B.R. 1736 (6) RESTRICTED

N A V A L S T A F F H I S T O R Y

SECOND W O R L D W A R

S E L E C T E D O P E R A T I O N S( ME D I T E R R AN E A N) , 1 9 4 0

(Battle Summaries Nos. 2, 8, 9 & 10)

1957

This book is the property of Her Majesty’s Government and is for the use of persons in Her Majesty’s Service only. It must not be shown or made available to the Press or to any

member of the public.

«

JOINT SERVICES WF

ASSO Library

P f'cr-ìv̂c m/SEP/wo

Vision No.No. ( j f 3

-I

R E S T R IC T E D Attention is called to the penalties attaching to any infraction o f the Official Secrets Acts

B.R. 1736 (6)

N A V A L STAFF H I S T O R Y

S E C O N D W O R L D W A R

S E L E C T E D O P E R A T I O N S

(M E D IT E R R A N E A N ), 1940

B A T T L E S U M M A R I E S

No. 2 : Action off Cape Spada, CreteNo. 8 : O peration M .A .5 and Action off

C alabriaNo. 9: Action off Cape Spartivento, SardiniaNo. 1 0 : O peration M .B .8 and F.A.A. Attack

on T aran to

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

This information is disclosed only for official use by the recipient Government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as may be engaged on a defence project. Disclosure to any other Government or release to the Press or disclosure in any other way would be a breach of these conditions. The information should be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standard of security as that maintained by ±ier Majesty s Government in the United Kingdom. The recipient is warned that information contained in this book may be subject to

privately-owned rights.

H IS T O R IC A L S E C T IO N

A D M IR A L T Y

Admiralty, S.W.l

5 March 1957

H .S./17/55

B.R.1736 (6) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Selected Operations (Mediterranean), 1940 1957, having been approved by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, is hereby promulgated.

The following Battle Summaries are hereby superseded:—No. 2 : Action off Cape Spada, Crete.

No. 8 : Operation M.A.5 and Action off Calabria.

No. 9 : Action off Cape Spartivento, Sardinia.

No. 10 : Operation M.B.8 and F.A.A. attack on Taranto.

B.R. 1736 (4), B.R. 1736 (6) and B.R. 1736 (6) (1) should be destroyed in accordance with instructions contained in B.R. 1.

By Command o f Their Lordships,

ContentsPage

F o r e w o r d l x

A b b r e v i a t i o n s x

CHAPTER I

{Battle Summary No. 8)Operation M .A .5 and Action off Calabria,

July 1940

Section

1 Strategical situation, June— July 1940 12 O peration M .A .5 : object and organisation 33 Italian plan o f operations 44 Initial moves, Operation M .A .5 , 7th— 8th Ju ly 55 M ovements of Italian Fleet, 8th— 9th Ju ly 76 A ction off C alab ria : the approach 87 A ction o ff C alab ria : surface contact 118 A ction off C alabria: Phase 1 129 A ction off Calabria: Phase 2 13

10 A ction off Calabria: Phase 3 1511 A ction off C alab ria : Italian air attacks 1712 Fleet movements after action 1813 Movements and F .A .A . attack on Port Augusta,

io t h ju ly !914 Passage to Alexandria, n t h — 15th July 1915 Remarks on action o ff Calabria 22

AppendicesA Italian N aval Forces: Operations 7th— 9th

J u ly 1940 73 B A ction off Calabria: Comparison o f British and

Italian Forces 76C Italian air bombing 77P Details of British N aval A ircraft 96

FiguresI O peration M .A .5 as planned 22 Italian disposition, 1500, as it appeared to the

British 103 Italian disposition, 1500, from Italian records 10

i i i

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I (cont.)

Plans*1 Operation M .A .5 , movements o f British and

Italian Fleets, 7th— gth J uly 19402 A ction off C alabria: Surface contact3 A ction off C alabria: 1514— 15364 Action o ff Calabria: 1548— 16155 Operation M .A .5 , movements of Convoys and

Covering Forces, 10th— 15th July 1940 Reference Chart, M editerranean

SourcesM .05369/41. C .-in-C., M ed.: Operation M .A .5 and Action off Calabria with

enclosures.M .01717/41. C . -in-C., M e d .: W ar Diary.W ar D iary, A dm iralty Historical Section.N aval S taff History, Mediterranean, V ol. I.Logs o f H .M . Ships Orion and Gloucester.M inistry o f M arine, Rom e, O fficial Narrative.The War at Sea, Adm iral G . Bernotti.A Sailor's Odyssey, Adm iral o f the Fleet Lord Cunningham o f Hyndhope, K .T ., G .C .B .,

O .M ., D .S.O .N avy Lists

* All plans and Reference Chart will be found at the end of the book.

iv

CONTENTS

CHAPTER II

(.Battle Summary No. 2) Action off Cape Spada, Crete,

19th July 1940

Section Page

16 Plan for operations in Aegean 2517 Movements of Forces, 18th— 19th July 2618 Surface contact 26

19 Destroyer engagement with Italian cruisers 2820 H .M .A .S . Sydney engages enemy cruisers 2921 T h e sinking of the Bartolomeo Colleoni 3022 Chase of the Bande Mere 3 i23 General situation, 1100, 19th J uly

H .M .S . Havock dam aged by air attack32

24 3225 Return to Alexandria 3326 Comments on the action off Cape Spada

Appendices

34

D A ction off Cape Spada: Comparison o f opposing78forces, 19 th July

E A ction off Cape Spada: Expenditure of ammuni­tion by the British ships, 19th July

Com m ander-in-Chief’s M em orandum : Rescue of79

FSurvivors from Enem y Ships

Figure

79

4 Position o f forces, 0722, 19th J uly 1940

Plans

27

6 A ction off Cape Spada, 19th July 1940

SourcesM.020932/40. C.-in-C. M ed: 0903/0710 o f 21st September 1940. W ith five

enclosures and eight sub-enclosures to Enclosure No. 1 {Sydney). T .S .D . 4740 /40. C.-in-C. M e d .: W ar D iary.W ar Diary, A dm iralty Historical Section.N aval Staff History, Mediterranean, V ol. I.N .I.D . 1900/48. Report by Vice-Adm iral Casardi to M inistry o f M arine, Rome. The War at Sea, A dm iral G . Bernotti.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

(Battle Summary No. I o)Operation M.B.8 and F.A.A. attack on Taranto,

November 1940Section Page

27 G eneral situation, M editerranean, Novem ber 1940 3628 Operation M .B.8: objects 3729 Operation M .B.8: Forces 373° Convoys and air reconnaissance 3931 Convoy A .N .6 sails for the Aegean 3932 C.-in-C. and Convoy M .W .3 sail for M alta 4033 Junction with reinforcements 4 134 Taranto: conditions and plan of F .A .A . attack 4235 A ir attack on Taranto (Operation “ Judgm ent ” ) 4436 Results o f F .A .A . attack 4637 R aid into Strait o f O tranto, 1 ith /i2 th November 4738 Conclusion o f O peration M .B.8 4939 Comment and reflections, Operation M .B.8 5°40 Message from H .M . T h e K in g 5 1

AppendicesG Operation M .B .8 : British forces employed 80H Taranto: Italian defences and arrangements,

11 th November 83I F .A .A . attack on Taranto ; Aircraft, H .M .S.

Illustrious 85J F .A .A . attack on Taranto: Narratives of aircraft 87K F .A .A . attack on Taranto: R .A .(A )’s Orders to

Illustrious and escort force, 11 th November 9 'L Report on Suda Bay, 1 ith November 92P Details o f British N aval Aircraft 96

FiguresOperation M .B.8 as planned 38

Plans7 A ir attack on Italian Fleet at Taranto,

Novem ber 19408 Strait o f O tranto: R aid on Italian convoy,

Novem ber 1940.Reference Chart, Mediterranean

n th

12th

Sources

C.-in-C. M e d .: Operation M .B.8 with enclosure. V .A ., M alta: Report on photographs o f Taranto.

M.06480/41.M.023897 /40.A.0138/41A.0238/41 /-Reports of R .A . (A) H .M .S. Illustrious.A.0755/41 JT .S .D . 5701 /41. C .-in-C., M ed., W ar Diary.M inistry o f M arine, Rom e, O fficial Narrative.A Sailor's Odyssey, Adm iral o f the Fleet, Lord Cunningham o f Hyndhope, K .T ., G .C .B .,

O .M ., D .S.O .

v i

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV

(Battle Summary No. 9)Action off Cape Spartivento, Sardinia,

27th November 1940

Section P aSe

41 Introductory remarks 5242 Plan o f Operation “ Collar ” 5243 Preliminary considerations and enemy intelligence 5344 British and Italian movements, 25th— 27th

November 5545 Situation at 0800, 27th Novem ber 5646 Reconnaissance aircraft report enemy forces at sea 5647 Measures to safeguard convoy and to join

Force “ D ” 5748 T h e approach 5949 Vice-Adm iral Somerville’s appreciation, noon,

27th November 5950 A dm iral Cam pioni’s appreciation, noon, 27th

Novem ber 6051 Surface contact 6152 T he action 6253 First attack by H .M .S . Ark Royal’s T /B Striking

Force 6554 Vice-Adm iral Somerville’s appreciation, 1315,

27 th November 6655 Further attacks by H .M .S . Ark Royal's aircraft 6756 Enem y air attacks on British forces 6857 Composition of and damage to Italian forces 7°58 T h e Vice-Adm iral, Force “ H ” ’s remarks on

the action 7159 Epilogue 72

AppendicesM Operation “ C o lla r ” : H .M . Ships, w ith M ain

Arm am ent and Com m anding Officers 93N Action off Cape Spartivento: Italian N aval Forces 94O Action off Cape Spartivento: A dm iral Somerville’s

reasons for decision to abandon chase 95P Details o f British N aval Aircraft 96

Figures6 Plan o f Operation “ Collar ” 547 Situation at 1035 from Renown's plot 578 Situation shortly before noon from Renown's plot 609 Situation at 1315 from Renown's plot 66

10 Bombing attack on H .M .S. Ark Royal 69

v i i

CONTENTS

C H A P T E R I V (cant.)

Plans9 Operation “ Collar movements of British and

Italian Forces, 0800-1140, 27th November 1940 10 Action o ff Cape Spartivento, 27 th November

1940: Approxim ate movements o f opposing fleets

SourcesM .024148 /40. Appendices I.

II.III.IV .V .

V .A .C . Force “ H ” Report on Action o ff Sardinia, 27/11/40. Narrative, V .A .C . Force “ H ” .Chronology Gunnery CommunicationsNarratives and reports o f Senior Officers and C .O .s of ships:—

(i) Renown and Ramillies(ii) Ark Royal

(iii) Berwick(iv) V .A .C . 18th C .S., Sheffield, Newcastle, Southampton, Manchester(v) Despatch

(vi) Capts. (D) 8 and 13, Firedrake, Forester, Fury, Encounter, Jaguar, Kelvin

M.023544/40. Report o f proceedings, Force “ H ” 19/29 November.Enclosures. 1. Orders for Operation “ Collar ” .

N avy Lists. October-Decem ber, 1940.The War at Sea, O fficial History, Captain S. W . Roskill, D .S .C ., R .N .M inistry of M arine, Rom e, Official Narrative.The War at Sea, A dm iral G . Bernotti.A Sailor’s Odyssey, A dm iral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, K .T ., G .C .B .,

O .M ., D .S .O .

I n d e x

Page

97

F O R E W O R D

TH E F O U R Battle Summaries superseded by this volume were originally issued in 1942, and were

contained in three separate books. In the present volume they have been largely re-w ritten to include inform ation from the opposing side and other sources not available at the time they were produced, and have been arranged each as a separate chapter. They have also been am ended in m atters o f detail, where such have proved in error.

T he most interesting additions which have been m ade are an account of the p lan and movements of the Ita lian fleet prior to and during the indecisive action off C alabria (C hapter I), the state of Ita lian defence measures at T aran to a t the time of the F.A.A. attack (C hapter I I I and App. H) and inform ation derived from Italian sources on Sir Jam es Somerville’s action off Cape Spartivento, Sicily (C hapter IV).

I t m ust be remem bered that all these events took place in the early days of radar. Few ships were fitted with sets other than for the detection of high-flying aircraft. No ships as yet had fighter direction equipm ent.

Plans illustrating the events described have been completely re-draw n to include up to date inform ation. As m ight be expected the composition and movements of the Ita lian forces in the actions off C alabria and Cape Spartivento differ somewhat from the contem porary estimates of the British. They will be found at the end of the volume, together w ith a reference chart of the M editerranean Sea.

August, 1954

ix

Abbreviations

A.A. Anti-aircraftA.B.V. Armed boarding vesselA/G Aircraftac Aircraft carrierA.N. Aegean— North (convoy)A.S. Aegean— South (convoy)A/S Anti-Submarinebe Battlecruiserbs BattleshipC.-in-C. Commander-in-ChiefC.P.B.G. Common pointed ballistic capped shell G.S. Cruiser SquadronD.G. Depth Charge D.C.T. Director Control Tower D.F. Destroyer Flotilladr. DestroyerF.A.A. Fleet Air ArmF.B. Flying boatF.O . Flag officerF.O.(H) Flag officer Commanding Force “ H ”G.R.T. Gross registered tonsH.A. High angle H.E. High explosive H.L.B. High level bombingH .Q . Headquarters M.A.S. Motor anti-submarine ME. Malta— East (convoy)MF. Malta— Fast (convoy)MS. Malta— Slow (convoy)M /S MinesweeperM .T. Mechanical transportM .V. Merchant vesselMW. Malta— West (convoy)N.A. Naval AttachéR.A.(A) Rear-Admiral, Aircraft CarriersR .A .l Rear-Admiral ist Battle SquadronR.A.F. Royal Air ForceR/C ReconnaissanceR.D/F Radio direction finder (Radar)S.A.P. Semi armour piercingS/M SubmarineS.O. Senior OfficerT.O .O . Time of originT.S.R. Torpedo Spotter reconnaissanceT/B Torpedo BomberTr. TrawlerV.A.(D) Vice-Admiral, Destroyer FlotillasV.A.L.F. Vice-Admiral, Light ForcesW /T Wireless Telegraphy

I

1x

RESTRICTED

CHAPTER I

(Battle Summary No. 8)

Operation M.A.5 and Action off Calabria,July 1940

1 . S t r a t e g i c a l S i t u a t i o n , J u n e - J u l y 1 9 4 0

W I T H T H E d e cla ra tio n o f w a r b y I ta ly o n i i t h J u n e 1940 a n d the co llap se o f F ra n ce on the 22nd, the stra te g ic b a la n ce in th e M e d i­terra n e a n u n d e rw en t a ra d ic a l ch a n g e , m u c h in fa v o u r o f th e A x is

Pow ers. P ro m p t decisions b y H .M . G o v e rn m e n t restored th e s itu a tio n re m a rk a b ly q u ick ly . S tern m easures to ensure th a t n o im p o rta n t un its o f th e F re n ch F le e t sh o u ld fa ll in ta c t in to th e h an d s o f th e e n e m y a n d th e fo rm a tio n o f a p o w e rfu l fo rce a t G ib ra lta r h a d la rg e ly n eu tra lised the e ffect o f th e F re n c h d efectio n in the W e ste rn M e d ite rra n e a n w ith in a fo rtn ig h t, w h ile in th e E a stern b asin A d m ira l S ir A n d r e w C u n n in g h a m h a d sp ee d ily in d u ce d th e F re n c h A d m ira l G o d fro y to d em o b ilise his ships a t A le x a n d r ia , a n d as e a r ly as 2 5th J u n e h a d d e cid ed to resum e th e ru n n in g o f co n vo ys to a n d from the A e g e a n a n d E g y p t a n d also b e tw ee n M a lta a n d A le x a n d r ia .1

H a v in g settled th e distressing q u estio n o f th e F re n c h F lee t, th e B ritish N a v a l F o rces in the M e d ite rra n e a n co u ld tu rn th e ir u n d iv id e d a tte n tio n to the Ita lia n s , a n d p u t M u sso lin i’s m u c h v a u n te d p re -w a r c la im to th e co n tro l o f the M e d ite rra n e a n to the test.

Possessing n u m e ric a lly su p erio r forces a n d w ell-s itu a te d bases th e y h a d the a d v a n ta g e o f b e in g a b le to co n cen tra te q u ick ly , b u t as th e lines o f c o m m u n ica ­tio n to th e ir A fr ic a n colonies in tersected th e im p o rta n t B ritish ro u te fro m G ib r a lta r to th e S u ez C a n a l, n e ith e r side co u ld co n tro l th e ir co m m u n ica tio n s w ith o u t a n tic ip a tin g co n stan t a tta ck . T h e in itia tiv e th a t the e n e m y w o u ld d isp la y in a tte m p tin g to in terfere w ith the B ritish co m m u n ica tio n s w as an o p en question . H e co u ld e m p lo y his forces— air, su rface o r su b m a rin e — ■ sin g ly o r in co m b in atio n . T h e first a n d th ird co u ld y ie ld o n ly lim ited results, b u t the secon d o r a co m b in a tio n o f a ll th ree m ig h t p ro v e a v e r y d ifficu lt p ro b lem to tack le.

E a r ly in J u ly S ir A n d r e w C u n n in g h a m d re w u p p lan s for an o p eratio n term ed M .A .5 . 1° this o p eratio n h e p ro p o sed to e m p lo y p ra c t ic a lly th e w h o le stre n g th o f his F le e t in m a k in g a n exten sive sw eep in to th e C e n tr a l M e d ite r­ra n ea n a lm ost as fa r as th e I ta lia n coast, w h ile tw o co n vo ys w ere p assin g fro m M a lta to A le x a n d r ia . I t so ch a n ce d th a t O p e ra tio n M .A .5 syn ch ro n ised

1 See Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 1, and Mediterranean, Vol. /.

1

Op

er

at

ion

M

.A.5

as

pl

an

ne

d

OPERATION M.A.5: OBJECT AND ORGANISATION 3

with the passage o f an important Italian m ilitary convoy from Naples and Catania to Benghazi, covered by the bulk o f the Italian Fleet. This led to the first surface action between the British and Italian Fleets, an encounter which took place off the Calabrian coast on gth July 1940.

2 . O p e r a t i o n M .A .5 : O b j e c t a n d O r g a n i s a t i o n {Fig. 1)

T he primary obj'ect o f Operation M .A .5 was to ensure the safe passage o f two convoys from M alta to Alexandria. These consisted o f a fast convoy (M .F .i) o f three 13-knot ships1 carrying evacuees, and a slow convoy (M .S .i) o f four 9-knot ships2 with stores. They were to sail from M alta at 1600,3 D 3,4 and steer to pass through 34° 40' N., 2 10 50' E. (Position “ Q ,” ).

Governing the convoy movement was the determination to seize any opportunity of bringing the enemy to action, whenever or wherever he might be encountered; and it was also intended to attack ships in Augusta with aircraft from the Eagle, while the Fleet was in Central Mediterranean waters.

For the Operation, the Fleet was organised in three forces, v iz .: F o r c e “ A ” , under Vice-Adm iral (D) J. C . Tovey, consisting o f five 6-inch cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron and the destroyer Stuart-, F o r c e “ B ” , the fast battleship Warspite,B flying the flag o f the Commander-in-Chief, and five destroyers; F o r c e “ C ” , under Rear-Adm iral H. D. Pridham-Wippell, the battleships Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the carrier Eagle, and 11 destroyers.

An escort force of four or five destroyers, known as F o r c e “ D ” , was to be detached to M alta after the Fleet reached a position east o f Cape Passero (Sicily). This force, augmented by the Jervis (Lieutenant-Commander A. M. M cKillop) and Diamond (Lieutenant-Commander P. A. Cartwright) which were already at M alta, would form the convoy escorts.

The three forces were routed to arrive independently at about 1600, D3 (9th July), at which time the slow convoy was to sail from M alta, in the following positions:—

Force “ A ” 36° 30' N., 16° 20' E. (60 miles ioo° from Cape Passero),Force “ B ” 36° 00' N., 17° 00' E. (100 miles 1150 from Cape Passero),Force “ C ” 350 50' N., 180 40' E. (180 miles 105° from Cape Passero).

From these positions they were to work to the eastward under their respective senior officers, keeping pace with the convoys to the northward of their route till D6, when Forces “ B ” and “ C ” were to return to Alexandria, followed by Force “ A ” , which was to keep to the north-westward o f Convoy M .S .i till nightfall that day.6

Arrangements were made for flying boat patrols o f 201 Group to operate in conjunction with the Fleet on each day from 8th to 13th July. These patrols were to operate as follows:—

1 El Nil, Rodi, Knight of Malta.2 ^eeland. Kirkland, Masirah, Norasli.3 Zone minus 2 Time is used throughout.4 D i being the date of commencement of the operation, i.e. when the covering force left

Alexandria.5 The Warspite had been modernised in 1937. Maximum range of her 15-inch guns was

32,200 yards, as against 23,400 for the Malaya and Royal Sovereign. The Warspite and Malaya could steam at 23 knots, the Royal Sovereign at only 20— a serious disadvantage compared with the 26-knot Italian battleships.

6 A relief force consisting of the battleship Ramillies and the 4th Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers was to leave Alexandria (as soon as the four destroyers which were to be drawn from Force “ C ” could be fuelled on arrival in the evening of D6) and cover the arrival of Convoy M .S.i.

4 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940

D2 and D6 (8th and 12th July): flying boats on passage Alexandria-Zante- M alta.D3, 4, 5 (gth-i ith J u ly ): continuous patrol on lines M alta-Cape Spartivento (Calabria) and Cape Colonne-Corfu.D7 (12th J u ly ): to a depth 60 miles to westward o f Convoy M .S. 1.

During the operation a diversion by Force “ H ” ,1 under Vice-Adm iral Sir James Somerville, which had arrived at Gibraltar on 6th July after operations off Oran, was staged in the Western Mediterranean. The diversion was to take the form o f an air attack by the Fleet A ir Arm of the Ark Royal on Cagliari (Sardinia), at dawn, 10th July (D4)— the day following the convoys’ first night out from Malta.

3 . I t a l ia n P l a n o f O p e r a t io n s (Plan l )2W hile Adm iral Cunningham was making the arrangements just described

the enemy were planning to run an important troop and military stores convoy from Naples to Benghazi at about the same time. Leaving Naples on 6th July, the convoy was to pass through the Strait o f Messina in the forenoon of the 7th (M .A.5, D i) and follow the Sicilian coast till off Syracuse when it was to steer a diversionary course for Tobruk, altering direct for Benghazi after dark. A t 0500, 8th (M .A.5, D2) when it was expected to be in 340 54' N ., 17° 58' E., the convoy was to split into a fast (18-knot) and a slow (14-knot) section, due to arrive at Benghazi 1600 and 1900 that evening respectively.

The convoy was to be escorted by two 6-inch cruisers,3 four fleet destroyers and six torpedo boats, while distant cover was to be provided to the eastward o f the route by six 8-inch cruisers4 and 12 destroyers, and to the westward by four 6-inch cruisers8 and four destroyers. Tw o battleships, the Cesare flying the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Adm iral I. Campioni, and Conti di Cavour, with six 6-inch cruisers6 and 16 destroyers, were to cruise in support.

T he surface forces were to remain in their covering positions till the afternoon o f 8th July, when they were to return to their bases.

Special submarine dispositions between 6th and n t h July were ordered west o f a line joining Cape Passero-Malta-Zuara (32° 50' N., 12° 32' E.) to cover the approaches from the Western Mediterranean, and in the Eastern basin east o f a line joining Cape M atapan— Ras el Hilal (330 N., 22° 10' E.), as shown in Plan 1.

1 F o r c e Hood.

■H'(Flag, F.O. Force “ H ” )

(eight 15-inch)Valiant (eight 15-inch)Resolution (eight 15-inch)Arethusa.Enterprise.Delhi.Ark Royal (Flag, V.A.(A))

(30 T .S.R ., 24 Fighters)18 Destroyers, S.O., Capt.(D) 8 (Faulknor)

Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, K.C.B., D.S.O. Captain I. G. Glennie.

Captain H. B. Rawlings, O.B.E.Captain O. Bevir.Captain Q.. D. Graham.Captain J. C. Annesley, D.S.O.Captain A. S. Russell.Vice-Admiral L. V . Wells, C.B., D.S.O.

Captain C. S. Holland.Captain A. F. de Salis.

2 This plan shows the actual movements of the Italian forces, which closely adhered to the original plan until after they had left the convoys off the North African coast.

3 Banda Nere, Colleoni (2nd Division).4 Pola (flag, Vice-Admiral R. Paladini); < W , Gorizia, Fiume (1st Division); Trento, Bolzano

(3rd Division).5 Eugenio di Savoia, Duca d'Aosta, Attendolo, Montecuccoli (7th Division).6 Da Barbiano, Cadorna, da Giussano, Diaz (4th Division) ; Duca degli Abruzzi, Garibaldi (8th

Division).

IN ITIA L MOVES 5

4 . I n i t i a l M o v e s , O p e r a t i o n M .A .5, 7 t h - 8 t h J u l y (Plan 1)

Operation M .A .5 started in the afternoon o f 7th July, when Rear-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell sailed from Alexandria with Force “ C .” 1 T h at same afternoon, some 900 miles to the north-westward, the Italian squadrons were putting to sea from Palermo, Augusta, Taranto and Messina.

After clearing the swept channel, the Eagle embarked No. 813 Squadron from Dekheila,2 and course was then set for Kaso Strait. Forces “ A 1,1 and “ B ” x sailed that evening, and by midnight 7th /8th July all ships3 were clear o f the harbour, and steering to pass through the following positions:—Force “ A ” — 350 00' N., 210 30' E .; Force “ B ” — 340 15 ' N., 24° 50' E.; Force “ C ” — -33° 20' N., 27° 50' E.

Evidence was soon forthcoming that the enemy was keeping watch on the approaches to Alexandria, when at 2339, 7th, the Hasty sighted and attacked a submarine on the surface at 1,000 yards range in 320 35' N., 28° 30' E. A full pattern o f depth charges was dropped and it was considered that the

1 F o r c e “ A ” (7th Cruiser Squadron)Orion (Flag of V.A.(D) (eight 6-inch,

eight 4-inch H.A.).Neptune (eight 6-inch, eight 4-inch

H.A.)Sydney (eight 6-inch, eight 4-inch H.A.)Liverpool (twelve 6-inch, eight 4-inch

H.A.)Gloucester (twelve 6-inch, eight 4-inch

H.A.)Stuart (five 4 • 7-inch, one 3-inch H.A.)

Vice-Admiral J. C. Tovey, Captain G. R. B. Back.

Captain R. C. O ’Connor.

C.B., D.S.O.

Captain J. A. Collins, R.A.N.Captain A. D. Read (joined from Port Said

a.m. 9th July).Captain F. R. Garside, C.B.E.

F o r c e “ B ”Warspite (Flag of C.-inC.), (eight 15-

inch, eight 6-inch, eight 4-inch H.A.) Nubian (eight 4-7 inch)Mohawk (eight 4 • 7 inch)Hero (four 4 • 7 inch)Hereward (four 4 • 7-inch)Decoy (four 4 • 7-inch, one 3-inch H.A.)

F o r c e “ C ”Royal Sovereign (Flag R .A .i) (eight 15-

inch, 12 6-inch, eight 4-inch H.A.) Malaya (eight 15-inch, twelve 6-inch,

eight 4-inch H.A.)Eagle (Aircraft Carrier) (nine 6-inch,

four 4-inch H.A.), (17 T .S .R .: 3 Fighters)

Hyperion (four 4 • 7-inch)

Hostile (four 4 • 7 inch)Hasty (four 4 .7-inch)Ilex (four 4 • 7-inch)Imperial (four 4-7 inch)Dainty (four 4- 7-inch, one 3-inch H.A.) Defender (four 4 • 7-inch, one 3-inch

H.A.)Juno (six 4 • 7 inch)Janus (six 4 • 7-inch)Vampire (four 4-inch)Voyager (four 4-inch)

Commander H. M. L. (Capt. (D) 10th D.F.).

Waller, R.A.N.

Admiral Sir A. B. Cunningham, K.C.B.,D.S.O. Captain D. B. Fisher, O.B.E.

Captain P. J. Mack (Capt. (D) 14th D.F.). Commander J. W. M. Eaton.Commander H. W. Biggs, D.S.O. Lieut.-Commander C. W. Greening. Commander E. G. McGregor.

Rear-Admiral H. D. Pridham-Wippell, C.B., C .V.O . Captain H. B. Jacomb.

Captain A. F. E. Palliser, D.S.C.

Captain A. R. M. Bridge.

Commander H. St. L. Nicolson (Capt. (D) 2nd D.F.).

Commander J. P. Wright.Lieut.-Commander L. R. K . Tyrwhitt. Lieut.-Commander P. L. Saumarez, D.S.C. Lieut-Commander C. A. de W. Kitcat. Commander M. S. Thomas. Lieut-Commander St. J. R. J. Tyrwhitt.

Commander W. E. Wilson.Commander J. A. W. Tothill. Lieut.-Commander J. A. Walsh, R.A.N. Commander J. C. Morrow, R.A.N.

! For this occasion, in addition to her normal complement of two T.S.R. Squadrons, the Eagle embarked three spare F.A.A. Gladiators (fighters) from Alexandria, which proved their value in the ensuing operations, by shooting down a shadower and two or three bombers. They were flown by Commander (Flying) Keighly-Peach, an old fighter pilot and another officer.

3 Except the Liverpool, which was at Port Said, having just arrived there after transporting troops to Aden. She sailed to rendezvous direct with Vice-Admiral Tovev.

6 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940

submarine was probably sunk. W hen proceeding to rejoin Force “ G ” , the Hasty, at oioo, 8th, attacked a confirmed contact and possibly damaged a second submarine.1

A few hours later the Imperial burst a feed tank, and was ordered to return to Alexandria. Enemy submarines were reported by the Eagle’s aircraft on A /S patrol at 0658 and 0908; the latter was attacked with bombs.

During the night the Commander-in-Chief, with Force “ B ” , set a mean line o f advance 305°, 20 knots. The original plan was modified, and a rendezvous appointed for all forces at 1400, 10th July, in 36° 30' N., 170 40' E.

M eanwhile, unknown to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Cam pioni’s forces were at sea, steering southerly courses in pursuance o f their plan for covering their convoy to Benghazi.

T he first intelligence o f the enemy Fleet being at sea was received in the Warspite at 0807, 8th, from the submarine Phoenix (Lieutenant-Commander G. H. Nowell), who reported that at 0515 she had made an unsuccessful attack at extreme range on two battleships and four destroyers steering 180° in 35° 36' N., 180 28' E. (about 185 miles to the eastward o f M alta). This enemy activity might well be due to movements covering an important convoy, and the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Vice-Adm iral, M alta2, to arrange for a flying boat to search for and shadow the enemy force. Pending further information, the Fleet maintained its course and speed.

During the day o f 8th July, all three forces experienced heavy bombing attacks by formations o f aircraft coming apparently from the Dodecanese bases. Between 1023 and 1837, five attacks were made on Force “ A ” , in the last o f which the Gloucester, seemingly singled out as a special target, was hit by a bomb on the compass platform. This unhappily caused the following casualties:— officers, 7 killed (including Captain F. R. Garside), 3 wounded; ratings, 11 killed, 6 wounded. The damage to the Gloucester’s bridge andD .G .T . obliged her to steer from aft and use her after gun control.

Force “ B ” was attacked seven times between 1205 and 1812, some 120 bombs being dropped without result. Six attacks were made on Force “ C ” between 0951 and 1749. No hits were made, though about 80 bombs were dropped, the Eagle being the chief target. In these attacks, which were all delivered from levels between 10,000 and 14,000 ft., there was a number of near misses. .

Further information of the Italian fleet was received at 1557, 8th— a signal from Flying Boat L.5803, reporting two battleships, six cruisers and seven destroyers in 330 08' N., 190 45' E.3 (60 miles north o f Benghazi) steering 340° at 1500. Later, the flying boat reported that the enemy had altered course to starboard, and gave their course at 1630 as 070° 20 knots: it was obliged to return to M alta at 1715 and no relief was then available to continue shadowing the enemy fleet.

Suspecting that the “ battleships ” reported by the flying boat were probably 8-inch cruisers, the Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that the enemy had some special reason for wishing to keep the British Fleet away from the Central Mediterranean. T h e intensive bombing already experienced strengthened

1 It is now known that neither of these submarines was sunk.

2 Vice-Admiral Sir Wilbraham T. R. Ford, K.B.E., C.B.

3 There are discrepancies in the reports of this position which cannot be reconciled, (a) In the C.-in-C.’s report on the operation it is stated to be 330 35' N.190 40' E. at 1510. (b) In the C.-in-C.’s War Diary, 330 18' N.,190 45' E. at 1510. (c) The actual signal made by F/B L5803 (quoted in an enclosure to the C.-in-C.’s report) puts it as 10 miles 180° from 330 18' N .,ig° 45' E., i.e. 330 08' N., 19° 45' E. at 1500. This latter position is within 20 miles of the actual position of the Italian 8-inch cruisers (to which it undoubtedly refers) at the time.

MOVEMENTS OF ITALIAN FLEET, 8 t h - 9 t h JU LY 7

his impression that the Italians might be covering the movement of an important convoy— probably one to Benghazi. Acting on this conclusion, he decided to abandon temporarily the operation in progress and to proceed at best possible speed in the direction o f Taranto, in order to get between the enemy and that base. He accordingly took the following steps. Forces “ A ” , “ B ” and “ C ” were ordered to concentrate to the southward o f Zante (36° 5 5 ' N., 20° 30' E.) at 0600, 9th July.1 Tw o flying boat searches were ordered to commence at dawn, one between 070° and 130° from M alta, the other westward of a line 180° from Cape M atapan between 350 N. and the African coast. A t the same time, the Eagle was to fly off a search to a depth o f 60 miles between 180° and 300°. T h e submarines Rorqual and Phoenix were ordered to positions on a line 160° from Taranto— the Rorqual as far north as possible, the Phoenix south of 37° 30' N.

During the night 8th /9th July the Com mander-in-Chief maintained a mean line o f advance of 310°, 20 knots, Forces “ A ” and “ C ” adjusting courses and speeds as necessary to make the rendezvous.

5 . M o v e m e n t s o f I t a l i a n F l e e t , 8T H -9TH J u l y (Plan 1)

M eanwhile, the Italians had carried out their convoy movements almost exactly as planned. A t 0150, 8th July, Adm iral Campioni received a signal from the Italian Adm iralty reporting that British forces from Alexandria were estimated to be in positions 340 10' N ., 230 00' E. and 340 5 ' N., 240 00' E. at 2000, 7th July.2

Steps were taken to concentrate the covering forces, and just before 0500 the convoy’s course was altered to 180° till the situation should be clarified. Air search at dawn to the eastward and south-eastward of the Cesare to a depth of 100 miles having proved negative, the convoy resumed its course for Benghazi during the forenoon and arrived there without incident that evening.

Between 1430 and 1520, 8th the covering forces turned to the north-north­westward to return to Italy, the battleships then being about 75 miles to the north-east o f Benghazi and the 8-inch cruisers some 30 miles north-west o f the battleships. It was shortly after the 8-inch cruisers had made this turn that they were sighted and reported by F.B. L .5803.3 Soon after this, on the strength of an air report o f three enemy battleships and eight destroyers to the south o f Crete, Admiral Campioni decided to steer to intercept them, and altered to a N .N .E .’ly course, the cruiser forces altering to close him; but at 1820 the Italian Adm iralty intervened and cancelled this movement, pending further orders. Course 330° was therefore resumed.

The Italian Adm iralty had intercepted and decyphered enemy signals, which indicated that early next afternoon (9th) the British Fleet would be some 80 miles east o f Sicily. This information seemed to offer a golden opportunity of engaging the main British naval force in their own waters with shore-based aircraft, submarines and surface forces. T h ey accordingly directed Admiral Campioni to steer for this area (later amended to one further north, o ff Calabria), at the same time ordering five submarines to take up positions between 350 50' N. and 370 N. and 17° and 17° 40' E.

The plan was a good one, but it did not quite take into account Adm iral Cunningham’s offensive spirit, which led him to change his aim as soon as he saw a chance o f getting between the enemy fleet and its base, and to thrust

1 Sunrise, 0520; Beginning of nautical twilight (sun 6° below horizon), 0450, Zone minus 2.2 It is not known on what information these positions were based. Actually, no British

forces from Alexandria were so far west till nearly 24 hours later.3 See Section 4.

2

8 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940

boldly towards Taranto, thereby, as things turned out, leaving the submarine trap some 60 miles to the southward o f him.

These intentions and the information on which they were based were communicated to Adm iral Campioni during the night, who continued to steer 330°. A t midnight 8th/9th July the Cesare was approximately 200 miles west o f the Warspite, both the opposing forces making to the north-westward on slightly converging courses. Soon after this Admiral Paladini, as the result o f a signal from the Italian Adm iralty giving warning of the presence o f two British submarines, altered the course o f his 8-inch cruisers to ooo°, 20 knots, without informing the Commander-in-Chief, thereby getting to the eastward o f the battleships next morning. The four light cruisers o f the 7th Division, which after covering the convoy to the westward were proceeding to Palermo, continued steering towards the Strait o f Messina till soon after 0600, 9th, when they were ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief to the east o f Cape Spartivento.

6. A c t io n o f f C a l a b r i a : T h e A p p r o a c h (Plans 1, 2)

To return to the British Mediterranean Fleet.The concentration of the fleet was effected south of Zante at 0600, 9th July,

in 36° 55 ' N., 20° 30' E., and the fleet took up the following formation: Force “ A ” in the van eight miles ahead o f Force “ B ” , with Force “ C ” eight miles astern o f the Warspite, the mean line o f advance being 260° at 15 knots.

The air searches ordered the evening before had commenced at dawn, the Eagle having flown off her aircraft at 0440, and reports o f the enemy began to come in. The first came from Flying Boat L.5807 at 0732— two battleships, four cruisers and ten destroyers steering 350°, 15 knots in 370 14' N., 160 5 1 ' E. Further air reports quickly followed of a group o f six cruisers and eight destroyers bearing 080°, 20 miles from the main fleet at 0739, and then at 0805 that the main fleet had altered course to 360°. According to this information the main enemy fleet now bore about 280°, 145 miles from the Warspite. The Commander-in-Chief altered course to a mean line o f advance o f 305° and an hour later to 320° at 18 knots in the endeavour to work to the northward of the enemy and so reach a position between him and Taranto.

A t 0858, 9th, the Eagle flew off three aircraft to search the sector between 260° and 300° to a maximum depth. Several reports from these reconnaissance aircraft and from Flying Boats 5807 and 9020 were received between 1026 and 1135. These, though they differed considerably, seemed to afford fairly reliable information o f the enemy’s movements. Thus, at 1105, one of the Eagle’s aircraft reported two battleships and a cruiser with four other cruisers near by in 38° 07' N., 160 5 7 ' E., while at 1115, Flying Boat L.5807 reported the enemy battlefleet in 38° 06' N., 170 48' E., steering North. It seemed probable that the ships in the latter report were, if correctly identified, actually considerably further to the westward.

These reports indicated that the enemy fleet consisted of at least two battle­ships, 12 cruisers and 20 destroyers, dispersed in groups over a wide area. It looked, too, as i f the group of cruisers and destroyers, reported at 0739, had made a wide sweep to the north-eastward and had been joined by another group o f cruisers and destroyers, possibly those reported as being in company with the battlefleet.

A t 114 5 ,9th, acting on the assumption based on the air reports that the enemy fleet was then steaming north in a position 295° 90 miles from the Warspite, a striking force of nine Swordfish aircraft was flown off from the Eagle to attack with torpedoes. But owing to a lack of reconnaissance aircraft and to un­

ACTION OFF CALABRIA: THE APPROACH 9

avoidable delay in flying o ff relief shadowers, air touch had been lost ten minutes earlier (1135), and it so happened that just before Adm iral Campioni, deeming that he was getting too far to the northward, had altered the course of the battlefleet to 165° in order to concentrate his fleet in about 370 40' N., 170 25' E.

A ir touch was regained at 1215, when Flying Boat L.5803 reported six cruisers and ten destroyers in 370 56' N., 17° 48' E. steering 220° and five minutes later a group of three 8-inch cruisers in 370 55 ' N., 170 55 ' E . steering 2250; but owing to the battlefleet’s turn to the southward, the striking force failed to find it, though at 1252 it sighted a large number of enemy ships and working round to the westward of this group, at 1330 attacked the rear ship. The ship was thought at the time to be a battleship, but actually it was one of Admiral Paladini’s 8-inch cruisers which were then steering for the rendezvous; no hits were made in this attack, which had to face heavy A. A. fire, though the aircraft suffered little damage.

Meanwhile the Warspite had maintained her course 320°, and at noon estimated her position as 37° 30' N ., 18° 40' E. A n air report at 1330 that there were no enemy ships between 3340 and 2910 to a depth o f 60 miles from 38° N., 180 E . made it clear that the enemy battlefleet had turned to the southward, and that the cruiser groups which were thought to have been sweeping to the north-eastward had altered to the south-westward. The indications were that the enemy fleet was concentrating south-east o f Calabria in the approximate position 370 45 ' N., 170 20' E.

Further air reports helped to establish its position and movements: thus, at 1340, Flying Boat 9020 reported three battleships and a large number of cruisers and destroyers in 370 58' N ., 170 55' E ., steering 220°, and at 1414 gave their course and speed as 020°, 18 knots.

Apparently the enemy had by that time completed his concentration, and turning to the northward was maintaining a central position with three directions open for retreat. W hether he intended to stand and fight in an area o f his own choosing was still a matter o f conjecture. The British Fleet on its north-west course was rapidly closing and at 1400, having achieved his immediate object o f cutting him off from Taranto, the Commander-in-Chief altered course to 270° to increase the rate o f closing. Though the cruisers were well ahead, the Royal Sovereign’s speed limited the rate of approach, and at 1430, in 38° 02' N., 18° 25' E ., the Warspite increased speed to 22 knots, acting as a battle-cruiser to support the 7th C.S., which in comparison with the enemy cruiser force was very weak, being fewer in numbers and lacking 8-inch gun ships.

A t 1434, the Eagle’s striking force had landed on and an air reconnaissance report received at 1435 gave the enemy’s course and speed as 360°, 15 knots. This was amplified four minutes later when the enemy’s bearing and distance from the Warspite was signalled as 260°, 30 miles. Force “ A ” , less the Stuart which had just been ordered to join the Royal Sovereign’s screen, was then eight miles ahead o f the Warspite while Force “ C ” was about ten miles astern of her.

