracetheconventional

understandingofphenomenawithoutbelievingthattheentitieswehavecommerce

28RoyW.Perrett,“PersonalIdentity,Minimalism,andMadhyamaka,”PhilosophyEastandWest,Vol.52,No.3(July,2002):373-385.29Perrett,“PersonalIdentity,Minimalism,Madhyamaka,”375:“AccordingtoMinimalism,metaphysicalpicturesofthejustificatoryundergirdingsofourpracticesdonotrepresentrealconditionsofjustificationofthosepractices.Anymetaphysicalviewthatwemayhaveofpersonsisnotindispensabletothepracticeofmakingjudgmentsaboutpersonalidentityandorganizingourpracticalconcernsaroundthesejudgments.”30SeeNāgārjuna’sMūlamadhyamakakārikā,(Saṃskāra-parīkṣā),13.8.

śūnyatāsarvadṛṣṭīnāmproktāniḥsaraṇaṃjinaiḥ|

yeṣāṃtuśūnyatādṛṣṭistānasādhyānbabhāṣire||

EmptinessisdeclaredbytheVictoriousonestobetheexpedientforall[metaphysical]views.Forthoseforwhomemptinessisaview,theyhavebeensaidtobeincompleteandincurable.

61

withariseunmediatedbyconceptualimputation.Ofcourse,revealingthatwe

imputeconceptsonourexperiencesdoesnotmeanthatwehavetoembraceradical

skepticism.It’sonethingtosaythatsomethingismediatedbyconcepts,andquite

anotherthingtosaythat,asaresult,we’vefalsifiedourexperience.31The

deflationaryandminimalistreadingtempersMadhyamakabyviewingitasa

rejectionofthetraditionalrealistprojectofdescribingthingsfromapurportedly

God’s-eyeview,or,a“viewfromnowhere.”Soitviewsjustificationassolelya

productofconventionandconceptualconstruction.32Allentitiesariseoutofaweb

ofinterdependentconceptualschemes,andseeingtheschemequaschemeis

presumedtobealiberatingachievementthatfreesusfromthepangsof“views”

(dṛṣṭi).Thus,wecanreadMadhyamakaasatherapeuticandself-corrective

philosophyalongthelinesofWittgenstein.33However,allthisnotwithstanding,it

seemsuncontroversial—orproblematicallyambiguous—thatMadhyamaka

philosophyeschewsthebeliefinanysortofmetaphysicalownershiporfirmly-fixed

31ThispointhasbeenbroughthomebyBernardWilliamswithrespecttoNietzsche’sclaimthatallconceptualmediationisfalsificationofonesortoranother.CitedinGaneri,TheConcealedArt,168.Seealso,BernardWilliams,TruthandTruthfulness(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002),17.32Perrett,“PersonalIdentity,Minimalism,andMadhyamaka,”379:“Iwanttoclaimthatthe…MadhyamakapositiononpersonalidentityasaBuddhistanalogueoftheWesternMinimalistpositiononpersonalidentity.Bothbelievethatanymetaphysicalviewthatwemayhaveofpersonsisnotindispensabletothepracticeofmakingjudgmentsaboutpersonalidentityandorganizingourpracticalconcernsaroundthesejudgments.Bothbelievethatthepresenceorabsenceof“deepfacts”aboutpersonalidentityislargelyirrelevanttojustifyingourordinarynormativepracticesbecausethesearefoundednotonmetaphysicsofpersonbutonourcircumstancesandneeds.”33Yuktiṣaṣṭikā,“Nāgārjuna’sReasonSixtywithCandrakīrti’sCommentary,”translationbyJosephLoizzo(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2007).SeePartIIIofLoizzo’sintroduction,“DereificationandSelf-CorrectioninChandrakīrtiandWittgenstein.”

62

individuatingbase,andthisbecomesaproblemwhenwe’retryingtomakesenseof

agencyandthealtruisticprogramendorsedbyMahāyānaBuddhism.Accordingly,I

willnowturntoBodhicaryāvatāra—atextglossedasanexampleofMadhyamaka

philosophy—andassesswithmoredetailwhetherornotŚāntideva’sprojectcan

withstandtheconceptualobstaclesIaddressedabove.

2.4Bodhicaryāvatāra:Altruism,Egoism,andUtility

The8thcenturyCEBuddhistphilosopher,Śāntidevacomposedoneofthe

mostlyricalandsincereexpressionsoftheMahāyāna-BuddhistethosintheSanskrit

language.Indoingso,healsoprovidedamoresystematicandethics-driventreatise

thatmorecloselyparallelsthegenerality,strategies,andaimsofcontemporary

ethicsthandoothertextsinclassicalBuddhismandIndianphilosophy.34Infact,

CharlesGoodmanarguesthattheshiftintheethicalorientationbetweenearly

TheravādaBuddhismandlaterMahāyānaBuddhismliesinthelatter’smore

systematicarticulationofvaluesthatparalleluniversalist-consequentialismand

classicalact-utilitarianism.Insupportofthisclaim,it’sworthcitinginwholethe

34Goodman,TheConsequencesofCompassion,96:“IthasbecomeacommonplaceamongscholarsthattheBuddhisttraditiondidnotproduceanysystematicethicaltheory.Thereissometruthtothisassertion;theTheravādatraditionandsuchMahāyānatextsasthe“ChapteronEthics”donotpresentreasoningaboutthenatureofmoralityortherationaleforparticularethicalnormsthatrisestothelevelofgeneralityfoundinnumerousancientandmodernWesterntreatmentsofthesubject.OfalltheproductionsoftheIndianBuddhisttradition,thetextsthatcomeclosesttoaworked-outethicaltheoryarethetwoworksofŚāntideva:theBodhicaryāvatāra,orIntroductiontotheBodhisattva’sWayofLife,andŚīkṣā-samuccaya,orCompendiumoftheTrainings…Thesophistication,generality,andpowerofŚāntideva’sargumentsgivehimalegitimateclaimtobethegreatestofallBuddhistethicists.”

63

passagefromŚāntideva'sŚikṣāsamuccayathatGoodmanbelievesepitomizesthe

Mahāyānaproject.35

Throughactionsofbody,speech,andmind,theBodhisattvasincerelymakesacontinuousefforttostopallpresentandfuturesufferinganddepression,andtoproducepresentandfuturehappinessandgladness,forallbeings.Butifhedoesnotseekthecollectionoftheconditionsforthis,anddoesnotstriveforwhatwillpreventtheobstaclestothis,orhedoesnotcausesmallsufferinganddepressiontoariseasawayofpreventinggreatsufferinganddepression,ordoesnotabandonasmallbenefitinordertoachieveagreaterbenefit,ifheneglectstodothesethingsevenforamoment,heisatfault(italicsmine;translation,Goodman).36

Bracketingtheintricatedistinctionsandphilosophicaldifferencesthat

characterizethevariousMahāyānaschoolssincec.100BCEtothepresentday,we

canbesurethatallMahāyānaBuddhismconvergesonthegeneralbeliefthat

cultivating“greatcompassion”(mahākaruṇā)ispartlyconstitutiveofthegoalof

achievingBuddhistenlightenmentandBuddhastatus.FortheMahāyānaBuddhist,

achievingBuddhahoodisthesupremegoal.WhiletheBuddhacouldhaveremained

alonelyforest-dweller,savedbyhisowntranscendentaccomplishments,heinstead

chosetoteachoutofcompassionfortheexistentialsufferingofotherseekers.Not

onlymotivatedtoseekpersonalliberation,theMahāyānaBuddhist-heroes,or,

Bodhisattvasdelaytheirownreleaseinordertoliberateallsentientbeingsfromthe

throesofsaṁsāra(cyclicexistence),andthevarious“hellrealms”believedtoexist

inclassicalBuddhistcosmology.Bodhisattvasstrivetocultivatethe“awakened35Goodman,9736Goodman,TheConsequencesofCompassion,97:“Notoneofthemajorcharacteristicsofclassicalact-utilitarianismismissingfromthispassage.Thefocusonactions;thecentralmoralimportanceofhappyandunhappystatesofmind;theextensionofscopetoallbeings;theextremedemands;theabsenceofanyroomforpersonalmoralspace;thebalancingofcostsandbenefits;thepursuitofmaximization:everyoneofthesecrucialfeaturesofutilitarianismispresent.”

64

mind”(bodhicitta),whichamountstothecultivationofnobleattainments,or,

“perfections”(pāramitā).Byattainingunshakeabledhyāna(meditativeone-

pointednessofmindandyogicdetachment),whichisthekeypāramitādevelopedin

chapter8ofBodhicaryāvatāra,Bodhisattvasrecognizetheinterdependenceofself

andother,andtheypracticeanexalted“exchange”oridentificationwithall

sufferingbeings.Thisisinfactsoexaltedastateofachievementthatitisregarded

asasortof“secret”(guhya)drawnoutofacavernouslyinward,obscured,andnot

fullyarticulatedsenseoffellow-feeling.ŚāntidevanotablycapturesthisintheBCAat

8:120:

Whoeverlongstorescuequicklybothhimselfandothersshouldpracticethesuprememystery(paramam-guyam):exchangeofselfandother(parātma-parivartanam).

ThemeritsthatBodhisattvasaccruethroughthesepracticesaredevotedto

thesalvificreleaseofthosewhoarestillcorruptedbythepangsofmortalexistence.

Therevisionary/reformativeMahāyānaschoolsviewedtheso-calledlesservehicle

Buddhists(hīnayāna)oftheearlyTheravādatradition(adesignationfashionedby

Mahāyāna)asinsufficientlyconcernedwiththealtruisticspiritoftheBuddha.While

TheravādapresumablyemphasizesindividualliberationintheimageoftheArhat,

Mahāyānaemphasizesthealtruisticcompassionoftheself-sacrificingBodhisattva.

Mahāyānaschoolsfurtherdistinguishthemselvesbyviewingachievementof

Buddhahoodasthegreatestgoal.PartofwhatitmeanstobeaBuddha,theybelieve,

istodevoteoneselftouniversalsalvation.Thisdedicationisexpressedthrough

altruisticandconsequentialist-orientedactsofself-sacrifice.

65

Foronewhofailstoexchangehisownhappinessforthesufferingofothers,Buddhahoodiscertainlyimpossible—howcouldthereevenbehappinessincyclicexistence?(BCA,8:131)HeyMind,maketheresolve,‘Iamboundtoothers’!Fromnowonyoumusthavenootherconcernthanthewelfareofallbeings(BCA,8:137).Ifthesufferingofoneendsthesufferingofmany,thenonewhohascompassionforothersandhimselfmustcausethatsufferingtoarise(BCA,8:105).Throughmymeritmayallthoseinanyofthedirectionssufferingdistressinbodyandmindfindoceansofhappinessanddelight.Aslongastheroundofrebirthremains,maytheirhappinessneverfade.LettheworldreceiveuninterruptedhappinessfromtheBodhisattvas(BCA,10:2-3).

Thisexaltedsenseofconcernforallbeingsresonateswiththeagent-neutral

ethicsandimpartialismfoundinutilitarianandconsequentialistdiscourses.Rather

thanplacingemphasisontheownerofsuffering,theutilitarian-mindedphilosopher

placesultimateimportonthetotalquantityofsuffering.Inchapter1,Ibriefly

discussedŚāntideva’sargumentforviewingsufferinginanegalitarian,impersonal,

andthereforeimpartiallight.Therationalandmotivationaleconomyrequiredto

practicesuchanethiciswhatearly20thcenturyutilitarianslikeSidgwickcalled,

“rationalbenevolence.”Inachievinganimpersonalview,onerecognizesthat“from

thepointofviewoftheUniverse,”herownsufferingisnotprivilegedoveranyone

else’s.Giventhatmoregoodisbetterthanless,onerecognizesareasontotake

particularinterestinthetotalsumofgoodandbadintheworld.Andinorderto

actuallyactuponthatinsight,onemustcultivatethecapacitytosacrificeone’sown

egocentricconsiderationsforconsiderationsofthegreatergood.Likewise,

Bodhisattvasarecalledontodelaytheirownreleaseuntilallsentientbeings

achieveenlightenment.Theyselflesslydevotethemselvestothegoodofall.

66

Thephilosophicalquestionthatarisesformeisthis:How,andunderwhat

conditions,woulditmakesensetosetasidemyoptimaladvantageforanother’s

advantage?Inanapplied-ethicalcontext,thiswouldhavetobeassessedonacase

bycasebasis.ButI’maskinghowwecanmakesenseofthisstructurally,thatis,

withrespecttoageneralframeworkofreasonsfordoingthings.Asfarasclichésgo,

wecanalwayssay,“Tohelpothers,youmustfirsthelpyourself.”Butwecanalways

askwhy,asageneralrule,orinanormativesense,wemustbemotivatedtohelp

others.Beingmotivatedtohelpmynearestanddearestisnotsuchamysterytome,

buthowfar-outdoesrationalitydemandIextendthisconcern?Now,ifwereverse

thecliché,wemightsay,“Tohelpyourself,youmusthelpothers.”Wemayeven

interpretthelogicofŚāntidevaalongthisline.

Thosewhobecomeoceansofsympatheticjoywhenlivingbeingsarereleased,surelyitistheywhoachievefulfillment.Whatwouldbethepointinaliberationwithoutsweetness?(BCA,8:108).

Somesortofcarrotmustmotivatethereasonablepersontodelayhervalidneeds

andaspirationsforthesakeofsomeoneelse’swell-being.WhenIactprudently,I

delaygratificationformyselfrightnowforthesakeofagreaterbalanceof

happinessonthewhole.Idothisbecause,ultimately,Iwillbenefitfromthisinthe

longrun.Woulditmakesensetodelaymyvalidneedsnowforthesakeofsomeone

else,withoutpursuingastateofaffairsinwhichIamalsowelloffinthelongrun?

WhatamIsupposedtoultimatelyaimforwhenIengageinactsofcharityand

altruism?Oneconsequentialist-mindedresponseisthatIshouldaimforalarger

totalquantityofhappinessorgood.ButwhenIconsiderthemanifestfactthatIam

oneindividualamongmanyindividualsstrivingforamorepleasingandfulfilling

67

life,Icannothelpbutwonderwhythatquantityofoverallgoodshouldnot

necessarilyincludemyownwelfare.Letmebegintodevelopananswertothese

questionsbyexaminingsomeoftheleadingreconstructionsofpassages101-103in

Bodhicaryāvatāra.

2.5Bodhicaryāvatāra:AltruismandtheAnātmanDilemma

Chapter8ofBodhicaryāvatāramaybereconstructedtoendorsethe

followingviews:(1)impartialconcernforthewelfareofallisrationallyjustified;(2)

allsuffering,regardlessofwhosesuffering,oughttobeeradicated.Takentogether,

theseprovideaworkingdefinitionof“altruism,”glossedinnormative-ethicalterms,

ratherthanpurelysocio-biologicalorgame-theoreticalterms.37Themorerecent

cottageindustryemergingoutofchapter8ofBodhicaryāvatāracentersonpassages

101-103.ThisislargelyduetoPaulWilliams’sseminalstudyofthetext,andhis

controversialclaimthatŚāntideva’spositionnotonlyfails,butalsounwittingly

underminestheBodhisattvapathitaimstoendorse.38Akeycontroversythat

philosopherslikeWilliams,Siderits,Pettit,Clayton,andHarris39haveengagedis

37Harris,“DoesAnātmanRationallyEntailAltruism?OnBodhicaryāvatāra8:103,”93-123:“Throughoutthisessay,Iwilluse‘altruism’torefertothepositionthatoneshouldhaveanimpartialconcernforone’sownandotherswelfare,andshouldstrivetoremoveallsuffering,regardlesstowhomitbelongs”(95).Healsonotes(n.2,95)JonWetlesen’sglossonaltruism.Wetlesencallsthealtruisticpersononewho“hasanimpartialconcernforthewelfareofallpartiesconcerned,withoutdiscriminatingbetweenthewelfareofhimselforherselfandothers.”SeeJonWetlesen,“DidŚāntidevaDestroytheBodhisattvaPath?”JournalofBuddhistEthics9,2002:34-88,at42.38PaulWilliams,Studies,174-176.39BarbraClayton,“CompassionasaMatterofFact:TheArgumentfromNo-selftoSelflessnessinŚāntideva'sŚikṣāsamuccaya,”ContemporaryBuddhism,2:1,83-97.Seealso,JohnPettit,“PaulWilliams:AltruismandReality:StudiesinthePhilosophyoftheBodhicaryāvatāra,”JournalofBuddhistEthics,6,120-137.Seealso,MarkSiderits,“TheRealityofAltruism:ReconstructingŚāntideva,”PhilosophyEastand

68

whetherornottheNo-Selfviewprovidesrationaljustificationforaltruism.While

thishasspawnedanextensiveconversationintheliterature,I’dliketoprovideonly

abriefaccountofsomekeyphilosophicalreconstructionsofthesaidpassages,

whichhavebeensuccinctlytackledinHarris’sessay.40I’llexaminewhetherornot

thetextcanstanduptosomeoftheconceptualproblemsI’veaddressedabove.So

letmebeginwiththepassagesthemselves:

Thecontinuumofconsciousness,likeaqueue,andthecombinationofconstituents,likeanarmy,arenotreal.Thepersonwhoexperiencessufferingdoesnotexist.Towhomwillthatsufferingbelong?(BCA,8:101)Withoutexception,nosufferingsbelongtoanyone.Theymustbewardedoffsimplybecausearesuffering.Whyisanylimitationputonthis?(BCA,8:102)Ifoneaskswhysufferingshouldbeprevented,noonedisputesthat!Ifitmustbeprevented,thenallofitmustbe.Ifnot,thenthisgoesforoneselfasforeveryone(BCA,8:103).

Verse101addressestheorthodoxBuddhistviewthatperson-involving

conceptsultimatelyreferinonewayoranothertoanimpersonalcontinuumor

“stream”(saṅtāna)ofpsychophysicalaggregates(skandhas).41Buttheversealso

warnsusnottohypostasizethisdynamiccomplexorviewthestreamasan

enduringandrealcompositeentity(samudāya).Śāntidevaisenumeratingapremise

hereacceptedbynearlyallofhisBuddhistinterlocutors,thatis,thatapersonis

nothingoverandabovetheindividuating,stream-likepsychophysicalconstituents,

West,50(3),412-424.MarkSiderits,PersonalIdentityandBuddhistPhilosophy:EmptyPersons(Burlington,VT:AshgatePublications,2003).40Harris,“DoesAnātmanRationallyEntailAltruism?”41Theaggregates(skandhas)are:rūpa(physicalform/structure),vedanā(emotionalcoloring/feeling),samjñā(conception/recognition),samskāra(volition/habit/impulse),vijñāna(discernment/synthesizingconsciousness).Abhidharmaphilosophyderivesvariousspeciesofdharmasfromtheselargercategories.

69

andthe“stream”isnotarealcompositeentity.Justlikeastringofbeadsoranarmy,

awholeismerelyaconceptualimputation(prajñapti),derivedfromultimately

independentelementsconceivedtoappearaspartsofawhole.Infact,the

ĀbhidharmikaBuddhistwhoadoptsthe“momentariness”thesis

(kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda)believesthateverydharma,or,metaphysicallyatomicentity

arisesasanindependentlyephemeralpoint-instance.Thearisingofanewdharma,

whichinsomewayoranotherappropriatescertainaspectsofitspredecessor,

followsfromtheperishingofaprecedingdharma.Thesedharmas,whicharespecies

ofthefivebasicpsychophysicalaggregates,serveasthereduction-baseforall

entities.Giventheirradicallyephemeralnature,wecanattributetheappearanceof

persistenceoftheseseeminglyrealcompositeentitiestoconceptualconstruction.

Thesedharmasarenotpartsofarealwhole,noraretheythepropertiesofan

underlyingsubject;thus,mentaloccurrencesarenotultimatelyproperties,because

noenduringsubjectexiststobearthem.Whatwehavehereareephemeral

property-tropes.So,iftheselfisacompositeentityconstitutedby,oremergentfrom

thefiveskandhas,andcompositeentitiesareonlyconceptuallyconstructedfictions

(mṛṣā),thentheselfmustinturnprovetobeasortoffictionorerror.42

So,asŚāntidevaclaimsin102,withoutarealself,thereisnoowner

(svāmika)orultimatelyenduringlocusofsuffering,andifsufferingoughttobe

removed,thenitoughttoberemovedsimplybecauseitissuffering.Śāntidevais

addressingtheegoistwhobelievesthataquantityofsufferingbeing“mine”

42Harris,“DoesAnātman,”95:“Verse101pointsoutthatsinceapersonisapartiteentity,acceptingthatpartiteentitiesdonotexistentailsacceptingthatpersonsarefictions.”

70

relevantlyrestrictspracticalconsiderations,andjustifiesprivilegingone’sown

futurewelfare.Thefactthatmyburnthandprovidesmewithcompellingpractical

reasonstotendtomyselfinawaythathearingaboutastrangerburningherhandin

NewMexicodoesnotmightcompelmetobelievethat,ingeneral,myowninterests

areespeciallyprivileged.Śāntidevacountersthatwithouttherestrictionofreal

ownershipthatcomeswiththeexistenceofenduringsubjects,therearenoultimate

limitations(niyama)thatjustifypartialconcernforone’sownoranother’ssuffering.

Ifsufferingoughttobeprevented,thenitmustbepreventedbecauseitisinherently

bad.Ifoneweretoobjecttothatpoint,asŚāntidevapointsoutinverse103,thenhe

orshewouldbecommittedtotheviewthatnosufferingoughttobeprevented.

However,thislatteroptionisareductiothatallowsŚāntidevatoderivehis

conclusionthatonemustremaincommittedtopreventingallsuffering.Asinall

sūtraliterature,thesepithypassagesrequiredetailedunpacking.Iwilltherefore

provideabriefsketchofleadingreconstructionsoftheargumentinordertobetter

situatemyownglossonŚāntideva’sproject.

ForPaulWilliams,Śāntidevacommitsabasicfallacy.Hemakesthe

ontological,descriptiveclaimthatrealselvesarenonexistent,andthentriesto

derivethenormativeconclusionthatwemustbecommittedtoaltruism.43Onthe

surface,then,Śāntidevawantstoappealtoourrationality,butcannotsuccessfully

bridgetheis/oughtgap.AsHarrishaspointedout,“DrawingupontheTibetan

commentarialtradition,WilliamsinterpretsŚāntideva’sargumentasanappealto

ourrationality.Onceweunderstandrealitycorrectly,andaccepttheselfis

43Williams,AltruismandReality,104.

71

nonexistent,itwillnolongerberationaltoremoveone’spainbeforeremovingthe

painofothers.”44

AgeneralproblemIhavewithWilliamspointisthatIthinkheexaggerates

andoversimplifiestheontologicalweightoftheargument.Theideathatselvesdo

notexistatthe“ultimate”levelofanalysisisnotnecessarilyapurelydescriptive

claimthatcarriesnonormativeforce.TheBuddhist-hermeneuticaldeviceof

distinguishingbetweenconventionaltruth(saṃvṛti-sat)andultimatetruth

(paramārtha-sat)shouldnotbesostraightforwardlyglossedasthePlatonic

distinctionbetweenappearanceandreality.It’snotsoclearthatinthesepassages

Śāntidevasimplywantstomakethetruth-functionalclaimthatpersonsinfactdo

notexist,andthatapresumablymoreaccuratedescriptionofrealitywillnotinclude

person-involvingconcepts.It’snotjustthatwhenwetalkinperson-involvingways

we’renot“gettingitright”inanabsolutesense.Amoreliteralinterpretationofthe

concept,“saṃvṛti,”wouldbethatofa“concealing”ora“cloaking”truth,45thus

admittingsomedegreeofconcept-mediateduniversality.Ganerihasprovidedan

excellentalternativetothetypicalsubjective/objectivecumappearance/reality

dichotomyoftenfoistedontotheseBuddhistconcepts.46Thecloakingtruth,andits

cousin,theconceptuallyfashionedtruth(prajñapti-sat)arenotnecessarily

“subjective”orpurelyfalsifyingtruths,somuchastheyareindicativeofobserver-

dependent,conceptually-mediatedpositionality.Viewinganimpressionistpainting

44Harris,“DoesAnātman,”96.Alsoseen.4,96.HarriscitesWilliams,AltruismandReality,105.45Ganeri,TheConcealedArt,PartIII:ASelflessPerson’sSenseofSelf,“TheImperfectRealityofPersons,”155-185.46Ibid.,155-185.

72

fromadistance,Iseeagrassyfieldfashionedoutofvividcolorsanddelicateforms.I

seecouplesstrollingalongunderparasols.However,asIclosethedistance,what

seemedlikesolidformsbecometinypointsofcolor.Ilosetheimageofcouples

enjoyingthebrightandcloudlessday.Theimagesfromthepaintingcanbesaidto

lose“stabilityunderanalysis.”47Butthatdoesnotmeanthattheimagesemergingat

adistancearepurelypersonalandsubjectiveimagesthatfalsifyreality.Ifanyfiction

(mṛṣā)isinvolved,it’sthebeliefthattheperson-involvinglevelofdescriptionisa

solid,unanalyzablefactthatstandsonitsown.Onceweachieveanon-person-

involvinglevelofanalysis,wecometoappreciateanimpersonalperspectivethat

levelsoffviewingthingsintermsofownersandbearersofproperties.Wecometo

recognizeanimpersonalfieldofrelations.Theself,whichisanexperiencedaspect

ofrealitywhenone“zoomsout”atacertaincognitivedistance,isnotasmucha

perniciouslyfalsifyingconceptastherigidview(dṛṣṭi)thattheselfisanenduring

substancethatexistswithanessence(svabhāva),independentlyofitscausesand

conditions.

Someoftheleadinginterpretersofthetext,whiledivergingonimportant

detailsoftheargument,agreethatŚāntideva,theMādhyamika,isprovisionally

adoptingtheĀbhidharmikapositionhere.48Remember,thereductionist-minded

Ābhidharmika,likeVasubandhu,believesthatthereisnoselfoverandabovethe

streamofpsycho-physicalconstituents.However,forthesephilosophers,the47Ibid.,171.Ganeriwrites:“Thesedefinitions[betweencloakingandultimatetruths]suggestthatwhatisreallyatissueisnotsomuchtheexistenceofsocialpracticesorconventionalfabrications,butwhatwemightcall‘stabilityunderanalysis’.Animpressionistpaintingceasestorepresentanythingwheninvestigatedtooclosely:theperceptualimageisunstableunderanalysis.”48Seen.35,p.27.

73

constituentslikeform(rūpa)andaffective-coloring(vedanā),forexample,remain

stableunderanalysis.Whenweshiftourcognitiveframe,theseconstituentsremain

unanalyzableandbasic.Śāntideva,theMādhyamika,adoptstheĀbhidharmika’s

positionasadialecticaltactic.ShowingthatfromboththeMadhyamakaand

AbhidharmaperspectiveonemustbecommittedtoaltruismallowsŚāntideva's

interlocutortoembracealtruismwithoutnecessarilyrejectinghispriordoctrinal

commitments.IfweacceptthisreadingofŚāntideva,thenthingslikesuffering—at

leastinthecontextoftheargumentinchapter8—arefixedaspectsofunanalyzable

dharmassuchasaffective-coloring(vedanā).Thus,fromthecloakinglevelofreality,

selvesexist,whilefromthestableorunanalyzablelevelofdescriptionthey

disappear.Suffering,however,remainsastableaspectoftheunanalyzabledharmas.

It’simportantnottoconfuseGaneri’sconceptofstabilityandnon-stability

underanalysiswithMadhyamakaanti-foundationalismandirrealism.If,througha

purelydeconstructiveanalysis,Madhyamakaclaimsthattheultimatetruthisthat

thereisnoultimatetruth,Vasubandhu’sdistinctionbetweenthetwotruthsisnot

irrealistandanti-foundationalist,norisiteliminativistinnature.Rather,hisviewis

reductionist,withthecaveatthatperson-involvingconcepts,andtherefore,

conceptsconcerningbearersofsuffering,provideausefulenoughglimpseofreality

thatuniversallyshowsupataparticularlevelofcognitive-framing.However,from

theanalyticallystableperspective,ownersofsufferingcompletelydisappear.This

meansthatinsteadofsolelyexaminingwhetherornotoneviewis“moreobjective”

innature,whichisofcourseappropriateincertaincontexts,weshouldalsobe

askingourselveswhatthepragmaticupshotofviewingtheworldinonewayrather

74

thantheotheramountsto,andwecandothiswithoutsuccumbingtofull-blown

relativismorMadhyamakaanti-foundationalism.Inotherwords,oneperspectiveis

notsimply“better”thananotherjustbecauseitcapturesmorebasicand

unanalyzableaspectsofreality—it’snotasthoughweshouldclaimthatthe

physicistis“moreimportant”thanthebiologist,becauseshedealswithmorebasic

items.Thebiologistdealswithcomplex,organicsystemsthatarenotamenableto

talkofquarks,neutrinos,andblackholes.Pragmatically,wecanaskourselveswhat

wegetwhenweoperatefromtheunanalyzableconceptualperspectiveasopposed

totheconceptuallyunstableperspective.Now,it’spartofthebasicmessageof

Buddhismthattheperson-involvinglevelgeneratesattachmentandgraspingthat

producessuffering.Buddhistinterlocutorsalreadyacceptthenormativeclaimthat

sufferingissomethingbadandoughttobeovercome.SoanyBuddhistwillagree

thatweshouldstrivetoavoidseeingtheworldfromaperspectivethatcontributes

tosuffering—that’sjustpartofthecommitmentthatcomeswithassertingthatall

sufferingisbad.Tobesure,undertheAbhidharmabanner,therearethingsthat

reallyexist,andthingsthatreallydonotexist.However,thepointofemphasisisnot

solelyontheontology.Buddhismalwaysremainspragmatictoonedegreeor

another.

SowheredoesthisleaveWilliams’sclaimthatŚāntidevafallaciouslytriesto

deriveanoughtfromanis?Ifwecanachieveanimpersonalview,thentheegoist’s

claimthatadistinctionbetweenselfandotherjustifiesegoismdoesnotapplyatthis

levelofanalysis.WhenŚāntidevaontologizeshere,hedoessotoundercutthe

egoist’sstickingpointthatthedistinctionbetweenselfandother—particularlythe

75

first-personexperienceofpainversusathird-persondescriptionofanother’s

pain—justifiesprivilegingone’sownfuturewelfare.Fromthemetaphysicallevel,no

suchdistinctionapplies,andgiventhecommitmenttoendsuffering,weoughtto

maintainthisperspectivetothebestofourabilities.Thenormativeforceofthe

BuddhistviewonsufferingallowsŚāntidevatoderivehisdesiredconclusion.The

speech-actofsincerelyassertingXcomeswithacommitment,namely,a

commitmenttoactinlightofthattruth,andacceptanytruthsderivablefromit.So,

ifwefindthatthemoststableanalysisdoesnotincludeperson-involvingconcepts,

thenwearecommittedtoacceptinganytruthsderivablefromthatassertion.

Likewise,ifweacceptthatsufferingisintrinsicallybad,andultimatelyreal(thatis,

stableunderanalysis),thenwe’recommittedtoacceptinganyderivableclaimsfrom

thatassertion.Partofwhatitmeansforsomethingtobebadisthatitshouldbe

eradicatedifpossible,andit’spartoftheBuddhistworldviewthatweshouldavoid

perspectivesthatproducesuffering.Thus,wecanadoptanimpersonalview,and

giventheBuddhistthesisonsuffering,weoughttomaintainthatperspectivesinceit

arguablydefusessuffering.Theegoist’sprimaryjustificationforegoismdisappears

fromtheanalyticallystableperspective.Śāntidevaisnotderivinganormativefrom

adescriptiveclaim.Rather,he’saddressinganinterlocutorwhoarguesthattheonly

sensiblelimitingconditionthatjustifiespartialismwithrespecttosufferingis

ownership.Butfromtheconceptuallystableperspective,ownershipdisappears.

However,fromthissame,stableperspective,sufferingpresumablyremainsintact,

andtheconceptofsufferingalreadyhasnormativeforce,andcarrieswithitahost

ofcommitments.

76

Nevertheless,Williamshaspointedoutamuchdeeperproblemwith

Śāntideva’sargument,andSideritshasinturncometoŚāntideva'sdefenseina

strategysimilartowhatI’vesketchedabove.Iwillbrieflydevelopthesepoints,and

thenassessHarris’sanalysisofthedebate,becauseIthinkultimatelyHarriscum

WilliamshaveoutlinedadilemmainŚāntideva'sargumentthatisnotsoeasily

defused.WhatIwouldaddisthat,specificallywithrespecttoother-centricand

altruisticconsiderations,bridgingthegapbetweenselfandotherinanormative

contextisbestservedbyconceptsofidentityandrealrelationality,andnotby

conceptslike“emptiness”andnon-ownership.Inotherwords,theintegritybetween

selfandothermustbemaintained—andnotjustasamatterof“conventional

reality”—inordertoimpelonetofindamotivatingandethically-relevantbridge

betweenselfandother.

Now,WilliamsandSideritsarguethatŚāntidevaisemployingthe

Ābhidharmikaperspectiveasanexampleofskillful,or,pragmaticmeans(upāya).

Ābhidharmikasaremereologicalirrealists,thatis,theydonotbelievethatawhole

existsoverandabovethepartsthatarethoughttomakeitup.However,theydo

believethatthereareultimatephysicalandmentalevents,or,dharmasthatarethe

reallyexistingbuildingblocksoverwhichconceptualimputationoperates.As

Ganerihasmorerecentlyshown,ĀbhidharmikaphilosopherslikeVasubandhumay

verywellbelieveintheconventionalvalidityofmedium-sizedobjectsalongwith

thevalidityoftheconventionalself.49Vasubandhuwouldinsteadarguethatour

49Ganeri,TheConcealedArt,172:“Vasubandhu’sstatementthatpersonsare‘realwithreferencetoconception’istobetakenassayingthatonecanthinkinaperson-involvingwayonlyaslongasonedoesnotanalyzeor‘mentallydivide’theperson

77

beliefintheselfasanenduringentity,whichexistsindependentlyofitscausesand

conditions,isaperniciousfabricationthatproducessuffering.

Withthisinmind,WilliamsarguesthatŚāntidevamust,nevertheless,deny

thevalidityoftheconventionalself.Hearguesthisonthebasisthatallweneedto

potentiallyprioritizetheinterestsofpersonAoverpersonBistheabilityto

distinguishbetweenAandB.Intheconventionalcontext,wecanmakethis

distinction.Thus,acceptingthevalidityoftheconventionalselfisenoughtojustify

atleastmoderateegoism,whereonebelievesthatitissometimesperfectlyjustified

toprioritizeone’sownwelfare.Putstillanotherway,moderateegoismclaimsthatit

isnotimmoraltoprioritizeone’sownfuturewelfare.Thisisenoughtoundercuta

demandingethicsofuniversalaltruism.IfWilliamsisright,thenŚāntidevamust

rejectthevalidityoftheconventionalselfinordertomaintaintheviewthatwe

oughttobeunwaveringlycommittedtoaltruism.ThismeansthatŚāntidevacannot

justattackthebeliefinanenduringmetaphysicalself,butmustalsodenythe

validityoftheconventionalandtransactionalself.Butthisisaglaringproblemfor

Śāntideva'sargument.Theconventional,transactionalworldiswherethingslike

altruismandegoismmakesense.Agencyingeneral—andethicalagencyin

particular—drawsonthesortsofconventionsthatonlymakesenseatthe

transactionallevelofreality.ThisisthelevelofrealityinwhichIdonotjustsee

suffering,butIseethatyouaresuffering,andthatIaminapositiontohelpyou,or

sacrificemyinterests,orsimplyignoreyourpain.Moreover,Iaminapositionto

identifythefactthatnotallpainismypain,andthatyouhaveastakeinyourlifeintoaflowofexperience…SoVasubandhu’sviewisnotthattherearenopersons,butthatperson-involvingconceptualschemesareunstable.”

78

thatisworthyofmyattentionandrespect.Thus,bydenyingthevalidityofsucha

world,Śāntidevarendersaltruismunintelligible.

HarristentativelyobjectsthatweneednotfoistthisviewontoŚāntideva.50

HeoffersaquickglossonBarbraClayton’sinterpretationofpassages101-103to

illustratethepoint.ClaytonseesaparallelbetweenŚāntideva'sargumentandanti-

discriminationarguments.51Ifallbeingsequallydesirehappinessandfreedomfrom

suffering,anditisethicalformetoultimatelyprioritizemyownwelfare,thenIneed

toprovideanethicallyrelevantdistinctionthatjustifiesmybias.Ifmyfutureself

thatIamconcernedwithturnsouttobeidenticaltomycurrentself,thenthat

wouldprovidethedistinctionthatjustifiesmytemporalneutralitywithrespectto

myownhappiness,andmybiaswithrespecttothehappinessofothers.Butinthe

lightofŚāntideva’sargument,mycurrentandfutureselvesarenotreallyidentical,

butonlyconventionallyso.Thus,Icannotprovidetheethicallyrelevantdistinction

thatwouldjustifymypartialitywithrespecttothecommongoodofhappiness.IfI

regardsufferingasanilltoberemovedinmyowncase,thenIoughttoapplythat

viewtoallcasesofsuffering.AsHarriswrites,“Śāntidevacanbeseenasclaiming

thatalthoughconventionalselvesexist,whenwerealizetheyareonlyconvenient

fictionswewillacceptthatweshouldnotprioritizeourownconventionalself’s

welfareabovethatofotherpersons.”52But,asHarrispointsoutinthecontextof

Williams’sargument,whenweemphasizetheconventionalnatureoftheself,we

mightnotonlylearntobecomelessfixatedonourownsuffering,butalsolearnto

50Harris,“DoesAnātman,”99.51Clayton,“Compassion,”91.52Harris,“DoesAnātman,”100.

79

becomelessfixatedonanyone’ssuffering.Inotherwords,altruismisnotthelogical

outcomeofsuchabelief.Onemayloseallconcernforsufferingingeneral.

Verse103maybeinterpretedasaresponsetothissortofproblem.Suffering

isnotsomethingthatcanbeviewedasmorallyneutral:itisnotsomethingwecan

everreallyfeeljustifiedinignoring.AsBodhicaryāvatāraputsit:“Noonedisputes

that!”SoŚāntidevaappealstocommonsense.But,asHarrispointsout,theopponent

“canrespondthatmostpeopleagreetothisbecausetheybelievetheirself,andthe

selvesoftheonestheycareabout,endure.”53Whileitmightbethecasethat

anātmanprovidesaltruisticmotivationsforsome,itmayverywellprovidenosuch

motivations,orevenapathy,forothers.IfŚāntidevaweretorespondthat

psychologicalconnectednessandphysicalcontinuitymotivateustocareaboutour

conventionallyestablishedfuturesuffering,thenhewouldplayintothehandofthe

egoist,whoclaimsthatclosetiestoourfuture-selfwarrantspecialconcernforour

futurewelfare.Thus,Śāntideva’sargumentfacesadilemma.

However,thedilemmadevelopedinWilliams’sargumentreliesonacrucial

assumption:ourobligationtoremovepainrequiresthattherebeselvesto

experiencethispain.54Inparticular,theapathy/moralnihilismhornofthedilemma

assumesthatwithoutthebeliefinanenduringself,andwithoutemphasizingthe

importanceofpsychologicalconnectednessandphysicalcontinuity,welose

motivationtocareaboutanysuffering.Butwhydoweneedtheseviewstomotivate

thecultivationofcompassionandother-centricaction?AccordingtoSiderits,

53Ibid.,101.54Harris,“DoesAnātman,”103.

80

Śāntidevarejectsthiskeyassumption.Here’sareconstructedversionofSiderits’s

interpretation:55

1. Theperson,beinganaggregate,isultimatelyunreal.

2. Henceifpainisultimatelyreal,itmustbeownerlessorimpersonal.

3. Weareinagreementacrosstheboardthatpainisbad(eventhough

concernoverpainisoftenrestrictedtoone’sowncase).

4. Eitherpainisultimatelyandimpersonallybad,ornopainisultimately

bad.

5. Butit’snotthecasethatnopainisultimatelybad;therefore,itis

impersonallyandultimatelybad.

Sogiven(5),wecansaythatpainisimpersonallybad,whichjustmeanswehaveno

reason,otherthanpragmaticconsiderations,torestrictourconcerntoourselvesor

ournearestanddearest.AsHarrisglossesSiderits,“Itisourcommitmentto

removingthispain,whichultimatelyexistsimpersonally,thatleadstousadopting

personhoodconventionsinwhichweidentifyourcurrentandfuturecollectionof

causalconstituentsasbeingthesamepersons.”56Sideritsmakestheoriginaland

controversialpointthatpersonhoodconventionsareusefulforremovingsuffering,

since,oftentimes,weareinauniquepositiontosuccessfullyalleviatethesuffering

thatappearsclosesttous.Thus,personhoodconventionsbecomeastratagemfor

removingpain,whichisultimatelyimpersonal.Wecangaugetheextenttowhichwe

mustpayattentiontoourselvesandournearestanddearestbyemployinga

consequentialistcalculationofonesortoranother.55Siderits,Personal,103.56Harris,“DoesAnātman,”104.

81

Harrispointsouttwoproblemswiththisinterpretation.57First,asWilliams

hasclaimed,itisquestionablethatmostBuddhistphilosopherswouldbuythat

personhoodconventionsareusefuldevicesemployedtoremovesuffering.The

orthodoxviewisthatbeliefinaninnateconceptionofself,thatis,identificationwith

theegoanditsambitions,producesself-attachmentandgrasping,andthis

contributestoexistentialsuffering.Thissortofself-attachmentmotivates,and/or,

worksintandemwiththebeliefina“furtherfact”ormetaphysicalpresence

underlyingtheflowofmentaloccurrences.Personhoodconventionsdomoreto

entrenchself-attachmentandego-identificationthantheydotofacilitatethe

removalofpain.However,aBuddhistfollowingSiderits’sstrategymightobjectthat

themisidentificationofthestreamasanenduringperson,whichcontributesto

fixationontheegoanditsprojects,causessuffering.ButthepracticeofBuddhist

detachmentand“rightviews”preventsonefromclingingtoselfhood.Withoutsuch

clinging,sufferingdoesnotarise.ThisisperfectlyconsistentwithSiderits’sclaim

thatpersonhoodconventionsarestratagemsforremovingpainandsuffering.

ThesecondandmorecontroversialproblemthatHarrispointsoutisthatitis

questionablewhetherornotpainisinherentlybad.58Onemightdistinguishpain

fromsuffering,andclaimthatimpersonalpainisnotreallybad.Onlythegrasping

thatcomeswithbelievinginareallyenduringself—ratherthanrecognizingthatthe

selfisaconceptualimputation—transformspainintosuffering.Thislineofthought

reliesonacceptingthedistinctionbetweenpainandsuffering.Ontheonehand,pain

isnotultimatelynegative—onlytheinterpretationofpainasbelongingtoareally57Ibid.,105-106.58Harris,“DoesAnātman,”108.

82

existingandenduringpersonisnegative,andthissortofbelieftransformspaininto

suffering.Ontheotherhand,sufferingisillusory,sinceitdisappearsuponrealizing

therightview.Sothereisnorealneedtoeliminatepain,andifwecanachievethis

remarkablerealization,thensuffering,asitwere,simplyfallsaway.Thislineof

thoughtwouldbedamningtoŚāntideva'sargument,sinceitreliesonthenormative

claimthatallpain/sufferingisinherentlybad.

However,evenifthisquasi-Stoiclineofthoughtissomewhatconvincing,it’s

hardtoarguethatnopainisintrinsicallynegative.Mentalpainlikedepression,for

example,isnotsoclearlyanalyzableasarelationshipbetweensomeinitialquantity

ofphysicalpain,andapersonalinterpretationthatthengeneratesangstandfull-

blownsuffering.Depressionisjustdepression,evenifitistheresultofcognitive

framingofonesortoranother.Inotherwords,thepainandsufferingofdepression

areco-temporal.Unlikethecaseofphysicalpain,itisconceptuallydifficultto

distinguishbetweenthesufferingthatcomeswithseeingtheworldthrough

melancholyeyes,andtherawdataofamorecognitivelyneutralsensation.Untilthat

moreneutraldataisdrawnintoamelancholyportrait,itisinappropriatetocallit

“pain”atall.SowecanatleastassumewithŚāntidevaandSideritsthatsomemental

statesareintrinsicallynegative,regardlessofwhetherornottheybelongto

persons.59

Butnevertheless,asHarrispointsout,bridgingtheis/oughtgapstillremains

aproblemforŚāntideva'sargument.Certainmentalstatesbeinginherentlynegative

59Harris,“DoesAnātman,”107.

83

donotnecessarilyentailthemoralconclusionthatweoughttoremovethem.60

HarrisbelievesthatŚāntidevaanticipatesthispoint,andthusappealsin103to

ethicalintuition.“Everyoneagrees”thatsufferingneedstoberemoved.Inother

words,thisbasicbeliefisnotupfordebate.Inresponse,Harrislevelsacherry-

pickingargument.Whileendorsinganātmanpurportedlyunderminestheethical

intuitionthatsupportsegoism,italsothreatenstounderminetheethicalintuition

thatallsufferingisinherentlybad,andwecannotjustcherry-pickwhichethical

intuitiontotakeseriously.

Ibelievethispointneedstobeassessedabitfurther.First,whenappealing

tocommonsense,wecanonlydispensewithineluctableintuitionsonacasebycase

basis.Harrisclaimsthatethicalintuitionsupportstwoprinciples:thePrincipleof

ModerateBenevolence(PMB),andthePrincipleofModerateEgoism(PME).61PMB

agreesthatweoughttoremoveanyone’ssufferingprovidedthatitisnotoverly

demanding,whilePMEclaimsthatitisnotimmoraltoprioritizeone’sownfuture

welfare.Onecanconsistentlymaintainbothprinciples.PMEjustsaysthatitisnot

necessarilyimmoraltoprioritizeourownwelfare,notthatwemustalways

prioritizeourownwelfare.Harris’sargumentisthatifthetruthofanātmanismeant

toundercuttheintuitionssupportingPME,thenitcanlikewisedothesametoPMB.

Attheanalyticallystablelevelthatframestheanātmanview,PMEmayfallaway,

butthefactthatsufferingisbadnolongerseemsintuitiveatthislevelofanalysis.

60Harris,108:“Theopponentmayobjectthatsimplypointingoutthefactthatamentalstateisnegativedoesnotobviouslyentailthenormativeconclusionthatweoughttopreventorremoveit.”61Harris,“DoesAnātman,”109.

84

It’snotthatŚāntidevaisjustcherry-pickingbetweenethicalintuitions.Rather,

Śāntidevaischerry-pickingbetweenthelevelsofanalysishedrawsfrom.PMBis

mostintuitivefromtheconventionalor“unstable”levelofanalysis.WhenŚāntideva

undercutsPMEbymovingtothemoreanalyticallybasiclevelofanalysis,there’s

nothingthatseemstopreventbothPMEandPMBfromfallingawayasintuitive

claims.

However,Harrisdoesnotseemtohaveadequatelyentertainedthe

possibilitythattheintuitionthatimpersonalsufferingoughttoberemovedismore

resilientthaneitherPMBorPMEattheanalyticallybasiclevelofanalysis.

Remember,PMBandPMEare“moderate”andmutuallyconsistentprinciples.

However,theimpersonalsufferingthesisisademandingprinciplethatclaimsthat

allsuffering,nomatterwhose,oughttoberemoved.Couldthismakeanysenseat

theimpersonaloranalyticallybasiclevelofanalysis?Harrisclaimsthatheisnot

clear“thatwehaveanyintuitionsaboutimpersonalsuffering.”62Butifweaccept

thatŚāntidevaemploys“skillfulmeans”throughembracingAbhidharma

metaphysics,thereisnothingtostopusfrominterpretinghimtoembraceother

Buddhistmetaphysicalprinciplesthatwouldstrengthenhisargumentandbolster

itsrhetoricalforce.Themetaphysicalviewthatcomestomindformeistheview

thatallmentaldharmasareinherentlyself-reflexive(sva-prakāśa),andinthissense,

self-aware.Whatthismeansisthatanymentaloccurrenceisbothawareofan

object,andawareofitsownawarenessoftheobject.So,iftherereallywere

quantitiesofsuffering“justhangingthere,”withoutarealsubjectwhobearsthemas

62Ibid.,109.

85

properties,thenwecanseehoweachsufferingmomentwouldtosomeextentbe

awareofitsownsuffering.Theself-reflexivityviewis,amongotherthings,a

metaphysicaldevicethathelpsmakesenseofthephenomenalfeelof“mineness,”

whichthen,alongwithothertheoreticalprinciplesnotpertinenttothediscussion

here,betterexplainsthepsychologicalconnectednessofvariousmental

occurrences.Inshort,thereisasenseortraceofownership,butthatdoesnotmean

thatwehavetobelieveinareallyexistingandenduringsubjectwhoownsthat

suffering.Moreimportantly,wecanimaginepoint-instancesofsufferingthattake

onafirst-personfeel.Inotherwords,thereissomeformofself-awarenessthat

accompaniesinstancesofsuffering.Perhaps,contrarytohowWilliamsandHarris

havestatedthings,enduranceandpsychologicalconnectednessarenotthemost

importantfactorsthatmotivatecompassionandconcernforinstancesofsuffering.

Self-awarenessseemstobethemostbasicfactaboutsufferingthatmakesitamoral

ill.Infact,suffering(asopposedtodamageorcorruption)seemsunintelligiblewhen

wedonotincludeself-awarenessasabasiccomponentofthephenomenon.The

self-reflexivityprinciplemakessenseofself-awarenesswithoutappealingtoany

realorconventionalownership.WhilePMBandPMEmayfallawayasintuitive

conceptsattheimpersonallevelofanalysis,thenastinessofinstancesofself-aware

sufferingseemsresilienttowhateverlevelofanalysisweoperatefrom.Harrisis

correctthatthere’sasortofcherry-pickinggoingonhere,butIdonotthinkthatwe

loseallintuitionaboutourviewofsufferingwhenweoperatefromtheimpersonal

level,solongaswearecommittedtoothermetaphysicalprinciplesthatwouldallow

ustobelievethatself-awaresufferingcanariseasapoint-instanceinaflowof

86

ephemeraltropes.Now,thismayseemtoplayintothehandsofthedilemma,

becauseHarrisorWilliamsmightarguethatbystressingownership,continuity,

psychologicalconnectedness,andothersuchconventionalnotions,wemay

embrace,atveryleast,PMEifnotfull-fledgedegoism.Buttheonly“ownership”and

connectednessemployedhereisonewherewecanmakesenseofthereflexive

awarenessofeachmomentaryflashofsuffering,andthatmeansthataslongas

thereistheexperience/awarenessofsuffering,wehaveroomtocompassionately

careaboutanypoint-instanceofsuffering.Whilethismightnotbeintuitive,it

providesatheoreticalandsophisticatedbitofmachinerythatcansupportour

alreadyentrenchedintuitionthatsufferingisanastythingnomatterwhoendures

it.However,thesamecannotbesaidfortheegoisticintuition.Ifthereisnoenduring

entitythatultimatelyreapsthebenefitsandenduresthepainofasetofcurrent

actions,thenitseemslessimportanttobefixatedonwhoexactlyenduresthe

suffering.Thatdoesnotmeanthatwedonotcareaboutsufferingwhatsoever,we

simplycaremoreabouttheoverallquantityofsufferingandgoodintheworld,

whichisaviewthatalignsnicelywithconsequentialismandutilitarianism.Bearin

mindthatthisassumes,asHarrisallows,thatitmakessensetosaythatsufferingis

inherentlybad.Tosaythatitisimpersonallybadisjusttosaythatwedonotneed

person-involvingconceptstojustifyourconcernforsuffering.Wecansimplythink

intermsofquantitiesofatypeofmentaloccurrencethat,beinginherentlyself-

aware,perpetuatesalargerquantityofinherentlynegativeexperiences.Harris’s

problemisthat“Śāntidevahasshiftedtheburdenofprooftohisopponentby

pointingoutthatthereisacommonacceptancethatsufferingoughttoberemoved.

87

Theopponent,however,mayrespondthatonceanātmanhasbeenaccepted,itis

irrationaltoacceptanyintuitionsthatariseindependenceonthebeliefinenduring

persons”(110).Presumably,then,thebeliefthatsufferingisinherentlynegativeis

onesuchintuitionthatdependsonsomeinvestment,howeverattenuated,inthe

enduranceofpersons.I’mtakingexceptionwiththatclaim.Instead,I’mfocusingon

theawarenessandself-awarenessofsuffering,nomatterhowattenuated,asa

motivatingreasontopreventsuffering.

WhileIthinkthatŚāntideva'sargumentmaybeabletowithstandthecherry-

pickingcritique,IthinkthatreadasaMadhyamakatext,itdoesnotsupplythesort

ofsystematicethicalclaritythatGoodmanimaginesitdoes.Bychapter9of

Bodhicaryāvatāra,ŚāntidevaendorsestheradicalteachingofMadhyamaka

irrealism.Remember,thisvieweschewsanynotionof“place”or“base”(seefigure

1).Andyet,heclaimsthatweneedtoembraceaconventionalviewofselftomake

senseofaltruismandMahāyānacompassion(seechapter1).Thisseemstoindicate

thatwhenwegraduatepasttheconventionalviewofthingsintotheimpersonal

view,thingslikealtruismandethicsdisappear.So,insomesense,Williamsand

Harrisarecorrectthattheultimatelevelofontologicalanalysis,atleastfromthe

Madhyamakaperspective,doesnotcomeembeddedwithanynormative

implications.Śāntideva,himself,seemstoagreebyemphasizingthatthealtruistic

motivationsoftheBodhisattvarequireaconventionalviewofthingstomakesense

ofagent-drivenconceptslikekarma,retribution,andkindnessandcompassion.If

myresponsetoHarrisaboveisatallsatisfying,thenitreliesonagreatdealof

metaphysicalmachinery,includinga“base”ofindividuation(seefigure1)thatthe

88

Mādhyamikawouldnotultimatelyendorse.Withoutownership(“place”)and

withoutanymetaphysicalindividuation(“base”),it’snotclearwhatguiding

principlesweshouldappealtowhenconsideringthetreatmentofothers,andthe

valueoftheirsuffering.ThismaynotbeasmuchaproblemforfigureslikeHume

andParfit,sincesomenotionof“base”isstillinplay.However,thesamecannotbe

saidforŚāntideva.Śāntidevaneedsaconventionalsetoftransactionalnotionsto

makesenseofethicalrequirements,andthatispreciselywhyherecommendsthat

weembracethe“delusion”ofconventionalrealityforthesakeofbeingguidedby

altruisticprinciples(seechapter1).Butthisdoesnotclarifywhatsortofprinciple

wouldmotivatehimtotakethefabricationsofconventionalrealityseriouslyto

promoteuniversalsalvation.Anyprinciplethatwoulddothatsortofworkwould

onlymakesenseinconventionalreality.Asapurelytranscendentandamoral

philosophy,thiswouldnotbeaproblem;butthesamecannotbesaidforan

ethically-orientedphilosophythathasanynormativeteeth.

Finally,althoughIappealedtoself-awarenessratherthanendurancetomake

senseofthenormativeforceofsuffering,andtomakesenseofwhywemightbe

motivatedtocarethatanyoneissuffering,enduranceandpersistencearestillkey

conceptsthatmakesenseofagencyconstruedmorebroadly.Fromreasoning,to

languageacquisitionandlinguisticcommunication,toanticipationand

responsibility,weneedsomeaccountofownershipandpersistence.The

Mādhyamikamightbeabletoappealtoconventiontomakesenseofhowwecome

tooperateinadomainoftransactionalreality,butthestateof“perfectwisdom”he

89

ultimatelyrecommendsdoeslittletomakesenseofwhyweoughttocareoneway

ortheotheraboutthesufferingthatwefindinthatdomain.

2.6TowardOwnershipandOther-centricity

IhavedevotedconsiderableattentioninthischaptertotheMahāyāna

philosopher,Śāntideva,becausehisMadhyamakatextprovidesanovelapproachto

anethicaltheoryofaltruism.Wecancallthis,“emptinessethics.”Whilewecan

certainlyfindconsequentialist-utilitarianstreaksinŚāntideva’stext,aspectsofhis

approachareuniqueandnotsoreadilyaccommodatedbymodernand

contemporaryEuro-Americanethics.Theanalyticanddecision-proceduralschools

requirearatherrobustnotionofagencyandpracticalidentitytojustifytheir

emphasisonuniversalprinciples,practicalrationality,freedom,responsibility,and

punishment.WhileŚāntideva’sconcernsmaybereadinawaythatisconsonant

withsomeofthoseaims,hedoesnotprovideenoughresources(ortheusualsorts

ofresourceswefindinEuro-Americanethics)thatwouldsupportsuchanendeavor.

Hisuniquenessliesintryingtomake“emptiness”(ofownershipandindividuation)

dotheworkthatcontemporaryprinciples-basedethicsdoesthroughtheoriesof

realagencyandpracticalidentity.Ontheotherhand,whilethenon-principlesbased

schools—likethesituationalandcare-ethicalschools—emphasizerelationalityand

interdependence,theselfisnotsoeffacedintheseschools,becausethatwould

undercuttheverypartialconcernsthatprioritizeintimacy,family,andfriendship.

Norcanitbesoeffacedthatitthreatenstoundercutone’scapacitytorespectand

taketheotheronhisorherterms.Andyet,Śāntidevatriestobuildother-regarding

concernandethicalresponsibilityoutofaradicaleffacementoftheselfandits

90

practicalidentity,effacementsoradicalthatpartialismtowardlovers,family,

friendsorneighborsisrejected63—thus,preventingŚāntideva'sethicsfrom

conversingproductivelywithcare-ethics.Śāntidevaexplicitlyaimsforan

impersonal,impartial,andagent-neutralethics.So,ontheprinciples-basedside,he

neglectsarobustenoughaccountofagencytocrediblymakesenseofresponsibility

andethicalaction,andonthenon-principlesside,heeffacestheselfsoradicallythat

it’snotclearwhat(orwho)canbeself-possessedenoughtoinvestinitsimmediate

relationshipsofcareanditssituatednessinanexusofcaringrelationships.

Śāntideva,andmorerecentNo-SelferslikeParfit,denythebeliefina

Cartesiansoulorsubstance,inordertobetteraccommodateandrespondtothe

needsoftheother.Cartesiandualismthreatenstoproduceanegoisticself-

enclosure—bothametaphysicalandanethicalsolipsism—thatisonlybridgedby

reducingother-regardingconsiderationstoanextensionofegocentric,self-

regardingconsiderations.Thissortofmetaphysicsgeneratestheproblemofmaking

senseofaltruismandother-centricconsiderationsfromaninescapablyegocentric

vantage-point.TheselflessnessthesisinŚāntidevaaimstoundercutthesortof

metaphysicsthatgenerateinescapableegoism.MādhyamikaBuddhismdoesthisby

denyingtherealityofeitherownershipofcognitionandvolition,orabaseof

individuation.WhileDerekParfitorientshisethicsinasimilarlynon-Cartesian63See8:1-90inCrosbyandSkilton.Thesesectionslayouttheemotionalpreparatoryworkfortranscendingcommonlyreactivestatestiedtoourinvestmentsinpublicopinion,familyandfriendship,andthecravingthatcomeswithlustingandtheobjectifyingthelover’sbody.AsŚāntidevawrites,“Distractiondoesnotoccurifbodyandmindarekeptsequestered”(8:2),and“Freefromacquaintance,freefromconflict,heisquitealoneinhisbody”(8:36),andfinally,“…Oneshouldrecoilfromsensualdesiresandcultivatedelightinsolitude,intranquilwoodlandsemptyofcontentionandstrife”(8:85).

91

direction,hisreductionistprojectstillremainsgroundedinanindividuatingbase—

namely,thebody—whichhelpsorienttheethicalactbyprovidinguswithenoughof

adistinctionbetweenselfandothertomakesenseofthetermsinvolvedinan

ethicalrelationship.Inthenextchapter,Iwillfurtherexplorethesortof“emptiness

ethics”wefindinMadhyamakaphilosophy,andexaminewhetherornotthissortof

researchprojecthassomemorepromisinginsightsandmovesavailabletoitfor

addressingthecritiqueI’veprovidedsofar.

Ihavearguedthatethicallyaltruisticactionrequirestheconceptofaself,

whichownsitscognitive,affective,andvolitionalstates.Imakethisclaimontwo

accounts.First,Ihavearguedthatweneedaclearself/otherdistinctioninorderto

bothgenerateother-orientedness,andintelligiblyplaceouractsofcompassionand

generosityinaspacenotfullydescribableinegocentricterms.Withoutthe

Ownershipviewoftheself,theself/otherdistinctioniscompromised,andtheother

forwhomwebecomeresponsibleloseshisorherindependence.Instead,theother

becomesacomplicatedextensionoftheego.Second,I’vetriedtoshowthattheNo-

Selfstrategydestabilizesoursenseofgenuineagency,includingtheagentivewillto

actagainstthebasicegoisticinclinationofthenatural,self-possessedperson.We

needaselfthatownsitsmentalstatestomakesenseofbothagency,andthe

capacitytorecognizethevalidityofanother’sneedsindependentlyofimmediate

self-interestanddesire.Inshort,theNo-Selfview,whilesoundingfriendlyto

unselfishaction,failstoprovideuswithgenuineother-orientationandgenuine

agency.Therefore,other-orientation,whichisthegroundofaltruisticaction,

requiresanOwnershipviewoftheself.

92

ArethereotherNon-Ownershipviewsthatnotonlymakesenseofaltruistic

action,butalsoshowhowtheOwnershipviewcomesupshort?Iwilltacklethis

questioninthenextchapter,byprovidingahybridNo-Selfview.Thiswillbemy

attemptatpreservingethicalobligation,andthelivedexperienceofcaringfor

another,withoutappealingtoarealselforanOwnershipview.

93

CHAPTER3.BEINGOTHERTHANMYSELF:DEFENDINGANETHICSOF

SELFLESSNESS

3.1Introduction

Inthischapter,Idevelop“emptinessethics”ingreaterdetail.Iexamine

whetherornotMadhyamakaBuddhism,fusedwithcontemporaryNo-Selfviews,

canprovideatransformativeandethicallycompellingorientationthatismore

practicallyattractivethantheSelfview.Inthissense,thenatureoftheprojectis

metaethical.However,inanothersense,theprojectisphenomenological,becauseI

focushereonakindoflivedexperience,whereunsettlingalterityandotherness

showupasethicalresponsibility(tobeexplainedindetailbelow).Iexamineways

inwhichthisexperienceofresponsibilitycanbeimportantlysupportedbyNo-Self

views.

Section3.2providesthetechnicalnutsandboltsformyargument.Thekey

liesintreatingegocentric,first-personconcernsasspecialcasesofother-centric,

thirdpersonconcerns.Forexample,whenIcareaboutthecharacter,values,and

well-beingofthegoodoldmanIhopetobecome,I’mactuallyconcernedwith

anotherperson.WhenIrecognizethis,Iseethatother-centricresponsibility

resonatesatthemostbasiclevelofmyself-centeredexperience.Iamsuggesting

thatthissortofparadoxicalrealizationcanbeethicallytransformative.TheNo-Self

view,asIdevelopitthroughoutthechapter,mayallowustomakesuchaclaim.To

helpmakesenseofthis,IexamineParfit’sdistinctioninReasonsandPersons

betweenthe“moderateclaim”andthe“extremeclaim.”Themoderateclaimstates

thatuponadoptingtheNo-Selfview,wemayhavemoralreasonsforcaringabout

94

ourfuturesurrogate-selves.TheoldmanIhopetobecomeisnotastageinmylife—

he’sasurrogate.Butthisdoesunderminemyobligationtomakesacrificesforhis

future.Theideahereisthatwecanforgepracticallyrelevantconnectionswithour

surrogate-selveswithoutestablishingmetaphysicalcriteriaforpersonalidentity.

Theextremeclaimstatesthatwithoutsuchcriteria,wehavenoreasontoanticipate,

project,orcareaboutthefuture.ThisisareductioontheNo-Selfview.WhileI

believetheNo-Selfviewhasresourcestodefusethisworry,Iarguethatthe

moderateclaimbreaksdowninlightoftheanticipatoryfirst-personstructureofour

livedexperience:knowingthattheoldmanwhoreplacesme(inthatgradualand

continuouswaywhichwecall“myselfgrowingolder”)willsufferpainfulprostate

cancerisdifferentthanknowingthatmydearfriendwillsufferthird-degreeburns.

Inthissense,Isuppose,Itentativelydefendtheextremeclaim.Parfitjudiciously

entertainedtheanticipationproblem,butIthinkitisastrongobjection.Again,the

extremeclaimstatesthatwithoutmetaphysicallysubstantiveperduranceofthe

self,1anindividualdoesnothavegoodreasonstocareaboutthefutureofa

surrogate-self(or,atleastnotprudentialreasons,whichinvolveprojectinginto

one’sownfuture).Inotherwords,forward-lookingagencyrequiresthatweproject

intoafutureinwhichweexist(orweexistwithspecifictemporalparts),andthat

existinginthisfutureistheprimaryreasonwehaveforcaringaboutitwhen

consideringactionstotakenow.Themoderateclaimstatesthatwecancareabout1Thesamepointmightbemadewithanendurantistview,butthislatterview—thattheselfiswhollypresentineachmomentofitsexistence(asopposedtobeing“spread”temporallywithdistinct“temporalparts”oversomethinglikeafour-dimensionalspace-time)—mightaddfurthercomplexitiestotheargument.Formypurposes,Ineedn’tgetintothefinedistinctionsbetweenenduranceandperdurance.

95

oursurrogate,butnon-metaphysicallyidenticalfuture-selveswithoutbelievingin

substantivecriteriaforpersonalidentity.Theanticipationproblemcountersthe

moderateclaimbystatingthatabasicaspectofcaringaboutthefutureisnot

accountedforinthemoderateclaim,whicheschewsbeliefinrealpersistenceover

time:thefactis,Ianticipatefuturepainandpleasureinafirst-personwaythatI

simplydonotandcannotdowithrespecttosomeoneelse’spleasuresandpains.

Withtheseproblemsinmind,Ibelievethattheremaybewaysofreframingthings

thatdojusticetobothclaims,andIshowhowthismaysupporttheNo-Selfview’s

practicalandethicalworth.

Insection3.3,Idevelopthisdefensefurtherbyprovidingapracticalglosson

ThomasMetzinger’swork.2Metzinger,whostartedoffbywritingamajorwork

titled,OnBeingNoOne—aworkarguingthatnobodyeverhadaself—concedesin

hislaterworksthattheso-calledselfisan“ego-tunnel”or“personalself-model”

(PSM).AccordingtoMetzinger,theselfisasimulationbuiltoutofthebrain’shigher-

ordercapacitytorepresentandorientitsrepresentationalactivities.ForMetzinger,

consciousnessisanevolvedcapacitytorepresentreality,andthefirst-person

experienceisahigher-orderrepresentationofthoserepresentationalcapacities.

WithMetzinger’sversionoftheNo-Selfview,wemightbeabletosplitthedifference

betweenthemoderateandtheextremeclaims.Inshort,Metzinger’sworkmight

supporttheviewthat,althoughwemaynothavetheusualreasonstocareabout

ourfutures,thiscanbeliberatingwhenitcomestoanxietyandthedreador

2ThomasMetzinger,BeingNoOne:TheSelf-ModelTheoryofSubjectivity(Massachusetts:MITPress,2003).Alsosee,ThomasMetzinger,TheEgoTunnel:TheScienceoftheMindandtheMythoftheSelf(NewYork:BasicBooks,2009).

96

anticipationofdeath.Moreover,wecanappealtoevolutionarily-adaptive

conventionstosecuremanyofourintuitionsaboutagencyandself-regarding

considerations—somethingSelfistsbelieveNo-Selfmodelscannotdo.ThatIam

free,andhaveawillthatcausesthingstohappenintheworldmaybeasimulated

illusion—butit’sonethatworks.Therefore,theextremeclaimisover-reactive,and

themoderateclaim,onitssurface,isflippantlyoptimistic.

However,Igoontoarguethatglossingtheego-tunnelinthispractical

(enactive?)wayproducesanewproblem.Developingatheoryofactionintermsof

simulationandtransparentthird-personprocessesfacesadilemma.Eitherthe

conceptofanego-tunnelkeepsmanyofourcommonsenseviewsaboutagency

intact,oritdoesnot.Ifitdoes,thentheSelf/No-Selfissueispracticallyspeaking

irrelevant.Ifitdoesnot,thentheSelfistcanmorecrediblyarguethatNo-Selfers

carrytheonusofproof,becausetheirviewup-endsmanifestfactsaboutour

practicallives.Buthere’swhereIthinkfusingMadhyamakaandcontemporaryNo-

Selfviewscanbemorallyandpracticallyinstructive.Metzinger’sfictionalism

concerningtheselfcanthen,perhaps,leanonthedeviceof“twotruths”(ultimate

andconventional)withwhichtheMādhyamikadoesthetight-ropewalkingbetween

realismandeliminativismabouttheagent-self.

Toshowthis,IappropriateaspectsofLevinas’smetaphysicalethics,

specifically,hisviewofotherness.3Myappropriationcannuanceanethicallyrich

fusionofMadhyamakaandcontemporaryNo-Selfviews.Iarguethatsincerely3AlthoughLevinas’sworkonthesubjectisextensive,Iappropriateclaimsmadeinhisseminalpiece:EmmanuelLevinas,TotalityandInfinity,transl.AlphonsoLingis(Pittsburgh,DuquesneUniversityPress,1969).

97

embodyingthisversionoftheNo-Selfviewcanreorientouregocentricinstincts.

Thisreorientationnurturesanexpansiveconcernforthegeneralfieldofsuffering.

Andratherthancaringlessaboutmyfuture,assomeSelfistsbelievetheNo-Self

viewforcesustodo,Icanseemyfuture-directedconcernasaspecialcaseof

altruisticcareandresponsibilityfortheother.

Insection3.4,IexamineinfurtherdetailwhetherornottheSelf/No-Self

viewmakesanypracticaldifference.Eveniftheextremeclaimiscorrect,nothing

aboutmypersistingintothefuturenecessitatesthatIshouldcareaboutmyfuture,

especiallyifthepersonIwillbecomehasanentirelydifferentsetofmemories,anda

differentpracticalidentity.SelfersmightclaimthatIshouldcareaboutmyfuture,

becauseitisafuturestageofmylife.ThisiswhatRaymondMartinhascalledthe

“me-consideration.”4Hehasarguedthatitisnotjustified,andthereforetheSelfand

No-Selfviewsmayequallyfailtogroundforward-lookingconcerns.Idisagree.I

thinkthe“me-consideration”isstrongerthanMartinthinks,withthecaveatthatwe

needtoappreciatethebodyasanindividuatingbaseforselfhood.Inordertoprove

this,IoffermyowntentativeestimationofwhatIthinkaSelfmightbe,andwhatI

thinkaSelfcando.However,Iendthechapterwithatension(ifnotadilemma).I

showhowboththeSelfandNo-Selfviewsprovideuswithgoodreasonstocare

aboutourfutures.Thelatterprovidesuswitharevisionaryaccountofself-regard

thatcanblossomintofull-blownaltruism.Theformer,forreasonsIwilldetail

below,cansuccessfullygrounditsegocentric,forward-lookingconcerns.Butthen

4RaymondMartin,“WoulditMatterAllThatMuchifThereWereNoSelves?”inPointingattheMoon:Buddhism,Logic,AnalyticPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009):115-134.

98

thequestionbecomeswhetherornottheSelfviewcannotonlyprovideanequally

compellingaccountofaltruism,butonethathasadvantagesovertheNo-Selfview.I

reservearesponsetothis—aresponsethatliesattheheartofthisentirework—for

thefinalchapter.

3.2.1AnticipatingMyFuture:HowtoTreatMyselfasOther

Whatwoulditbeliketoreversethegoldenrule?Insteadof“Treatothersas

youwouldyourself,”whatifweteachourchildren:“Treatyourselfasyoutreat

others.”5Obviously,wewouldneedtoclarifywhat“other”means.Emmanuel

Levinas’s“other”6issomeonewho,unlikeanordinaryobject—likeastatue,for

5I’mgratefultoDr.ArindamChakrabartiwhoinapersonalconversationofferedthisplayfullyimportantglossonParfitandŚāntideva.6Lingistranslatesthe“personalOther,theyou”as“Other”withacapital“O.”ThistranslatestheFrench,“autrui”(24).Hetranslates“other”(withoutthecapital)fortheFrench,“autre.”Thisisimportant,becauseLevinasproblematizestheusualsenseofotherness(withoutthecapital)asadelimitingconcept.Sinceitisinvokedinmakingsenseofmyself—theself-same“I”—itisdefinedinrelationtothe“I,”andthusnotso“strange”and“other”thatitwoulddisruptmycapacitytoreduceittoasystemofintelligibleconcepts.ButforLevinas,themetaphysical“Other”iswhollytranscendent,andeludesreduction—itisan“Otherwithanalteritythatdoesnotlimitthesame,forinlimitingthesametheotherwouldnotberigorouslyother:byvirtueofthecommonfrontiertheother,withinthesystem,wouldyetbethesame”(39).Iamcapitalizingonthemetaphysicalweightandtranscendence—orstrangeness—ofthisOtherwhoshowsupasarealstranger.However,I’mnotnecessarilycommittedtoLevinas’sdevelopmentofthisconcept—I’minterestedinthelivedexperienceoftheinscrutablethatcanbeastranger,butcanthenbefamiliarizedorinsomesenseidentifiedwith,thatis,thepastandfutureme(orcontinuantorsurrogate)whoIamnotidenticalwith,andwho,inthatsense,isastrangertome,butwhoIlearntorecognizeacontinuitywith.Thus,Iwillnotmakeafussaboutcapitalizingornotcapitalizing“other”inwhatwillfollow.However,foradeepreadingofLevinasonhisownterms,thiswouldbeatravesty,becauseforLevinas,“TheabsolutelyotheristheOther.HeandIdonotformanumber.ThecollectivityinwhichIsay‘you’or‘we’isnotapluralofthe‘I.’I,you—thesearenotindividualsofacommonconcept.NeitherpossessionnortheunityofnumbernortheunityofconceptslinkmetotheStranger[l’Etranger],theStrangerwhodisturbsthebeingathomewithoneself[lechezsoi]”(39).ThisspeakstotheideaofbuildingarelationshipwiththeOtherinanon-totalizingway—thatis,inawaythatdoesnot

99

example—generatesacalltowhichwemustrespond.Theotherhasaface,which

bringsthe“I”facetofacewithit.This“must”ofresponsetotheotherisnotalogical

orprincipleddemand,butpresumablyalivedexperienceofprimordial

responsibility—theexperienceofoursubjectivitycomingfacetofacewithsomeone

whoresistsreducibilitytoourfamiliarconcepts.TheotherandIcannotevenforma

generic“we”together.Intheother’sradicalsingularity,Iamforcedtorespond.

Othersarenotjustsomecollectivityofindividualsofaspecificrace,gender,height,

orotherobjectifyingproperty:theirfacesaresingularandelevatedandbeaming

withinscrutablelife.AsWilliamLargewrites,“Theotherisnotjustanotherself,

eitherafriendoranenemy,whomIcanlabelanddescribeandthus

domesticate…butthatwhichunsettlestheverycoreofmybeing…theotherisnot

justeverythingIamnot,butmorethanme.”7Iwillnotpursueadetailedexegesisof

Levinas’sworkhere.I’msimplyappropriatingtheideathatatthecoreofourbeing,

weexperienceunsettlingdifferenceandalterity,andwefeelbothrelatedtoandyet

separatedfromthisunsettlingother.Theother,asI’mthinkingofit,isthefirst-

personexperiencethatIcansensebutneverpossess,anaddressedfirstpersonto

whommyselfcomessecond:theuniquenessofyourlife-forcecomingfacetoface

withmine,andtheresponsibilitythatcomeswithrecognizingthatyouareaunique

openingontotheworld.

reducetheOthertoone’sownterms,butinstead,allowsothernesstobeitsownuniquesingularity.Thispost-modernaccountofotherness,especiallyitspoliticalandsocialramifications,goeswellbeyondmypresentpurposes.7WilliamLarge,Levinas’TotalityandInfinity(NewYork:BloomsburyAcademicPublishing),27.

100

WithrespecttoNo-Selfviews,particularlyMadhyamakaBuddhismandthe

morerecentworkofthephilosopherofmind,ThomasMetzinger,I’dliketopropose

thatabasicexperienceofbecomingothertoourownselvesmightlendanethical

nuancetotheNo-Selfviewnotyetexploredinthisessay.Becomingothertooneself

mightrevealaresponsibilitythatexistsatthemostbasiclevelofsubjective

experience.AccordingtoLevinas,webecomeothertoourselves,andthroughanact

ofappropriation,solidifyoursenseofselfhood—of“mine-ness”—inthemidstof

constantalterityandheterogeneity:

TheIisnotabeingthatalwaysremainsthesame,butisthebeingwhoseexistingconsistsinidentifyingitself,inrecoveringitsidentitythroughoutallthathappenstoit.Itistheprimalidentity,theprimordialworkofidentification[myitalics].8

Iwanttoexamineanexperienceofourownalterityanddifferencewithrespectto

ourpastselvesandourfutureselves,andshowhowitproducesabasicsenseof

ethicalresponsibility,whichissupportedratherthanunderminedbytheNo-Self

view.Accordingly,myexplorationofothernessinthecontextofanalyticand

BuddhisttextswillonlycursorilyresembleLevinas’sideaofotherness.I’mchiefly

interestedindevelopinganideaofothernessthatplaysanimportantethicalrolein

BuddhistandcontemporaryNo-Selfviews.

Solet’sbeginbyreversingthegoldenrule.Wedosobecausewecometo

realizethattheselfismoreorlessalwaysothertoitself—anotherforwhomwe

care,onwhosepastwedraw,andofwhosefuturewearecircumspect.Whenthe

selfisnotapersistingandsubstantialmetaphysicalentitytowhichthedynamic

continuumofmentallifeistethered,thepersonprojectingforwardintoherso-8Levinas,TotalityandInfinity,36.

101

calledfuturelearnstoseehercircumspectionasconcernforanintimateother

somehowboundtoher.ForcontemporaryanalyticphilosopherslikeDerekParfit,

thisboundednessisafunctionofcausalandpsychologicalcontinuities,andnot

somesortofreallypersistingentityorphenomenologicallylivedexperienceto

describe.ButIwanttosaythatadeeplyexperiencedsenseofothernessinthe

projectedfaceofthepersonwhowewere,andthepersonwhowewillbecome,

mightrevealourtypicallyself-regardingconcernasaspecialcaseofother-

regardingconcern.Iwillshowonewayinwhichthisreversalmightbemorally

instructive,andalsohowitgrowsoutofabasicexperiencethatNo-Self

reductionistslikeParfit,andNo-SelfirrealistsliketheMādhyamikaBuddhist,

capitalizeupon.ThepointhereistoshowhowNo-Selfcampsmaynotonlydebunk

realismabouttheself,butalsoprovidemorallyinstructivereasonstodoso.This

standsincompletecontrasttowhatI’vedevelopedsofar,namely,theviewthatwe

needtothinkintermsofpersistingselvesinordertolivecoherentsocialandethical

lives.ButasI’vealreadystatedinthepreviouschapters,IndianBuddhismbegins

withpractice,nottheoreticalmetaphysics.ThepracticalunderpinningsoftheNo-

Selfviewrequireslengthyexaminationsinceitisbelievedtoliberatetheego-

centeredperson,andmotivateadeeplyother-centricorientation,andwithout

eradicatingego-centricitythereisnohopeoferadicatingevenone’sownsuffering

letaloneothers’.Fortheover-archingpracticalgoalof“eradicationofsuffering—no

matterwhose,”No-Selfmetaphysics,asitwere,hastobecommissioned.Inorderto

102

explorethispossibilityIwill,forthesakeofargument,grantreductionismaboutthe

self.9

3.2.2TheContinuantOther:GoodReasonstoCareAboutMySurrogate(Non)-

Self

Iembodythebeliefthatme,themanwritingthischapter,willnotstrictly

speakingpersistintothefutureinsomedeepmetaphysicalsense.Granted,Imay

relatemoreintimatelywiththeideaofmein20yearsthanIdowithmyneighbor

Samin20years.AnalyticphilosophersmightarguethatIdoso,becausethereexists

individuatingpsychologicalandphysicalrelationshipsbetweenme-nowandmy

future-continuant.Still,whenweacceptthat“I”doesnotpickoutanythingthat

strictlypersistsintothefuture,thenwemayviewKPMin20yearsasanother

person—alittlelessotherthanmyneighborSam,butstillotherthanme.KPM-20is

notafuturestageofme—he’smysurrogate,myreplacement,or,myheir.Imayfeel

adeepbondwiththeconceptofhim,becauseIimaginehewillresemblemein

importantways.Perhaps,hewilllookalotlikeme,butthenagain,ifIamunhappy

withmycurrentvisage,andamtryingtogetaface-lift,Iimaginethathewillnot

lookalotlikeme.Still,hewillsharealotofmymemories,ticks,andbeliefsand

habits:thestuffthatpicksmeoutinmoreorlessuniqueways.IfIdonotbelieve

thatanydistinct,furtherfactrelatesmetothissurrogate,thenIdonotinanyliteral9“Reductionism”herereferstotheclaimthattheconceptoftheselfmightbeconstruedinnon-personalterms.WhilethisalignswithParfit’sReasonsandPersons,wemustrememberthatParfitretractsthatclaim.However,hedoesnotbelievethatitmakesmuchpracticaldifference.Hecomparesittoreplacingtheconceptofariver,forexample,withtheconceptofacontinuousflowingofwaterinacertainpattern.SeeDerekParfit,“Experiences,Subjects,andConceptualSchemes,”PhilosophicalTopics26,1999:217-270,at228.Cf.RichardSorabji,TheSelf,chapter15.

103

sensegettohavethatfuturetowardwhichIproject:KPM-20maybetheresultofa

continuitythatdependsuponcertainaspectsofme-now,butheisnotastageover

whichIcanclaimownership.WhenItakemeasurestosecurehisinterests,say,by

devotingmyselftoPilatesinordertoallowhimtohaveabackthatdoesn’tache,and

ahipthatdoesn’tsoeasilygiveout,I’minessenceworkingforthefutureofanother

person.AcceptingthisrequiresinanuancedwaythatIdevelopbelow,thatItreata

first-personsenseofself-regardingandegocentricconcernasathird-person

accountofother-regardingconcern—thesortofconcernwemightexpressforour

neighbors,children,orfamilyandfriends.ThisisonewayImightexperiencemyself

asother.

AsIreadParfit,heentertainsthispossibilitywhendefendingwhathecalls

the“moderateclaim”overthe“extremeclaim.”10Accordingtotheextremeclaim,

whenweacceptreductionismabouttheself,weloseanyspecialreasonstohave

future-orientedandegocentricconcerns.InEarly-ModernEuropeanphilosophy,

BishopButleradvancedthislineofargument.Hebelievedthatwithoutapersisting

selfthatownsitsmentalstates,nobodywouldhaveanyreasontocareabouthisor

herownfutureforthesimplereasonthattheywouldnotactuallyhaveafutureto

careabout.ThisissupposedtobeareductioontheNo-Selfview,becausetheview

cannotmakesenseofabasicfeatureofforward-lookingagency.WhenI’mmakinga

sandwich,I’mdrivenbyagoalthatisforward-looking.Inaverymundaneway,I’m

projectingtowardafuturegoodinwhichKPMin10minutesgetstoenjoyafull

belly.However,theNo-Selfviewmightspinsthingsdifferently.Inthispicture,my

10DerekParfit,ReasonsandPersons,307-320.

104

deepconcernforKPM-10orKPM-20’sfuturemaybemoreorlessonparwith

caringaboutneighborSam’sfuture.ButtheproblemBishopButlerandothershave

pointedoutisthatImightnotcaresomuchaboutneighborSam’sfuture,sinceso

muchofitdoesnotdirectlyconcernme.Andlikewise,Idon’thaveanyspecial

reasontocareaboutKPM-20’sfutureifit’sjustaspsychologicallyandtemporally

distantasneighborSam’sfuture.IfIdohappentocare,thatmaybecommendable,

andafunctionofvariouspsychologicalproclivities.Butrationalprudencedoesnot

demandthisofme.Parfitdeniesthisextremeclaimandinsteaddefendsthe

moderateclaim.His“RelationR,”whichreplacesthenotionofpersonalidentity

overtimewithstream-likepsychophysicalconnectednessandcontinuity,maybe

goodenoughforfuture-orientedself-regard:

Extremistsarewrongtoassumethatonlythedeepfurtherfactgivesusareasonforspecialconcern.Thinkofourspecialconcernforourownchildren,orforanyonewelove.Giventhenatureofourrelationtoourchildren…wecanplausiblyclaimthatwehavereasonstobespeciallyconcernedaboutwhatwillhappentothesepeople.Andtherelationsthatjustifythisspecialconcernarenotthedeepseparatefactofpersonalidentity.Iftheserelationsgiveusreasonforspecialconcern,wecanclaimthesameaboutRelationR.Wecanclaimthatthisrelationgiveseachofusareasontobespeciallyconcernedabouthisownfuture(italicsmine).11

AsIreadhim,Parfit’spointisthatreasondoeschimeinwithrespectto

future-orientedconcern.Whateverreasonswehaveforcaringaboutthosewhoare

closetousmayapplytoreasonswehaveforcaringaboutourfuturesurrogates.

Personalidentityanddeepfurtherfactsarenotnecessaryforhavingareasonto

careaboutsomeone.KPM-20isnotliketheneighborI’veneverspokentoacrossthe

street;he’smorelikeaclosefriend,ortheneighborI’vehadabeerwith.Asa

11Parfit,ReasonsandPersons,311.

105

reductionistabouttheself,Irecognizethatwhatever“I”picksoutnow,it

importantlycontributestowhatever“KPM-20”willpickout,anditusuallydoesso

inawaythatitcan’twhenconsideringDonaldTrumpin20years.Somehow,this

verypersonalpsychologicalconnectiontoKPM-20drawsmeclosertohisplight.

Beingtemporallydistant,IamnotnecessarilyasclosetoKPM-20asIamtothe

partnerIsharemybedwithrightnow.Butjustasmyspousebeingmyspouse

drawsmeclosertoherplightthan,say,DonaldTrumpbeingDonaldTrumpdoesto

his,KPM-20standsinaspecialrelationtome-now.Ifallgoeswell,KPM-20willnot

beDonaldTrump,andhewillnotbemyneighborSam.Infact,hewon’tbeanyone

whoissoremotelyrelatedtome.Hemightnotevenbea“he”atall.Instead,he

mightfeellikeadistantrelative,ormyownoffspring,whosefuturedeeplyconcerns

me.

Letmereflectabitfurtheronwhatwouldhavetobetrueifthisseems

convincing.ThereasonIcareaboutthefuturewelfareofmysonisthatIamrelated

tohiminimportantways.I’vebeentheretowatchhisvictoriesanddefeats.I’ve

supportedhimthroughthegrowingpainsofhistryingearlyteenyears.Ishare

laughsandtearsandstoriesandmealswithhim.Thelistgoeson.Inshort,I’m

prettydarnedclosetohim,becausesomuchofourpracticalandemotionallives

overlapandimpacteachother.ButonemightarguethatIdonotneedrigorously

groundedcriteriaforpersonalidentitytojustifycaringforhim.Wecareaboutour

loved-one’sfutureandwecareaboutourselveswithoutanyappealtometaphysics.