A t this stage when the period o f approach m ay be considered to end, there was a general impression that the enemy proposed to vindicate Mussolini’s claim of M are Nostrum concerning, the Mediterranean. The moment for which the Italian Fleet had been built up was at hand, if the Italian Com mander-in-Chief was prepared to accept the gage of battle.

This impression was not far wrong. The first enemy report received by Adm iral Campioni that day had come from an aircraft at 1330. The signal, which arrived at rather an awkward moment, just as he was concentrating his fleet— a manoeuvre complicated by the F .A.A. attack on the heavy cruisers— made it clear that the British had been steering for an objective further north than had been conjectured the night before. He determined, therefore, to

^ 8 ' Cruisers<3

<

Battleships

Ó

s<a

<3

<?

1h z<r

C ^ 8 ' Cruisers

4 ^<3>

Scale - Sea Miles

Fig. 2. I t a l i a n D is p o s i t i o n , 15 0 0 , a s i t A p p e a r e d t o t h e B r i t i s h

it

A

4 rC

¿O

1t

¿OC-in-C.

£ 7 f t 1}<?

^ 6 ' Cruisers

4^ 6 ' Cruisers

<3 (pos’n. unknown) <1

Scale - Sea miles

Fig- 3- I t a l i a n D i s p o s i t i o n , 1 5 0 0 , f r o m I t a l i a n R e c o r d s(Positions of destroyers are unknown)

10

ACTION OFF CALABRIA: SURFACE CONTACT 11

interpose his fleet between the Italian coast and the enemy, and if possible to get between him and Taranto, accepting battle and relying on his superiority o f speed to enable him to break o ff the action if the superior weight of gunfire o f the British capital ships should prove too much for him.

He then had in company the two battleships, six 8-inch cruisers, eight 6-inch cruisers and 24 destroyers.1 The four light cruisers o f the 7th Division were still some distance to the south-westward, but in view o f the urgency to keep open the route to Taranto and the marked numerical superiority in cruisers and destroyers he already possessed, he decided to steer to the northward without waiting for them.

7 . A c t io n o f f C a l a b r i a : S u r f a c e C o n t a c t (Plan 2)

A t 1447, 9th July, the Orion sighted white smoke bearing 230° and two minutes later black smoke, bearing 2450, being laid by a destroyer. Apparently the enemy was completing his concentration behind this cover o f smoke. A t 1452 the Neptune reported two enemy ships in sight bearing 236°. These reports were amplified by further details at 1455 and 1500 from the Orion.

O n first sighting the enemy the damaged Gloucester was ordered to join the Eagle, which— screened by the Voyager and Vampire— was taking station ten miles to the eastward of the Warspite, while the air striking force was re-arming and re-fuelling in readiness to renew its attack. T h e remaining four cruisers, in order from north to south Neptune, Liverpool, Orion, Sydney (henceforth referred to as the 7th Cruiser Squadron) were formed on a line of bearing 320°, steering 270° at 22 knots, distant ten miles 260° from the Warspite.

A t 1500 the enemy fleet appeared to be disposed in four columns or groups spread over a wide area, with intervals o f about five miles between the columns, which were on a line of bearing I30°-3I0°. The direction of their advance was reported as 020°, speed 19 knots. O nly a few o f their ships were visible simultaneously to the British ships and then only for short periods (see Fig. 2). The difficulty o f gauging their formation and what ships were present can be seen by a comparison with Fig. 3, which shews it from Italian records.

Taking the enemy columns in order, as they appeared to the British: the port wing column (marked A in Fig. 2) consisted of five or six cruisers, including some o f the Bolzano class, the next column (B) was thought to consist o f two or three cruisers, ahead of two Cavour class battleships. In the third column (C) four cruisers, probably 8-inch, and in the starboard wing column (D) four 6-inch cruisers. In the van were a number o f destroyers, probably three flotillas (X, Y and Z) while some others formed the battleship A /S screen.

Actually, this was an overestimate o f the number o f cruisers present in this opening stage, according to the Italian records. Adm iral Campioni had been proceeding on a mean course 010°, the six 8-inch cruisers under Admiral Paladini in the Pola (in the rear), disposed three miles on his port beam, and four 6-inch cruisers (two from the 8th Division and two from the 4th) five miles on his starboard beam. A t 1500 the 8-inch cruisers were going ahead to take station in the van, a movement facilitated by a turn to port by the battleships. The four cruisers o f the 7th Division (which it will be remembered had been on their w ay home) were some distance off, coming up from the south-westward.

It was a fine day, with the wind north, force 4, sea slight, I / 10th cloud and visibility ranging from 13 to 18 miles.

1 The 8th, 15th and 16th Destroyer Flotillas (nine destroyers) had been sent into harbour to re-fuel at 0600, 9th, and did not rejoin the fleet till 1930 that evening. Three other destroyers and two light cruisers (the Cadorna and Diaz) had been detached with engine trouble or defects in the course of the day.

Vice-Admiral Tovey was getting a long way ahead o f the Warspite, and at 1508, in order to avoid becoming heavily engaged before she was in a position to support, he altered course together to ooo0.1 As he turned, the Neptune reported two battleships bearing 250°, 15 miles off. The 7th Cruiser Squadron was still closing the enemy and soon groups o f enemy cruisers and destroyers were seen showing up between the bearings o f 2350 and 270° at distances of12 to 18 miles. Course was again altered— to 045°— and at 1514 the squadron was formed on a line o f bearing 350°.

The surface action which ensued falls into three phases:—( 0 15 14 to 153®- Cruiser action, in which the Warspite intervened.(2) 1548 to 1615. Battleships and cruisers in action, and F.A.A. attack by

the Eagle's aircraft.(3) J6i5 to 1649. The Italian Fleet in full retreat; British cruisers and

destroyers engaging enemy destroyers as opportunity offered.

From 1640 to 1925 the enemy shore-based aircraft carried out heavy but ineffective attacks on both fleets with complete impartiality.

12 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940

8. A c t io n o f f C a l a b r i a : P h a s e 1 (Plan 3)

A t 1514 the enemy cruisers (C )2 bearing 250° opened fire at a range 23,600 yards on the 7th Cruiser Squadron. Vice-Adm iral Tovey increased speed to 25 knots at 1515 and a minute later altered course to 025° to open the “ A ” arcs. W ith the advantage o f the sun behind him, the enemy’s fire was good for range, but it fell o ff later. After a couple more alterations o f course together to 355 and 030°, the 7th Cruiser Squadron was ordered at 1522 to engage an equal number of enemy ships.

The Neptune and Liverpool immediately opened fire, range 22,100 yards, followed by the Sydney at 1523 engaging the fourth cruiser from the right. The speed o f the Squadron was increased to 28 knots and the Orion, at 1526, fired at a destroyer (Z) for three minutes, range 23,200 yards. W hen this destroyer altered course away, the Orion shifted target to the right-hand cruiser, then bearing 2490, range 23,700 yards. By this time the Warspite was intervening. It appeared urgently necessary to support the outnumbered cruisers, and at 1525 the Commander-in-Chief detached his destroyer screen, which formed single line ahead on the Nubian, and altered course to starboard to pass on the Warspite’s disengaged side. A minute later (1526) the flagship opened fire on what was believed to be an 8-inch cruiser (C )3 bearing 265°, range 26,400 yards. Blast from the first salvo damaged the Warspite's aircraft, which was subsequently jettisoned. Ten salvoes were fired, and it was thought a hit was scored by the last.4 The enemy cruisers turned away under smoke; this took them out o f range o f the 7th Cruiser Squadron which checked fire a t I53 .I-

During this opening stage o f the action no hits had been observed on the enemy ships, whose fire had been equally ineffective. The British cruisers were straddled several times, but the only damage done was by splinters from

1 This manoeuvre anticipated the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief who at 1506 (time of receipt 1520) signalled: “ Do not get too far ahead of me. I am dropping back on battlefleet. Air striking force will not be ready till 1530.” Throughout the action, Admiral Tovey manoeuvred his squadron by blue pendant only.

2 The 6-inch cruisers Garibaldi and Abruzzi. According to Italian records their time of opening fire was 1518.

3 Actually a 6-inch cruiser, the Abruzzi or Garibaldi (8th Division).1 According to the Italians, no hit was scored.

ACTION OFF CALABRIA: PHASE 2 13

a near miss to the Neptune’s aircraft, which was jettisoned shortly afterwards,as it was leaking petrol. .

Sir Andrew Cunningham was finding the slow speed of his battlefleet a sore trial. H aving ordered the Malaya to press on at utmost speed, he turned in the Warspite through 360° and made an S ” bend to enable her to catch up. The 7th Cruiser Squadron, whose orders were not to get too far ahead of the Commander-in-Chief, made a complete turn to conform with this movement. W hile under helm the Warspite fired four salvoes between 1533 and 1536 at each of two 6-inch cruisers, forcing them to turn away.1 It was thought that these ships were attempting to work round towards the Eagle, as they were on an easterly course when sighted.

Apart from this burst o f fire, there was a lull in the action till 154^* lh e Commander-in-Chief could do nothing but wait for his battleships to come up. There is a smack of old world courtesy— almost of apology— in the signal he flashed to Vice-Adm iral Tovey at this time:— “ I am sorry for this delay, but we must call upon reinforcements.”

The situation of the British Fleet was then as follows: the 7th Cruiser Squadron, steering 310°, 28 knots, to close the enemy was 3I miles to the northward o f the Warspite, which was turning to 3450. The Malaya and Royal Sovereign— particularly the former— had gained considerably. The destroyers, all o f which had been released from screening duties, were con­centrating in their flotillas on the disengaged bow of the battlefleet. A squadron of six enemy cruisers (presumably column A) was in sight ahead of their battlefleet.

9 . A c t io n o f f C a l a b r i a : P h a s e 2 (Plan 4)Just at this moment (1548) the second phase or battleship action began,

when the enemy battleships opened fire on the Warspite at extreme range. Reserving her fire till i 553> the Warspite then fired at the right-hand enemy battleship (Cesare), bearing 287°, range 26,000 yards. Just previously, the Eagle’s striking force of nine Swordfish of No. 824 Squadron, which had flown off at 1545, passed over her on their w ay to the attack.

T he enemy’s shooting was moderately good, most of his salvoes falling within 1,000 yards, some straddling, but nearly all having a wide spread. O ne closely bunched salvo fell about 400 yards off the Warspite s port bow. The destroyers, then passing to the eastward o f her, under orders to join Adm iral Tovey, were narrowly missed by salvoes of heavy shells falling one to two miles over the Fleet flagship.

A t 1600 a salvo from the Warspite straddled the Cesare at a range of 26,200 yards and a hit was observed at the base of her foremost funnel. The effect was immediate; the enemy ships altered course aw ay and began to make smoke. T h e shell had exploded on the upper deck casing, starting several fires and killing or wounding 98 men. Four boilers were put out of action and her speed dropped to 18 knots, causing the ship to drop back on the Cavour. This meant that Adm iral Campioni had lost the margin of speed on which he was relying to counter-balance the superiority of the British gunfire, and he decided to break off the action without more ado. Accordingly he altered course to west and later to 230°, and ordered those destroyers suitably

1 The Italian 4th Division, Barbiano and Giussano. Neither was hit. The two ships altered right round to port and after steering to the southward for a few minutes passed astern of their battleships on a north-westerly course and took no further part in the action. The other two ships of the division, the Cadorna and Diaz, had been detached a couple of hours earlier to Messina, suffering from engine trouble.

placed to lay smoke and attack the enemy fleet, though he recognised that in broad daylight against practically untouched ships they were unlikely to achieve material success. A ll he hoped was that they might delay the enemy from closing during the critical stage of disengaging.

The 11 arspite at 1602 tried to close the range by altering course to 310°. The Malaya, by then in station bearing 180° from her, fired four salvoes at extreme range, but all fell short. Three more salvoes, fired by her at 1608, had an equally disappointing result. The Royal Sovereign, unable to close the Warspite nearer than three miles, took no part in the action. A t 1604 the enemy battleships became obscured by smoke, and the Warspite ceased fire, having got off 17 salvoes.

Just as this engagement between the battleships was ending, the Eagle’s striking force attacked Admiral Paladini’s 8-inch cruisers. After passing over the Warspite, the Swordfish had a bird’s-eye view o f both fleets opening fire and noticed several salvoes straddling the Warspite. W hen two-thirds o f the w ay towards the enemy they came under A. A. fire at 6,000 feet. The enemy fleet, partially obscured by smoke, seemed to be in some confusion with 15-inch shell straddling their ships. Observing two large ships1 at the head of a line of cruisers, the squadron leader, Lieutenant-Commander A. J. Debenham, decided to attack the leading ship, which at the moment was turning in a circle. After the attack by sub-flights had commenced this ship became more distinct; though it then seemed probable she was a Bolzano class cruiser and not a battleship, he decided not to call o ff the attack. Anti-aircraft fire became general during the final approach, which was made at 1605 in three sub-flights from ahead. All the aircraft dropped their torpedoes successfully on the enemy ship s starboard side between her bow and beam bearings. Observers in the Neptune testified to the determined manner in which the attack was made. O n account of smoke from the ships’ guns the aircraft crews were unable to establish definite claims to results, but five members reported individually having seen columns o f water, smoke, or an explosion. O n the strength of this evidence it was assumed that at least one torpedo got home, but it is now known that this was not the case.2

M eanwhile, the cruisers had renewed their action. The 7th Cruiser Squadron, steering 3 I0°) endeavoured to close the enemy, who at 1556 reopened an accurate fire. The Orion replied at 1559, her target being a Bolzano class cruiser (A) bearing 287°, range 23,000 yards. A t 1600, the Neptune and Sydney opened fire respectively at the second and fourth enemy cruisers from the right, and the I.iverpool followed suit two minutes later. The course o f the Squadron was altered to o io° and then 070°, but as the enemy was seen to be turning away at 1606, course o io° was resumed.

About this time, too, the destroyer flotillas were coming into action. T hey had been ordered at 1545 to join the 7th Cruiser Squadron, and after their unpleasant experience among the “ overs ” while passing the Warspite, were reformed at 1555 by Captain P. J. M ack, the Senior Captain (D), on course 350 in the following order:—14th D.F. Nubian, Mohawk, Juno, Janus.2nd D.F. Hyperion, Hero, Hereward, Hostile, Hasty, Ilex (in single line ahead

25 knots on bearing 140° from Nubian).10th D.F. Stuart, Dainty, Defender, Decoy (in single line ahead 27 knots on

bearing 220° from Nubian).From 1602 and 1605 the two leading flotillas (14th and 10th) came under

1 3rd Division, Trento, Bolzano.2 “ The 3rd Division was attacked by torpedo aircraft, three of which were shot down; the

torpedoes were avoided by manoeuvring ” . Italian Official History.

14 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940 ACTION OFF CALABRIA: PHASE 3 15

heavy fire from the enemy cruisers but were not hit. The enemy destroyers were observed at this time by the Warspite moving across to starboard from the enemy’s van, and at 1607 two destroyer salvoes could be seen landing close to the Stuart.

A t 1609 the Warspite fired six salvoes at a cruiser bearing 313°, range 24,600 yards, which had drawn ahead o f the enemy battleships. A minute later the tracks o f three or more torpedoes were seen passing through the 14th Flotilla.

A t 161 1, the Orion shifted target to the right-hand cruiser bearing 308° range20,300 yards,1 which was then the only ship within range. The Sydney’ too fired a few salvoes at this ship, her previous target having become very indistinct. The Neptune straddled her target which she claimed to have hit, and the Liverpool straddled with her fifth salvo, after which the enemy ships altered course away, throwing her salvoes out for line. During this period of the action, a hot fire from the enemy destroyers, which were moving up to gain a position for attack, was a constant source o f annoyance to the British cruisers.. T heir guns outranged the cruisers’ 4-inch armament, but as soon as the enemy cruisers had disappeared in the smoke, the cruisers turned their 6-inch guns on to these hornets, which were quickly silenced and driven off. This ended the second phase o f the action.

1 0 . A c t io n o f f C a l a b r i a : P h a s e 3

A t the beginning o f the third phase of the action (about 1615) the genera position was thus roughly as follows:—

The Italian Fleet was withdrawing to the westward, the damaged Cesare and Cavour sorting themselves out behind a smoke screen on a westerly course and the cruisers gradually conforming on north-westerly courses.2 Their destroyers were either laying smoke, or proceeding to positions suitable for attack on the British; one flotilla was already firing on Adm iral T ovey ’s cruisers.

Turning to the British, the battleships on a north-westerly course were endeavouring to close the enemy battlefleet, with the destroyer flotillas bearing about 030° from the Warspite— steering to join Adm iral Tovey, then some nine miles north o f the Warspite; the 7th Cruiser Squadron had turned back to o io° to conform with the enemy’s turn away, and was engaging the 8-inch cruisers.

A t 1614 the signal for our destroyers to counter-attack the enemy destroyers was made. T h e flotillas were then about four miles N .N .E. o f the Warspite-, speed was increased to 29 knots and course altered to 270 to close the enemy, each flotilla manoeuvring as necessary to clear the others and keep their lines of fire open. Speed was increased to 30 knots at 1617 and at the same time the 7th Cruiser Squadron altered course to 340° in support3 but four minutes later altered away to 040° to avoid fouling our destroyers.

The 10th Destroyer Flotilla opened fire at 1619 on an enemy destroyer ahead, range 12,600 yards, and the Stuart’s first salvo appeared to h it.4 The

1 It is difficult to reconcile this relative position with the Italian movements as shown on their plan.

2 If the impressions of the Eagle's striking force are correct, the fleet was in considerably greater disorder than the parade ground precision of their movements, shewn in the plan subsequently produced by them, would imply (see Plan 4).

3 About this time the Orion thought she scored a hit on the bridge of a destroyer of theMaestrale class, bearing 303°, range 175100 yards; but the Italians state that no such hit wasobtained.

* This is not confirmed by Italian sources.

OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940

2nd D.F. opened fire at 1626 on a destroyer bearing 290°, range 14,000 yards, and the 14th D.F. at 1629 on one ° f two destroyers bearing 278°, range 12,400 yards.

Apparently at this time a number o f enemy destroyers, after working across to starboard o f their main fleet, were attempting in a half-hearted manner to make a torpedo attack. After firing their torpedoes at long range, they turned away to the westward making smoke, the second flotilla retiring through the smoke made by the leading flotilla. O n account o f these cautious tactics, our flotillas were only able spasmodically to engage targets when they presented themselves within range, uno^scured by smoke. No hits on either side were seen by the Warspite's aircraft on observation duty.

T o return to the 7th Cruiser Squadron, after turning to the north-eastward to clear the flotillas, the enemy quickly disappeared and fire was checked at 1622; at the same time a submarine was reported, which, however, proved to be the wreckage o f an aircraft. In order to place the cruisers in a better position to support the destroyers Adm iral Tovey then altered course round through south to 280°. The Orion then opened fire again on her former target, and the Neptune managed to get o ff a couple o f salvoes a t a cruiser, which showed up momentarily out of the smoke. The Sydney's target, a smoke-laying destroyer, was engaged till she became obscured; and the Liverpool at 1625 fired four salvoes at a cruiser, range 19,000 yards, before she also disappeared into the smoke screen. A t 1628, course was altered to 180°; the Orion, Neptune and Sydney fired occasional salvoes whenever they caught fleeting glimpses o f enemy destroyers, and four minutes later Adm iral Tovey hauled round to 210° in pursuit o f the enemy. At 1634, with all their targets rapidly disappearing in the smoke, the 7th Cruiser Squadron ceased fire. This marked the end o f the cruiser action, apart from a few salvoes fired by a ship invisible to our cruisers at 1641. The principal feature o f its desultory character was the unanimous determination o f the enemy cruisers to avoid close action. This they achieved with conspicuous success.

The Commander-in-Chief, meanwhile, in the Warspite, with the Malaya in company and the Royal Sovereign about three miles astern, had been steering a mean course 3130 at 20 knots, and by 1630 was nearing the enemy’s smoke screen. Several enemy signals had been intercepted, saying that he was

constrained to retire ” at 20 knots and ordering his flotillas to make smoke, and to attack with torpedoes; there was also a warning that they were approaching the submarine line. “ These signals,” — wrote Adm iral Cunning­ham afterwards— “ together with my own appreciation o f the existing situation, made it appear unwise and playing the enemy’s own game to plunge straight into the smoke screen.” 1 He therefore altered course to starboard to 340° at I®35> *-° work round to the northward and to windward o f the smoke. A few minutes later enemy destroyers came in view and between 1639 and 1641 the Warspite fired five salvoes o f 6-inch and the Malaya one salvo at them and they disappeared into the smoke. The proceedings were enlivened by the first appearance that day o f the Italian A ir Force, which carried out an ineffective bombing attack on the Warspite at 1641.

The fitful engagement continued until 1649, our destroyers seizing every opportunity involuntarily offered by the enemy as he bolted in and out o f the smoke cover. A t 1640 two torpedoes were seen passing astern o f the Nubian, and at 1647 she observed one of two enemy destroyers apparently hit and dropping astern. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla passed through the smoke, while the 14th tried to work round it to the northward. A ll endeavours to get to close quarters were unsuccessful, and at 1654 orders were received from

1 C.-in-C.’s Report (in M .05369/41).

ACTION OFF CALABRIA: ITALIAN AIR ATTACKS, 9 t h JU LY 1 7

the Commander-in-Chief, who three minutes earlier had altered course to 270 , to rejoin the 7th Cruiser Squadron. W hen the destroyers finally cleared the smoke screen at 1700, the enemy was out of sight, having retired to the south- westward in the direction o f his bases.

The flotillas then proceeded as necessary to join Vice-Adm iral Tovey, who was to the north o f the Warspite steering 280° at 27 knots, taking stations in accordance with Destroyer Cruising Order No. 3.1

T o the east, the striking force was just getting back to the Eagle', all the Swordfish landed on safely at 1705. Another striking force was being got ready, but it could not be despatched before the general recall o f aircraft was made at 1750. During the engagement the Eagle had also maintained aircraft, as available, on reconnaissance, as well as one acting as spotter for the Royal Sovereign.

The surface action was over; its indecisive character at all stages was due to the “ safety first ” tactics o f the Italians. Throughout its course, their cruisers had kept at extreme ranges, the battleships called for smoke protection as soon as one was hit, and the destroyers— dodging in and out o f the smoke screen— fired a few torpedoes at long range and then withdrew at their best speed. W ith the British Fleet between them and their main base (Taranto), they were hurriedly seeking shelter in other bases to the south and west. It was now the turn of the Italian A ir Force to see if it could do better against Admiral Cunningham ’s fleet.

11 . A c t io n o f f C a l a b r i a : I t a l i a n A i r A t t a c k s , 9 t h J u l y

The first appearance of enemy aircraft on the scene, as already mentioned, was at 1640— just as the surface action was petering out5—when the Warspite was attacked. From then till about 1930, the Fleet was subjected to a series of heavy bombing attacks by shore-based aircraft.

The Warspite and the Eagle were particularly singled out as targets, each being attacked five times;2 but the 7th Cruiser Squadron received numerous attacks and many bombs fell near the destroyers. A t 1654, the Orion fired on a formation o f nine aircraft which attempted to bomb the flotillas. Vice- Admiral Tovey effectively disposed his cruisers in a diamond formation to resist these attacks, which were frequent till 1920.

Most o f the bombing was extremely wild, from heights of between 10,000 and 15,000 feet, carried out by formations o f aircraft varying in numbers from nine to a single aircraft, but generally in formations of three. No ships were hit during any o f the attacks, but there were numerous near misses and a few minor casualties from splinters. T he Malaya claimed to have damaged two aircraft by A .A . fire, but none was seen to fall.

During this period o f the action the coast o f Italy was in sight, the high land of Calabria showing up prominently as the sun got lower in the West.

About 600 miles to the westward, Vice-Adm iral Somerville with Force “ H ” , who was then south o f M inorca on his w ay to carry out the diversionary attack on Cagliari, which had been arranged for the next morning, was under­going a similar experience at much the same time. Adm iral Somerville, deeming that the risk of damage to the Ark Royal outweighed the importance of a secondary operation, cancelled the proposed attack and returned to

1 14th D.F. in the centre, 2nd D.F., to port, and 10th D.F. to starboard.

2 Warspite at 1641, 1715, 1735, 1823, 1911; Eagle at i 743> I8og, 1826, 1842, 1900. Norecords of times or numbers of attacks on other ships are available.

18 OPERATION M A .5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940

G ibraltar.1 No damage was suffered from the air attacks, but the destroyer Escort was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine on the return passage two days later.

1 2 . F l e e t M o v e m e n t s a f t e r A c t io n (Plan 1)

To return to the Italians.The sudden retirement behind the smoke screens had naturally thrown the

fleet into considerable disorder and the manoeuvre had not been helped by the F .A .A . attack on the Bolzano which had developed a few minutes later. The battleships steered a westerly course till about 1615 and then steadied on 230 , the other squadrons steering to the north-westward and gradually conforming.

By 1645 t!le Cesare’s boilers had again been connected up, and Admiral Campioni considered the possibility o f pushing towards Taranto and regaining contact with the British Fleet. Nothing could be seen o f the enemy, owing to the smoke screens, and he had received no report o f his movements since 1615; but he knew that their battleships were by that time concentrated and there would be danger of his being forced on to the Calabrian coast by their gunfire. He therefore decided to steer for the Sicilian ports. Shortage o f fuel in his available destroyers prevented him from sending them to locate the enemy and subsequently attempt a night attack.

From this time onwards the various units o f the fleet were repeatedly bombed by their own shore-based aircraft.2 “ Signals were made with searchlights, wireless messages were sent, national flags were spread on the turrets and decks— but without results. Ships frequently replied with gunfire to the dropping of the bombs.” 3 The marksmanship o f the Italian pilots seems to have been no better on their own ships than on the British for none was hit “ due to the quickness of the ships’ manoeuvring but the attacks kept the fleet in disorder, and it was not till 1800 that it was reformed, the light cruiser squadrons and destroyers then taking station to the east and south-eastward and the heavy cruisers disposed to the north-westward o f the battleships.

A t 1930 the destroyers which had been fuelling rejoined his flag, and the various units o f the fleet arrived at Augusta, Messina and Palermo in the course o f the evening— the majority, by order o f the Ministry of Marine, sailing for Naples early on 10th July.

The British Fleet, meanwhile, had continued steering 270° from 1700 to 1735= 9th July. As it was plainly evident that the enemy had no intention of renewing the action and that it was impossible to intercept him, the Commander- in-Chief, being then about 25 miles from the Calabrian coast, altered the course o f the fleet to 200°. A t 1830 the destroyers were ordered to resume their screening formations on the battleships and at 1910 the Gloucester was ordered to rejoin Vice-Adm iral Tovey. A couple o f alterations o f course were made to open the land.

An interesting decision as illustrating the considerations which should govern the acceptance01 risks. The Ark Royal, our only large modern carrier in the Mediterranean, was of unique importance. Already a major attack on Italian battleships (subsequently carried out at laranto in November 1940) was under consideration. Under these circumstances, Admiral bomeralle declined to accept the risk to her for the sake of a subsidiary operation. It is to be noted that he had no hesitation in accepting a greater risk to her in connection with the bom­bardment of Genoa the following February. In war, risks must often be accepted, but the object should always be adequate.

Bftween 1643 and 1750» 12 attacks were carried out by formations of varying strength usually three at a time. After a pause of about an hour, the attacks recommenced and between 1044 ano 2110 a further 11 attacks— the last in the Messina Strait— were carried out.

3 Italian Official History of the War at Sea.

A n enemy destroyer was believed to have been severely damaged, but on account o f shortage o f fuel in his own destroyers, Sir Andrew Cunningham reluctantly decided not to detach a force to deal with her. The last information o f the enemy fleet received from the Warspite's aircraft reported it in 37 54 ^ ■> 160 2 1 ' E. (about 10 miles from Cape Spartivento) at 1905, steering 230° at 18 knots.

A t 2115, 9th, Adm iral Cunnigham altered course to 220 for a position south o f M alta. During the night, which passed without incident, eight destroyers (Stuart, Dainty, Defender, Hyperion, Hostile, Hasty, Ilex, Juno) were detached to arrive at M alta at 0500, 10th, to complete with fuel.1

T he Vice-Adm iral, M alta, had been told to delay the sailing of the convoys for Alexandria. However, “ on hearing that the fleets were engaged, he wisely decided that the Italians would be too busy to attend to convoys, so sailed the fast convoy ” 2— M .F. 1— escorted by the Diamond, Jervis and Vendetta (Lieutenant R. Rhoades, R .A .N .) at 2300, 9th July.

MOVEMENTS AND F.A.A. ATTACK ON PO RT AUGUSTA, 10t h JULY 19

1 3 . M o v e m e n t s a n d F.A.A. A t t a c k o n P o r t A u g u s t a , 1 0 t h J u l y

A t 0800, 10th July, the fleet was in 350 24' N., 150 27' E. (about 50 milesE.S.E. o f M alta), steering west, and throughout the day cruised to the south of M alta, while the destroyers were fuelling. A n air raid took place on M alta at 0855, but no destroyer was hit. Three or four enemy aircraft were shot down. T h e second group (Hero, Hereward, Decoy, Vampire, Voyager) proceeded to M alta at 1525, the last three being ordered to sail with Convoy M .S. 1. Shortly after noon, the Gloucester and later the Stuart were detached to join Convoy M .F .i.

A fiying-boat reconnaissance o f Port Augusta having reported three cruisers and eight destroyers in harbour there, the Eagles striking force of nine Sword­fish aircraft was flown off at 1850, 10th, to make a dusk attack. Unfortunately, the enemy force had left before it arrived, and the only ships found were a destroyer of the Navigatori class and an oil tanker of 6,000 tons in a small bay to the northward. The destroyer— the Leone Pancaldo— was hit by two torpedoes and sank after breaking in two; the tanker also was hit. A ll the aircraft returned safely, landing at M alta.

A t 2000, 10th, the 7th Cruiser Squadron was ordered to search to the eastward in the wake of Convoy M .F. 1; and half an hour later the Royal Sovereign, Nubian, Mohawk and Janus were sent in to M alta to refuel. As they neared the island, an air raid on the neighbourhood o f Calafrana was seen to be in progress. The ships entered harbour at midnight and left at 0430, 1 ith to rejoin the Commander-in-Chief. The remainder o f the fleet at 2100 steered 180° from position 350 28' N ., 14° 30 E., till 0130, 11th July, when course was altered to the north for a rendezvous at 0800.

In view o f the bombing attacks experienced on the 8th and 9th July, the Air Officer, C .-in-C., M iddle East, was requested to do everything possible to occupy the Italian air forces while the fleet and convoys were on passage to Alexandria.

14 . P a s s a g e t o A l e x a n d r i a , 1 1t h - 1 5 t h J u l y (Plan 5)

A t 0800, n t h July, the ships which had been fuelling rejoined the flag in

1 The Stuart had only 15 tons of oil remaining on arrival.2 Cunningham of Hyndhope. A Sailor's Odyssey, English edition, p. 263.

35° I0, N., 150 00' E., and the Eagle landed on her air striking force from M alta.

The slow convoy, M .S .i, escorted by the Decoy, Vampire and Voyager had left M alta at 2100, 10th, and at 0900, 11th, the Commander-in-Chief in the Warspite, screened by the Nubian, Mohawk, Juno and Janus (Force “ B ” ) 1 went on ahead at 19 knots for Alexandria, while Rear-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell in the Royal Sovereign, with the Malaya, Eagle and remaining destroyers (Force “ C ” )2 proceeded on a mean line o f advance 080°, 12 knots, to cover the passage o f the convoys. Vice-Adm iral Tovey, who after being detached had kept to the southward o f the track o f convoy M S .i, closing to about 20 miles from it at daylight, was then about 80 miles to the eastward of the Warspite, and had just opened fire on a shadowing aircraft which had appeared a few minutes previously. Considering that the protection against air attack which cruisers of the Orion class could give to the slow convoy was not o f sufficient value to justify closing it, the Vice-Adm iral decided to continue on a south­easterly course until he was 150 miles from Sicily, when he altered course to 045° and took up a covering position.

As expected, it was not long before air attacks commenced. Between 1248 and 1815, 11th, 66 bombs were aimed at the Warspite and her destroyers in five attacks.3 Force “ C ” — which had already experienced a submarine alarm, when the Defender attacked a contact at 0955, without result— suffered13 bombing attacks, mostly directed against the Eagle, between 1111 and 1804, about 120 bombs being dropped. The Malaya and the Royal Sovereign each claimed to have damaged an aircraft and one was shot down by a Gladiator in the course of these attacks. It was remarked that the attacks at lowest levels were made on destroyers, and that the seaplanes came in lower than other types o f aircraft.

Convoy M .S .i was attacked four times. None o f the ships was damaged, and there was only one casualty— M r. J. H. Endicott, Commissioned Gunner o f the Vampire, who died after transference to the Mohawk. Convoy M .S .i was overhauled by the Warspite at 1500, and the Janus was then ordered to exchange stations with the Vampire in the convoy escort.

Further east, Adm iral T ovey’s cruisers also were bombed. Between 1445 and 1500, they were attacked by 15 aircraft in waves o f three. No damage was done to either side, though one stick o f bombs fell close to the Neptune. After the attack an attempt to evade further attacks was made by altering course to 225° for 75 minutes, after which course 070° was resumed but this proved unsuccessful, for another attack developed at 1812, when eight bombs

all very bad shots ” — fell ahead of the Orion. These aircraft, flying very high, were not engaged before they dropped their bombs. Another attack occurred at 1930, the bombs again falling wide. O ne aircraft hit in this attack made off to the north-west, then turned eastward losing height and with smoke coming from one of its engines. It was thought unlikely that it reached its base 180 miles away.

T he night o f n th /12 th July passed quietly. The Commander-in-Chief, who was in 340 22 N., 190 17 ' E. at 2100, n th , continued to the eastward, steering n o °. Force “ C ” , after operating aircraft, at 2000, n th , feinted to the north-west for an hour and a half, before turning to 150° at 2130, in order to keep to the westward o f convoy M .S. 1. A t 0254, 12th July, the Hasty attacked a submarine contact. The 7th Cruiser Squadron, which had been ordered to join the Commander-in-Chief at 0800, 12th July, steered so as to

1 Less Decoy.2 Less Vampire and Voyager.3 The Warspite was shadowed during the day by aircraft which transmitted “ longs ” by

W /T at intervals to direct the attacking aircraft.

20 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JU LY 1940 PASSAGE TO ALEXANDRIA, 1 1t h - 1 5 t h JU LY 21

approach the rendezvous from the northward. It sighted the Warspite at 0638, 12th; the Orion and Neptune were then detached to join Convoy M .F .i, the Liverpool and Sydney remaining in company with the Commander-in-Chief.

During this day, 12th July, the bombing attacks on the Warspite were intensified. Between 0850 and 1550, in seventeen attacks about 160 bombs1 were dropped. The Warspite was straddled three times2 and there were several near misses, splinters from one killing three ratings in the Liverpool, and wounding her executive officer and five ratings. As a result o f these attacks course was altered to close the Egyptian coast and No. 252 W ing was asked to send out fighter aircraft, but when these arrived late in the afternoon the attacks had ceased. Force “ C ” , after flying o ff A /S patrols at dawn, had sighted Convoy M .S .i at 0621, 12th. A t 0925 the Defender was detached to find and escort the oiler British Union to Alexandria. As regards bombing, Force “ C ” got o ff lightly on this day, only three attacks being made between 1110 and 1804; 25 bombs were dropped, all o f which fell wide. Haze overhead made sighting o f aircraft difficult. The Dainty reported passing the body of an Italian airman at 1848.

Vice-Adm iral Tovey with the Orion and Neptune, on parting company with the Com mander-in-Chief at 0730, 12th, had set course 1150, 25 knots, in search o f the fast convoy. Between 0850 and 0950 the two cruisers were attacked by 30 aircraft without result, and again at 1312 by a solitary aircraft, which dropped four bombs near the Neptune. The effect o f these attacks was to deflect the ships to the northward, so that they did not gain touch with Convoy M .F .i— then about 150 miles from Alexandria— till 1825. After passing the morning rendezvous to the Gloucester, the Orion and Neptune pro­ceeded on course 080° to keep clear during the night and arrived at Alexandria at 0645 next morning (13th July). The Commander-in-Chief, in the Warspite, with the Liverpool, Sydney and destroyers had arrived three-quarters o f an hour earlier, and Convoy M .F .i, with escort, arrived at 0900. The Ramillies (Captain H . T . Baillie-Grohman), screened by the Havock (Commander R. E. Courage), Imperial, Diamond and Vendetta, was then sailed to meet and cover Convoy M .S .i.

M eanwhile Rear-Adm iral Pridham-W ippell with Force “ C ” had been slowly working to the eastward, adjusting his advance to keep to the westward o f Convoy M .S .i. A t nightfall 12th July, course was set to pass rather closer to Ras el T in than to Gavdo, but as a result o f instructions from the Commander- in-Chief, an alteration to 085°, in order to increase the distance from the Libyan coast, was made at 0215, 13th. Some three hours later (0524) the Capetown (Captain T . H. Back) flying the flag o f the Rear-Adm iral, 3rd Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral E. de F. Renouf) and the Caledon (Captain C . P. Clarke), which had sailed from Alexandria the previous day to meet Convoy M .S .i about 60 miles S.W . o f G avdo, hove in sight. These two cruisers then took over M .S .i and Force “ C ” went on for Alexandria.

The first warning of trouble from the air came at 0802, when one o f the Eagle’s Gladiators reported a shadower, which it shot down a little later. Air attacks on Force “ C ” began at 1056 and continued till 1622. From m o to 1300 the attacks were too numerous to record precisely, the Eagle being the favourite target. The attackers found she could hit back, however, two of them being shot down by the Gladiators and a third so seriously damaged as to prevent its return home. A destroyer was sent to pick up the only airman

1 The Commander-in-Chief’s report (in M.05369) puts this number as 300. The number 160 is taken from the Warspite’s detailed return of the attack, enclosed in the C.-in-C.’s report.

2 The Commander-in-Chief subsequently remarked that “ the most unpleasant attack on Warsbite at 1530, 12th July, resulted in 24 bombs along port side and 12 across starboard bow simultaneously, all within 1 cable but slightly out of line ” (Mediterranean War Diary).

2 2 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JULY 1940

seen to come down, but no body was found. The average height of the attacking aircraft was about 12,000 feet; although there were several near misses and straddles, no damage was done to any o f the ships.

A t 1210, 13th, Force “ C ” steered to close the coast o ff Mersa M atruh, in compliance with orders from the Com mander-in-Chief and at 1800 course was altered to the east-north-east to adjust the time o f arrival at Alexandria next morning. Force “ C ” entered harbour at 0815, 14th July, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, Ramillies and Convoy M .S .i on the morning o f the 15th, thus bringing operation M .A .5 to a successful conclusion.

1 5 . R e m a r k s o n A c t io n o f f C a l a b r ia

Commenting on the action o f 9th July, the Commander-in-Chief, M edi­terranean, remarked:—

“ It is still not clear w hat brought the enemy fleet to sea on this occasion, but it seems probable that it was engaged on an operation designed to cover the movement o f a convoy to L ibya. W hen our fleet was reported south o f Crete it seems that the enemy retired close to his bases, fuelled his destroyers by relays, and then w aited hoping to draw us into an engagement in his own waters (under cover of his A ir Force and possibly w ith a submarine concentration to the southward of him) whence he could use his superior speed to w ithdraw at his own time.

“ I f these were, in fact, the enem y’s intentions he was not altogether disappointed, but the submarines, i f there were any in the vicinity o f the action, did not materialise and, fortunately for us, his air attacks failed to synchronise w ith the gun action.

“ It will be noted that the whole action took place at very long range and that the Warspite was the only capital ship w hich got within range o f the enemy battle­ships. Malaya fired a few salvoes which fell some 3,000 yards short. Royal Sovereign, owing to her lack of speed, never got into action at all.

“ Warspite’s hit on one o f the enemy battleships at 26,000 yards range might perhaps be described as a lucky one. Its tactical effect was to induce the enemy to turn aw ay and break o ff the action, w hich was unfortunate, but strategically it probably has had an im portant effect on Italian mentality.

“ T h e torpedo attacks by the Fleet A ir A rm were disappointing, one hit on a cruiser being all that can be claim ed,1 but in fairness it must be recorded that the pilots had had very little practice, and none at high speed targets, Eagle having only recently joined the Fleet after having been employed on the Indian O cean trade routes.

“ T h e enem y’s gunnery seemed good at first and he straddled quickly, but accuracy soon fell o ff as his ships came under our fire.

“ O u r cruisers— there were only four in action— were badly outnumbered and at times came under a very heavy fire. T h ey were superbly handled by V ice- Adm iral J . C . T ovey, C .B ., D .S .O ., w ho by his skilful m anoeuvring managed to m aintain a position in the van and to hold the enemy cruiser squadrons, and at the same time avoid dam age to his own force. Warspite was able to assist him with her fire in the early stages o f the action.

“ T h e enem y’s smoke tactics were impressive and the smoke screens laid by his destroyers were very effective in completely covering his high speed retirement. W ith his excess speed of at least five knots there was little hope of catching him once he had decided to break o ff the action. A n aircraft torpedo hit on one o f his battleships was the only chance and this unfortunately did not occur. . . .

“ A feature o f the action was the value, and in some cases the amusement, derived from intercepted enemy signals. W e were fortunate in having the Italian Fleet Code, and some o f his signals were made in plain language. . . .

“ M y remarks on the bombing attacks experienced by the Fleet during the course o f these operations are contained in m y signal timed 1619 o f 14th July 1940.2

1 Actually no torpedo hit was obtained by the F.A.A. According to the Italians, three 6-inch shell hits on the Bolzano was the only damage suffered by the 8-inch cruisers.

2 See Appendix C.

REMARKS ON ACTION OFF CALABRIA 23

“ I cannot conclude these remarks without a reference to H .M .S . Eagle. This obsolescent aircraft carrier, w ith only 17 Swordfish embarked, found and kept touch w ith the enemy fleet, flew o ff two striking forces o f nine torpedo bombers within the space of four hours, both o f w hich attacked, and all aircraft returned. 24 hours later a torpedo striking force was launched on shipping in Port Augusta and through­out the five days’ operations Eagle maintained constant A /S patrols in daylight and carried out several searches. M uch of the Eagle’s aircraft operating work was done in the fleeting intervals between, and even during, bom bing attacks and I consider her performance reflects great credit on Captain A . M . Bridge, R oyal N avy, her Com m anding Officer.