Evenifmyloved-oneisjustastreamofcontinuants,or,strung-togethersurrogates,

there’snoreasonthecontinuantprocessthatdescribesmyhistorycannotcare

106

aboutthecontinuantprocessthatdescribeshis.Wecanremainintimately

connectedwithoutestablishingmetaphysicalcriteriaforpersonalidentity.Grant

thatthereisnorealselfordeeperownerofmyexperiences.Grantthattheconcept

ofpersonalidentityisreallyjustaconfusedwayofdescribingvariouspsychological

andphysicalconnectionsandcontinuitiesovertime.Still,there’snothingespecially

importantaboutrelatingtomyselfinapersistingandfirst-personwaytoensure

thatIcareaboutKPM-20.Inotherwords,IcanlearntotreatmyselfthewayItreat

others,justasourreversaloftheoldmaximclaims.Ifthishasanypractical

purchase,thenImustbeabletoseemyselfasmyownother,andrevisethereasons

Ihaveforcaringaboutthisfuture-me.IdonotjustcareaboutKPM-20because,

“He’sme!”Icareabouthim,becauseheisdeservingofmycare.

Now,inhistypicallyjudiciousmanner,Parfitdoesnotinsistthatthe

moderateclaimisnecessarilycorrect.Therearereasonstoendorsetheextreme

claim,butthereareequallyreasonsnottoendorseit.Here’sareasonwhywemight

endorsetheextremeclaim.WhenI’mtoldthatIwillexperienceacripplingback

injuryin20days,theanticipationofthatpainseemsqualitativelydifferentthan

beingtoldthatmywife,myneighbor,ormydearfriendwillexperiencecrippling

painin20days.Itseemstomethatthefirst-personfeelofpainin20days

distinguishesmyconcernforKPMovermyconcernformywife.Myownfuturepain

isanticipated“fromtheinside,”whilemylovedone’sfuturepainisviewed“from

theoutside.”Buthowcanwemakesenseofthisdistinctionifpeopledonotpersist

intotheirownfuture?Anticipatingourownfuturepaindoesnotseemtobeonpar

withconcernforourlovedone’sfuture—it’sadifferentsortofphenomenon

107

altogether.Butbeingasteadfastreductionist,Imayarguethatanticipationofone’s

ownfuturepainisnotreallyjustified.Maybeanticipationissimplyaresidual

prejudiceorconfusedstatewecanlearntorevise.Justasmotivationsbasedon

psychologicalandgeographicaldistancearenotnecessarilyargumentsagainst

moralreasonsto,say,donatemoneytoUNICEF,similarly,mypsychological

proclivitytoanticipatefutureeventsandfeelingsmightbeasimpleprejudicethat

soberreflectioncures.Imighthavepsychologicalhang-upsaboutmysurrogate,that

is,Imayhavealingeringsensethatitwillbemewhoexperiencesfuturepain,but

thatdoesnotmeanIshouldletsuchappearancesguidemyactionsnow.Putanother

way,thereductionistmightclaimthatifandwhenthereisareasontocareforhis

futuresurrogate,itdoesn’trequireanidentityrelation.Moreover,anticipation

mightjustbearesidual,lessphilosophicallymaturewayofcaringaboutthisfuture

person’splight.Soitallcomesdowntohowweanalyzethephenomenonand

ontologyofanticipation.Asjudiciousasthismaysound,Ibelievethatthe

anticipationobjectionispreciselythesortofobjectionthatmakesallthedifference.

Butperhapstherearemoresophisticatedwaysofmakingsenseofforward-looking

egocentricconcernfromaNo-Selfperspective.WhatI’llexplorenextisaviewI’ve

constructedoutofcontemporaryphilosophyofmindandMadhyamakaBuddhism.

Thisviewsplitsthedifferencebetweenthemoderateandextremeclaims,and

justifiesconventionalconcernforourownfuturewithoutinvestinginsomefurther

fact.Itmaybeacompellingview,butIthinkithassomeseriousshortcomingsthatI

willdiscussbelow.

108

3.3.1Ego-TunnelsandMadhyamaka:TheEthicsandConsolationofSimulated

(Non)-Selves

ThomasMetzinger’s“personalself-model”(PSM)maybejustthesortofNo-

Selfviewthatrevisesthesimpledistinctionbetweenaso-calledmoderateversus

extremeclaim.ThePSM,orwhatMetzingeralsocalls,“theego-tunnel”isan

organizingcomponentinafunctionalneuralnetwork.Consciousness,accordingto

Metzinger,is“averyspecialphenomenon,becauseitispartoftheworldand

containsitatthesametime.”12Nature,asitwere,carvesinwardnessand

representationintoitsownfabric.Now,Metzingeroperatesattheinterdisciplinary

cuttingedgeofempiricalhardsciencesandthehumanities,wherethelogical

structureofconsciousness,particularlythephenomenologicalfeelof“mine-ness,”

or,thefirst-personexperience(rationallyreconstructedbyanalyticphilosophy,and

describedthroughlivedexperienceinphenomenology)mustanswerto

neuroscience,biology,andempiricaldata.ForMetzinger,consciousnessisan

evolvedcomponentofadvancednervoussystemsthatrepresentthebasicstuffof

reality(basically,variouswavelengthsofenergy)inadaptivelyadvantageousways.

Thus,naturecarvesoutaninternalspace,or,representationaltunnelwithinitself.

Theegoemergesatamuchmoreadvancedevolutionarystageinwhich

representationalactivitycan,inanestedandloopingway,representthatvery

activity.Thisappearsasaself—orsinglepointoforigin—forwhichsuchactivity

representsauniqueandrecursivelyself-awarevantagepointontoreality.However,

thisfeelof“mine-ness”ispurelysimulation,or,thePSM:“Theprocessofattending

12Metzinger,TheEgoTunnel,15.

109

toourthoughtsandemotions,toourperceptionsandbodilysensations,isitself

integratedintotheself-model.”13Thismeansthatanevolvedformofthird-person

processes—coordinatedneuronalfirings,etc.—representthoseveryprocesses

transparently.Inotherwords,therepresentations,ratherthantheneuronal

correlatesofconsciousness(NCC)underlyingsuchrepresentations,aretheonly

thingsvisibleatthishigher-orderlevelofrepresentation.Theego-tunneldoesnot

representtheorganicandphysicalprocessesinvolvedinrepresentation.Theego-

tunnelappearsasanagentforwhomvariousdecisionsaboutitscoordinated

activitiesmustbemade.Strictlyspeaking,thereisnoonetherewhomakes

decisionsorwitnessestheunfoldingofreality.Consciousrealitycarvesoutan

inner-domainofnestedandtransparentrepresentationalphenomena.If“I”refersto

anything,itreferstothisorganizationalcomponentinthedynamicnetworkof

neuronalactivity.

Adoptingthistheory,wemightbelievethategocentricandfuture-directed

concernisnotjustifiedintheusualsense,becausethereisstrictlyspeakingnoone

therewhoseneeds,hopes,andfearsweshouldworrytoomuchabout.Thisishow

thePSMmodelmightappropriatetheextremeclaim.Perhaps,practicallyspeaking,

thiswouldbeliberating.Whenitcomestothefearofdeath,ortheanxietyofamind

obsessivelyconcernedwithitsownfuture,knowingthere’snoonetheretoreally

haveorlosecontroloverthefuturemightbepsychologicallypalliative.ThePSM

approach,supportedasitisbyempiricaldataandinterdisciplinaryresearch,might

alsohelpilluminateincontemporarytermswhatseemsobscureorincoherentina

13Metzinger,TheEgoTunnel,16.

110

surfacereadingofMadhyamakaphilosophy.Forexample,PSMmightclarify

Nāgārjuna’sopeningdedicationtotheBuddhainhisMūlamadhyamakakārikā:

IsalutetheFullyEnlightenedOne[theBuddha]…whotaughtthedoctrineofdependentorigination,accordingtowhichthereisneithercessationnororigination,neitherannihilationnortheeternal,neithersingularitynorplurality,neitherthecomingorthegoing[ofanydharma,forthepurposeofnirvāṇacharacterizedby]theauspiciouscessationofhypostatization.14

WecanreadMadhyamakaphilosophyasdeflationaryandepistemically

humble(seechapter2).TheMādhyamikahighlightsourevolvedtendencytoreify

andposittheoreticalentities—entitiesusedtonavigateournaturalandsocial

reality.Inthecontemporaryscene,wewouldsaythatMadhyamakadeconstructs

theunstablereificationsthatimbueourfolk-psychologicalbeliefinsubstantial

entitiessuchassouls,persons,universals,permanentsubstrataofchange,etc.The

hardscienceshaveproducedcoherentandempiricallysupportedmodelsthat

destabilizenaïverealism.Advancesinstatistics,neuroscience,biology,andphysics

haveshownusthatsubstantialist-discourseisaproductofourcollectivetendency

tohypostasizeandsimplifydynamic,non-linear,andmetaphysicallyopen-ended

processes.Basically,whenwelearntothinkintermsofnestedsystemsand

probabilities—likeglobalweatherpatterns—ratherthanlinearalgorithmsand

causallydeterminedclosedsystems,wecometorealizethatthelanguageof

“comingorgoing”or“cessationornon-cessation”doesnothavethesamedeeply

entrenchedpurchaseitoncehad.Madhyamakaphilosophyisuniqueinthatitweds

14TranslationinSideritsandKatsura,Nāgārjuna’sMiddleWay,2013: anirodhamanutpādamanuchhedamaśāśvatam| anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam| yaḥpratītyasamutpādamprapañcopaśamaṃśivam| deśayāmāsasaṃbuddhastaṃvandevadatāṃvaram||

111

variousBuddhistassumptionsandpracticalcommitmentstoitsirrealistand

conventionalistdiscourse.Granted,itcastsitsnetwiderthansomewouldlikewhen

itclaimsthatnothingwhatsoeverhasanyintrinsicnature(svabhāva),butitalso

coheresmoresuccinctlywithsomeofthemorecogentbutradicalclaimsdrawnout

ofevolutionarybiology,andquantumandchaostheories.Itappearsthatour

nervoussystemsarealwaysbusyinventingindependent-seemingrealitiesoutside

andinsideourselves.Associalcreatureswithresponsivenervoussystems,wemay

bedescribedascreaturesthatcoordinateconsensualpatternsofactivityaroundthe

waythingsshowuprelativetoournervoussystems.Moreover,withadvancesinthe

studyofmirror-neurons,wearebeginningtodevelopaphysicalpictureofhow

intersubjectivitycanarisewithinanexusofself-interpretingnervoussystems—

nervoussystemsthatcouplewith(ratherthanperfectlymirror)anexternal

environmentinselectivelyadvantageousways.Lookingatthingsthisway,we

becomelesscommittedtothenaïvebeliefthatwecandescribeanobserver-

independentreality.Instead,weviewourselvesasparticipantsintheunfoldingof

appearances.Likewise,Isuggestthatthemodelofaselfwhosuffers,ordisappears

orsurvivesafteritsdeathholdslessimportanceoverourdeliberationswhenwe

thinkintermsofprocesses,systems,andsimulationsratherthansubstances,

billiard-ballcausality,andrealmetaphysicalselves.So,inaway,PSMandNāgārjuna

takeseriouslytheSelfist’sbeliefthatwithoutsubstantialistmetaphysics,wedonot

have(theusual)reasonstocareaboutourfutures.Inthissense,theytakeSelfism

andtheextremeclaimseriously,butthengoontoshowhowrevisingfuture-

directedconcernscanactuallybeliberatingandmorallyinstructiveratherthana

112

nihilisticreductioontheNo-Selfview.Now,whenitcomestoeverydaypractical

considerations,theycandefusetheSelfist’sextremeclaimbywinningbackethics

andself-regardingandother-regardingconcernsthroughconvention(the“two

truths”gambit).15Inonesense,wedonothavea“special”reasontocareforaself

15IneedtobecarefulaboutmyverygeneralglossofNāgārjunahere.IntheMMK,specificallytheAryasatya-Parīkṣā(“AnalysisoftheNobleTruths”),NāgārjunaisaddressingaBuddhistaudienceworriedthattheMadhyamakaemptinessdoctrine(śūnyatā)underminestheethicalorientationandpurposeoftheBuddhistpath.Theworryisthatemptinessofallintrinsicnaturesandnaturalkindsunderminesthefournobletruths,ofwhichtheprescribedeight-foldpathplaysavitalethicalroleforBuddhists.Nāgārjunaarguesthat,first,onemustbearinmindtheBuddha’sdoctrineofthetwotruths(dvausatyau):theconventionalor“concealing”truth(saṃvṛti-satya)versustheultimatetruth(paramārtha-satya).InhisPrasannapadā,theMādhyamika,Candrakīrtigivesthreeglosseson“conventional.”Histhirdglosssteersawayfromtheideathattheconventionaltruthconcealsanultimatestateofobserver-independentfacts.Instead,Candrakīrtipointsoutthatconventionaltruthissociallyconstructedandisbuiltoutofthesemanticandcognitivehabitsofordinarypeople(loka).Recognizingthisfactjustisthe“ultimatetruth.”Oftentimes,Indiancommentatorsfavorthelastetymologicalglosstheyprovideforacontestedterm—sothisseemstobehispreferredgloss.Formoreonthis,seeSideritsandKatsura,Nāgārjuna’sMiddleWay,272.Now,wemayinterpretMadhyamakaasclaimingthattheultimatetruthisthatnoultimatefoundationscanbefoundbyanalysis.Thus,recognizingthatweareinherentlysocialandinterpretivebeingscanliberateusfromstubbornlydogmaticviews.Yetitisonlythroughtheseself-sameconventionsthatwecandevelopsomethinglike“thenoblepath”inthefirstplace.So,recognizingourparticipantroleintheconstructionofrealitydoesnotnecessarilyundermineallourcherishedethicalintuitions. Second,NāgārjunaarguesthatforXtohaveanintrinsicnatureisforXtobechangelessandboundtothepermanentexpressionofitsessentialnature.Thus,Xisnotamenabletobearingdynamicdependencyrelationswithotherentities.Nāgārjuna’spointisthatthepathtonirvāṇaisdynamicandprocessual.However,intheGatāgata-Parīkṣā(“AnalysisoftheMovedandNot-Moved”)chapteroftheMMK,Nāgārjunafamouslyarguesthatmotion(orprocessandchange)doesnotmakesensewhenwethinkintermsofrealsubstanceswithpermanentnatures.Thus,thesuccessfulpracticeoftheBuddhistpath,whichisadynamicprocess,issupportedbytheemptinessdoctrine,becausethedoctrineclaimsthatthingshangtogetherinconstructeddependencyrelationsthatwouldarguablynotmakesenseifwebelievedinpermanentandintrinsicnatures.MypointhereisthatNāgārjunacaneschewthebeliefinrealselvesandpersistingandsubstantialentitieswithoutunderminingBuddhistpracticeandBuddhistethics.Dependentorigination(pratītyasamutpāda)isthecornerstoneofMadhyamakaphilosophy,andthoughtby

113

thatwasneverreallythereinthefirstplace.Ontheotherhand,thesimulatedself

servesevolutionaryandpragmaticpurposes,andacircumspectiveattitudetoward

futuresurrogatesissomewhatinevitablegiventhenatureofthesimulation.As

socialcreaturesthatmustplanforafuture,ordeterminewhoisresponsibleforan

actionbyholdingsomeoneaccountabletohercommitmentsandpromises,westill

needamoredetailedpracticalpictureofhowthePSMandNo-Selfmodelscanmake

senseofnormativephenomena,orofferusanyconsolationsaboutourfutures(if

thereareanytobehad).Perhapswithamoredetailedsketch,andwithon-going

conversationbetweenthehardsciencesandhumanities,ashiftintheoretical

paradigmscanmoredirectlyimpactashiftinourpracticaloutlooks.

Forexample,saythat“I”picksoutaprocesscalled“Kevin.”Thisprocess

eitherarisesinarealbaseofindividuation—say,abodythatallowsustodistinctly

locateitthroughspaceandtime—or,asMadhyamakaphilosophyseemstoargue,

arisesasaconventionalconstruct.Madhyamakausestheverylogicof

substantialismandnaïve-realismtodeconstructtheessentialistparadigm.Through

adeconstructive,purelycriticalendeavor,theMādhyamikaBuddhistlearnstostop

theMādhyamikatobetheBuddha’sessentialteaching.AccordingtoNāgārjuna,dependentorigination—ortheefficacyofconstructeddependencyrelations—onlymakessenseifwebelievethatallthingsareemptyofintrinsicnatures.Sotheethically-chargednatureoftheBuddhistpath,whichconsistsinrecognizingthetruthsofsuffering,arising,cessation,andtheeight-foldpath,issupportedratherthanunderminedbyeschewingrealnaturalkindsandpersistingmetaphysicalentities: yaḥpratītyasamutpādapaśyatīdaṃsapaśyati| duḥkhaṃsamudayaṃcaivanirodhaṃmārgamevaca| Hewhoseesdependentorigination[understoodasśūnyatā]seesthis: Suffering,arising,cessationofsuffering,andtheverypathitself.

114

thinkingintermsofrealnaturalkinds,realmetaphysicallydistinctbasesof

individuation,andsubstanceswithrealintrinsicnatures.Instead,theMādhyamika

learnstoembraceontologicalcommitmentswithadegreeofirony—thatis,he

learnstoseetheboundednessandindividuationofvariousmedium-sizedobjectsas

aproductofinterpretivepossibilitiesarisingoutoftheconceptualframeworksthat

organizeourmentallives.Thereisnoobserver-independent,ontologicalrealityto

uncover.Andwedonotembodysuchaviewonlyinmystical,hallucinatory,orLSD-

inspiredexperiences.Oureverydayexperience—theso-calledmanifestimage—can

stillseethingsinarelativelyordinarywayevenacceptingthefactthatour

metaphysicalconclusionsareopen-endedfunctionsofchanginginterpretative

possibilities.Forexample,embodyingMadhyamakaphilosophycomeswitha

deflationaryorminimalistcommitmenttothinkingintermsofdependency

relationsratherthanstrictcausalrelationships.ThisispartofwhytheBuddha

chosetospeakintermsofinterdependentrelationality,or,“dependentorigination”

(pratītyasamutpāda)ratherthanbilliard-ball,cement-of-the-universecausalforces.

Forexample,Irefusetoleavetherally,apoliceofficerspraysafinemistinmyeyes,

andnowIexperiencetear-jerkingpain.Thecomplexityofoverlappingrelationships

andinterpretiveschemasinvolvedinthatsimplecausalstorywouldundermineany

final,billiard-ballaccountoftheincident.Butformypurposes,thestoryisfineasa

seriesofeventsdependingonotherevents.ThissortofaccountgetsmewhatIneed

outofthestory:ifnotforthishappening,thenthatwouldn’thavehappened,etc.Or

sayIleadalifeofcrimerobbingdrugstoresfortheirnarcotics.I’marrested,andat

mytrialthereisnooneelseIcanconvincinglyofferupforpunishment.Claiming

115

thatI’maBuddhistwhodoesnotbelieveinpersistingselvesornaturalkindsdoes

notgetmeoffthehook.Ineitherclaimdeepmetaphysicalidentitywiththeman

whorobbedthedrugstores,nordoIbelieveitwasanyoneelse.Butifanyoneneeds

tobedeterred,reformed,orpunished,it’snotgoingtobemyneighborSam—it’s

goingtobeme,theguywhogotcaughtred-handed.Ultimately,ifIacceptthePSM

theory,thennoonethingreallydidanyofthis.Aprocess,organizedbyyearsof

evolutionandrandomadaptivefit,organizeditselfalonganasymptoticpointof

selfhood,asimulatedpointneverreallyreached,andneverreallyidentifiedforthe

simplereasonthattheselfdoesnotstrictlyspeakingexist.Theprocessnames

variousintimatelyrelatedeventsthatleadtoKPM—ahypostatization—becominga

self-awaredrugstorecowboy.“I”referstoaprocesswithrepresentationalthought

thatcan,inanestedandrecursiveway,representthefactthatitrepresentsthings.

Thisisaprocessthatcanreflect,think,feel,anticipate,andhopeforthings,buta

processnotreallytetheredtoanyonepersistingpoint.

Withrespecttopracticalconsiderations,wemightaskhowendorsingthis

viewimpactsourthoughtsondeath,inbothegocentricandother-centricterms.We

mightexplaintheego-tunnel’sfearofdeathasmorethanafearoftheunknown,or

theyearningforthingstoalways“belikesomething”inafirst-personsortofway.

WhenIdreadorfearmydeath,theego-tunnelorPSMthatconstitutesmysenseof

selfreachesazero-pointthatmakesnosense:itisoverwhelmedbytheexistential

anxietyofmeaninglessness—understoodastheinabilitytorepresentthefaceof

oblivion.IfwetakethePSMtheoryseriously,thenthird-personprocessesremain

transparenttoasimulated“I,”whichisthereasonthatthis“I”experiencesitselfasa

116

singleentityandnotjustadynamic,physicalprocess.Thisprocessdoesnot

incorporatetheideaofitscompleteannihilationinanysortofcoherentway.

Granted,elementsofexistenceareexperiencedas(properties’orstates’)coming

andgoing,buttheabsoluteceasingofanycomingandgoingarenotcomputabletoa

processthatislivingandconstantlyregeneratingandrepresentingitself—toa

processthatisalwaysprocessingandnotsimplyceasing.(Incidentally,evenunder

Eternalism,theSelfcannotjustceasetoexist).IfIcanembodythistheoryin

practice,thenperhapsIcanlearntoneitherfearnornot-fearwhateludes

experientialprocessingandrepresentation:I’mneitherflippantnoramI

overwhelmedbytheprospectofadeaththatIusually(andparadoxically)take

ownershipofwhenI’manaïverealistabouttheself.Thereissimplynostaticor

persistingentitythatcanownitsdeath.Thereisnoselfwhowillsufferannihilation,

butonlyanintensechangeinanalways-dynamicprocess.Perhapsachievingthis

sortofequanimityispreciselythesortofliberatingnirvāṇaNāgārjunareferstoin

hisdedicatoryverseabove.Remnantsoftheextremeclaimremainhere,because

thereisnospecialreasonIhaveforworryingtoomuchaboutthefuture,simply

becausethereisnoonethingpickedoutby“I.”However,theremaybeother

reasonsforconcernthataresimplygeneratedbythebiologicallyandculturally

situatednatureofthesimulated“I”experience,andthisishowthePSMview

appropriatesthemoderateclaim:wecanhaveconcernforasimulatedfuture,

becauseitisoftenadvantageoustodoso.Thus,wecanstaveoffnihilismeveninthe

faceofagrowingtheoreticalframeworkthatviewstheselfasakindoffictionor

simulation.

117

Whilethismayconsoleusinthefaceofourowndeaths,I’mnotconvinced

thatitoffersmuchwhenitcomestodreadingthedeathofothers.EvenifIwillnot

betheretofretovermydeath,andevenifthere’snooneentitydeprivedofthe

valueoffuturegoods,thisdoesnotconsolemewhenIexperiencethepassingaway

ofalovedone.InthePālisutras,Buddha’spupils,andevenhisclosestandmost

advanceddisciple,Kaśyapapourtearsovertheimminentdeathoftheirgreat

teacher.LikeSocrates,Buddhascoldsthemforsuchunenlightenedbehavior.16

16Zhuangzi(476-221BCE)—aclassicalDaoist,process-philosopherfromtheWarringStatesperiodinChina—seemstohavegonetotheotherextreme,drumminghappilywhenhiswifedied.PerhapstheBuddharecommendedamiddlewaybetweeninconsolableandinterminablegrieving,andnonchalantcelebratingofthedeathofadearone.SeeBurtonWatson,ChuangTzu:BasicWritings(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1964),113.

ChaungTzu’s[Zhuangzi’s]wifedied.WhenHuiTzuwenttoconveyhiscondolences,hefoundChuangTzusittingwithhislegssprawledout,poundingonatubandsinging.“Youlivedwithher,shebroughtupyourchildrenandfewold,”saidHuiTzu.“Itshouldbeenoughsimplynottoweepatherdeath.Butpoundingonatubandsinging—thisisgoingtoofar,isn’tit?” ChaungTzusaid,“You’rewrong.Whenshefirstdied,doyouthinkIdidn’tgrievelikeanyoneelse?ButIlookedbacktoherbeginningandthetimebeforeshewasborn.Notonlythetimebeforeshewasborn,butthetimebeforeshehadabody.Notonlythetimebeforeshehadabody,butthetimebeforeshehadaspirit.Inthemidstofthejumbleofwonderandmysteryachangetookplaceandshehadaspirit.Anotherchangeandshehadabody.Anotherchangeandshewasborn.Nowthere’sbeenanotherchangeandshe’sdead.It’sjustliketheprogressionofthefourseasons,spring,summer,fall,andwinter.[Sic] “Nowshe’sgoingtoliedownpeacefullyinavastroom.IfIweretofollowafterherbawlingandsobbing,itwouldshowthatIdon’tunderstandanythingaboutfate.SoIstopped.”

118

Afterall,reallyembodyingtheBuddha’steachingsshouldgivethepupilsreasonsto

celebrateratherthanlamenthisdeath.However,theBuddha’spupilsrecognizethat

theymustnowendureaworldwithouttheBuddha’sdirectinfluence.Theymust

learntolivewithouthisfriendshipandhiscompassionategaze.Likewise,Imust

endurethedeathofthosewhomattermosttome.Livingwithoutthosewhobring

meaningtomylifewouldbepainfulandworthyofmysorrow.IfendorsingaNo-Self

viewsomehowassuagesmyconcernforalovedone’sdeath,andthustosome

extentmitigatesmyreasonsfordreadingdeath,thenitmustfollowthatathird-

persontheoryaboutthefirst-personexperience,say,aPSMtheoryorwhatever,can

revisemyintimaterelationshipswithothers,andtransformthemeaninginvestedin

howtheyenrichmylife.Buthowdoesthatexactlyfollow?EvenifIacceptthatmy

belovedmotherisnothingbutasimulationofanindividualself,nothinginmy

practicalrelationshipwithherischangedotherthan,perhaps,theconsolationthat

comeswithbelievinghersoulwillliveonafterherbody’sdeath.Sheprovidesme

withunconditionalloveandencouragement,andherpassingwillmarkthe

devastatingendofadearlyintimaterelationship,afinalseveringfromthewoman

andfriendwhonurturedmeinherwombandinherhome.

Moreover,evenwhenit’smyselfratherthanmylovedonethatI’mconcerned

with,otherpracticalproblemsarise(tosaynothingabouttheconceptualissueof

whethermyowndeathisevenimaginablebyme;worryingaboutmyowndeath—

whichWittgensteinteachesuswillnotbeaneventinMYlife—seemsharderto

makesenseofthanworryingaboutmyageingfromwhich,atleast,mydeathwillbe

atotalrespite).AmInotjustifiedincaringaboutwhatsortofoldmanIwillbecome,

119

orwhatsortofretirementImayormaynotenjoy,orwhatsortofgloballywarmed

andenvironmentallydegradedplanetImustendure?Processorno-process,

conventionorno-convention,eventhesimulated“I”stillhastocontendwiththese

issuesaspartofthecontentandrepertoireofitsthoughtsandgoal-oriented

behavior.Iamsuggestingherethatthinkingaboutpracticaldeliberationandagency

asprocessandsimulationeitherconfuseshowIshouldfeel,ordoesnothingto

assuagetheexistentialwoesthatcomewithlivingamortallife.However,thinking

intermsofaselfwhohasarealhistory,aselfwhocanliveuptoandtakeownership

overherdecisionsandindecisions,mightbettermotivatemetotryto“getitright”

inthefaceofmyshorttimeonthisplanet.ThatIsufferisarealproblemforme,and

thatImusthelplesslyendurethepainonsufferingfaces,orcopewiththelossofa

lovedoneislikewiseadreadedfeatureofmyexistence.Iamnotconsoledbythe

cold,surgicalconclusionsofawell-developedtheory.

Furthermore,whenIthinkofmyselfasanagentwhomustmakedecisions,I

projectmyselfintoafuturethatIcareabout.EvenifIweresuicidal,Iwouldbe

driventoproduceafuturethatmatterstome—albeitafuturethatendsallfuture

possibilitiesforme.Agentsalwaysanticipatepossibilitiesagainstabackgroundof

beliefsandembodiedcapacities.Thismeansthatagentshaveahistorybywhich

theyassessthepresentmomentwhileprojectingintoanunknownfuture.ThePSM

modeldoesnotadequatelyclarifyhowIshouldrelatetomyselfasanagent.Perhaps

PSMdoesnotdisturbmanyofourintuitionsaboutagencyandforward-looking

deliberations,becauseitpostulatesasimulated“I”whodoestheworkthata

persisting“I”issupposedtodo.Butthen,PSMhasnopracticalorethicalupshot

120

whenitcomestofuture-orientedconcern,bothegocentricandother-centric.

Ethicallyandpracticallyspeaking,youcouldflipacointodecidewhetherornotto

endorsetheSelfortheNo-Selfview,whichmeansthatneitherviewmakesanyreal

practicaldifference.Soifwe’regoingtofindpracticalandethicalworthinthese

theories,thenboththeSelfandNo-Selfviewsmustshowuswithgreaterdetailhow

themetaphysics(ormetaphysicalrevisions)reallymatter.Foraphilosopherof

mindlikeMetzinger,thismightnotbesuchanimportantissue.Granted,certain

transhumanistethicalconsiderationsmayariseregardingA.I.andtheresurrection

ofegosinnewbodiesorsuper-computers.Butsomeofourmorebasicconcerns

aboutbeingethicalagentsarenotreallyaddressedbythismodel.However,being

abletothinkofoneselfasotherinthemoreradicalwayIsuggestedmightprovidea

novelwayofjustifyingaltruismandother-regardingconsiderations.I’lldevelopthis

furtherbelowasIexploreinmoredetailwhetherornottheSelforNo-Selfissue

makesanypracticaldifference.

3.3.2Madhyamaka,Ego-Tunnels,andAltruism:SeeingtheWorldasa

SpectrumofGradedConcernsfortheOther

IshouldremindyouthatIamappropriating,inaverycursoryway,Levinas’s

glosson“metaphysics”and“otherness,”becauseIbelieveitmayactuallyprovide

theNo-Selfmodelwithgreaterethicalandpracticalpurchase.ForLevinas,

metaphysicsisaconversationwithwhatisother,thatis,withthe“infinite”

understoodasthatwhichresistsreductiontotheconcept,andisexperiencedas

121

“morethan”or“otherthan”oneself.17Again,withoutprovidingcommentaryon

Levinas,Iwouldonlyconnectthiskindofunsettlingexperiencetotheinabilityto

directlyexperiencetheinnerlifeofanotherperson.Above,Idiscussedtheroleof

mirror-neuronsintheircapacitytoprovideaphysicalbasisforintersubjectivity.But

evenmirror-neuronscannotclosethegapbetweenwhatismanifestlypresenttome

inafirst-personway,andwhatmaybemanifestlypresenttoothers.Thesciencehas

sofarshownthatmyneuronscanmirrorcertainfunctionalstatesinthebrainof

anotherwhoissuffering.Thisispostulatedtobepartofthephysicalbasis

underlyingempathy.However,theneuronsdonotmirrorthosefiringsinthe

sufferingsubjectassociatedwiththefirst-personexperienceofpain,andthisjust

meansthatIdonotliterallyfeelyourpain.However,Icanempathizewithyourpain

asmybrainmirrorsthefiringsassociatedwiththegeneralfunctionalstateofpain.

Mybrainmatchesthesetorelevantpatternsofbehaviorthathavepathwaysinmy

motorcortex.SointhecaseofLevinas’sunderstandingoftheimpenetrableor

“transcendent”other,wecanthinkthisintermsofanego-tunnelorfirst-person

experiencethatisneverdirectlygraspablefromourownvantagepoint.Again,this

isasimplificationofboththeneuroscienceandLevinas’swork,butthepointhereis

that“metaphysics,”understoodasalivedencounterwiththeinscrutableother,

17Levinas,TotalityandInfinity:“Therelationbetweenthesameandtheother,metaphysics,isprimordiallyenactedasconversation,wherethesame,gatheredupinitsipseityasan“I,”asaparticularexistentuniqueandautochthonous,leavesitself”(39).Also,“Themetaphysicaldesirehasanotherintention[otherthanordinarydesire];itdesiresbeyondeverythingthatcansimplycompleteit.Itislikegoodness—theDesired[other]doesnotfulfillit,butdeepensit”(34).Andfurtheron,“Infinityischaracteristicofatranscendentbeingastranscendent;theinfiniteistheabsolutelyother”(49).

122

mightshowhowtheNo-Selfmodelprovidesapowerfulrevisionofpracticalagency

andethicalother-centricity.Letmeexplainthisinmoredetail.

AsParfitargued,themoderateclaimisjustified.Evenifthereisstrictly

speakingnoonetheretolaugh,cry,suffer,ordie(asthePSMmodelclaims)westill

careaboutpeoplearoundus,andwecaremostforthosewhoareclosesttous.This

isamanifestaspectofourlivedexperience.Similarly,wecanlearntocareforour

surrogatestowhomwebearRelationR.Wecantakepainsandsacrificecertain

pleasuresnowtohelpensureabetterlifeforoursurrogates,andwecandoso

withoutbeingoverlyconcernedthatoursenseofidentitywiththesurrogateis

simplyamatterofevolvedconventions.Ifweacceptthis,thenwecanmoreorless

havemorality,prudence,responsibility,andmanyofthemorallyrichcategoriesthat

comewithhavingmetaphysicallypersistingselves,andwecanhavethisallonthe

reductionist’sterms.ButunlessParfit’spictureprovidesuswithrevisedethical

concernsandcommitments—whichhehasargueditdoes18—thenwe’recaughtina

problematicconundrum:theSelfandNo-Selfviewsmatterverylittleinthepractical

andethicaldomains.However,Iarguethatbydevelopinganotionof“otherness,”

andfusingitwithMadhyamakaBuddhism,theNo-Selfviewcanhaveamorally

relevantupshot.Infact,theNo-Selfviewmayofferauniquerevisionofourusual

distinctionbetweenself-regardingandother-regardingconsiderations.Inchapters

1and2,Iarguedthatsuchrevisionmightperniciouslydestabilizetheself/other

distinction,which,Iargued,isnecessaryforempathyandother-regarding

motivationstohittheirtarget.ButperhapsImissedsomeimportantnuancesthat

18Parfit,ReasonsandPersons,321-347.

123

allowalittleplayinthatdistinctiontoservegreaterpracticalends.The“otherness”

cumirrealistMadhyamakaviewmayprovideuswithauniqueviewofaltruismasa

spectrumofgradedconcernsthat,uponembracingtheNo-Selfview,openup

subtlerandyetmorefar-reachingopportunitiesforaltruism,andforthesortof

emotionalmaturityrequiredwhenactingfromaltruisticmotivations.Thisis

preciselythesortofusefulrevisionthatIdiscountedinchapters1and2.Solet’ssee

howitmightworkhere.

WhenIseetheworldintermsofconstant“othering,”Inolongerremainso

deeplyentrenchedinthesolipsismoftheself—entrenchedinthatsenseofprivate

mine-nessthatalways(falsely?)appearsthesameinthemidstofmyalways

fluctuatingmentallife.WhenIbecomeothertomyself,inthewayI’vesuggestedwe

mightbecomebyembracingtheNo-Selfview,primordialotherness—notjust

betweenmeandyoubutbetweenmeandme—ishighlighted.Anditisnotjust

highlightedasageneralstructure.Theselfisviewedasbothother(remembermy

storyaboutKPM-20)andyetsomeonetowhomIamcalledontorespond.I

experienceapsychologicalaswellastemporaldistancebetweenme-nowandmy

futureself,becausethisfuturesurrogateisinsomewayinscrutableand

unknowable.WhenIwas5,Iwantedtobeaboxerandawriter(maybeIwasin

touchwithmyinnerHemingway),butIcouldn’thaveforeseeninanyintellectualor

visceralway,themanIhavebecome.Andyet,whenIproject20yearsdowntheline

tostillanothermanIwillbecome,eveninhisalterityanddifference,Ifeel

responsibleforandtohim.Icomefacetofacewiththe“transcendent”(inthe

124

LevinasiansenseIdiscussedabove),butinthefaceofthisotherness,Iexperience

responsibilityasageneralfeatureofmyexperience.

Letmefleshthisout.Considerprojecting20yearsintothefuture.Ihavea

vividsenseofconnectiontothispersonIwillbecome,andIsimultaneouslyfeel

distanttothisfutureagent,asthoughheweresomeoneelsealtogether.Iwantto

claimthatthisisnotjustamatteroftemporaldistance,there’sanontologyinvolved.

Somuchabouthimwillbedifferentfrommenow,thatinasubstantiveway,hewill

beadifferentsortofperson,someoneIcannotdirectlyidentifywith.Thiscanalso

becapturedmoresuccinctlybyconsideringthebackwardgaze.Thereissomuch

differenceintheexperiences—nottomentionthephysicality,thepeculiarstyleof

embodiedliving,andthevariousconcernsandvalues—ofmyformerlifeasayoung

boyandteenagerfrommylifenow,thatIcansometimesfeellikeitwassomeone

else’slife.Inotherwords,thispastthatIcallmyownisinmanywaystranscendent

towhoIamnow,andtowhatitisinmycapacitytofeel,think,anddo.It’s

“transcendent”inthesensethatitexistspowerfullyoutsideofme,andyetIfeel

moreorlessconnectedtoit.I’moftensurprisedtohearinterpretationsfromothers

abouteventsinmypast—interpretationsofwhatIwassupposedlydoingor

thinkingorfeeling—andI’mamazedbythedisparityinnarrativelenses,andthe

extenttowhichsomeonecanconvincemethatIoughttoviewwhoIwasandwhatI

didinsuchandsuchaway,awaythatIwasnotprivytobeforeopeningthe

discussionwiththisotherperson.Wecanprovidesuchradicallydifferent

narratives,becausewe’reallseeingthese(identical?)eventsthroughunique

vantage-pointsthatrequireimagination,creativesynthesis,andnarrativefiltering.

125

Itdoesn’thelpmetoclaimthatIcantrumpmymother’s,myfather’s,myteachers’,

andmyfriends’andneighbors’viewaboutmyselfbecauseitwas“mylife,”and“I

knowwhoIwasandwhatIcaredaboutandwhatIwentthrough”inawaythatno

oneelsecan.Perhapsinacertainsensethatistrue,butmostofthetime,Icanbe

surprisedbytheuniquenarrativeoptionsthatIhadnoideawereavailablefor

viewingandmakingsenseofmypast.WhatI’msuggestingisthatthisexperience

putsawedgebetweenme-now,andmypastassomethingIcanviscerally“own”

rightnow.Whensittinghereinpain,becauseI’vecutmyhandslicinganapple,I

haveanimmediatesenseofownershipoverthephysicalandmentalstatesinplayin

awaythatIdonotwhenIprojectbackwardonsufficientlydistantexperiences.The

distance,I’msuggesting,isnotjusttemporaloramatterofrecollection,butalso

personal:sometimesIhavetoworkhardtotakeownershipofmypastactionsin

spiteofbeingabletorememberthoseexperiences.Ibelievethatsomethingsimilar

isinplaywhenIprojectforwardintothefuture.Thereisatranscendentalterity

thatshowsup,whichprovidestheontologicalbasisformycapacitytocompletely

dissociatefrommypastandmyfuturedespitemybeingabletotakeownershipof

thoseexperiencesthroughaprocessofnarrativeconstruction.

Now,onecanrespondthatanobviousasymmetrybetween“owning”mypast

andprojectingtowardmyfutureisinplayhere.IcanownsomethingI’vedone,but

it’shardtoimagineowningamerepossibility,afutureoccurrencenotyetsaidor

done.ThisisparticularlyproblematicwhenweconsideraMinorityReportscenario.

InPhilipK.Dick’sstory,peoplearepunishedinadvanceforwhattheywilldo.This,

ofcourse,requiresadeterministicaccountofthings,butthepointisthatweare

126

hard-pressedtoblamesomeoneforhisorherpossibleandnotyetmanifested

deeds—thatiswhythestoryisdystopian.Soperhapsmyappealtothealterityof

thepastdoesnothelpclarifywhat’sinvolvedinprojectingtowardthefuture.There

seemstobeanopennessorfreedomwithrespecttothefuture—howeverillusory

thatfreedommaybe—thatallowsmetohaveanimportantsayinwhatIwilldo.

Thisoptiondoesnotexistwithrespecttothepast.Soletmeinsteadspinthisina

slightlydifferentdirection.ThepointonthetableisthatIexperiencealteritywith

respecttomyselfinthefaceofmypastandmyfuture,andIexperiencethisasboth

anotherperson—apersonIdonotdirectlycontrol—andyetsomeoneintimately

connectedtome(ifnotsimply,myself)forwhomItakeresponsibility.Inbothcases,

narrativeinterpretationandfilteringareatworkinconstructingmypastand

projectingtowardthepossibilitiesinmyfuture.Mybiases,prejudices,and

perspectivaluniquenessandshortcomingsconstructthebeingwhosepastIbelieve

Iown,andthebeingwhosefutureIcanown(inthemodalsenseofapossibilitythat

Icanactualize).WhatI’msayingisthatthepalpableandcommonsensewayin

whichIowntheimmediaterushofpainwhenslicingmyfingerinthepresentisnot

thewayinwhichIcometomakesenseofmypastandprojectintomyfuture.Thisis

whyIwouldcallthisnarrativeframing,“appropriation”ratherthanmere

ownership.Althoughbothtermsareintimatelyrelatedinthesenseoflayingclaim

toproperty,thereisakindofdistancetothepastselfandfutureselfthatdoesnot

allowmetoseethat“property”asfullymyown.

Onceweaccepttheexistenceofthislivedexperienceofalterity,theextreme

ofwhichshowsupasdepersonalization,wecandistinguishbetweenthelackof

127

takingresponsibility(indepersonalization),andthealmostdissonantsensein

whichIacceptthat“thatwasme,andthatiswhatIintended”and“thatwillbeme

carryingoutmycurrentintentions,”andyet,“that‘me’isnotmeintermsof

metaphysicalpersonalidentity.”Theappropriativeactisanactofexperiencing

responsibilityandresponsiveness.Andwecantakethisonestepfurtherwhenwe

considerthe“anticipationproblem”Iaddressedearlierinthisessay.

WhenI’mtoldthatinaMinorityReportsortofwayaKevin-surrogate,thatis,

someonewhowillhaveoccurrentquasi-memoriesofhavingbeenme-now,willbe

anactiveshooterthatcausesterriblesufferinganddeathtoinnocentvictims,and

I’mtoldthatmywife,Elizabethwillbeaterribleactiveshooter,there’sasensein

whichIfeelcloserandmoreresponsiblefortheKevinsurrogate(or,what’sthe

same,aKevincontinuant)thanIcanforthefutureElizabeth.Ianticipatethings

aboutthateventthataresimplynotpossibleformetoanticipateinconsidering

Elizabeth’sfuture.However,thespinI’veputonthingsisthis.Froma

philosophicallymaturedperspective,Irecognizethatit’samatterofdegreeand

interpretivelimitationsthatallowsmetoownmypastandfeelresponsibleformy

future.Irecognize,likeParfitaskedustodo,thatpersonalidentityisnotreallyin

playatall.However,Idonotbelievethatthis,alone,canpracticallyexonerateme

fromthedeedsthatI’veperpetratedorwillperpetrate(orthatIwill“quasi-

perpetrate”).I’mstrungbetweenasenseofalterityandotherness,whileatthesame

timeimbuedbyasenseofresponsibility(incasesinwhichIdonotdisconnect

entirelyorexperiencedepersonalization).Thus,IcometorecognizethatIam

responsibleforandtoanother,andwhatIneedtobeabletodoismakesenseof

128

howlevelsofintimateconnectionstoothernesstakeholdindegreesofrelatedness

andappropriativeidentificationratherthanthroughmetaphysicallysubstantive

personalidentityrelations.Iexperienceresponsibilityforsomeone’sinjurywhenI

unintentionallyhithiminthefacewithadoorhe’stryingtowalkthrough(let’ssay

thatunbeknownsttome,astrangeriswalkingcloselybehindme,andI’mangryat

myspouse,andIslamthedoorviolentlybehindmeasIwalkthrough).Themost

obviousreasonIfeelresponsibleisbecauseinsomesenseIcausedthistohappen,

andyetIfeelacertainlackofresponsibilitybecauseitwasnotmyintentiontoharm

anyoneinthatinstance(Ididnotevenknowsomeonewaswalkingbehindme).

Similarly,therearemanywaysinwhichIfeellikeI’vecausedthedeedsofthepast,

andwillcausecertainintendedandunintendedoutcomesinthefuture,andyet

therearesomanyaspectsofmypastexperiencesandexperiencesyettobethatare

outsideofmycontrol,andtosomeextent,contributetothesenseofalteritywith

whichIregardmypastandfutureselves.Ifeelresponsibilityasanagent—acausal

forceorprocess—butnotnecessarilyasasubjectpersonally-identicaltomypast

selfandmyfutureself.Soattheheartofexperiencingmyselfasanagent(rather

thanjustasubjectpersonally-identicaltovariousmanifestationsofmyexistence

overtime)isasenseofresponsibilityformycontributiontothewaytheworld

showsup.Icanfeelthisinrelationtothefuture,becauseIprojecttheforceofmy

agencyeffectingfutureoutcomes.WhenIseetheothernessofthefieldofoutcomes

thatsurroundme,andyetImaintainasenseofagency,Ifeelresponsibilityinthe

faceofothernessandinthefaceoftheotherthatisboth“I”and“not-I.”Thisis

fundamentallydifferentfromhavingasensethatthesearemythoughtsandfeelings

129

anditches.Inthelattercase,Iaman“opening”ora“place”inwhichvarious

propertiesandoccurrenceshangtogether.Intheformercase,Iamaforcethat

effectsoutcomes,andIamresponsive,andthusresponsibleforcontributingtohow

somethingthatismuchlargerthanmyselfshowsup.

IcanmaintainboththesenseofresponsibilityIfeeltowardmysurrogate,

andthesenseofothernessthatthinkingintermsofsurrogatespresents.AndI’m

suggestingthatthisisanexperiencewehavewiththeideaofbothourfutureselves

andourpastselves.WhenIlookbackatmychildhoodinConnecticut,andtryto

experiencetheconcernsthatlittleboyhad,orrememberwhatitfeltliketoholdon

fordearlifetohismother’shandinthemidstofaravishingblizzard,Iencountera

paradoxicalidentityanddifference—I’mnotthatlittleboy,andyetIcouldn’tbe

herewritingthisnowwithouthim.19TheidentityIimagineIhavewithhimisnot

basedonanypalpabletasteofwhatthatlittleboy’sinnerworldwaslike.Atthe

time,hemighthavebeenpetrifiedbythelargenessandunpredictabilityofnature.

Butnow,reflectingonthatmemory,Ifeelmelancholyandnostalgia—somethingI’m

surethechildhadnotyetmaturedtoevenanticipateletaloneexperience.Ihonestly

can’tfeelhisthoughtsorexperiencehisimagination.Iprojectanidentity,asthe

Buddhistsuggests,throughconventionandvariousdependencyrelations,butI

ultimatelyexperiencehimasinscrutablyother.Icannotfullydisclosetherealityof19ArindamChakrabartidevelopstheconceptof“radicalrepentance,”whichsimilarlyplaysonthisparadoxicalexperienceofidentityanddifferencewithrespecttoone’spastself.IrecognizesomeactiondoneinthepasttobesoheinousthatthecurrentIcannotimagineeverdoingit.Iamaghastthinking,“Whoisthatpersonwhocoulddothat!?”Andtothatextent,thedoerissomeonealienandyet,thisradicallyotherperson,thecurrentrepenter,feelsresponsibleforhim,becausehefeelssomesortofcontinuitywiththis“despicablepast-self”(Chakrabarti,personalconversation).

130

hissubjectivity.Andyet,Ifeelresponsibletohim,andresponsibleforhim.Likewise,

IfeelresponsibletoandforKPM-20.SowhatI’msuggestingisthattheNo-Selfview,

whensincerelyanddeeplyembodied,mightbemorallyinstructive,becausewhenI

learntomoreclearlytreatmyselfasother,andyetmaintainmybinding

responsivenesstothisother,Icultivateanother-centricperspectivethatpotentially

reachesahighnormativepitch.WhatImeanisthatIbegintoseehowresponsibility

towardothersisbasictoeveryaspectofmyexperience,evenatthemostpersonal

and“private”levelofthefirst-personperspective,projectingforwardintoitsown

future,andgazingbackwardintoitsownpast.Ibegintorecognizethatconfusions,

contingentpsychologicalproclivities,andmetaphysicalprejudiceoftenimpedemy

senseofresponsibilitytowardtheindependentneedsofothers.I’msuggestingthat

thisconfusionandprejudiceisafunctionofremainingtetheredtonaïverealismand

theself/otherdistinction,andthustetheredtothesortofethicaldilemmasthat

arisefromoperatingoutofthoseconceptualschemes.WhenIseeKPM-20asboth

otherandself,andreallyembodythesimultaneousclosenessanddistanceofthis

other,thenIlearntoseethatitisnottherigidself/otherdistinctionthatis

paramountinhavingethicalreasonsforaction,butratheraquestionofwhatsorts

oftiesmakememoreorlessresponsivetoanalways-pervadingotherness.As

ŚāntidevaandtheentireBuddhisttraditionbeforehimclaimed,suffering,whichis

alwaysself-awareandalwaysexperiencedasanegativevalence,mayprovide

reasonsforpromotingcertainbehaviorsanddisavowingotherbehaviors.The

other’ssuffering—asufferingIcannotfullygrasp,butstillremainresponsiveto—is

131

alwaysimportant,becauseevenmyownsufferingisanother’ssufferinginthe

nuancedsenseI’vebeentryingtodescribehere.

Sidgwick,whoadoptedtheextremeclaim,worriedthatabandoningtherigid

self/otherdistinctionwouldleadtomoralnihilism,andrenderourprudential

concernsunintelligible.20Healsobelievedthatmaintainingtherigidself/other

distinctionleftuswithapracticaldilemma:aconflictbetweenrationalegoismand

utilitarianaltruism,tworationalmotiveshebelievedaphilosophically-matured

“commonsense”justified.I’msuggestingthattheNo-Selfviewmaybolsterrather

thanthreatenSidgwick’sutilitarianvision.Sufferingandpleasurebecomekeyissues

toconsider,andwecometoseethatresponsibilityforanotherisabasicingredient

ofallexperienceviewedfromthephilosophically-maturedperspective.Oncewe’ve

seenthatothernessimbuesallourconcernsandresponsibilities,oncewe’veseen

thiseveninourprojectedrelationshiptoourownpastandfuture,thefundamental

concernbecomeshowmuchsufferingexists,ratherthanwhothesufferingbelongs

to.Thisdoesnotmeanthatwecansimplyabandonourfirmconcernforournearest

anddearest,butitdoesmeanthatfromthephilosophically-maturedperspective,we

understandthattheirsufferingisethically(orprincipally)onparwithanyoneelse’s

suffering.Wedonotconfusepsychologicalfacts,andtheimpassionedconcernwe

haveforournearestanddearest,withnormativefacts.Ifwecouldtrulyembody

thisversionoftheNo-Selfview,thenperhapstheinstincttocarealmostexclusively

20Sidgwick,TheMethodsofEthics,419:“GrantthattheEgoismerelyasystemofcoherentphenomena,thatthepermanentidentical‘I’isnotafactbutafiction,asHumeandhisfollowersmaintain;why,then,shouldonepartoftheseriesoffeelingsintowhichtheEgoisresolvedbeconcernedwithanotherpartofthesameseries,anymorethanwithanyotherseries?”

132

forourownwelfarewouldmatureintoamorefar-reachingconcernforthegeneral

fieldofsuffering,whichisaproductofnaturalprocessesalwaysothering

themselves.Ratherthancaringlessaboutmyfuture,Imightinsteadseemyconcern

asaspecialcaseofaltruisticcareandresponsibilityfortheother.Thispossibility

arisesoutofourlivedexperienceoffeelingresponsibletoaprojectionofourselves

asboththesame(“mein20years”)andother(“mewhoisnot-meandnotknowable

in20years”).Withemotionalmaturity,werecognizethatwe’reneveractually

tendingtosomespecialprivatepoint—theself—butmorestrictlyspeaking,we’re

attendingtosomethingthateludesidentityandsameness,andyetencompasses

themboth.We’realwaysattendingtotheother,thatprojectedpersonwho,ineach

moment,wecanneverfullydetermine.

3.4DoestheExistenceofaSelfMakeAnyPracticalDifference?

Iwillnowexamineanobliqueattackagainstthebeliefinarealself.This

bringsusbacktotheissueofwhetherornotthereisanypracticalstakeinthe

Self/No-Selfquestion.Whetheraselfreallyexistsorjustneedstoberiggedup

conventionallytogoonwithoursocialandemotionalbusinessmayturnouttobea

non-issue,fromthepractical,ethicalpointofview.Specifically,thisaddressesa

critiqueagainstwhatRaymondMartincallsthe“me-consideration”(seethe

introductionabove).AsI’vesaid,thinkerslikeButlerandSidgwickhavearguedthat

theNo-Selfviewcannotmakesenseofforward-lookingagencyandegocentric

concerns.Butifthisisareasontobelieveinapersistingself,thenpresumablythe

Self/Ownershipviewadequatelymakessenseofourprudentialandforward-

lookingconcerns.The“me-consideration”istheclaimthatwecareaboutourown

133

futures,becausewepersistintothosefutures.However,asMartinpointsout,the

Selfistowesusastoryofwhyme-nowshouldbeegoisticallyconcernedwithme-

later.WhyexactlydoIcareabouteitherafuturestageofmyself(underthe

Ownershipview)orasurrogateofmyself(undertheNo-Selfview)?Theme-

considerationisanintuitiveresponse.Ishouldegoisticallycareaboutme-later,

becauseanygoodorill-fortunethatbefallsme-laterimpactsmeoverall.Itisme

whowillreaptheoutcomesofeventsspanningallthestagesofmylife.Future-meis

astageofmybecoming,andthusIcananticipatetheachesandexaltationsthat

awaitme.Inshort,theSelfistwhoappealstotheme-considerationistemporally

neutralwithrespecttoprudentialconcerns,thatis,hehasaneyeonachievinga

balanceddistributionofgoodoverthewholeofhislife.Hebelievesthatthefurther

factunderlyinghispersistenceisenoughtojustifyfuture-orientedconcern.

Now,Martinarguesthatreductionismabouttheselfisnotabigdeal

practicallyspeaking.Withthenotionofacontinuer-self,or,surrogatethereisgood

reasontocareaboutourfuturesurrogates.21Iwillexplorethisinmoredetail,

becauseifMartiniscorrect,thentheSelfandNo-Selfmodelsprovetobeneutral

withrespecttopracticalrationality.I’veshownyouwhyIthinkthisiswrongfrom

thesideoftheNo-Selfmodel.Thereareethicalandagentiveimplicationsinvolved

intreatingoneselfasother.Withrespecttoforward-lookingagency,mydefenseof

21Martincompares“continuer-consideration”and“continuer-interest”toParfit’s“quasi-memories”inReasonsandPersons.SeeMartin,124.Martinconcludes:“When,asreductionists,wegiveupourbeliefintherealityoftheself,wedon’tgiveupourbeliefintheexistenceofabrain,abody,andaseriesofinterrelatedphysicalandpsychologicalevents.Nordoweabandoncontinuer-interest.Whatweusedtothinkofasourfutureselveswestillregard,albeitperhapslessrobustly,asourfuturecontinuersandwemayvaluethemassuch”(128).

134

theNo-Selfviewappealedtoacertaintypeoflivedexperienceratherthanarational

reconstruction.Iappealedmoretophenomenathananalyticstructure.Butwhat

abouttheSelfmodel?Doespersistingintothefuturegivemespecialreasonstocare

aboutthatfuture?Iwanttoshowwhythinkingintermsofembodiedselveswho

owntheirphysicalandmentalstatesdoesmakeapracticaldifference.IfI’mright

aboutthat,thenreductionismabouttheself,paceMartin,isabigdeal,because

believinginapersistingselfmakesapracticaldifference.

Toputmycardsonthetablebeforeproceeding,thesortofselfIbelieve

makesadifferenceisanunderlying,synthesizingaspectofembodiedconsciousness.

Theselfoperatesatthesub-personalandpersonallevels;itisuniquetothebodyin

whichitisrealized,andisnotjustaproductofmemories,dispositions,values,and

practicalidentity.Iwilldevelopthispointinmoredetailbelow.Butbeforedoingso,

I’dliketoillustratesomeofthepracticalandethicalconsiderationsthatareatstake

inbelievingeitherthatone’sembodiedselfisunique—andnotthesortofthingthat

canbesimplytransferredtoanotherbody—or,instead,believingthattheselfisa

(hollow?)ego-tunnelthatcanbeuploadedtosuper-computersorresurrected

throughtransplants.

Intherecentfilm,Self/Less,starringBenKingsleyandRyanReynolds,areal

estatetycoon,Damian(playedbyKingsley)takesadvantageofanewtechnology

thatallowshimtotransplanthisegointoanotherbody.TheprocedureisinitsBeta

stage,asremnantsofthehostbrain’sformeregolingerintheneuralnetwork.

Damianthinkstheseexperiencesarehallucinations.Inactuality,the“hallucinations”

arefragmentsofthememories,feelings,dispositions,andcapacitiesoftheformer

135

egostrugglingtoremainintactandreintegrateitsidentity.Theplotting

transhumanistscientist,whosoldDamianontheprocedure,giveshimachemical

concoctiontoslowlyerasethesehauntingremnants.HetellsDamianthatthe

“hallucinations”arecontrollablesideeffectsoftheprocedure.Damianisalsotold

thatthebodyusedforthetransplanthasbeengeneticallyengineered.Butactually,a

poorsoldier(RyanReynolds)willingtodieforcashtosavehisdaughterfromalife-

threateningmedicalconditionhassoldhisbodytothescientist.Damianuncovers

thisdarksecret,andsaddledwithguilt,seeksoutthesoldier’swife,anddevelopsa

fatherlybondwithhernowhealthydaughter.Damian’sethicaldilemmagrows

abundantlycleartohim.Hecanstoptakinghismedicationsinordertobringback

thesoldier,orhecanrobthelittlegirlofherfather,androbthewomanofher

belovedhusband.IfDamianweretostoptakinghismeds,thenwithinafewweeks,

hisegowoulddissipateintooblivion,andthesoldier’smemorieswouldreturn.

Ifweacceptthisstoryatfacevalue,thenclearlytheonlythingthatmakesa

personaperson,andaselfaself,isanego-tunnelsuperveningoveraworkingbrain.

WhenDamianishauntedbythesoldier’sflashbacks,wemightbeinclinedtobelieve

thatnoclearcriteriaofpersonalidentitycanestablishwhetherornotit’sDamianor

thesoldierexperiencingtheturmoil.We’veenteredaParfitiangrayarea,because

theself,understoodasanego-tunnel,isnolongerindividuatedbyasinglestreamof

consciousness.Ourmetaphysicalinterpretationofthisfilmhasimportantethical

upshots.

Saywebelievetheselfunderliesasynthesizingcomponentinthestructure

ofconsciousness,acomponentthatoperatesatboththesub-personalandpersonal

136

levels.Wealsobelievetheselfisembodied,anduniquetotheparticular

embodimentinwhichitisrealized.Theexistenceofthisselfwouldhaveserious

ethicalramifications.Forexample,ifJohn’swife,LunasufferedfromAlzheimer’sto

thepointwhereshehadnomemoryofbeingJohn’swife,Johnwouldbekeepinghis

weddingvowbyremainingdevotedtoLunainheramnesiacstate.Heshouldseeher

asthesamepersonhemarried.Onlynow,shesuffersfromAlzheimer-induced

amnesia.Heshouldnotbelievethatshehasdiedorbeenreplacedbyasurrogate.On

theotherhand,ifAlzheimer’s-Lunawerejustasurrogate,Johnmightdecidethathe

owedthesurrogatenothing—sheisnottheonehevowedtocareforinsicknessand

health.Lunadiedwhenherego-tunnelfadedawayintooblivion.Butiftherewerea

uniqueselfthatunderliesbutisnotreducibletoitsego,thenthesoldier’swifein

Self/Lessshouldbelievethatherhusbandisthevictimofthoughtimplantation.

Damianhasnotactuallystolenthesoldier’sbody.Duringthetransplant,Damian

dies,andthesoldiersuffersfrommemoryandbeliefimplants.Hisstreamof

consciousnesshasbeenseverelydisrupted,ashesuffersfromasortofsplit-

personalityinwhichhemostlybelievesheisDamian.Ifthereweresomefurther

fact(andnotnecessarilyanimmaterialsoul)thatunderliesaperson’sidentityand

persistenceintime,thenthesoldierhasnotbeenreplaced,thesoldierhasbeen

infiltrated,andhisegoisnowhighlyunstable.

Ontheotherhand,ifwebelievethereareonlyopen-endedego-tunnels,then

atsomepointinthefilm,we’renotdealingwithDamian,norarewedealingwiththe

soldier.WhenDamiantakestheethicalhigh-roadandstopstakinghismedications,

thenwe’vewitnessedaresurrectionofthesoldier.Thesedistinctviewsoftheself

137

haveimplicationsforthecommitmentswemake,andforthefeelingswebelievewe

oughttohavetowardloved-oneswhohavebeenseverelyalteredbybraininjuries

anddiseases.Ifmywifewereentirelyconstitutedbyanego-tunnel,thenstayingby

thesideofheramnesiac-Alzheimer’ssurrogatewouldnotfulfillavow.Iamno

longeraloyalhusband.Instead,Iaminvolvedinanactofcharity,givingselflesslyto

aneedystranger.Loyaltyandcharityarebothethicallycommendable,buttheseare

distinctethicalactionswithdistinctmotivations.SoSelfversusNo-Selfwouldmake

asignificantpracticaldifference,becauseendorsingoneortheotherviewmight

impactthesortsofmotivationsandreasonswehavefordoingthings.

Keepingthisillustrationinmind,IwanttodirectlyassessMartin’sthesisthat

theSelf/No-Selfissuedoesnotmakeapracticalandethicaldifference.Hismain

contentionisthattheme-considerationdoesnotreallyprovideananswertowhyI

shouldcareaboutmyfutureself.Theme-considerationmightpairwiththeextreme

claim.TheSelfistmightarguethatifIdon’tpersistintomyfuture,thenIhaveno

directreasontocareaboutthefuturesurrogatewhowillreplaceme.Again,Imight

careaboutKPM-20,butImightjustaseasilynotcare.RaymondMartinbelievesthat

theextremeclaimisungrounded,andthatifitappliestotheNo-Selfmodel,thenit

likewiseappliestotheSelfmodel.Thisisastrategyworthtakingseriously,because

itnotonlyobliquelydefendstheNo-Selfview,butalsoputsitonequalfootingwith

theOwnershipviewwhenitcomestomakingsenseofforward-lookingagency.Soif

wehavesomeconvincingempiricalandmetaphysicalreasonstotaketheNo-Self

viewseriously—whichwedo—thenafailuretoadequatelymakesenseofan

essentialcomponentofagencyshouldnotcountagainstit,sincethesameproblem

138

existsfortheOwnershipview.Itcouldbethatwhateverwillprovideuswithan

adequatetheoryofactionismoresophisticatedthaneithertheReductionistor

Ownershipview.Inordertodefendhisthesis,Martintentativelygrantsthatsome

furtherfactestablishesthesamenessoftheselfacrosstime,andthatthisselfwill

reapthefutureoutcomesofitsactions.Martinarguesthatthepersistenceofaself

doesnotnecessarilyjustifyegocentric,future-directedconcernbyme-nowforme-

later.

Here’sonereasonthismightbetrue.Supposeone’spsychologydoesnot

persist.Letthefeltnarrativeofbeing-someonebediachronicallyinterruptedand

disjoint.Futurestagesofaselfwhosepsychologyisradicallydistinctfromthe

presentaretooforeign,tooremote,andtoopsychologicallydisconnectedfromthe

presenttoprovidetheselfwithreasonstohavespecialconcernforherfuture

stages.Wedon’tneedsci-fithought-experimentsregardingteleportation,orfission

andfusion,tomakethispoint.Wecaninsteadprojectintoafutureinwhichone’s

views,dispositions,life-stylechoices,andmemoriesandself-interpretationsare

radicallydifferentfromone’scurrentego.

Martinasksustogrant,forthesakeofargument,theexistenceofapersisting

self.Imaginethattheselfpersistsassomefurtherfactbehindallthequantitative,

qualitative,andpsychologicalchangesthatmakeupaconscioushumanlife.These

changescanbemoreorlesscontinuous,allowingforradicalrupturesbetween

currentvaluesandpersonalhistory,andlatervaluesandmemories.Infact,wecan

imagineacaseinwhichpsychologicalfactsaboutaparticularself,say,itsaims,its

values,itsexistentialprojects,andallofthepersonalmemoriesthatshapeits

139

personalhistorychangesoradicallythatsomefuturestageofitwillhaveno

psychologicalrelationto(thatis,recognitionof)itscurrentstage.The“who”

constitutedbythecontentofpersonalidentity(thememories,aims,andprojectsof

aperson)basicallybecomessomeoneelse.Woulditbesoobviousthatthecurrent

selfshouldbeegoisticallyconcernedforthewelfareofsuchafutureself?

Me-nowwouldfindalotlesscolorinaworldwithoutthepoetryofBob

Dylan,andwithoutthecomedyofTinaFeyandAlecBaldwinin30Rock.But

perhapsfuture-mewouldnotbeabletogetpastDylan’snasalvoiceandamateurish

harmonicaandguitarplaying.Perhapsfuture-mewouldresentacomedythat

featuresahaplessandovertlyliberalfemaleleadinapositionofpower.Ican’teven

besurethatthisradicallyalteredfuture-mewouldn’tvoteforDonaldTrumptobe

PresidentoftheUnitedStates,andwouldn’tsupportbuildingawallbetweenthe

UnitedStatesandMexico.Supposingallthisweretrueoffuture-me,Iprobably

wouldn’tbeespeciallyconcernedwiththisverydifferentcreature(anationalist,

misogynist,andracistme,inaveryimportantsense,wouldn’tbemeatall).Butthe

Selfistwhobelievesinafurtherfactiscommittedtotheviewthatthispersonwould

stillbeme,albeitaterribleversionofme.Martin’sconclusionisthatpersistenceof

selfisnotenoughtojustifyegoisticconcernformyownfuture.Therefore,theSelfist

whoendorsestheOwnershipviewisnobetteroffthantheNo-Selfistwhodoesnot

endorsetheOwnershipview.Bothcampsneedtoadequatelyjustifyself-regarding,

future-directedconsiderations.

ThebasicproblemIhavewithMartin’sargumentisthatitdoesnot

adequatelyexplorethecomplexwaysinwhichtemporality,thedistinctionbetween

140

synchronicanddiachronicunity,andthequestionofthemetaphysicalbaseof

individuation(wevisitedinchapter2)impactwhatitmakessensetocareabout.

Specifically,hefailstodistinguishbetweenthosethingsweremainespecially

concernedwithdespitepersonalidentityandpsychologicalcontinuity,andthose

existentialandnarrativeitemsoftheego-tunnelwhosediscontinuitycomplicates

thematterofwhoitmakessensetocareabout.Letmeillustratethepoint.

Supposeme-laterwillbeajingoisticracist,whoopposessocialsecurityand

anysortofwelfareentitlements,andwhothinksclimatechangeisahoaxandthat

nature’sonlypurposeistoservetheneedsofhumanpopulations.Me-laterwillnot

remembertheprogressivemewhohasleaningstowarddeep-ecologyandwhogrew

upthesonofanIranianimmigrant.Me-laterwillremembernothingaboutme-now

andthenarrativeI’vedrawnoutofmypast:myearlydaysasaskaterandsurfer

andangrypunk-rocker,mypenchantforwritingpoetry,myloveforcomposing

songsandreadingphilosophy,mydeepconcernforthewell-beingofthenatural

environmentandthealarmingrateofspeciesdie-offs.MaybeIwon’tcaresomuch

aboutthisfuture-mewhoisutterlydisconnectedfrommycurrenthistory.Wemight

evenwonderifformer-me—theanarchisticpunk-rocker—wouldwanttohave

anythingtodowiththeslightlybourgeois,soft,andacademic-mewritingthisessay

rightnow.ButsupposeIfindoutthatme-laterwillbepunishedbyanexperimental

virtual-painmachinethattorturesitssubjectthroughneuro-stimulation.Thismight

beaClockworkOrange-esquepunishmentexactedonfuture-mebyautilitarian

governmentforcommittingsomehorriblyracisthatecrime(remember,thisisthe

intolerant,DonaldTrumpversionofme).Ialsofindoutthataspartofthe

141

punishmentforthehatecrime,onceeveryyearfor5yearsafterthesentencing,me-

laterwillexperiencethemostvividandhorrificnightmaresfor48hours,andliveon

thevergeofsuicideuntilthenightmaressuddenlystop—again,aconditioning

techniquecreatedbyaverysadisticbig-brother.Ithinkit’squiteobviousthatI

wouldegoisticallycareabouttheplightofme-later,becausethesearegenerally

terribleexperiences.Afterall,we’reassumingit’sthesameme,inthesensethat

somefurtherfactmakesme-laterafuturestageofme-now.Imightnotpractically

caretoomuchfortheTrump-supportingfuture-me.Itwouldbehardtoknowhow

tofeelaboutsomeonewhosharesnoneofmymemories,hopes,ordispositions.But

Iwouldcertainlydreadthetortureandmind-curdlingnightmaresthatawaitme.I’m

notbeggingthequestionhere,becauseI’mclaimingthatgeneralaspectsof

experience,liketheamountofpleasure,pain,fear,orloveandfulfillmentone

experiencesmattertoussolongasweknowthatsometangiblecontinuitybetween

ourfirst-personexperienceswillexist.Insomesense,albeitnotasaprogressiveson

ofanimmigrant,I’llbetheretofeelthepain.Butthekeyisthatmy“being-there”is

notjustamatterofmyexistentialprojects,personalmemories,andpractical

identity.Somethingsupportsthatidentity,andthisistheembodiedself,whichisthe

baseofindividuationpersistingthroughpsychologicalanddispositionalchanges

thatdifferentiatesmefromanyotherindividualexistingintheuniverse.Aslongas

mynervoussystemisingoodworkingorder,painwillneverceasetobeanissuefor

me,nomatterhowmuchofanassholeoramnesiacIbecome.Idonotneedtoknow

thatIwillremainaprogressiveliberalwhoadoresBobDylan,andthatIwill

organizemylifearoundtheconstraintsofbeingagoodfatherandahalf-waydecent

142

philosopherinordertodreadtheprospectsofanamnesiacfuturefilledwith

horrifictortureandfear.Soinshort,evenifmypsychologydoesnotpersistasit

doesnow,Ihavegoodreasontocareaboutaspectsofmyfuturethatinvolvemy

generalphysicalandpsychologicalwelfare.Thisofcourserestsonthepossibilityof

theselfpersistingthroughradicalchange.Bearinmindthatthisdoesnotcommit

metobeliefinaCartesian,immaterialsoul.Infact,itrequiresthatthebodyplayan

essentialroleinthehistoryandprospectsoftheself.Thesimplepointhereisthatin

orderforanembodiedselftohaveacoherentexperienceitmustbeunifiedboth

synchronicallyanddiachronically.However,certaindisruptionstonarrative

diachronicunitymightconfuseusatthelevelofexistentialanalysis.Wemaynot

knowhowtofeelaboutourselveswhenprojectingintoafutureinwhichour

personalhistoryisforgotten,andourprojectsandaimsareradicallyaltered.We

maynotknowwhichcommitmentsmadenowremainintact,andwhichmaybe

overturnedgivenradicalrupturesinlifeprojectsanddeepvalues.Butsynchronic

unity,whichallowsforanindividualtoidentifythisredobjectascausingthis

sensationofpain,isenoughtojustifyfearanddreadinme-nowforafutureIwill

viscerallyfeel.Whilethenarrativemaychange,itwillstill“belikesomething”forme

tobeaTrumpsupporterwhoremembersnothingofhisprogressivistpastorhis

lovingandmulti-culturalfamily.Thisrestsontheassumptionthatitwillbeme—the

synchronicallyunifiedandembodiedself—whoexperiencesthefuturepain,even

thoughaspectsofdiachronicunitythataccount,amongotherthings,forpersonal

identitymayhavebeenseverelydisrupted.

143

Anotherpossibilityisthatmypsychologydoesnotpersistduetoacoma.DoI

havereasontocareaboutthisfuture-me?Simplyput,yes.Aslongasthedisposition

tohaveafirst-personexperienceexists,thenIcancareaboutthatshellofaman,

andwhateverhisegomayexperienceinthestateofacoma.I’mnotmakingan

ethicalclaimhereaboutwhenitisappropriatetounplugapatientonlifesupport.

I’msimplyclaimingthatifwebelievetheselfpersistsintoitsfuture,thenithas

reasonstocareaboutthatfuturebasedonwhatsortofgeneralandvisceralfirst-

personexperiencesthatselfwillhave,andnotnecessarilywhatsortofpractical

identitythatselfwillarticulatethroughhiscommitments.

Now,letmeclarifythisfurtherwithrespecttothediscussioninchapter2of

thedistinctionbetween“place”/locus(ādhāra—ownershipofmentalstates)and

“base”(āśraya—thefoundationofindividuationandmetaphysicaldependence).The

selfmightberelatedtoitsmentalstatesinanadjectivalsense,thewayadentis

relatedtoasurface.22ForaselftobeadjectivaluponsomeX,itmustbeessentially

oforinX,23andcouldnotexistwithoutX.So,forexample,thementalstatesofa

subjectmightbemetaphysicallydependentonabody.24Thebodywouldbeitsbase

ofindividuationuponwhichitmetaphysicallydepends.Noticethedistinctionhere

betweenasubjectowningsomesetofmentalstates—meaningtheyarenot

experiencedasexternalassailments,andtheyareavailableforendorsementor22Ganeri,TheSelf,36:GaneriborrowsthisfromSidneyShoemaker,TheFirst-PersonPerspectiveandOtherEssays(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),10.Theideahereisthatamentallifeisadjectivaluponsomesubjectofexperience,theway,say,“abending”maybeadjectivaluponsomebranchthatisbent.Thisiscontrastedwithviewingthementallifeasacollectiveproperty,say,superveningupon,oremergentfrom,acollection,nosinglepartofwhichconstitutesthemind.23Ibid,36.24Ibid,37.

144

disavowal—andtheontologicalstateofaffairsmakingitthecasethatthereisa

pluralityofindividuals.25Iftheselfismetaphysicallydependentuponabody—its

baseofindividuation—andpsychologicalcontinuityismoredirectlyboundupwith

asenseofownership,thenegoisticconcernforme-laterisjustifiedevenifme-now

cannotimagineowning(inthesenseofendorsingoranticipating)mostofthe

beliefsanddispositionsofme-later.Thisisbecauseownershipcanbeamatterof

propensitiestoendorsement,whileindividuation(metaphysical-ontological

dependence)canbetheproductofanembodied“capacityfornormativeemotional

response.”26Imaynotbeabletoanticipatewhatit’slikeforthefuture-metobevery

greedywithmoney—somethingthemoresuccessful,business-entrepreneurialme

mightbe—butIcanstillanticipatethepalpablepainoffuture-mehyperventilating

andpanickinguponwatchingthestock-marketcrash.Aslongasthereiscontinuity

betweenthestagesofmybody,andmybodymaintainsitscapacityforemotionally

charged,normativeresponses,whicharefeltinafirst-personway,namely,my

mind-bodycomplexexperiencesthingsasdesirableorundesirable,orrightor

wrong,Ihavesomereasontocareaboutafuturemewhoispsychologically

disconnectedfromme-now.Letmeexplainthisfurtherbyprovidingmoreofthe

phenomenologicalassumptionsdrivingmythought.

Wemayfavoranon-cognitivistandphenomenologicalglossonwhatit

meanstoactinagoal-directedway.Thissortofglosswouldprioritizesomething

25Ibid,37.26Ibid,39:“Myownviewisthatownershipis‘rooted’inthedeeppsycheoftheindividualandintheirpropensitiestoendorsement,andindividuationisdeterminedbytheessentiallyembodiedcharacterofacapacityfornormativeemotionalresponse.”

145

likeaHeideggerianapproachto“being-in”overthecognitivist/beliefs-desires

accountofintentionality.Accordingtothenon-cognitivistaccount,wearefirst

“being-in-the-world”inthesenseofbeingabsorbedinasocializationprocessamidst

transparentbackgroundpractices.27Wearenotessentiallymindswithbeliefsand

desires,butrather,“agents”(inHeidegger’ssenseofDasein)whoareabsorbedin

copingstrategies.Whenweskillfullycopewiththemeaningfulcontextinwhichwe

findourselves,andalignourpatternsofbehaviorwithwhatitmakessensetodo,

wearenotnecessarilytakingatheoreticalattitude,whichassessesitsownbelief

anddesirestructures.Priortotheoreticalandcalculativethought,weexperience

theworldmoreoriginallyaspossibilitiesforactionamidaffordancesthatemerge

frominteractionsbetweentheembodiedselfanditsphysicalandsocial

environment.Theinfantmuddlingthroughherenvironmentonallfoursbeginsto

developasenseofwhatshecanandcannotdo,andshebeginstoanticipate

possibilitiesfor,say,grabbingstuff,orsupportingherbodybasedonaffordances

fromherenvironment.Forexample,theedgeofanoaktableaffordsitselfasa

meanstostandup.Narrativesanddispositionstowardendorsementsemergeoutof

anembodiedselfthatviscerallyexperienceswhatitcanandcannotdobeforeit

overtlycalculatesthingsthroughvariousdecisionprocedures.Iskillfullyskipovera

puddlewithlittletonocalculation,asIamaversetogettingmypantlegswet.It’san

immediate,non-algorithmic,andyetgoal-drivenresponse.Withoutcalculation,I

anticipatemyreachandbodilymomentumandforce,andIhaveasenseofthe27SeeHubertDreyfus,Being-in-the-World:ACommentaryonHeidegger’sBeingandTimeDivisionI(Massachusetts:MITPress,1991).AsDreyfushasargued,hedoesnotbelievethatmindsdonotexist.Rather,hisnon-cognitivistglossonHeideggerhasontologicalpriorityoverthecognitivistbeliefs-desiresaccountofagency.

146

boundednessofthispuddleagainsttheboundednessofmybody.Iproceedto

navigatethroughthecrowdedstreettomytrain,anticipatingmybody’smovement

alongadynamicgridofothermovingbodiesthatIcangetaround,keeppacewith,

orpressagainst.Thiscapacitytonavigatethroughenvironmentalandsocialsignsis

drivenbyasenseoftemporalityimbuingsensations,anticipations,feelings,and

moodsandemotions.Gettingtothegrocerystore,whichisablockaway,is

unthinkableforme,becausethedistanceis“insurmountable”whenI’minthemood

ofdarkdespairandcripplingdepression.Butinsomeothermood,say,of

bittersweetjoyinwalkingadearoldfriendwhoI’mnotsureI’llseeagaintothe

subwaynexttothestore,Iexperiencethestoreastragicallyclose.Thismore

primaryrelationshiptomyenvironment,coloredasitisbytemporalityandvarious

affectiveattunements,informshowIbuildself-narrativeswithoutbeingreducibleto

thenarrativeitself.Inessence,theselfisnotessentiallya“thinkingthing.”

Moreover,radicalpsychologicaldiscontinuityovertimedoesnotnecessarily

amounttoacompletelapseindiachronicunityforthebodythatsupportsthis

capacitytocare,circumspect,endorsebeliefs,andviewitselfasresponsibleto

variousnormativeconstraints.SoitmakesperfectsensetoclaimthatImight

disavowthebeliefsandnarrativeofsomefutureincarnationofme,thatis,Imight

notbeabletocomprehendwhatitwouldbeliketoownthisfutureexistence,butI

canstillanticipatehisaches,pains,joysandfearsinavisceralandfirst-personway.

Therefore,Martin’sconclusionthatpsychologicaldiscontinuityputsthe

Self/OwnershipviewonequalfootingwiththeNo-Self/No-Ownershipviewisnot

convincing.TheSelf/OwnershipviewthatI’mtentativelyputtingforwardcan

147

accommodatelapsesorcompleterupturesinpersonalidentity,becauseitalso

maintainsthebeliefthatabodyandnervoussystemsupportthecapacitytodevelop

asenseofownership.First-personexperiencesblossomoutoftheindividuating

baseofthebody,andremaincircumspectivetowardenvironmentalaffordances

regardlessofconsciouslyendorsedpatternsofbehavior,andregardlessofthe

personalhistorythatinformspersonalidentity.

3.5MadhyamakaasBorderlessandConstructedCareforthe(Non)-Self

IwillconcludebydirectingtheanalysisspecificallytoMadhyamakaNo-

Selfism.LetmedothisbyfirstcontrastingthatviewwiththeotherNo-SelfoptionsI

havedevelopedsofar.TheNo-Selfview,pacetheMādhyamika,mightappealto

somesortofcontinuityinthebaseofindividuation.LiketheSelfist,theNo-Selfer

canappealtothecontinuityofabodyandanervoussystem(ortoastreamof

consciousness).ButNo-Selferscannotconnectthefirst-personsenseofmine-ness

thatIamexperiencingnowwithjustanyperson’ssenseofmine-ness.Theymust

makesenseofmeanticipatingthings,andtheymustclarifywhyIoverwhelmingly

believeitwill“belikesomething”formetohavethoseexperiences.It’snotenough

tosaytherewillbesomeonewhoalsosays“I”atT2.Evennow,thereareplentyof

otherswhorefertothemselvesas“I,”andwhodescribewhatit’sliketobe

experiencingthings.Idonotidentifywithoranticipatetheirexperiencesbasedon

theiravowalofafirst-personperspective.ImusthavesomesensethatIcanown

partsofthatexperienceinordertoidentifywithitandanticipateit.Alotneedsto

besaidabouthow(andif)thiscanbedonewithoutappealingtoapersistingself,

butthiswillbevisitedmorethoroughlyinmyfinalchapter.Wehavethecontinuer

148

orsurrogateoption,inwhichacontinuerofme-nowbecomesmyfuturesurrogate.

AndevenfromtheSelfistside,wemightendorsepunctualism,whichistheview

that“I’s”pickoutsomethingreal,butthese“I’s”onlylastepisodically,andare

strungtogetherlikepearlsonanecklace.Finally,thePSMtheorybelievesthat“I”

picksoutnothing.SoI’mnotsurewhatstoryaboutfuture-directedconcernis

availabletothistheory,unlessitappealstovariouscontinuityrelationshipslike

ParfitandotherNo-Selferswhobelievethattheselfisimportantlytiedtoan

individuatingbody.

However,I’dliketofocushereontheMadhyamakaNo-Selfview.Fromthis

perspective,nothing,noteventhebody,hasanintrinsicnaturethatpersists.The

challengehereistodeterminehowanysortofconcernforfuture-meisjustified

wheneschewingbeliefinanysortofplace(ownership)orbase(metaphysical

individuation).Thereisnobaseonwhichtohanganticipationforaparticularly

nastyorpleasantfirst-personexperienceinthefuture.TheMādhyamikawillappeal

toconventionaldesignationformakingsenseoftheconnectednessbetween

experiences,butifnothingotherthanconventionrelatestheseexperiences,welose

theveryvisceralandanticipatorysenseoffuturefirst-personexperiences.

Moreover,underthismodel,radicalrupturesinpsychologicalcontinuityand

personalhistorymoreeasilyleadtotheconclusionthatoneisnotjustifiedinbeing

especiallyconcernedforafuturesurrogate.SotheMādhyamikaowesusatheory

abouthowwejustifythemanifestexperienceofcaringaboutourownfutures.

Candrakīrtiprovidesatheoryofhowwehaveasenseofownershipforthis

experiencethroughappropriationofvariousthoughtsandfeelings,etc.(seechapter

149

2).Yet,withoutappealtosomesortofunityorbody,orsomeothersortof

individuatingbase,hedoesnotofferaveryclearpictureofhowwedevelopand

justifyfuture-orientedconcerns.Butonmytentativeview,itisthecontinuity

betweenstagesofthebodyanditsembedded-nessinaphysicalenvironment,

repletewithnavigablesignsandanticipatoryintentionalitytowardsocialand

physicalpossibilities,thatallowsmyfirst-personsenseofwhatit’sliketohavethis

bodyconcernitselfwithfuturefirst-personexperiences.WhetherIremembermy

pastexperiencesandcommitments,orremembermycurrentvaluesandprojects,

thatis,whethermypersonalidentityisradicallydisrupted,Icanimagineafuturein

whichitwill“belikesomething”forme—asentientandsapientdynamismofflesh,

circumspectiveaction,andthought—tosufferassomeothertypeofpersonalowner

ofexperiences.Iwillbesomeothertypeofowner,say,aTrump-supportingtypeof

owner,butthankstothecontinuityofsynthesizingfirst-personexperiencespiggy-

backingonbodilycontinuity,Iwillbeanownernevertheless.Thisisbecausethe

contentofthoseexperiencesdoesnotnecessarilyhavetoinvolvecontinuity

betweennarrativesanddeepcommitments.Theysimplymust“belikesomething,”

say,painorjoy,orelationandgiddinessformetocareaboutthem.Andtheycanbe

likesomethingtome,becauseIamasentientbodythatcanownitsexperiences

throughvariousnarrativelenses.

Still,thereisacardleftfortheMādhyamikatoplay.Grantthatwehave

independentreasonstoadoptMadhyamaka’smoreglobalmetaphysicalirrealism.

Andgrantthatadoptingtheseinsightsareimpactfulonrelevantaspectsofpractical

deliberation.Anyconcernforthatfuture-me(whichwouldbe“me”strictlyoutof

150

conventionaldesignation)mightbeviewedasother-centricandaltruistic(perhaps

initiallyinanobscuredway)sinceitisstrictlyspeakingsomeoneelsethatI’m

concernedwithandfeelresponsibletoward.LikeParfitsuggests28wemayhave

moralreasonsforconcerningourselveswithfuturesurrogates.Iwouldarguethat

thisisthemostattractiveandrevisionaryaspectofglossingMadhyamaka-

Mahāyānaargumentsforradicallyself-effacingaltruism.Icannotreallyjustify

egocentricconcernforthisfuture“other”thatismysurrogate,butnevertheless,I

manifestlycareforthisotherwhoisinonesensemeandinanothersensenotme.

Thus,Icanrevisethisfuture-directedconsiderationtobeanobscuredformof

other-centricity.Icanthenbuilduponthistojustifybroaderaltruisticconcernfor

allsentientbeings.Putmoresimply,ifthereareanygeneralreasonsforcaring

aboutothers,thenIcanfindreasonstocareaboutthisfutureversionofme.But

reversingtheformulamightalsobemorallyinstructive.Givenmymanifestconcern

forthisdistantandfutureversionofme,Icanalsocultivatemorerobustconcernfor

distancedotherswhoareneverthelessclosertomenowthanthisfutureversionof

me.Inotherwords,ifIhavereasonstocareforthisfutureversionofmewhose

relationshiptomeisthin,thenIhavereasonstocareforothersnowthatareonly

thinlyrelatedtome.ThisisarguablyonewayofglossingŚāntideva'sargument

againsttheegoist.Thispersonclaimsthatheisjustifiedinprivileginghisown

suffering,becausehedoesnotexperienceanother’ssufferinginafirst-personway.