“ T he meagre material results derived from this brief meeting w ith the Italian fleet were naturally very disappointing to one and all under m y command, but the action was not without value. It must have shown the Italians that their A ir Force and submarines cannot stop our fleet penetrating into the Central M edi­terranean and that only their main fleet can seriously interfere w ith our operating there. It established, I think, a certain degree o f m oral ascendancy since, although superior in battleships, our fleet was heavily outnumbered in cruisers and destroyers and the Italians had strong shore-based air forces within easy range compared to our few carrier-borne aircraft. On our side the action has shown those without previous w ar experience how difficult it is to hit w ith the gun at long range, and therefore the necessity of closing in, when this can be done, in order to get decisive results. It showed that high level bom bing even on the heavy and accurate scale experienced during these operations, yields few hits and that it is more alarming than dangerous.

“ Finally, these operations and the action off Calabria produced throughout the fleet a determination to overcome the air menace and not to let it interfere with our freedom o f manoeuvre, and hence our control o f the M editerranean.” 1

The Italian Official History contains a lengthy review o f the operations. M uch o f it deals with topical and technical matters, and with Adm iral Campioni’s reasons for the decisions he took, all o f which seem to have been approved by the Ministry o f Marine. The latter in their remarks stress the value o f the information received by wireless interception in the early stages of operation M .A .5, and from reconnaissance aircraft on 8th July. O n the other hand failure of air reconnaissance on the gth embarrassed Admiral Campioni in the early stages of the approach.

As regards the action they were impressed by the advantage conferred on the British Fleet by the presence o f an aircraft carrier:—

“ English reconnaissance aircraft were able to follow our fleet undisturbed, providing valuable information all the time to their Com m ander-in-Chief, because of our failure to stop them owing to our shore-based fighters being out o f range, and not possessing an aircraft carrier w ith our fleet.

“ T h e presence o f an aircraft carrier w ith the English fleet, besides permitting them to fight o ff the activities o f our aircraft, both bombers and reconnaissance, allowed the enemy to carry out attacks w ith torpedo aircraft w hich, although frustrated by ships’ manoeuvring, interfered w ith the formations attacked and so delayed their rejoining the remainder o f our forces.”

Naturally, as Adm iral Cunningham remarked, there was considerable disappointment in the Mediterranean Fleet that the Italians had managed to evade close action. Nevertheless, this first encounter set the tone, as it were, for the whole naval war in the Mediterranean and was the first step in establishing that moral ascendancy which Sir Andrew Cunningham — with numerically inferior forces— maintained against the Italians till their capitula­tion in 1943.

It was no doubt recognition o f this aspect which in some measure prompted

1 C.-in-C.’s report, in M.05369/41.

24 OPERATION M.A.5 AND ACTION OFF CALABRIA, JULY 1940

the message from the Admiralty received by the Commander-in-Chief on 17th Ju ly:—

“ T heir Lordships have read w ith great satisfaction your telegraphic report o f operations carried out between 7th and 13 th July, and wish to congratulate you and all concerned on the determined and efficient manner in w hich they were conducted.”

CHAPTER II

(Battle Summary No. 2)

Action off Cape Spada, Crete19th July 1940

1 6 . P l a n f o r O p e r a t i o n s i n A e g e a n

W IT H IN A W E E K o f the conclusion o f Operation M .A .5, a fortuitous encounter between H .M .A .S. Sydney with five destroyers and two Italian 6-inch gun cruisers resulted in the sinking o f one o f the latter, and

must have accentuated Italian doubts as to their control o f the Mediterranean which m ay have been engendered by the brief engagement off Calabria ten days previously.

It was Adm iral Sir Andrew Cunningham ’s policy to use his light forces in periodic sweeps as a means o f countering the activities o f Italian submarines in areas through which British convoys had to pass, and at the same time attacking Italian shipping.

O n 17th July 1940 orders were issued for such an operation which was to consist o f a submarine hunt towards Kaso Strait and round the north coast o f Crete by four destroyers, combined with a sweep by a cruiser and one destroyer into the G u lf o f Athens for Italian shipping. T h e cruiser was to be prepared to support the destroyers in case of need.1 The forces for these operations were organised in two groups, viz.,— -

1 The operation orders were contained in the two signals from Vice-Admiral Tovey (V.A.(D)) following:—

(i) To: D(2), repeated to C.-in-C., C.S.3, R.A.(L), Hero, Hanock, Hasty, Ilex, Sydiey. IM PO RTAN T. Carry out following operation. Object destruction of U-boats. Leave Alexandria 0001 tomorrow, Thursday, with Hyperion, Ilex, Hero, Hasty. Sweep to Kaso Strait to pass through about 2130, then along north coast Crete to pass through Antikithera Channel about 0600C, 19th July, then to Alexandria to arrive 0800C, 20th July. Sydney and Havock will support as in my 1451/17. (T.O.O.1447/17.)

(ii) To: Sydney, repeated to Ilex, Havock, R.A.(L), C.S.3, Hero, C.-in-C., D(2), Hasty. IM PO RTAN T. M y 1447. Carry out following operation. Objects support of force under D(a) and interception of Italian shipping in Gulf of Athens. Leave Alexandria with Havock at 0430, tomorrow Thursday. Pass through Kaso Strait at about 2200C thence to Gulf of Athens to search for enemy shipping, then pass through Antikithera Channel to arrive Alexandria 1400C, 20th July. (T.O.O. 1451/17.)The operations ordered in the above signals were preliminary to a further submarine hunt starting on 20th July between Crete and Cyrenaica by eight destroyers, which were afterwards to sweep into the Aegean to cover a convoy for Aegean ports sailing from Alexandria on the 19th.

25

26 ACTION OFF CAPE SPADA, CRETE, 19TH JULY 1940

F o r c e “ A ” 3rd Division, 2nd D .F . under Commander (D2). Hyperion (four 4 -7-inch) Commander H. St. L. Nicolson, D .S.O . (D2). Ilex (four 4 '7-inch) Lieutenant-Commander P. L. Saumarez, D .S.C . Hero (four 4 '7-inch) Commander H. W . Biggs, D .S.O .Hasty (four 4 '7-inch) Lieutenant-Commander L. R. K . Tyrwhitt.

F o r c e “ B ”Sydney (eight 6-inch, eight 4-inch, H .A.) Captain J. A. Collins, R .A .N . Havock (four-4 '7-inch) Commander R. E. Courage, D .S .O ., D .S.C .

1 7 . M o v e m e n t s o f F o r c e s , 1 8 t h - 1 9 t h J u l y

Force “ A ” sailed from Alexandria at 0015, 18th,1 and swept towards Kaso Strait. After passing through the strait at 2130, keeping well over towards the Cretan shore to avoid being sighted from Kaso Island,2 the division steered westward at 18 knots between O vo Island and the Cretan shore. Nothing was sighted, and at 0600, 19th, course was altered to 240° to pass through the Antikithera Channel, the destroyers spread in line abreast 1} miles apart, carrying out the anti-submarine sweep at 18 knots.

Force “ B ” — the Sydney with the Havock in company— sailed from Alexandria at 0430, 18th, and after passing through Kaso Strait at 2345, steered a mean course 2950, speed of advance, 18 knots, zig-zagging on account o f full moon and improving visibility. Captain Collins seems to have found the double object given to him in the operation orders something o f an embarrassment, for he subsequently wrote that in the morning o f the 19th “ I was . . . proceeding on a westerly course about 40 miles north o f Crete in accordance with my instructions to afford support to (D)2 and destroyers . . . M y instructions included the second object o f the destruction of enemy shipping in the G ulf o f Athens. I decided however that it was my duty to remain in support of [the] destroyers until 0800, by which time they should have cleared the Antikithera Strait, although this precluded the successful achievement of the second object.” 3

M eanwhile, unknown to the British, two Italian cruisers under Vice- Adm iral F. Casardi, the Giovanni delle Bande JVire1 (flag) and Bartolomeo Colleoni4 had sailed from Tripoli at 2200, 17th July, for the Aegean. Throughout the 18th they steered to the eastward for a point 30 miles north of Derna, which they reached at 2307, 18th, and then turned to the northward. A t 0700, 19th, they were steering to enter the Aegean through the Antikithera Channel, just as Commander Nicolson’s destroyers were approaching it from the E.N.E. (See Fig. 4).

1 8 . S u r f a c e C o n t a c t (Plan 6)

A t 0722, 19th July, two Italian cruisers were sighted ahead by the Hero, the second destroyer from the northward. The Italians had sighted the destroyers about five minutes earlier, and apparently turned to head them off, as they seemed to the Hero to be steering 1600 ; but Admiral Casardi, suspecting from their formation that they were screening heavy craft, hauled round to port at about 0723 and steadied on 360°. However prudent this m ay have

1 Zone minus 3 Time is used throughout.2 One of the Dodecanese, at that time Italian.3 Report by C.O., H.M.A.S. Sydney (M.020932/40).4 Bande Nere, Colleoni armament:— eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A .: speed 34 knots.

SURFACE CONTACT 27

been it lost him an opportunity o f inflicting serious damage on the destroyers with his heavier armament.

O n sighting the enemy at 0722 Commander Nicolson at once turned his division to starboard together to course 060°, and increased speed, the destroyers concentrating in sub-divisions on the Hyperion, in accordance with previous instructions.

It was estimated that the Sydney at ogoo would be in position oio°, 55 miles from Cape Spada1, and while steering for this position Commander Nicolson endeavoured to work round to the northward. Actually, thanks to Captain

1 North-west extremity of Canea Bay, Crete.

28 ACTION OFF CAPE SPADA, CRETE, 19TH JULY 1940

Collins’ decision to give precedence to supporting the destroyers, the Sydney was a good deal nearer, and when at 0733 she received Commander Nicolson’s enemy sighting report (two enemy cruisers steering 160° bearing 2550, distant ten miles) her position was 01 o° Cape Spada 40 miles. The Hyperion gave her own position as 340° Agria Grabusa1 Light 3 miles. Acting on this information Captain Collins altered course at 0736 to 240° to close the destroyers but on receipt a minute later o f an amplifying report giving the Hyperion’s course as 060° and the enemy’s as 360°, he hauled round to 190° and commenced to work up to full speed.

1 9 . D e s t r o y e r E n g a g e m e n t w i t h I t a l i a n C r u is e r s (Plan 6)

By this time (0737) Commander Nicolson’s destroyers had been in action for 11 minutes. O ne of the enemy cruisers had opened fire at 0726 on the Hyperion and Ilex, and the latter returned the fire. W ith their engines working up fast, the speed of the destroyers reached 31 knots by 0735, and the Hyperion then opened fire with her after guns at maximum range, but ceased firing very soon as all her shots fell short. The enemy’s shooting was erratic. His salvoes fell short, throwing up red, yellow and green splashes, possibly due to the use o f identifiers. The Italian report stated that the destroyers were scarcely visible, either because of mist or the slanting rays o f the sun, which was bearing about 070° at 110 elevation.

Although the range was opening rapidly, the enemy instead o f heading in chase of the destroyers held on his course north, “ manoeuvring so as to keep at the limit o f enemy gun range and to avoid the chance o f an effective torpedo attack ” .2 These tactics again lost him a favourable chance of utilising his superior gun power. A t 0738 the enemy bore 270°, 11 miles, and the Hyperion at 0740 ordered her division to cease firing as the enemy was out o f range. Five minutes later the enemy’s fire also ceased.

A t 0747 the enemy, then bearing 270°, 14 miles, was still steering north. W ith the object o f gaining ground and o f identifying the class o f the enemy cruisers, the destroyer division altered course to 360°. A t 0753, when the enemy turned to close, course was altered back to 060°. A signal from the Commander-in-Chief to join the Sydney was received by the Hyperion at 0800, and four minutes later course was altered to 030°, with the enemy then bearing 265°, 17 miles, steering 090°. These positions were signalled to the Sydney at 0805, and course was altered a minute later to 060°. A t about this time there was sighted ahead eight miles off a Greek steamer, which turned away quickly to the northward.

Still trying to work to the northward, the destroyers’ course was altered to 040° at 0814 and to 030° at 0821. The enemy reopened fire at 0825, but again his shooting was very short and erratic. He ceased fire after five minutes, and was then observed to be altering course to the southward.

This was due to the sudden arrival o f the Sydney. Commander Nicolson had kept her informed o f his movements and those o f the enemy. Captain Collins on the other hand had been careful to preserve W /T silence to avoid disclosing the presence of the Sydney.3 In this he was entirely successful. He had altered course at 0800 to 150° and shortly afterwards signals arrived from the

1 Island off C. Busa, north-west extremity of Crete.2 N.I.D. 1900/48. Report of Admiral Casardi to Ministry of Marine.8 “ I realised that I was placing Commander . . . Nicolson . . . in an awkward position and

running a certain degree of risk of non-contact by not informing him of my position, course and speed by W /T on getting his enemy report. I was however determined to make full use of surprise . . . I appreciated that, if I made a wireless signal, the enemy would learn that other forces were in the vicinity and make away back through the Straits ” (Report by C.O.,H.M.A.S. Sydney).

H.M.A.S. STD N E T ENGAGES ENEMY CRUISERS 29

Commander-in-Chief directing the destroyers to join the Sydney and the latter to support them. Further alterations o f course were made at 0815 to 160° and at 0820 to 1200; at 0826 the enemy ships, steering 090°, were sighted bearing 188°, range 23,000 yards, about 20° before the starboard beam, and three minutes later the Sydney opened fire on the Bande Nere at a range of 20,000 yards.

The gun flashes were seen away on the port beam o f the Hyperion and at 0832 the Sydney and Havock could be seen bearing 2 9 0 1 0 miles— a welcome sight. Commander Nicolson by then steering 020° at once altered course, first to 240° then to 260° and formed the division in line ahead.1 The enemy cruisers, then 17,400 yards distant, were by that time steaming fast to the south-eastward making heavy black smoke, and at 0836 the Hyperion led round to 170°, in order to get to a position of torpedo advantage on their bow.

20. H .M .A .S. Sydney E n g a g e s E n e m y C r u is e r s (Plan 6)

W hen the Sydney opened fire on the Bande Nere at 0829, she took the Italians completely by surprise. They were then engaged with the destroyers on their other side and the first intimation they had of her presence was the arrival o f her salvoes. Low-lying mist partially concealed the new enemy, which was thought to consist o f two cruisers. Adm iral Casardi at once altered course some 40° away steadying on about 1 150, and at 0832 the Italians returned the fire, concentrating on the Sydney’s gunflashes, which were all they could see. Their salvoes fell short at first, then over, with an occasional straddle.

The Sydney continued on a south-easterly course to meet the destroyer division and at the same time to close the enemy. A t 0835 her fire appeared effective2 and the enemy was seen to turn away, making smoke.

Three minutes later (0838) Commander Nicolson’s destroyers hove in sight fine on the port bow about six miles off, steering 170°; at that moment they opened fire in divisional concentration at extreme range on the left-hand cruiser, but ceased fire after five minutes as all their salvoes were falling short. The Havock at once proceeded to join Commander Nicolson and at 0841 Captain Collins ordered the destroyers to “ Close and attack the enemy with torpedoes but by the time the signal got through (0844) a drastic alteration of course to the south-westward by the enemy at 0840 had rendered this impossible. Commander Nicolson therefore altered course together to 2150 and forming the division on a line o f bearing 350°, chased at his best speed. The Sydney also turned to 2150 at 0845, a manoeuvre which brought her on the beam of the destroyers; from then onwards the action was a chase.

It was not until about this time that Captain Collins was able definitely to identify the class o f his opponents and “ was relieved ” 3 to find they were not 8-inch gun ships. He had been “ even more pleased ” 3 to observe the enemy making smoke in the early stages, which implied that they were already thinking of evasive tactics.

A t about 0846 the Sydney’s original target was so obscured by smoke that fire was shifted to the rear cruiser (Colleoni), which was engaged by “ A ” and “ B ” turrets on bearing 203°, range 18,000 yards. T h e destroyer division also renewed its fire at extreme range for a couple of minutes. A t 0851 the enemy altered course to port, and the Sydney conformed, which had the effect o f opening her “ A ” arcs; but two minutes later the enemy, making vast

1 From 0747 to 0832 all alterations of course by the destroyer division were made by White pendant, i.e. leaders together the rest in succession. (This is not shewn in Plan 6).

2 It is now known that the Bande Nere had already been hit by a 6-inch shell which passing through the foremost funnel and exploding near the after part of the aircraft discharge machinery killed four ratings and wounded four more.

3 Report by C.O ., H.M.A.S. Sydney.

30 ACTION OFF CAPE SPADA, CRETE, 19TH JU LY 1940

quantities o f smoke, altered course to starboard, 16 points in succession,1 and the Sydney, observing them steadying on course 230° at 0856, resumed the chase in a south-westerly direction.

For a minute, at 0901, the Sydney checked fire while she shifted target again to the Bande JVere. When this ship, at 0908, again became obscured by smoke, fire was shifted back again to the Colleoni then bearing 210°, range 18,500 yards. A t 0915 the Sydney altered course 30° to starboard to open her “ A ” arcs, and it was soon evident that her fire was having considerable effect. W ith the range down to 17,500 yards at 0919, the Sydney also came under an accurate fire, receiving her only hit at 0921. This projectile, bursting on the foremost funnel, blew a hole about three feet square in the casings, causing minor damage to three boats and some fittings, but only one slight casualty.

Throughout the chase the destroyers steaming at 32 knots had made every effort to reduce the range, but until 0918, when the range o f the Colleoni was down to 17,000 yards and closing rapidly, they were unable to do so.

21 . T h e S in k in g o f t h e Bartolomeo Colleoni

A t 0923 the Colleoni was seen to be stopped, apparently out of action in a position about five miles E.N.E. o f Cape Spada. Survivors afterwards stated that she was brought to by a shell in the engine or boiler room. The electrical machinery failed, including the turret power hoists and steering gear. A ll her lights went out and ratings stationed in the magazines groped their way out by means o f matches and cigarette lighters! The Bande JVere, after a tentative turn towards her wounded consort, left her to her fate, and made off at high speed to the southward, rounding Agria Grabusa Island at a distance o f about a mile, with the Sydney in hot pursuit, leaving the destroyers to finish off the Colleoni.

Commander Nicolson altered course to 240° and opened fire in divisional concentration at a range o f 14,500 yards. By 0930 the range was down to about 5,000 yards. The Colleoni was drifting and silent; for some minutes she had been hit repeatedly, chiefly below the bridge; her control had been put out o f action and some H .A. ammunition set on fire. The whole bridge structure was soon in flames. But she was still afloat, and at 0933 the Sydney signalled the one word “ Torpedo.” Ordering Commander Biggs o f the Hero to take charge o f the other destroyers and follow the Sydney, Commander Nicolson in the Hyperion with the Ilex approached his quarry. By then the Colleoni was on fire amidships, her colours on the mainmast had been shot away or, as some thought, struck, and a heavy explosion had occurred forward.

A t 0935 the Hyperion fired four and the Ilex two torpedoes at a range of 1,400 yards. One torpedo from the Ilex hit the Colleoni forward, blowing away about 100 feet o f her bows and her aircraft. The Hyperion’s torpedoes, owing to too great a spread, passed two ahead and two astern, and ran on to explode ashore on Agria Grabusa Island. The Hyperion then closed in, and observing the Colleoni more or less abandoned, but not sinking or too heavily on fire, Commander Nicolson decided as he passed down her starboard side to go alongside and see if anything could be salved. Barely two minutes elapsed, however, before a large fire broke out in the forward superstructure which was followed by an explosion which blew the whole bridge away in a cloud o f smoke. The Hyperion then fired another torpedo at short range, which hit the doomed ship amidships at 0952, and seven minutes later the Colleoni heeled over and sank bottom up in position 029° Agria Grabusa Light 4 -5 miles.

The Hyperion and Ilex immediately began to rescue survivors, in which work

1 The purpose of these manoeuvres gave rise to some speculation at the time, but Admiral Casardi’s report states that they were merely “ to lessen the effect of the enemy’s fire.”

CHASE OF THE BANDE NERE 31

they were joined by the Havock, which had been too far o ff to read Commander Biggs’ signal to join him and had apparently missed a signal from Captain Collins at 0943 to Commander Nicolson to leave one destroyer to deal with the Colleoni, and follow him with the rest. According to survivors’ accounts, the men o f the Colleoni had started to jum p overboard as soon as the ship stopped, and many of them were in the sea before the Ilex’s torpedo struck the ship. She had suffered many casualties forward, on the upper deck and round the bridge, among them her Captain seriously wounded.1 There seems to have been little or no attempt to launch any boats or rafts, but all the crew had life belts.

The Italians were much impressed by the rate and accuracy o f the British gunfire, as well as the tactical superiority of the British Commanders. Some prisoners even insisted that the calibre o f our guns must be more than 6-inch.

During the rescue work several signals were received from Captain Collins directing the destroyers to join him as soon as possible, but it was not till 1024 that the Hyperion and Ilex proceeded at high speed to do so,2 leaving the Havock to continue picking up survivors. The Ilex had some 230 prisoners on board. Most o f them were naked and 58 wounded, 25 seriously, three o f whom died that night.

A t 1138 the Havock signalled to the Sydney that survivors stated that the Italian cruisers had expected to meet strong supporting forces that morning.3 A t 1237, when she had picked up some 260 survivors, six Savoia bombers were sighted, approaching from the southward. Thus threatened with attack the Havock was forced to abandon her humane task and proceeded at full speed for Alexandria.

Altogether, 525 survivors out o f a complement of 630 had been picked up by the three destroyers, and it was afterwards learned from the Naval Attaché, Athens, that seven others were rescued off Crete, after swimming for from 26 to 42 hours.

22. C h a s e o f t h e Bande JVere

M eanwhile the Bande JVere, after passing between the island of Pondiko Nisi and the Cretan mainland, at 0945 bore 1920 at a range of 20,000 yards from the Sydney. A t 0950 the Italian received a second hit; a shell penetrated the quarter deck and exploded on a bulkhead, killing four and wounding 12 ratings. But ammunition in “ A ” and “ B ” turrets was running low and the Sydney checked fire; the Bande JVere, however, continued firing her after guns, the shots from which fell consistently 300 yards away on the Sydney’s quarter. A t 0955 Captain Collins repeated his signal to Commander Nicolson to finish off the Colleoni and rejoin him, and three minutes later reopened fire on the Bande JVere, still 20,000 yards distant, but checked fire again at i o n . By this time the range was increasing and the visibility o f the target and the fall o f shot becoming more indistinct. A final couple of salvoes at 1022, range21,000 yards, could not be observed; the Mediterranean haze combined with the enemy’s smoke had rendered spotting impossible. The Sydney then had

1 Captain Umberto Novaro died from his wounds on board the hospital shin Maine, at Alexandria on 23rd July.

2 Vice-Admiral Tovey subsequently remarked that “ it was an unfortunate and serious mistake that all destroyers did not continue the pursuit of the second cruiser without delay ” — an opinion concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief (see Appendix D).

3 This signal did not surprise Captain Collins, who since 0845— from the Bande Nere’s deter­mination to escape to the southward, instead of to the westward (which would have been easier) and later her desertion of the Colleoni— had suspected she was leading him on to superior forces. There is, however, no confirmation from Italian sources that any such support had been contemplated.

32 ACTION OFF CAPE SPADA, CRETE, 19TH JU LY 1940

remaining only four rounds per gun in “ A ” turret and in “ B ” turret one round per gun o f C .P.B .C . shell. Shortly afterwards the Bande Nere, 11 miles off, disappeared in the haze, going 32 knots on course 200°.

The Hero and Hasty, gradually drawing further ahead of the Sydney, had continued the chase at 31 knots, firing ranging salvoes at intervals in the hope that the enemy’s frequent alterations of course would bring him in range, but they all fell short. A t 1020 the Hero signalled to the Sydney “ Regret, I am not catching her ” , and eight minutes later in compliance with a signal from Captain Collins she and the Hasty dropped back to form a close screen on the Sydney. A t 1037 Captain Collins reluctantly abandoned the chase, and altered course to 150° for Alexandria, reducing speed to 25 knots to allow the Hyperion and Ilex to come up. The last seen of the Bande Mere was from the Hero at 1044— a smudge on the horizon bearing 1770, 15 miles away.

2 3 . G e n e r a l S i t u a t i o n , 1 1 0 0 , 1 9 t h J u l y

W hile the Sydney and the destroyers had been fighting their eminently satisfactory acdon, the Com mander-in-Chief at Alexandria, acting on their reports and in view o f the possibility that there might be other enemy forces at sea had decided to take the Fleet to sea.1

The general situation at 1100, 19th July— shortly after the Bande Nere had been lost to view— was as follows. Vice-Adm iral Tovey in the Orion with the Neptune had sailed at 0915 and was sweeping to the north-westward at 30 knots. The Com mander-in-Chief in the Warspite with destroyer screen was just leaving harbour, to be followed at 1230 by the 1st Battle Squadron (less Royal Sovereign), Eagle and screen for a sweep to .the westward. A n air reconnaissance by flying boats of 201 Group R .A .F . was arranged to search for the Bande Nere, but as it was clear that she could not be intercepted before reaching Tobruk if making for that port, the Eagle was ordered to prepare a striking force to attack Tobruk harbour and 201 Group was requested to make a dusk reconnaissance.

Actually, the Bande Nere then (1100, 19th) some 40 miles due west o f Gavdo Island, and steering for Tobruk, altered course for Benghazi about an hour after shaking off the pursuit, where she arrived that afternoon.

The Sydney, Hero and Hasty some five miles south o f Elaphonisi Light (the south-west point o f Crete) were steering 150°, 25 knots, and the Hyperion and Ilex, about 18 miles astern o f them, were steering to overtake them at 30 knots. O ff Agria Grabusa the Havock was still picking up the Colleoni’s survivors.

2 4 . H .M .S. Havock D a m a g e d b y A i r A t t a c k

Commander Courage in the Havock, as already mentioned, continued rescue work till 1237, when on the appearance o f enemy aircraft he steered at full speed for Alexandria. A t 1245 ar*d I25° the bombers in formations of three attacked her without success, doing no more than deluge her with water from near misses. A couple o f hours later (1455) nine more aircraft attacked her o ff Gavdo Island in flights o f three, the second flight scoring a near miss, splinters from which penetrated and flooded No. 2 boiler room. Tw o ratings received minor injuries. These attacks, which were made from levels between3,000 and 4,000 feet, were countered with effective gunfire, which in two instances broke up the formations. The bomb that caused the damage

1 The Commander-in-Chief also postponed the movements of convoy Aegean North 2, and the ships which had sailed from Port Said were ordered to return. An oiler convoy from Alexandria to Port Said was ordered to proceed unescorted.

RETURN TO ALEXANDRIA 33

appeared to be one of 250 lb., which burst six feet under water about ten feet from the ship’s side. After losing w ay for five minutes the Havock picked up speed again and was able to proceed at 24 knots.

Captain Collins, on receiving the Havock.'s signal reporting her damage at about 1500, and finding to his surprise that she was some 75 miles to the northward,1 turned back in the Sydney in support, after ordering the Hero and Hasty to continue on their course for Alexandria and informing the Commander- in-Chief, who detached the Liverpool to join the Sydney. Shortly after turning northward a heavy bombing attack was made on the Sydney without success. Realising as he proceeded north the danger o f submarine or possibly surface attack, Captain Collins ordered the Hyperion and Ilex to join the Havock at sunset. The Sydney made contact with the Havock at about 1640 and took station a mile astern o f her; as she did so Commander Courage signalled: “ Thank you. I hope your H .A. is as good as your L .A .” — a happy allusion to the Sydney’s prowess in the surface action combined with a heartfelt desire in the present circumstances.

Meanwhile the Hyperion and Ilex, having been unable to rendezvous with the Sydney (they had been steering further to the eastward than the cruiser) were proceeding to Alexandria. W hen the Havock’s report o f being damaged was received, Commander Nicolson turned back to her assistance, but later (1545) learning that the Sydney had also turned back, resumed his former course until 1608, when he received Captain Collins’ signal to join the Havock at sunset. After the junction was effected at 1840, the Hyperion and Ilex formed a screen ahead o f the Havock on course 150°, speed 20 knots. The last bombing attacks o f the day occurred between 1845 and 1848, doing no damage. A t 2100 the Sydney parted company to rendezvous with the 7th Cruiser Squadron the destroyers continuing for Alexandria.

2 5 . R e t u r n t o A l e x a n d r ia

Little remains to be told.As no further information of the Bande Nere came in during the afternoon of

the 19th July, the Commander-in-Chief decided that at 2100 all forces should return to Alexandria. The Warspite’s aircraft was catapulted at 1700 to search the Tobruk area, but was obliged to make a forced landing to the eastward o f the port, and the Jervis was detached to search for it.

Tobruk spent a disturbed night. Aircraft o f Nos. 55 and 211 Squadrons, R .A .F ., carried out bombing attacks on the shipping there and claimed several hits. A t 0240, 20th, six aircraft o f No. 824 Squadron, F .A .A ., from the Eagle made a successful moonlight torpedo attack, encountering heavy barrage fire from all sides o f the harbour, which damaged three aircraft, wounded an observer seriously and slightly wounded a pilot. Hits were claimed on three ships, and a sheet o f flame from an oiler indicated that she carried petrol. Reconnaissance o f Tobruk after the night raids showed the following ships were absent: one large cruiser, one destroyer and two merchant vessels.

Search for the Warspite’s aircraft was continued by flying boats o f 201 Group after dawn on 20th July without success.2

The Fleet entered harbour at Alexandria during the morning of the 20th, where all ships cheered the Sydney and Commander Nicolson’s destroyers on

1 Up till then Captain Collins had supposed that the Havock was with the Hyperion and Itex a few miles astern and catching him up.

2 An Italian report on 25th July, 1940 stated the crew was safe. They had swum ashore from their scuttled aircraft and been made prisoners.

34 ACTION OFF CAPE SPADA, CRETE, 19TH JULY 1940

their arrival. Immediate recognition1 o f the successful issue o f this action was conveyed in a signal from the First Lord of the Adm iralty, saying that His M ajesty the K ing had awarded the C.B. to Captain Collins and a bar to the D .S .O . to Commander Nicolson, and “ His Majesty has also asked me to send his personal congratulations to all concerned in this splendid achievement.”

In his covering letter, dated 2ist September, 1940, to the Admiralty, Sir Andrew Cunningham wrote:—

“ T he credit for this successful and gallant action belongs m ainly to Captain J. A . Collins, C .B ., R .A .N ., who by his quick appreciation of the situation, offensive spirit and resolute handling o f H .M .A .S . Sydney, achieved a victory over a superior force which has had important strategical effects. It is significant that, so far as is known, no Italian surface forces have returned into or near the Aegean since this action was fought.”

2 6 . R e m a r k s o n t h e A c t io n o f f C a p e S p a d a

The action off Cape Spada was practically a duel between the Sydney and two adversaries, each of which was her equal in force, though the presence of the British destroyers undoubtedly influenced Adm iral Casardi’s tactics. Several points of interest emerge from the narrative.

It will be noted that this was one o f the few surface actions o f the war in which aircraft— either for reconnaissance, spotting or attacking— played no part. Admiral Casardi had not catapulted any o f his aircraft in the early morning because he considered it too rough, and he also thought it certain that reconnaissance by shore-based aircraft over the area of the Aegean he had to pass through would have been arranged by Headquarters at Rhodes. T he Sydney had no aircraft embarked— a circumstance characterised by Captain Collins as ‘ ‘ unfortunate” ; she had lost her aircraft at the bombardment of Bardia on 21st June, and a replacement had been damaged by bomb splinters before it could be embarked.

The initial mistake o f the Italian Adm iral in steering north and engaging the destroyers at long range instead of immediately chasing them and trying to overwhelm them with his superior weight of metal has been remarked on. It is true that the formation o f the destroyers may well have looked like a screen for heavier craft; but if a superior force were always to hold off till perfectly certain o f what might be out o f sight beyond the enemy few surface actions would ever take place.2 Per contra Captain Collins’ unhesitating attack on a force practically double his strength, after having duly gauged the risks and taken steps to minimise them by keeping wireless silence and skilfully exploiting the advantage o f surprise, achieved the success it deserved. The effect o f the surprise was helped by the presence o f the Havock, which, as he suspected, was mistaken by the enemy for a cruiser in the first shock o f the attack. It is also o f interest to note the encouragement Captain Collins derived from the Italians’ early use of smoke, which he immediately recognised as evidence that his enemy was fighting with one eye over his shoulder.

Perhaps the Italians were particularly unfortunate in meeting the Sydney, which had been in action twice during the preceding three weeks. “ I was thus,” wrote Captain Collins, “ in the happy position o f taking a ship into action that had already experienced two successful encounters with the enemy.”

1 At a later date additional awards included: Officers, two D.S.O.s, two D.S.C.s, four Mentions in Despatches. Ratings, six D.S.M.s, eight Mentions.

2 Admiral Casardi was presumably well aware of the advantage of speed he possessed over the British heavy ships of the Mediterranean Fleet.

R EM A RKS ON TH E A C T IO N OFF CAPE SPADA 35

The superiority of the Sydney's gunfire both for accuracy and rate was most marked throughout the action.1

The shooting of the Italians was poor. Though described as accurate for range at first, it was slow, erratic and spasmodic, and fell off under punishment. It is remarkable that between them the two enemy ships only succeeded in scoring a single hit. A n y advantage they might have had from superior speed was discounted by their violent zig-zagging, which enabled the Sydney to keep the range steady, while opening her “ A ” arcs.

“ The destroyers also were ably handled and fought” 2 both in retirement and on turning back immediately after sighting the Sydney at right angles to the enemy’s course— a movement that possibly prevented the Italians from trying to escape to the eastward.3

To sum up, this little action well illustrates the value and application of almost all the principles of war. The importance o f having the aim clearly defined comes out in Captain Collins’ deliberate decision the night before the action as to his principal aim— which the operation orders issued to him had left a little ambiguous— and his adherence to it, viz., the support o f the destroyer division. Thus, when the enemy cruisers were reported, he was in a position to fulfil his aim, and lost no time in steering to do so. As events developed the destruction of the enemy cruisers became the immediate object. Incidentally, this was the surest w ay o f achieving the original aim. He had exceptional reason to be satisfied with the Morale o f his ship’s com pany; and — though he does not specifically state it in his report— he was probably equally satisfied from past experience that that o f the enemy was not too good. Offensive action (which seems to have been rather lost sight o f by the Italians) was the keynote of his tactics; but he did not forget Security. He was about to attack a very superior force, and he “ determined to make full use of Surprise,” 4 in order to redress the balance— so far as might be— in his favour. Such weight did he give to the importance o f surprise that he deliberately accepted some risk o f failing to concentrate with the destroyers, through their ignorance o f his position. This risk— which was much felt by Captain Collins at the time— was more apparent than real, and as things turned out, thanks to the intelligent Co-operation o f Commander Nicolson, Concentration o f force was effected most efficiently at the critical moment.

Thereafter, the action became a chase, in which the Italians had the legs of the British, and were bound to get away, except for a speed-reducing hit such as happened to the Colleoni; but it is worth noting that after she had been winged, Captain Collins left her to be finished off by some o f the destroyers and he himself with the others at once followed up his success by pressing on in chase o f the Bande Mere (Economy o f Effort and Maintenance o f the aim). Nor did he abandon the chase till lack o f ammunition and his obvious inability to catch her rendered further pursuit useless. »

1 “ Sydney's gunnery narrative . . . shows the results obtainable by an efficient control team backed by good material, and it should be given the weight due to the experience of a ship which has had the unique opportunity of firing 2,200 main armament rounds in action in 6 weeks.” — C.-in-C., Med., 0903/0710/30/2 of 21st September 1940 (M.020932/40).

2 C.-in-C., Med., 0903/0710/30/2 of 21st September 1940.3 “ The manner in which Commander (D) brought his Division into action, after having

heard nothing of me until I made my first enemy report at 0827, was most reassuring. The division appeared on my disengaged bow, steering a course to pass ahead of me and practically at right angles to the enemy’s course. It was evident that Commander Nicolson had on sighting me anticipated my order to close and attack the enemy with torpedoes ” . Report by C.O., H.M.A.S. Sydney (in M.020932/40).

4 Report by C.O ., H.M.A.S. Sydney (in M.020932/40).

CHAPTER III (.Battle Summary No. 10)

Operation MJB.8 and F*A.A. Attack on Taranto,

November 1940

2 7 . G e n e r a l S i t u a t i o n , M e d i t e r r a n e a n , N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 0

DU R IN G T H E F IV E months o f war with Italy, the British Fleet, or portions o f it, had made some 16 sweeps into the Central Mediterranean. Varying in length from three to seven days, these had produced littie

result, for only on three occasions was the Italian Fleet found to be at sea. M inor surface forces had been engaged on other occasions and losses had been inflicted on the enemy, but the only encounter between the battlefleets had been in the partial action o f 9th July, o ff Calabria. It had been little more than a distant exchange of fire but had apparently been enough to reduce the Italian Fleet to a state o f inactivity.

There remained, however, two areas o f the Mediterranean, the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian seas, where Mussolini might still expect to retain some degree o f command, for in those waters he could rely on superior air power and numerous submarines. Safe in the seemingly secure shelter o f Taranto, he doubtless hoped that the Italian Fleet would dominate the Greek campaign until the day when it could participate in his triumphal progress to Athens.

A t the beginning o f November, 1940, the situation in the Mediterranean was governed by the new circumstances arising from Italy’s unwarranted attack on Greece on 28th October. In answer to the latter’s appeal for assistance, immediate steps were taken to concert measures .of action with the Greek authorities, naval, military and air.

Foremost among these was the establishment of a fuelling base for the fleet and aircraft at Suda Bay and for the transport o f troops and stores to Crete and supplies to the Piraeus. Preliminary movements had been completed between 29th October and 3rd November, the only enemy interference being a heavy air attack on Suda Bay and Canea on the 1st November, in which no damage was done to the ships and two aircraft were shot down. A n attack on a force under Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell, who had succeeded Adm iral T ovey as Vice-Adm iral Light Forces, by four torpedo aircraft on 2nd November had proved equally fruitless.

The main Italian Fleet was at Taranto, and on 27th October it was reported to consist o f five battleships, three 8-inch cruisers, six 6-inch cruisers and a number of destroyers. The possibility o f attacking this fleet in harbour had been carefully studied but in the case o f torpedo-carrying aircraft was considered feasible only i f the fleet lay in an open anchorage.

36

OBJECTS AND FORCES 37

28. O p e r a t i o n M .B.8: O b je c t s

The British Fleet in the Mediterranean consisted on 31st October o f four battleships, two aircraft carriers, six cruisers, two A .A . ships, 22 destroyers1 and 15 submarines. It had been decided to reinforce it with the battleship Barham, the cruisers Glasgow and Berwick and three destroyers, all o f which were to embark military reinforcements for the garrison at M alta. Their passage from Gibraltar was to be covered by Force “ H ” (Operation “ Coat ” ) and operations in the Western Mediterranean were to be directed by the Flag Officer commanding that force (Vice-Adm iral Sir James Somerville).

Convoys were waiting, too, for passage to and from M alta; the Government considered it imperative to hold Crete, and reinforcements, stores, guns and fuel had to be carried to Suda Bay; personnel and fuel also to the Piraeus for the R .A .F . bombers in Greece. In view of these commitments, the Com- mander-in-Chief decided to take up a central position with the battlefleet so as to cover the various convoy movements and at the same time ensure a junction with the reinforcements coming to him.

This was the basis o f Operation M.B.8 which included the passage o f rein­forcements from Gibraltar (Operation “ Coat ” ) and ended with an air attack on Taranto (Operation “ Judgment ” ) and a raid by light forces into the Strait o f Otranto. Although preliminary movements began on 4th November, the 6th November was to be the starting day (Day one).

2 9 . O p e r a t i o n M .B.8: F o r g e s

The fleet was organised for this operation in the following forces:—

F o r c e “ A ” Battleships Warspite (flag, C.-in-C.), Malaya (flag, Rear- Admiral Rawlings), Valiant; aircraft carrier Illustrious (flag, Rear- Adm iral Lyster, R .A .(A ); 3rd C.S. Gloucester (flag, Rear- Adm iral Renouf), York', destroyers Hyperion, Havock, Hero, Hereward, Hasty, Ilex (2nd D.F.) Decoy, Defender (20th D iv.), Nubian, Mohawk, Janus, Juno, Jervis (14th D .F.).

F o r c e “ B ” Cruisers Ajax, Sydney. T o take troops and equipment from Port Said to Suda Bay and there get the Bofors guns mounted. Sydney to join Force “ A ” . Ajax to be guardship at Suda Bay till relieved by Calcutta, then join Force “ A ” .

F o r c e “ C ” Cruiser Orion (flag, Vice-Adm iral Pridham-W ippell, V .A .L .F .)T o take R .A .F . stores and personnel to the Piraeus, then to Suda Bay.

F o r c e “ D ” (Convoy Escort Force) battleship Ramillies; A .A . ships, Coventry, Calcutta-, destroyers Vampire, Voyager, Waterhen (10th D .F .) , Dainty, Diamond, Wryneck (A.A. ship); trawlers Kingston Coral (A.N.6), Sindonis; minesweeper, Abingdon to escort Convoy A.N .6 to Suda Bay.

F o r c e “ F ” Reinforcements for Mediterranean Fleet: battleship Barham (700)2; cruisers Berwick (750) Glasgow (400); destroyers Griffin (50), Greyhound (50), Gallant (50).Attached from Force “ H ” to Force “ F ” to proceed as far as M alta, then to return to Gibraltar, destroyers Faulknor (50), Fortune (50) Fury (50).

F o r c e “ H ” Aircraft carrier Ark Royal (flag, Vice-Adm iral Sir James Somerville) : cruiser Sheffield-, destroyers Duncan, Isis, Foxhound, Forester, Firearake.

1 Including one A.A. (Wryneck).2 Figures in brackets give the number of military personnel on board.

38

Op

er

at

ion

M

.B.8

as

P

la

nn

ed

CONVOYS AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE 39

The Eagle, aircraft carrier, was unable to accompany the fleet and remained at Alexandria.

The total British forces employed were:—

B. A /C C. Cr. D. M.S. Tr.

Force “ A ” 3 i 2 I3 _ _Force “ B ” — 2 _ _Force “ C ” _ _ i _ _ _Force “ D ” i _ 2 6 i 3Force “ F ” i _ 2 6 _Force “ H ” — i i 5 — —

T o t a l 5 2 10 30 i 3

30. C o n v o y s a n d A i r R e c o n n a is s a n c e

There were four convoys waiting to sail. Firstly, M .W .3 (M alta, West 3) to proceed from Alexandria to M alta. It consisted o f five ships: the Waiwera (12,435 tons), Devis (6,054 tons), Plumleaf (5,916 tons), Volo (1,587 tons) and Rodi (3,333 tons), the last three carrying cased petrol. This convoy was to be joined by two ships for Suda Bay— the Brisbane Star (12,791 tons) carrying eight mobile 3 '7-inch A .A . guns and motor transport, and the Bramble Leaf (5,917 tons) with fuel and petrol. T h e speed of the slowest ship was 1 1 \ knots.