Hecapitalizesontheme-consideration:

IfIgivethemnoprotectionbecausetheirsufferingdoesnotafflictme,whydoIprotectmybodyagainstfuturesufferingwhenitdoesnotafflictme?The

28ReasonsandPersons,311-312.

151

notion‘itisthesamemeeventhen’isafalseconstruction,sinceitisonepersonwhodies,quiteanotherwhoisborn.(BCA,8:96-97).

Initshistorical-textualcontext,thisversespeakstotheBuddhist(andina

differentrespect,HinduSelfist)beliefinreincarnationafterbodilydeath.29The

Buddhistdoessomethingsandavoidsotherthingsforthesakeofthisfuturebeing’s

welfare.WhiletheMādhyamika’sviewaboutnirvāṇa,whichistheBuddhist

summumbonum,iscomplextosaytheleast,Śāntidevaisclearlydirectinghispoint

topractitionerswhoputalotofstockinfuturemeritsanddemerits.These

practitionersfollowethicallyrelevantpatternsofbehaviorforthesakeofachieving

nirvāṇa.Withoutanysortoflastingimmaterialsoul,andwithoutphysicalor

psychologicalcontinuity,thisreincarnatedbeing(ifitcanbecalledthat)iscertainly

“other.”Andyet,onemanifestlycaresaboutthisfutureperson.Wecanexplainthis

phenomenologicallyasanexperientialgiven,aspartofourlivedexperience.Or,we

mightclaimthatconcernnaturallyarisesoutofrecognizinghowthefuture

surrogateisdependentuponone’scurrentexistence(or,tospeakinnon-ownership

terms,isdependentuponthecurrentlydynamicandepisodic,andyetsomehow

conventionallyboundedflowofpsychophysicalevents).Ineitherevent,Śāntideva

doesnotclaimthattheconcernisillogical.Rather,heexploitsthefactthatwe

normallyhavesuchforward-lookingconcern,butthenarguesthatthisconcernis

29IcannotdiscussthecomplexmatterofindividualBuddhisttreatmentsofthemostlypan-Indianbeliefinreincarnation.Itwillsufficetosaythatwhilethefuturepersonisnotidenticaltothecurrentpersonbyvirtueofsomelasting,immaterialsoul,thereisanimportantdependencerelationshipbetweenone’sactionsandafutureavatarthatwillsomehowembodytheresultsofthoseactionsafteronehasperished.SomeIndo-Tibetanschoolsclaimthatatemporaryanddynamic“soul-like”energydoesinfactleaveonebodyandinformthedevelopmentofafuturebody,butagain,thesecomplexissuesgowellbeyondthecurrentdiscussion.

152

incorrectlyassessedasself-regardingandegocentric.Śāntidevausesthisagainstthe

egoisttoshowthatanyreasonwehavetocareaboutourfuturesurrogateappliesto

otherpersonsnow.Inotherwords,wehavejustasmuchreasontocareforcurrent

othersaswedotocarefordistantsurrogates,sincethefutureentityisstrictly

speakingotherthanoneself.Lapsesintime,andseparatenessofbodies,arguably,

donotmakeanymeaningfuldifferenceintheconcernweoughttohaveforfuture

suffering.Therefore,Śāntidevaendorsestemporalandagentneutralitywhenit

comestoreasonsforaction(althoughhecertainlydidnotspeakintermsof

“reasonsforaction”).Sopragmaticconsiderationsnotwithstanding,Śāntideva

endorsesaradicallyaltruisticethics.

Ithinkhisargumentismoregenerallyapplicablewhetherornotwetetherit

toreincarnation.AsI’vereadParfit,wemayrevisethenormaljustificationwehave

foregocentricfuture-directedconcernthroughlargermoralconsiderationsforour

futuresurrogates.Śāntideva,centuriesearlier,motivatedakindofexaltedaltruism

outofthiskeyinsight.Hedidsobyblurringthedistinctionbetweenselfandother,

whilemaintainingthecommonsenseviewthatourfutureselvesprovideuswith

reasonstocareaboutthem.Whenwemaintainthisaspectofthecommonsense

view,butshedthebeliefthatthisfutureselfissomethingmorethanasurrogate,

theninsteadofexperiencinganihilisticbreakdownincaring,wecultivatea

transformativeandrelevantlypracticalstanceonhowfaroutourconcernshould

extend.Indeed,Śāntidevabelievesitshouldextendindefinitely:weshouldcare

aboutallsufferingequally.Thishastobeanormativepoint,because,empirically

speaking,wecaremoreaboutthosewhoareclosesttous.

153

Śāntideva'spointisalsoapplicabletotheradicalchangesthatspanthegapin

asinglelifetime.ForifwetaketheMādhyamikaseriously,thereisnoreal

metaphysicalunitybetweenmeat10yearsoldandmeat30(or,perhapsevenme

at30and1minute,andmeat30and1.001minutes).Thisisonegoodreasonwhy

futuresuffering(inperhapsthemostminutesliceoftimefromthepresent)does

notafflictme.Wemightbetemptedtoreadthisasthetriviallytruestatementthat

futuresufferingdoesnotafflictmenow.Butthenon-trivialpointIthinkŚāntidevais

tryingtomakeisthatIdothingsnowtoprotectabodywhosefuturesufferingisnot

mineatall.IlearntotreatmyselfasItreatothers—asother.Thisunderliesthe

altruisticconclusion:

Ishoulddispelthesufferingofothersbecauseitissufferinglikemyownsuffering.Ishouldhelpotherstoobecauseoftheirnatureasbeings,whichislikemyownbeing(BCA,8:94).

SinceIfeelresponsibletothesurrogate-other,whoisonlyconventionally

me,thereisnoreasonnottoextendthiscourtesytoallsentientotherness.Granted,

thisisnotadeductiveconclusiondrawnoutoftheversesabove.However,whenwe

considertheideathatwearealways,insomesense,concernedwithwhatisother,

givenouracceptancethatnorealmetaphysicalunityexistsbetweenthisepisodeof

appropriativeself-identityandsomefutureepisodeofappropriativeself-identity

(seechapter2),wecanlearntorecognizethatwhatmakesthisother“myself”isa

higher-orderactofappropriation.Ifwecanlearntoexpandthatsenseofownership

toincludeothersentientfieldsthatarelessdirectlyassociatedwithourselvesnow,

wecanatleastnegativelyrecognizethatnometaphysicalbarrierspreventusfrom

beingaltruisticallyconcernedwithallsuffering.Hence,Śāntideva'spoint:

154

Throughhabituationthereistheunderstandingof‘I’regardingthedropsofspermandbloodoftwootherpeople,eventhoughthereisinfactnosuchthing.WhycanInotalsoacceptanother’sbodyasmyselfinthesameway,sincetheothernessofmyownbodyhasbeensettledandisnothardtoaccept?(BCA,8:111-112).

Ifthereisnometaphysicalunitybetweenmybodynowandmybodyinthe

future,andthesenseofselfisexplainedbyappropriation(again,seechapter2),

thenall“coalescence”ofappropriativeactivityisaplayofdistinctsentientepisodes

directedbyaconcernwhoseintentionalobjectisstrictlyspeaking,other.When

Śāntidevaenjoinsustoseethis,hebelievesthatitisethicallyimpactful,becausewe

canlearntodrawthisrelationshipbetweenselfandothertosuchanexpansivelevel

thatallsuffering(ifanysuffering)becomesimportantandethicallyrelevant.Soif

weexperienceethicalconcernfoundationallyasresponsibilitytothegood(however

wedefineit—evenifonlyasaregulativeidea),thenweareresponsibletowardall

episodesofsufferingthatobstructthegood.Moreover,theconventionally

constructedself/otherdistinction,alone,doesnotprovideagoodreasonto

privilegeanyoneepisodeofsufferingoveranother,becauseevenconventionally,I

cancultivateanexperienceofmyselfasanothertowhomIamresponsible.

WhileIhavenowcomefullcircletoaNo-Selfmodelthatsupportsauniquely

altruisticvision,IhavedispelledMartin’sargumentthattheSelf/No-Selfquestionis

irrelevanttopracticalmatters.Iftheselfisanembodiedselfthatpersistsintime,

thentheremaybeverygoodreasonsforittocareaboutfuturestagesofitself.In

short,theme-considerationisjustifiedwhenwegetclearaboutthebaseof

individuationthatsupportsunityandpersistence,andwhenwegroundcertain

anticipatoryconcernsinthephysicalandemotionalcapacitiesofthatbase.

155

However,I’vealsoshownthattheNo-SelfBuddhist,eithertheMādhyamikawho

rejectsthebeliefincontinuitiesandabaseofindividuation,ortheBuddhistwho

believesthattheownerlessstreamisabaseofindividuation,candevelopauniquely

altruisticperspectivethatisdecidedlyimpactfulonpracticalreasonsforaction.So

thatleavesuswithapuzzle.

Doestheme-considerationprovidemorerobustreasonsforactionthanthe

No-Selfview?Whatgroundsforother-centricityexistontheSelfmodel?Dothey

provideanysortofadvantageovertheNo-Selfview?CouldtheNo-Selfersbe

conflatingtheselfandtheegooraretheSelfersdrawingaspuriousdistinction

betweenthem?Iargueinthenextchapterthattherearetheoreticalepistemological

advantagestotheself/egodistinction,andthatSelfersarethereforeonfirmfooting.

Still,theNo-Selfermightbelievethatcompassionandaltruismareintimately

connectedtotheNo-Selfview.ButtheBuddhistversionofthatviewalsoconstrues

theselfassomethingthatimpedes,ratherthansupports,other-centricity.IfNo-

SelferscanclearlyshowhowtheSelfviewproducesegoistsratherthanaltruists,

thentheiruniquemodelofaltruismstandsonsurerfooting.

156

CHAPTER 4. EXALTED ALTRUISM AND MEREOLOGICAL HOLISM

4.1 Introduction

In what follows, I provide two broad accounts of selfhood: two general

models that account for our sense of ownership and immersion in a first-person

experience. Addressing the problem of how altruism is justified, I argue that both

accounts provide us with reasons to pursue and perform altruistic deeds. One

account provides ontologically minimal scaffolding, while the other provides an

ontologically thicker account of how altruistic reasons can be robustly motivational

in nature. The first account advances “the normative self,” a general model under

which a variety of normative accounts of selfhood may fall. The second account

advances what I’ll simply call, “the metaphysical view.”

The normative self owns its mental and physical states because of

individuating a narrative history, which is strung upon an embodied, normative-

emotional framework through avowals and disavowals. Such individuation has been

referred to in the literature as “participation,” or, the forging of a “participant self.”1

The normative view offers an ontologically minimalist account of our capacity to

recognize rational reasons for taking up another’s cause at our own expense.

However, in section 4.2, I will argue that the normative account does not adequately

1 Ganeri, The Self, 32 (see fn. 41). Ganeri borrows this from Laura Waddell Ekstrom “Keynote Preferences and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review Vol. 59, 1999: 1057-63, also: Ekstrom, “Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, 2005: 45-67. As quoted from Ekstrom by Ganeri, a participant self is “a self constituted by ‘a collection of preferences and acceptances…along with the capacity or faculty for forming and reforming that [collection],’ where a preference is a desire formed by a process of critical evaluation, and acceptance marks the ‘endorsement of a proposition formed by critical reflection with the aim of assenting to what is true’ (2005: 55).”

157

explain our capacity to connect directly with others in an experience of emotional

wholeness, an experience that I believe is essential for both motivating altruistic

deeds and for making sense of the epistemology of intersubjective, motivationally-

emotive states. Of course, I owe an explanation of what I mean by “wholeness,” and I

will develop that account through what I’m calling, “mereological holism.”

To this point, the metaphysical view offers an ontologically deeper account of

an underlying sense of identification with others, which justifies concern for the

well-being of others to the extent that concern for any suffering is justified. The idea

here is that if I feel compelled to care and be motivated by my own suffering, it can

make sense for me to care and be motivated by another’s suffering so long as that

suffering can in some non-trivial sense be shared. While a similar conclusion is

reached in the normative account, the metaphysical account supports its view based

on aspectual metaphysics, or, mereological holism (to be explained in what is to

come). To develop this point further, I will draw on the metaphysics of the

Pratyabhijñā philosophy (the “Recognition School”) of the c. 10th century Kashmiri

philosopher, Abhinavagupta. Without necessarily endorsing his theological

commitments, I believe that his metaphysics are instructive for the contemporary

view that reality is multivalent, and thus describable in both pluralistic and monistic

terms, with each description providing an equally true count of objects that can be

viewed as both a collection of individuals, as well as aspects of a single, but

composite whole. So, for example, we can count the car in terms of many parts, and

we can say that only the hood is dented. But we can also count the car as a single

whole, and simply say that the car has been damaged, and the latter description is

158

not simply reducible to the former. This, I believe, provides a way of making sense of

intersubjectivity—and shared motivations—while preserving the integrity of

difference and pluralism.

For Abhinavagupta, realization of an underlying universal Self paradoxically

both actualizes and overcomes (perhaps in the Hegelian sense of aufhebung!) the

real presence of otherness, particularly, the otherness of other selves. He argues

further that when we recognize our wholeness as a universal Self encompassing all

individuals, we do not gain new information (that is, he does not offer this as an

empirical claim), but rather, we clarify for ourselves what was already there to

begin with—something akin to (but not identical with) unpacking an analytically

derived claim from a concept clarified with greater depth. This is not to be confused

with a Fregean sense/reference distinction, where the whole and the individual

have distinct senses, but identical reference. According to Abhinavagupta, and his

predecessor, Utpaladeva, clarifying for ourselves the nature of selfhood—

understood as a self-reflexive unity of consciousness—discloses a background unity;

we can re-cognize an original unity that lingers as an obscured, but background

presupposition. We do not immediately recognize this original unity, because,

according to Abhinavagupta, we are ontically “distracted/deluded” (moha) by the

play of individuation and particularity, which Abhinavagupta describes as the

universal self playfully “forgetting” itself (like an actor or child fully absorbed in a

role).2 For Pratyabhijñā philosophers, the self allows itself to get absorbed in its role

2 See Utpaladeva’s Vivṛti, verse I, 1, 5 (commentary on his auto-commentary to the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā: the seminal work that deemed this school, Pratyabhijñā philosophy), quoted by Abhinavagupta in his commentary, cited from Isabelle Ratié,

159

as limited and individuated beings. I will argue that even if we are uncomfortable

speaking of a universal Self, mereological holism provides tools for making sense of

metaphysical pluralism (individuals emerging as aspects, and not properties of the

whole) while also acknowledging the real existence of composite, whole entities.

The relationship between me and you, self and other, then becomes something like

bhedābheda, or, “identity-in-distinction.” In other words, I will develop a

metaphysics of identity-in-difference that, in tandem with Abhinavagupta’s

metaphysics, might provide a fresh view on what it means to share an emotional

world and be motivated by the needs and feelings of others.

At first glance, Abhinavagupta’s Advaita-Śaivite metaphysics (monistic

metaphysics of the Śiva devotees) seems not only out of place in a discussion of the

contemporary moral psychological issue of how to motivate other-regarding

actions, but also paradoxical if not outright contradictory. It attempts to

acknowledge the real existence of different individuals, while also transcending that

individuation toward a single, universal Self. It is surely not a form of solipsism, and

yet, it concretely gravitates towards a selfing of the other. If we are uncomfortable

with the theological overtones of this view, we can, instead, think of the universe in

terms of a real whole, or better, a dynamic system undergoing transition-states.

“Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy (2007) 35: 313-370, at 367 fn. 106. Abhinava quotes: “But otherness has as its essence nothing but an incomplete opinion of oneself (abhimāna) that is produced by distraction (moha) due to the self-concealing power (māyā) [of the Universal Self].” All references to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta will be draw from Ratié’s translation and her source manuscripts.

160

Individuals articulate “aspects” of the whole rather than distinct properties.3 In the

view I’ll develop, the universe is multivalent.4 With respect to individual selves, we

can claim that as an aspect, individuated psychophysical streams are distinct and

singular, but as another aspect, they are never insulated from one another in their

“interests” or “emotions,” and each of them remains simply an expression of a

composite whole. This means that we can describe individuals in distinct but

equally true ways (which is what I mean by “mereological holism”). As one aspect,

the person I witness on the news leaving pipe-bombs in New York City is “other,”

and the whole does not bear his sins. Under another aspect, the whole suffers and

therefore is that very predicament of aggression. I believe that something like this

can be articulated out of Abhinavagupta’s view. I draw from his metaphysics to

show how the metaphysical view contributes to a phenomenology in which an

individual identifies with the suffering of others, and experiences the other’s need as

overwhelmingly motivational. I believe that the normative view does very little to

make sense of this emotively-charged experience. The minimalism of the normative

view might justify altruistic considerations, in the sense of abstract principles, but it

does not adequately explain how we sometimes transcend egoistic considerations,

and how we sometimes forfeit our own advantage for the sake of another’s welfare.

According to my metaphysically thicker model, the experience of transcending

egoistic considerations may reach an exalted crescendo when psychological

altruism affords the moral agent a glimpse of the truth that “I can act for the sake of

3 Donald L.M. Baxter, “Altruism, Grief, and Identity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (March 2005), 371-383. 4 I borrow this directly from Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity.

161

all because I am all.” This, in turn, speaks to a capacity to experience an

extraordinary cognitive and conative richness, something akin to the spirit of the

jovial gift-giver, who is unhampered by an underlying sense of scarcity and anxiety.

This sort of experience defuses the natural inclination to prioritize self-regarding

concerns. Out of the experience of exalted fullness, we can overwrite egocentricity.

The outcome amounts to what I call, “exalted altruism.” This refers to a state in

which our deliberations can take on an exceedingly other-centric tone, one that may

be viewed as supererogatory from the everyday state of transactional reality. In this

sense, the exalted altruist experiences “selflessness” of the everyday ego by deeply

identifying with something that transcends her own personal needs and her own

embodied history.

In making this point, I am also appropriating aspects of Śāntideva's

Ownerless view without endorsing the full-fledged No-Self view. At the level of

shared feelings, we can sometimes say that the feeling does not belong to a single

unit; there is simply grief and suffering that requires attention. On the surface, this

may seem to challenge what I’ve been endorsing throughout the entirety of this

essay, namely, the Ownership view. In section 4.3, I will briefly explain how this

tension arises, and how I wish to defuse it. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I will articulate

my final argument in broad strokes, and then proceed to defend it in the final

segments of the chapter. Finally, in section 4.6, I will introduce the solution that the

c. 7th century Buddhist idealist, Dharmakīrti offers with respect to the problem of

intersubjectivity, or, other minds. I will do so to further develop my metaphysical

view, which I build out of Abhinavagupta’s critique of Dharmakīrti and the account

162

of mereological holism that I provide in 4.7. While the metaphysics are, for me,

mostly exploratory, I believe they are attractive from an ethical standpoint, insofar

as they provide a motivationally compelling account of how we come to grieve and

experience joy with others, and, consequently, how we sometimes share each

other’s feelings, which includes the motivation to act on behalf of something that

transcends our individual, narrative identities. My view supports the common

sentiment that when someone grieves, suffers, or passes away, we can sometimes

feel that a part of us has grieved, suffered, or passed away. I believe this metaphysics

provides an attractive way of filling a motivational gap left open by the strictly

normative account. In 4.8, I will conclude by connecting mereological holism to

Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of intersubjectivity, and I will argue that

this is an ethically attractive account of how we can directly share our world, and

thus be motivated by something much larger than egocentrically present concerns.

4.2 The Normative Self

In chapters 1 and 2, I argued that viewing the self as the unifying owner of

embodied mental states provides an ethically (and naturalistically) attractive view.

The view allows us to speak of “ownership” without positing a metaphysical entity,

and without endorsing substance dualism. Ownership can refer to the practical fact

that we exercise the capacity to endorse our mental states.5 While we can construe

this in terms of higher-order deliberation, and avowals or disavowals, over first-

order mental states, we can also view endorsement under the concept of authority.6

5 See Ganeri, The Self, 323. 6 See Ganeri, The Self, 324, where Ganeri borrows from Bortolotti and Broome, “A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion,” in

163

We exercise a capacity to accept and/or acknowledge that a mental state is our own,

and in cases of thought-insertion, this is made abundantly clear.7 When we exercise

this capacity, we come to more directly author our own lives.8

But this authority is not necessarily the free-wheeling libertarian authority

that a Cartesian entity exercises; for one of the first insights new meditators

experience is the capacity to witness the compulsive and scattered unfolding of the

contents of their mind as an uncontrollable parade of feelings, emotions, plans, and

fantasies. Not only do we seem to experience perceptual passivity in simply coming

face to face and body to body with objects in the world, but we also experience

introspective passivity in bearing thoughts we might quite consciously wish away to

no avail. For example, I’m having an important meeting with someone I deeply

respect, and I sense faint sexual feelings emerging throughout the conversation.

More importantly, though, I sense that they are, in fact, my thoughts—I’m not going

to childishly shoulder the responsibility on someone else. While I am assailed by

such feelings, I also see them as belonging to me. I may paradoxically feel like I am

the owner and author, but also the passive victim of such thoughts. But a deeper

sense of authority emerges from the fact that, when things are going right, I can

ultimately disavow such thoughts. This makes sense of me claiming, “Those are not Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2008): 205-224, at 211. Ganeri cites Bortolotti and Broome’s concept of ownership in terms of a physical base, spatiality, introspective access, self-ascription, agency, and authority. 7 Ibid, 324. 8 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press, Massachusetts), 170: “To this extent the person, in making a decision by which he identifies with a desire, constitutes himself. The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire that he “has” merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur, as a person may “have” an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his body.”

164

the kind of thoughts befitting to this situation.”9 The important point here is that I

can exert authority over, and in this sense, author a thought by determining the

weight it has in the constellation of my deliberations and actions. For example, in

spite of my initial aggravation and desire, I consciously elect not to shout at or

threaten the infuriating driver who has blocked me in my parking spot. All of this is

obviously cloaked in normative terms. For example, what’s befitting of me is that I

sufficiently see my lover as a partner in desire and sexual joy; but what’s befitting in

our board-meeting is that I see her as my colleague and superior (say, when she is

the director or chair). In this way, we respond to normative constraints in

determining which mental states we come to own through our avowals and

disavowals, and this capacity is bound up with our prior commitments.

Ownership as endorsement is also bound up with embodiment, because

normative demands both emerge from commitments presupposed in speech-acts—

declarations, promises, and assertions—and from emotively-charged attitudes that

are realized in our bodies.10 The self, then, becomes a normatively constrained, but

dynamic framework of attitudes, emotions, and beliefs. This shapes what it makes

rational sense to do with our bodies and our embodied thoughts. The self is also co-

realized with other selves in a public space, which is shaped by commitment-laden

speech-acts and the normatively rich social roles that we adopt. This is the sense in 9 Ganeri, The Self, 323, also cf. fn. 6. Through the lens of the Nyāya philosopher Vātsyāyana, Ganeri writes: “We are all too easily persuaded that motivations, desires, and ideas are ours when in reality they have nothing to do with us, a mistake of taking to be myself what is not myself.” 10 Ganeri, The Self, 325-326: Emotionally-charged endorsements and motivationally relevant shifts in attitude imply embodiment, because beliefs and attitudes would not have force without us actually inhabiting rather than merely observing emotional perturbations.

165

which a self is immersed in a first-person stance, and “takes a stand” on its identity

in the various spheres of its social world. Borrowing from Laura Waddell Ekstrom,

Ganeri calls this a “participant self,” who occupies and authors a first-person,

embodied stance.11

This concept of selfhood is grounded in a physical, embodied structure, and

to this extent, it makes sense to examine the neuronal correlates of consciousness

(NCC). But the self also enjoys introspection and a sense of first-person “mineness”

within that framework of participation and ownership. The participant self is a

dynamic and complex entity that is unified in what it participates in owning of itself.

This allows the self considerable flexibility in coming to identify with others through

shared commitments in a “co-arising” and dynamic social order.

Now, one might ask, “What gives anyone ultimate authority over my natural

right to do as I please?” He may further clarify, “By ‘natural,’ I mean my material

capacity to reject any external authority (despite the consequences that may

follow).” A crude Contractarian, in the classical Hobbesian sense, develops a picture

of independent, rational agents coming together out of self-interest in some sort of

original and explicit agreement.

11 Ibid, 327: “Ownership…is now understood in terms of participation and endorsement, and so as implying the occupation of the a first-person stance and not merely the witnessing of a set of attitudes and emotions within oneself; and individuation (the question of ‘base’) is understood in terms of a common ownership relation obtaining between clusters of commitments, resolutions, and intentions, circumscribed by normative emotional response and implying agency and sentience and so embodiment.” This has been adapted from Ekstrom, “Keynote Preferences and Autonomy,” Philosophical and Phenomenological Review, 1999, 59: 1057-63. Ekstrom argues that the self is a “collection of preferences and acceptances…along with the capacity or faculty for forming and reforming that [collection].”

166

However, the participant, or, normative self co-emerges in a social space.

Explicit agreements are not deliberated over with respect to background

constraints. Instead, we have something like a dance of mostly unconscious and

coordinated receptivity and interaction. For example, my capacity to determine the

conditions that satisfy the use of a word in a particular context presupposes

conventions that arise with and are sustained by other language-users. If I were to

work as a projectionist in a retro, art-house movie theater, I could comfortably tell

my assistant, “The film is running,” without provoking him to go on a wild goose-

hunt for a film that he believes “ran off.” You, reading this passage right now, also

understand that I am not referring to an assistant chasing after a plump, wild goose.

This coordinated activity of sharing language and responding to appropriate

meanings in given contexts is mostly reached without explicit agreements. Add the

premise that my capacity to introspectively and publicly develop a sense of my

individual identity is shaped by embodied and linguistically-constituted thoughts.

This allows me to derive the conclusion that my sense of self is quite literally

dependent upon others. In fact, as I pointed out in Scheffler (chapter 1), large

portions of the action-guiding values that constitute our “self-interest” include the

well-being and success of others in our life. We’re often unable to determine where

our own success and another’s success part ways. The profit-sharing employee and

the CEO can intelligibly claim, “Blue Steel Co. is flourishing,” while including their

individual and collective success in the equation. We see this on a more intimate

level in tight-knit families. The child’s success is partly constitutive of the parents’

success. And even if a parent does not acknowledge “success by association,” the

167

public might not view things as such. One might say, “Wow, you must be proud of

her!” And while the “must” here is basically predictive, it can still retain some of its

normative tone: “Whether you think so, you have something to be proud of; so

enough with the misplaced humility: be proud!” From what I have argued, we can

say that the socially immersed, normative self is required to take the needs of others

seriously—in some instances, at its own expense—because the context demands it

(in the same way that contexts provide implicit imperatives to use particular words

with particular shades of meaning). The demand is not something mysterious. The

demand may emerge in the very instant that I claim, “I am suffering, and you ought

to lend me a hand!” If I consistently apply this imperative across appropriate

contexts, then I recognize that it makes sense for you to make the same demand of

me.12 Therefore, I have a reason to help you, even if I do not always desire to do so.

This means that I can quite rationally act on that sense of obligation without having

to prove that it serves me in some material way. In short, I can rationally be an

altruist.

Now, this model is consistent with a Bundle-view of self, if that view leaves

room for the notion of an embodied agent who has a say in ordering clusters of

preferences, etc. that constitute her practical identity. However, the Mādhyamika

claim that ownership and individuation are ultimately “empty” (śūnyatā) and

erroneous concepts sharply distinguishes it from the normative view. From the

normative perspective, there is a “resting place” (āśraya) for the self (see chapter 2);

in other words, there is a real, albeit ontologically minimal, subject. The base of

12 See John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Press, 2005), chapter 5.

168

individuation for a self emerges from a body capable of emotively-charged attitudes

that are attuned to a normative framework. Whether a permanent, metaphysical

entity underlies that framework may thus seem immaterial.

As I’ve pointed out, viewing selfhood in terms of ownership and participation

adds another dimension to the stock arguments against ethical egoism. So long as

our capacity to enjoy an independent life is premised on our ability and desire to

align our intentions and actions with others, which is evident in the intention to

communicate through the normative framework of language, we cannot believe that

we are inherently privileged or subject to standards that transcend a general

framework applicable to other selves. More importantly, the general framework we

emerge from and implicitly commit to through communication does not always

direct us to act in our own best interest. Assuming so betrays a depleted sense of

what it means to be an inherently social self.

4.3 Selves as “Ownerless” Owners: Revisiting Sidgwick’s Ethical Dilemma

In the previous chapters, particularly chapter 1, I addressed Sidgwick’s now

classic thesis that egoistic and altruistic considerations represent fundamentally

independent domains of concerns. In ethics, particularly applied ethics, we might

struggle to justify which domain of concern has authority. For example, is it

reasonable for me to sacrifice a percentage of my income, which could be spent

supporting, say, my research and those things that bring joy and meaning to my life

and my family, to support school-lunch vouchers for poor children in my state?

Should I sacrifice my valuable office hours doing fulfilling and lucrative work to

assist a student who has poor study habits and thus “needs my help” (after all, I’m

169

not in the business of teaching my adult college students how to organize their time

and discipline their urges to procrastinate)? Of course, compassion, good-will, and

various normative constraints (say, as a professor who must shoulder certain

expected social responsibilities) provide me with reasons to contribute in a way that

does not always directly benefit me in my personal life. And compassionately

helping a student uncover his own incompetency and develop his talent is certainly

one aspect of being an exemplary teacher (and not just a researcher). But the

question is whether these reasons have some sort of authority over reasons of

prudence and desire. For Sidgwick, the problem remained intractable, because

ultimately our numerical distinction from one another gives us reasons that are

sometimes mutually inconsistent, but enjoy equal authority. From the perspective of

the individual, I am prudent, and concerned with long-term pleasure and fulfillment.

From the perspective of the whole, I am concerned with the flourishing of the whole

to which I contribute. But when I am numerically distinct from you, I retain the

individual perspective. It seems utterly reasonable to promote what would serve me

best. For example, it’s not so cruel to spend my Sunday watching football rather than

answering my phone and consoling my chronically depressed friend, who always

tends to reach out to me on my cherished day of relaxation. On the other hand, I am

connected to a larger society and social network, and that requires that I promote

the overall good. How do we judge which reasons hold greater authority?

A radical move is to deny what fuels this interminable stand-off; we might

elect to deny the ultimate existence of numerical distinction. The Buddhists,

particularly Śāntideva, present arguments that defuse the relevance of such a

170

distinction. For Śāntideva, the Owernlessness thesis—understood in terms of the

Mādhyamika No-Self view—seems to entail that altruistic reasons have greater

authority. I explained in chapters 2 and 3 why I think his argument ultimately fails. I

can sum this up by saying that the No-Self view goes too far, because it destabilizes

the authority of any reasons whatsoever. However, I believe that Śāntideva was on

the right track in trying to disarm egoism at its core, namely, at the belief in

ultimately individuated and owned constellations of psychophysical events that pit

“my fair share” of goods against “your fair share.” This may seem contradictory to

everything that I’ve tried to establish so far in this essay, because I have argued that

we need some sense of ownership to make sense of our conventional and ethically

salient reality. I’ve also claimed that the ultimate normativity of collective living

(and language-use) provides us with a background of obligations and concerns that

circumvent the problem of totally disparate domains of considerations remaining

interminably at odds.

But in this final chapter, I want to further clarify and nuance what the

Ownership view can mean. Conventionally, we need this view to make sense of our

transactional reality—this much, any Buddhist would grant. However, the Buddhist

might be right that achieving a sense of ownerlessness can motivate a

transformative ethics. But I think construing this in terms of either “no self” or

“without self” is not so conceptually fruitful. “The self” can also be viewed more

substantially as an underlying synthesizer of otherwise disparate experiences. The

self, as I’ve argued, allows us to make sense of communication, language

comprehension, and arguably, memory in a way that epicycles of No-Self (or even

171

Without-Self) views do not. More importantly, it allows us to more easily make

sense of our ethical transactions reaching their intended targets, and it supports our

sense that compassionate concern for another is not defused over a possibly

unbounded flow of ephemeral and radically individual person-events. From one

level of description—say, a very narrow reading of Leibniz’s Identity of

Indiscernables—when John is concerned for Sarah at 20 and Sarah at 35, he’s

concerned with different people (given the distinctness of properties between A and

B). But the depth of concern he may have for Sarah at 35 may incorporate her real

past. Sarah contracts lymphoma at 35, and John views this as an even starker turn of

events given that she recovered from a nearly fatal aneurism at 20, which led to a

bicycle accident that crippled her for several years. If the Lockean determines

Sarah’s personal identity by memory alone, then John’s sadness in the face of Sarah’s

long-endured pain would be misplaced if Sarah radically dissociates from or

completely forgets her past. But John experiences sympathy for Sarah, and the

meaning and quality of that sympathy encompasses the stretch of Sarah’s life. He

may be glad that she does not remember some of these tragedies, but his sympathy

is for the whole person, and not just for her memories, or for distinct and ephemeral

individuals over which he has imputed an illusive unity. Sarah is the self-same

individual who, in Hegelian terms, is whole over a dynamic mediation of becoming:

she is not any particular piece of changing content, and yet she is “substance” in the

sense of maintaining her unity (self-sameness) amidst determinate difference.

Now, one may argue that Sarah’s life has integrity as a narrative, so the

current state of “Sarah-ness” is pregnant with the outcomes and memories of past

172

events (related in the right way). One may further argue that “no self” doesn’t

necessarily mean that she lacks unity and wholeness in her life. There may be a

sense of synchronic unity that integrates the moments of her life (even when

diachronic unity has been eroded), but it is not metaphysically deep. She has a sense

of wholeness, but it is nevertheless “without self,” which means that there is no

further underlying fact about what integrates her into a whole and rounded

individual. In response, I believe there is an advantage to viewing the self as that

very wholeness, that is, in viewing Sarah as a real continuant. The general advantage

is that “wholeness” is a unifying term (in a way that I believe “without self” is not),

and it can accommodate diversity and relational dynamics, both in terms of

individual lives, and in terms of group dynamics, without abandoning either the

thread that connects an individual to the moments of her life, or connects an

individual to the social spectrum of differences that conditions her individual

contribution to that whole. While we may want to eschew the view that individuals

are radically autonomous and static rational agents, and in this sense, claim that we

are “without self,” the notion of wholeness allows us to imagine a synthesis of

differences that begets shared values (when thinking in terms of diverse groups),

and it allows us to view the individual as a dynamic but integrated being capable of

real change as opposed to being only a conceptually constructed vehicle that

organizes for us what is really just a replacement of experiences and property-

tropes across independent events. Moreover, an advantage lies in being able to

accommodate radical asymmetry between Sarah’s “internal” narrative and our

“external” narrative of her life; there is a real set of facts about what happened to

173

Sarah despite differences of opinion and memory. On a practical level, this will

impact how we treat Sarah, and it will help us better determine the sorts of

remunerations we believe she may deserve. In the case of radical dissociation (or a

breakdown in diachronic unity), this may even justify paternalistic measures to

treat Sarah, and help her recover what she has lost.

Now, with respect to the nature of personal identity, we may reach a

conceptual impasse, and perhaps our only recourse lies in more or less grounded

decisions (rather than arguments). Either we help her “recover” her past by

collectively imputing a metaphysically empty narrative that we can train her to

accept, or she can recover memories and associations with different events that

have occurred over the historical unfolding of her real life. I believe the latter has

the distinct advantage of requiring less counter-intuitive conceptual labor than what

would be required to live as though diachronic unity were a conceptual fabrication.

In other words, diachronic identity is the default for complex creatures like us. I also

believe that we do not have a clear enough sense of what is involved in “conceptual

imputation” to assume that our helping Sarah recover her past is some sort of

collective work of the imagination (where “imagination” is understood in terms of

falsification). Finally, I believe that when Sarah dissociates from the tragic events of

her life, and John is nevertheless deeply impacted by those events, he is not

mourning a different Sarah than the Sarah who is blissfully unaware of her tragic

past. Despite their different narratives, there is simply the tragedy of Sarah’s life

that one might uncover upon a larger view of the facts, which means that Sarah can

get it wrong about herself.

174

Now, if we accept, as I do, that it makes more conceptual sense to think in

terms of real individuals and real continuant selves, an epistemic problem looms.

We have immediate awareness of our own conscious states, but only indirect

awareness of other conscious states. I find you grieving, and I am compassionately

compelled to reach out and help you. Say that I do so at the expense of my own well-

being. There is a general conceptual presupposition underlying this common

transaction. I am referring to the fact that I am attuned to your grief, and I am

motivated by something that transcends my private experience of grief. One may

agree that my concerns can be directed at you and your well-being. But, one may

further argue, I am ultimately just chasing the tail of my personal constellation of

private feelings and desires. There is an epistemic question of how I come to know

and incorporate your motivating feelings into my decisions. Even when I sense that I

am motivated by your grief, I had better have access of some form or another to

your feelings. Put another way, we had better be able to share our emotional worlds.

If I endorse strict, naïve realism about ownership, then we are numerically distinct

entities that own our individual psychophysical states. I’ve already explained why

this is relevant to ethical actions, but I have not assessed the epistemology of

knowing which sorts of motivating reasons drive us. I want to believe that you and

your needs directly motivate my helping you (in the sense that we can

intersubjectively share emotional worlds). If this were not the case, then altruism

would be impossible, because I would always be one-step removed from the person

whose needs I aim to serve. That does not mean that my actions cannot be described

as altruistic. The problem is that the other I wish to serve only exists as if she has

175

feelings and needs that ought to be met. The source of my motivation to help is

ultimately me, who has taken this indirectly experienced other as a perceptual

object worthy of my consideration—any “source of normativity” that favors helping

is grounded in the only values that I directly experience, my own. Thus, a kind of

attenuated altruism is possible, but the ground of its value and motivation is

fundamentally egocentric. So if a non-egocentric, motivating reason exists, I need to

explain how I can know that what motivates me is not something entirely personal,

private, and therefore, purely egocentrically present.

This is an iteration of the problem—at the level of motivation and reasons for

action—of determining how we intersubjectively share a world of common

perceptual objects, like tables, lamps, and meadows, for example. If it is only my

grief that is directly present to me, then in the final analysis, I am acting on an

egocentric consideration, because the good that guides my action is reflexive and

ultimately self-regarding, and only indirectly other-centric. If it is your grief I aim to

ameliorate, and I regard your need as intrinsically valid, then it remains to be

explained how it might directly compel me in an agentive way. My point is not that

we are always psychological egoists. I am making the epistemological point that to

conceptually (not just empirically) rule this out, I must know that your grief has real

purchase in motivating my action; I must be able to share it with you. And, in terms

of value, I must recognize that the source of your value does not rest entirely in me.

When it comes to non-egocentric altruistic action, the person that motivates my

action needs to be the real and intrinsically valuable other. This is especially true

when we admit that the hero may not want to sacrifice herself for a stranger by

176

stepping in front of a bullet, but she can somehow feel compelled (and even

obligated) to do so. After all, the claim, “I didn’t want to be a hero, but it felt like the

right thing to do…so I did it” is neither empirically unfounded nor logically

contradictory. So how do we explain this?

A simple solution is that we do not have any sort of direct access to each

other’s feelings and motivations, but we can infer them. Inferring the existence of

other subjectivities does not provide us with direct access to each other’s feelings.

We might explain emotional connectedness through physical mechanisms that in

some billiard-ball causal fashion transmit information. From some such model we

make progress in the area of, say, mirror-neurons, and these may explain the

underlying physical mechanisms that support our capacity to empathize with each

other, and in some analogical sense, experience each other’s grief. But in a way,

we’re left with only a black box. How can these neurons experience, or partly

constitute, grief that is both their own and not their own? An account that provides

us with some sort of direct connection to each other can both satisfy our ethical

need to explain altruistic action—and purge, once and for all, any traces of

psychological egoism—while at the same time providing us with an epistemically

satisfying account of how we come to know other minds (and thus other states of

grief, pain, and sorrow that might motivate us to sacrifice our own well-being for

another’s advantage). It’s just such an account that I wish to develop here, and in

order to do so, I’m going to develop my account of selfhood in a way that I hope

avoids the usual impasse between Bundle-theories and realism about the self. On

the one hand, I wish to preserve the integrity of individual continuant selves, which

177

means that I will not offer a nuanced version of a Bundle-theory that views selves as

property tropes related in the right ways. On the other hand, I will also relinquish

the belief that our psychophysical states are, strictly speaking, always individually

owned under all accurate descriptions of reality.

Let me initially motivate this through an analogy with theoretical physics.

Think in terms of the distinct principles that distinguish systems and quantum field

theory from linear, mechanistic models. For example, two protons accelerated in a

particle accelerator each have measurable motions, and measurable velocities and

energy states. They collide and then part ways. Observationally, we find that they

still exist, but in their collision, new particles have appeared with measurable

masses and electrical charges. Describing this with Newtonian mechanics and

within the purview of Einstein’s “E = mc2” requires something like the claim that the

incident particle motion of the two protons creates new objects. This means that

some of the properties of the two colliding protons change into objects.

Object/property ontology distinguishes the world of objects from properties, and no

element of either transforms into the other. This would be like claiming that the

height of the Eiffel tower can somehow transform into another Eiffel tower, or

claiming that colliding planets can emerge from their collisions and beget a host of

newly created planets (rather than merely broken off fragments of the former

planets).13 Quantum field theory makes sense of this by radically departing from the

mechanistic interpretation, while more deeply problematizing the notion of

13 I borrow this example, and general description of the physics involved here from Bernard d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 15.

178

“creation.” Observationally speaking, we simply do not have a clear formula that

quantifies the concept of creation. So, we can instead speak in terms of transition-

states of a dynamic system.14 Thus, instead of thinking in terms of metaphysically

distinct absolutes (basically, atomistic and mechanistic thinking), we might think in

terms of the transition-states of a single system, whereby the creation of a new

particle (or individual) is just the transition of one state of a certain “something”

into another state. Similarly, I’m recommending that we revise our view of distinct

individuals with their private experiences, and examine something like transition-

states of a non-linear single system, from which emerge shareable and

interconnected emotional phenomena. The caveat is that we can describe this in

terms of individuals that nevertheless bear the marks of quantum “non-locality”

(that is, they are inherently connected, and in this way “share” information without

appeal to mechanistic packets of information being traded at speeds that would

have to move faster than the speed of light). This is the substantive difference

between speaking in terms of “wholes” and speaking in terms of “emptiness” or “no-

self.”

When we’re viewed as numerically and metaphysically distinct entities, the

gap between self and other is always looming. In one description of things, each of 14 Ibid., 16: “…let us begin by observing that the notion of creation is not a scientific one: We do not know how to capture it, and even less quantify it. It is therefore appropriate to try and reduce it to something we can master. Now we do master the notions of a system state and changes thereof. We know how to calculate transition rates from one state to another. And the brilliant idea…just came from this. It consisted in considering that the existence of a particle is a state of a certain “Something,” that the existence of two particles is another state of this same “Something,” and so on. Then, the creation of a particle is nothing else than a transition from one state of this “Something” to another, and therefore we may hope to be able to treat it quantitatively.”

179

us directly experiences our own private mental occurrences; we only indirectly

share a world of common perceptual objects. This leaves us in a certain ethical

conundrum with respect to determining the authority of egoistic and altruistic

reasons. It also generates an epistemological-metaphysical conundrum with respect

to our capacity to understand and identify with each other’s grief while

simultaneously recognizing the distinction between self and other.

The normative account might provide me with reasons to take your needs

seriously by allowing me to see my needs as importantly bound up with your needs.