Secondly, there was Convoy A .N .6 (Aegean, North 6) consisting o f three ships carrying petrol and fuel from Egypt to Greece. T hey were the Dutch s.s. Abinda (3,359 tons), the Pass o f Balmaha (758 tons), the British Sergeant (5,868 tons). T he speed was 81 knots. Other ships were to be added as ordered by the Senior British Naval Officer, Canal Area, provided their speed was not less than 8 1 knots.

Thirdly, there was Convoy M .E.3 (M alta, East 3) o f four large ships, empty, from M alta to Alexandria— the Memnon (7,506 tons), the Lanarkshire (9,816 tons), the Clan Macaulay (10,492 tons) and the Clan Ferguson (7,347 tons). (All 15-knot ships.)

The monitor Terror and the destroyer Vendetta were also awaiting passage from M alta to Suda Bay where the Terror was to act as a harbour defence ship.

Fourthly, there was A.S.5 (Aegean, South 5) to be made up o f ships of over 8 knots speed, proceeding from Greece or Turkey to Egypt.

Arrangements were made with A .O .G . Mediterranean for air reconnaissance in the Ionian Sea and at Taranto on 6th and 7th November; for the same at daylight on the line Zante-M alta on 8th-12th November, when the M alta convoy would be between Crete and M alta; also in the Sicily—Tunis area and along the north coast o f Sicily on 9th November when Force “ F ” with reinforcements would be approaching from the west. The A .O .C ., 201 Group, was asked to supplement these arrangements by the provision of reconnaissance ahead of the convoys to M alta and the Piraeus.

31. C o n v o y A .N .6 S a il s f o r t h e A e g e a n

The operation commenced on 4th November with the sailing o f three ships of A.N .6 from Port Said. It was escorted by a minesweeper and two trawlers, but, owing to the breakdown of the latter the Dainty and two other trawlers, the Kingston Coral and Sindonis, were sent off from Alexandria to take their place. T hey picked the convoy up on the Egyptian coast on the 5th; the next day the A. A . ship Calcutta and the Pass of Balmaha joined them and Convoy M .W .3

4

40 OPERATION M.B.8 AND FA.A. ATTACK ON TARANTO, NOV. 1940

at 1500, 6th,1 passed them going some 2-| knots faster. A.N.6, numbering by that time seven ships,2 went steadily on, delayed by its slow trawler escort which could go only 7 knots. A bright moon was shining as they made their w ay through Kaso Strait, east o f Crete. The Calcutta went on ahead to act as S.N .O . at Suda Bay where there was much to be done— a boom to be laid, A .A . guns to be mounted and an airfield to set up.3

The convoy steamed on along the north coast o f Crete and arrived safely at the Piraeus with its anxiously-awaited load of stores and petrol. It had seen nothing o f enemy aircraft or submarines.

3 2 . C . - i n - C . a n d C o n v o y M .W .3 f o r M a l t a

Convoy M .W .3 consisting o f five ships for M alta and two for Suda Bay left Alexandria on 5th November, with an escort o f one A .A . ship (Coventry) and three destroyers. M aking 1 1 | knots it passed A .N .6 off Kaso Strait, detaching later the two ships, Brisbane Star and Bramble Leaf, for Suda Bay, where they arrived on 7th November with the important loading of A .A . guns. The remainder passing north o f Crete passed through Antikithera Channel and at 1800, 7th, were some 40 miles south o f Cape M atapan (350 44' N., 22° 4 1 ' E.) proceeding westward.

Vice-Adm iral Pridham-W ippell was to examine the situation at the Piraeus and in Crete. H aving embarked R .A .F . personnel and stores for Athens the Orion sailed from Alexandria at 0900, 6th, arriving at the Piraeus at 0930, 7th. There the Vice-Adm iral had a long consultation with the Greek authorities before proceeding to Suda Bay to examine the defences there.

The Com mander-in-Chief with the Warspite, Illustrious, Valiant, Malaya, Ramillies and destroyers had left Alexandria at 1300, 6th, steering to the westward. The Ajax and Sydney (Force “ B ” ) had sailed on 4th November for Port Said where they embarked the H.Q,., 14th Infantry Brigade, a light and a heavy A .A . battery and administrative troops for Crete. After disembarking them at Suda Bay on the 6th, they joined the Commander-in-Chief.4 A t 1200, 8th, the fleet was half-way between Crete and M alta (in 350 27' N., 18° 46' E.) when Convoy M .W .3 was sighted ten miles to the south-west and the fleet took up a covering position to the north o f it. A t 1230, 8th, an enemy reconnaissance aircraft reported the convoy and was chased off by Gladiators. The fleet was then some 180 miles from Sicily and at 1520 another recon­naissance aircraft appeared and was driven off. A n hour later seven bombers, S.79s, appeared on the scene: they were attacked by three Fulmars who shot down two and forced the remainder to jettison their bombs and make off.

A t 0920, 9th, the Ramillies and three destroyers were detached to take the convoy on to M alta, while the Commander-in-Chief remained some 100 miles to the south-eastward of the island and the 3rd C.S. (Gloucester and Tork) and 7th C.S. (Ajax and Sydney) proceeded to carry out sweeps to the northward. No air searches were carried out at this time as the weather was overcast and squally. Between 1048 and 1550, 9th, enemy aircraft were reported four times and continued to shadow throughout the day, one o f them (a Cant. 506) being shot down at 1640 by a Fulmar. A t 1219, a Swordfish, just after taking off

1 Zone minus 2 Time is used throughout.2 Mandalay, British Sergeant, Abinda, Hannah Molter, Odysseus, Pass of Batmaha, and a Turkish

gunboat.s Calcutta submitted that trawlers with such limited speed as 7 knots should not be sent on

escort duty. Also that British Sergeant and Pass of Balmaha which were to proceed independently to Suda Bay had not been informed of the sw'ept channel and did not know that nets had been laid. This entailed a lot of complicated signals to ships without a signal staff.

1 Sydney at 1700, 7th November and Ajax at 1700, 8th.

JU N C TIO N W ITH REINFORCEMENTS 41

on A /S patrol, made a forced landing near the Warspite, the crew being rescued by the Jervis.

3 3 . J u n c t i o n w i t h R e i n f o r c e m e n t s

A t 2100, 9th November, the fleet shaped course for the rendezvous 40 miles west o f Gozo (36° 8 ' N ., 130 26' E.) where it had been arranged to meet the reinforcements from Gibraltar (Force “ F ” ). There seem to have been submarines following it, for at 0010, in 35° 13 ' N., 15° 25' E., two heavy explosions were heard in the Warspite, thought later, on the evidence of Italian broadcasts, to have been torpedoes fired at the fleet. Aircraft were flown off at 0700, 10th, to search a sector between 3150 and 045°; one o f them crashed into the sea shortly after flying off, the crew being picked up by the destroyer Nubian. The 3rd C.S. (Gloucester and Tork) and the 7th C.S. (Ajax and Sydney) rejoined the flag at 0715. Three hours later the Barham and Force “ F ” were met at the appointed rendezvous. Force “ H ” (the Ark Royal, Sheffield, Glasgow and six destroyers) after carrying out Operation “ Crack ” — the bomb­ing of Cagliari on 8th November— had accompanied it as far as Sardinia and had parted from it at 1915, 9th, in 370 55 ' N ., 90 8' E., 165 miles west o f Sicily.

The Berwick, carrying some 750 troops and ten Bofors guns for M alta, and the Glasgow, 400 troops, with the Griffin, Greyhound, Gallant and Faulknor went on with all despatch to M alta to disembark the troops from their crowded decks.

A t noon on the 10th, the Com mander-in-Chief was in 350 55 ' N., 130 30' E., some 40 miles west o f M alta. Danger was lurking in the air; shadowers were sighted and at 1230 one o f them (a Cant. 501) was shot down. The approach of an enemy formation was detected; about an hour later ten bombers appeared and at 1330 attacked in two formations from about 14,000 ft. Intercepted and engaged by Fulmar fighters who disabled one, they dropped about 25 bombs at random without doing any damage to the batdefleet which was awaiting them in a loose formation.

A t 1500, Convoy M .E.3 (four ships) which had left M alta at 1330 for Alexandria escorted by the Ramillies, Coventry, Decoy and Defender, was sighted away to the eastward. The Terror and Vendetta which left M alta the same day were on their w ay independently to Suda Bay. The convoy was probably attacked that night by a submarine, for at 0310, n th , the Ramillies1 felt three explosions and an Italian broadcast reported a successful attack by a submarine. Actually no ship was hit. The Ramillies’ convoy made the passage at 14-7 knots and reached Alexandria safely.

The Commander-in-Chief and the fleet went on to the eastward. A t noon on n t h November, he was half-way between M alta and Crete (in 36° 10' N., 18° 30' E.). Here the Orion (Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell) rejoined the flag. After visiting the Piraeus Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell had proceeded to Suda Bay to examine the situation on the spot. He arrived at 0700, 9th. M uch— very much— remained to be done. Guns, net defence, A .A . guns, ammunition dumps, coal, water, security, medical arrangements, all were calling for labour and transport, and the N avy and Royal Marines were right in the forefront.2 Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell left at 1630, 10th, to rejoin the flag.

The convoy operations were over; the two other tasks remained— the air attack on Taranto and the raid on Otranto Strait. The raid was to be carried out by a force (temporarily termed Force “ X ” ) consisting of the

1 i n 34 0 4 3 ' N ., 16° 8 ' E .

2 See Appendix L.

42 OPERATION M.B.8 AND F A A . ATTACK ON TARANTO, NOV. 1940

cruisers Orion (flag), Sydney and Ajax with the destroyers Nubian and Mohawk. A t 1310, n th , Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell proceeded with it towards Otranto Strait. Later in the day, at 1800 the carrier force under Rear- Adm iral Lyster in the Illustrious with the 3rd C.S. (Gloucester, Berwick, Glasgow and York) and four destroyers1 was also detached and made for a position 40 miles west o f Cephalonia, while the Commander-in-Chief with the remainder o f the fleet took up a position to cover the two operations.

34 . T a r a n t o : C o n d i t i o n s a n d P l a n o f F.A .A . A t t a c k (Plan 7)

Taranto, lying in the gulf o f that name, some 320 miles from M alta, is the finest naval port in Italy. The inner harbour, entered by a narrow channel, called “ the canal ” , is completely landlocked and immune from surface torpedo attack; the large outer harbour, open to the westward, is protected by long breakwaters from surface attack. The Italians were fully alive to the danger of air attack and had taken every precaution that occurred to them to guard against this menace. These included numerous A .A . batteries, with reporting stations and searchlights, balloon barrages, anti-torpedo nets round the ships, and a carefully worked out plan for co-ordinating A .A . fire of shore batteries with that o f the ships. Details o f the defences will be found in Appendix H : suffice it to note here that it was a first-class modern defended port and that its defenders were- kept fully on the alert.

The possibility o f attacking it with torpedo bombers had been carefully studied, but it was not till the arrival o f the Illustrious that the project became practicable. Initiated originally on instructions from the Adm iralty it was intended to be subsidiary to the passage o f reinforcements to the Mediterranean Fleet (Operation “ Coat ” ). Its success depended chiefly on three factors— first, an accurate and timely reconnaissance, giving the exact location of the enemy ships, which did not become possible till the arrival o f Glenn Martin aircraft at M alta ; second, an undetected approach necessitating in the case of Swordfish the use o f long range tanks, which were not available till the arrival o f the Illustrious early in September; third, a sufficient standard o f efficiency in night flying which was not reached till mid-October. A n attack planned for the night o f 21st October had to be deferred on account o f a fire in the Illustrious’ hangar which destroyed or damaged a number of aircraft. It was hoped to carry it out on the night of 30th—31st October, when the fleet was off the coast o f Greece, but again it had to be deferred as there was no moon and the crews had had very little practice in the use of flares. These successive postponements were not, however, without their compensations, for the latest photographs by the R .A .F . revealed the existence o f balloons and nets, a knowledge o f which was o f the greatest value in planning the actual attack.

A plan had been drawn up by Rear-Adm iral Lyster (28th October 1940, amended 6th November 1940) embodying the following proposals for an attack on the Italian main fleet in Taranto,2 numbering four to six battleships, five cruisers and 20 destroyers:—

(a) A moonlight torpedo attack against battleships and cruisers in the outer harbour (M ar Grande) simultaneously with dive-bombing attacks on ships in the inner harbour (M ar Piccolo).

1 Hyperion, Ilex, Hasty, Havock.2 This plan was substantially the same as a plan worked out by Rear-Admiral Lyster when

captain of the Glorious by direction of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound (then C.-in-C., Mediterranean) at the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938* when it appeared quite probable that war would break out at any moment with Italy on the side of Germany. Admiral Lyster subse­quently remarked that he was “ fortunate in having planned an attack in detail in peace time and carried it out in war time ” .

TARANTO: CONDITIONS AND PLAN OF F.A.A. ATTACK 43

(b) The torpedo attack to be made from the west and towards the moon, the date depending on a suitable direction o f the moon.

(c) The carrier force not to be far north o f the line M alta-K ithera before dark; the run to the north to be made before moonrise; aircraft to fly off as soon as possible after 2100; not to fly more than 400 miles; to fly off and land on in moonlight.

A ny night from the n th to the 19th November was suitable for these conditions.

The carrier force should be detached after dark to reach a flying-off position about 60 miles west-south-west o f Cephalonia1 and aircraft should fly on in a position 20 miles west o f Cephalonia. A maximum striking force should be employed consisting o f 30 Swordfish in two ranges o f 15 each; in each range nine to be armed with torpedoes (to attack battleships), five with bombs to dive-bomb cruisers and destroyers and one with bombs to attack as a diversion from the east.

Enemy action might take the form of air, surface or submarine attack against the carrier force and of A .A . fire against the aircraft. The distance of the carrier force— 240 miles by day and 150 miles at night— should in itself prove a sufficient protection against air attack. Surface attack could be countered by a strong cruiser escort or by patrol o f the area or by keeping well to the eastward if the enemy was out. The A .A . fire likely to be encountered at Taranto was not considered a serious deterrent. As searchlights at a low angle might dazzle the torpedo droppers, a distraction should be provided to keep them up. Photographic reconnaissance would be required on each day prior to the attack and it would be necessary to have a clearance search of the Ionian Sea during the day and patrols o f the Strait o f Otranto, the G u lf of Taranto, and Messina, up to midnight.

Some modifications had to be introduced into this plan arising from lack of aircraft, a revised date of attack and the discovery by photographic recon­naissance o f balloons and net obstructions in the enemy defences. First, there were not 30 aircraft available. The Eagle was to have co-operated in the attack but was unable to take part owing to serious defects in her petrol system caused by near misses earlier in the w ar.2 Five o f her T .S .R . with eight complete crews were therefore transferred to the Illustrious-, but three T.S.R .s had unfortunately been lost3 during preliminary operations on 9th-11 th November. The attack had therefore to be made by the Illustrious alone and the number o f aircraft taking part had to be reduced to 21 in two flights, one of 12 and the other of nine.

Further it was considered unnecessary for the purpose o f “ surprise ” to keep to the southward until after dark, and it was decided to carry out the operation earlier in order to lessen the risk o f attack by surface craft. It was decided, too, to use flares and, on account of the number o f suitable dropping places being restricted by balloon and net obstructions, only six torpedo aircraft were to be used in each attack.

In the final dispositions for attack it was decided that the Illustrious and her escort were to be in a position 270°, 40 miles4 from K abbo point, Cephalonia, by 2000 on n t h November, when the first range o f 12 aircraft would fly off followed by a second range o f nine at 2100. Aircraft were to land on com­mencing about 0100 12th in a position 270°, 20 miles from K abbo Point

1 i.e., in about 370 43' N., 190 io ' E., about 200 miles south-east of Taranto. (See Appendix K.)

2 Heavily bombed on 1 ith July 1940.3 The crews were all saved. Investigation proved the loss to be due to contaminated petrol

from the tanker Toneline.4 i.e. 38° 12' N., 190 30' E.

44 OPERATION M.B.8 AND F.A.A. ATTACK ON TARANTO, NOV. 1940

(38° 12 ' N., 1 g° 4 7 ' E.). The first range was to pass up the centre o f the G u lf o f Taranto and approach the harbour from the south-west. The primary attack was to be by six torpedo bombers on battleships in the M ar Grande, preceded by flares dropped along the eastern side and by dive-bomber attacks on cruisers and destroyers in the M ar Piccolo (see Plan 7). A proposal that the W ellington bombers at M alta should attack the dockyard and ships in M ar Piccolo between 2030 and 2115 was not adopted.

35. A i r A t t a c k o n T a r a n t o ( O p e r a t i o n “ J u d g m e n t ” ) (Plan 7)

It was 1800, n th November, when Rear-Adm iral Lyster in the Illustrious with the four cruisers and four destroyers parted company, while the Commander-in-Chief took up a covering position1 to the southward. The latest photographs had arrived from M alta, and confirmed the fact that no important changes had taken place at Taranto, except the arrival o f another battleship during the afternoon. The Illustrious reached the flying off position and the first range o f 12 aircraft were all away by 2040, heading for Taranto 170 miles away. The second range of nine aircraft got away an hour later (2134); one of them (LF5) damaged its wing fabric and had to be struck below for repairs, but so keen was the crew to take part that it got away only 24 minutes late.

The surface wind was light and variable, the upper winds westerly, about10 knots, with 8/10 thin cloud at 8,000 feet. The moon was three-quarters full, bearing nearly south.

The first flight entered a cloud at 2115, and four aircraft got separated.2 The Squadron Commander (Lieutenant-Commander Williamson) continued his way with eight (five torpedo, two flare droppers and one bomber). A t 2252 they sighted the flash o f guns3 and four minutes later the flare droppers were detached to lay their flares along the east side o f the harbour.

O n the eastern side of M ar Grande, behind the breakwater (Diga di Tarantola) and a zareba o f nets were lying six Italian battleships— two Littorios (35,000 tons) and four Cavours (23,620 tons).4 They were moored three-quarters o f a mile from the eastern shore, which was encircled with barrage balloons. To seaward o f them were three 8-inch gun cruisers and eight destroyers.

About 2300 the flares of the first aircraft began to illuminate the harbour. The Italians were on the alert, and barrage fire from the fortress batteries opened at once, in which some o f the battleships joined with their machine guns a few minutes later. The torpedo attacks developed at about 2315. Three aircraft coming in from the west over San Pietro Island made for the battleships on the south side and fired at the Cavour. One torpedo hit and a great explosion flamed up alongside her. The other two passed close ahead and ran on towards the Doria. H eavy A .A . fire was soaring up from the batteries on San Pietro, the cruisers and destroyers, and one aircraft (L4A)

1 At noon, 12th November, the C.-in-C. was in 36° 40' N., 28° 8 ' E., E., miles 95 south of the flying off position.

2 Narratives of individual aircraft will be found in Appendix J.3 The Italians received reports of “ suspicious noises from the air ” at 2225, and the defences

were alerted. Presumably the noises came from the first flight. Twenty-five minutes later (2250) the nearest observation posts again reported noises, and the A.A. batteries of the San Vito zone commenced barrage fire towards the south and south-east.

* At the time of the attack these ships could of course not be accurately identified, except as to their class; but it is now known how they were lying, and their actual names are given in this account.

A IR A T T A C K ON TAR AN TO 45

was brought down, crashing into the sea near the floating dock.1 Three others coming in from the north fired their torpedoes at the Littorio, one of which hit her starboard bow and another her port quarter. W ithin five minutes the torpedo attacks were over and all the aircraft except the one shot down had made their get-away. The bombing attacks lasted longer. The two flare droppers bombed the oil storage depot, and the remaining four aircraft attacked cruisers and destroyers in M ar Piccolo, and the seaplane base, where a large fire began to blaze.

By 2335 the last aircraft o f the first flight had withdrawn; but barrage fire in all four quadrants continued, for by this time the second flight was approach­ing. They were only eight, as one had been obliged to return owing to a defect.2 A t 2355 two aircraft dropped flares and five minutes later the torpedo craft led by Lieutenant-Commander Hale came in from the north-west. Four fired torpedoes, two at the Littorio, one at the Veneto and one at the Duilio; one (E4H)3 which was shot down in the middle of M ar Grande, m ay have fired at the Gorizia. In these attacks, two torpedos found their mark, one on the already twice hit Littorio and one on the Duilio. O f the remaining aircraft, the two flare droppers bombed the oil storage depot and the last bombed cruisers and destroyers in M ar Piccolo, obtaining a hit on the Trento with a bomb that failed to explode.

The torpedo bomber had justified its existence in no uncertain terms. In a first-class defended port, half the Italian battlefleet had been put out of action for six months or more, for the loss o f two Swordfish and four officers,4 two of whom happily survived as prisoners of w ar.5 The bombers were not so successful; direct hits were scored on the Trento and destroyer Libeccio, but in each case the bomb failed to explode, as did several others— according to the Italians— which narrowly missed other ships in M ar Piccolo.

W ith the exception of the two aircraft which were missing, all the Swordfish had landed on by 0250, 12th November, and the Illustrious shaped course to rejoin the Commander-in-Chief at 0700. She was greeted by the flag signal: “ Illustrious manoeuvre well executed ” — a masterpiece of understatement.

1 The crew of this aircraft (L4A), Lieut.-Commander Williamson and Lieutenant Scarlett, were quickly picked up by a boat from the dock. According to the destroyer Fulmine, which was well placed to witness the incident, it was this aircraft which obtained the hit on the Cavour.

2 It lost its external overload tank at 2205, and the loose strap began to give trouble.

3 Neither of the crew of this aircraft, Lieutenants Bayley and Slaughter, survived.

4 These remarkably light losses are the more impressive when viewed in the light of the opposition encountered. From Italian sources, the ammunition expenditure from shore batteries was as follows:—

C a n n o n 4-09-inch 1,4.30 rounds4 02-inch 313 rounds3 • 05-inch 6,854 rounds

M a c h i n e - g u n i • 61-inch 931 rounds■83-inch 2,635 rounds• 52-inch 698 rounds•32-inch 637 rounds

T o t a l 13,489 rounds

Ships’ gunfire was confined to machine-guns; expenditure is unknown.

6 It is pleasant to record that these two officers were well treated by the Italian Navy, “ in fact,” to quote Lieut.-Commander Williamson, “ we were almost popular heroes. Two nights after our raid the R.A.F. came over and we were put in an air raid shelter full of seamen. They all pressed cigarettes on us and towards the end of the raid about 20 of them sang ‘ Tipperary ’ for our benefit.”

46 OPERATION M.B.8 AND F.A.A. ATTACK ON TARANTO, NOV. 1940

3 6 . R e s u l t s o f F.A .A . A t t a c k

A full appreciation of the results o f the attack was not possible for some days. The extent of the damage could not be known to the pilots at the time, though enough had been observed to be able to pronounce the operation a success.

Photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft from M alta in the course of the next few days showed clearly that three battleships had been hit. The Littorio was badly down by the bow, which was partly awash; on 14th November she had alongside her two naval auxiliaries, a large submarine, a tanker and several smaller craft. Actually, she had got o ff fairly lightly, considering that she had been hit by three torpedoes;1 a dent in her starboard quarter m ay have been caused by a fourth, which was found unexploded, embedded in the mud beneath her. The Cavour to the south of her was in a worse state; she was abandoned and beached, with practically the whole of her decks underwater and with the after turret completely submerged.2 The Duilio, north of the Littorio, had also been beached, and was attended by small craft and enclosed by nets;3 later removed for docking and repairs to Genoa, she was narrowly missed when that port was bombarded by Force “ H ” the following February.

The total number o f torpedoes fired was eleven and the ships attacked as follows:—

TARGET FIRST FORCE SECOND FORCE TOTAL FIRED HITS

Littorio I ( 400 yd.) i (1,000 yd.)

I (700 yd.) I (700 yd.)

4 3

Veneto i (1,300 yd.) 1 (500 yd.) 2 Nil

Duilio Nil i (800 yd.) I ■Cavour 3 ( 700 yd.) Nil 3 I

Goritzia Nil i I Nil

TOTAL 6 5 11 5

The results o f the bombing attacks were not noticeable at the time. It is now known as already mentioned that the Trento and Libeccio received direct hits from bombs which failed to explode, and other ships were narrowly missed; according to the Italians few of these bombs exploded.

1 Two in the first attack, one on the starboard bow which blew a hole 49 by 32 feet in the bulge abreast No. 1 6-inch turret, and the other on the port quarter, abreast the tiller flat (hole 23 by 5 feet). In the second attack a torpedo exploded at a very low level in the bulge on the starboard side, forward of the previous hit, blowing hole 40 by 30 feet. Repairs were not completed till the end of March 1941.

2 Hit on the port bow under the foremost turret and seriously damaged by a torpedo in the first attack, which blew a hole 40 by 27 feet. Nos. 1 and 2 oil fuel tanks were flooded, with resultant difficulty in preventing flooding in adjacent compartments. The Cavour was towed towards the shore and abandoned at 0545, 12th November, settling down with her stern on the bottom at 0800. She was refloated in July 1941 - and towed to Trieste, but was not repaired in time to take any further part in the war.

3 Hit on starboard side abreast of No. 1 5 • 25-inch mounting, at a depth of 29ft. 6in. Blew a hole 36 by 23ft. between Nos. 1 and 2 magazines, which were completely flooded. Repairs were not completed till mid-May 1941.

RAID BY LIG HT FORCES 47

3 7 . R a i d i n t o S t r a i t o f O t r a n t o , 1 1 t h /1 2 t h N o v e m b e r (Plan 8)

Meanwhile, Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell with his force o f three cruisers and two destroyers (Force “ X ” ) had proceeded into the Strait o f Otranto with the object o f “ enheartening the Greeks and dealing the enemy a blow in his own waters.” The particular objective was the Italian convoy which ran nightly across the Adriatic from Otranto, Brindisi and Bari. His, force consisted of the cruisers Orion, Sydney, Ajax and the destroyers Nubian Mohawk. Their orders were issued by signal in the forenoon o f the 11 th. They were to pass through position 390 10' N., 190 30' E., at 2030 that evening (south-west o f Corfu), thence steering 340° at 25 knots till 2230, when speed would be reduced to 20 knots. A t 0100, 12th (when they should be level with Brindisi), they were to turn round and rendezvous at 0800, 12th, in 38° 20' N., 190 50' E. (off Cephalonia). The cruisers were to be in line ahead in close order with the destroyers two miles on either bow. All darkened ships were to be treated as hostile. A n y ship becoming detached was to withdraw immediately to the southward. I f illumination were necessary, star shell was to be used in preference to searchlight. In the event of a single merchant ship being met, the rear cruiser was to part company and deal with her. I f a convoy was met, ships were not to keep rigid station but were to manoeuvre as necessary, maintaining touch.

Keeping his force concentrated on account of the bright moonlight, Vice- Admiral Pridham-Wippell steered a course up the middle of the Strait, passing some ten miles west o f Fano Island. The sea was calm, wind force 1, sky seven-tenths cloud, and the moon three-quarters full, bearing S.W. His ships apparently escaped observation or detection by the reported hydrophone.1 There was time enough to reach the line Brindisi to Valona but not the Bari- Durazzo line, and there remained a margin of only half an hour available for action against any ship sighted.

By 0100, 12th, the force had reached its northern limit. It was on its w ay back when at 0115 the Mohawk on the port bow o f the Orion sighted darkened ships. They bore 120° about eight miles away and proved to be four merchant ships in convoy, escorted by a destroyer and torpedo-boat, steering to the north-westward towards Brindisi.

Increasing speed to 25 knots, the Mohawk made the alarm signal to the Nubian, and turned to 120° to close the enemy, opening fire at 0125 on the torpedo boat, at 4,000 yards range. A hit was obtained with the fourth salvo and the enemy turned away making smoke.

The Orion, which had sighted the enemy at the same time as the Mohawk, headed across the bows of the convoy and at 0128 opened fire with her 6-inch guns on the third ship while the 4-inch guns fired four salvoes at the torpedo boat. The range was 6,400 yards, the bearing 088°. The merchant ship was badly damaged and set on fire; two torpedoes were fired at her, one o f which hit and she was seen to sink. Star shell from the 4-inch were lighting up the target as the 6-inch guns shifted to the fourth ship bearing 063°, range5,300 yards. Hit repeatedly, she was set on fire and abandoned by her crew, then hit by a torpedo (range 5,000 yards, bearing 012°), she settled by the stern.

The Ajax, sighting the convoy at 0125, had opened fire at 0130 on the destroyer, which passed astern out o f effective range apparently unhit. Her guns then shifted to one of the merchant ships which was set ablaze. A second ship came under fire; a torpedo fired at her missed but she was hit by two salvoes and left sinking.

1 A remote-controlled hydrophone had been recently reported off C. Santa Maria di Leuca.

48 OPERATION M.B.8 AND F A A . ATTACK ON TARANTO, NOV. 1940

The Sydney, the last ship in the line, sighting five darkened ships as early as o i 21 opened fire at 7,000 yards on the leading ship which was hit and set ablaze. Fire was shifted to the second ship from the right which was seen by the light o f star shell (0132) to be turning away with shots falling all round her; then the destroyer, which was making smoke, came under fire. She drew ahead and fire was shifted to the original targets now bunched together, which were hit and lost to sight in the night. A torpedo track passed under the Sydney (0140). Fire was shifted to a vessel lying stopped which was under fire from the other ships and being badly hit. Course was altered to the southeast and at 0148 two torpedoes were fired at a ship to the right of the one on fire. A t 0150 when the guns ceased fire, there were two ships in sight bearing 020° and 025° and one on fire bearing 349°, which was seen to sink at 0200.

T he two destroyers had been equally busy. The Nubian at 0119 saw four merchant ships on the port bow, bearing 110° and opened fire (0131) at 8,000 yards on a light grey ship; then when she was on fire shifted to the one on her right.

The Mohawk, after her engagement with the torpedo boat, had fired on the second merchant ship from the left. The escorting ships had been lost to sight and the convoy was beginning to scatter. A t 0145 land could be seen looming to the south-eastward. The Nubian was then forming up astern, and the Mohawk shifted target to the fourth ship from the left. The last ship, hit by a salvo aft, was lying stopped, emitting clouds o f steam. The Nubian took over the target and the Mohawk was about to turn to starboard in order to form astern of her and attack the disabled ships with torpedoes, when at 0153 there came an order from the Vice-Adm iral to steer 1660, 28 knots. The ships turned accordingly and the action was broken off.

Vice-Adm iral Pridham-Wippell had received a signal1 from the Naval Attaché, Ankara, conveying a report that the Italian Fleet intended to sail that night to bombard Corfu. The report was incorrect, but at the time suggested the unpleasant possibility o f a strong force o f cruisers in the Strait, waiting to cut them off. The convoy had been virtually destroyed and there was nothing more in view. Though smoke screens laid by the enemy and the blinding flash2 o f our own gunfire made it very difficult to assess results, one merchant ship— hit by a torpedo and gunfire— had been seen to sink, while two others were on fire, completely disabled and in a sinking condition. The fourth was last seen making for Valona, apparently on fire.3

A t 0315 the Ajax reported a shadowing aircraft, which hung on to them till 0515, half an hour after the moon had set. Speed was maintained at 28 knots in order to get as far as possible before daylight from the enemy bases which had been stirred up during the night. It was 1100, 12th November, when in compliance with a signal passed by flying boat, the 7th Cruiser Squadron, having satisfactorily performed its task, rejoined the Commander-in-Chief.

1 T.O .O .1936/11.2 Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell in his report referred to the immense advantage that would

be conferred by the provision of flashless cordite for use at night. He also recommended that in future raids should be confined to nights of little or no moon and should be carried out by two sub-divisions of destroyers, each working in its own area with a dividing line up the middle of the Strait.

“ The supporting force of cruisers should remain outside the Straits and should retire ahead of the raiding force so as to be in close support at daylight without risk of contact between these forces at night. As this raid will probably cause the enemy to establish patrols at the entrance to the Adriatic and to support them with striking forces, as was done in the last war, though not by the Italians, the raiding forces should be instructed to withdraw as soon as they have reason to suppose their presence has been detected.”

3 Catalani (2,429 tons, Capovado (4,391), Premula (4,427), Antonio Locatelli (5,691). All were sunk. Total 16,938 G .R.T.

CONCLUSION OF OPERATION M.B.8 49

“ T h e raid . . . ” subsequently commented Sir A ndrew Cunningham , “ was a boldly executed operation into narrow waters where the enemy m ight well have been expected to be encountered in force. It succeeded in doing considerable damage to the enemy, and undoubtedly had considerable moral effect.”

38. C o n c l u s i o n o f O p e r a t i o n M.B.8

A t noon, 12th November, the Com mander-in-Chief was in 36° 40' N., 20° 8' E., between Greece and Sicily. He had been joined by Rear-Adm iral Lyster with the Carrier Force and by Vice-Adm iral Pridham-W ippell with Force “ X ” . It was intended to repeat the air attack on Taranto, and the fleet remained in this area during the day, escaping detection from the air through the skilful action of three Fulmars, who shot down three Cants, before they could make reports. A striking force of 15 aircraft, consisting of six torpedo aircraft, seven dive-bombers and two flare droppers, was got ready for the purpose o f a new attack1 but the weather deteriorated and after consulting the R .A . (A) by signal the Com mander-in-Chief decided to cancel the operation.

A t 1800, 12th, the Com mander-in-Chief shaped course for Alexandria; Rear-Admiral Rawlings (1st Battle Squadron), with the 2nd Division, Malaya and Barham, together with the Ajax, Dainty, Diamond, Greyhound, Griffin and Gallant, was detached to fuel at Suda Bay. The York and Berwick proceeded at best speed for Alexandria, on their way, at 0920, 13th, sighting a submarine which did not attack, in 320 48' N., 26° 45' E. O n arriving o ff Alexandria at 1745, 13th, their entry was delayed for half an hour by an air raid. Convoy M .E.3, which was being escorted by the Ramillies, arrived safely at Alexandria at 0645, 13th. Convoy A .S .5, which had left the Piraeus for Port Said, escorted by the destroyers Wryneck and the trawlers Victorian and Sindonis, was joined by the Fiona and Chakla at 0210, 12th, in 340 48' N., 230 46' E. After parting company with the Wryneck at 1100, 13th, the convoy was attacked at 1330 in 320 55 ' N., 28° 17 ' E., by two S.79 aircraft with torpedoes, both o f which missed. It arrived safely at Port Said on 15th November.

M eanwhile at noon, 13th, the Commander-in-Chief was south-west o f Crete (340 23' N., 230 43' E.) The fleet was located during the afternoon by aircraft, and one shadower was possibly shot down; course was accordingly altered to 050° at 1600 and to 090° at 1800. A n enemy air force was detected to the southward by radar but failed to find the fleet. During the whole course of Operation M.B.8 only one air attack— by high level bombing— was made on the fleet (see Section 33). This immunity was attributed by the Com mander-in-Chief to effective fighter interception2, and underlined the importance o f the inclusion o f an aircraft carrier in the fleet.

The fleet arrived at Alexandria without further incident at 0700, 14th November.

1 The story goes that an Observer on being warned to stand by for this second attack remarked that after all they had only asked the Light Brigade to do it once!

’■ On 8th November one reconnaissance aircraft was shot down and a formation of seven S.79 bombers was subsequently intercepted and turned back 35 miles from the fleet, one S.79 being shot down and one damaged. On the 9th a reconnaissance aircraft was shot down. On the 10th a shadower was shot down and a bomber formation broken up; on the 12th three reconnaissance aircraft were shot down before they could make reports. On the 13th a Cant. 501 was engaged and apparently shot down and two aircraft made an abortive attack on Convoy A.S.5.

50 OPERATION M.B.8 AND F.A.A. ATTACK ON TARANTO, NOV. 1940

39 . C o m m e n t a n d R e f l e c t io n s , O p e r a t i o n M.B.8

Commenting on Operation M.B.8, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham rem arked:—

“ T h e operation (M.B.8) was originally initiated in the instructions of the A dm iralty for the passage o f the Barham, Berwick and Glasgow to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet (Operation “ Coat ” ). T h e period of the moon was also favourable for the execution o f the oft-postponed Operation ‘ Judgm ent ’ (the attack on Taranto).

“ Com ing as it did shortly after the entry of Greece into the w ar there were also outstanding commitments in the w ay of passing supplies to Greece and the est­ablishment o f naval and m ilitary base forces and equipment at Suda Bay. These were in addition to the passage of convoys to and from M alta, w hich have always to be made when operations in the Central M editerranean provide suitable cover.

“ In addition, it was necessary to get H .M .S . Terror1 aw ay from M alta, to provide temporary defence at Suda Bay while the coast defence guns were being installed, and with a view to her ultimate employment on the flank of the arm y in Libya.

“ Finally, it was decided to carry out a raid into the Straits o f O tranto while the opportunity offered, w ith the object o f enheartening the Greeks and of dealing an additional blow to the enemy in his own waters.

“ It can therefore be seen that the operation became one of considerable complex­ity, covering a large area with a wide succession o f subsidiary movements. A part from the excellent results obtained in offensive action, perhaps the most surprising feature o f the operation was the almost clockwise regularity w ith w hich the convoys ran, ships unloaded guns and material, and with w hich the rendezvous of w idely dispersed units were reached at the appointed time.

“ These results were only rendered possible by the good co-operation o f the Naval, A rm y and A ir Force authorities concerned at Suda Bay in the establishment o f the base, whereby ships were released punctually to their duties; and not least by the good performance of merchant ships in convoys whose punctual arrivals contributed much to the success o f the operation. T he w ork of M alta in the rapid unloading of stores and troops and in the refuelling of destroyers was excellent.”

The Com mander-in-Chief might well be satisfied with every part o f the operations, but the palm must go to the F.A .A . Squadrons o f the Illustrious and Eagle, operating from the Illustrious. The potentiality o f the carrier, not merely as an indispensable component of a modern fleet, but as a mobile airfield capable o f operating aircraft against objectives otherwise immune to air attack was— perhaps for the first time— fully demonstrated to the world. It is not too much to claim that the Illustrious on this occasion effected as radical a change in the naval strategical conditions in the Mediterranean as the Japanese carriers at Pearl Harbour2 and the American carriers at M idway Island3 were to do in the Pacific in the not too distant future.4

Commenting on this, the first occasion on which the F .A.A. attacked an enemy base in the Mediterranean, Captain Boyd o f the Illustrious made the following remarks:—

“ T h e excellent photographic reconnaissance promoted by the R oyal A ir Force was a most important factor in the success o f this operation. T h e accurate meteorological forecast from M alta was also most useful.

“ There was considerable debate as to the wisdom of using D uplex pistols in such constricted waters. It was decided to run o ff ioo yards of the safety range and the battery resistance was removed to ensure that the torpedoes would remain

1 Monitor (1915), two 15-inch, eight 4-inch, three 2-inch H.A.2 7th December 1941.* 3rd— 6th June 1942.4 Admiral Lyster deeply regretted the unavoidable absence of the Eagle. “ Her fine squadrons

(instead of only a few representatives) ” — he wrote in a private letter— “ would have increased the weight of the attack considerably, and I believe would have made it devastating.”

M ESSAGE FR O M H.M. THE KIN G 51

dangerous on completion of their run. T h e decision to use them was indeed fortunate as the results could not have been obtained by any other weapon. T o those whose faith in this weapon has remained unshaken the greatest honour is due and their faith has been am ply justified by three battleships being either sunk or crippled by nine, or possibly eleven, 18-inch torpedoes.

“ T h e attack was carried out under somewhat difficult conditions. O w ing to the heavy Fleet program me no rehearsal had been possible. A ircraft from H .M .S. Eagle were embarked the day before leaving the harbour and had had no previous experience o f landing on H .M .S . Illustrious’s deck, or o f our controlled landings and the use o f the barrier. A third obstacle was presented by the discovery that our petrol was contaminated, three Swordfish being lost on the preceding days from this cause. In spite o f this, the zeal and enthusiasm of everyone to carry out this great enterprise was unabated and it is impossible to praise too highly those w ho in these com paratively slow machines made studied and accurate attacks in the midst o f intense anti-aircraft fire.

“ A lthough the proper function o f the Fleet A ir A rm m ay perhaps be the operation of aircraft against an enemy in the open sea it has been demonstrated before and repeated in no uncertain fashion by this success that the ability to strike unexpectedly is conferred by the Fleet A ir Arm .

“ It is often felt that this arm w hich has had a long struggle w ith adverse opinions, and its unspectacular aircraft is underestimated in its power. It is hoped that this victory will be considered a suitable reward to those whose work and faith in the Fleet A ir A rm has made it possible.”

The Com mander-in-Chief in his report remarked that the attack was

“ adm irably planned and the determined and gallant m anner in w hich it was carried out reflects the highest credit on all concerned.

“ This was the first occasion on w hich D uplex pistols were used in the M edi­terranean. It is considered that the results achieved have proved the value o f this weapon and that the m any years o f research and experiment devoted to its develop­ment have been well repaid.

“ There can be little doubt that the crippling of h a lf the Italian battlefleet is having and w ill continue to have, a marked effect on the course of the war. W ithout indulging in speculation as to the political repercussions, it is already evident that this successful attack has greatly increased our freedom o f movement in the M editerranean and has thus strengthened our control over the central area o f this sea. It has enabled two battleships to be released for operations elsewhere while the effect on the morale o f the Italians must be considerable.”

4 0 . M e s s a g e f r o m H . M . T h e K in g

These operations marked the culminating point o f the successes achieved in 1940 by the Mediterranean Fleet against an enemy superior in strength operating from his home bases.

Foremost amongst its achievements was the Fleet A ir Arm attack on the Italian Fleet. A brilliantly conceived operation executed with skill and daring against a powerful fleet in a strongly defended anchorage, it merits a classic place in naval annals as an outstanding example of the strength o f air power exercised by a fleet at sea.

The following message from H .M . The K ing was received by the Com- mander-in-Chief on the 18th November:—

“ T h e recent successful operations o f the Fleet under your command have been a source o f pride and gratification to all at home. Please convey m y warm congratulations to the M editerranean Fleet, and in particular to the Fleet A ir Arm on their brilliant exploit against the Italian warships at T aran to.”

CHAPTER IV (Battle Summary No. 9)

Action off Cape Spartivento, Sardinia,27th November 1940

4 1 . I n t r o d u c t o r y R e m a r k s

W IT H IN A F O R T N IG H T of the events described in the last chapter, there occurred an action in the Western Mediterranean, o ff Cape Spartivento, Sardinia, between British forces under Vice-Adm iral

Sir James Somerville and units o f the Italian N avy under Adm iral I. Campioni. The encounter took place during operations to ensure the passage o f very important military stores and personnel through the Mediterranean to the M iddle East. The safe passage of these reinforcements was Sir James Somerville’s paramount consideration throughout and it is in the light o f this liability that the action must be studied.1

Once again the Italians, availing themselves o f their superior speed, withdrew almost before action was joined, and little material damage was suffered by either side. But the British were thereby left free to pass the convoy through according to plan, and the operations contributed another nail in the coffin of Italian supremacy in the Mediterranean.

4 2 . P l a n o f O p e r a t i o n “ C o l l a r ”

The British units taking part in the operation, which was known as “ Collar ” , were organised in three groups2 as follows:—

1 “ In convoy defence there is only one object, namely THE SAFE AND T IM E L Y A R R IV A L OF THE C O N V O Y A T ITS D ESTIN ATIO N ” — Fighting Instructions, 1939, Art. 625. In mid-1941, the Section on “ Convoy Defence” was amended. In this and later versions, including Fighting Instructions, 1947, “ the safe and timely arrival of the convoy at its destination ” remains the primary object or aim of the escort Commander but it is not so strongly emphasised, the words “ there is only one object ” being omitted.

2 See Appendix M.F o r c e “ B ” F o r c e “ F ” F o r c e “

Renown ( F . O . H . ) Manchester RamilliesArk Royal Southampton NewcastleSheffield Hotspur CoventryDespatch (Commodore) [West Indies] Peony BerwickFaulknor (D.8) Salvia DefenderFiredrake Gloxinia GreyhoundForester Hyacinth GallantFury Encounter Clan Forbes HerewardDuncan (D.13) Kelvin Clan Fraser DiamondWishart Jaguar New Zealand Star

Note. For the sake of clarity, the composition of these forces is repeated in abbreviated form throughout the narrative, e.g. Force “ F ” (2 cr. 1 dr., etc.).

5 2

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS AND ENEMY INTELLIGENCE 53

F o r c e “ B ” consisting o f the battle-cruiser Renown (Flag Officer Com­manding Force “ H ” , Vice-Adm iral Sir James F. Somerville), the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, cruisers, Sheffield and Despatch, and nine destroyers o f the 8th and 13th Flotillas.

F o r c e “ F ” composed o f the cruisers Manchester (Flag, Vice-Adm iral L. E. Holland) and Southampton, each carrying about 700 R .A .F . and military personnel, the destroyer Hotspur, four corvettes on passage to the Eastern Mediterranean, and three merchant vessels carrying mechanical transport.

F o r c e “ D ” from the Eastern Mediterranean, consisted o f the battleship Ramillies, the cruisers Newcastle, Berwick and Coventry (A.A.) and five destroyers.1

The general plan of the operation was that Forces “ B ” and “ F ” should escort and cover the passage o f the transports and corvettes from Gibraltar through the Western Mediterranean, and should be met by Force “ D ” to the south o f Sardinia at approximately noon,2 27th November. A ll three forces were then to make for a position between Sicily and Cape Bon (latitude 370 40' N., longitude io° 50' E.) which they would reach at dusk. After dark, Vice-Adm iral Holland with Force “ F ” , reinforced by the Coventry and destroyers o f Force “ D ” was to pass through the Narrows to the Eastern Mediterranean, where he would be met the next day by the Mediterranean Fleet. Force “ B ” with the Ramillies, Newcastle and Berwick would then return to Gibraltar.

4 3 . P r e l i m i n a r y C o n s id e r a t io n s a n d E n e m y I n t e l l i g e n c e

The condition of the ships taking part in the operation was not wholly satisfactory. The Renown, Ark Royal and Sheffield were in good fighting condi­tion, but the Ark Royal had a number o f inexperienced pilots and observers, and the efficiency of her torpedo striking force was low, owing to the lack of opportunities for exercise. The destroyers o f the 8th and 13 th Flotillas had been running very hard, though there was no reason to anticipate the develop­ment o f any definite defects. These ships comprising the permanent nucleus o f Force “ H ” , were the only vessels in the whole force which had ever worked together as a squadron.3 Some o f the cruisers were handicapped by defects. The Berwick could not steam more than 27 knots, owing to the removal o f some rows of turbine blades, and Newcastle’s boilers were not entirely reliable.

The Hotspur had just undergone temporary repairs and her speed was limited to about 20 knots; she was also without asdics. The corvettes could not be relied upon for a speed of advance of more than 14 knots.

The Manchester and Southampton were each to carry some 700 R .A .F . and military personnel, to the detriment o f their fighting efficiency, and doubts were expressed by Vice-Adm iral Holland as to the advisability o f including them in Force “ F ” . As extreme importance was attached to the safe and timely arrival o f these reinforcements at Alexandria, he represented that the cruisers should proceed independently, relying on their high speed and mobility, for with so many additional men on board, the ships were not in a condition to fight, and if compelled to do so, the casualties among the R .A .F. might be heavy. Vice-Adm iral Somerville on the other hand, was o f the

1 For measures and movements in the Eastern Mediterranean, see Naval Staff History, Mediterranean, Vol. II, Chapter I.

2 Zone minus 2 Time is used throughout.3 In this connection it is interesting to note the constant changes which circumstances had

imposed on the composition of Force “ H Between ist July and 27th November 1940, the following different ships were at one time or another included in the Force:—

7 capital ships, 3 aircraft carriers, 13 cruisers, 33 destroyers.

54

Pla

n

of

Op

er

at

ion

“

Co

ll

ar

BRITISH AND ITALIAN MOVEMENTS 25TH-27TH NOV. 55

opinion that the complete object o f the operation, which included the safe passage of the transports and corvettes, was more likely to be achieved by a show o f force sufficiently powerful to deter the Italians from attempting to interfere.1

No very definite intelligence with regard to the Italian Naval Forces seems to have been available,2 but Vice-Adm iral Somerville considered it very probable, in view of the Taranto episode,3 that the enemy would attempt some operation in the Western basin of the Mediterranean. There they could achieve a considerable superiority over Forces “ B ” and “ F ” (i be., I ac.,4 cr., io dr.) which would be forced to stand and fight owing to the presence of the slow transports (16 knots). He estimated that a concentration of three battleships, five to seven 8-inch cruisers, and several 6-inch cruisers with other light forces could be effected by the enemy for this purpose.4 For this reason, he asked for the battleship Royal Sovereign, then undergoing repairs at Gibraltar, to be included in the operation; this was approved by the Adm iralty, but her defects could not be completed in dme.

4 4 . B r i t i s h a n d I t a l ia n M o v e m e n t s , 2 5 t h - 2 7 t h N o v e m b e r

The transports passed through the Strait o f Gibraltar during the night of 24th/25th November, and were joined by the four corvettes to the eastward of Gibraltar a.m., 25th. The remainder o f Forces “ B ” and “ F ” sailed at 0800 that morning, and the operation proceeded according to plan without any particular incident until the morning o f 27th November.

These movements and the departure of Force “ D ” from Alexandria did not escape the notice o f the Italians and at 1200, 26th November, strong forces under Adm iral Campioni, the Com mander-in-Chief Afloat, left Naples and Messina and steered to pass to the southward o f Gape Spartivento, Sardinia (a distance o f about 350 miles) with the intention of intercepting Force “ H The Italians were organised in two Squadrons, v iz:—-

F i r s t S q u a d r o n , consisting o f the battleships, Vittorio Veneto (flag, Commander-in-Chief), Cesare, and eight destroyers.

S e c o n d S q u a d r o n , under Vice-Adm iral Iachino, six 8-inch gun cruisers, Pola (flag, Vice-Adm iral Iachino), Fiume, Gorizia (1st

1 At Vice-Admiral Holland’s request, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was asked whether the safe passage of personnel or M .T. ships should receive priority if circumstances were to arise which made a decision necessary, after Force “ F ” had parted company for the passage of the Narrows. The Commander-in-Chief replied, “ Personnel ” but subsequent instructions were received from the Admiralty that this must be subject to the overriding consideration that if Italian forces were in sight, the action taken by the cruisers must be the same as if personnel were not embarked.

2 Air reconnaissance from Malta, on 24th November, gave the following disposition of Italian forces:—

Taranto Outer harbour, two battleships, five cruisers, nine merchant vessels.Inner harbour— not seen.

Messina Three cruisers, five destroyers, six submarines.Catania Nil.Augusta A few small vessels.Syracuse Possibly one destroyer and a few smaller vessels.

3 Attack by torpedo bombers on Italian Fleet, n th November 1940 (see Chapter III).1 Reliance was apparently placed entirely on reconnaissance by shore-based aircraft to

locate enemy units in the Western Mediterranean during the days immediately preceding the battle (24th/27th November), a task for which Vice-Admiral Somerville subsequently stated they proved entirely inadequate.

No information was received from any special sources, and the first report received by the Admiral of enemy ships being at sea in the Western Mediterranean was provided by carrier reconnaissance a few hours before the action commenced.

\

56 ACTION OFF GAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

division), Trieste (flag, Vice-Adm iral Sansonetti), Trento, Bolzano (3rd division) and eight destroyers.1

Throughout the afternoon of 26th November and the night 26th/27th, the fleet made to the westward without incident. No further news o f the British came in, except a report shortly after midnight from the torpedo boat Sirio, which had sighted seven warships (types unspecified) on a north-westerly course off Cape Bon; to these ships (Force “ D ” ), Adm iral Campioni correctly assigned the intention o f joining the group coming from Gibraltar.

4 5 . S i t u a t i o n a t 0 8 0 0 , 2 7 t h N o v e m b e r (Plan 9)

A t 0800, 27th November, about half an hour before sunrise,2 the situation was as follows. The Italian battlefleet was about 30 miles east-south-east o f Cape Spartivento steering 260° 16 knots with the 1st Cruiser Division some n miles ahead and the 3rd Division disposed 180° five miles from the 1st Division.

Vice-Adm iral Somerville in the Renown, with the Ark Royal, Sheffield and four destroyers, was about 90 miles south-west o f Cape Spartivento, steering 083°, 16 knots.

Some 30 miles to the west-south-west o f him, the Vice-Adm iral, 18th Cruiser Squadron, in the Manchester, with the Southampton, Despatch, and five destroyers was in company with the convoy. The four corvettes had been unable to keep up with it and were about 10 miles to the westward.

The visibility was excellent, the wind south-easterly, force 3 to 4, and the sea calm. Neither British nor Italian forces were aware of the presence of each other.

A t this time the Ark Royal flew off a section o f fighters, one A /S Patrol, one meteorological aircraft and seven T .S.R .s designed to cover the area to the west o f Sardinia, and between Sardinia and Africa. The depth o f this reconnaissance to the eastward was sufficient to cover Force “ D ” (1 bs., 3 cr.,5 dr.) which was approaching from Skerki Bank.

Vice-Adm iral Somerville continued on an easterly course, in order to concentrate with Force “ D ” should the air reconnaissance reveal the presence o f important enemy units in the vicinity o f that force.3 A t 0900, having received no such report, he altered course to the south-westward to join the convoy and give it additional A. A. defence against the earliest bombing attacks from the Sardinian airfields.

4 6 . R e c o n n a is s a n c e A i r c r a f t R e p o r t E n e m y F o r c e s a t S e a

Just about this time, at 0852, one of the Ark Royal’s reconnaissance aircraft had sighted a group o f warships about 25 miles to the southward o f Cape Spartivento, and closing to investigate, at 0906 sent an alarm report o f four cruisers and six destroyers, which, however, was not received by any ship of the British Forces. Sighting the convoy at 0920, the Renown manoeuvred to pass astern of it and take station to the southward and up sun, in the probable direction of air attack. A t 0956, while still on the port quarter of the convoy, Vice-Adm iral Somerville received from the Ark Royal an aircraft report, timed

1 See Appendix N.2 Sunrise was at 0824, Zone minus 2.3 A signal from the Chief of Staff, Alexandria, timed 0330/27, indicated that the presence

of Force “ D ” might be known to the enemy.

MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD CONVOY AND JO IN FORCE “ D ” 57

0920, of five cruisers and five destroyers some 65 miles to the north-eastward of him.1

Though it seemed possible that this report referred to Force “ D ” steam was at once ordered for full speed, and screens o f two destroyers each were detailed for both the Ark Royal and the convoy. Further reports from aircraft, confirmed by the Ark Royal, established by 1015 the presence o f enemy battle­ships and cruisers, and the Renown altered course to 075° to join the Ramillies, increasing speed as rapidly as possible to 28 knots.

4 7 . M e a s u r e s t o S a f e g u a r d C o n v o y a n d t o J o in F o r c e “ D ” (Plan 9) Tw enty minutes later, though the plot at 1035 clearly showed enemy forces

1 Owing to faults in the receiver the Renown failed to receive the first 11 aircraft reports made on the reconnaissance wave.

58 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

to the north-east, their com position and relative position was still in doubt. In these circum stances, the V ice-A d m iral decided that the convoy should continue towards its destination, steering a south-easterly course (120°) in order to keep clear o f a n y action w h ich m ight develop. I t was given an escort o f tw o cruisers, the Despatch (Com m odore C . D ouglas-Pennant) and Coventry and tw o destroyers.1 T h e rem ainder o f the cruisers and destroyers o f Force “ F ” (2 cr., 3 dr.) w ere ordered to jo in Force “ B ” (1 be., 1 ac., 1 cr.,4 dr.,) w h ich steered to concentrate w ith Force “ D ” (1 bs., 3 cr., 5 dr.) prior to attacking the enem y. A t the same time, M a lta was told the position o f two enem y battleships, and the Ramillies was told the position o f the Renown. T h e Ark Royal was ordered to prepare and to fly o ff a T /B striking force, acting independently under cover o f the battlefleet.

A t 1058 a Sunderland flying-boat closed the Renown and reported Force “ D ” bearing 070° 34 miles. A s the ju n ction o f the tw o forces seem ed to be assured, the speed o f the Renown was reduced to 24 knots, in order to m aintain a position betw een the convoy and the enem y force. Its estim ated position was 025° 50 miles distant and the flying-boat was ordered to shadow and report its composition.

T h e cruisers Manchester, Sheffield and Southampton h ad m eanw hile concentrated w ith the destroyers in the van , bearing five miles from the Renown in the direction o f the enem y.

Reports from the reconnaissance aircraft o f the Ark Royal contained a num ber o f discrepancies w hich m ade it im possible to obtain a clear picture o f the situation. T w o groups o f cruisers had been reported, as w ell as two battleships; it seemed certain that five or six cruisers w ere present, b u t the num ber o f battleships rem ained in doub t; it m ight be one, or two or three. “ B ut w hatever the com position o f the enem y force,” it was clear to V ice- A d m iral Som erville that “ in order to achieve his object— the safe and tim ely arrival o f the convoy a t its destination— it was essential to show a bold front and attack the enem y as soon as possible.”

A t 1115 , the enem y origin ally steering to the w estw ard, were reported to be altering course to the eastw ard.2

A ll this tim e Force “ D ” had been com ing w estw ard, and at 11203 was sighted in the Renown, approxim ately 24 miles distant. T h e Ramillies sighted Force “ H ” , bearing 2390, five m inutes later.

T h e aircraft reports indicated that the enem y force consisted o f tw o b attle­ships, six or m ore cruisers and a considerable num ber o f destroyers. T h e action appeared likely to develop into a chase, and the Ramillies was therefore ordered to steer 045°, so as not to lose ground. V ice-A d m iral H olland was placed in com m and o f all the cruisers in the van, and the Berwick and Newcastle from Force “ D ” w ere ordered to jo in him . It was shortly after this that the Ark Royal flew o ff the first T /B striking force.4

1 Exclusive o f the Hotspur. T he Coventry and destroyers Wishart and Duncan did not make contact till 1300.

2 A n observer who witnessed this alteration of course reported that the eastern group of cruisers appeared to be thrown into confusion. The leading ship turned i8o°, while the following ships turned only go°. Collisions appeared to have been narrowly averted, and at one time all three ships seemed to be stopped with their bows nearly touching each other.

3 In Adm iral Somerville’s report, time o f sighting is given as 1 128, but in the Chronological Appendix to the report it is given as 1120. From other evidence, this latter time appears to be the correct one.

4 See Section 53.

APPROACH 59

48. T h e A p p r o a c h (Plans 9, 10)

A t 1 1 34, V ice-A d m iral Som erville increased to 28 knots, and six m inutes later altered course to 050° to close the enem y. T h e position o f the British forces was as follows. Fine on the port bow o f the Renown w ere the cruisers Manchester, Southampton and Sheffield in single line ahead; the Berwick and Newcastle w ere com ing from the eastw ard to jo in them. T w o miles astern o f the cruisers, C ap tain de Salis (D.8) in the Faulknor was gradually collecting the Encounter and the 8th Flotilla, some o f w hich had been screening the convoy. T h e five destroyers o f Force “ D ” were also com ing west to jo in the Faulknor, and were even tually stationed three miles 270° from her.

T en miles fine on the starboard bow o f the Renown, the Ramillies w as altering to a parallel course. T h e Ark Royal had dropped some distance astern, and was carryin g out flying operations betw een the m ain force and the convoy, w hich was now about 22 miles south-south-west from the A dm iral.

A t 1154, the Sunderland flyin g-boat returned, and reported six cruisers and eight destroyers, bearing 330°, 30 miles from the Renown. H er report unfortun­ately gave no course or speed o f the enem y, and she disappeared from sight before this could be obtained. T his inform ation— the first visual link received — indicated that one group o f the enem y forces was considerably further to the west than those previously reported, and m oreover that it w as in a position to w ork round astern and attack the Ark Royal and the convoy. V ice-A d m iral Som erville accordin gly altered course to north in order to avoid getting too far to the eastw ard.1

49. V i c e - A d m i r a l S o m e r v i l l e ’s A p p r e c i a t i o n , N o o n , 27t h N o v e m b e r

T h e situation as it appeared from the Renown’s p lot ju st before noon is shown in Fig. 8 overleaf. T h e prospects o f bringing the enem y to action appeared favourable. T h e com position o f the Italian forces was not definitely established, but there did not appear to be m ore than tw o battleships w ith them.

T h e British forces had effected their concentration, o f w hich the enem y seemed to be unaw are, since no shadowers had been sighted, or detected by radar. His speed was reported as between 14 and 18 knots, w hich suggested that his reconnaissance was not com pleted. T h e sun w as im m ediately astern o f the British forces, giv ing them the advantage o f light, and, i f the nearest reported position o f the enem y w as correct, there seemed every possibility o f b rin ging o ff a sim ultaneous surface and T /B attack, providin g he did not retire im m ediately at h igh speed.

V ice-A d m iral Som erville’s intentions w ere:—

(i) T o drive o ff the enem y from an y position from w hich he could attack the convoy.

(ii) T o accep t some risk to the convoy, providin g there was reasonable prospect o f sinking one or m ore o f the enem y battleships.

T o achieve the second o f them he considered that the speed o f the enem y w ould have to be reduced b y T /B attacks to 20 knots, or less, and that the enem y battleships m ust be engaged b y the Renown and Ramillies in concert.

1 No further report o f this group was received during the action, and the Adm iral consequently remained in doubt as to its whereabouts and intentions. T he Ark Royal was, however, between his main forces and the convoy, and he considered that her returning aircraft would sight and report this group should it attempt to work round to a position from which to attack the latter.

60 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

Fig. 8 . S i t u a t i o n S h o r t l y B e f o r e N o o n f r o m Renown’s P l o t

50. A d m i r a l C a m p i o n i ’ s A p p r e c i a t i o n , N o o n , 27t h N o v e m b e r (Plans 9, 10)

It was not till 1015, 27th N ovem ber, that the Italian C om m an der-in-C hief received an y further news o f the British. T h is cam e from an aircraft catapulted from the Bolzano— a report o f one battleship, tw o light cruisers and four destroyers in position 20 miles north o f C ap e de Fer (135 m iles S .W . o f Spartivento) steering 090° at 0945.1 A d m iral C am p ioni for a tim e thought this w as the C a p Bon force (Force “ D ” ), as the num bers coincided w ith the group reported during the night, though the position w as further to the west than was to be expected, even i f the ships h ad only ju st reversed course.

A second sighting report, received from the Gorizia’s a ircraft a t 1144, con­

1 This report almost certainly referred to Force “ B.”

ADMIRAL CAMPIONI’S APPRECIATION 61

firm ed the position given in the 1015 report, but did not m ention “ two cruisers,” an omission possibly explained b y the fact that the cruisers o f Force “ B ” h ad b y then m oved on ahead o f the Renown to jo in the cruisers o f Force “ D ” . (See P lan 9.)

A ctin g on the Bolzano’s report A d m iral C am pioni led the First Squadron round to course 1350 a t 1128. B oth divisions o f cruisers o f the Second Squadron conform ed to his turn to the S.E . H e then envisaged an encounter between the w hole o f his forces and the Renown w ith possibly tw o cruisers and some destroyers, and this view was upheld b y the Gorizia’s a ircraft report at 1144. H e h ad not, a t that tim e, appreciated that Forces “ B ” and “ D ” had joined, nor that the Ark Royal was in the offing, although he knew the aircraft-carrier had left G ib ra ltar w ith the other ships. His report reads as follow s:—

“ T h e sighting report (at 1015) p ersuaded m e to a lter course to 135° in order to close the E n glish forces, an d i f possible in tercep t them . T h is ap p eared possible at the tim e, also I h ad in m in d th at th e E n glish forces w ere in ferior to the Ita lian . F urth erm ore th e encou n ter w o u ld be b rou gh t a b o u t in w aters closer to S icily th an Sard in ia, th at is in conditions fav o u rab le to us.

“ B u t w h ilst ou r forces w ere ta k in g u p station on th e n ew course I received at 115 5 a signal, o rig in ally m ad e a t 1 1 1 0 b y an a ircraft from A rm era , g iv in g the position o f the Renown’ s group. T h is position w as 20 m iles n earer to the Vittorio Veneto than the one show n b y the p lo t based on previous sighting reports, an d w as n ear enough to the other British forces to render their m eetin g v ery easy.

“ A state o f affairs w as thus created w h ich on the best hypothesis w as un favou rable to us n u m erica lly 1 and q u alita tive ly . P a rticu larly im p o rtan t w as the presence o f an a ircraft-carrier, w h ich w ith w ell-d irected action p ro p erly syn chron ized w ith action o f th eir ships, th at w ere certa in ly n ot inferior to ours, w o u ld h ave brou gh t abou t a situation o f the utm ost grav ity .

“ It w as a situation not on ly a t varia n ce w ith th e d irective g iven to m e b y the M in istry o f M arin e , b u t w ith th at im posed b y m ilitary necessity.” T h e A d m ira l then explain s th at in this latter term h e w as referring to the effect on the Ita lian n a v y o f the F .A .A . a ttack on T a ra n to on n t h N o vem b er, an d th e fact th at the battleship Andrea D oria w as n ot y e t ready.

“ U n d e r these con dition s,” con tin ued A d m ira l C am p io n i, “ in con form ity w ith the spirit and letter o f the orders received an d w ith w h a t a t th at m om en t I deem ed to be m y d u ty I d ecided not to becom e in vo lved in a b attle . In th eo ry I should have been a b le to take in to calcu latio n a n effective in terven tion b y our shore-based aircraft, b u t m y previous exp erien ce d iscouraged m e from p u ttin g too m u ch faith on such in terven tion , h a vin g learn t from exp erien ce w h a t to e x p e ct.” 2

A t 12 15, 27th N ovem ber, the Italian adm iral’s appreciation and decision am ounted briefly to th is:—

“ T h e British a ircraft w ill d a m a ge our ships, the I ta lia n a ircraft w ill n ot dam age theirs, the en em y are n ot inferior in num bers or q u a lity to us, an d a t present w e can n ot a fford a n y further redu ction in cap ita l ship stren gth .”

H e therefore hoisted the signal not to becom e involved in action, “ course 090°; increase speed o f engines.”

51 . S u r f a c e C o n t a c t (Plan 10)

M ean w hile, A d m iral Som erville was steering to the n orthw ard at his best speed to close the enem y.

1 In the matter o f actual numbers and strength the Adm iral’s statement about the “ English being num erically superior ” was incorrect, for there were two capital ships on each side, seven Italian 8-inch cruisers compared with one 8-inch and four 6-inch on our side, and 16 Italian destroyers to our ten (i.e. not counting the two destroyers with the Ark Royal).

2 Presumably Adm iral Cam pioni had in mind the action o ff Calabria, 9th Ju ly 1940, when the Italian A ir Force, although well within range, failed to inflict any damage on the British Fleet, and, in addition, bombed their own.

62 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

A t 1207, the Renown developed a hot bearing on one shaft, w hich lim ited her speed to 2 7 i knots. A t the same time, puffs o f smoke w ere observed on the horizon bearing 006°, and the cruisers in the van sighted masts and ships between the bearings o f 006° and 346°. Six m inutes later (1213, 27th), a signal (timed 1147) cam e in from the Ark Royal, reporting the com position o f the enem y as two battleships and six cruisers, accom panied b y destroyers. T h is report did not nullify that o f the Sunderland. T h ere still rem ained the possibility that the Sunderland’s reported group o f six cruisers and destroyers was a separate force further to the westward. T h e British cruisers b y this tim e were concentrated in the van, and had form ed a line o f bearing o75°-255° in the sequence from west to east, Sheffield, Southampton, Newcastle, Manchester, Berwick.1

T h e nine destroyers w ere stationed five miles 040° from the Renown, in order to be placed favourably to counter-attack an y destroyers attem pting a torpedo attack on the Renown or Ramil lies.2

T h e situation as seen b y the cruisers im m ediately before the action com ­m enced was as follows. Between the bearings o f 340° and 350° three enem y cruisers and some destroyers were visible at a range o f abou t 11 miles, steering a northerly course.3 This force w ill be referred to as the “ W estern G roup ” .

A second group o f cruisers, also accom panied b y destroyers, w hich w ill be referred to as the “ Eastern G roup ” bore between 0030 and 0 130. This group was further a w ay and was steering approxim ately ioo°.

52. T h e A c t i o n (Plan 10)

A t 1220, 27th the enem y in the western group4 opened fire, and the British advanced forces im m ediately replied. T h e enem y’s first salvo fell close to the Manchester, exact for range, but 100 yards out for deflection. As soon as fire was opened b y the British cruisers, the Italians m ade smoke and retired on courses varyin g betw een north-west and north-east. B ehind their smoke screen they seemed to be m aking large and frequent alterations o f course, ju d gin g from glimpses w hich were obtained.

A ctu a lly , the cruisers had ju st received the G om m ander-in-C hief’s orders to steer to the eastward, follow ed a t 1224 b y a signal “ D o not jo in action ” . A t 1222 the eastern group5 had altered to 050°, 28 knots, increasing to 30 knots at 1230. A t the same tim e V ice-A d m iral lach in o ordered the western group to

1 T he Newcastle could not maintain the speed o f the remainder and never quite reached her station.

T he Berwick had signalled at 1158 that as her speed was limited to 27 knots she proposed to join the Renown. This she turned to do, thereby losing ground. She subsequently took station on the starboard bow of the Manchester, but owing to her lack o f speed, dropped back during the action.

2 The destroyers maintained a distance o f five cables apart throughout the action. V ice- Adm iral Somerville remarks that when the number o f destroyers present or on a flank is limited to approximately one flotilla, this is a very suitable distance. It relieves the commanding officers of the necessity to maintain accurate station, and reduces the damage likely to be caused by gunfire.

3 Evidence as to the movements o f the western group immediately prior to the action was conflicting. It appeared probable that this group was in line ahead on a southerly course until 1210, when course was altered together to the northward. Between 1210 and 1220 further alterations might have been made. W hen first observed from the Renown the ships appeared to have a fairly broad inclination to the eastward. Actually, this group— the 3rd Division (Trieste, Trento, Bolzano)— was making two 180° turns to starboard, in order to take station 270” from the 1st Division. (See Plan 10).

1 Third Division ( Trieste, Trento, Bolzano).5 First Division, Pola (flag Vice-Adm iral lachino), Fiume, Gorizia.

THE ACTION 63

keep further a w ay from the enem y. “ T h e T h ird D ivision ,” he subsequently w rote, “ being the target o f the E nglish fire and realising that at a n y m om ent a salvo o f 15-inch shells m ight hit them , increased to their m axim um speed and presented their sterns to the enem y ” .

It was a t 1224 that the Renown opened fire a t the right-hand ship o f the western group (identified as an 8-inch cruiser o f the Zara class) a t a m ean range o f 26,500 yards. A fter six salvoes, the target was lost in smoke. T h e Ramillies also fired tw o salvoes a t m axim um elevation to test the range, but both fell short; she then dropped astern follow ing in the w ake o f the Renown a t her best speed, 20 *7 knots, throughout the action.

Just before opening fire, the Renown had sighted two ships w hich w ere not m aking smoke, bearing 020° at extrem e visibility. T h e y w ere thought at the tim e to be the Italian battleships though they proved later to be cruisers o f the eastern group. O n losing her first target the Renown a ltered course to starboard to close these supposed battleships and to bring the cruisers o f the western group broader on the bow. She had hard ly done so w hen the centre ship o f the latter group appeared m om entarily through the smoke, and was given tw o salvoes. A g ain course w as altered to open “ A ” arcs on the left- hand ship, a t w h ich eight salvoes w ere fired at a range o f abou t 30,700 yards before she too disappeared in the sm oke at 1245. A t this m om ent, two large ships steering to the w estw ard em erged from the smoke cloud; the Renown’s turrets w ere trained on this new target, but before fire could be opened, they were fortunately identified as French liners.

T h e enem y w ere b y this tim e on the run, and had passed outside the range o f our cap ital ships, though at 1311 the Renown fired tw o ran gin g salvoes, w hich fell short, at two ships o f the eastern group.

M ean w hile the British cruisers had been h otly engaged a t ranges varyin g between 23,000 and 16,000 yards. M a n y straddles w ere obtained, b u t smoke rendered spotting and observation exceedingly difficult. N o concentration o f fire w as ordered, ow ing to the rap id ly chan gin g situation, and the large num ber o f targets.1

T h e Manchester, Sheffield and Newcastle a ll opened fire a t first on the right- hand ship o f the western group ; the Berwick engaged the left-hand ship o f the same group, w hilst the Southampton chose the left-hand ship o f the eastern group. T h e Manchester and Sheffield continued firing at the sam e ships for abou t 20 minutes (until 1236 and 1240 respectively), b u t the Newcastle after firing 18 broadsides shifted to the Berwick’s target. T h e Southampton, after five salvoes at her original target, engaged a destroyer w hich w as seen to be hit. A t least one other destroyer was believed to have been hit during this phase and the Faulknor a t 1227 and Newcastle a t 1233I thought they saw hits on a cruiser by large calibre shell.

T h e enem y’s fire was accurate durin g the early stages but, w hen fu lly engaged, it deteriorated rapidly, and the spread becam e ragged. T h eir rate o f fire is described as “ extrem ely slow .” T h e only casualties on the British side occurred in the Berwick, w h ich received a hit from an 8-inch shell at 1222, w hich p u t “ Y ” turret out o f action .2 T h e Manchester was straddled several

1 T he Vice-Adm iral, 18th Cruiser Squadron, was doubtful what the results o f an attempt at concentration would have been, as the ships o f the 18th Cruiser Squadron had not been in company for a considerable time, and had come from Rosyth, R eykjavik (Iceland). M alta and the vicinity o f the Azores.

2 This shell entered “ Y ” gun barbette about 15 inches above the quarter deck, and, travelling down through the training pump space, burst on the starboard side o f the barbette above the main deck, and expended itself in the cabin flat, killing Surgeon-Lieutenant W . W . W ildman, R .N .V .R ., and six ratings, and wounding nine others. A considerable fire was started inside the turret training space, which spread to the gun house and was not subdued for over an hour.

64 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

times, b u t though under continuous fire from 1221 till about 1300, escaped unscathed.1

B y 1234, 27th, the ships in the western group w ere alm ost lost in smoke. A t this tim e the course o f the British cruisers w as 020°, and the eastern group o f the enem y was passing across their front from left to right. V ice-A d m iral H olland therefore altered course to 360°, w ith the intention o f separating the tw o enem y groups, and then concentrating on one or other o f them. T his m anoeuvre was successful, and he selected the eastern group as his target,2 the Manchester shifting her fire to the left-hand ship o f this group, then 30° on her starboard bow , a t a range o f 21,000 yards. T h is ship she engaged for betw een three and four m inutes, and then shifted her fire to a destroyer m aking a sm oke screen 17,000 yards on the port bow , w hich after being straddled several times, turned aw ay behind her ow n sm oke.3 B y 1240, all ships o f the 18th Crusier Squadron were firing a t this group. T h e Berwick received another hit at 1235, w hich w recked some cabins w ithout causing an y casualties. She had ju st started to engage a ship thought to be an 8-inch cruiser o f the Pola class at w h ich she fired 47 salvoes during the next 20 m inutes.4

A t 1245 the cruisers altered course to 090° to prevent the enem y w orking round ahead and attacking the convoy. T his b rought the relative bearing o f the eastern group to R e d 40, and the Manchester once m ore engaged the left- hand ship. F ive m inutes later a further alteration to the southw ard was m ade to counter w h a t appeared to be an attem pt to “ cross the T ” o f the 18th Cruiser Squadron. T h e enem y, how ever, at once resum ed their north­easterly course, and V ice-A d m iral H olland led b ack to 070° a t 1256 and 030° a t 1258. T h e rear ship o f the enem y line was h eavily on fire aft5; betw een 1252 and 1259, she appeared to lose speed, b u t picked up again and drew aw ay w ith her consorts.

A t 1301, the masts o f a fresh enem y unit steering to the south-west w ere sighted at extrem e visibility right ahead o f the Manchester. I t bore 0450 and tw o m inutes later, two battleships w ere identified in it; their presence was quickly corroborated b y large splashes w h ich com m enced to fall near the Manchester and Berwick, and an enem y report, was m ade to the A dm iral. T h e

1 T he 35 officers and 623 other ranks o f the A rm y and R .A .F . taking passage in the Manchester were dispersed between decks throughout the ship. All bathrooms were filled with troops. A number o f officers and men were formed into willing parties to transfer ammunition from “ X ” and “ Y ” turrets to “ A ” and “ B ” turrets. “ T o carry a shipload o f passengers into battle ” , wrote Vice-Adm iral Holland, “ is an unenviable lot, but their presence had perforce to be dismissed from m y mind. T hey themselves were exhilarated at having been in a sea battle.”

2 O n this decision Adm iral Holland wrote:— “ It was reasonable to suppose that the smoke screen enveloping Group A (the western group) was hiding some damage, and this group was believed to be the weaker o f the two. By closing Group A it seemed that some immediate tactical achievement might result. Against this, however, it has to be appreciated that the object o f the whole enterprise was to pass a convoy through the Narrows, and that if our cruisers sheered o ff to the westward the field would be left clear for Group B (the eastern group), to turn to the south-eastward and attack the convoy. I therefore decided that Group B should be our future target . . . ”

3 T he destroyer Lanciere was hit at 1235 by a 6-inch shell in the after boiler-room. She continued to steam at 23 knots, but at 1240 a second shell struck her amidships, port side, penetrating a petrol tank without exploding. A third shell struck her under the water line, starboard side, without exploding. A bout 1300 she came to a stop, and at 1440 was taken in tow by the Ascari at 7 knots for Cagliari.

4 Vice-Adm iral Iachino was not impressed by the British gunnery. “ The English ” , he wrote, “ as usual, fired rapid salvoes with a limited spread, making frequent turns to disturb our fire and so as to bring all their guns to bear. The general result was ineffective and not well directed. T he fire from our cruisers was appreciably better and more efficacious, since two enemy cruisers were certainly hit.”

5 This was observed by the Manchester, Newcastle and Southampton, but no report o f it reached Vice-Adm iral Somerville until after the action.

FIRST ATTACK BY H.M.S. ARK ROTAL’S T/B STRIKING FORCE 65

end on approach resulted in the range decreasing ve ry rapidly, and at 1305 V ice-A d m iral H olland turned the cruisers to 120°, w ith the dual purpose o f w orking round the flank o f the battleships, and closing the gap to the Renown. T h e enem y battleships w ere n ot prepared to close and altering course to the north-eastward, presum ably jo in ed their 8-inch cruisers. V ice-A d m iral H olland therefore altered back to 090° at 1308, and steadied on a course o f 050°. T h e enem y w ere b y now rap id ly running out o f range, and ten minutes later the action cam e to an end.

53. F i r s t A t t a c k b y H .M .S . Ark Royal’s T /B S t r i k i n g F o r c e (Plan 10)

M ean w hile, a T / B striking force consisting o f 11 aircraft o f N o. 810 Squadron had been flown o ff from the Ark Royal a t 1130, w ith orders to attack the Italian battleships reported b y reconnaissance aircraft. A t 1216 they sighted two battleships betw een 25 and 30 miles to the eastw ard, and altered course so as to approach from the direction o f the sun. T h e ships w ere identified as one o f the Littorio ( Vittorio Veneto) and one o f the Cavour (Cesare) class; they w ere screened b y seven destroyers, one ahead, and three in line ahead a oou t 1,000 yards on each beam o f the heavy ships. T h e enem y’s course was easterly, and their speed abou t 18 knots; this course was altered in succession to the w estw ard some five minutes before the attack developed and alm ost im m ediately after­wards back again to the eastw ard together.

T h e aircraft w ere unobserved b y the battleships until the leader w as abou t1,500 ft., although the cruisers to the w estw ard had opened fire on them , evidently only as a w arn ing to the battleships, for the bursts w ere very short.

T h e leading battleship Veneto w as selected as the target, and all torpedoes were dropped inside the screen a t abou t 700 to 800 yards range. O n e hit was claim ed ju st abaft the after funnel,1 and an explosion also occurred ju st astern o f her; another explosion w as seen ahead o f the Cesare. N o other hits were seen. A very h eavy concentration o f light A .A . fire from both heavy ships and screening destroyers was opened on the a ircraft; during the getaw ay, heavier weapons w ere used, and the cruisers w hich b y then w ere abou t five miles to the west also jo in ed in. T h e aircraft in passing m achine-gunned the bridges o f the battleships and destroyers; all returned safely to the Ark Royal.2

T h e Italian view s on this attack are now available, and are o f interest. A fter rem arking that the attack was carried out w ith resolution, A dm iral C am pioni stated that it

“ was successfully staved off by the manoeuvring and gunfire of our ships, and through the presence of a close escort of destroyers.

“ The fact that the battleship group had, as it happened, inverted their course just previous to the attack developing,3 must have had a marked effect as well. The aircraft could not pass over the destroyer lines except with extreme difficulty and suffering a loss of control; which confirms the great usefulness of a close escort in the special case of air-torpedo attacks. It is essential that the close escort should be left in position up to the last moment, and removed only when the gun action renders their presence no longer possible. Furthermore, I wish to confirm the great advantage of distant A .A . escorts, although the tasks of our smaller naval units does not usually permit of such employment.” .

In this connexion V ice-A d m iral Iachino, in his sum m ing-up, recom m ended that in future 6-inch cruisers o f the D i Giussano class should accom p an y the Squadrons to a ct as A .A . cruisers. __________

1 According to Italian sources this hit did not occur.2 The Italians claimed to have shot down two aircraft, but this was not the case.3 Course was altered in order to close Vice-Adm iral Iachino’s cruisers.

66 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

54. V i c e - A d m i r a l S o m e r v i l l e ’ s A p p r e c i a t i o n , 1315, 27t h N o v e m b e r

T h e relative positions o f the opposing forces at 1315 are shown in Fig. 9. Firing had p ractica lly ceased, ow ing to the enem y draw ing out o f range. T h e h eavy smoke m ade b y the Italians during the chase had prevented accurate fire, and so far as was know n, no serious dam age had been inflicted on them. T h e British striking force had attacked, b u t no report o f the results had been received. It seemed evident that the speed o f the enem y had not been m aterially reduced.1

T h e British forces, m eanw hile, w ere rap id ly approaching the enem y coast,

1 A t 1308 Vice-Adm iral Somerville had signalled to Vice-Adm iral H olland: “ Is there any hope o f catching cruisers? ” to which the latter had replied “ N o.” A later message from Vice- Adm iral Holland estimated that the enemy had three knots excess o f speed.

FURTHER ATTACKS BY H.M.S. ARK ROYAL’S AIRCRAFT 67

and it w as a question w hether a continuance o f the chase w as justified, and likely to be profitable.

T h e m ain object o f the w hole operation was still the safe passage o f the convoy. T h e en em y’s principal units had been driven o ff far enough to ensure that they could no longer interfere w ith it, even i f the cruisers reported to the north-w estw ard b y the Sunderland had been w orkin g towards it round the western flank o f the British forces. It w as also im portant to provide the fullest possible scale o f defence for the transports against attacks b y torpedo bom bers and light surface forces a t dusk,1 and in order to reach the convoy in tim e to do this, it w ould be necessary for the British m ain forces to shape course for it before 1400. In a n y case, the en em y’s superiority o f speed rendered it m ost im probable that he could be brought to action b y the Renown and the Ramillies. U n der these circum stances, V ice-A d m ira l Som erville decided to abandon the chase and rejoin the convoy as soon as possible.2

A t 1312 V ice-A d m iral Som erville accordin gly ordered his forces to retire, course 130°. H a lf an hour later, he received a report o f an enem y dam aged cruiser stopped in a position 30 miles from the Renown and ten m iles from the coast o f Sardinia. T h e question o f detaching the Berwick and Newcastle3 to search for and attack this ship was carefully considered. It w ould, how ever, have involved the m ain British forces rem aining in a position to support these cruisers, w h ich w ould cause un acceptable delay in rejoining the convoy. T h ere was the further possibility o f isolated ships in such close proxim ity to the enem y coast being singled out for air attack; the Berwick w as m ost vulnerable to this form o f attack, and her disablem ent w ould have involved the w hole British force in the task o f effecting her extrication. T h ere was nothing to indicate that the dam aged enem y w ould rem ain stopped, and she m ight w ell effect her escape before she could b e overtaken.4

Instructions w ere therefore sent to the Ark Royal to attack the dam aged cruiser w ith aircraft i f it w as considered feasible; a ll the rest o f the force continued to the southward, the V ice-A d m iral, 18th C ruiser Squadron, being ordered to jo in the convoy w ith the Manchester and Southampton.