Still, when it comes to reasons for altruistic actions, and compelling, emotively-

charged motivations that support such behavior, an issue of identification and

knowledge is left to be resolved. Mechanistically speaking, we might resolve this by

analogy or inference. But if this proves tenuous, we can explore a metaphysics that

is robust enough to provide a real identity between self and other, while preserving

the commonsense distinction between individuals. The benefit here is that I can

both respect your individuality, and yet truly share states of joy, grief, and pain with

you. When I identify with you—or, more accurately, with your motivating

suffering—any authority your needs might have in motivating me to act would be as

reasonable as tending to my own suffering. But the trick here is not that my self-

regarding considerations are really just other-regarding considerations (I explored

this option in chapter 3). Rather, under one aspect, I’m able to identify with the

whole, and thus be motivated to promote the well-being of the whole, and yet under

another aspect, I can see myself as a historical and embodied individual who is

distinct from that whole. I can see that at the individual level I might be at a

180

disadvantage in promoting your well-being, but at the same time, I can recognize

your well-being as part of my well-being, and vice versa. I do not just reduce the

whole of suffering to my own embodied, historical and egocentric existence. I’m able

to see a genuine other whom I feel obligated to care for, while at the same time

recognizing that the reasons and motivations I have to care for myself (at the

individual, egoistic level of embodied existence) may operate at the larger level of

the whole: it is not “my” self I am attending to at this larger level, but the shared

experience of selfhood. In this sense, my empathy and compassionate motivations—

and your grief and suffering—can both be “ownerless” with respect to our historical

and embodied existence, but also owned within the worldview of an underlying

whole, or, dynamic system whereby various transition-states manifest as both

particular and non-local.

The key point I’m making here is that the normative account leaves open a

gap in explaining motivation, and in explaining how we can share conative,

motivational states. I may be able to provide authoritative reasons for altruism

through the normative account, but this relies on a very suspicious claim. For

example, John Searle provides a compelling account of why we may have desire-

independent reasons to promote another’s well-being.15 The outcome boils down to

this. I believe that you have a reason to help me (if you can do so). My child is

drowning, my arms are broken and in casts from a bicycle accident I sustained, and I

solicit your help to brave the crashing waves and save him. Given the commitments

that come with speech-acts, I can only sensibly call this a “reason to help me” if it

15 Searle, Rationality in Action, chapter 5.

181

applies with universal scope (given various contextual constraints). But, as Searle

points out,16 our capacity to be reasonable only makes sense if we are free to be

irrational. So, we still need to make sense of an emotive force that compels you to

risk your neck for my son. If you choose to ignore my need, then calling your

selfishness irrational would not score me many points. You might reply: “Hey, what

you call a ‘general reason’ is yet to be proven—isn’t that what’s precisely at stake—I

have an authoritative reason to avoid the risk of drowning; you have a subjective

reason to want me to help you; looks like we’re facing a tragedy here, and for that,

I’m deeply sorry, but no dice! There’s nothing to adjudicate these competing

reasons.” The problem is that you still see things as “me” and “my neck” versus the

world. I’m not saying you’re wrong in doing so, but I’m asking how it is that you can

transcend that basic concern, and share my dismay to such a degree that you go

after my son. I’m of the mind that it’s not just duty that drives you, or some packet of

information from my experience that mechanistically triggers something totally

private in you. I want to employ a more metaphysically robust account of how an

emotively-charged recognition might motivate you to risk your life for me.

Now, before directly proceeding with my argument, I need to address the

central claims I wish to defend. Admittedly, my strategy is precarious because I

toggle between an ontologically minimal account of selfhood and an ontologically

robust view. But I will do just that.

16 Ibid., chapter 5.

182

4.4 Two Chief Claims to Defend

First Claim

There are two larger claims I wish to defend here. First, altruism enacts a

type of freedom. This freedom is of a special sort: altruism shows us that the self is

porous, and co-defined in relation to others. In this sense, its content is

interdependent and not categorically individuated. And yet, the self is free to

individuate itself—that is, autonomous—through the commission of both mundane

and extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice. The self is capable of “gifting” itself to take

up the cause of another as its own. This is akin to what the literature has called, “The

Paradox of Altruism,”17 where the fierce independence and individuality that

informs the psychology and praxis of a strongly altruistic person exists in tension

with a deep sense of interdependence and emotional identification. Compassion,

which I view, in distinction from sympathy, as inherently motivational, allows us to

co-participate in an emotive state, and this can transcend the partition between self

and other. This transcendence articulates a freedom otherwise unavailable to the

empirically limited ego-self. On the other hand, transcendence also articulates a

capacity that seems unavailable to certain versions of the No-Self view. The No-

Selfer who endorses the view that the first-person stance resists a purely physicalist

description has trouble explaining how a bundle or cluster of psychophysical events

can account for anything outside that cluster, including, other psychophysical

clusters. To genuinely experience the other as someone real and worthy of concern,

17 Robert Paul Churchill and Erin Street, “Is There a Paradox of Altruism?” in The Ethics of Altruism, editor Jonathan Seglow (Southgate, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 89-106.

183

as someone whose cause one can feel obligated to take up at one’s own expense, is

to be free from the limitations that come with viewing the self solely in terms of

first-person immersion and “mineness.” This is one sense in which genuine altruism

articulates the porousness and relationality of the self.

The idea of the “relational self” is supported by experiments in

developmental psychology that seem to show that a sense of selfhood beyond that of

a mere body reacting to stimuli emerges simultaneously with awareness of other

selves, and this is evidenced by the infant’s capacity for achieving shared attention

and coordination of action and intention with her caretaker even before developing

a robust command of language.18 Research has shown that most infants get busy,

early-on, coordinating their attention and intentions with their caretakers, whose

mental states they in some sense perceive. When we mature and develop an

enriched sense of selfhood—with all its intimations of first-person privacy,

introspection, and subjectivity—we might more easily believe that we are essentially

independent individuals (or uniquely singular and individuated subjectivities), and

thus be naturally inclined to believe that our own welfare and sense of the good is

somehow privileged (at least with respect to what it makes practical sense to care

most about from our own, individual perspectives). But given that the self is only

developed in tandem with a sense of other-personness (and not just bare otherness),

losing sight of the robust reality of other selves, or, as in the case of severe autism,

not robustly sharing attention with or fully recognizing the reality of other

subjectivities, means that we have a weaker or more depleted sense of self. Couple

18 See Sorabji, The Self, 24-30.

184

this with the idea that the sacrifices we endure in the altruistic act (however un-

heroic or mundane that act may be) require a fairly developed will, one that

exercises higher-order volitions in avowing or disavowing various impulses, beliefs,

and desires. These higher-order volitions, and the commitments they both

presuppose and enact, allow one to justify overwriting the instinct to prioritize

one’s own welfare at the expense of others. When we remain egoists, entrenched in

the belief that the world begins and ends with the individual, then we have not

adequately exercised our deeper capacity for identification with others through

motivating compassion; we inhibit the flourishing of our autonomy by not robustly

enough identifying with a larger whole. Consequently, in this trenchantly egoistic

state we are not robust selves, but only “self-ish.”

So the self is porous in both its capacity to identify with others through

compassion, and in its capacity to imagine what it’s like to be in another’s shoes

through empathic connection. And yet, the self paradoxically individuates itself by

exercising its autonomy through self-sacrifice and identification with a larger whole.

The self identifies with and is dependent upon the other person, and yet it achieves

autonomy and distinction in the face of transcending its own egoistic inclinations.

This is a somewhat conceptually unhappy statement, but I am emphasizing that

there is a productive tension between identity and difference that arises as the self

and other co-emerge. The egoist has the individuation game down, but misses out

on the ethically extraordinary (but perhaps developmentally ordinary) capacity to

identify with another by exercising the freedom to transcend the naturally egoistic

compulsion.

185

Why do I call this “freedom”? I do so because both the embodied state of

being a self, which individuates us into personal beings with very personal histories,

and the immersive sense of occupying a first-person stance naturally direct our

attention to what is in the closest psychological and physical proximity: our own

ego-selves, with their occurrent needs and desires. However, there is a tyranny at

work in this proximity, because when the inward gaze falls too far into the rabbit

hole of private, first-person experiences, it is both metaphysically and epistemically

limited. What it can know, and consequently what it can do is limited; it shuts itself

off from a whole range of experiences that are generated by compassionately

communing with another. Over-emphasizing individuation threatens to perniciously

limit the greater range of possibilities that are inherently open to one who identifies

with a larger whole. So I am not using “freedom” in a completely libertarian Kantian

sense. I’m also including creative and imaginative freedom in my account of what it

means to identify with something larger than the private ego-self. This is the first

big claim I wish to defend.

Second Claim

Second, while I applaud the general Buddhist view that the self is not a single

thing, whose essence is thinking (a la Cartesianism) or any other such singularly

defining property, I believe that certain Mahāyāna Buddhist accounts of selfhood do

not sufficiently support their chief practical aim, namely, altruistic compassion. This

is due, in large part, to certain weaknesses in their understanding of selfhood. While

I believe that some of these same weaknesses exist in contemporary reductionistic

theories of selfhood, and some contemporary minimalist views of selfhood,

186

critiquing the weaknesses in the Buddhist views will be instructive, since their

points of emphasis do not necessarily overlap with contemporary debates. The

various Buddhist views I’ve developed here have not adequately accounted for what

we mean by “selves.” I contend that the requirements of “having a self” (or better,

being a self) are, from an ontologically minimalist perspective, bound up with

normativity and participation. And, as we cannot have normativity without others,

that is, without a public space, we can in some sense say that the self is constructed

out of its normative and participant relationships. Normativity is essentially bound

up with sharing a public space; thus, an adequate notion of self must include the

individual in the context of its meaningful relationships to others, which in turn

requires thinking of the self as self-other. However, rather than appealing to the

relational view to derive the conclusion that the self is “empty” or “without self” (in

the sense developed in the minimalist reading of Madhyamaka), we might instead

view the self as something real, but also something far more extensive than the

personal histories of individual egos. The self plays the role of unifier.

Be that as it may, selfishness is only possible against a background of shared

space that is inherently imbued with normative requirements. These emergent

requirements reveal the self as porous and always-already co-emergent with others.

Getting a better handle on what constitutes selfhood means getting clearer about

the inherent normativity and other-centric requirements involved in being a self.

These “rules of engagement” are not directly desire-dependent or egocentric in

nature. That is, I can only have self-regarding considerations against a background

of other-regarding considerations, and these latter considerations are not ultimately

187

derivative of (in the sense of being less fundamental than) egocentric

considerations; they co-arise with other-regarding considerations that are

experienced and logically situated as being “externally” binding. This is another

sense in which I claim that the self is “porous” and thus “open” to others by its very

nature. So my case does not rest on moral psychology, alone, but also accommodates

normativity, which is the condition for the possibility of communicating and

coordinating action through language. The space created between self and other

presupposes a background of mutuality and co-creation. Borrowing from my

discussion of Levinasian-inspired “otherness” in chapter 3, I should add that this

mutuality is inherently imbued with a sense of ethical command. That is, I am not

only with others, but also in some sense obligated to respond to others as a basic

feature of my encountering someone who cannot be fully reduced to a quantity or a

mere object.

On the other hand, I will develop an account here that goes beyond the

normative self, and I do this to make better sense of the phenomenology of

mutuality and identification with the other. So in what follows, I will support the

view that altruism is reasonable based on an analysis of the normative self, and I

will also show how a felt (and thus motivating) altruistic obligation may be the

upshot of a specific metaphysics. The heart of this dissertation lies in these two big

claims.

In the next section, I will briefly take stock of the specific uses of the No-Self

thesis I’ve covered throughout this dissertation. I’ll do so by more specifically

addressing two Buddhist schools of philosophy that have been central to the

188

intellectual-dialogical history of Indian philosophy and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism:

Vasubandhu’s (c. 4th century CE) Abhidharma-Sautrāntika metaphysics, and

Nāgārjuna’s (c. 2nd century CE) and Śāntideva's (c. 8th century CE) Madhyamaka

minimalism and deconstruction. This dissertation has not pretended to provide in-

depth hermeneutics for these complex schools of Buddhist thought. I have rationally

reconstructed much of what I’ve developed here as a preparatory work supporting

further research in the ethical ramifications of contemporary theories of selfhood.

Altruism and compassion are central practical concepts in Mahāyāna Buddhist

philosophy, because Mahāyāna Buddhism (at least in the texts I’ve covered here,

particularly in Śāntideva) believes that altruistic motivations are in some sense a

natural (if not logical) outcome of experientially recognizing the unreality of the self.

Thus, deriving an agent-neutral and altruistic ethics from a revisionary metaphysics

of selfhood is arguably a major philosophical program in Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna,

and to some extent, Theravāda texts. So there is much to be gained by bringing this

program into conversation with the contemporary scene by extracting its more

general and controversial philosophical commitments. While one cannot entirely

ignore responsible philology, I have examined these texts as a philosopher and not

an expert Sanskritist, philologist, or student of religious studies.

With that in mind, I will also assess another set of controversial philosophical

contentions endorsed by the Buddhist scholastic, Dharmakīrti (c. 7th century CE).

Dharmakīrti endorsed a brand of idealism, or, what’s been called in the classical

Indian tradition, “mind only” (citamātra) metaphysics. While for Dharmakīrti the

self is not real, he developed a philosophy of mind whereby mental occurrences are

189

self-reflexive and momentary, and he argued that the concept of selfhood emerges

out of the self-reflexive nature of these momentary mental occurrences. For

Dharmakīrti, mental occurrences are self-illuminating, that is, mental occurrences

are inherently aware of their own awareness. Perceptual objects like tables, chairs,

and lamps are a function of these self-reflexive and self-illuminating mental

episodes externalizing themselves as “other.” Thus, Dharmakīrti collapses the

ultimate distinction between subject and object. While Dharmakīrti must make

sense of how these insulated and momentary occurrences relate and individuate

themselves as the continuous stream of an individual self experiencing a world of

external objects, he must also make sense of how an individuated stream of

consciousness can come to experience other selves outside that stream. Thus,

Dharmakīrti faces the task of explaining the experience of otherness in general, and

the experience of other selves, in particular. The 10th century Kashmiri Śaivite,

Abhinavagupta, leveled some damning critiques against Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics.

I believe that the upshot of those critiques provides a fresh solution for making

sense of other-centricity and altruism. I have argued that the link between Bundle

and No-Self theories on the one hand, and agent-neutrality and altruism on the

other, are not so logically compelling. So I’ll begin by defending the second big claim

I made, my claim that the Buddhist No-Self view (anātman) does not have the

resounding ethical implications many Buddhist thinkers believe it does. I will then

go on to develop an account of otherness by using Dharmakīrti as a foil. I contend

that my account provides a unique view of how we can come to know each other

and come to share motivating feelings. These shared feelings can motivate altruistic

190

action, because they transcend ownership, and are therefore not derivative of (in

the sense of being less fundamental than) the egocentric concerns of the agent who

is motivated by them. Moreover, in so far as these shared feelings disclose an

original, albeit not always consciously recognized unity, egocentric concerns are in

this sense less fundamental because they presuppose background unity. I will

elaborate on this in the final sections of this essay. For now, I will turn again to

various general forms of the Buddhist No-Self view.

4.5.1 The Practical Inadequacies of the Anātman Thesis: Critique of Chapter 3

What can a Buddhist mean by claiming that there is no self? I utilized

Ganeri’s taxonomy in chapter 2 to sort out some of the ways in which the No-Self

claim has logically functioned in the corpus of Buddhist texts. Let me now move

from some general forms of this claim to more specific developments of the claim in

the tradition of Buddhist philosophy.

While we may be tempted to believe that the No-Self view more generally

refers to the absence of a Cartesian soul-self, and that No-Selfism is an attack against

substance dualism, the view in the Buddhist context is more pointed and

controversial. For example, one reading of the early Buddhist metaphysician,

Vasubandhu, would have him argue that the term, “I” is not ultimately meaningful,

even if it does provide some pragmatic use. For Vasubandhu and the early

Ābhidharmikas (Buddhist metaphysicians), what we’ve erroneously taken to be a

self is a complex and dynamic relationship among physical structures (rūpa) and a

host of intentionalistic, mental phenomena. Buddhists claim that five skandhas, or,

“heaps” of psychophysical phenomena produce the erroneous belief in a self. These

191

heaps consist of the following: physical matter and forms of experience (rūpa),

affectively-charged perception (vedanā), normatively-relevant patterns of

conceptual imputation (samjñā), normatively-relevant patterns of behavior

underlying a sense of agency (samskāra), and the capacity to synthesize over

diverse modalities of sensory input (vijñāna). This makes up a psychophysical

“stream” (saṅtāna) of consciousness. The stream is the base/locus (āśraya), or,

metaphysical base of individuation, while the “place” of this occurrence (ādhāra)—

that which characterizes ownership of this dynamic complex—is metaphysically

unreal. This is what Ganeri referred to as “No-Self View 2” (see chapter 2). So

according to this view, ownership is unreal when assessing things from the ultimate,

metaphysical perspective. However, “the mind” is not reducible to ultimately atomic

physical structures. Mental phenomena are metaphysically distinct from physical

phenomena. So this form of the No-Self view is anything but monistic and physicalist

in nature. The chief point Vasubandhu raises with respect to the self is that it is an

ethically pernicious error imputed over a dynamic relationship between mental and

physical occurrences. Uncovering this error is both morally instructive and essential

to Buddhist soteriology. Thus, while there may be many contemporary agnostics

and atheists who believe in the meaningfulness of the term, “self,” without believing

in the existence of a soul, Vasubandhu would argue that emphasizing the

importance of the concept of self is ethically insidious, because it contributes to

egocentric and selfish behavior, and it is anathema to Buddhist soteriology.

Now, I gave some strong reasons in chapter 1 why I believe ownership is

essential for making sense of the human experience, both metaphysically and socio-

192

linguistically. But we can still ask how Vasubandhu and other No-Selfers of his ilk

consider this revisionary metaphysical view to be ethically illuminating and

ethically liberating. In chapter 2, I covered some ways in which a Parfitian spin on

this view might provide important ethical upshots concerning the nature of

responsibility and punishment. But what normative value can the Buddhist view

provide? What sort of ethical traction can a revision of essentialism about the self

provide? In terms of the question of altruism and its practical and ethical role, it

becomes two questions: How does this make sense of the felt, obligatory nature of

altruism? How does this justify altruism? While there may be some creative ways to

account for altruism in the stream view of Buddhist No-Selfism, there has been an

ongoing debate as to its normative applicability (as I illustrated in chapter 2). The

ethical traction of normative-ethical requirements, especially as they pertain to any

sort of altruistic mandate (if one exists), does not straightforwardly follow from the

view that the experience of being a real continuant self is a conceptual fabrication.

However, I’ll try to motivate yet another way in which one might think that

experiencing the unreality of the self leads to a normative conclusion. I will

ultimately reject this strategy, but I do believe that, at least on the surface, it has

some viability. I will develop this strategy by more precisely addressing the foil to

this argument in the next section, namely, ethical egoism. I will examine whether

ethical egoism is a moral theory (or simply a theory that undermines ethics

altogether), and I will also argue that the theory is not a straw man; ethical egoism,

at least on the surface, is a real contender, albeit a terribly flawed contender.

193

4.5.2 Numerical Distinction and the Egoist’s Strategy

Egocentric considerations arguably only make sense against the background

belief that the ego perdures in some form or another. This is the “extreme claim” I

discussed in chapter 3, and as I said there, it is usually wedded to the “me-

consideration.” For example, when I consider the interests (understood more

narrowly as needs rather than mere urges or inclinations) of a stranger, I am

obviously forward-looking in my concerns. I care about what will happen to that

person if deprived of her basic needs. Similarly, part of the reason I care about my

future suffering is that it will be me who suffers in the future. While the logical

importance of continuance (also called in the metaphysical literature, “persistence”)

is the common factor in both cases, there is a disanalogy between self and other

here. I can be temporally-neutral with respect to my own needs, that is, I can believe

that I have good reasons now to delay opportunities and gratifications to promote

the needs of my future self, because I am (or will be) that future-self. While my

current socialist-leaning inclinations might view the needs of a future bourgeois-me

as less than motivating, recognizing that it will be me makes some practical

difference in my life now. I might still delay certain gratifications to ensure that

some important needs are met for my future-self (especially when it comes to the

fitness and health of my body and brain-functions). When it comes to the stranger

whose needs I consider, I cannot say the same thing. The person I care about now

may transform so radically that I have little reason to care about or work to promote

her future. In the first case, there is a metaphysical relationship between me-now

and the needs of my future-self that makes a practical difference about what I

194

should care about, but in the second case, that continuity does not exist. Thus, I

cannot in any straightforward sense claim that the egoist is inconsistent in being

temporally neutral with respect to prudential reasons, but agent-relative with

respect to reasons for action overall (as Derek Parfit argues in Part I of Reasons and

Persons). Caring about an overall state of affairs, as is the case in agent-neutral

ethical systems, is substantively distinct from caring about the overall state of my

temporally stretched life.

One might counter that this asymmetry is not ethically relevant. Just because

I will not be Sally, but (trivially speaking) I will be myself, does not warrant ethically

privileging my needs over Sally’s. A description of the logic and metaphysics of

forward-looking agency does not necessarily entail a normative claim about who or

what one ought to privilege. However, I can counter by pointing out that the

strongest and most immediate reason to promote the needs of my future-self is that

my life is intrinsically worthwhile, and the future will be another stage of that

intrinsically worthwhile whole. If my life is intrinsically worthwhile to me now, then

I simply care about my well-being as whole. When considering this in terms of time,

there is no reason to favor one stage of that whole over another (I am, of course,

bracketing discussions about how quality of life determines its worthiness; I am

addressing the fact that we care that our lives have quality, and that normally our

lives are simply valuable to us, which is why suicide is rarely a flippant act, but

usually includes considerable conflict). But I do not have the same neutrality when it

comes to others, because, to some extent, their worth and well-being is conditional

in a way that my own is not. I can certainly feel shame when comparing my lifestyle

195

and choices now with the values and choices of my former self. Self-loathing may

reach such a pathological point that I consider or attempt suicide. But this is a much

more difficult prospect than damning a formerly respected friend who has become a

brutal and morally depraved leader (we can imagine what the Jewish art dealer, Max

Rothman must have felt when the eccentric Austrian artist he took under his wing

became the monstrous Fuhrer of Germany). I can more easily disregard the well-

being of a former friend who has now become a moral monster than I can disregard

my own well-being (moral monster or not). In other words, I require a reason of a

different order that justifies my caring about another’s well-being. However in my

own case, whatever adds to the case that I should care about my future, an essential

presupposition is fulfilled in advance, namely, that it will be my intrinsically

worthwhile future to care about. While this might not directly support the

conclusion that ethical egoism is a superior normative theory, it certainly provides

some support for the view that any other-regarding considerations I take seriously

are less authoritative than self-regarding and prudential reasons. Thus, any action

that promotes the needs of others at considerable expense to my own needs ought

to raise a serious red flag. When I understand myself in terms of being a continuant

self that is numerically distinct from all other selves, the worth of my own life shows

up to me in a way that it does not with respect to others, and this makes a practical

difference in considering who or what I ought to care about.

There are some objections to the picture I’ve developed here that I need to

consider, and in doing so I will make the controversial claim that ethical egoism is

not just a theory about ethics that denies the need for ethics; ethical egoism can be

196

construed as a contending ethical theory. The first objection is that one does not

have an ethical reason to care about one’s future, only a prudential reason. So, again,

it is of little concern to ethics that we value self-maintenance and well-being in a

qualitatively different way than we value the well-being of others. Now, if it were

true that prudential reasons are substantively distinct from ethical reasons (in the

sense that the former sorts of reasons have no bearing on what it makes ethical

sense to do), then it would seem that only other-regarding and non-prudential

reasons count as ethical reasons, which would mean that ethics may overlap with

but need not fundamentally include prudential reasons. But then, when considering

conflicts that arise due to the demandingness of ethical reasons, we would need to

arbitrate between two distinct domains, and it would be difficult to determine

which sorts of principles (neither prudential nor ethical) could mediate the dispute.

It’s better if the two sorts of reasons are more closely related. But I will elaborate on

this after addressing the second objection. The second, and closely related, objection

is that the claim that other-regarding considerations are somehow “derivative” of

prudential reasons is absurd. What would such a “derivation” even look like? More

importantly, if this were the case, then sacrificing one’s life would always be an

error. I do not believe that the primacy of prudential reasons would entail that self-

sacrifice is always an error, but I do believe that ethical egoism fails to provide a

convincing account of situations in which self-sacrifice serves absolutely no

prudential concerns. So the spirit of this objection is spot-on and damning for ethical

egoism. I will develop this further in the following section.

197

4.5.3 Motivating Ethical Egoism

Consider the following two statements:

(1) Over all, things will be better for me if I do X.

(2) Over all, the world will be better if I do Y.

The first is a self-regarding consideration, and the second is a consideration

for the greater good. We can modify (1), and state it this way:

(1)’ Over all, I will suffer less if I do X.

Qualifying this in terms of pleasure and pain (taking “suffer” in a narrow

sense) allows us to call this an egocentric-hedonistic consideration. Likewise, we can

modify (2), and state it this way:

(2)’ Over all, S will suffer less if I do X, and I am not S.

We can call this an other-centric consideration that can be agent-specific

(where S = an individual) or group-specific (where S = a group of individuals). Now

augment this other-centric formula as follows:

(3) S suffers less when I do X, and I believe I will suffer and things will be

worse for me overall if I do X.

This is now an altruistic consideration. In this case, I weigh the burden of

suffering more for the sake of others, without pursuing any ulterior self-regarding

goals.

The problem I’ve been examining throughout this essay has centered on

whether or not either the collection of egocentric considerations (1) and (1)’, or

non-egocentric considerations (2) and (2)’ and (3) possess some authority the other

lacks. One obvious position is that neither enjoys ultimate authority; rather, context

198

should determine whether it makes sense to suffer some amount for the greater

good or whether one should forgo considerations of the greater good to suffer less.

Likewise, in the case of altruistic considerations, context may dictate whether it is

reasonable to suffer for the sake of another without believing one will gain a

personal advantage by doing so. While altruistic considerations are a species of

other-centric considerations, problems that arise with considerations of the greater

good and problems that arise with altruistic considerations may be distinct. Suppose

I grab a stranger from the clutches of an angry dog, believing I will be considerably

mauled in the process, and believing that I have nothing to directly gain for myself

by doing so. I am in fact mauled, and in some description of the world, it would have

in fact been better for everyone that the stranger be mauled rather than me. In this

case, I am not sacrificing anything for the greater good, nor do I intend to sacrifice

anything for the greater good. But I am acting altruistically. So on what grounds

would it make sense to do such a thing? Can I only appeal to compassion,

conditioning, or sentimentality? If I do not believe that in any ultimate sense I hold a

privileged position in this world, then surely, I don’t imagine that this stranger holds

an ultimately privileged position. While it’s a tragedy he should suffer, it’s likewise a

tragedy that I should suffer. There seems to be no rational grounds for claiming that

I ought to act altruistically. I may in fact be conditioned or disposed to behave in

such a way, but that does not directly count as a rational justification for my

behavior, as I can be conditioned or disposed to act in any number of ways.

Why is this important for normative ethics? An ethical egoist may claim that

any action one takes ought to benefit oneself in some way. If we put things in terms

199

of “maximization,” an ethical egoist may claim that maximizing one’s own self-

interest (however we construe the latter) ought to have ultimate authority in

dictating what actions one ought to take. Consider the objection that a system

prioritizing prudential reasons is not an ethical system. It would follow that ethical

egoism can’t be a contending ethical theory, because it clearly prioritizes prudential

reasons above all else. We might view ethical egoism as a reactive position,

particularly with respect to agent-neutral systems like utilitarianism. These systems

claim that actions promoting the greater good of those relevantly affected are the

right actions to take. Reacting to this, the ethical egoist might simply claim that one

has a right to opt out of such sacrifices. But Kantian ethics—which would not

sanction treating a person as only a means for some larger good—makes a similar

claim, and Kantian ethics are surely not foundationally egocentric. So what sort of

claim is the ethical egoist trying to make? I suggest that we more charitably read the

egoist’s claim as a sincere, normative-ethical claim: one ought to favor states of

affairs in which one in some way does better for oneself. The “ought” must be a

moral “ought” rather than a prediction or description of what one would do (which

would conflate a psychological thesis with a substantive, normative-ethical thesis).19

19 This is a central problem that Korsgaard identifies with some confused, contemporary versions of egoism. The problem is that one might conflate what is supposed to be a minimalist view of practical rationality construed as purely instrumental reason—the view that in some broad sense we are always pursuing our own good (psychological egoism)—with the substantive, normative claim that we ought to pursue our own good. The purely descriptive claim is distinct from the prescriptive claim, and the latter is hardly self-evident, especially considering the complexity involved in ranking our own preferences. See, Christine M. Korsgaard, “The Myth of Egoism,” in Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, eds. Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 57-91.

200

Now, in a toss-up situation in which I can either rescue the other person at

considerable losses to myself (with no foreseeable material gains for myself), or I

can simply avoid the situation (and thereby gain the benefit of suffering less than

doing otherwise), I seem to have a strong intuitive reason to favor the latter. Given

that neither of us is ultimately privileged, and I have not, in advance, endorsed

utilitarianism, I can defer to intuition (which, ex hypothesi, favors prudence). My life

matters to me, and avoiding suffering whenever I reasonably can seems to be plain

common sense. In other words, agent-relative reasons seem more basic and more

intuitively palatable and motivational than agent-neutral reasons. Agent-relative

reasons may be construed as follows:

(AR): For any agent A (A ought to favor an uncentered state of affairs in

which A_____).

Agent-neutral reasons can be construed as follows:

(AN): For any agent A (A ought to favor the uncentered state of affairs W).

The first sort of reason includes A while the second is dictated by some state

of affairs that does not reflexively include A. Utilitarianism operates by agent-

neutral reasons. One way of defending altruistic actions is by appealing to an agent-

neutral utilitarian calculation in which one ought to do X, because it would serve the

greater good, and by doing X, one incurs considerable losses (with no long-term

material advantage gained for the agent by incurring such losses). So utilitarianism,

to some extent, requires the cultivation of an altruistic disposition. This virtuous

disposition would allow one to make the necessary personal sacrifices sometimes

needed for securing the greater good.

201

In response, an ethical egoist might provide some intuitive arguments that do

justice to our overwhelming concern for our individual well-being. First, our lives

matter to us in a viscerally personal way. Our own suffering matters to us in a

viscerally personal way, and we do not usually deliberate too deeply over whether

or not to avoid our own suffering; on the contrary, we require more convincing to

knowingly suffer for some cause or long-term goal. However, when it comes to

considering another’s suffering, that sort of immediacy is often lacking. My suffering

even a minor laceration by an angry dog is viscerally immediate in a way that the

mauling of a hundred thousand others will never be for me, and that is mostly

because I recognize and experience my own suffering directly, but when it comes to

another’s suffering, that is not the case. The egoist might claim that knowledge of

another’s suffering is derivative (in the sense of being indirect) rather than

foundational (in the sense of being immediate). One can never directly experience

another’s suffering, but at best, one can only imagine such suffering (however

vividly one might do so). In this way, empathy is instructive to the extent that it

allows one to envision what it might be like to suffer from another’s point of view.

So egoism honors the derivative nature of understanding another’s pain. Therefore,

motivational and epistemic asymmetry exists between one’s own and another’s

suffering, and egoism honors that asymmetry. Second, we do not want our

preferred ethical system to be overly demanding (“ought” implies reasonable

accommodation of our more stubbornly ingrained dispositions and ways of being).

So, motivationally speaking, egoism reasonably accommodates our commonsense

desire to avoid our own suffering and avoid ethical systems that are unpalatably

202

demanding. Finally, there may be irreducibly egocentric-hedonistic considerations

that can never harmonize with considerations for the greater good. In such cases,

one favors a state of affairs in which one suffers less, and favoring such a state of

affairs does not bring about a maximally better state of affairs (that is, it does not

serve the greater good). This means that there are powerfully motivated self-

regarding considerations that reveal a stubborn and unbridgeable divide between

egocentric-hedonistic and non-egocentric considerations. Say that I suffer from

amnesia from a terrible accident, and in the hospital, I come to know that KPM

rather than John Doe will suffer a terribly painful life-altering surgery. I reason that I

must either be KPM or JD. I will naturally prefer that I am JD. I usually do not need a

further reason for favoring a state of affairs in which I suffer less, but I do require

some further convincing to favor a state of affairs in which I suffer more (for an

individual or for the greater good). Ethical egoism honors these basic asymmetries;

it’s a practical system that tethers ethical sanctions and commissions to the intuition

that each of us matters to ourselves in a motivationally intense and basic way, and

sacrificing our individual well-being for another must in some way provide us with

an emotional, social, or value-driven pay-off that substantively includes our own

flourishing (or good or whatever). Ethical egoism may even provide a utilitarian-

leaning argument. The ethical egoist might claim that self-abnegation is a more

harmful social disposition to cultivate (with less optimal pay-offs for the greater

social good). She may argue that self-respect, in the form of prioritization of the

betterment of the self within the strictures of a functioning social framework,

requires mostly prioritizing self-regarding considerations. So, this is not a

203

philosophy of blind selfishness, but rather a philosophy of self-development, with

positive “trickle-down” ramifications for the social whole. Our libertarian friends

remind us that we gain more from the innovative spirit of self-possessed citizens

than we do from condescending welfare bureaucrats and emotionally impulsive

altruists: when the meek inherit the earth, they inherit a meek earth hindered by an

erosion of creative and innovative possibilities (we need only think of Mill and

Nietzsche, who provided some thinking in this direction).

Now, ethical egoism should not be conflated with psychological egoism, the

view that an agent is always motivated directly by self-interest. What it does claim is

that when one is in a toss-up situation, it requires more complex deliberation to

justify suffering for the sake of another than it does to justify protecting oneself

from avoidable suffering. It may be the case that I’m simply wired or conditioned to

engage in more other-centric and altruistic actions, and in this sense strong

psychological egoism is false; I’m certainly not always directly motivated by self-

regarding considerations. However, the ethical egoist may respond that: (1) the

world would be a better place if each individual mostly prioritized their own self-

interest within the strictures of a stable social order; (2) most of our common sense

moral judgments are consistent with egoism (that is, we can account for many of our

moral norms by appeal to self-interest pursuing social strategies for self-

flourishing); (3) given the strong weight of prudential reasons for action, ethical

egoism is not an overly demanding ethical theory that goes against the grain of the

human condition.

204

Now, consider the objection that ethical egoism entails that self-sacrifice is

always wrong. Say that I do myself considerable harm (and very nearly drown) to

save a drowning stranger. I’m not a lifeguard or medic or first-responder, just an

ordinary guy. The nuanced ethical egoist does not claim that it is always morally

wrong to act without directly furthering my self-interest (so that by risking my neck

for the drowning swimmer I’ve done something ethically bad, which would be a

ridiculous claim). She might argue that altruistic deeds have some conventional

nobility, and in some way further my social position and my personal interest

staked in being, say, a courageous hero. After all, the ethical egoist is not a

megalomaniac, and thus, an ordinary ethical egoist responds to and develops values

out of her socially-attuned and socially-situated nature. Of course, if my action is

strongly motivated by my personal vision of the good life, which includes being a

hero who pursues dangerous deeds, then the action is not purely other-centric. But

that’s fine, because we can at least provide a reason for pursuing an altruistic action

that would otherwise remain mysterious (or at very least, difficult to rationally

justify) without ignoring the evidence that people often do take such actions. This

need not be a case of psychological egoism, because the self-regarding

considerations that come with my personal vision of the good life are not always in

the forefront of my consciousness, nor did they need to be when I took the plunge.

However, at some point in my career as an agent, values that fulfill my self-

regarding concern for realizing the best life possible for me have conditioned my

dispositions, the motivations of which are now transparent. In this case, the ethical

egoist might claim that I’ve acted consistently with my vision of the good life, and

205

pursuing this daring deed makes my life qualitatively better (albeit at a considerable

quantitative risk).

However, one may object that this picture conflates prudential reasons with

ethical reasons. Surely the ethical egoist is not committed to believing that all

prudential reasons (and ultimately self-regarding reasons) are ethical reasons. To

avoid this embarrassing problem, the ethical egoist would have to claim that not all

first-order prudential reasons are ethical reasons, but insofar as there are ethical

reasons for doing things, they must in some way appeal to (or at very least provide a

structure for more adequately satisfying) prudential reasons. For example, I take

important time away from my family and my money-paying projects to help a

student struggling in my class. Whether the student does well will not in this context

make one bit of material difference to my life. My reasons for helping this person are

transparent—it just seems like the right thing to do (and not just because of my

normatively relevant social role as an instructor, for in this case, I believe I’ve

delivered amply on that front). But my now transparent disposition to help is a

function of social training, and a strong explanatory candidate for my taking to such

training (other than by direct force or threats) is that such character-dispositions

achieve some sort of personal pay-off for me in terms of the overall quality of my

life. This works well with the view that ethical reasons are ultimately grounded in

social conventions that in one way or another allow individuals to thrive in

communities by harmonizing their more immediate self-regarding reasons with

social goods that provide a relatively stable framework for satisfying such reasons.

In short, ethical reasons are grounded in larger, rational reasons for action. When

206

we distinguish between first-order and second-order reasons, we can avoid the

embarrassing conclusion that ethical reasons are only prudential reasons. The point

is that ethical reasons are derivative (in the sense of being explained and justified by

other sorts of reasons), and prudential reasons provide the justificatory soil out of

which ethical reasons emerge.

In terms of the stated objections previously considered, the ethical egoist can

say the following. First, prudential and ethical reasons are closely related, but not

identical. Ethical reasons have very little traction when too far removed from

prudential reasons, and if ethics is to be a rational enterprise, it must be grounded in

rational self-interest, which is socially-situated and sensitive to group dynamics.

Complex, second-order ethical reasons are far less mysterious when we recognize

how they ideally accommodate first-order prudential reasons. When the context

radically shifts, and the relationship between first-order prudential and second-

order ethical reasons is radically compromised, ethics becomes overly demanding

and irrational. So, while the two sorts of reason are not identical, ethical reasons

make rational sense by dovetailing out of prudential reasons. This explains why care

of the self takes on ethical tones, where the line between prudential self-

maintenance and ethical obligation can become fuzzy if not overlapping.

Second, ethical egoism can be an ethical system to the extent that it

sufficiently accommodates our intuitive moral judgments (not to steal, lie, murder,

etc.). Like all candidates for a good theory, it must convincingly explain the evidence

(in this case, common moral judgments and their properties). Ethical egoism claims

that prioritizing self-interest provides a credible principle from which to justify

207

other-regarding considerations. When all goes well, other-regarding considerations

advance long-term self-interest and quality of life for the individual.

Ultimately, I disagree with this account. However, the ethical egoist might

argue that reciprocity and cooperation, and the sense of obligation to fulfill one’s

roles in such relationships, works on an egoistic foundation, because it suits one’s

prudential interest to cooperate. Acting as if your needs have independent (or

intrinsically valid) worth ultimately serves my long-term self-interest. Ethical

egoism claims that it is right that we prioritize long-term interest, and that we ought

to do so. Randian thinking would even claim that the world is better for such

thinking. Thus, ethical egoism should not be confused for “blind egoism,” or,

narcissistic megalomania, which would not count as an ethical theory at all.

Moreover, the ethical egoist does not necessarily conflate her normative system

with psychological egoism, but the system is certainly consistent with and

buttressed by the psychological claim. If we were fundamentally motivated to

prioritize self-interest above all other concerns (which Butler and others have

shown us is conceptually problematic and empirically false), then ethical egoism is a

better explanatory, empirical theory about what constitutes a morally good action.

Therefore, ethical egoism is not an a-moral theory. However, it may be a bad theory.

Finally, in terms of self-sacrifice always being an error, the ethical egoist may

claim that an individual might rationally develop character traits that value risk and

danger, which are always premised on the possibility of loss, severe harm, or even

death. These become transparent values that in some way improve the quality of the

said individual’s life. So “self-sacrifice” is extreme risk that from a third-person

208

perspective is describable as sacrifice, but is only the outcome of a gambler suffering

the ultimate loss. But I find this to be a weak response, since we have plenty of

empirical examples of parents and loved ones directly sacrificing their lives for their

nearest and dearest (where the only risk involved is in whether the sacrifice actually

serves its purpose of saving the child or loved one). And, more importantly, we have

empirical examples of individuals directly sacrificing their lives for complete

strangers (where bias for loved ones falls from the equation). But the problem is

that while not all acts of apparent self-sacrifice are always bad, the egoist seems to

be committed to at least some of them being bad, and it is absurd to claim that these

bad cases are premised on whether the sacrifice promotes the quality of the

sacrificer’s life. If it is part of the sacrificer’s vision of the good life, then unless the

egoist can show that this vision always serves the sacrificer in some substantive

way, what we have here is a genuinely other-centric concern that values the overall

state of things rather than just one’s own individual plight. Moreover, ethical egoism

would radically part with the commonsense view that when, say, an adult occupant

of an Aleppo apartment, which is under a bombing siege, rescues a stranger’s child

from the apartment, knowing that it will most likely cost her own life, her action is

not morally praiseworthy. The staunch egoist must view this as either a morally

blameworthy act, or an instance of calculated risk that went wrong. Both

alternatives seem intuitively absurd. I believe that this is a damning objection to the

theory. Nevertheless, if the ethical egoist simply bites the bullet on acts of self-

sacrifice, we might provide a counter-argument that strikes at the core of the

theory’s metaphysical presuppositions.

209

4.5.4 A Rationally Reconstructed Buddhist Response

This is where the Buddhist might claim that the No-Self view has important

ethical implications. She might claim that seeing through the illusion of a perduring

ego removes the basic asymmetry that drives one to endorse the egocentric

conclusion. Strictly speaking, a psychophysical stream accounts for the individuality

that one believes is “owned” by one’s ego, or, “I-maker” (ahaṅkara). But the ego is

only illusorily permanent; it is nothing but the sort of fleeting perceptions that

Hume saw when he tried to introspectively verify the existence of a single and

perduring self. For the Buddhists, the belief that one owns one’s mental and physical

states is an error resulting from the ego’s belief that it is a permanent and fixed

being underlying the career of the self. So perhaps the asymmetry dissolves with the

experientially and conceptually recognized dissolution of ego-ownership. Now, if

one claims that this dissolution might dissolve any reason one has whatsoever to

care about anyone’s future (the “extreme,” moral-nihilism claim), we might employ

something like Siderits’s argument (see chapter 2 for the argument Siderits has

developed in reconstructing Śāntideva’s work). No one, strictly speaking, owns the

stream of psychophysical events. Although ownership is an illusion, suffering, and

its ethically-negative valence, is not. Thus, if a mandate exists to thwart needless

pain-and-suffering events, it must operate over the whole of sentient fields of

suffering, because no one can really claim ownership over a particular stream. With

this argument, altruism becomes a basic mandate only (seemingly) trumped by

practical and pragmatic considerations. For example, it may be most expedient in

some instances to reduce the overall sum of suffering by privileging “my own”

210

suffering at the expense of another’s. However, the general mandate operates in a

utilitarian-teleological fashion, and only justifies privileging oneself toward the end

of reducing the overall sum of suffering.