55 . F u r t h e r A t t a c k s b y H .M .S . Ark Royal's A i r c r a f t

T h e signal directing an attack to be m ade on the dam aged cruiser was received in the Ark Royal a t 1351. T h e Second T orp edo B om ber striking force was ju st ready to fly off. C ap tain H olland considering that the signal w hich he had sent at 1339 reporting the h it believed to have been scored on the Veneto b y the First striking force h ad not reached V ice-A d m ira l Som erville, and that, had the A d m iral received it, he w ould have ordered the second attack to be m ade on the battleships,5 decided to send the torpedo bom bers against them, and to dive-bom b the dam aged cruiser w ith seven Skuas, w h ich w ere then arm ing w ith 500-lb bombs.

1 Sunset was at 1807; nautical twilight ended 1908, Zone minus 2.2 See Appendix O .3 It was obviously undesirable to use the Manchester and Southampton for this purpose on

account o f the R .A .F . personnel embarked in these two ships for passage.T he Sheffield's radar was required to deal with the bombing attacks which would inevitably

develop.4 A subsequent air search failed to locate the damaged ship, so the stoppage was apparently

only temporary.5 T he signal ran “ Striking Force report that Italian battleship, Cauour class, damaged and

speed reduced.” The groups for “ damaged and speed reduced ” were received in corrupt form in Renown. T he first part o f the signal gave no indication that it was a report o f damage inflicted by the striking force.

68 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTI VENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

T h e T /B striking force consisting o f nine Swordfish was flown o ff a t 1410. T h e Squadron L eader was given the enem y battleships as his objective, but w ith full liberty to change it at his discretion, as he alone w ould be in a position to ju d g e the possibility or otherwise o f achieving a successful attack.

T h e aircraft sighted three cruisers screened b y four destroyers abou t 12 miles o ff the south-east coast o f Sardinia, steering to the eastw ard a t high speed. These w ere the Pola, Fiume and Gorizia. Som e eight miles ahead o f the cruisers w ere the two battleships, h eavily screened b y ten destroyers. T h ere was a total absence o f cloudcover, and it was considered essential to attack from the direction o f the sun, i f a n y degree o f surprise w ere to be achieved. A s an y attem pt, how ever, to gain such a position w ith regard to the battleships w ould in evitab ly have led to the striking force being sighted b y the cruisers, i t w as decided to attack the latter.

T h e attack w as carried out at 1520 and was not sighted till very late, only tw o salvoes being fired before the first torpedo was dropped. A s the first Swordfish reached the dropping position, the cruisers turned together to starboard; this caused several o f the follow ing aircraft, w ho w ere a lready com m itted to their “ drop ” , to miss their targets, b u t one hit was claim ed on the rear cruiser, and another possible hit on the leading cruiser.

T h e enem y gunfire then becam e intense, apparently quite regardless o f direction, or o f danger to their ow n ships. O n e large projectile was seen to hit the w ater close to the rear cruiser, and shells from close-range weapons were seen to burst close alongside all ships. T w o o f the British aircraft w ere struck b y shrapnel, but all returned safely to the Ark Royal.

D escribing the attack, V ice-A d m iral Iachino reported that it was carried out b y eight or nine aircraft, w ho “ laun ched three torpedoes at the Pola, and five or six against the Fiume and Gorizia. O n e torpedo was seen to break up on reaching the w ater and some o f the others m a y not have run since their tracks w ere not seen. T h e Fiume, how ever, observed four or five tracks w hich passed rather close, and one torpedo exploded at the end o f its run. O n e o f the aircraft was definitely brought dow n ; and another w hen passing over the b ridge o f the Libeccio m achine-gunned her w ith n egative results.

“ T h e ships m anoeuvred repeatedly to prevent the attacks and to avoid the torpedoes, w hich w ere dropped a t an inclination o f betw een 30° and 50° and at a distance o f 1,700 to 2,200 yards, com ing in b y groups alw ays from the sam e side, i.e., ‘ dow n sun ’ . . . I t remains to be said that our A .A . fire was not b rillian tly controlled ” .

M ean w hile, the striking force o f seven Skuas h ad flown o ff at 1500. T h ey failed to locate the dam aged cruiser b u t carried out an unobserved attack on three cruisers identified as Condottieri class, steering north o ff the south-west corner o f Sardinia. T hese w ere actu ally the Trieste, Trento and Bolzano, w hich had been sent b y V ice-A d m iral Iachino to cover the retirem ent o f the dam aged Lanciere', no hits w ere obtained, b u t according to the Italian report five bom bs fell very close to the Trento.

O n the w a y back to the Ark Royal the Skuas encountered and shot dow n an Italian R .O .4 3 .

56. E n e m y A i r A t t a c k s o n B r i t i s h F o r c e s

W h ile these British flyin g operations had been taking place V ice-A d m iral Som erville had been steering to the southw ard in accordance w ith his decision to close the convoy. T h e Ark Royal had lost sight o f the Renown to the north­eastward a t abou t 1250, b u t since the receipt o f the signal ordering the retire­m ent o f British forces, C ap ta in H olland had been m aking good a course o f 090°, so far as his flyin g operations perm itted, in order to rejoin the Flag. T h e first

ENEMY AIR ATTACKS ON BRITISH FORCES 69

radar indications o f the presence o f enem y aircraft were received in the Renown at 1407, and the line was staggered. Shortly afterw ards bom b splashes were observed on the horizon— the result o f an attack b y the Ark Royal’s Fulm ars, w hich caused several o f the Italians to jettison their bombs.

A s soon as the enem y aircraft, consisting o f ten S .975 in “ V ” form ation, were sighted b y the Renown a turn b y blue pendant w as m ade b y the British ships, in order to brin g a ll guns to bear.

T h e enem y m aintained a steady course, and their bom bs fell w ell clear o f the h eavy ships, b u t close to the screening destroyers.

T w o further attacks w ere m ade a t abou t 1645, each b y squadrons o f five aircraft. These attacks w ere concentrated on the Ark Royal, w h ich b y this tim e was in com pany w ith the fleet, b u t ow ing to flyin g operations, not actu ally in the line. A p a rt from a few bom bs w hich w ere jettisoned as the result o f interception b y our fighters, the high level bom bin g perform ed from a height o f abou t 13,000 ft. w as most accurate. Som e 30 bom bs fell in her vicin ity— two a t least, w ithin ten yards o f the ship— and she w as com pletely obscured from view b y the splashes.

A b o u t 11 minutes after this attack , a stick o f bom bs fell un expectedly ju st ahead o f the ship. T hese w ere dropped b y four C ap ro n i bom bers, w h ich had succeeded in approaching unobserved under cover o f the first attack, and missed b y a very narrow m argin.

f^ Stick dropped by

Caproni* s

18 bombs well clear to port

1 ©

© b

©©

a. Just below corner of Flight Deck (2) tb. Failed to explode

C. 20 to 30 yards off

d. Immediately below “Y ” director, (10 yards)

Fig. i o . B o m b i n g A t t a c k o n H .M .S . Ark Royal

T h e Ark Royal fortunately suffered no dam age, nor, so far as is know n, did the enem y bom bers.1 V ice-A d m iral Som erville rem arked that the com plete failure o f either fighter attack or gunfire to break up the form ation o f the Ita lian Squadrons w as m ost notew orthy.

N o further bom bin g attacks took p lace ; the convoy2 w as sighted a t 1700, and the operation proceeded subsequently accordin g to plan.

70 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

57 . C o m p o s i t i o n o f a n d D a m a g e t o I t a l i a n F o r c e s

O w in g to the lon g ranges at w hich the action was fought, the use o f smoke b y the Italians, and also to som ew hat confusing air reconnaissance reports, there w as considerable speculation after the action as to w h a t enem y forces h ad actu ally been present. T h e com position o f the battlefieet and the Eastern G roup o f cruisers w as correctly assessed. These cruisers had closed to about eight miles from the battleships b y 1240, and w ere thought to have follow ed astern o f them. Im m ediately after the surface action ceased, the battlefieet steered for C ag liari a t abou t 25 knots; at abou t 1500 it turned to the eastward and w hen last seen w as steering north up the east coast o f Sardinia. T h e com position o f the W estern G roup was doubtful; the Newcastle considered that a ll these cruisers w ere 6-inch gun ships, but other ships w ere o f the opinion that one or m ore 8-inch cruisers w ere included in it. A fter the action their m ovem ents w ere v e ry uncertain; it was thought p robable that they rejoined the battlefieet, b u t it w as recognised that they m ight have been the cruisers attacked b y the Skuas at 1530 (as was actu ally the case). W hether a third group o f cruisers was operating, as suggested b y the report o f the Sunderland a t 1154, was still m ore doubtful. A fter analysing a ll the availab le evidence, A d m iral Som erville considered that it was not possible to state definitely w hether the enem y forces included six or nine cruisers.

W ith regard to the dam age inflicted on the Italians, the estim ate was considerably in excess o f that a ctu ally suffered. It was thought that the rear cruiser o f the Eastern G roup and two destroyers in the W estern G roup were cetainly hit; some observers in the Southampton considered that one o f the latter was sinking, and V ice-A d m iral H olland suggested that it was not unlikely that the W estern G roup received other dam age w hich prom pted the dense smoke screen into w h ich it retired. A ctu a lly , accordin g to the Italian O fficial H istory, the only ships h it in the gun action w ere the destroyer Lanciere (seriously) and the cruiser Fiume; in this case the shell failed to explode and the dam age was negligible. O n e battleship, and one cruiser or possibly two w ere believed to have been hit b y torpedoes in the F .A .A . attacks, and one cruiser m ight have been dam aged b y the Skuas’ bom bs; b u t in fact none o f these attacks achieved success. D espite this m eagre m aterial dam age, how ever, the resolute attitude o f V ice-A d m iral Som erville’s force was sufficient to deter the enem y from a n y serious attem pt on the convoy.

1 Vice-Adm iral Holland remarked that he was in a good position to observe the British A .A . fire at the formation, which attacked at 1645. T he gunfire was intense, but he estimated the bursts to have been 1,000 feet low and about 1,000 yards short.

2 W hen it had become clear that an action was in progress south o f Sardinia, Commodore Douglas-Pennant had decided to take the convoy south o f G alita Island, keeping in the narrow deep water channel to minimise the risk from mines. Several French aircraft sighted the convoy in the course o f the day. A submarine contact— afterwards believed to have been “ non-sub ” — enforced an alteration o f 180° in the narrow part o f the channel; this caused a delay o f some 45 minutes. A part from this the passage was uneventful.

REMARKS ON THE ACTION 71

58. T h e V i c e - A d m i r a l , F o r c e “ H ” ’s R e m a r k s o n t h e A c t i o n

In com m enting on the action V ice-A d m iral Som erville rem arked that the fact that ships carried out their action duties correctly w ith the m inim um o f signalled instructions, and despite the fact that m any o f them w ere w orking together for the first time, is a tribute to the soundness o f our tactical training in peace and to the Fighting Instructions. O n the other hand, in m any im portant respects the standard o f fighting efficiency obtained in peace considerably exceeded that reached in w a r ; this he attributed to lack o f system atic practices and exercises, and instanced the reluctance o f V ice-A d m iral H olland to attem pt a concentration o f fire b y the recently re-united cruisers o f his squadron.

This lack o f opportunities for training during w a r tim e m ade itself felt in several directions in this action. M a n y o f the youn g observers o f the Ark Royal had little or no experience o f reporting enem y form ations, and ow ing to the necessity o f m aintaining wireless silence, except in the im m ediate neighbour­hood o f G ib raltar, had had but little opportunity o f exercising com m unications in the a ir.1

T h e results too o f the torpedo attacks b y the air striking force w ere dis­appointing as com pared w ith peace-tim e practices. In each case the approaches w ere skilful and unobserved and the attacks w ere pressed home with courage and resolution, but the results fell far short o f w hat m ight have been hoped for. T his was attributed entirely to lack o f initial training and subsequent “ runner ” practices.

Spotting aircraft did not give m uch assistance. T h is was partly due to the fact that in alm ost every case they w ere flown o ff too late, ow ing to w rong estimates o f the probable tim e o f contact w ith the enem y. In the Berwick the aircraft was dam aged b y the blast o f the first salvo, w hich was fired ju st as it was about to be launched, and it had to be jettisoned.

T h e A d m iral pointed out that it was better to fly o ff spotting aircraft too soon rather than too late, especially w hen an aircraft carrier on w hich they can land in an em ergency is present. Difficulties w ere experienced b y them in obtaining com m unication and in observing the fall o f shot ow ing to the dense smoke surrounding the targets. M ost ships com m ented on the difficulty o f target identification and observation due to this smoke. A p a rt from this, difficulties were experienced in m aintaining line, due in part to “ canted trunnion ” error, and in part to evasive action o f the enem y coupled w ith a long tim e o f flight.

T h e initial accu racy o f the Italian fire and its rap id deterioration when replied to has already been m entioned. V ice-A d m iral H olland suggested that on this account it m ight be w orth w hile in future to open fire before the Italians.2

This initial accu racy was attributed to the stereoscopic range-finders in use in the enem y ships, and both V ice-A d m iral H olland and V ice-A d m iral Som erville expressed the opinion that further experim ent w ith this type o f range-finder was desirable in the British Fleet

From the tactical point o f view , V ice-A d m iral Som erville pointed out that on this occasion the first consideration was to force the enem y aw ay from the direction o f the convoy as soon as possible, and that im m ediate attack b y the cruisers proceeding at their m axim um speed, and w ith the Renown in as close

1 Both Vice-Adm iral Somerville and the Captain o f the Ark Royal suspected that the original enemy reports by aircraft referred in actual fact to Force “ !).'* Taking all things into con­sideration, the Adm iral considered that the crews of the reconnaissance aircraft acquitted themselves with credit.

2 On this occasion the Manchester did not open fire at extreme range.

6

support as her speed perm itted, appeared to offer the best prospects o f achieving this object.

H e suggested, how ever, that w hen dealing w ith enem y forces w hich have superior speed, ineffective air reconnaissance, and a pronounced inclination to retire as soon as engaged, it m ight prove advantageous for our heavy and light forces to rem ain concentrated until contact is m ade, provided our A ir recon­naissance is accurate and reliable. T his m ight enable a heavy long range fire concentration to b e brought on the w hole or part o f the enem y forces before he could retire out o f range.

W ith regard to the operation o f carrier-borne aircraft, V ice-A d m iral Som erville rem arked that it is most desirable that the carrier should act independently, provided her com m anding officer is fu lly aw are o f the A d m iral’s view as to how his aircraft are to be em ployed. N ot only do signalled instructions concerning striking forces, reconnaissances and so forth add to wireless congestion, but they m ay be im practicable to carry out precisely, w ithout dislocating the intricate flying on and o ff program m e. Special circum stances m ay arise w hich call for special instructions, but the policy should be for the com m anding officer o f the carrier to act in accordance w ith the general situation, and w ith w h at he knows to be the A d m iral’s views.

72 ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA, 27TH NOV. 1940

5 9 . E p i l o g u e

V ice-A d m ira l Som erville arrived back at G ib raltar w ith Force “ H ” in the afternoon o f 29th N ovem ber. Ships in harbour paraded bands and received him w ith cheers. T h ou gh n aturally disappointed that the speed o f the Ita lian ships had robbed him o f the opportunity o f forcing them to a close action, he could congratulate him self on the com plete success o f the operation in passing the reinforcem ents unscathed through to their destination.

E arly next m orning there arrived a signal from the A d m iralty inform ing him that a B oard o f E nquiry, consisting o f A dm iral-of-the F leet L ord C ork and O rrery (President), V ice-A d m iral Sir G . H . D ’O y ly L yon and C ap tain R . G . D uke had been ordered to G ib ra ltar to enquire into his conduct in breaking o ff the action and the reasons w h y the second flight o f the Ark Royal's Swordfish had not attacked the enem y’s battleships.

N o report from him (except a signal containing a brief, general accoun t o f the action, m ade before arrival in harbour) had reached the A d m iralty , and he was consequently surprised that his conduct and that o f officers serving under him “ should be called to accoun t before an y inform ation could have been received on w hich to base a considered opinion o f our actions.” 1 T h ou gh he realised that the sum m oning o f a Board o f E n q uiry did not necessarily im p ly criticism , he felt that it m ight in some m easure com prom ise his prestige w ith Force “ H T h e Com m ander-in-Chief, M editerranean, agreed w ith this view and refers to the m atter in his b ook.2

T h e B oard o f E n q u iry sat from 3rd to 7th D ecem ber, and upheld Sir Jam es Som erville’s actions throughout.

1 Force “ H ” , 215/12 o f 19th December 1940.

3 A Sailor’s Odyssey (English edition), pp.292-294.

A P P E N D I X A

Italian Naval Forces: Operations 7th-9th July 1940C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , a n d C o m m a n d i n g F i r s t S q u a d r o n ,

A d m i r a l I. C a m p i o n i

NAME OF SHIP MAIN ARM AM ENT SPEED REM ARKS

F I R S T S Q U A D R O N

(2 B a t t le s h ip s , s i x 6 - i n c h C r u is e r s , 1 6 D e s t r o y e r s )

A d m i r a l C a m p i o n i ( f l a g i n Cesare). 5 T H D i v i s i o n (B a t t l e s h i p s )

V i c e - A d m i r a l B r iv o n e s i

Giulio Cesare Conti di Cavour

t e n 12 - 6 - in c h , t w e l v e 4 '7 - i n c h t e n 12 - 6 - in c h , t w e l v e 4 - 7 - in c h

2 62 6

Da Barbiano * Cadorna Da Giussano *Diaz

4T H D i v i s i o n ( 6 - i n c h C r u i s e r s )

V i c e - A d m i r a l M o r i o n d o e i g h t 6 - in c h , s ix 4 - i n c h A . A . e i g h t 6 - in c h , s i x 4 - i n c h A . A . e i g h t 6 - in c h , s i x 4 - i n c h A . A . e i g h t 6 - in c h , s ix 4 - i n c h A . A .

4 0

394 0

39

I n s u p p o r t >- o f c o n v o y

o p e r a t i o n s

Duca degliAbruzzi

Garibaldi

8 t h D i v i s i o n ( 6 - i n c h C r u i s e r s )

V i c e - A d m i r a l L e g n a n i t e n 6 - in c h , s ix 4 - i n c h A . A .

t e n 6 - in c h , s ix 4 - i n c h A . A .

35

35

Freccia*DardoSaetta*Strale

7 t h D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

f o u r 4 - 7 - i n c h , s i x 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s f o u r 4 - 7 - in c h , s i x 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s f o u r 4 '7 - i n c h , s ix 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s f o u r 4 '7 - i n c h , s ix 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s

36363636

*Folgore*Fulmine*BalenoLampo

8 t h D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

f o u r 4 '7 - i n c h , s ix 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s f o u r 4 '7 - i n c h , s i x 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s f o u r 4 '7 - i n c h , s ix 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s f o u r 4 '7 - i n c h , s i x 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s

36363636

W i t hb a t t l e f l e e t

Vivaldi *Da Noli Pancaldo

14 T H D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

s ix 4 '7 - i n c h , f o u r 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s s ix 4 , '7 - in c h , f o u r 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s s ix 4 '7 - i n c h , f o u r 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s

3 83838

*Pigafetta * Zeno

1 5 T H D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

s ix 4 '7 - i n c h , f o u r 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s s ix 4 '7 - i n c h , f o u r 2 1 - i n c h t o r p . t u b e s

CO CO

CO CO

* Not present at action o f gth July.

74 A P P E N D IX A

*jDa Recco*Usodimare*Pessagno

Pola

ZaraGoriziaFiume

TrentoBolzano

Eugenio di Savoia Duca d ’Aosta Attendolo Montecuccoli

*Bande Mere *Colleoni

LanciereCarabiniereCorazzareAscari

eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A . eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A . eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A . eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A .

2 n d D i v i s i o n ( 6 - i n c h , C r u i s e r s )

V ice-A d m iral C asardi eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A . eight 6-inch, six 4-inch A .A .

12 T H D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

four 4 '7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes i four 4 "7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes

four 4 '7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes

383838

F I R S T S Q U A D R O N — (Cont.)

1 6 t h D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

six 4 • 7-inch, four 21-inch torp. tubes six 4 • 7-inch, four 21 -inch torp. tubes six 4 • 7-inch, four 21-inch torp. tubes

S E C O N D S Q U A D R O N

(six 8-inch Cruisers, six 6-inch Cruisers, 20 Destroyers)

A d m iral R . P aladin i (flag in Pola)

eight 8-inch, tw elve 4-inch A .A .

i s t D i v i s i o n (8 - i n c h C r u i s e r s )

V ice-A d m iral M atteuch i

eight 8-inch, tw elve 4-inch A .A . eight 8-inch, tw elve 4-inch A .A . eight 8-inch, tw elve 4-inch A .A .

3R D D i v i s i o n (8 - i n c h C r u i s e r s )

V ice-A d m iral C attan eo

eight 8-inch, tw elve 4-inch A .A . | 36 eight 8-inch, tw elve 4-inch A .A . 36

7t h D i v i s i o n ( 6 - i n c h , C r u i s e r s )

V ice-A d m iral Sansonetti

33

333333

37373737

3434

39393939

}W ith 4th and 8th Divisions

(6-in. Crs.)

D istant C over east o f

C on voy route

D istant C over west o f

C on voy route

} C on voyescort

* W ith Pola

* Not present at action o f 9th July.

A P P E N D IX A 75

NAME OF SHIP MAIN ARM AM ENT SPEED REM ARKS

S E C O N D S Q U A D R O N —(Cont.)

q t h D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

AlfieriOrianiCarducciGioberti

four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes

| four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes

1 i t h D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

39393939

W ith f ist Division

J {Zara)

Artigliere Camicia Nere Aviere Geniere

four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 21 -inch torp. tubes

13 T H D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

39393939

W ith » 3 rd D ivision

(Trento)

GranatiereFuciliereBersagliereAlpino

four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1-inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes

1 o t h D e s t r o y e r F l o t i l l a

39393939

'I W ith 1 7th Division[ (Eugenio di

J Savoia)

MaestraleLibeccioGrecaleScirocco

four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1 -inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1 -inch torp. tubes four 4 '7-inch, six 2 1 -inch torp. tubes four 4, '7-inch, six 2 1 -inch torp. tubes

4T H T o r p e d o B o a t F l o t i l l a

38383838

»W ith C on voy

*Procione *Orsa *Pegaso * Orione

two 4-inch, four 17 '7-inch torp. tubes two 4-inch, four 17 '7-inch torp. tubes two 4-inch, four 17 '7-inch torp. tubes tw o 4-inch, four 17 '7-inch torp. tubes

A d d i t i o n a l T o r p e d o B o a t s

28282 82 8

> C on voy escort

*Pilo*Abba

five 4-inch, four 17 '7-inch torp. tubes five 4-inch, four 17 '7-inch torp. tubes

3232

* Not present at action o f gth July.

A P P E N D I X B

Action off Calabria: Comparison of British and Italian Forces

BRITISH ITALIA N

3 battleships m ounting twenty-four 15-inch, thirty-tw o 6-inch

1 aircraft carrier m ounting nine 6- inch, 17 T .S .R ., 3 fighters

5 light cruisers m ounting forty-eight 6-inch

16 destroyers m ounting sixty-nine4 '7-inch, eight 4-inch

2 battleships m ounting tw enty 12-6- inch, tw enty-four 4 - 7-inch

6 h eavy cruisers m ounting forty- eight 8-inch

8 light cruisers m ounting sixty-eight 6-inch

24 destroyers m ounting one hundred 4 ■ 7-inch

In speed the Italian battleships h ad an advantage o f 2-3 knots over the War spite and Malaya, and 5 -6 knots over the Royal Sovereign. W ith the exception o f the four Z ara class 8-inch cruisers, the Italian cruisers were from two to four knots faster than the British. T h e destroyers w ere practically eq ually m atched for speed and arm am ents.

W h ile the British F leet had an advan tage in havin g present an obsolescent aircraft carrier, the Italians had, at short range, num erous shore air bases affording a poten tially vast aerial superiority.

W ithin easy distance, too, w ere the n aval bases o f T aran to, M essina, Port A ugusta, Syracuse, Palerm o and N aples, an y one o f w hich offered secure shelter to dam aged ships. A ll these ports w ere subm arine bases, from w hich a strong concentration o f subm arines could operate a t short notice.

76

A P P E N D I X C

Italian Air Bombing

T h e C om m an der-in -C hief m ade the follow ing report to the A d m ira lty :— “ F ollow ing is m y sum m ary o f Italian air bom bing threat as seen before

detailed reports from units have been scrutinised.(1) A ll units o f the F leet have been bom bed several times a d ay for five days. As an exam ple force w ith Warspite on 12th J u ly was attacked 22 times, 260 to 300 bom bs being dropped. O n ly period o f im m unity was w hen Fleet was unlocated South o f M a lta on 10th J u ly and during hours o f darkness.(2) A ttacks have all been high level bom bing in dayligh t, average height 12,000 feet b y form ations varyin g from nine to single aircraft but generally in sub flights o f three. Bom bs have been dropped in sticks varyin g from six heavy bom bs to 18 or 27 light bom bs per form ation. M a jo rity o f bom bs appear to be light case H .E .(3) Single aircraft have generally shied o ff w hen fired at, b u t form ations have generally flow n steadily on w ith surprising determ ination.(4) M ost unpleasant attack on Warspite at 1550 12th J u ly resulted in 24 bom bs along port side and 12 across starboard bow sim ultaneously, all w ithin one cable b u t slightly out for line.(5) A .A . fire w ith exception o f one or two ships has been below pre-w ar standard but is im proving under stress. It has been disappointing that I have not seen an y enem y aircraft d irectly hit and fall into the sea. I am however satisfied that an appreciable num ber o f Italians have failed to return. N aval A ttach é, Athens reports one forced landed in Crete. Intercepted Italian reports show one forced landed o ff C eph alon ia and one o ff Benghazi. Italians adm it loss o f two in Fleet engagem ent on 9th Ju ly. T h ree aircraft have been seen to leave form ation after close burst b y A .A . gunfire. Warspite has seen airm en gettin g out b y parachute on two occasions.(6) A m m unition expenditure has been very heavy and F leet has returned to harbour w ith less than h a lf long range outfit rem aining.(7) M y sum m ing up is:—

(i) Intensive high level bom bing is to be expected on each occasion o f a F leet operation in the C en tral M editerranean.

(ii) T h e accu racy o f Italian bom bing entitled them to one per cent o f hits and the Fleet w ere extrem ely lucky that this num ber w as not obtained.

(iii) T his probable percentage o f hits rising to tw o per cent as the Italians get m ore practice m ust be carefu lly w eighed in considering the em ploy­m ent o f va lu able ships in the C en tral M editerranean.

(iv) T h a t provided proper antidotes are supplied this scale o f bom bing attack can be accepted as a reasonable w a r risk like mines or submarines.

(v) Prolonged bom bing is very w earin g to personnel and system started by m y predecessor o f havin g a t least tw o com plete reliefs for w hole A .A . arm am ent in battleships and cruisers has been shown to be essential for prolonged operations.”

(Med. War Diary 15th J u ly 1940).

77

A P P E N D I X D

Action oil Cape Spada: Comparison of the Opposing Forces, 19th July

T h e com parative force o f the ships engaged in the action o f 19th Ju ly o ff C ap e Spada w as:—

B r i t i s h

TONS k n o t s GUNS GUNS GUNS

Sydney 6,980 32 ‘5 8— 6-inch 8— 4-inch —

Hyperion i,34° 36 — 4-— 4 ‘7-inch

Hasty i >340 36 — — 4— 4 "7-inch

Havock 1,340 36 — — 4— 4 -7-inch

Hero i,34° 36 — — 4— 4 - 7-inch

Ilex i >370 36 — — 4— 4 -7-inch

8— 6-inch 8— 4-inch 20— 4 - 7-inch

I t a l i a n

TONS KNOTS GUNS GUNS

Giovanni delle Bande Nere 5,°69 34 8— 6 - in c h 6— 4 - in c h

Bartolomeo Colleoni 5>069 34 8— 6 - in c h 6 — 4 - in c h

. . .

1 6— 6 - in c h 1 2 — 4 - in c h

78

A P P E N D I X E

Action off Cape Spada: Expenditure of Am m unition by the

British Ships, 19th JulyT h e expenditure o f am m unition b y the Sydney was 935 rounds C .P .B .C '

and 21 rounds H .E ., in 181 salvoes. T h e destroyers expended:—

Hyperion 150 rounds Hero 170 rounds Havock 55 rounds Ilex 213 rounds Hasty 150 rounds

A P P E N D I X F

Commander-in-Chief’s Memorandum: Rescue of Survivors from Enemy Ships

A s a result o f the bom bing attack on the Havock w hile engaged in picking up survivors, the C om m an der-in -C hief on 22nd J u ly issued the follow ing m em or­an d u m :—

“ W hilst the instincts o f the British race and the traditions o f the sea produce in us all a pow erful urge to rescue survivors o f sinking ships, it m ust be rem em bered that there are other considerations to be w eighed against this hum ane work.

2. W e are w agin g a relentless w a r against odds, and here in the M ed i­terranean not only are w e com peting against n um erically n aval superior forces, b u t w e have also against us very considerable air forces w h ich our own A ir Force is not yet in a position to attack, except in eastern L ib ya.

3. It follows that no favourable opportunity m ust be lost o f destroying enem y forces, and the rescue o f survivors must never be allow ed to interfere w ith the relentless pursuit o f enem y ships.

4. It must also be borne w ell in m ind that practically the w hole o f the area o f our operations is subject to enem y bom bing. T herefore ships cannot usually afford to han g about picking up survivors, for not on ly do they thus expose themselves to bom bing attack under very disadvantageous conditions, but also subsequent operations are liable to be delayed. M oreover a destroyer with a large num ber o f prisoners on board is bound to be considerably reduced in fighting efficiency.

5. D ifficult and distasteful as it is to leave survivors to their fate. C om m an ding Officers m ust be prepared to harden their hearts, for, after all, the operations in hand and the security o f their ships and ships’ com panies m ust take precedence in w a r.”

79

A P P E N D I X G

Operation M.B.8: British Forces EmployedF o r c e “ A ”

ist B.S.

Warspite (eight 15-inch, eight 6-inch) (F lag o f C .-in-C . A d m iral Sir A n drewC unningham , K .C .B ., D .S .O .)

C ap tain D. B. Fisher, C .B .E .

Malaya (eight 15-inch, tw elve 6-inch) (F lag o f R ear-A d m iral H . B. R aw lings,O .B .E .)

C ap tain A . F. E. Palliser, D .S .C .

Valiant (eight 15-inch, thirty 4 -5-inch) C ap tain C. E. M organ , D .S .O .

Illustrious (24 Swordfish, 15 Fighters)

3rd c . s .

Gloucester (twelve 6-inch)

York (six 8-inch)

2nd D .F.

Hyperion (four 4 • 7-inch)

Havock (four 4 -7-inch)

Hero (four 4 -7-inch)

Hereward (four 4 -7-inch)

Hasty (four 4 -7-inch)

Ilex (four 4 - 7-inch)

20th D .F .

Decoy (four 4 -7-inch)

Defender (four 4 -7-inch)

14th D .F.

Jervis (six 4 -7-inch)

Nubian (eight 4 -7-inch)

Mohawk (eight 4 - 7-inch)

Janus (six 4 - 7-inch)

Juno (six 4 - 7-inch)

(Flag o f R ear-A d m iral A . L . St. G .Lyster, C .V .O ., D .S .O .)

C ap tain D . W . Boyd, D .S .C .

(Flag o f R ear-A d m iral E. de F. Renouf,C .V .O .)

C ap tain H . A . R ow ley

C ap tain R . H. Portal, D .S .C .

C om m ander H . St. L . N icolson, D .S .O .

C om m ander R . E . Courage, D .S .O .,D .S .C .

Com m ander H. W . Biggs, D .S .O .

L ieu t.-C d r. C . W . G reening

L ieu t.-C d r. L . R . K . T yrw h itt

L ieu t.-C d r. P. L . Saum arez, D .S .C .

C om m ander E. G . M cG regor, D .S .O .

L ieuten ant G . L . Farnfield

C ap tain P. J. M ack, D .S .O . (Capt. (D) 14)

C om m ander R . W . R avenhill

C om m ander J. W . Eaton

C om m ander J . A . W . T oth ill

C om m ander St. J. R . J. T yrw h itt

A P P E N D IX G

F o r c e “ B ”

81

Ajax (eight 6-inch)

Sydney (eight 6-inch)

Orion (eight 6-inch)

C ap tain E. D . B. M cC a rth y

C ap tain J . A . Collins, C .B .

F o r c e “ C ”

(Flag o f V ice-A d m iral H. D . Pridham - W ippell, C .B ., C .V .O . (V .A .L .F . 7th C .S .)

C ap tain G . R . B. Back

F o r c e “ D ”(C on voy Escort Force)

Ramillies (eight 15-inch, tw elve 6-inch) C ap tain A . D . R ead (when detachedfrom Force “ A ” )

Coventry (eight 4-inch H .A . /L .A .)

Calcutta (eight 4-inch H .A . /L.A .)

10th D .F .

Vampire (four 4-inch)

Voyager (four 4-inch)

Waterhen (four 4-inch)

20th D .F .

Dainty (four 4 - 7-inch)

Diamond (four 4 -7-inch)

Wryneck (four 4-inch) H .A . /L .A . (A .A . ship)

1Kingston Coral (Tr.)

1Sindonis (Tr.)

1 Abingdon (M /S)

C ap tain D . G ilm our

C ap tain D . M . Lees, D .S .O .

L ieuten ant J . A . W alsh

C om m ander J . C . M orrow , D .S .O .

L ieut.-C dr. J. H. Sw ain

C om m ander M . S. Thom as, D .S .O .

L ieu t.-C d r. P. A . C artw righ t

L ieu t.-C d r. A . F. Burnell-N ugent, D .S .C .

Skr. W . K irm an , R .N .R .

C h. Skr. G . R aw d in g, R .N .R .

L ieuten ant G . A . Simmers, R .N .R .

F o r c e “ F ”

^Barham (eight 15-inch, tw elve 6-inch) C ap tain G . C . Cooke (700)

2Berwick (S .O .) (eight 8-inch)

■*Glasgow (tw elve 6-inch)

2Griffin (four 4 -7-inch)

2Greyhound (four 4 - 7-inch)

2Gallant (four 4 -7-inch)

C ap tain G . L . W arren (750)

C ap tain H . H icklin g (400)

L ieuten ant K . R . C . Letts (50)

C om m ander W . R . M arsh all-A ’D eane, D .S .C . (50)

L ieu t.-C d r. C . P. F. Brow n (50)

1 W ith Convoy A.N .6 to Suda Bay.2 Reinforcements for M editerranean Fleet.

82 APPENDIX G

1Faulknor (five 4 • 7-inch)

1 Fortune (four 4 -7-inch)

1Fury (four 4 -7-inch)

C ap tain A . F. D e Salis (50)

L ieut.-C dr. E. N . S inclair (50)

L ieu t.-C d r. T . C . R obinson (50)

F o r g e “ H :

Ark Royal(A ircraft Carrier)

Sheffield (twelve 6-inch)

Duncan (four 4 - 7-inch)

Isis (four 4 - 7-inch)

Foxhound (four 4 - 7-inch)

Forester (four 4 -7-inch)

Firedrake (four 4 -7-inch)

(F lag o f V ice-A d m iral Sir J. Som erville, K .C .B ., D .S .O . (F .O ., Force H) )

C ap tain C . S. H olland

C ap tain C . A . A . L arcom

C ap tain A . D . B. Jam es (act.)

C om m ander C . S. B. Sw inley, D .S .C .

C om m ander G . H . Peters

L ieu t.-C d r. E. B. T an cock, D .S .C .

L ieu t.-C d r. S. H. Norris, D .S .C .

T h e Eagle (C ap tain A . R . M . Bridge) was unable to accom p an y the Fleet on accoun t o f defective petrol tanks.

Note-. T h e names o f the C om m an ding Officers are taken from contem porary N a w Lists.

1 Fautknor, Fortune, Fury, from Force “ H ” , to accompany Force “ F ” as far as M alta. The figures in brackets give the numbers o f m ilitary personnel on board each ship.

A P P E N D I X H

Taranto: Italian Defences and Arrangements, 11th November

Note. T h e follow ing inform ation is based on extracts from the report o f the Italian C om m an der-in -C hief A float to the C h ie f o f the N aval Staff, after the F .A .A . attack.

1. S t a t e o f B a s e A n t i - A i r c r a f t D e f e n c e s

(a) A .A . artillery. A ll in w orking order in accordance w ith plans w hich had been prepared for some time, w ith the addition o f num erous m achine guns recently arranged to deal w ith torpedo aircraft.

21 batteries arm ed w ith 4-inch guns.68 m achine gun m ountings w ith total o f 84 guns in stations ashore

and afloat.109 light m achine guns ashore and afloat.

(b) Reporting Stations13 A irphonic stations, two linked w ith searchlights.22 searchlights, m ostly m odern type long range, placed on shore

and on pontoons.2 searchlights from each ship were also to be used.

(c) Anti-torpedo net obstructionsA b o u t 12,800 metres o f nets w ere required for protection o f ships m oored in the M a r G ran de, b u t only 4,200 metres w ere in position.1

(d) Aerial obstructionsIn position, 27s balloons o f w hich 16 w ere m oored to the w estw ard o f ships inside the D iga di T a ra n to la and northw ard o f it, the other 11 b eing along the eastern shore o f the anchorage.

2 . S i t u a t i o n o f S h ip s , e t c .

(a) Position o f 1st Squadron at 2000, 11 th November. As shown in Plan 7. T h e anchor berths w ere as previously arranged, except that the Doria had been unable to recover her stern m oorings on her last return from sea. A ll ships in accordance w ith A d m iralty instructions were at three hours notice.

(b) Weather conditions. G ood; sky clear except for occasional slight m ist; w ind, north-east.

(c) Defence o f anchorage. D efence o f outer anchorage from air attack was arranged as follows:—

Shore batteries ( 4 -og-inch, 4 -02-inch, and 3 -05-inch).Stations, ashore and afloat, o f m achine guns (o -8-inch, and 1 -6-inch), were specially detailed to engage torpedo aircraft.‘ Photo-electrics ’ , ashore and on pontoons, could intercept on m oonlight nights either bom bers or torpedo aircraft, accordin g to arrangem ents m ade b y the C en tral Control.Balloon and net obstructions.

1 A further 2,900 metres were in store at the base, shortiy to be placed in position; the remainder was still being woven. A monthly output o f 3,600 metres had been reached by September, with which requirements o f several bases had to be met.

2 T he persistent bad weather in the few days preceding the attack destroyed 60 balloons. It had not been possible to replace them, because the local production o f hydrogen w as insufficient to cope with such a large demand at short notice.

83

84 APPENDIX H

T h e p a rt to be p layed b y ships a t anchor w as as follow s:—N o b arrage fire a t the same time as that o f shore batteries. M ach in e guns to be m anned and fired w ith the m ain arm am ent against aircraft visible to the naked eye or illum inated b y search- light.O n m oonlight nights, two searchlights a ship to w ork w ith those o f the shore batteries in previously defined sectors, for defence against torpedo aircraft. T hese had to be integrated w ith the searchlights w orked b y the base.

(d) Readiness o f Ships. A ll ships w ere in a state o f com plete readiness. Since the possibility o f the Italian attack on G reece, watchfulness during the night and at daw n had been intensified. Passive defence on board ship was at the m axim um efficiency that circum stances perm itted. A t the “ A larm ” all m en on w atch w ent to positions o f safety; those not on d uty w en t to shelter. Ships’ m ain arm am ents w ere half-m anned; A .A . guns fu lly so. T h e berths occupied b y ships w ere considered the best protected for all particular alarm s and circum stances— m oon­light nights etc.

(c) Warnings. F or some considerable tim e T aran to had been the object o f visits, both b y d ay and b y night, o f enem y aircraft. T his persistence, as w ell as special activ ity o f the enem y, served as a w arn ing o f heavy air attacks. T o m eet this contingency no steps other than those described could be taken, except to rem ove the ships from the port (as was done on 12th N ovem ber 1940), w hich o f course suffered from the grave draw back o f taking them from the most im portant centre o f the theatre o f operations.

3 . S h i p s P r e s e n t i n T a r a n t o , 11/11/40(a) In Mar Grande. Battleships, 15-inch, Vittorio Veneto, Littorio; twelve

6-inch, Cavour, Cesare, Duilio, Doria.Cruisers, 8-inch, Z arai Fiume, Gorizia.Destroyers, Folgare, Baleno, Fulmine, Lampo, Alfieri, Gioberti, Carducci, Oriani.

(b) In Mar Piccolo. Cruisers, 8-inch, (at buoys) Trieste, Bolzano, (at w harf) Pola, Trento-, 6-inch (at w harf) Garibaldi, Abruzzi-Destroyers (at buoys) Granatiere, Alpino, Bersaglieri, Fuciliere, (at w harf) Freccia, Strale, Dardo, Saetta, Maestrale, Libeccio, Grecale Scirroco, Camicia Nera, Geniere, Lanciere, Carabinieri, Coreziere, Ascari, Da Rocco, Usadimari, Pessagno. F ive torpedo boats, 16 submarines, supply and hospital ships; four minesweepers, one m inelayer, nine tankers w ith a num ber o f tugs and m erchant ships.

A P P E N D I X I

F.A.A. Attack on Taranto; Aircraft, H.M.S. Illustrious

A ircraft bearing the initial letter L belonged to H .M .S . Illustrious, those w ith E to H .M .S . Eagle. M em bers o f the crews from the Eagle are m arked. 1

A ll the torpedoes carried w ere 18-inch, M a rk X I I , set to 27 knots, 33ft. and arm ed w ith D u plex pistols, safety range setting 300 yards.

A ll bom bs carried w ere 2501b. S .A .P .A ll aircraft carried one parachute flare, setting 7, except the three flare

droppers w h ich each carried eight parachute flares, setting, 7 and eight setting 16.

T — T orpedo , B— Bombs, F— Flare

1S T S T R I K I N G F O R C E

a i r c r a f t

SQUADRON P ILO T . OBSERVER . LO AD

T A R G E T AND D R OPPING POSITION,

PL A N 7

L .4 A (815)(did not return)

L t.-C d r. K . W illiam son, R .N . L t. N . J . Scarlett, R .N .

i T Cavour (1)

L .4 C (815) S /Lt. (A) P. D . J . Sparke, D .S .C ., R .N . S /L t. (A) A . L . O . N eale, R .N .

i T Cavour (2)

L .4 R (815) S /Lt. (A) A . S. D . M acau lay, R .N . S /Lt. (A) A . L . O . W ray, R .N .V .R .

i T Cavour (3)

L .4 K (815) L t. N . M c l. K em p , R .N .S /Lt. (A) R . A . B ailey, R .N .

i T Littorio (4)

L .4M (815) L t. (A) H . A . I. Sw ayne, R .N . S /Lt. (A) J. Buscall, R .N .V .R .

i T Littorio (5)

E .4F (813) 1L t. M . R . M au n d, R .N .*S /Lt. (A) W . A . Bull, R .N .

i T Littorio (6)

L .4 P (815) L t. (A) L. J. K ig g e ll, R .N . L t. H. R . B. Jan vrin , R .N .

4 B 16 F

O il storage tanks (12)

L .5B (813) L t. (A) C . B. L am b , R .N . xLt. K . G . G rieve, R .N .

4 B > 1 6 F

O il tanks (13)

E .5A (824) 1C ap t. O . Patch, R .M . xLt. D . G . G oodw in, R .N .

6 B Cruisers and destroyers in M a r Piccolo(H )

85

86 APPENDIX I

A IR C R A FTSQUADRON P ILO T. OBSERVER. LO AD

TA R G E T AND

DROPPING POSITION,

PL A N 7

l .4l ( 8 1 5 ) S /Lt. (A) W . C . Sarra, R .N . M id (A) J. Bowker, R .N .

6 B Seaplane base in M ar

Piccolo ( 1 5 )

L .4 H ( 8 1 5 ) S /Lt. (A) A . J . Forde, R .N . S /L t. (A) A . M ardel-Ferreira,

R .N . V .R .

6 B Cruisers and destroyers in M a r Piccolo(16)

e .5q , (8 2 4 ) !L t. (A) J . B. M u rray, R .N . *S /Lt. (A) S. M . Paine, R .N .

6 B Cruisers and destroyers in M a r Piccolo ( i 7 )

2N D S T R I K I N G F O R C E

L-5a (819) L t.-C d r. J. W . H ale, R .N . L t. G . A . C arline, R .N .

I T Littorio (7)

E .4H (813)(did not return)

'L t. G . W . B ayley, R .N . xL t. H . J . Slaughter, R .N .

I T Gorizia (8)

L .5 H (819) L t. (A) C . S. C . L ea, R .N .S /Lt. (A) P. D . Jones, R .N .

I T Duilio (9)

l -5k (819) L t. F. M . A . Torrens-Spence, R .N . L t. A . W . F. Sutton, R .N .

I T Littorio (10)

E .5H (824) 'L t. (A) J . W . G . W elham , R .N . JL t. P. H um phreys, E. G . M ., R .N .

I T Veneto (11)

l -5b (819) L t. R . W . V . H am ilton, R .N . S /Lt. (A) J . R . W eeks, R .N .

2 B 16 F

O il storage tanks (17) (18)

L .4 F (815) L t. (A) R . G . Skelton, R .N .S /Lt. (A) E. A . Perkins, R .N .V .R .

2 B 16 F

O il storage tanks (18)( 1 9 )

L .5 F (819) L t. E. W . C lifford, R .N . L t. G . R . M . G oing, R .N .

6 B D ive bom b cruisers and destroyers in M a r Piccolo (19) (20)

L .5Q . (819) Lt. (A) W . D . M orford, R .N .S /Lt. (A) R . A . F. G reen, R .N .

I T E xternal tank fell off. R eturned to carrier

A P P E N D I X J

F.A.A. Attack on Taranto: Narratives of Aircraft

Note, ( i) These narratives have been supplem ented, and w here necessary am ended, b y inform ation received from Italian sources since the war.

(2) N um bers in brackets after torpedoes or bom bs refer to dropping positions on P lan 7.

F I R S T F L I G H T

N o. 1 L 4 A (L ieut.-C dr. W illiam son, Lieut. Scarlett)A rrived over island o f San Pietro w ith L .4 C and L .4 R a t 4,000 feet

and flew to centre o f M a r G rande. T his w as the last seen o f L 4 A b y the British. T h e aircraft was sighted in the p ath o f the m oon divin g at high speed w ith the engine cu t out a t 2314 b y the destroyer Fulmine, w hich a t once opened fire a t abou t 1,000 yards range. L 4 A ’s torpedo (1), dropped from a height o f abou t 30 feet, narrow ly missed the Fulmine and h it the Cavour. T h e aircraft then crashed near the floating dock. Both officers w ere rescued b y the Italians and m ade prisoners o f w ar.

N o. 2 L 4 C (Sub-Lieutenants Sparke and N eale)D ived from the centre o f M a r G rande and crossed the breakw ater on

T a ran to la shoal abou t two-thirds o f its length from the shore at a height o f 30 feet. H ad intended to attack the Vittorio Veneto but she could not be identified; sighted the Cavour and dropped his torpedo (2) a t abou t 700 yards.1 A n explosion was seen near the ship a m inute later. L 4 C then turned 180° sharply to port and got aw ay south o f San Pietro. Intense A . A . fire from the batteries at the harbour entrance was experienced during both the approach and the w ithdraw al. L 4 C landed on the carrier a t 0120, 12th N ovem ber.

N o. 3 L 4 R (Sub-Lieutenants M a ca u la y and W ray)L 4 R ’s story closely follows that o f L 4 C . T orp edo (3) was also fired

a t the Cavour at alm ost the same time as L 4 C .1 D urin g the get-aw ay the observer noted a line o f balloons at 1,000 feet outside T aran tola breakw ater. A .A . fire w as noticed from the batteries east and south o f the harbour. L 4 R landed on the carrier at 0125.

N o. 4 L 4 K (Lieut. K em p , Sub-L ieut. Bailey)A p proached from the west over western breakw ater at 4,000 feet,

experiencing heavy A .A . fire from batteries on San Pietro Island and near G ape R ondinella. Fire was continued from shore batteries as the aircraft dived betw een T ara n to and the cruisers, w ho opened an intense fire as sea level was reached. Several shells

1 The Doria reported two bombs exploding ahead of her at 2315. No bombs were dropped in this vicinity. It seems probable that these explosions were the torpedoes launched by L.4C, and L.4R , which had missed the Cavour and run on towards her. T he Doria was undamaged.

87

88 APPENDIX J

from the cruisers were seen to hit m erchant ships at anchor. Fired torpedo at abou t 1,000 yards (4) from the Littorio, w h ich was hit on the starboard bow . L 4 K then turned to starboard and passing over the end o f T a ra n to la breakw ater gained the open sea to the southw ard. A fire was observed in the v icin ity o f the seaplane base. T h e carrier was then reached w ithout incident.

N o. 5 L 4 M (L ieut. Sw ayne, Sub-L ieut. Buscall)B ecam e detached from leader and w aited a quarter o f an hour o ff

the harbour for the other aircraft. H avin g sighted flares, cam e dow n to 1,000 feet over western breakw ater, m eeting violent A .A . fire from ships and batteries. L ost height w h ile crossing M a r G ran de and a t end o f T a ra n to la breakw ater m ade a sharp turn to port and dropped torpedo (5) about 400 yards from the Littorio a t 2315. T h e torpedo h it the Littorio on the port quarter a few seconds after L 4 K ’s hit on the starboard bow . L 4 M then passed d irectly over the Littorio, and got a w ay over San Pietro under h eavy fire from the cruisers and shore batteries, even tually landing on the Illustrious at 0150.

N o. 6 E 4F (Lieut. M au n d, Sub-Lieut. Bull)A rriv in g over the lan d north o f C ap e R ondinella, E 4F m et w ith A .A .

fire from shore batteries and cruisers w hile planing dow n to dropping position S.W . o f the C an al. Torpedo (6) w as fired at the Veneto at a distance o f abou t 1,300 yards. T h e torpedo probably grounded and exploded o ff the starboard quarter o f the Littorio about 2315 .1 E 4F then turned sharply to starboard and got aw ay over San Pietro, m eeting vio lent A .A . fire on the w ay.

N o. 7 L 4 P (Lieuts. K ig g e ll and Janvrin)W as detached to seaward o f C ap e San V ito , and w ith L 5B proceeded

at a height o f 7,500 feet, experiencing A .A . fire w hile crossing the coast. B eginning at 2302 dropped a line o f flares east o f the harbour, to burn at 4,500 feet a t intervals o f h a lf a mile. L 4P then turned to starboard and cruised for 15 to 20 minutes, w hen a dive-bom bing attack (12) w as m ade on the oil fuel depot to the southw ard, after w hich it returned to the Illustrious, landing on at 0120.

N o. 8 L 5B (Lieuts. L am b and Grieve)Follow ed astern o f L 4P , but did not drop flares as those already

dropped w ere functioning efficiently. T h e A .A . fire encountered and course follow ed w ere the same as for L 4P , and the same oil fuel depot was dive-bom bed (13).

N o. 9 E 5 A (C ap tain Patch, R .M ., L ieut. Goodw in)A rrived over San Pietro at 2306 a t height o f 8,500 feet and was fired

on b y shore batteries there and at C ap e R ondinella. Proceeded to western part o f M a r Piccolo. A fter some difficulty in identifying target, carried out a dive-bom bing attack on tw o 8-inch cruisers (14), crossing M a r Piccolo from N .W . to S.E. M achine gun fire was opened from m any places and the cruisers. E 5 A then turned east and about five m inutes later noticed a large fire in the vicinity o f the seaplane base. A .A . fire from a new position w as avoided b y sheltering behind a range o f hills. E 5 A even tually crossed the

1 T he Duilio observed an explosion in this position at the time.

A P P E N D IX J 89

coast to the southward about eight miles east o f T ara n to harbour, and landed on the Illustrious at 0135.

No. 10 L 4 L (Sub-Lieut. Sarra, M idshipm an Bowker)A rrived over land to w estw ard o f T a ra n to at 8,000 feet and dived to

1,500 feet over M a r Piccolo. T h e pilot could not identify the target, so attacked the seaplane base from height o f 500 feet (15) hitting hangar and slipw ay and causing a large explosion in the store. H eavy m achine gun fire was m et, particu larly after the attack. L 4 L disengaged to the south, leavin g the land abou t five miles east o f the harbour, and returned to the Illustrious w ithout incident.

N o. 11 L 4 H (Sub-Lieuts. Forde and M ardel-Ferreira)Lost contact w ith m ain group and arrived to eastw ard o f C ap e San

V ito whilst the first flares w ere being launched. A fire was noticed in the oil fuel depot. A rriv in g over M a r Piccolo, turned to port and attacked from N .E . to S .W ., dropping bom bs from 1500 feet (16). First bom b fell in w ater short o f the two 8-inch cruisers. D urin g the dive intense A .A . fire was suffered. T h e pilot was not sure that his bom bs had dropped, so turned round in the western part o f M a r Piccolq and repeated the attack. T h e b reakaw ay was m ade to the N .W ., and L 4H crossed the coast abou t five miles west o f the harbour.

N o. 12 E 5 Q (Lieut. M u rray, Sub-Lieut. Paine)A rrived to eastw ard o f C ap e San V ito w hile flares w ere being dropped

and proceeded north to eastern extrem ity o f M a r Piccolo. C arried out bom bing attack from east to west along the line o f moles as far as the western cruiser from 3,000 feet (17). T h e destroyer Libeccio was hit b y a bom b w hich failed to explode. E 5Q , then turned 180° to port and drew aw ay in the same direction from w hich it had approached.

S E C O N D F L I G H T

N o. 13 L 5 A (L ieut.-C dr. H ale, L ieut. Carline)A fter experiencing heavy A .A . fire from San Pietro, arrived one mile

north o f C ap e R ondinella a t 5,000 feet and dived over the m erchant ship harbour, under intense fire. T orp edo was dropped at range o f 700 yards at the Littorio1 (7), and aircraft then turned to star­board and got aw ay ju st north o f the T a ra n to la shoal breakw ater, h eavily engaged b y destroyers. L 5 A landed on the Illustrious a t 0200, 12 th.

N o. 14 E 4H (Lieuts. B ayley and Slaughter)Follow ed L 5 A over C ap e R ondinella and was not afterw ards seen

by the British. T h e Italian account mentions an attack on the: Gorizia and shows an aircraft shot dow n in this vicinity.

N o. 15 L 5 H (Lieut. L ea, Sub-Lieut. Jones)Follow ed L 5 A and dived over C ap e R ondinella to a point 2 i cables:

south o f C an a l entrance. L aun ch ed torpedo at the Duilio (9) an d h it her on starboard side abreast N o. 2 turret (angle o f im pact 8o°,

1 The Littorio was hit by a torpedo which exploded on her starboard bow at 0001. Thismay have been L s A ’s, or L 5IC S , which was launched practically simultaneously from thesame direction. An unexploded torpedo was afterwards found stuck in the m ud under theLittorio’s keel.

90 APPENDIX J

No. 16

N o. 17

N o. 18

N o. 19

N o . 20

N o. 21

depth 29-5 feet). L 5 H then turned to starboard and got a w a y betw een the Z ara an-d Fiume and then over the north o f San Pietro under violent A .A . fire from cruisers, destroyers and shore batteries.

L 5 K (Lieuts. Torrens-Spence and Sutton)Follow ed L 5 A and dived over C ap e R ondinella to about five cables

south o f the C an al entrance, under A .A . fire from battleships, cruisers and shore batteries. T orp edo fired from about 700 yards at the Littorio2, (10), and L 5 K then broke aw ay to the southward o f Sao Paolo, eventually landing on the Illustrious at 0215.

E 5H (Lieuts. W elham and H um phreys)A fter passing over C ap e R ondinella astern o f L 5 A flew over the M a r

Piccolo and the town o f T a ra n to ; then turned to starboard towards the centre o f M a r G rande, passing very close to the northern balloon on the Eastern shore. E 5H then dived to the attack under heavy m achine gun fire; the outer aileron rod was hit, tem porarily putting the aircraft out o f control. W hen control was regained, torpedo was launched 500 yards from port quarter o f the Veneto(11) . T h e aircraft then turned sharply to starboard and got aw ay through intense A .A . fire north o f San Pietro, after receiving a hit on the port w ing. T h e Illustrious was reached at 0205.

L 5B (Lieut. H am ilton, Sub-Lieut. W eekes)A rriv in g over C ap e San V ito a t 7,500 feet cam e dow n to 5,000 feet

and dropped a line o f flares at intervals o f 15 seconds to eastward o f the harbour was fired on b y A .A . guns w hile dropping the flares. L 5B then carried out a dive bom bing attack on the oil storage depot, causing a sm all fire (18), and then returned to the carrier, landing on at 0230.

L 4 F (Lieut. Skelton, Sub-Lieut. Perkins)A p proach ed on a sim ilar course to L 5B and dropped flares to south­

east o f the harbour. Bombs were dropped near the oil storage depot (19), it was thought unsuccessfully. A .A . fire was m et w ith and some shells cam e very close during the d ive bom bing attack. L 4 F landed on the Illustrious at 0200.

L 5 F (Lieuts. C lifford and Going)T his aircraft left the Illustrious 24 minutes late, arriving a t T aran to

w h ile the attack was in progress. It reached lan d abou t five miles east o f the harbour entrance and steered for the dockyard at the edge o f M a r Piccolo. T u rn in g to port, a bom bing attack (20) was carried out at 2,500 feet from west to east along the line o f cruisers and destroyers. T h e Trento was hit and other ships n arrow ly missed, but none o f the bom bs exploded. L 5F then turned north, crossing M a r Piccolo before altering to starboard to cross the coast five miles east o f the harbour entrance. A .A . fire was experienced the w hole time the aircraft was overhead, being particu larly intense from pom-poms during the bom bing run. L 5 F landed on at 0250.

L 5 Q (Lieut. M orford, Sub-Lieut. Green)T h e external overload petrol tank fell o ff at 2205 and the fittings

ban gin g against the fuselage necessitated a return to the carrier. Fired red V ery L igh t on approaching the Illustrious, b u t not being expected, the Illustrious and Berwick opened fire. Fired a two star identification light and firing ceased.

2 See note, L5A .

A P P E N D I X K

F.A.A. Attack on Taranto: R.A.(A)’s Orders to Illustrious and Escort Force,

11th November1W hen detached, Illustrious w ill adjust course and speed to pass through

position “ X ” , 270° K a b b o Point 40, a t 2000, w hen course w ill be altered into w ind and speed adjusted to give speed o f 30 knots. O n com pletion o f flying o ff first range, course w ill be altered 180° to starboard, speed 17 knots and a second alteration o f 180° to starboard w ill be m ade to pass again through position “ X ” a t 2100 w hen course and speed w ill be adjusted as before. O n com pletion o f flying o ff second range, Illustrious w ill a lter course to 150°, 17 knots and subsequently to pass through position “ Y ” , 270° K a b b o Point 202, a t 0100 w hen course w ill be altered into w ind and speed adjusted to w ind and speed o f 25 knots to be m aintained till both ranges have landed on. I f there is an easterly w ind it m ay be necessary to reverse the course between flying on first and second ranges, in w h ich case both turns w ill b e to starboard and speed o f ship dow n w ind 25 knots. O n com pletion o f landings, course w ill be altered to return to C .-in -C ., speed 18 knots. A ll the above and any other alterations o f course necessary w ithout signal.

N orm al n ight zigzag w ill be m aintained, except during flyin g operations.I f enem y surface forces are encountered during the night Illustrious is to

w ithdraw , rem ainder are to engage under C .S .3 . T w o destroyers are to be detailed to w ithdraw w ith Illustrious.

1 Report o f C .O . Illustrious, 13th Novem ber 1941, App. V (in A.0138/41).

2 i.e. 270° 20 miles from K abbo Point, Cephalonia.

91

7

A P P E N D I X L

Report on Suda Bay, 11th November

T h e defence o f C rete was a m atter o f prim ary im portance a t this tim e and the C .-in -C . had, on 28th O ctober, issued orders for the establishm ent o f a fuelling base a t Suda B ay. N et defence was to be laid b y the Protector and A .A . cruisers w ere to defend the anchorage. “ A lth o u gh the need for an advanced base in the Eastern M editerranean had been appreciated for m any years and was fu lly provided for in 1935, in 1940 ow ing to m ore urgen t requirem ents in H om e W aters it had n ot been possible to allocate a n y personnel or special m aterial to the M ed iterran ean .” (C .-in C ., 19/3 /41). A “ com m ission ” o f n aval, arm y and a ir officers left A lexan d ria b y air on 29th O ctober. A conference w as held w ith the G overnor-G eneral and the G reek G en eral O fficer Com m anding, G en eral A lexakis. T h e Protector arrived on 31st O ctob er and started lay in g nets. A Base D efence p arty from H .M .S . Liverpool o f 11 officers and 147 m en under L ieut.-C om m ander J . N . H icks, w ith four 4-inch guns, tw o m achine guns, five pom -pom s and four 3-pdrs., also arrived in the Fiona and Chakla. A ir raids com m enced on 1st N ovem ber. M a jo r P. W . Phibbs, R .M ., had four 6-inch guns m ounted b y 24th N ovem ber. L ack o f labour and transport w ere the principal difficulties. O n 16th N ovem ber, 13,500 G reek troops left, taking 215 o f the 382 lorries in the island. T h e 4-inch guns were m ounted on baulks b u t only one o f the m ountings fitted accurately. In the rem ainder the holes w ere not in line w ith those o f the base p late and h ad to be laboriously burn t out as there w ere no large augurs available. M ajor Phibbs h ad difficulties in m ounting and setting up the base plates in the concrete. T h e N a v a l O fficer-in-C harge (Suda) w as L ieut.-C om m ander H . R . M . N icholl, and though there w ere m an y difficulties they w ere w on der­fu lly surm ounted b y the N a v y and M arines.

V ice-A d m iral Pridham -W ippell visited the Base on 8th N ovem ber. W ork was progressing satisfactorily. T h e layin g o f the net defences was proceeding satisfactorily but there was an “ urgent n e e d ” for an A / S patrol. T h e question o f w ho was Fortress C om m ander required to be settled at an early date. T h e N a v a l O fficer-in-Charge needed secretarial assistance and P ay­m aster Sub-L ieutenant E. P. G . K ea ley , R .N .V .R ., was landed from the V ice- A d m ira l’s sta ff for this d u ty .1

1 V .A .L .F . report o f n t h November 1940, in C.-in-C., M ed., 19/3/41 (Establishment o f N aval Base at Suda Bay) in M .05531/41.

92

A P P E N D I X M

Operation “Collar” : H.M. Ships, with Main Armament and Commanding Officers

F o r g e “ B :

Renown (six 15-inch guns)

Ark Royal (sixteen 4 -5-inch guns) (60 aircraft)

Sheffield, (tw elve 6-inch guns) Despatch (six 6-inch guns)

Faulknor (five 4 -7-inch guns) Fire drake (four 4 - 7-inch guns) Forester (four 4 • 7-inch guns) Fury (four 4 ‘7-inch guns) Wishart (four 4 ‘ 7-inch guns) Encounter (four 4 -7 inch guns)

Kelvin (six 4 ‘7-inch guns) Jaguar (six 4 ‘7-inch guns)

F lag, V ice-A d m iral Sir Jam es F. Som er­ville, K .C .B .,D .S .O . (ret.) ( F .O .“ H ” )

C ap ta in C . E . B. Sim eon C ap ta in C . S. H olland

C ap ta in C . A . A . L arcom B road pendant. C om m odore C . E.

D ouglas-Pennant, D .S .C . (Com re. W .I.)

(D.8) C ap ta in A . F. D e Salis L ieuten ant-C om m ander S. H . N orris L ieuten ant-C om m ander E. B. T a n co ck L ieuten ant-C om m ander T . C . R obinson C om m ander E. T . Cooper L ieuten ant-C om m ander E. V . St. J .

M organC om m ander J . H . A llison, D .S .O . L ieuten ant-C om m ander J . F. W . H ine

F o r c e

Manchester (twelve 6-inch guns)

Southampton (tw elve 6-inch guns) Duncan (D .13) (four 4 ‘ 7-inch guns) Hotspur (four 4 ‘ 7-inch guns)Vidette (four 4-inch guns)

Peony (one 4-inch gun)

Salvia (one 4-inch gun)

Gloxinia (one 4-inch gun)

Hyacinth (one 4-inch gun)

Flag, V ice-A d m iral L . E . H olland, C .B .(C .S.18)

C ap tain H . A . Packer C ap ta in B. C . B. Brooke C ap tain A . D . B. Jam es C om m an der H . F. H . L aym an , D .S .O . L ieutenant E. N . W alm sley L ieuten ant-C om m ander M . B. Sher­

wood, D .S .O . (retired) L ieuten ant-C om m ander J . I. M iller,

D .S .O ., R .N .R . L ie u t e n a n t - C o m m a n d e r A . J . C .

Pom eroy, R .N .V .R .L ieuten ant J . I. Jones, R .N .R .

F o r c e “ D

Ramillies (eight 15-inch guns) Newcastle (tw elve 6-inch guns) Coventry (ten 4-inch A /A guns) Berwick (eight 8-inch guns) Defender (Tour 4 ‘7-inch guns) Greyhound (four 4 ‘7-inch guns)

Gallant ("four 4 ‘ 7-inch guns) Hereward (Tour 4 ‘ 7-inch guns) Diamond (four 4. ‘ 7-inch guns)

C ap tain A . D . R ead C ap ta in E. A . A ylm er, D .S .C .C ap tain D . G ilm our C ap ta in G . L . W arren L ieuten ant-C om m ander G . L . Farnfield C om m ander W . R . M a rsh all-A ’D eane,

D .S .C .Lieuten ant-C om m ander C . P. F. Brow n Lieuten ant-C om m ander C . W . G reening Lieuten ant-C om m ander P. A .C a rtw rig h t

93

A P P E N D I X NItalian Naval Forces:

Action off Cape SpartiventoC o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , a n d C o m m a n d i n g F i r s t S q u a d r o n , A d m i r a l I. C a m p i o n i

NAME OF SHIP MAIN ARM AM ENT SPEED REMARKS

Vittorio Veneto

F IR S T S Q U A D R O N

(2 Battleships, 8 Destroyers) Adm iral Campioni, C.-in-C.

nine 15-inch, twelve 6-inch 29 Flag, C .-in-C .Giulio Cesare ten 12 -6-inch, twelve 4 -7-inch 26

Freccia

7TH D estroyer Flotilla

four 4 -7-inch, six 2 i-inch torp. tubes 36Dardo four 4 -7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 36Saetta four 4 - 7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 36Strale four 4 • 7-inch, six 21 -inch torp. tubes 36

Granatiere

13TH D estroyer F lotilla four 4 - 7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39

Fuciliere four 4 -7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39Bersagliere four 4 -7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39Alpino four 4 -7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39

Pola

SE C O N D S Q U A D R O N

(6— 8-inch Cruisers, 8 Destroyers) Vice-Adm iral A . Iachino

ist C ruiser D ivision eight 8-inch, twelve 4-inch A .A . 33 Flag,

Gorizia eight 8-inch, twelve 4-inch A .A . 33 Vice-Adm iralFiume eight 8-inch, twelve 4-inch A .A . 33 A. Iachino

Alfieri

9th D estroyer F lotilla four 4 '7-inch, six 2 i-inch torp. tubes 39

Oriani four 4 '7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39Garducci four 4 '7-inch, six 21 -inch torp. tubes 39Gioberti four 4 • 7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39

Trieste

3RD C ru iser Division eight 8-inch, twelve 4-inch A .A . 36 Flag,

Trento eight 8-inch, twelve 4-inch A .A . 36 Vice-Adm iralBolzano eight 8-inch, twelve 4-inch A .A . 36 Sansonetti

Lanciere

1 2th D estroyer F lotilla four 4 ‘7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39 Damaged in

Goraziere four 4 ‘7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39 actionAscari four 4 ‘7-inch, six 21 -inch torp. tubes 39Libeccio four 4 ‘7-inch, six 21-inch torp. tubes 39

94

A P P E N D I X O

Action off Cape Spartivento: Admiral Somerville’s Reasons for

Decision to Abandon Chase

V ice-A d m iral Som erville sum m arised the reasons for and against continuing the chase as follow s:—

For continuing the chase—(i) T h e possibility that the speed o f the enem y m ight be reduced b y some

unforeseen eventuality.(ii) H e m ight appreciate that his force was superior to m ine and decide to

turn and fight.

Against continuing the chase—(i) T h ere was no sign that an y o f the enem y ships, and especially his

battleships, had suffered dam age, nor was there reasonable prospect o f inflicting dam age by gunfire, in view o f their superior speed. Unless the speed o f the enem y battleships was reduced very m aterially he could enter C agliari before I could bring him to action w ith Renown and Ramillies.

(ii) I was being led towards the enem y air and subm arine base at C agliari, and this m ight w ell prove a trap. His appearance in this area appeared to be prem editated, since it was unlikely that this was occasioned solely b y the inform ation he had received the previous night o f Force “ D ” ’s presence in the Narrows.

(iii) T h e extrication o f one o f m y ships dam aged by air or subm arine attack from m y present position w ould certain ly require the w hole o f m y force and m ust involve leavin g the convoy uncovered and insufficiently escorted during the passage o f the Narrows.

(iv) T h e enem y m ain units had been driven o ff sufficiently far to ensure they could no longer interfere w ith the passage o f the convoy.

(v) A second T /B attack could not take place until 1530 to 1600, b y w hich tim e the convoy w ould be entirely uncovered and the enem y fleet could be under the cover o f the A .A . batteries and fighters a t C agliari. I entertained little hope that the attack w ould prove effective, as I knew that the second flight was even less experienced than the first.

(vi) I had no assurance that the cruisers reported to the north-west m ight not be w orkin g round towards the convoy and the Ark Royal.

(vii) I t was necessary for contact to be m ade w ith the convoy before dark, to ensure the cruisers and destroyers required for escort through the N arrow s should be properly form ed up. It was also necessary to provide the fullest possible scale o f defence against T /B and light surface force attack at dusk. T o effect this a retirem ent betw een 1300 and 1400 was necessary.

95

A P P E N D I X P

Details of British Naval AircraftI. F i g h t e r A i r c r a f t C a p a b l e o f D e c k L a n d i n g

SEAg l a d i a t o r SKUA FULM AR REMARKS

C rew 1 2 2 T h e clim b o f these aircraft v a r ie d ; for G ladiator and Fulm ar it was 3J to 4 ! m inutes to 10,000 feet; for the Skua 12J minutes.

A rm am ent 4— ' 3 °3 F * i — -303 R | i — 500 lb. or i — 250 lb. bom b

4— -303 F 1— -303 R 1— 500 lb. or 1— 250 lb. bom b

8— -303 F

1— 500 lb. or 1— 250 lb. bom b

W hether dive bom ber N o Yes N o

F it t e d fo r o b s e r v e r navigation, W /T, and folding

N o Yes N o

M axim u m speed, K nots 213 195 230

E ndurance at m axim um (approx.)

1 h o u r 2 hours 2 hours

M a xim u m endurance a t econom ical speed

2¿ h o u r s 6 hours 6 hours |

II . R e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d S t r i k e A i r c r a f t

SWORDFISH ALBACORE W ALRU S§

C rew 3 reconn: 3 strike

3 reconn: 2 strike

3 reconn:

A rm am ent i — -303 (or -3) Front, 1— -303 (or -3) R e ar G un

T orp edo or bombs,1,500 lbs.

T orp edo or bombs, 1,500 lbs.

Bombs, 500 lbs.

C ap ab le o f dive bom bing Yes Y es Lim ited

C ap ab le o f torpedo attack Yes Yes N o

M axim u m speed, K n ots I25 155 110

M axim u m endurance and range w ithout extra tankage :—Reconnaissance Strike Force

5 J hours 450 miles

6 hours 630 miles

3 I hours 300 miles

W hether extra tankage Yes Yes N o* F — Fixed Front Gun. f R — Rear Free Gun. } W ith extra tank. § Catapult ship aircraft.

96

IndexT h e num erical references are to pages.

O n ly those names o f individuals that are specifically m entioned in the text o f the n arrative are included in the index : for other names o f C om m an ding Officers the appropriate footnote, or A p p en d ix (G, I, and M ), m ust be consulted.

Abinda, M .V ., Convoy A .N .6, 39, 40 (note)Abingdon, minesweeper, 37Adm iralty, congratulate C-in-C., M ed., on Opn. M .A .5, 24, ruling as to function o f cruisers

when carrying military passengers, 55 (note), order Board o f Enquiry on action o ff C. Spartivento, 72

Adriatic Sea, Italian command of, 36 ; 47 Aegean Sea, 25 (note), 26, 34A gria Grabusa, Island off N.W . Crete, 28, hit by torpedoes, 30, Colleoni sinks off, 30, 32 Aim , (object), Opn. M .A .5, 3, temporarily changed, 7 ; sweep into Aegean, 25 (note), Capt.,

Collins’ decision as to main object, 26, 35 ; Opn. M.B.8, 37 ; raid on Strait o f Otranto,47, 50 ; Opn. “ Collar ” , 52 (and note), 55, 56 (note), 59, 67

A ir, Aircraft, see F l e e t A i r A r m and R o y a l A i r F o r c e

A ir attacks, British, on Italian cruisers o ff Calabria, 9, 14, 15 (note), 17 ; on Port Augusta,19 ; on Tobruk, 33 ; on Italian Fleet, Taranto, 42-46, 50 (and note), 51, Apps. H , I, J , K , P ; on Italian Fleet o ff Cape Spartivento, 65 (and note), 67 (and note), 68, 71. Bombing attacks, 33, 41, 42-46, 68 ; Fighter attacks, 5 (note), 20, 21, 23, 40, 41, 49 (and note) 69, 70 ; Torpedo attacks, 9, 14, 19, 22 (and note), 23, 33, 42-46, 50, 51, Apps. H, I, J , K , P. I ta lia n , on M ed. Fleet, 6, 12, 17 (and note), 20, 21 (and notes), 22, 23, 40, 41, 49 (and note) ; on own fleet, 18 (and note), 61 (and note) ; on Force “ H ” , 17, 18 (and note), 69 ; on Convoys M .S .l, 20, A .S .5, 49 ; on M alta, 19 ; on Havock and Sydney, 32, 33 ; remarks by C-in-C., M ed., A pp. C ; effect on rescue o f survivors, A pp. F

A ir cooperation, R .N . with R .A .F ., 3, 19, 32, 33, 39, 42, 44, 50Aircraft, B r i t i s h , details o f F .A .A . aircraft, App. P. Fulmars, 40, 41, 49, 69 ; Gladiators, 5

(note), 21, 40 ; Skuas, 67, 68 ; Swordfish, 8, 13, 14, 17, 19. 23, 33, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 56, 65, 68, 71 ; Wellingtons (R.A.F. bomber) 44. I t a l i a n , Cant. 506, 40 ; Cant. 501, 41, 49 (and note) ; R .O . 43, 68 ; S. 79, 40, 49 (and note)

Aircraft Carriers, see A r k R o y a l , E a g l e , I l l u s t r i o u s . V alue o f 17, 18 (and note), 23, 49, 50, 51 , 61 ; V . Adi. Somerville’s remarks on operation of, 72

A ir losses, B r i t i s h , 33 ; Opn. M.B.8, 41, 43 ; F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 45 (and notes), Apps. I , J. ; I t a l i a n , Opn. M .A .5, 20, 21 ; Opn. M .B.8, 40, 41, 49, (note) ; 68

A ir patrols, Opn. M .A .5, 4, Opn. M.B.8, 39 A ir photographs, o f Taranto, 42, 43, 46, 50A ir reconnaissance, B r i t i s h , F .A .A ., 7, 8, shortage o f aircraft 8, 9 ; 21, 23, 41, 56, 57, 58, 71

(and note) ; R .A .F ., 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 32, 39, o f Taranto, 42, 46, 50, 55 (notes) ; 58, 59 ; photographic, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50. I t a l i a n , 7, 9, 23, 34, 40, 41, 48, 49 (and note), 60, 61

Ajax, H .M .S ., cruiser, 37, 40, 41-42, raid in Otranto Strait 82, 83, 84 ; 85, 86 Alexakis, Greek G .O .C ., Crete, App. LAlexandria, M ed., Fleet main base, 1, 3, 4, 5, Italian S /M off, 5 ; 7, 19, 21, 22, 25 (note),

26, 31, 32 (and note), 33, 39, 40, 41, 49, 55 Ammunition expenditure, by Sydney and destroyers, 19th July, A pp. E ; by Italians at Taranto,

45 (n<>te)Andrea Doria, Italian battleship, at Taranto, F .A .A . attack, 44 ; 61 Annesley, Captain J . C ., D .S .O ., C .O . Enterprise, 4 (note)Anti-aircraft defences, at Taranto, 42, A pp. H Anti-aircraft fire, at F .A .A ., Taranto, 44, 45 (note), A pp. J Antikithera Channel, N .W . of Crete, 25 (notes), 26, 40

97

98 INDEX

Antonio Locatelli, Italian M .V ., sunk, 48 (note)Appreciations, C-in-C., M ed., 6, 7, action off Calabria, 16 ; Adi. Somerville, 16, 18 (and note),

59, 67, A pp. O ; C .O ., Sydney, 28 (and note) ; Adi. Campioni, 11, 18, 61 Arethusa, H .M .S., cruiser, 4 (note)Ark Royal, H .M .S., aircraft carrier, Flag, V .A . (A), with Force “ H ” , 4 (and note), importance

of, 17, 18 (and note), flag, V . Adi. Somerville, 37, Opn. “ C ra c k ” , 41, Opn. “ C o lla r” , pilots and observers inexperienced, 53, 71 ; in action off Cape Spartivento, 56, 57, 58, 59,62, 65, 67 (and note), 68, attacked by bombers, 69

Ascari, Italian destroyer, tows damaged Lanciere, 64 (note)Athens, G u lf of, sweep for Italian shipping, 25 (and note), 26 ; 36 Attendolo, Italian Cruiser, 4 (note)Augusta, Sicily, 5, F .A .A . attack, 19 ; 55 (note)

Back, Captain G . R . B., C .O ., Orion, 5 (note)B ack, C a p ta in T . H ., C .O ., Capetown, 21 B aillie-G rohm an , C ap ta in H . T ., C .O ., Ramillies, 21 Bande Nere, Ita lian cruiser, see G io v a n n i d e l l a B a n d e N e r e .Barham, H .M .S., battleship, 37, joins C-in-C., M ed., 41 ; 49, 50 Bari, N.W . of Brindisi, 47Bartolemeo Colleoni, Italian Cruiser, 4 (note), sails for Aegean, 26, engaged by Sydney, 29, damaged

and sunk, 30, 31 ; Apps. A , D Bayley, Lieutenant G. W ., killed, Taranto, 45 (note), Apps. I, JBenghazi, Cyrenaica, Italian base, 3, 4, Italian fleet reported north of, 6 (and note) ; 7, Bande

Nere escapes to, 32Berwick, H .M .S., cruiser, 37, lands troops, M alta, 41 ; 42, 49, 50, Opn. “ Collar ” , 52 (note),

53, joins V . Adi. Holland, 58, 59, in action off Cape Spartivento, 62 (and note), damaged, 63, (and note), 64 ; 67

Bevir, Captain O ., C .O ., Resolution, 4 (note).Bombs, F .A .A . attack, Taranto, failure to explode, 45, 46 Bon, Cape, Tunisia, Force “ D ” reported to Italians, 56 Bridge, Captain A. R . M ., C .O ., Eagle, 5 (note), 23Biggs, Commander H. W ., D .S.O ., C .O ., Hero, 5 (note), 26, chases Bande Nere, 30, 31 Bolzano, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), attacked by F .A .A ., 14 (and notes). 18 ; 56, 60, 61, 62 (note),

bombed by F .A .A ., 68 ; Apps. A , H, N Boyd, Captain D. W ., D .S.C ., C .O . Illustrious, remarks on F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 50, 51 Bramble Leaf, M .V ., Convoy M .W .3, 39, arrives Suda Bay, 40 Brindisi, N .W . o f Strait o f Otranto, 47Brisbane Star, M .V ., Convoy M .W .3, 39, arrives Suda Bay, 40 British Sergeant, M .V ., Convoy A.N.6, 39, 40 (note)British Union, oiler, 21Busa, Cape, north-west extremity, Crete, 28 (note)

Cadoma, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), engine trouble, n (note), 13 (note) ; App. A Cagliari, Sardinia, diversionary air attack planned, 4, cancelled, 17, 18 (and note) bombed by

F.A .A ., 41 ; 64 (note), 70 Calabria, Southern Italy, 3, 4, 7, action off, 9th July, approach, 8-11, surface contact, n , 12,

phase 1, 12, 13, phase 2, 13-15, phase 3, 15-17, air attacks off, 17 ; 18, 23, 25, 36 Calafrana, M alta, air attack, 19 Calcutta, H .M .S., A .A . cruiser, 37, 39 (and note)Caledon, H .M .S., A .A . cruiser, 21Campioni, Adm iral I., Italian C-in-C. Afloat, 4, receives report of British forces, and movements,

7, 8, 9, intentions, 15th July, and dispositions, n , decides to break o ff action, 13, and to withdraw to Sicily, 18, decisions approved by M inistry of M arine, 23, remarks on value o f aircraft carriers, 23 ; 52, sails to intercept Force “ H ” , 55, appreciation and intentions, 27th November, 60, 61, decides to decline action, 61 (and notes), remarks on F .A .A . attacks, 65, report on conditions at Taranto, F .A .A . attack, A pp. H

Canea Bay, Crete, north coast, 27 (note)Capetown, H .M .S ., A .A . cruiser, flag R. Adi. Renouf, 21 Capital ships, B r i t i s h , limitations, 3 (note)Capo Vado, Italian M .V ., sunk, 48 (note)

INDEX 99

Cartwright, Lieut.-Com ., P. A ., C .O ., Diamond, 3Casardi, Vice-Adm iral, flag in Bande Nere, sights 2nd D .F., 26, 27, 28 (note), engaged by

Sydney, 29, 30 (and note), tactics, 34 Casualties, British, in Gloucester, 6 ; Vampire, 20 ; Liverpool, 21 ; Sydney, 30 ; Havock, 32 ; F .A .A .,

Taranto, 45 (and note) ; Berwick, 63 (and note), 64. Italian, in Cesare, 13 ; Colleoni, 31 (and note)

Catalini, Italian M .V ., sunk, 48 (note)Catania, Sicily, 3, 55 (note)Cavour, Italian battleship, 4, n , 15, torpedoed by F .A .A ., Taranto, 44, 45 (and note), damage,

46 (and note) ; 65 ; Apps. A , H, I, J Cephalonia, island west o f Greece, Illustrious operates off, 43 Cesare, Italian battleship, flag, C-in-C., 4, 8, hit by Warspite, 13 ; 15, 18, 55, 65 Chakla, H .M .S., A . B. V ., 49 Clan Ferguson, M .V ., convoy M .E .3, 39 Clan Forbes, M .V ., 52 (note)Clan Fraser, M .V ., 52 (note)Clan Macaulay, M .V ., Convoy M .E .3, 39 Clarke, Captain C. P., C .O ., Caledon, 21“ Coat ” , Operation, passage o f reinforcements from Gibraltar, 37, 42, 50 “ Collar ” , Operation, passage o f reinforcements from Gibraltar, plan, 52, 54 Colleoni, Italian cruiser, see B a r t o l o m e o C o l l e o n i

Collins, Captain J . A ., R .A .N ., C .O ., Sydney, 5 (note), decision as to main object, 26, preserves W /T silence, 28 (and note), engages Bande Nere and Colleoni, 29, 30 (and note), 31, returns to Havock, 33 (and note) awarded C.B., 34, remarks on action, 34, 35 (and note)

Colonne, Cape, Calabria, air patrols off, Opn. M .A .5, 4 Commanding officers, see Names of C .O .s etc.Convoys, B r i t i s h , i ; M .F .l and M .S .l, 3 (and notes), 19, 20,21, 22 ; 32 (note), M .W .3,

M .E .3, A .N .6, A .S .5, 37, 39, 40, 41, 49, regularity of, 50 ; Opn. “ Collar ” , 52 (and notes), 55> 56, 58, 59, 67, 70 (and note), 71. I t a l i a n , Catania to Benghazi, 3, 4, 7 ; Bari to Valona, sunk by light forces, 47, 48 (and note), 49

Co-operation, Navy, Arm y, A ir Force at Suda Bay, 50 Cordite, flashless, advantage of, 48 (note)Corfu, island, off Southern Albania, air patrols, Opn. M .A .5, 4 ; 48Cork and Orrery, Adm iral of the Fleet the Earl of, G .C .B ., G .C .V .O ., presides over Board of