I addressed rebuttals and counter-rebuttals to this line of argument in

chapter 2. But the most damning problem I see here is that it’s not so clear that a

“general mandate” to thwart suffering makes any sense when we dissolve

ownership of suffering. Arguably, suffering is not the sort of thing that just hangs

there, and even if it does, it’s not clear how and why it’s so bad when it’s not

connected to the very real deprivation and anguish of an individual with a very real

history and future that she cares about. In other words, the sort of existential

anguish Buddhists seek to liberate us from, is articulated in the complex and

concrete conventional relationships of transactional human existence. When we

view things from the ownerless, ultimate perspective, we lose sight of the meaning

of “suffering and anguish.” These terrible experiences emerge in a meaningful , social

whole, and without viewing things from the perspective of our conventional

identities, suffering loses its ethically-relevant valence. If Vasubandhu or Śāntideva

want to argue that ownership and selfhood are not necessary to make sense of pain

and suffering, they still should show how, from the ultimate perspective, any sort of

deontic claims can be made about such suffering. They may argue that it’s a natural

facet (svabhāva) of suffering that “it ought to be thwarted.” But for Śāntideva, the

Mādhyamika, it’s hard to understand what that would mean, since the premise of his

Buddhist philosophy is the Nāgārjunian view that nothing whatsoever has an

intrinsic nature (niṣvabhāva). Now, if it’s convention that determines our normative-

211

ethical relationship to pain and suffering, then why not just claim that it’s

convention that produces asymmetry between self-regarding and other-regarding

considerations, the very asymmetry needed in a defense of egocentric privileging?

This is the “cherry-picking” problem I highlighted in chapter 2 (see Harris’s

argument). The fact is, both Vasubandhu and Śāntideva will have to appeal to

convention to win us back ethical relationships and normativity, and unless we

provide a creative spin on “otherness” (the sort I developed in chapter 3), it’s hard

to see how the claim that there is no self provides us with a normative-ethical

justification for altruism. Moreover, the Buddhist would also have to appeal to

convention to make sense of any practical (or purely rational) principles for

justifying altruism.

While I’m obviously amenable to the view of otherness that I spun in chapter

3, I believe it has some serious shortcomings. If this is the case, then I’ve just about

spun-out on forging a directly practical link between the No-Self thesis in Buddhism

and any sort of normative grip that altruistic action may hold over us. I will now

explain where I believe these shortcomings lie.

In chapter 3, I argued that Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, understood as

deflationary minimalism, is not commited to the belief in a perduring self, nor is it

committed to Bundle-theory metaphysics. Bundle-theory, in one way or another,

reduces the appearance of selfhood to a real stream of metaphysically individuated

psychophysical events. However, I tried to defend other possibilities for the

Buddhist philosopher by spinning a sort of mash-up of contemporary No-Self

theories of mind and selfhood with Abhidharma-Buddhist metaphysics. The latter

212

believes that the concept of self erroneously appears over the interplay of real

atomic psychophysical phenomena, and I claimed that, nuanced in the right way, we

might develop an ethics of otherness that builds responsibility for others out of a

revision of self-regarding and forward-looking concerns. I nuanced this by

appropriating basic elements from the well-developed post-modern discussion of

“otherness.” The idea was that even at the core of our most personal and egocentric

concerns, we experience responsibility toward an “other” that we ourselves are (in

an attenuated sense). Nevertheless, both Bundle-theories and Abhidharma

metaphysics have practical weaknesses. For example, even if we can individuate

streams of consciousness by appeal to either a physical body, or a collection of

psychophysical phenomena forged through unique dependency relations (in the

case of Abhidharma metaphysics and Parfitian Bundle-theories), the responsibility

we have toward various dimensions and temporal stretches of this stream remain

ambiguous at best, and grossly under-determined at worst. This motivated me to

bring Madhyamaka irrealism into the mix. Madhyamaka can provide a more praxis-

driven gloss on the notion of “otherness,” because it eschews metaphysics

altogether, while deconstructing realist and essentialist discourse. So in a sense it

promotes conventionalist-pragmatic discourse that speaks directly to the field of

practical relationships and convention-driven actions. Madhyamaka Buddhism adds

two important possibilities to “solving” the problem of justifying altruism. First,

Madhyamaka focuses on the lived experience of seeing our future and past selves as

both the same and other. I made a case for how this works in Śāntideva's text. This

“sameness” is not something metaphysically identical, nor is it grounded in a

213

physicalist commitment to enduring bodies; it is, rather, the capacity to appropriate

(upādāna), or, more literally, “be fueled by” what is always experienced as other,

and thus to feel a responsiveness, and consequently a responsibility toward what is

other. This underlies our sense of unity (sameness) with otherness. We learn to

relate to and “own” this otherness through appropriative identification. In this way,

I’ve clearly stepped outside the post-modern, or, Levinasian discussion of otherness,

because I’m actually trying to bridge the gap between sameness and otherness—

something the extraordinary and irreducible “Other” in Levinas would never allow.

However, in another sense, I’m in step with that conversation, because I’m trying to

respect the inscrutability and distinctness of the other, by holding identification and

distinction in a productive and yet never fully-resolved tension. What I wanted to

add to this picture is that appropriative identification does not entail that when I

consider this future surrogate, and believe that it is other than me now, I completely

overcome the sense of separateness and distance in a blissful “oneness.” The

argument of chapter 3 sees this appropriative identification—this collapsing of the

gap between self and other—as one forged through an ethical commitment to caring

for the other (who is our future-surrogate) as one’s own, and caring for the other as

one worthy to be cared for. This means that distinctness and sameness must be

gripped in a productive tension that is never fully resolved. So caring about oneself

is instructive in caring about the other. This would do some contemporary justice to

the Buddhist connection between no-selfhood and ethics.

The second facet Madhyamaka brings to the table is that not committing to

any real base of individuation (see chapter 2), and endorsing deconstruction in the

214

practical way I developed in chapter 3, helps unravel a quite natural view that often

impedes us from acting beyond our own egoistic inclinations: it deconstructs the

self/other dichotomy, and shows us that no knock-down metaphysical reasons

prevent us from acting altruistically, and no knock-down metaphysical reasons

ultimately support the view that altruistic reasons are less fundamental than

egocentric concerns. Madhyamaka can do this because it is not commited to either a

physicalist base of individuation (a real and metaphysically distinct body), nor is it

commited to real ownership, since it eschews the belief that any sort of intrinsically

existing phenomena constitutes a metaphysically distinct stream (saṅtāna).20

According to this view, “mineness” is a conceptual fabrication built out of

appropriation, which then attempts to ground this concept in deep metaphysical

structures. Thus, while no knock-down arguments prove that we must take the

other into ethical consideration, the minimalist and anti-metaphysical approach of

Madhyamaka helps tear down the barriers between self and other that seem to

motivate the natural inclination toward egoism. To this point, I argued that no

metaphysical barriers prevent us from being altruistically concerned with all

suffering. Thus, Madhyamaka clears a space for far-reaching altruistic concern by

undermining some of the usual appeals that motivate egoism. By embracing

“otherness” in the way I nuanced it in chapter 3, we can argue that our actions are

always-already responsive to what is “other.”

But there are several problems with this approach. First, this negative point

is non-implicational. If I say that nothing prevents me from being unselfish, this does 20 “The continuum of consciousness [saṅtāna], like a queue, and the combination of constituents [samudāya], like an army, are not real [mṛṣā—‘fiction’]” (BCA, 8:101).

215

not mean that anything necessarily motivates me to be altruistic. For example, I may

claim that the flower does not smell bad, but this does not necessarily imply that it

smells good (it may smell bland or neutral or like nothing at all to me). So the

challenge is to show how not only the barriers come down, but also how a positive

altruistic motivation can grip us and guide our actions in a way that reaches the

power of an ethical command.

Second, I claimed that at the core of experience there is a sense of personal

responsibility toward what is other, and that when we tear down the metaphysical

barrier between self and other, and see all action extending out toward what is “not

me” (and, “me” in an attenuated and appropriative sense) our sense of responsibility

can mature and cast itself wide enough to conceptually encompass everyone. These

far-reaching considerations resonate with the agent-neutral sensibility informing

utilitarianism. But here’s the problem with this. While I can view myself as other in

the way I described in chapter 3, this implies that either: (a) I maintain a robust

personal bond with this other, or, (b) I experience depersonalization. The latter

means that I lose my bond with this other, and thus it remains mysterious why I

experience any responsibility. So I have overplayed my hand by conflating

“responsiveness” and “responsibility,” especially when the later term carries a

normative-ethical weight that the former does not. However, if I maintain a personal

bond as stated in (a), I can argue that this “other” is never fully other. Or, put

another way, there is a difference in the bond I have with my surrogate and those

thin bonds I have with strangers and acquaintances that surround me now. So,

there’s still the possibility that a metaphysical ground for ethically privileging some

216

relationships over others, like the one I have with my surrogate-self, remains intact.

One may argue further that the best explanation for the sense of responsibility I

have for my surrogate-heir lies in identifying with this other. If I fully identify with

this future person as myself rather than as a surrogate, then I have an ordinary, self-

regarding and prudential concern. Yes, things are attenuated, because I may not

believe that deep metaphysical bonds connect me to this future person. However,

something (conventional?) still makes this person especially relevant to me-now in

a way that it does not with any other person. Granted, my relationship to this future

person is also thin and abstract, but a good reason for caring about this future

person is that he is, practically speaking, me. While I do, paradoxically, identify with

and yet distance myself from this other-me, I can simply view this distance as a

temporal issue. For example, an endurantist about time—someone who believes

that all time is dimensionally present—may embrace a four-dimensional view of

time, which is par for the course in Einstein’s Relativity. Thus, the endurantist may

claim that the temporal distance between me-now and future-me does not mean

that future-me is metaphysically distinct from me-now. The properties of future-me,

like my receding hair-line and my growing tummy, are temporal parts of the whole

of me, and future-me is only thinly related to me-now from the vantage point of the

spotlight shining on this part of the block universe, the part I call, “now.” So, I have

not really treated myself as metaphysically other. Future-me is only a temporally

distinct but metaphysically non-distinct version of me. Therefore, I contest that the

Buddhist-hybrid picture I developed in chapter 3 ultimately fails to cogently explain

217

how I take up another’s cause as my own, and how I come to view and feel this

action as an ethical requirement.

However, the one element I’d like to preserve from chapter 3 is the claim that

when all things go well, responsibility towards others resonates at the core of our

lived experience. I do not believe we learn to care about others from scratch.

However, barring congenital psychopathy, and sociopathology developed out of

early childhood trauma, we do learn how to extend our narrow frame of other-

regarding concerns (say, an infant’s focused concern for her caretaker) to

encompass ever larger fields of fellow humans and non-human creatures. That is,

we can learn to more widely generalize our inherent sense of concern and

responsibility to others, particularly when we recognize that we are imbued—in

adopting values and meaningful goals—by a network of interdependent others.

Thus, I want to argue the following. The No-Self views of the Buddhists I’ve

drawn from do not adequately account for what we mean by “selves.” Herein lies the

ethical problem. I believe that a more appealing model of what constitutes selfhood

is ineluctably bound up with normative phenomena that makes better sense of the

normative grip altruistic actions can hold over us. Obviously, then, I believe that

altruistic action often does have normative grip. But altruism can also be viewed as

supererogation. Phenomenologically speaking, we can say that altruism exercises

our unique capacity to feel “whole” and “full” enough to give beyond what might be

socially required of us. So we can think altruism in terms of ethical duty, and we can

think altruism in terms of moral psychology—compassion and identification—and,

218

finally, we can think altruism in terms of supererogation.21 Another possibility lies

in thinking altruism out of metaphysics, a point I will devote a section to by

assessing the role of compassion in the Mahāyāna-Vijñānavāda (or citamātra)

school of Buddhist idealism—a school I have not treated yet in this work—

specifically, the work of the Buddhist scholastic, Dharmakīrti, and the critique of his

school by the Kashmiri Advaita-Śaivist, Abhinavagupta. For the latter, altruism is

made possible by a monistic metaphysics and soteriology of recognition and

identification with the universal self. This self is an infinitely creative energy that

emanates into an individuated reality. Abhinavagupta and his lineage refer to this

as, “Śiva.” Although capable of individuation, the self remains ultimately whole, and

inherently imbued with will (icchā) and cognition that is self-manifesting

(svaprakāśa) and self-conscious (svasaṃvedana). Full recognition of the empirical

self as the universal self presumably reveals the inherent “bliss” (ānanda) and

“fullness” (pūrṇatva) that also characterizes the playful creativity of this dynamic

and self-manifesting force. This recognition generates altruistic concern for the

other. While the Śaivists believe that full self-recognition (identification with the

universal self) transcends the ethical domain of “duty” (dharma) and “negligence of

duty” (adharma), the enlightened Śaivic sage still is motivated to devote his work

and energy to others without any ulterior, self-regarding motivations. In other

words, he engages philosophy and rational theology solely for the sake of helping

others achieve recognition of their identity in the universal self. While the 21 These are conceptual possibilities, and in forthcoming work, I will more thoroughly distinguish the altruistic act from things like favors and acts of kindness, of which “gift-giving” may be one. The latter do not bear the ethical weight that altruism does.

219

enlightened, ultimate perspective may transcend many conventional ethical

standards, the will remains operative (indeed, it is a fundamental aspect of the

universal self). In this extraordinary state, the will is directed toward helping others,

because the philosopher-sage who has secured identification with Śiva is “complete”

or “full,” and thus not driven by self-regarding desires associated with an embodied

and historical existence that is radically individuated. At this level, egoism is simply

empty of meaning.22 But the main upshot that I am introducing is this: clarifying (or

re-cognizing) this union with general selfhood provides us with a metaphysics that

makes sense of how we can be compelled and compassionately motivated through

empathic channels to behave altruistically. The idea here is that we are not

metaphysically cut off from one another, and our emotional connectedness is not

just a matter of thoughtful inference.

I will draw from Abhinavagupta’s metaphysical account of selfhood to

develop the metaphysics of aspectual, mereological holism, which I believe can

provide a promising account of the felt experience of obligation (and altruistic

motivation) that comes with recognizing oneself in terms of a larger and dynamic

whole. As far as metaphysics goes, there are important concepts the Śaivite

introduces that fill motivational and epistemic gaps in the Buddhist and naïve realist

accounts. To best develop this view, I’ll need to assess its foil (pūrvapakṣa), that is, 22 See Isabelle Ratié, “Remarks on Compassion and Altruism in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 37, Issue 4, 2009: 349-366. In reference to Abhinava’s interpretation of Utpaladeva, she writes: “Because the essence of consciousness is a subtle dynamism of which will or desire (icchā) is the first manifestation, the subject who escapes the bondage of individuality does not cease to have any will; but his will is exclusively turned toward others—it cannot be selfish, given the completeness or the fullness (pūrṇatva) that the liberated subject has acquired by recovering a full awareness of himself” (355).

220

the idealism and momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda) views endorsed by

Dharmakīrti. By “momentariness,” I am referring to the belief that reality is

cinematically made up of self-manifesting and ephemeral point-instances, or,

property-tropes. These property-tropes, according to Dharmakīrti, underlie the

illusion of continuity.

Again, the challenge is to show how not only the barriers between self and

other come down, but also how a positive altruistic motivation can grip us and guide

our actions in a way that reaches the power of a felt, ethical command. I want to

address the challenge in two directions. The first, I’ve already dealt with: the

normative self emerges in a relational social-space, and thereby, integrates its

practical identity through its higher-order, “participant” volitions. The second and

more robust solution requires a metaphysical account, where as one aspect, the self

remains individuated and distinct, but under another aspect, the self shares in a

more general experience of selfhood. So, in the next section, I will assess

Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics and Abhinavagupta’s critical engagement with them.

4.6 Momentariness and the Problem of Other Persons in Dharmakīrti: an

Advaita-Śaivite Response

How am I able to distinguish a non-sentient object from a conscious subject

(pramātṛ)? I can reasonably infer that creatures exhibiting the same types of

publicly observable traits as I do possess consciousness, and those with whom I can

converse probably have first-person experiences and a sense of self. Stones and

laptops do not look like me, nor do they behave like me. And most living things, like

trees and weeds, do not exhibit agency; so they probably do not experience

221

anything. But what does it mean to “exhibit agency?” Perhaps “agency” refers to the

self-directed action of complex language-users making various commitments and

promises within a conditioned, causal order. Or, it may be enough to call someone

an agent who exhibits characteristic behaviors that, like my dog’s behaviors, reveal

some sense of flexible responsiveness, emotional aptitude, and sensory-motor

integration. How, then, do I perceive someone’s agency?

As a start to answering some of these big questions, I begin with a manifest

fact: stones, laptops, trees, and dogs do not appear to be extensions of my own mind.

Even in a simulated or dream world, I view myself as one among many external

objects, which means that I inherently employ a general concept of otherness

(paratva). Otherness shows up in my experience of a distinct object, a mere “it.” But

otherness also shows up in my experience of other conscious beings, which I

designate with personal pronouns.

I also experience the immediate presence of perceptual objects, and by that, I

mean everyday things like desks and mounting piles of paperwork. While I can

attest for this immediate experience of presence in my own case, I cannot do so for

you. As Wittgenstein humorously put things, I might believe that I have a beetle in

my own box (or a private and conscious experience in my own head), but I can only

tenuously infer that another body houses or generates private experiences. What’s

worse, I cannot be sure that conscious experience necessarily requires a body at all,

especially since my body can sometimes show up as just another object in a way

that my occurrent, first-person experience cannot. While one thought may become

part of the content of another thought—as in the case of deliberation and memory—

222

the experience of presence, itself, is not the sort of thing that is publicly observable.

Nor, do I believe, is it introspectively observable; “presence” is already in play from

the moment I turn my attention inward. Therefore, consciousness does not show up

as a thing among other observable things. It’s not as though I can definitively claim

that my wife is conscious in the morning just because her eyes open. Still, I see her

eyes open, and I know that she is conscious. This seems to me a small miracle!

Unconvinced that consciousness and subjectivity emerge from something

purely inert, and unconvinced that it makes sense to believe that objects exist

outside the minds that cognize them, Buddhist-idealists (Vijñānavādins) advanced a

host of arguments attacking external-world realism and materialism. Their basic

argument is that any X and Y that are invariably concomitant cannot be

metaphysically distinct. An object of consciousness cannot be viewed as an

independent object outside of some sensory experience of that object: wherever

there is an experience of the harvest moon, the conscious experience always

accompanies the perceptual object. These Buddhists capitalize on the fact that it

makes little sense to say that there can be “something out there” that we are unable

to perceive under any sensory contexts or modalities, which strict independence

between objects and subjects would logically, although not necessarily materially,

seem to entail. Cogent or not, I do not intend to elucidate the host of idealist

arguments advanced by various citamātra, or, “mind-only” Buddhist philosophers.

Instead, I wish to focus on the shape the problem of otherness takes within the

framework of Buddhist idealism. At stake for the Mahāyāna Buddhist, among other

things, is the very coherence of compassion and altruism: without a coherent

223

account of otherness, Buddhists struggle to provide a compelling account of other-

centric motivations.

The representationalist model of perception that Sautrāntika Buddhists23

advanced left a gap for idealist arguments of the Yogācāra, Mind-Only and

Vijñānavāda schools.24 For the Sautrāntika, we do not directly see the objects that

support our perceptions. All perception is mediated. Along with the idealists, they

believe that an intentional object of consciousness is the product of that very

consciousness. Thus, we are only conversant with our ideas of objects, and we must

infer an external support (ālambana) for these representations. Still, Sautrāntikas

remain realists about external objects. This school posits the existence of external-

world objects through inference (bāhyārthānumeyavāda). But if this inference is

shown to be weak, then we’re left with only the objects of our own consciousness, a

point that drives all species of idealism. The Sautrāntika philosophers argue that

Vijñānavāda idealism is incoherent, because our perceptions represent multiple and

qualitatively diverse objects. However, according to these same philosophers,

consciousness is not multiple and qualitatively diverse, but simply a singular

capacity to illuminate and represent (or take the mold of) what is diverse: the light

is singular, but the objects that shine under its illumination are diverse. Thus,

consciousness and the objects of consciousness cannot be equivalent since they bear

distinct essential properties.

23 This refers to the school of “sūtra followers,” or, Abhidharma-Buddhist metaphysicians. 24 For the sake of simplicity, I conflate the various strands of these idealist schools.

224

The idealist can respond that “the awakening of residual traces”

(vāsanāprabodha) from past lives, or, beginningless streams of consciousness, can

account for the variety of perceptions. These traces are somehow “reawakened” in

the flow of insulated and singular cognitions. We do not need to appeal to external

objects, because the mind-stream that accounts for the image of diverse things bears

residual traces of experiences, or, “seeds” (bīja) by which it generates an on-going

experience of diversity. Poetically, we can say that consciousness dresses its

experience in a perfume (vāsanā) of residual traces (vāsanā). For the Buddhist-

idealist, the belief that objects are external to the mind is ultimately false, and we

see this layered into the very definition of a “vāsanā,” by the fact that the term may

also designate false perceptions and images.

Now, as realists about the external world, we can try to corner the idealist by

asking what accounts for the variety of vāsanās. The idealist seems to regressively

push the problem back: diversity, itself, is the very thing that needs to be explained.

Nevertheless, for the Vijñānavādin, the stream over which we erroneously develop

the belief in an enduring self is not a psychophysical stream. The saṅtāna (the

streaming of isolated, but associated cognitions that we erroneously reify) is

nothing but a series of momentary cognitions, or, ephemeral point-instances of

consciousness. These give rise to new cognitions in a cinematic emergence of

conscious moments. In contemporary metaphysics, we would call these property-

tropes, or, instances of properties unbounded by an underlying or continuous

225

substance. Contemporary Stage-theory metaphysics25 also parallels this by

advancing the view that reality unfolds cinematically and episodically rather than

continuously.26 For Dharmakīrti and the Buddhists, this sort of metaphysics is

consistent with the Buddha’s message that there is no underlying self-substance

(ātman), and everything is, quite literally, impermanent (anitya). The subject

(pramātṛ) is not an enduring metaphysical entity, but a conceptual error (vikalpa) of

the imagination that arises out of these ephemeral cognitions. For Dharmakīrti, all

cognitions are self-reflexively aware (svasaṃvedana), and this partly explains how

we develop the false belief that a self endures through multiple cognitions.27

Cognizing X also means at the same time cognizing the cognition of X. The immersive

first-person cognition that ensues retains the seed-like trace of its ephemeral

predecessor, but the X that it sees is not really separate from the self-generating and

self-reflexive point-instance. As Ratié puts it, for the Vijñānavādin, “the objects

perceived by the subject have no existence outside of the cognitive series, objectivity

is nothing but a cognitive event in which consciousness presents itself as external.”28

The world is a pure externalization of the mind, which is impermanent, something

dying and being re-born in self-manifesting and ephemeral point-instances. So, my

25 See Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 26 For Stage-theorists like Hawley, this view can solve various identity problems we encounter in thought experiments like the Ship of Theseus. 27 On svaprakāśa (self-luminosity) and svasaṃvedana (reflexive, self-consciousness), see Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu I: 10: sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam: “All cognitions and all mental phenomena are self-conscious.” Cited in manuscript of Dharmottara’s commentary, Nyāyabinduṭīka (see bibliography), cited in Ratié, 321. 28 Ratié, Otherness, 320.

226

seeing anything is just an ephemeral cognition that sees itself externalized as a

distinct object while seeing that very seeing.

But if this is true, then the Buddhist must show how other selves show up to a

self-illuminated and self-manifesting episode of consciousness. Even if the Buddhist

bites the bullet and accepts solipsism, he fairs no better in making sense of the

experience, or, sense of an external subject. Dharmakīrti’s endorsement of

svasaṃvedana seems to dig him into this hole. A self-manifested cognition cannot be

grasped by another cognition, because it would cease to be self-manifested, and

become a mere object for another. However, the appearance of a subject who has

self-illuminating cognitions cannot just show up as a mere object for the obvious

reason that we lose the subjectivity of the subject; we reify and objectify the self-

subject that was allegedly perceived. So by Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics, I cannot

account for your immediate presence of experience, that is, your sense of selfhood,

because I cannot come into direct contact with you.29

This is potentially damning to his larger project, because the ethics of

compassion and altruism must preserve the integrity of other persons. But perhaps

this is only a superficial problem. We might explain being motivated by another’s

suffering through indirect apprehension of their pain. However, admitting that

something exists externally to consciousness—like other streaming minds that

project a reality—defeats the very premise of Buddhist idealism, namely, that we

29 Ratiér, Otherness, 321: “Because cognition has this self-manifesting power as its characteristic, no given cognition can be manifested or grasped by another cognition, otherwise it would cease to be a cognition and become a mere object of cognition, which means that I can never take as objects of my consciousness someone else’s cognitions.”

227

cannot ultimately distinguish between the subject who is conscious and the object

that only appears to exist externally to that consciousness. Why it should be

different with respect to the otherness of other subjects, even if they are reduced to

mere streams of associated and isolated cognitions, is not clear. The bigger problem

that arises is that not being able to distinguish other streaming minds from this

streaming mind that I erroneously call “myself” undermines my capacity to

distinguish minds from mere objects. At stake is my capacity to make sense of even

a general notion of “otherness,” since the boundary between mind and intentional

object collapses altogether.30 Thus, the logic of this form of idealism threatens to

undermine any normative grip that commands the Buddhist to cultivate impartial

compassion for all sentient and suffering creatures. Duties notwithstanding, this

brand of metaphysics also destabilizes the motivational rationality of the felt

concern for another’s pain.

As a solution, Dharmakīrti bites the bullet on directly knowing other minds.

He believes that we simply infer their existence, and so, we never directly know

others.31 The best that we can derive is a general concept of otherness. In claiming

this, Dharmakīrti puts his finger on an enduring problem. There is no instrument of

knowledge (pramāṇa) that provides us with direct perception (pratyakṣa) of other

30 Ratiér, Otherness, 321: “The Vijñānavādin fails to account for otherness because the others [who are other persons] cannot be ontologically distinguished from mere objects.” 31 Ratiér, Otherness, 324, who cites Stcherbastsky’s translation of Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi (“Proof of the Existent-Streams of Others”), sūtra 72: “General concept [of other mind] is not identical with other mind itself. If it were so, we would have cognized the form of other mind as clearly as that of our own.”

228

selves. The best that we have at our disposal is inference.32 The ethical problem that

I see here is that your need may become a concern for my altruistic sensibility, but I

cannot ultimately establish its authorship (so long as the inference proves tenuous):

I cannot know how (and if) you motivate me. I cannot know how the purported

experiences of your mind have any direct bearing on my motivations, nor can I

know how it makes sense to feel that your well-being is intrinsically valuable. We

see a similar problem in epistemological skepticism: if I cannot provide a clear and

unwavering account of how I acquired my belief (in the “right way”) a wedge is left

open for skepticism.33

The argument from inference does not seem to work in Dharmakīrti’s brand

of idealism, and, even worse, it leaves Dharmakīrti unable to account for

otherness.34 My goal is to show how the monistic-idealism of Abhinavagupta

provides a cogent critique of the inference-strategy, while offering a new avenue for

32 Buddhist epistemology since Dharmakīrti (and his predecessor, Digṅaga) only accepts two pramāṇas (knowledge-producing instruments): direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Of the latter, there are inferences made from causal associations (kārya-hetu), where X is seen to be the cause of Y appearing (e.g., fire being the cause of smoke arising), and svabhāva-hetu, where the nature of X, once clarified, includes Y (something like an analytic claim). A valid inference must have, among other things, a statement of invariable concomitance, where X is found to follow Y, and where the contraposition (vyaterika) also holds: ~X is found to follow from ~Y. For an excellent analysis of Dharmakīrtian inference and general problems in Indian logic, see: B.K. Matilal, The Character of Indian Logic (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): chapter 5. 33 This, of course, lies at the heart of naturalized epistemology, which emerges as an answer to the “justified, true belief” account of knowledge that Gettier problems destabilize. 34 Ratié has provided a detailed and cogent argument addressing that point through her analysis of the Sautrāntika-Buddhist “externalists,” and Abhinavagupta’s commentaries on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and its auto-commentaries. See, fn. 2 above.

229

“reading other’s emotions.”35 This new avenue fills what I believe is a basic

epistemological and motivational gap in the purely normative account.

4.7.1 The Problem of Inferring Other Minds, and the Possibility of Sharing a

World

Dharmakīrti’s inference works like this. He experiences the action of speech

to be invariably concomitant (vyāpta) with a desire that causes him to say or have

the thought, “I want to speak.” This concomitance is of the kārya-hetu variety. In

other words, Dharmakīrti believes that the desire enters into the causal history of

the speech-act (or propositional thought); so, whenever the desire is absent, the

propositional thought that can issue in speech is also absent. This insight can now

serve as a generalizable premise in an inference. Devadatta speaks. Devadatta does

not suffer from Tourette syndrome. Where there’s an absence of desire (or some

relevant mental state), there’s an absence of speech, and where there’s an absence

of a thought that can issue in speech, there’s an absence of desire (or whatever

relevant mental state). Thus, Devadatta desires to speak. Unlike a stone or a lap-top,

Devadatta is a mental stream.

But how does Dharmakīrti know that Devadatta is not just another product

of his own mental stream? Well, that’s easy. He never experiences the relevant

mental state that directly motivates Devadatta to say, “Hey, it’s me…Devadatta, and I

want to be heard!” However, when Dharmakīrti speaks, he does experience the

35Arindam Chakrabarti crafts much of this strategy. However, he does not directly connect this to the weakness of a purely normative account of altruistic reasons and selfhood. See Chakrabarti, “How Do We Read Others’ Feelings? Strawson and Zhuangzi Speak to Dharmakirti, Ratnakīrti and Abhinavagupta” in Comparative Philosophy Without Borders (Bloomsbury Academic Publishers, 2015), Chapter 5.

230

relevant mental state underwriting his own thought. Furthermore, he cannot make

sense of that mental state unless it is directed toward an audience of whom he

wishes to be heard. This is the final premise supporting the inference that Devadatta

is another stream (santānāntara). Dharmakīrti hears Devadatta speak, and part of

Dharmakīrti’s own speech-act includes wanting to communicate and be heard by

others when he speaks. This provides him with a concept of otherness, while

Devadatta speaking provides him with a concept of other mental streams.

Consequently, we develop a general concept of “otherness,” without ever directly

perceiving the fact that other subjects exist. This also means that we never really

directly share feelings—we can infer them, but they can never directly motivate us.

However, this line of thinking is exactly where Wittgenstein’s “beetle in a

box” rears its head. The relationship between my own motivating mental state and a

speech-form (or propositional thought) takes universal scope only when I assume in

advance that the utterances of an allegedly distinct stream are not random

occurrences. I never confuse Siri on my cellphone for a breathing, thinking, and

conscious assistant. “She” is always only an “it” to me, and I never have to worry

about giving it Christmas bonuses. If I have not established in advance that you have

a “mental beetle” in your head, then I cannot assume that what I’ve introspectively

discovered about myself applies to anyone but myself.

Abhinavagupta’s critique of the argument is that it both undermines our

ability to make sense of our experience of other selves, and it undermines our ability

to make sense of otherness as a well-formed concept. The problem lies in

Dharmakīrti’s inference. Dharmakīrti believes he has secured a premise articulating

231

universal concomitance: whenever he utters something, he has some desire to utter

something (barring Tourette Syndrome). Moreover, his not uttering something is

explained by a desire not to utter something (even in cases where he has conflicting

desires—like when he bites his tongue and chooses to withhold an utterance out of

prudence). He hears Devadatta utter something. So he infers that Devadatta must

have a desire as well, and this proves that Devadatta has a mind.

Dharmakīrti cannot help himself to the universal premise he provides. Just

because I know in my own case that my utterances are underwritten by a desire to

speak, which introspectively reveals that I am immediately aware of my own

subjectivity, I cannot assume that such a relation holds between Devadatta, because

I cannot publicly observe his desire without begging the question that he’s the type

of entity that has desires in the first place. The problem here is that determining this

is precisely what was at stake in the first place. So either I know in advance that

Devadatta has a mind, thus begging the question, or I cannot help myself to the

inference, thereby leaving me without the kernel of knowledge I had hoped to glean.

I am hopelessly unable to prove the existence of another self. The critique, then, is

that Dharmakīrti’s argument both undermines our ability to make sense of our

experience of other selves, and it undermines our ability to make sense of otherness

as a well-formed concept.

Dharmakīrti responds by appealing to the communicatory aspect of

language. I do not just say things because I feel like saying things. I also want to be

heard, and more importantly, this presupposes my capacity to communicate with

others. My speech-act is always grounded in the background presupposition that I

232

am communicating to an audience who can potentially understand me. In this way, I

can become the object for another’s thought-stream. This allows us to revise our

belief in distinct selves (through independent arguments to that effect), while also

explaining how we form the view that we are (relatively) distinct individuals.

Presupposing an audience to whom one wishes to communicate is a background

assumption underlying language-use. Thus, Dharmakīrti does not beg the question;

he simply uncovers the ultimately erroneous appearances that make sense of our

experience. This is the cherished outcome of any useful revision.

But the deepest problem is that Dharmakīrti maintains both his

momentariness and no-self claims along with his idealism. Subjects and objects are

not ultimately distinct. There are no selves to distinguish one mental stream from

another. So the only distinction available rests in the content of the cognitions

themselves. This means that Devadatta and I have numerically and qualitatively

distinct cognitions. Potentially, then, the appearance to me of a vast ocean is only a

smear of grey paint for Devadatta. Nevermind sharing emotions—nothing

determines how we share any perceptual objects! The best that Dharmakīrti might

supply here is a sort of Occasionalism. Cognitions provide an occasion for similar,

but ultimately distinct, views of reality. Somehow, we share a collective illusion that

supports conventional reality.

4.7.2 Mereological Holism and Other Minds: A Metaphysical Solution to the

Problem of Unity in Diversity (Bhedābheda)

Before diving into Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of otherness, I

would like to sketch a metaphysics that both parallels the Śaivite system, and

233

collapses the numerical distinction that Sidgwick viewed to be an ethically

intractable problem. The problem, as Sidgwick saw it, is that real numerical

distinction between persons provides one with irreducibly egocentric reasons for

action. This, of course, generates the question as to what sorts of reasons have

authority—either generally speaking, or in particular contexts. But I believe that we

can bridge the divide between egoistic and altruistic reasons by revising our

commonsense metaphysics. I might say that with the passing of a loved one, some

part of me dies. Can I so easily say the same when I hear of the tragic loss of

innocent lives in Aleppo? If I’m of normal temperament, and I experience sympathy,

and different intensities of compassion, then of course I feel the weight of the

tragedy that has unfolded in Syria. We can chalk up the difference of compassionate

weight in the two scenarios to different levels of emotional attachment. However,

both the loss of my loved ones and the loss of strangers hold something important in

common: I can only poetically speak of “a part of me” dying with these people. When

I hear of a thief suffering dismemberment in a country with particularly stringent

laws, I never confuse that dire act of punishment with the loss of my own hand. So in

what sense do I share his grief? In what sense does a little part of me feel tortured

when my government illegally subjects some of its political prisoners to

waterboarding? My goal here is to show that, from one aspect, I lose nothing when

another is dismembered. However, from another aspect, we all lose a part of

ourselves in that brutal event.

234

Counting Problems with Parts & Wholes: Aspects vs. Properties

The Buddhist philosopher will argue that talk of either psychophysical or

purely mental “streams” (saṅtāna) is just reification. More strictly put, we should

describe the situation as a “stream-ing.” Moreover, even if we eschew the

momentariness thesis, we can claim that the various dharmas (elements) that make

up an object or a person are, strictly speaking, independent parts operating in

concert. Any sort of whole that we posit is simply a product of a pragmatically

useful, but conceptual fabrication. The chariot is not a whole above and beyond the

parts out of which it is constructed. We are tempted to introduce such a notion in

order to explain the dynamic and fluid unity that allows us to count composite

objects. But believing that a “whole-chariot” really exists above the chariot-parts

proves to be explanatorily bankrupt (so the Buddhist argues). If the chariot were to

collide into a tree and find itself strewn into parts all over the road, we would not

claim that the chariot exists in several locations at once. All we have are parts that

were once related in various ways, and their hypostasized continuity is simply a

matter of functionality. When the chariot still functions, but loses one of its wheels,

we can speak of the whole chariot missing a part. Buddhists provide a number of

arguments to this effect. For example, if the whole were something over and above

the parts-in-relation, we could ask where this whole is located. Is it located in every

part? If so, then the whole would be multiple. But the whole is distinguished from its

parts by being singular. How can it be both one and many at the same time?

Furthermore, if we insisted that the whole exists in its parts, we would have to

believe that part of the chariot exists in the reins, in the carriage, and in the wheels,

235

etc. In other words, the whole is distributed throughout its parts. But this means the

chariot-whole can be divided into “whole-parts” that are in the various chariot-parts

that make up the chariot. Some part of the whole is in the reins, and some part is in

the wheels, etc.36 But this introduces new parts, and the problem of whether such

parts are identical with, imbued by, or distinct from some underlying whole would

regressively reintroduce itself. Moreover, it would not explain what it was supposed

to explain, namely, how these parts come together to constitute a whole.37 Finally,

this generates a counting problem. Say the chariot was composed of 15 parts. Do we

have 15 or 16 objects, the parts-in-relation as well as the whole chariot? Parsimony

dictates that we keep the count at 15.

On the other hand, parsimony might dictate keeping the count at 1 (if we

really go down the rabbit hole of counting constitutive parts, we’d have a nearly

infinite count of electrons, protons, quarks, and parts within parts—something the

work of context-sensitive sortals can help us avoid by keeping us tethered to

medium-sized objects). So let’s just say we have a single object, a chariot. But then

how do things add up when the chariot has a single, dented wheel? In one sense, we

can say that the chariot is dented. In another sense, we can say that the front-left

wheel is dented, but the other three wheels are not. Taken as a real composite, the

chariot is dented. But viewed in terms of only parts, the front-left wheel is dented.

Does this mean that a composite is a useful, but ultimately hypostasized entity? Can

36 For a thorough, analytic account of mereological reductionism in Buddhist metaphysics, and Vasubandhu’s attack against the Nyāya belief in real wholes and real substances, see Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007), chapter 6, cf. 105-113. 37 Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 109.

236

we do justice to the idea that there are real composites, and they are not simply

conceptual fabrications woven over individual items?

On that measure, Nyāya philosophy appeals to a theory of substances and

universals. So, a substance (say, tea) inheres in the atoms of which it is composed.

Universals, like redness, inhere in the ruby ring and in the red paint. Naiyāyikas

would further argue that a cloth is distinct from the threads of which it is composed,

just as the universal quality, redness, is distinct from this particular red swath.38

Now if we were to accept such a robust metaphysics, then we would encounter

familiar problems with positing the existence of real universals, and we would

definitely add entities to a world that we may otherwise wish to pare down. A vast

literature is devoted to this issue in both South Asian and Euro-American

philosophy—so I do not intend to rehearse that enduring conversation. Instead, I

would like to propose a view developed in Baxter.39 The idea here is that the chariot

is exactly 15 things (in my simplified example), but at the same time, it is simply one

chariot. The key point here is that if the chariot is genuinely one whole, then we

have to devise a way to count the individuals making up that whole as numerically

identical. Individuals cannot remain numerically distinct at the ultimate level,

because then we would remain hampered by the “one versus many” argument (a

38 Ibid, 110: Siderits reconstructs from the classic, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Vasubandhu’s Buddhist attack against the Nyāya view: “Suppose there is a piece of cloth on the floor, but I can only see a single thread of its fringe. We would not say that I then see the cloth. Why not? If it is because I am seeing just one part of the cloth, then the cloth as a whole is not in that thread. To see the cloth I must see more than just one thread. And if it is a large piece of cloth, I may never see all the threads at one time…but if I never see the cloth as a whole, then it is something that is put together by the mind, not something existing in reality.” 39 Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity, 377.

237

favorite of Buddhist philosophers). Wholes would become mere playthings of the

mind.

So how do we defend such a view? Like the Advaita Vedāntin, we can claim

that distinction is ultimately illusory (māyā). Wholes are not reducible to parts-in-

relation, because, in a Bradlyean twist, relations themselves prove illusory. There is

simply an inexpressible whole (Brahman as nirguṇa: “without qualities”), out of

which beginningless illusion generates the mistaken belief in pluralism. Some

obvious problems plague this view (for example, the problem of explaining, without

endorsing dualism, how a single block essence carves out a space of “beginningless

illusion,” or, māyā within its omnipresent singularity). So let me illustrate another

possibility.

Consider Leibniz’s Law. Ted is a handsome father and husband. Ted is also a

media tycoon. These are various aspects through which Ted exists. As a loving

husband, viewing women as his equals, Ted can object to one of his media outlets

airing the Howard Stern show (a depraved show that objectifies women and

applauds a multitude of lewd behaviors and outlandish pranks). But as a CEO, for

some normatively relevant reason, he can give the green-light on airing the show.

This is not a contradiction (although it generates an extreme tension with respect to

his personal ethical loyalties and the normative requirements expected of him

under the adoption of different social roles). However, when Ted is the CEO of a

media empire on January 20th, 1995, then a bald Ted and a long-haired CEO of that

empire on January 20th, 1995 would be a contradiction. Under all aspects of Ted

considered in that moment, he will have baldness; so it’s a contradiction to say that

238

he is bald under all aspects in that moment, but not bald under the aspect of being a

CEO. Baldness is a quality, or, property he bears whether he’s a father, a board-

member, or a devout Catholic. So one individual cannot possess and not-possess

some property under all aspects. But the same individual can certainly manifest in

aspectually complex ways. To say that Ted under one aspect is identical to a

composite whole, and under another aspect, is individuated as a particular entity is

not to say that he has a certain quality and lacks a certain quality under all aspects of

his current existence. This aspectual distinction is akin to saying that Ted is both a

morally conservative husband, and a Media tycoon who gives the green-light to a

morally reckless show. From one aspect, Ted is an individual; and from a different

aspect, Ted is the whole (non-individual). These are not contradictory properties,

but only different aspects. We can loosely think of this in terms of time and four-

dimensional metaphysics. My thin, unwrinkled self is identical to my plump,

wrinkled self, because I am one whole stretched out over time. Granted, in the

current spotlight of the present, I cannot be both wrinkled and unwrinkled. But

under the aspect of this individual slice, and under the aspect of time taken as a

whole block, I can manifest what would be contradictory properties at any single

instance. This means that one temporal slice of me has one quality, while another

slice has another quality. This is no more contradictory than saying that the road is

both straight and curved—one stretch is straight, while another stretch is curved

under the aspect of a single, whole road. Likewise, the individual threads of the cloth

are whole, and therefore, numerically identical, but under a different aspect, one

burnt section of the fringe is black, while another non-burnt section retains its lush,

239

pomegranate-red hue. There is no illusion involved here. We can view reality as

multivalent, and therefore, describable under different aspects of its

manifestation.40

This view affords us a different angle into the problem of “the one vs. the

many.” We do not have to claim that the whole is something “above and beyond” the

parts in which it inheres. The whole is simply whole (a fitting tautology), and yet it

manifests under the aspect of individuation and numerical distinction. We can count

reality in two distinct ways. Likewise, we can count the chariot in two distinct ways.

When we count it as one thing, then a dent in its wheel means that the chariot is

dented. When I’m rear-ended, I can say that my bumper is dented—but not my

hood—and that’s important when I need to locate the damage on my vehicle. But I

can just as easily call my insurance agent and file a claim for my “dented car.”

Let me further elucidate, through an example drawn from classical-modern

empiricism,41 the distinction between aspectual complexity and qualitative

diversity. Empiricists in Hume’s era might have claimed that it makes sense to talk

about a simple, partless property like a red-simple. Consider a red-simple and a

blue-simple. The red is similar to the blue in being simple, but it is dissimilar in

being a red-simple rather than a blue-simple. So this hypothesized simple, which,

qua simplicity, is a partless entity, nevertheless shows complexity. It does not have

the contradictory properties of being similar and dissimilar. Rather, it manifests

aspectual complexity.42 Likewise, reality does not have the distinct properties of

40 Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity, 376-383. 41 Baxter provides this example in Altruism, Grief, and Identity, at 379. 42 Ibid., 378.

240

being one and being many; instead, reality may be viewed as aspectually complex,

and this is what I mean by “mereological holism.”

Aspectual Complexity and the Ethics of Other Minds

The view I’ve adopted here does not succumb to the problems of simple

monism. When a loved one passes away, my family does not have to hold a funeral

for me and my dearly departed. In this way, things remain economically

parsimonious for my family, and we do not proliferate entities beyond the pale of

what commonsense would accept. Obviously, I can participate in the funeral without

requiring my own funeral. However, I can also experience a metaphysical absence in

my core. In some sense, I’ve been buried away with this dear soul. In this other

sense, numerical distinction simply does not apply. This view allows us to do justice

to calling a bad carton of eggs a single thing, while admitting that one broken egg in

the carton entails only eleven good eggs.

Earlier, I claimed that an inference to the existence of other minds leaves us

with an ethically relevant epistemological problem. I cannot know how your grief

and suffering directly motivates me, nor if its value lies in anything other than my

egocentrically present values. I might accept this fact, and simply believe that your

grief only indirectly motivates me. But this can lead us to pernicious solipsism.

Moreover, the motivated force of my action only indirectly includes your suffering.

By this view, I can never really know how your “external” grief motivates me

“internally.” However, with mereological holism, I can now bridge this gap by saying

that your suffering is my suffering under the aspect of the whole. Any intrinsic

worth my life has is just the intrinsic worth of sentient life as such. Under this view,

241

altruism may amount to recognition of unity that transcends the concerns of the

delimited ego. I recognize myself as the whole, and my ingrained identification with

my narrative self is temporarily elided. In other words, I do not project my ego over

the whole (as in crude solipsism), but simply recognize pervading unity. Your grief

is real, and it really motivates action (and sometimes it directly motivates my

action), because grief and suffering are real and shareable as such. Sidgwick’s

dilemma falls away under the holism of aspectual complexity. Nevertheless, the

difference between Śāntideva’s ownerless strategy and mereological holism is

pronounced. Without a self that underlies (and under an aspect, locates) suffering,

and without a unifying thread that allows one to retain and genuinely respond to a

flowing stream of passing experiences, altruism and other-regarding considerations

remain empty.43 Moreover, experiencing selfhood as such means that the reflexive

nature of consciousness is partly constitutive of what existing as self amounts to.

While consciousness can be “for itself” (in the sense of being reflexively aware) it

can be “for another” (in the ethically relevant sense of caring for another) when it

sees itself as other. But nowhere in this process does the concept of selfhood just fall

away. Ownerlessness refers to the ego-self and not the unifying thread of selfhood in

general.

43 Perhaps even Śāntideva, at least rhetorically, could not resist such a solution: “If you think that it is for the person who has the pain to guard against it, a pain in the foot is not of the hand, so why is the one protected by the other” (8:99 in Crosby and Skilton; at 96). For this to make sense, the hand and the foot must be identifiable as a single, suffering body. If we extend this to cover suffering creatures in general, then the egoist cannot claim that it is ultimately every individual’s own responsibility to cure their own pain. However, Śāntideva resists such a move, because he tows the Buddhist belief that unity and continuity—as well as the self—does not ultimately exist.

242

While Occam might not have approved of such an inflated metaphysics, this

view provides us with the distinct advantage of locating our shared world—replete

with shared feelings, and shared joy and suffering—in a field that reverberates with

motivating forces available to us all. For the naturalistic-minded person—and for

the materialist—this may not be as extravagant as it sounds. A field that manifests

as a particle in a collapsed wave-function allows us to speak of the probability of a

photon showing up in an exact location, while also allowing us to speak of an

amorphous wave that defies exact location: we can speak of a holistic phenomenon

that manifests as both wave and particle. No “ghost in the machine” is necessarily

required in this model (nor is it inconsistent with this model). I employ this very

loose analogy only to emphasize that a physical description of holism—and thus,

ultimately “ownerless” and yet delimited manifestations of matter—can similarly

make sense of things like quantum entanglement that by another description (of

real, metaphysically individuated entities, occupying exact locations) would have to

allow information to travel faster than the speed of light. Perhaps my “ethical

entanglement” with your feelings allow us to remain numerically distinct while

ultimately whole. In the holism I am developing here, altruism would be an

emergent phenomenon located in the toggle between my sense of delimitation, and

my sense of direct connectedness to a larger whole that transcends the limits of the

ego.

4.8.1 Self and Other Minds…a Bridge to Motivated Altruism

I argued that viewing selfhood in terms of a normative, participant self helps

ground altruistic reasons. Also, this view of self may provide steps for contextually

243

determining the authority of altruistic reasons over self-regarding reasons.

Basically, when I believe that a context affords me the right to expect (and in this

sense, demand) help, I cannot consistently claim that, all things equal, your

occupying that position does not generate the same demand. In this way, the

demand manifests as an “external” constraint, and not a mere product of my

subjective desires: it emerges out of background prior-commitments that make

communication possible. Just as I believe that my starving child is a reason for those

in a position to help to give up some of their time, resources, or energy to help him,

anyone else has the same legitimate reason that applies to me in spite of my

immediate inclination to ignore their problem. It is altruistic when I recognize and

act upon the legitimacy of the demand, without its legitimacy originating in a

personal desire or an expectation that I directly benefit from it. Even when we view

altruism as supererogation, this view has much to recommend it. On the applied-

ethical side, we may not ethically chastise the soldier who does not leap on the

landmine. We may not ethically scold the unsuspecting citizen, who, while waiting

for a subway car, leaps onto the tracks with a train only dozens of meters away to

save the life of a person who has unwittingly fallen on those same tracks. If that

were the case, then we would have a whole subway station of morally reprehensible

people, and our claim would seem to entail that everyone of able body ought to be a

hero. The normative view only claims that reasonable demands emerging out of the

background commitments that communication presupposes have normative grip

without direct appeal to personal desires and self-regarding considerations. This

shows how it can be reasonable to act on behalf of another without immediate

244

concern for advancing one’s own agenda, and without concern for appeasing one’s

own self-regarding wishes.

Still, my problem with this view is that it leaves motivators out of the story.

While much of my argument seems to hinge on a strict distinction between “reason”

(rational principle) and “motivation” (a holistic and emotive responsiveness that

drives action), this sort of distinction shapes various strategies, and pre-determines

various conversations and philosophical puzzles from the outset, puzzles that may

otherwise fall away without such prior commitments determining the domain of

discourse. The egoistic worldview thrives on just this sort of firm distinction. My

believing that it is reasonable—or somehow required—that a stranger who lives

thousands of miles away should assist my hurricane-ravaged family is precisely the

issue of contention for the egoist. Certainly, if we accept in advance that this is a

rational requirement written into the speech-acts that shape our social living, the

claim would have some traction. But an egoist might not demand help from others

(granted, he may want it, but we’re presumably not talking about only subjective

desires or conative motivators at this level of normative analysis). He may believe

that his demand is not legitimate, and that it ultimately lacks rational authority

despite its emotive force. For example, he sees your new Tesla, and he wants it, but

he’s under no illusion that his desire entails a legitimate demand; after all, desire

alone (so the egoist argues) should not be confused for a principle of action. The

egoist might argue that his desire to call out for help should never be confused for

an authoritative principle. Likewise, your desiring help from the egoist needs some

sort of principled grounding that legitimizes it. While that may be true, perhaps we

245

go too far to assume that a “principled grounding” arises from some purely cognitive

domain that somehow needs to connect to a separate, motivating and conative

domain. The larger problem that I believe underlies this contention is the view that

rationality somehow conceptually exists beyond the pale of motivators. Unlike Kant,

I would argue that emotive force and motivation is bound up with rational

reasons—by that, I mean that without a proper emotional economy, rationality

would have no bearing on our lives; and this is not just a contingent issue;

rationality shows up experientially as felt and emotively charged reasons. Not only

do I respect your inherent dignity, but I also feel your worth. I feel the worth of

acting on principle, and that is part of experiencing my decision as a rational choice.

Sometimes the principle shines so powerfully that it requires things of me at odds

with my immediate inclinations, and I experience considerable cognitive and

emotional tension. But I nevertheless feel the weight of its authority (and I don’t

mean this trivially—its authority is communicated through an emotive and

representational pathway that allows it to show up as a guiding value).

You might argue that, metaethically, this reduces moral values to conative

forces, thus rendering talk of truth-values moot when it comes to moral judgments.

But I’m suggesting that we explore the possibility of our capacity to really share—

not merely infer—an emotional ground that dovetails into guiding values. The truth-

value of the principle lies in a common ground of experience, which under one

aspect shows up as a motivating, emotional force, and under another aspect, shows

up as representational content, something like a demand or a commitment. We have

something that is both belief and feeling. This view requires making sense of how

246

any such “common ground” exists. Can we directly share common feelings, or do we

only indirectly infer them? The latter possibility is attractive when we view an

embodied psychophysical organism as part of a closed system. This sort of biological

computer would operate on inputs and “decision modules”—replete with decision-

trees and evaluation functions that adjust themselves to perturbations in its nervous

system. I am suggesting that this requires we view “sharing” as inferences that keep

us one-step removed from the environment (and our fellow creatures) that afford

“inputs” for the organic system. But just as in the case of a cell membrane, perhaps

the borders of our psyches—our thoughts and feelings—are more porous than we

imagine. What we need to do is make sense of the exchange of ethically relevant

materials that penetrate the dynamic membrane of our practical, ethical, and

emotion-driven lives.

On the ethical and epistemological front, this leads us to the problem of other

minds. Empathy and compassion—not just pristinely principled reason—can

motivate us to do what we feel is right. Sometimes the right thing to do is act on

behalf of another without expecting (or desiring) anything in return. But how do I

come to feel the gravity of your situation, how does your suffering or joy directly

motivate my action, rather than remain an indirectly inferred data-point in a causal

chain? Can I really know that your suffering motivates me to act strictly on your

behalf? I do not believe that inference gets us there, partly because of its dearth of

emotive force, and partly because I endorse the view that a third-person description

of consciousness does not fully capture qualia and the “what-it’s-likeness” of a first-

247

person experience. In other words, the conscious feeling of grief or suffering is not

just another object in the world, like a lap-top, stone, or a tree.

I offer one basic argument to defend this latter point. Any good revision must

make sense of my experience. I still see the sun setting daily, but I do not believe it

actually sinks below the horizon. I know that the appearance is caused by the

rotation of the earth (among other things). Still, the revision that allows me to

dispense with my thought also provides an answer to why I experience things that

way. The self-reflexivity thesis, endorsed by both Abhinavagupta and Dharmakīrti—

a thesis that I endorse—is not explained by an objectified account of the first-person

experience. You might provide an excellent account of the physical mechanisms that

underlie immersion in an experience, but you can only do so by ignoring the first-

person experience altogether. The revision has not explained my experience, but

instead, it has explained it away. Similarly, as Abhinavagupta points out, self-

reflexive awareness is not an object that I can perceive. Even when I introspect, this

occurs against a background of awareness already presupposed by the “inward

gaze.”

Something like this last point—the inherently reflexive and first-personal

view of consciousness—underwrites various forms of idealism. Dharmakīrti, and

other Vijñānavāda Buddhists, provide ample reasons for endorsing idealism. While

the Pratybhijñā philosophy of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also endorses

idealism, it parts with Dharmakīrti in positing both a real self, and metaphysical

monism. These views collectively amount to solipsism, which on the surface seems

to perniciously undermine the coherence of other-centric and altruistic

248

considerations. However, Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of otherness and

other minds nicely parallels the mereological holism I have developed above. This is

where I believe the metaphysical view has some distinct advantages in being able to

better explain our sense that we share feelings, and these sometimes motivate

selfless action. I will conclude by more thoroughly explaining how Abhinavagupta

helps get us there, and what this might mean for altruistic action.

4.8.2 “Guessing” the Existence of Other Minds: A Śaivite Account of Reaching

Common Ground

In his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā-vimarśini (IPV), Abhinavagupta comments

upon Utpaladeva’s claim that “through action, knowledge of others is guessed

(ūhyate).” Two things are puzzling in this claim. First, a superficial read of the claim

might identify it as a form of behaviorism. I see Chakrabarti act in the right ways,

and I assume that he is conscious just like me. Second, it seems that by “guessing”

the agency and sentience of Chakrabarti (by observing his behavior), I’m only

inferring that he has a mind. However, Abhinavagupta argues that Utpala uses the

concept of “guessing” to avoid the claim that we infer the existence of other minds.44

At stake in the distinction between “guessing” and empirically inferring is the belief

that consciousness cannot be objectified, and thus, empirically inferred. Your feeling

44 Cited from Ratié, Otherness, 355. The IPV verse:

| ūhyata ity anena jñānasya prameyatvaṃ na nirvahatīti darśayati anyathā hy anumīyata iti brūyāt || By “is guessed” (ūhyate), [Utpala] indicates that knowledge cannot bear to be an object (prameya), for otherwise he would have said [instead]: “is inferred” (anumīyata). IPV, volume I, 49.

249

is not an object that operates as a data-point in a causal chain motivating my action.

Like the Buddhist idealists, the Advaita-Śaivite would not stand for explaining away

the reflexive first-person experience through an objectifying third-person account.

Your feeling is inherently first-personal and reflexive, something the description of a

data-point or causal force does not directly explain.

But imagine if we adopted the inference model. Your suffering enters into the

causal story of my decision to help you. But the only first-person presence I

experience appears from a single vantage-point. I may act as if there were other

minds with vantage-points, but “this immediate and singular presence” is all that I

directly encounter. I do not need to commit to any metaphysical view of self here.

On a purely empirical basis, I observe that the “I” is simply the vantage-point from

which things are present in a first-person way.45 Other first-person experiences are

only inferred, and remain within the fictionalist-domain of “as if” semantics. Acting

for the sake of the common good, or solely for the sake of your well-being, would

amount to me acting out of the presence of my first-person considerations. Granted,

the target of my action—that is, a sentient-sapient creature for which things can

matter—is objectified as a special sort of perceptual object, but as an object

nevertheless. Any sense of “I-ness” that would connect my action to an agent, and

not a passive or inert object, would be derivative of the only “I” that I experience—

myself (the one for whom things are present).46 This does not rule out the possibility

of acting on considerations of the greater good, but it comes with the caveat that all

45 Caspar Hare develops this view in On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects. He calls this “Egocentric Presentism.” 46 Ibid., see chapter 1.

250

of my considerations are derivative of egocentric concerns. These are not

necessarily selfish concerns, but they are always egocentrically present concerns. In

other words, I am unable to be directly motivated by your suffering, or immediately

experience you as a self-aware person for whom I can altruistically act. We lose the

possibility of a directly other-centric action, because we lose the possibility of

directly encountering the other.

Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva attack the inference hypothesis, because it

objectifies consciousness. And yet, their monistic-idealism amounts to solipsism,

and so the same sort of problem with respect to other-centricity also seems to

emerge. However, Abhinavagupta develops Utpaladeva’s point further, and offers

what I believe is a solution to the problem that is very much aligned with the

account of mereological holism I developed earlier. To develop Abhinavagupta’s

argument further, we need to look at some important premises driving his account.

Key Premises

[Premise 1]: Consciousness, understood as reflexive awareness, is a form of

knowing, in the sense that perceptions include “self-grasping” (svasaṃvedana) 47

and “internal grasping” (saṃrambha).

47 By this account, it seems, any expression of sentience would be, simultaneously, sapient. So if I were willing to admit that my beloved dog is sentient—which I am willing to admit—then my dog would be included in the class of things that have knowledge. More problematic, however, is the idea that consciousness comes with “self-grasping.” The view that a self is only formed in language, and that any robust notion of “I-ness” requires complex language-use and a developed self-narrative would not permit bare consciousness, say of a toad or a horsefly, into the class of things that have a self. But this problematic notion is also compelling: conscious things may very well be “selves” at various orders of complexity. This issue goes well beyond what I can cover here.

251

o By “self-grasping” I am referring to the view that when P is cognized, the

cognizing of P is also simultaneously cognized.

o “Internal grasping” refers to my capacity to recognize that what is inert in my

perception, say, this white sheet of paper, is indelibly manifested in a first-

person experience; this is my conscious state cognizing a white sheet of

paper. In this way, perception is always active and (at least in a broad sense)

knowledge-producing (it manifests the knowledge of its own awareness).

[Premise 2]: Knowledge, understood as an inherent facet of consciousness, does

not “shine as an object” (na…jñānam idantayā bhāti).48 In other words, we do not

experience the consciousness of other minds as a mere object, just as we do not

experience our own minds as empirical objects replete with spatially locatable

properties.

o For Abhinavagupta, consciousness is self-manifested in the sense that it

cannot be proved, but only presupposed in any proof. For it to be the sort of

thing that we experience, say, introspectively as an object, would be

unthinkable, because experiencing my consciousness already presupposes

the very awareness I may aim to objectify. Viewing the self as background

reflexive-awareness, explains why Hume and the Buddha could not find the

empirical object they were introspectively seeking: self-awareness is

empirically transparent.

o The immediate grasping of my own conscious state is called “vimarśa,” and

unlike Dharmakīrti, Abhinavagupta does not see the inherently conceptual

48 See Ratié, Otherness, 356, where she quotes IPV.

252

nature of perception as error-producing, or something that covers over an

initially non-conceptual and ephemeral property-trope. Instead, self-

awareness is a self-standing background constraint.

These premises underwrite Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of other

minds. The “guess” of which Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva speak, amounts to a

kind of recognition rather than a rational inference. Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva

would agree that we distinguish the conscious from the inert by observing agency,

but this is not an ordinary empirical claim. In Dharmakīrti’s system, a kārya-hetu

inference connects two independent events by locating one as part of the causal

story of the other. But in his auto-commentary on the IPV, Abhinavagupta argues

that our “guess” of other minds is an inference of the svabhāva-hetu variety. When I

observe a closed-plane figure consisting of three and only three sides, I am

grounded in calling this a triangle. I soon come to recognize that I am warranted in

making the claim that the sum of two right angles is equivalent to the sum of the

angles in a triangle by appealing only to the meaning of the terms involved. I was not

initially in a position to make this claim, because I was initially confused about the

nature of triangles and right angles. In this way, inferring that when I see the

triangle, I also see the sum of two right angles does not provide me with

independent, empirical knowledge. Similarly, when I see consciousness incarnated,

say, in the speech-act of a person, I am not making an empirical inference between

two independent events, one of which stands as the cause of the other (as in

Dharmakīrti’s argument). Instead, I recognize that the very essence of consciousness

includes action. In this sense, I am “guessing” (but not inferring) the existence of

253

other minds, because I am coming to recognize that what allows me to call this an

“action” (and not just a mere event) grounds my calling this an incarnation of

consciousness.

But how does Abhinavagupta ground such a claim? The key lies in Premise 1.

Consciousness is viewed as inherently knowledge-producing in the sense that it

discloses itself in the very act of cognizing. Now, in Dharmakīrti’s example of the

speech-act/mental-state pervasion (vyāpta), we can distinguish a mental state from

the action it underwrites. However, for Abhinavagupta, since perception is itself

already an action (in the sense that it grasps an external object while simultaneously

grasping itself), incarnated action is only the final stage of consciousness itself. The

power of “internal action” (āntarī kriyāṡaktiḥ) is not something I infer. It is

something immediately experienced, because to hypothetically observe

consciousness grasping itself and grasping an object (say, as a third cognition

observing the relation between the latter two) would, again, presuppose the very

act of grasping I am attempting to observe. Consciousness does not see itself

grasping itself as it might see a cup of tea on the desk. In the very act of seeing the

tea, consciousness recognizes its own seeing. This may partly explain why I am

shocked that what I was looking for was right in front of my eyes the whole time

(literally), and yet, it is not as though upon learning this I see a new object filling

space where, before, I was gazing at a mere void, or, an absence. Instead, I realize

that in distraction (moha), I was indeed gazing at an object without explicitly

recognizing the nature of the object standing before me. Consciousness was at work

taking in its experience even in my distracted state.

254

The idea here is that just as I recognize that the wave in the ocean is a partial

state (aṃśa) of the ocean itself, I recognize that the action of the person in front of

me is a manifested state of consciousness.49 This view is attractive, because it

collapses the distinction between logical behaviorism and irreducible first-person

awareness—we move past the problem Wittgenstein was getting at with his “beetle

in a box.” We do not reduce the inherent first-person experience of consciousness to

a mere set of describable actions and subjunctives. Nor do we puzzle over how to

connect first-person thoughts with external behavior. In some sense, we actually

perceive consciousness incarnated through the carrying out of what (logically, not

temporally) begins as an internal, but sentient action manifesting in bodily

movement.

When we couple this view with mereological holism, we provide ourselves

with just the tools we need to share motivating emotional states. In one state of the

whole, I am numerically distinct from you, and can experience the independent

validity of your needs (and my own). However, I may also come to recognize (in the

sense that I re-cognize a background unity that was always there to begin with) the

inherently motivating state of suffering itself. Suffering is “owned,” because it

belongs to a suffering-self. But the suffering is only delimited by the incarnated

manifestation of the whole under the aspect of individuation. This is the sense in 49 Ratié, Otherness, 359: “And just as, when we perceive a wave, we are not perceiving an entity that would be different from the river and that the river would produce while remaining ontologically distinct from it, but a mere aspect (aṃśa) of the river itself…in the same way, to perceive the other’s action is not to perceive an entity different from him or her, and merely related to him or her by a causality relation, for the relation between a subject and his action is not a relation of causality but a relation of identity—only the latter is a partial aspect of the former, his objective aspect.”

255

which Abhinavagupta would argue that my awareness of you is recognition of my

own subjectivity,50 but not of the empirically grounded sort of ego-solipsism that

“Egocentric Presentism” describes.51 I am not alone as a solitary ego. When we

communicate with each other, and I recognize your suffering as the sort of thing that

would prompt you to seek help, our subjectivity in some sense “fuses.”52 The degree

to which I take your suffering seriously, and the degree to which it motivates me as

it does you, is the degree to which it is possible for me to see past our distinctly self-

interested trajectories, and act on behalf of the larger suffering I see before me. To

see your suffering at this level is to see past the narrative and participant identity

that shapes my social self, and recognize a will to act that responds to suffering as

such. My delimited-ego is no longer the only ground of my action. Suffering itself

moves me to act in the recognition that suffering requires action. Of course, at the

applied level, the context will determine what sort of action suffering requires (for

example, if we’re talking about helpful suffering, or suffering that warrants an act of

omission). But I can respond to something beyond the constellation of

“egocentrically present” empirical perceptions, because the motivation of my action

does not need to be reduced to something my ego-self “owns.”

In this sense, I am merely pointing a way toward a metaphysical self. We may

argue that unity across sensory modalities—my capacity to touch now what I saw

then—requires a synthesizing self that allows me to experience the sensory 50 Ratié, Otherness, 363: “To be aware of others is to recognize in them my own subjectivity.” 51 See fn. 42. 52 Ibid, 364: “For communication, according to [Abhinava and Utpala], is nothing but a partial fusion of the different limited subjects. Such a fusion is possible because the absolute consciousness is, in its essence, a free agency.”

256

wholeness of objects. We may argue that to make sense of a memory being more

than an item of consciousness related to some earlier item in the “right way,” we

need a unifying thread that makes these both experiences of a single self. But I am

arguing that to make sense of my capacity to be directly motivated by suffering that

is not just my own—and thus, not derived from strictly egocentric grounds—I must

be able, in some sense, to directly experience manifested consciousness outside the

boundaries of my narrative ego. The metaphysical self would simply be the

background awareness that is presupposed in having a first-person experience, but

not necessarily limited to a single vantage-point. Mereological holism is one way of

providing a metaphysics that can support such a view, but the need for such a view

is driven by the presuppositions of ethics. When I act for your sake, I am not just

responding to stimuli locked into a closed psychophysical system. I can, in favored

moments, transcend the ego, and be motivated to act in and for a larger whole that

sometimes manifests as considerations for the greater good.

257

CONCLUSION

Icancontractthenotionofaselftoadense,butemptyspace.Icanviewthe

selfasaplace-holder,anecessaryfictionthathelpsorganizeandsupportapurely

biological,thinkingsystem.ButIcanalsoexpandthenotionofselfsofaroutthat

theplacewhereoneconstellationofthoughts,feelings,andemotionsleavesoff,and

another’sbegins,growsvague.TheBuddhistsbelievethatvaguenessshowshowthe

selfisnothingotherthanaconceptualimputation,anerrorthatmightberemedied

andexperientiallyrecognized.However,whenwebeginwithassessingtheself

outsideofthecontextoflifeanditsethicaldemands,wemightmorereadilyavail

ourselvesofpuzzlesandargumentsthatIbelieveholdlessweightconsideringthe

demandsthatothersoftenplaceuponus.

WemightconsiderthemetaphysicalquestionoftheexistenceofSelftobe

entirelydistinctfromtheverypractical,ethicalquestionofwhatthiscontextually

situatedpersonoughttodo,andforwhomthispersonoughttodoit.Butinchapter

1,Iarguedthatontological(andmetaphysical)commitmentscarrynormativeforce.

Atveryleast,“purely”theoreticalbeliefscommitustovariousotherbeliefs,andin

thisway,presentuswithwhatweoughttodo(namely,adoptandendorsecertain

beliefs).Thus,believingisakindofaction,andthereforeourontological

commitmentsandnon-commitmentswillimpactwhatitmakessenseforustodo,as

beliefisboundupwithinaclusterofdynamicactionsandresponsestoexperience.

Claimingthatselvesdonotexist—inthewaysomeBuddhistshave—isconsistent

withactsofomissionthatwewouldusuallyviewasbeingnegligentandselfish.The

Buddhistsbelievethatsufferingisthefundamentalexistentialpredicamentthat

258

mustbeeradicated,andthechiefculpritofthisdiseaseis“clinging,”or,thenatural

selfishnessthatcomeswithbelievingthatwepersistovertime,andthatwemust

obtainvariousgoodsforourselvesinthatspanoftime.Thishighlightsthenatural

originofself-regardingandself-centeredconcerns.Fromthisperspective,weare

presentedwiththeproblemofdeterminingtheoriginandrationalityofdirectly

pursuingsomeoneelse’sconcerns,especiallywhenthepursuitcomesata

considerablecosttoourownwell-being.Pursuingourowngoodneedslittle

justification,butmakinganother’sconcernthesoletargetofouractionrequires

someexplanation.

TheBuddhist,particularlyŚāntideva,providesaningenioussolution:the

non-existenceofapersistingorsubstantiveselfmeansthatthesufferingwewitness

andreacttoisownerless.Putsimply,Ihavenoreasontobeselfish,sincethereis

nothingforthisemptyselftoobtainorlose.Tothispoint,Iarguedthateitherthe

conclusiondoesnotfollowfromthepremises—havingnoreasontobeself-centered

isconsistentwithhavingnoreasontocareaboutothers—orweneedtocommitto

moraltruthsthatexistinthefabricofbeingitself;namely,wemustcommittothe

ideathatself-awaresuffering,evenifownerless,isinherentlybad.Butifwecan

havesomethinglikeabasicmoraltruthwrittenintothefabricofbeing,thenit

wouldnotbepreposteroustoassumethatselvescanexistatthemostbasic

ontologicallevel,especiallygivenhowusefultheconceptisformakingsenseof

memory,thesynthesisofsensoryexperiencethatunifiesobjectsandevents,

synchronicidentity(anditsimplicationsforself-regardingconcerns),and

communicationthroughlanguage.

259

Tothechargethatournormativeandpracticalidentityissufficienttomake

senseofother-regardingconsiderationsandobligations—andtherefore,

metaphysicsisagainlefttothedustyarmchairsofBaroquethinkers—Iarguethat

evenanormativeselfisconsistentwithanattenuatedformofrationalegoism.The

normativeselfisconstitutedbyitsvariouscommitments,manyofwhichare

inherentlyother-regarding;butother-regardingcommitmentsmakelittlesense

whentheyarenotgroundedinbackgroundconcernsforourownpersonalprojects.

Isacrificemytime,timethatIcandevotetoearningmoney,furtheringmycareer,or

simplyenjoyingthefreeplayofmysenses,tohelpmysoncompletehishomework,

evenwhenheshowslittlerespectformeortheprocessoflearning.Thisisnottoo

difficulttounderstand.ButwhenIdoitfreeofchargeforyourchild,orfora

stranger’schild,whatsensedoesthatmake?Iamendowedwithahealthydoseof

benevolence,butsowhat.Mypersonalendowmentshardlyjustifyobligations,

especiallyobligationsonyourpart.Showmethatwe’reallbetterforexpressing

statesofcompassionandother-centricconcern,showmethatmyprojectsare

supportedandnurturedbysuchvirtuousqualities,andnowI’vegotadirectreason

tocultivateother-regardingvirtues.

Iexploredthepossibilitythatreasons,producedoutofthenormativesphere

ofspeech-acts,carry“externalforce”totheextentthatweattempttocommunicate

andtounderstandoneanother.Touseawordistobecommittedtoitscontextually-

shapedmeaningregardlessofwhatsomeindividualdesires.So,itispossibletotake

ondesire-independentobligations,thatis,obligationsthatsimplycomewithbeinga

language-userparticipatinginthesocialplayofcommunication.ButIthinkit

260

presumestoomuchtoassumethatwhenIpleadforyounottotreatmeinhumanely,

thatIbelievethatmypleadingnecessarilyprovidesyouwithareasontorespectmy

wish.Certainly,ifIbelievethistobetrue,thenthereasonshouldapplyuniversally,

andinthisway,Inowhaveareasontorespectyourhumanitydespitemy

immediateoroccurrentdesires.Buttheveryissueatstakeiswhethermypleading

reallyisareasonforyoutopromotemywell-being.Certainly,youmayunderstand

whyIwishforyoutostoptorturingme—andinthisway,myspeech-actworksin

thecontext—butnothinginmypleadingnecessarilyrequiresthatyou(orevenme,

forthatmatter)recognizeanexternalobligationtostop.Plainoldwishesdonot

amounttocommands.Agreateraffectiveforcemustbeinplaytochargethatreason

withanysortofcompelling,obligatoryforce.

WhenIviewtheselfasnon-substantial,or,anemptyplace-holderfora

singularpointofview,thenIampresentedwithakindofpernicioussolipsism.I

cannotaccountforsubjectivityotherthanmyown,butIcanindirectlyinferthatyou

enjoy“presence,”or,thefirst-personexperienceofaworld.Thisviewmayhave

someethicalbenefits.Iamfacedwiththeproblemofharmonizingmyself-regarding

considerations—mymildlyhedonistic,self-centeredconsiderations—with

considerationsofthegreatergood.Iwouldliketobeabletohelpmyselfinhelping

you,and,likewise,Iwouldliketoavoidself-abnegationwhileactinguponand

takingother-regardingconsiderationsseriously.WhenItreatyou“asif”youenjoya

perspective,andtothisdegree,Itakeyour“asif”needsintoconsideration,thenI’m

actingoutofmyegocentricallypresentexperienceofsubjectivity,andIam

ultimatelydoingsoforthesakeofsomethingthatmatterstome,namely,“you”(the

261

indirectlyinferredfirst-personexperiencethatisnotdirectlypresenttome).In

somesense,then,anyother-regardingconsiderationwillbederivativeof(or

secondaryto)theonlypresentconsiderationsthatIcanactupon,myown.So,I

reachouttohelpyou“asif”youhaveneedslikemyown.Isacrificemyenergyand

well-beingforyou“asif”yourneedsmattertoyou.ButIhappilyexistwithyouina

weboffictionalintersubjectivitythatultimatelyonlybeginsandendswithme.

Myproblemwiththisisthatitunderestimatesmycapacitytorecognize

subjectivityandconsciousness,incarnate,andmanifestingontheverysleevesof

youractions(orbetterstill,asyouractions).AsIarguedinchapter4,toseeyouas

anagentisnotatheoreticalassumptionImustmake(A.I.botsnotwithstanding),it’s

somethingIsimplyrecognizewhenclear-headed.Idonotusuallyconfusethe

rollingrocksforchildrengleefullyrollingdownhills.WhenIwatchthechildleap

fromtheswing,Iwatchherwillincarnate.Iseeagencyintheflesh.Thedata-pointis

notasetofmolecules,orsomesubstantialentitythatIcanmeasure.Rather,Icanbe

immediatelyfamiliarwithactionasanextensionofwill.NotonlycanIpossess

familiaritywithotherminds,butIcanalsodistinguishthesemindsfromnon-minds

withoutavailingmyselfofcomplicatedinferencestothebestexplanation.Inshort,I

shareaworldwithyou.Wemightevengosofartosaythatthisprimordial“we”is

thebackgroundoutofwhich“I”hasapointofview.

In8:99ofŚāntideva'sBodhicaryāvatāra,Śāntidevachallengestheegoist:“If

youthinkthatitisforthepersonwhohaspaintoguardagainstit,apaininthefoot

isnotofthehand,sowhyistheoneprotectedbytheother?”Ifmypainisprivileged

simplybecauseitisviscerallyexperiencedasbeingdistinctlymine,thenwhyshould

262

Icaresomuchforadistinctpartthatdoesnotconstitutemyselfhood.Thehandis

distinctfromthefoot,sowhydoesitbothertomassagetheachingfootwhenitdoes

notdirectlyexperienceanypainsitself?Thecryingchildisnotmeormyown,so

whyshouldIbothermyselfwithitspain?Whenitcomestomybodyparts,the

answerispainfullyobvious:theyarebothpartsofawhole,andinthisway,apainin

thefootisapaininthehandisapainforthewholeperson.Situatedincontext,I

mayhavetofocusontheexactlocationofthispain(thedoctorstitchesthe

lacerationofmyfoot,notmyhand).Butfromanotherdescription,Iamsimplyin

pain,andrequireattention,whetherIlocatethepaininmyhead,myfoot,myback,

ormythoughts.Śāntideva'spointiscompellingwithrespecttoanother’spain,

when,despitehisOwnerlessview,heseemstoarguethatwemayshareeachother’s

pain.Ibothrecognizeadistinctlylocatedinstanceofpain—thepainofanother—

andIrecognizepainwritlargeoverthewhole.Likewise,Ineverremainsmug,

because“onlymyfootisaching,notme.”Myachingfeetaresimplyadescriptionof

thewholeme,sufferinginthisverymoment.

Justastheconceptofselfunifiesandsynthesizesanotherwisechaotic

panoplyofdislocatedeventsandsensoryexperiences,itcanalsounifyinstancesof

needlesssuffering,andmotivatingpleasforhelp.Theselfisaninherently

recognized,butnotempiricallymeasured,sourceofunity.Kanttaughtusthismuch.

Butwhenthedynamicflowofeventsrestsuponasubstantialbaseunderlyingand

threadingourexperiences,thenitcanunifynotonlymyownworld,butalsoour

world.ThevaguenessargumentstheBuddhistsoffer—thefactthatthe“one”cannot

bebothoneandmany—andtheOwnerlessthesistheyoffertomotivateunselfish

263

behavior,canactuallyworkinfavorofpositingaunifyingselfthatsynthesizes

distinctexperiences.Compositescanbereal.Wecanspeakbothofthewholehouse,

andofitstermite-rottenfoundations.Thehousehasmonetaryvalueasawhole.

Thiscanbemeasuredbypartsthatonlyshowupas“parts,”becausetheybelongto

awhole.Thehousecanbeaccuratelydescribedasoneandmany.Hegeltaughtus

thismuch.Likewise,mydebilitatinglonelinessmaybedescribedandrecognizedas

morethananinfinitelydenseandsingularpointinalonelyprivateworld.Itis

“ownerless”(andthuscapableofbeingco-owned)totheextentthatitcanbeshared

withyou,whomayormaynotelecttorecognizeandactuponthatinstanceof

suffering.

IrecognizethataheavypricecomeswiththesortofmonismIamendorsing.

Empirically,thisisfar-fetchedanddoesnotaddresstherealorveryuseful

distinctionsthatpushknowledgeforward.Moreover,Iseemtobereifyingan

abstractunifyingprinciple,aconceptualschemethatisusefulincategorizingand

clumpingourworldtogether,butprovestobelamewithrespecttohonoringthe

richvarietyofdistinctitemsthatmakeupourworld.“Nature”isnotathing,it’sa

varietyofthingsthataresometimesusefullydesignatedinthesingular.Hume

taughtusasmuch.

However,vaguenessandcountingandSoritesproblemsplagueour

conceptualcategories.Medium-sizedobjectsturnouttobemanythingsdepending

uponwhichcategoriesofanalysisaremostusefultoacontext.Andthisproblem

arisesinthecontextofempiricalknowledgeandthereductionistprogram.The

programseemsmostsuccessfulwhenitprivilegesaparticularreduction-base,aset

264

offoundationalstructuresthatwecansay(orhope)accountsfortheself,the

medium-sizedobject,themolecule,theelectron,etc.Believingthatrealityhassome

privilegedbaseofanalysisisaregulativeidealthatmotivatesreductionistic

explanations,andtothedegreethatsuchreductionsproffergreatercontrolofour

environment,theyremaincompelling.Thismayevenoperateatthelevelofethical

analysis.ThebeliefthatIcancometoknowyourpain,andlearnwhatyouneedmay

motivatemetoanalyzeourexperiencesintoabaseofshareableelements.The

problemisthatunifyingthingstothepointofaParmenidian“One”amountstoan

inscrutable,andultimatelyinexpressible,blockthatdoeslittletoexplainwhatweas

individualsoughttobotherourselveswith,andinthisworld,wemustbother

ourselveswithquitealot,particularly,ethicallysalientsocialrelationships.

Iamnot,therefore,recommendingthatweareallthepropertiesofsomeone,

grandthing.Iamexploringthepossibilitythatrealityshowsupunderdifferent

aspectsofitself,aspectsthatsupportspeakingintermsofindividuals,andaspects

thatsupportspeakingintermsofawholecomposite.Propertiesoperateatthelevel

ofaspectualdescriptions,theyarenottheaspectsthemselves.Myfoot,describedas

anindividual,hasalacerationthatneedsmending.Mybody—asawhole—requires

mending,becausethewholethinghasbeencompromised.WhenIcanviewyour

painasapropertyofyouasanindividual,butIcanalsorecognizeitasourpain—or

“painassuch,”recognizedundertheaspectofawholeflowofsuffering—thenIcan

directlyknowofpainexistingoutsidethebordersofmyskin,andIcanthereforebe

motivatedtomendapainthatisnotdistinctlymyown.Icanbemotivatedtomend

apainthatisnotisolatedinsidethesphereofmyownprivateexperience.Bysaying

265

this,Iamnotintendingtoreifysomesingular,block“whole.”Iamsimply

recognizingthatmereologicalvagueness,andendlessreductionsthatfinddeeper

anddeeperlevelsofanalysisproceedbecausetheydonot“bottomout”ina

privilegedsetofmaterialthings.Theyareaspectsofadynamic“bringing-forth”that

canbedescribedas“whole”totheextentthatspeakingaboutboundariesatthis

levelismeaningless.Whenitcomestomycapacitytobemotivatedbyatargetthat

isnotderivativeofmyembodiedhistoryandconstellationofpersonalconcerns,the

reasonsIhaveforhelpingyouaresupportedbymycapacitytoacknowledgeyou,in

theliteralsensethatIcometoknowyou.Inthisway,Icansometimes,likea

characteractinginaplay,embodyinganarrativeandemotionalfieldmuchlarger

than“Kevin,”actasyou(asus).Therefore,Icanactforyou.Unwittingly,Buddhist

No-Selfismandinterdependence,becomesatrulyinterdependentwhole,bridging

theemptyspacebetweenselfandotherthroughtheownerless(or,undercertain

descriptions,unboundedandco-ownable)flowofasharedSelf.

266

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baxter, Donald L.M. “Altruism, Grief, and Identity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (March 2005): 371-383. _____. “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense.” Mind Vol. 97, (1988): 575-582. _____. “Many-One Identity.” Philosophical Papers Vol. 17, Issue 3, (1988): 193-216. Chakrabarti, Arindam. “How Do We Read Others’ Feelings? Strawson and Zhuangzi Speak to Dharmakirti, Ratnakīrti and Abhinavagupta.” Comparative Philosophy Without Borders. New York: Bloomsbury Academic Publishers, 2015. _____. “The Nyāya Proofs for the Existence of the Soul.” Journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 10, (1982): 211-38. Clayton, Barbra. “Compassion as a Matter of Fact: The Argument from No-self to Selflessness in Śāntideva's Śikṣāsamuccaya.” Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001): 83-97. Churchill, Robert Paul, and Erin Street. “Is There a Paradox of Altruism?” The Ethics of Altruism. Edited by Jonathan Seglow (Southgate, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 89-106. Dharmottara. Dharmottarapradīpa (sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīka, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s, Nyāyabindu), edited by D. Malvania. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955. Dreyfus, Hubert. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time Division I. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991. Ekstrom, Laura Waddell. “Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29 (2005): 45-67. _____. “Keynote Preferences and Autonomy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review Vol. 59 (1999): 1057-63. Frankfurt, Harry. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Ganeri, Jonardon. The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and Practices in Indian Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. _____. The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Experience. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Gombrich, Richard. “Review of J. T. Ergardt.” Numen 26 (1979): 270. Goodman, Charles. The Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

267

Guala, Francesco. “Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments Do (and Do Not) Demonstrate.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35 (2012): 1-59. Hare, Caspar. On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009. Harris, Stephen. “Does Anātman Rationally Entail Altruism? On Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:103.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 18 (2011): 93-123. Hawley, Katherine. How Things Persist. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Hershock, Peter. Valuing Diversity: Buddhist Reflection on Realizing a More Equitable Global Future. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012. Korsgaard, Christine M. “The Myth of Egoism.” Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. eds. Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. _____. “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, No. 2 (1989): 101-132. _____. The Sources of Normativity. Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Large, William. Levinas’ Totality and Infinity. New York: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 2015. Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. Martin, Raymond. “Would it Matter All That Much if There Were No Selves?” Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Edited by Marc D’Amato, Jay L. Garfield, and Tom J.F. Tillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Matilal, B.K. The Character of Indian Logic. New York: State University of New York Press, 1998. Metzinger, Thomas. Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2003. _____. The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self. New York: Basic Books, 2009. Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Translated with commentary by Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura. Somerville, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 2010. _____. Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī. Translation and commentary by Jan Westerhoff. New York: Oxford, 2010.

268

_____. Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, “Nāgārjuna’s Reason Sixty with Candrakīrti’s Commentary.” Translated with commentary by Joseph Loizzo. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Parfit, Derek. “Experiences, Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes.” Philosophical Topics 26 (1999): 217-270. _____. Reasons and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press, corrected edition, 1987. Perrett, Roy W. “Personal Identity, Minimalism, and Madhyamaka.” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July 2002): 373-385. Pettit, John. “Paul Williams: Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999): 120-137. Ratié, Isabelle. “Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy.” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 35 (2007): 313-370. _____. “Remarks on Compassion and Altruism in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 37, Issue 4, (2009): 349-366. Śāntideva. Śāntideva: The Bodhicaryāvatāra. Translated with introduction by Kate Cosby and Andrew Skilton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, reissued version, 2008. Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Schechtman, Marya. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Scheffler, Samuel. Human Morality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. _____. “Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory (New York: Oxford, 2010): 41-76. _____. “Potential Congruence.” Morality and Self-Interest. Edited by Paul Bloomfield. New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2008. Searle, John R. Rationality in Action. Hong Kong: MIT Press, 2001. Sen, Amartya. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer, 1977): 317-344. Shoemaker, Sidney. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Siderits, Mark. Buddhism as Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007.

269

_____. Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003. _____. “The Reality of Altruism: Reconstructing Śāntideva.” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2000): 412-424. Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981, republication of 7th edition, 1907. Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1 No. 3, April (1972): 229-243. Sorabji, Richard. Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Sturgeon, Nicholas L. “Altruism, Solipsism, and the Objectivity of Reasons.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 3 (1974): 374-402. Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Turner, Jason. “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity.” Composition as Identity, eds. Donald Baxter and A.J. Cotnoir. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Watson, Burton. Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Wetlesen, Jon. “Did Śāntideva Destroy the Bodhisattva Path?” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 9 (2002): 34-88. Williams, Paul. Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra: Altruism and Reality. Dehli, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998.