Enquiry, 72Courage, Commander R. E., D .S.O ., C .O ., Havock, 21, 26, 33 Coventry, H .M .S., A .A . cruiser, 37, escorts M .W .3, 40, M .E .3, 41 ; 52, 58 “ Crack ” , Operation, bombing Cagliari, 41Crete, M ed., Fleet reported south of, 7 ; 22, 25 (note), 36, air patrols, Opn. M.B.8, 39 ; 40, 70 Cruisers, B ritish , action o ff Calabria, 9, 11-17, 22 ; action off Cape Spada, 29-32 ; raid,

Strait o f Otranto, 47, 48 ; action o ff Cape Spartivento, 62-65 (and notes), 67. I ta lia n , action off Calabria, 8, 9, 11-15 (and notes) 17 ; action off C ap e Spada, 26-32 ; at Taranto, F.A .A . attack, 44, 45 ; action off Cape Spartivento, 55, 57, 58, 62-65, (and notes), 68

Cunningham, Adm iral Sir Andrew B., K .C .B ., D .S.O ., C-in-C., M editerranean, plans Opn. M .A .5, 1, 3 ; 4, 5 (note), receives enemy report, discontinues M .A .5 temporarily, 6, 7, approaches Italian Fleet, 8, 9, 12 (and note), delayed by Royal Sovereign, 13, decides to avoid enemy smoke screen, 16, movements after action, 19 ; 20, return to Alexandria, 21, remarks on action off Calabria, 22, 23, on Italian bombing attacks, A pp., C ; congratulated by Adm iralty, 24, policy, 25, orders Sydney to support destroyers, 29 ; 31 (note), 32 (and note), 33, remarks on action off Cape Spada, 34, 35 (and note), directions as to rescue o f survivors, App. F, plans Opn. M.B.8, 37, 39, leaves Alexandria for Central Mediterranean, 40, movements, 41, 42, rejoined by Force “ X ” and Illustrious after F .A .A . raid on Taranto,48, 49, remarks on raid in Otranto Strait, 49, on Opn. M.B.8 and F .A .A . attack on Taranto,50, 41, receives message from H .M . The K in g, 51, ruling as to importance o f passengers in cruisers, 55 (note) ; 72

Da Barbiano, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), engaged by Warspite, 31 (note) ; A pp. ADainty, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 37, 39, 49, A pp. GDebenham, Lieut.-Com ., A . J., leads F .A .A . torpedo attack, 14Decoy, H .M .S ., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, escorts M .S. 1, 20 ; 37, 41, App. GDefender, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, attacks S/M , 20 ; 21, 37, 41, 52 (note), A pp. G

100 INDEX

Dekheila, F .A .A . base, Alexandria, 5 Delhi, cruiser, 4 (note)Derna, Cyrenaica, 26de Salis, Captain A . F., (D) 8, Faulknor, 4 (note), 59Despatch, cruiser, broad pendant Commodore Douglas-Pennant, 52, 56, 58, App. MDestroyers, B r i t i s h , action o ff Calabria, 12-18 ; A /S sweep in Aegean 25 (and notes), 26, action

with Italian cruisers, 27-32 ; 33, 35 raid in G u lf o f Otranto, 47, 48 (and note) ; action off Cape Spartivento, 59, 62 (and note). I t a l i a n , action o ff Calabria, n (and note), 12, 15-17 ; action o ff Cape Spartivento, 61 (and note), 63 64 (and note), value as close escort against air torpedo attack, 65 ; 68

Devis, M .V ., convoy M .W .3, 39Diamond, H .M .S., destroyer, 3, escorts M .F .l, 19 ; 21, 37, 49, 52 (note), A pp. G D ia z, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), engine trouble, 11 (note), 13 (note), App. A D i Giussano, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), engaged by Warspite, 13 (note) ; 65 ; App. A Diversion, by Force “ H ” , Opn. M .A .5, 4, cancelled, 17, 18 (and note)Dodecanese Islands, east o f Crete, Italian air base, 6, 26 (note)Douglas-Pennant, Commodore C . E., D .S.C ., broad pendant in Despatch, escorts convoy,

Opn. “ Collar ” , 58, 70 (note)Duca d'Aosta, Italian cruiser, 4 (note) ; A pp. ADuca degli Abruzzi, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), engages 7th C .S., 12 (and notes) ; A pp. A Duilio, Italian battleship, torpedoed by F .A .A ., Taranto, 45, damage 46 (and note) ; Apps. A ,

H, I, J Duke, Captain R. G ., 72Duncan, H .M .S., destroyer, 37, 52 (note), 58 (note) ; App. G Duplex pistols, (torpedoes), 50, 51 Durazzo, Albania, 47

Eagle, H .M .S. aircraft carrier, 3, 5 (and note), attacked by bombers, 6, 17 (and note), 20, 21, air searches, 9th July, 7, 8, striking force attacks enemy cruisers, 9, action off Calabria, 11, 12, striking force attacks cruisers, 13, 14, 15 (note) 17 ; striking force attacks Port Augusta,19, commended by C-in-C., 23 ; 32, striking force attacks Tobruk, 33 ; 37, defects due to bombing, 5 S wordfish transferred to Illustrious, 43, take part in raid on Taranto, 44, 45 ; App. G

Eaton, Commander J. W . M ., C .O ., Mohawk, 5 (note) ; App. G Elaphonesi, Cape, S.W . point o f Crete, 32 E l N il, M .V ., Convoy M .F .l, 3 (note)Encounter, H .M .S., destroyer, 52 (note) ; App. MEndicott, M r. J. H ., Commissioned gunner, Vampire, mortally wounded, 20 Enterprise, H .M .S., cruiser, 4 (note)Escort, H .M .S ., destroyer, sunk by submarine, 18 Eugenio di Savoia, Italian cruiser, 5, 4 (note) ; A pp. A Fano Island, Strait o f Otranto, 47Faulknor, H .M .S., destroyer, 4 (note), 37, 41, 52 (note), 59, 63 ; Apps. G , M Fighting Instructions, on convoy defence, 52 (note) ; 71 Fiona, H .M .S., A . B. V ., 49Firedrake, H .M .S., destroyer, 37, 52 (note) ; Apps. G , M Fisher, Captain D. B., O .B.E ., C .O . Warspite, 5 (note)Fiume, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), 55, 52 (note), attacked by F .A .A ., 68 ; 70, Apps. A , N Flares, see I l l u m i n a t i o n

Fleet A ir Arm , 4, 5 (and note) action off Calabria, air searches 9th July, 7, 9, attacks on enemy cruisers, 9, 13, 14, 15 (note), 17, 23, attack on Port Augusta, 19, Tobruk, 33, Taranto, 42-46, 50, 51, Apps., H, I, J, congratulations from H .M . T he K ing, 51 ; Opn. “ C o lla r” , pilots and observers inexperienced, 53, 71, attacks on Italian fleet off Cape Spartivento, 65, 67, 68

Force “ H ” , diversion by, M .A . 5, 4 (and note), 17, 18 (and note), covers reinforcements, Opn. M .B.8, 37, 41, state, Opn. “ Collar ” , 53 (and note)

Ford, Vice-Adm iral Sir W ilbraham T . R ., K .B .E ., C.B., V .A ., M alta, 6, sails convoy M .F .l, 19Forester, H .M .S ., destroyer, 37, 52 (note) ; Apps. G , MFortune, H .M .S ., destroyer, 37 ; A pp. GFoxhound, H .M .S., destroyer, 37 ; App. GFulmine, Italian destroyer, 45 (note)Fury, H .M .S ., destroyer, 37, 52 (note) ; Apps. G , M

INDEX 101

Gallant, H .M .S ., destroyer, 37, 41, 49, 52 (note) ; Apps. G , M Garibaldi, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), engages 7th C .S., 12 (and note) ; App. A Garside, Captain F. R ., C .B.E., C .O ., Gloucester, killed in action, 6 Gavdo, island, south o f Crete, 21, Havock bombed off, 32George V I , H .M . K ing, sends congratulations on action off C . Spada, 34 and on O pn. M.B.8,

and F .A .A . attack on Taranto, 51 Gibraltar, Force “ H ” based on, 1 ; 18, 53, 55, 72Giovanni della Bande Nere, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), Flag, V . Adi. Casardi, sails for Aegean, 26,

engaged by Sydney, 29, 30, 41, escapes, 32 ; Apps. A , D Glasgow, H .M .S ., cruiser, 37, lands troops, M alta, 41 ; 42, 50 ; App. G Glennie, Captain I. G ., C .O ., Hood, 4 (note)Gloucester, H .M .S. cruiser, 5 (note), hit by bomb 6, joins Eagle 11 ; 18, escorts M .F .l, 19 ;

21, flag, R . Adi., Renouf, 37 ; 40, 41, A pp. G Gloxinia, H .M .S ., Corvette, 52 (note) ; A pp. M Godfroy, Adm iral, 1Gorizia, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), at Taranto, F .A .A . attack, 45 ; 55, 60, 61, 62 (note), F .A .A .

torpedo attack, 68, Apps. A , H , N Government, H .M ., action on collapse o f France, 1 Gozo, M alta, 41Graham , Captain Q_. D ., C .O ., Arethusa, 4 (note)Greece, attacked by Italy, 36 ; 49Greening, Lieut.-Com ., C . W ., C .O ., Hereward, 5 (note)Greyhound, H .M .S., destroyer, 37, 41, 49, 52 (note) ; Apps. G , M Griffin, H .M .S. destroyer, 37, 41, 49 ; A pp. G

Hale, Lieut.-Com. J . W ., leads second flight, torpedo attack, Taranto, 45, Apps. I, J Hannah Molter, M .V ., Convoy A.N . 6, 40 (note)Hasty, H .M .S ., destroyer, 5 (note), attacks S/M s, 6 (and note), 20 ; 14, 19, 25 (and note),

26, chases Bande Nere, 32 ; 33, 37, 42 (note) ; Apps. D , E, G Havock, H .M .S., destroyer, 21, 25 (note) 26, 29, joins 2nd D .F., rescues Colleoni’s survivors,

31, 32, damaged by bomb, 33 ; 37, 42 (note) ; Apps. D, E, G Hereward, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 37, 42 (note) ; Apps. G , M Hero, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 25 (note), 26, sights Italian cruisers, 26, chases

Bande Nere, 30, 32 ; 37 ; Apps. D, E, G Hicks, Lieut.-Com ., J. N., Liverpool, Commands Base Defence Party, Suda, App. L Holland, Captain, C. S., C .O ., Ark Royal, 4 (note), decides to attack Italian battleships, 67 ;

68, 71 (note)Holland, Vice-Adm iral L. E., C.B., V .A .C . 18th C .S., flag in Manchester, 53, questions use of

troop-carrying cruisers as convoy escorts, 53, 55 (and note), action o ff Cape Spartivento, commands cruisers in van, 58, engages enemy, 63 (note), 64 (and note), 66 (note) ; 70 (and note), 71

Hood, H .M .S., battlecruiser, flag, V . A di. Somerville, 4 (note)Hostile, H .M .S ., destroyer 5 (note), 14, 19Hotspur, H .M .S., destroyer, 52, Opn. “ Collar ” , speed 20 knots, 53 ; 58 (note) ; A pp. M Hyacinth, H .M .S., Corvette, 52 (note) ; A pp. MHyperion, H .M .S. destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 25 (note), 26, 27, action with Italian cruisers,

28, 29, sinks Colleoni, 30, rescues survivors, 31 ; 32, joins Havock, 33 (and note) ; 37, 42 (note), Apps. D, E, G

Iachino, Vice-Adm iral A ., Commanding 2nd Squadron, flag in Pola, 55, action o ff Cape Spartivento, 62, 63, remarks on British gunnery, 64 (note), and on F .A .A . attacks, 65, 68

Ilex, H .M .S. destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 25 (note), 26, action with Italian cruisers, 28, 29, torpedoes Colleoni, 30, rescues survivors, 31 ; 32, joins Havock, 33 ; 37, 42 (note) ; Apps. D, E, G

Illumination, flares at Taranto, 42, 43, 44 ; star shell in Otranto strait, 47, 48 Illustrious, H .M .S ., aircraft carrier, 37, 40, hangar damaged, 42 ; F .A .A . attack on Taranto

42-46, remarks by C .O ., on Taranto, 50, 51 ; Apps. G , J , K Imperial, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), bursts feed tank, 6 ; 21 Intelligence, Italian fleet reported at sea, 6 ; Opn. “ Collar ” , 55 (and note)Isis, H .M .S., destroyer, 37 ; A pp. G

102 INDEX

Italian-s, enter war, i ; plan of opns., 6th-gth July, 4 ; 6, 7, fleet movements, 8th-gth July, 7,8, 9, 11, action o ff Calabria, 12-19, App. A ; attack on Greece, and state o f fleet, October,36 ; defences at Taranto, App. H ; fleet sails to intercept Force “ H ” , 55, situation, 0800, 27th November, 61, action off Cape Spartivento, 62-71. A ir operations, see A i r A t t a c k s , etc.

Jacom b, Captain H. B., C .O ., Royal Sovereign, 5 (note)Jaguar, H .M .S., destroyer, 52 (note) ; App. M Janus, H .M .S., destroyer 5 (note); 19, 20, 37 ; App. G Jervis, H .M .S ., destroyer, 3, escorts M .F .i, 19 ; 37 ; App. G “ Judgment ” , Operation, F .A .A . attack on Taranto, 37, 42-46, 50, 51

Juno, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 20, 37 ; App. G

K abbo point, Cephalonia, 43, App. KKaso Strait— Island, east o f Crete, 5, 25 (and note), 26, 40Kealey, Pay., Sub.-Lieut., E. P. G ., R .N .V .R ., Secretary, N .O .I.C ., Suda, App. L Keighly-Peach, Commander (F), Eagle, 5 (note)Kelvin, H .M .S., destroyer, 52 (note) ; App. M Kingston Coral, H .M . Trawler, 37, 69 ; App. G Kirkland, M .V ., convoy M .S .i, 3 (note)Kitcat, Lieut.-Com ., C. A . De W ., C .O . Imperial, 5 (note)Knight o f M alta, M .V ., convoy M .F .I, 3 (note)

Lanarkshire, M .V ., Convoy M .E .3, 39Lanciere, Italian destroyer, damaged off C. Spartivento, 64 (note), 68, 70 ; Apps. A , NLeone Pancaldo, Italian destroyer, sunk by F .A .A ., 19 ; App. ALibeccio, Italian destroyer, hit by bomb, Taranto, 45, 46 ; 68 ; Apps. A , NLittorio, Italian battleship, torpedoed by F .A .A ., Taranto, 45, damage 46 (and note) ; Apps.

Liverpool, H .M .S., cruiser, 5 (notes), 11, engages enemy, 12, 14, 15, 16, joins C-in-C., casualties from bombs, 21 ; 33, party landed at Suda Bay, App. L.

Lyon, Vice-Adm iral Sir G. H. D ’O ., K .C .B ., 72Lyster, Rear-Adm iral A . L. St. G ., C .V .O ., D .S.O ., R .A . (A), flag in Illustrious, 37 ; 42, plans

F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 42 (and note), 49 ; App. G

“ M .A .5 ” , Operation, object and forces, 3, C-in-C.’s remarks on, 22, 23, A pp. C ; Adm iralty congratulations, 24 ; Apps. A , B

M ack, Captain, P. J ., D (i4 ), Nubian, 5 (note), 14 M cGregor, Commander E. G ., C .O ., Decoy, 5 (note)M cK illop, Lieut.-Com. A. M ., C . O . , Jervis, 3Maestrale, Italian destroyer, believed hit by Orion, 15 (note) ; A pp. AMalaya, H .M .S., battleship, 3 (and note), 7 (note), outranged, 14 ; 16, 17, 20, 22, 37, 40, 49 ;

App. GM alta, 3, 4, Italian S/M s off, 4 ; 6, 7, M ed. Fleet fuels at, 19 ; 20, air patrols, Opn. M.B.8,

37 ! 39. 4° . 4 i, 42, 43. 44. 5°Manchester, H .M .S ., cruiser, flag V . Adi. Holland, 52 (note), Opn. “ Collar ” , embarks 700

passengers, 53 ; 56, 58, 59, action off Cape Spartivento, 62, 63, 64 (and note) ; 67, 71 (note) ; A pp. M

Mandalay, M .V ., Convoy A .N . 6, 40 (note)M ar Grande, outer harbour, Taranto, 42-45 ; Apps. H , J M ar Piccolo, inner harbour, Taranto, 42-45 ; Apps. H , J Masirah, M .V ., Convoy M .S .I, 3 (note)M atapan, Cape, Greece, Italian S/M s off, 4“ M .B.8 ” , Operation, objects and forces, 37, convoys, 39, C-in-C .’s. remarks on, 50, con­

gratulations from H .M . The K ing, 51 ; Apps. G , H , I, J , K , L Mediterranean, strategical situation, June-July, 1940, 1, November, 1940, 36 ; state o f Fleet

and reinforcements, 37 Memnon, M .V . Convoy M .E .3, 39Messina, strait, 4, 5, 8, 13 (note), Italian ships attacked by Italian aircraft, 18 (note) ; 43,

55 (note)

INDEX 103

Meteorological forecast, before attack on Taranto, 50 M idw ay Island, Pacific, 50Mohawk, H .M .S., destroyer, 5 (note), 14, 19, 20, 37, 42, raid in Otranto Strait, 42, 47, 48 ;

App. GMontecuccoli, Italian cruiser, 4 (note) ; A pp. A M orale, 23, 35M orrow, Commander J. C ., R .A .N ., C .O ., Voyager, 5 (note)Mussolini, Dictator o f Italy, 9, 36

Names, o f Flag and Commanding Officers etc., Force “ H ” July, 4 (note) ; Forces, Opn. M .A .5, 5 (note) ; Forces, A /S sweep, i8th-igth July, 26 ; Forces, O pn. M.B.8, A pp. G ; Forces, Opn. “ Collar ” , App. M ; Pilots and observers, F .A .A . attack on Taranto, Apps. I, J

Naples, west coast o f Italy, 3, convoy leaves for Benghazi, 4, Italian fleet ordered to, 18 Neptune, H .M .S., cruiser, 5 (note), 11, reports enemy battleships, 12 ; engages enemy, 12, 13,

15, 16, bombed, 20 ; 21, 32 Net defences, Taranto, 42, 43, 44, A pp. HNewcastle, H .M .S., cruiser, 52 (note), Opn. “ Collar ” boilers unreliable, 53, joins V . Adi.

Holland, 58, 5g, action off Cape Spartivento, 62 (and note), 63, 64 (note) ; 67, 70 ; A pp. M New Zealand Star, M .V ., 52 (note)Nicholl, Lieut.-Com ., H. R. M ., N .O .I.C . Suda, App. LNicolson, Commander H. St. L ., D .S.O ., (D)2, Hyperion, 5 note, S.O . anti-S/M sweep into

Aegean, 26 ; 27, action with Italian cruisers, 28, 2g, sinks Colleoni, 30, rescues survivors, 31 (and note) ; 33, awarded bar to D .S.O ., 34

Norasli, M .V ., Convoy M .S .I, 3 (note)Novaro, Captain Umberto, C .O ., Colleoni, dies o f wounds, 31 (note)Nowell, Lieut.-Com ., G. H ., C .O ., Phoenix, 7Nubian, H .M .S., destroyer 5 (note), detached from Warpsite, 12, engages enemy, 14 ; ig , 20,

37, 41, 42, raid in Otranto Strait, 47, 48 ; A pp. G

O ’Connor, Captain R . C ., C .O ., Neptune, 5 (note)Odysseus, M .V ., Convoy A.N . 6, 40 (note)Orders by V .A .(D ) for A /S sweep, 25 (note)Orion, H .M .S., cruiser, flag V . Adi. Tovey, 5 (note), sights enemy, 11, engages enemy, 12, 14,

15 (and note) 16, bombed, 20, detached to M .F .I, 21, flag V . Adi. Pridham-Wippell, 37 ; 40, 42, raid in Otranto Strait, 47, 48 ; App. G

Otranto, Strait of, entrance to Adriatic, 37, raid on convoy in 47-50

Paladini, Vice-Adm iral R ., flag in Pola, 4 (note) ; 8, 11, 14 Palermo, Sicily, 5, 8, 18Palliser, Captain A . F. E., D .S.C ., C .O ., Malaya, 5 (note)Passero, Cape, Siciliy, M ed., Fleet to cruise off, 3 ; 4 Pass o f Balmaha, M .V ., Convoy A.N . 6, 39, 40 (and notes)Pearl Harbour, Pacific, 50Peony, H .M .S., corvette, 52 (note) ; A pp. MPhoenix, H .M .S ., submarine, attacks and reports Italian battlefleet, 6 ; 7 Piraeus, Greece, 36, 37, 3g, 40, 41, 4gPlans, B r i t i s h , Opn. M .A .5., 1, 3, modified, 6, 7 ; Opn. M .B.8., 37, 3g, F .A .A . attack on

Taranto, 42, 43 44, raid into Strait o f Otranto, 47 ; Opn. “ Collar ” , 52, 53 Plum leaf M .V ., Convoy M .W . 3, 3gPola, Italian cruiser, flag, V . Adi. Paladini, 4 (note) ; 1, flag, V . Adi. Iachino, 55 ; 62 (note),

F .A .A . torpedo attack, 68 ; Apps. A , H , N Pondiki Nisi, Island, west o f Crete, 31Port Said, Egypt, 5 (note), Convoy A .N . 2 postponed, 32 (note) ; 37, 3g, 4g Premula, Italian M .V ., sunk, 48 (note)Pridham-Wippell, Rear-Adm iral H. D ., C.B., C .V .O ., R .A . 1, flag in Royal Sovereign, 3, sails

with Force “ C ” , 5 (and note), covers convoys, 20, 21, promoted Vice-Adi., succeeds V . Adi. Tovey as V .A .L .F ., flag in Orion, 36, 37, visits Piraeus and Crete, 40, 41, App. L ; 42, raids Strait o f Otranto, 47, 48, remarks on raid, 48 (note) ; 4g

Principles o f W ar, exemplified by action o ff C. Spada, 35 Protector, H .M .S., netlayer, App. L

104 INDEX

Radar, 67 (note)Ramillies, H .M .S., battleship, 3 (note), covers M .S .l, 21, 22 ; 37, escorts M .W .3, 40, and

M .E .3, 41, 49, Opn. “ Collar ” , 52 (note), 53, 58, joins Renown, 59 ; 62, in action o ff Cape Spartivento, 63 ; 67 ; A pp. M

Range-s-ing, action off Calabria, cruiser action, 12, 14, 15 (and note), 16, battleship action, 13, 14, 15, destroyers, 15, 16, 22 ; action o ff Cape Spada, 29, 30 ; action o ff Cape Spartivento,63, 64, 71 (note)

Rangefinders, stereoscopic in Italian ships, 71 Ras el Hilal, Cyrenaica, Italian S/M s off, 4 Ras el T in, Cyrenaica, 21Rawlings, Captain H . B., O .B.E ., C .O ., Valiant, 4 (note), promoted R . A di., R .A .I., 37,

detached to Suda Bay, 49 Read, Captain A . D ., C .O ., Liverpool, 5 (note)Reconnaissance, see A i r R e c o n n a i s s a n c e

Renouf, Rear-Adm iral E. de F., C .V .O ., R .A ., 3rd C .S., flag in Capetown, 21, flag in Gloucester, 37 Renown, H .M .S ., battlecruiser, flag V . Adi. Sir J. Somerville, Opn. “ C o lla r” , 52 (note), 53,

56, 58, 59, develops hot bearings, 62, engages enemy off Cape Spartivento, 63 ; 67, 69 ; A pp. M

Resolution, H .M .S., battieship, 4 (note)Results of F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 46 (and notes), 61 Rhoades, Lieutenant R ., R .A .N ., C .O ., Vendetta, 19Risks, V . Adi. Somerville’s assessment, Ark Royal, 17, 18 (and note) ; Capt. Collins accepts

risks, 28 (note), 34, 35 ; V . A di., Somerville accepts risk to convoy, 59 Rodi, M .V ., Convoy M .F .l, 3 (note), M .W .3, 39 Rorqual, H .M .S ., submarine, 7Royal A ir Force, patrols Opn. M .A .5, 3, 4, report enemy ships, 6 (and note), 7, 8, 9 ; re­

connaissance, Port Augusta, 19, Tobruk, 32, and attack on shipping, 33 ; bombers in Greece,37 ; reconnaissance, O pn. M .B.8, 39, Taranto, 42, 43, 46 ; value of, 50 ; Opn. “ Collar ” , passage o f personnel in cruisers, 53, 55 (and note), 64 (note), reconnaissance, 55 (note),58, 59 (and note)

Royal Sovereign, H .M .S., battleship, 3 (and note), flag, R . Adi. Pridham-Wippell, 5 (note), speed limits approach of fleet, 9 ; 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 55

Russell, Captain A . S., C .O ., Delhi, 4 (note)

Salvia, H .M .S., corvette, 52 (note) ; A pp. MSansonetti, Vice-Adm iral, commanding 3rd Division, flag in Trieste, 56Santa M aria di Leuca, Cape, S.E. point o f Italy, hydrophone reported, 47 (note)Saumarez, Lieut.-Com ., P. L ., D .S.C ., C .O ., Ilex, 5 (note), 26 Scarlett, Lieut., N .J ., Observer, F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 45 (note) ; Apps. I, J Sheffield, H .M .S., cruiser, 37, 41, 52 (note), 53, 56, 58, 59, 62, action o ff Cape Spartivento,

engages enemy, 63 ; 67 (note) ; A pp. M Sicily-Sicilian, 4, 7, Italian fleet withdraws to, 18, air patrols, Opn. M .B.8, 39 ; 49 Sindonis, H .M . Trawler, 37, 39, 49 Sirio, Italian torpedo boat, reports Force “ D ” , 56 Skerki Bank, (60 miles west o f Sicily), 56Slaughter, Lieutenant H. J ., killed, Taranto 45 (note), Apps. I, JSmoke, laid by Italians, action o ff Calabria, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22 ; laid by Bande Nere,

encourages Capt. Collins, 29, 34 ; 30, 31, 48, action off Cape Spartivento, 62, 63, 64, 66, 70 Somerville, Vice-Adm iral Sir James F., K .C .B ., D .S.O ., Flag Officer, Force “ H ” , flag in Hood,

4 (and note), cancels diversionary attack on Cagliari, 17, 18 (and note), flag in Ark Royal, Opn. “ Coat,” 37 ; 52 (and note), flag in Renown, plans Opn. “ C o lla r” , 53, 55, employment o f troop carrying cruisers, 54, 55 (and note) ; 56, measures to safeguard Convoy, 58 (and note), action off Cape Spartivento, approach and appreciation, 59, surface contact, 61, 62 (and note), appreciation 1315, and abandons chase, 66, 67, reasons, App. O ., assessment of enemy forces and damage, 70, remarks, 71 ; 72

Southampton, H .M .S., cruiser, 52 (note), O pn. “ Collar ” , embarks 700 passengers, 53 ; 56, 58,59, action off Cape Spartivento, 62, 63, 64 (note) ; 67 (and note), 70 ; A pp. M

Spada, Cape, north-west Crete, action off, 25-35 Spartivento, Cape, Calabria, air patrols, Opn. M .A .5, 4 ; 8 Spartivento, Cape, Sardinia, action off, 52-72

INDEX 105

Strategical situation, Mediterranean, June-July, 1940, 1 ; 34, November, 36, effect o f F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 50

Stuart, H .M .A .S ., destroyer, 3, 5 (note), 14, 15, 19 (and note), joins M .F .l, 19 Submarines, B r i t i s h , Phoenix attacks and reports battleships, 6 ; 7. I t a l i a n , dispositions, 6th-

11 th July, 4, 9th July, 7 ; 6, 16, sink Escort, 18, countermeasures, 25 ; 36, attack M ed. Fleet, and M .E .3, 41

Suda Bay, Crete, advance base, M ed., Fleet 36 ; 37, 39, 40 (and note), 41, 49, 50. App. L Sunrise, 9th July, 7 (note), 27th November, 56 (note)Surprise, effected by Sydney, 28 (and note), 29, value o f 34, 35 ; F .A .A . attack, Taranto, 43 Sydney, H .M .A .S ., cruiser, 5 (note), n , engages enemy 12, 14, 15, 16 ; 21, 25, sweep in Aegean,

26, engages Bande Nere and Colleoni, 29, 30, chases Bande Nere, 31, 32, joins Havock, 33 ; 34, 35 (and note), 37, 40, 42, raid in Otranto Strait, 47, 48 ; Apps. D , E, G

Syracuse, Sicily, 4, 55 (note)

Taranto, Italian main base, 5 ; 7, 8, M ed., Fleet cuts Italian fleet o ff from, 9, 11, 17, 18 ; 18 (note), 36, 37, 39, 41, F .A .A . attack, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, defences, App. H ; 49, 50, 51, 55 (and note)

Terror, H .M .S ., monitor, 39, 41, 50Thomas, Commander M . S., C .O . Dainty, 5 (note)Tobruk, Italian base, Cyrenaica, 4 ; 32, attacked by R .A .F . and F .A .A ., 33 Toneline, Tanker, petrol contaminated, 43 (note)Torpedo-es, and settings, F .A .A . attack on Taranto ; A pp. 1. Attacks, B r i t i s h , by S/M s, 6 ;

Surface vessels, 30, 47, 48 ; Aircraft, see A i r A t t a c k s . I t a l i a n , by S/M s, 18, 41 ; Surface vessels, 15, 16, 17, 48 ; Aircraft, 49

Tothill, Commander J. A . W ., C .O ., Janus, 5 (note)Tovey, Vice-Adm iral J. C ., C.B., D .S.O ., V .A .(D ), 3, flag in Orion, 5 (note), at action off

Calabria, 12 (and note), 13, 15, 16, 17, enemy air attacks, 17 ; 18, Covers Convoy M .S. 1,20, 21, handling o f cruisers, 22, issues orders for A /S sweep, Aegean, 25 (note) ; 31 (note),32, succeeded by V . Adi. Pridham-Wippell, 36

Trento, Italian cruiser, 4 (note), 14 (note), hit by bomb, Taranto, 45, 46, 56 ; 62 (note), bombed by F .A .A ., 68 ; Apps. A , H , N

Trieste, Italian cruiser, flag V . Adi. Sansonetti, 5 6 ; 62 (note), bombed by F .A .A ., 68 ; Apps. H, N

Tyrrhenian Sea, west o f Italy, 36Tyrwhitt, Lieut.-Com ., L. R . K ., C .O ., Hasty, 5 (note), 26

U-boats, see S u b m a r i n e s

Valiant, H .M .S., battleship, 4 (note), 37, 40 ; A pp. G Valona, Albania, 47, 48Vampire, H .M .A .S. destroyer 5 (note), screens Eagle, 11 ; 19, escorts M .S .l, 30 ; 37, A pp. G Vendetta, H .M .A .S ., destroyer, escorts M .F. 1, 19 ; 21, 39, 41 Victorian, H .M . Trawler, 49Vittorio Veneto, Italian battleship, at Taranto, F .A .A . attack, 45, 46, flag C-in-C., 55, 6 i, attacked

by F .A .A ., 65 ; Apps. H, J , N Volo, M .V ., Convoy M .W . 3, 39Voyager, H .M .A .S ., destroyer, 5 (note), screens Eagle, n ; 19, escorts M .S .l, 20 ; 37 ; A pp. G

Waiwera, M .V . Convoy M .W .3, 39W aller, Commander H . M . L., R .A .N ., D .(io ), Stuart, 5 (note)Walsh, Lieut.-Com . J. A ., R .A .N ., C .O ., Vampire, 5 (note)Warships, H .M . S h i p s with main armaments and C.O .s, employed in Opn. M .A .5, 4 (note),

5 (note) ; A /S sweep, i8 th-igth Ju ly, 26 ; Opn. M .B.8, A pp. G ; O pn. “ C o lla r” , App. M . I t a l i a n Ships with main armament ; Opns. 6th-9th July, including action o ff Calabria,4 (note), App. A ; at Taranto, F .A .A . attack, App. H ; at action o ff Spartivento, App. N

Warspite, H .M .S ., battleship, flag C-in-C., M ed., 3 (and note), 5 (note), Opn. M .A .5, 6, 7, 8,11, 12, engages enemy off Calabria, 13, 14, 15, 16, attacked from air, 17 (and note), 21 (and note) ; 18, 20, 22, 32, aircraft lost, 33, Opn. M.B.8, 37, 40, 41 ; A pp. G

106 INDEX

Waterhen, H .M .A .S ., destroyer, 37 ; A pp. GW eather, 9th July, 11 ; mist obscures Sydney, 29 ; F A A . attack, Taranto, 44, App. H ; raid

in Otranto Strait, 47 ; prevents second attack on Taranto, 49 ; action off C . Spartivento, 56 Wells, Vice-Adm iral L. V ., C .B., D .S .O ., V .A .(A ), flag in Ark Royal, 4 (note)W ildman, Surgeon-Lieut., W . W ., R .N .V .R ., killed in action {Berwick), 63 (note)Williamson, Lieut.-Com ., K ., leads first flight, torpedo attack, Taranto, 44,45 (note) ; Apps. I, J Wilson, Commander W . E., C .O ., Juno, 5 (note)Wireless telegraphy, interception, 23 ; silence preserved by Sydney, 28 (and note), 34 Wishart, H .M .S., destroyer, 52 (note) ; 58 (note) ; A pp. M W right, Commander, J. P., C .O ., Hostile, 5 (note)Wryneck, H .M .A .S ., A .A . destroyer, 37, 49 ; A pp. G

York, H .M .S., cruiser, 37, 40, 41, 42, 49 ; A pp. G

Zante, island west o f Morea, air patrols off, Opn. M .A .5, 4 ; M ed. Fleet concentrates, 7, 8 ;air patrols, Opn. M.B.8, 39

Zara, Italian cruiser, 4 (note) ; Apps. A , H Zeeland, M .V ., Convoy M .S. 1, 3 (note)Zone time, 3 (note), 26 (note), 40 (note), 53 (note)Zuara, Tripolitania, Italian S/M s off, 4

35"

\ PLAN I

OPERATION “M.A.5” MOVEMENTS OF

BRITISH AND ITALIAN FLEETS, 7th-9th JULY 1940

LC . Colonne

^ To Taranto Q 360° 100 miles

1125/9 . 1700/9

A C T IO N SEE PLA N S

2 BS 5 C R \ 1105/9

(Eagle A/C)Taormina

0001/8 45/9Eagle’s striking force flown offj:4-6in. C R

v 4 D R .Catania

Augusta

Syracuse2 BS 4 C R 10 DR 0732/b (F/B.L5807) Fleet Concentrates

^ 1 . 0600/9

0440/9 u • s,Eagle flies off V y . Dawn Search

C. Passero D v1400/10

KitheraMalta Channel

Malta (515/8 PI oenix 2 E 4 D R

015/8(Phenlx)

ScarpantoSuda BayItalian est.

posn. British 0600/9

1805/8̂ 5^ 1625/8 ^— ^

¿ O .1837/8 143! 'J V . I 8 I 5 / 8 14*

Italian “presumed” * 0positions British ----Forces 2000/7

Gloucester hit

®X) 1500/8 Ras el Hilal2 BS 6 C R 7 D R 1500/8 (F/B. L5803)

DernaRas el Tin Hasty attacks S/M

k 2339/7

Convoys arr:

I60 0 ) b /7 1900 ] 8/7 Benghazi

Tobruk

Bardia

Es Solium

Mersa Matruh

Alexandria

PLAN 3ACTION OFF CALABRIA, 9th JULY 1940

PHASE I : 1514- 1536Tim e, Z o n e m inus 2 M ovem ents approxim ate

British m ovem ents are based on reports and plans in M 05369/41

Italian m ovem ents based on plan in Italian official history.

Sym bo ls closed g g shew posns. at 1514

.. „ 1536open □

W arspite

1514 Malaya

Royal Sovereign

1536

Malaya and 3rd Des. div. o rdered to 1514

join W arspite « *_ Royal Sovereign

Malaya

000°

A

2 nd and 10th

D.F S.

E. d i Savoia D uca d ’Aosta

Attendo! 0 M ontecuccoli

Scale: Sea miles

10 15 20H

1514

15° E. 19° 22« 23« 24« 25" 27« 28« 29« 30° E.

37«

Taorm ina,-/ ' ------- C, Spartivcnto

51 « 11 y / °rCatania^

F.A.A. attack 10/7Augusta‘S '

Syracuse c

Malta Channel

Zante

PLAN 5

OPERATION “M.A.5” MOVEMENTS OF CONVOYS M.F.I, M.S.I,

AND COVERING FORCES,10th -15th JULY 1940

Time», Zone Minus 2 : All positions a id movements are approximate

KeyMovements of Covering Forces shewn in Red » Convoys in Black

Ship symbols, open I D A ) positions at 1200, 11th July Ship symbols, closed ( H ) positions at 1200, 12th July

Cruisers (Vice Adml. Tovey) while detached from C.-in-C................

<0

Warspite, Force B, (C.-in-C.)....................................... .... ...........

Force C (Rear Adml. Pridham-Wippell)............................... 1,1Convoy M .S.I..... ... . ....... Convoy M .F.I....... — — — —

Tracks of 3rd C.S and R»mlllies not shewn

<n, Italian A ir Attacks

M.F.I sailed 2300/9 M.S.I sailed 2100/10

MaltJ^ ~2140/10

Fleet Cruising 10th July

oR.V.

0800 11/7

„ 1200/10

34°

Kithera ?

Antikithera^b

V ' Ì <x-000/". q OOOI/12

M.F.I N .- _ ^ J Ä 3 0 / I I N _

Gloucester®*' ^ joins M.F.I ^ >.

V Scarpanto

Force C 1200/12,%.

2000/11 ^S * 1110/12 ' ^

M . S . l "

0001/12 ¿200/12

& Gavdo

R.V. 1000/13 • x * \ /^3rd C.S. M.S.I

7th C.S. 0700/12

Sydney, Liverpool>' X---- X--XV

0800/14

>Ras el Tin

Gloucester"

Gulf of Sirte

Sirte

2000/12 __

> v ^ - -- ' "° Ò 0 0 I/ I3

0140/13M.F.I

1200/12 - " - O l ____ - ■ I

\ ^ I1800 13 — Times of arrivai Y

C.-in-C. in Warspite, 7th C.S........... 0600, 13/7

Convoy M.F.I .............................. 0900, 13/7

ForceC ..................................... 0815,14/7

Mersa M it rü h > Convoy M.S.I. 3rd C.S.. Ramillies .....0900, 15/7

37«

36»

35»

34»

33«

32°

Alexandria

14° 15° E. 16° 17° 18° 20° 22 ° 23° 25° 26° 27° 28° 29° 30° E.

Kisamo BayTheodora

36°N.

30'

24 °E.

36°N.

30'

24 ° E.

ACTION OFF CAPE SPADA,19th JULY 1940

Com piled from plans by H.M. Ships Sydney and Hyperion (M. 020932/40) Time, Z one minus 2 : M ovem ents are approxim ate

KEYBritish m ovem ents, Black and Red : Italian, Blue Ship sym bols closed posns., 0829 (Sydney open fire

„ „ open ( o o > ) „ 1000Track o f 2nd D.F. ru n to N .E . (0715 — 0833) ------------------

„ .................................S .W . (0833 — 1 0 0 0 ) --------------------,, „ Sydney .......„ „ Banc/e Nere and Colleoni -----------

H.M.S. Sydney's estim ated posn. o f sinking o f Colleoni ® Z O.F..........................Open fire C.F.......................... Cease fire

08 15 Sydney, Havock

082G Sights enem y _ j0 8 2 9 O pen firer —/

Y

PLAN 6

A ntik ith era 45Sm oke

CFÜ9J I Havock joined Flotilla

Smoke

09 10/perion, Ilex fire torped oes

Colleoni

" 0915, Ilex, Havock

rescuing/Survivors

Giovanni della Bande Nere, Bartolomeo Colleoni

C. Spada

0945’C V .Agria Grabusa

_ rtC .B usa

Canea Bay

0 1000 10 Hero . * Hasty

C. Rondinella

Carducci TarantoSeaplane Base

Oriani

Gioberti

GoriziaPt. Lo Scanno

Littorio

V. Veneto

Balena

Cavour

> Floating Dock

Trieste „ ,__ Bolzano

“ « t r o f ie

D ock '' ^ under construction

v - Ä . T

/|N / | \

/|N /|N \ 'S

C. San Vito

PLAN 7

M a r

L 4R L4C

^j|j) San P ie tro ^oOO

0 D r ^ l v L4A

*

^ .......... ^Iso le tto San P aolo '*».

®®

Key (¡Ji

A p p ro x . tra c k s o f T o rp e d o A/C., F irst a tta c k

A p p ro x . tra c k s o f T o rp e d o A/C., Secon d a t t a c k ________

A p p ro x . tra c k s o f T o rp e d o A/C., lo s t (Italian so u rces)

A irc ra f t sh o t d ow n ____________ _________ ___ _______ __ ■— ^

T o rp e d o a irc ra ft, d ro p p in g p o sitio n s ____________________ © . . 2 e tc . ©

B om bing a irc ra ft, d ro p p in g p o sitio n s ______________________ ( jD 12, 13 e tc . ©\ l / _\l/_

F l a r e s ------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------- -----------------/ j \

T o rp e d o ex p lo s io n s _ _ _ _ ______________________________________ * *

B arrag e b a lloon s _______________________________________________________ ________j f *

A n ti- to rp e d o n e t s ___ ________ ___ _________ _____ _____ _____ X X X X X X X

A /A G u n s _ _ _ _ _ ---------------------- -------- -------- ---- -------- ---------------- -----------

0 10 00 yd s. I 2

1 i I i T - I I I i I 1 " 1

Moon, 2300 Altitude 52°

Oil Storage Depot

AIR ATTACK ON ITALIAN FLEET AT TARANTO, I Ith NOVEMBER 1940

BY T.S.R. AIRCRAFT OF 813, 815, 819 AND 824 SQUADRONS, FLEET AIR ARM OF H.M. SHIPS “ILLUSTRIOUS” AND “EAGLE"

STRAIT OF OTRANTO

RAID ON ITALIAN CONVOY, 12th NOVEMBER 1940(From Plan in M 06480/41)

Tim e, Zo n e m inus 2

M ovem ents approxim ate : B r itish -Red, Italians-Blue

Ship sym bo ls shewn posns. at tim e o f s igh tin g (01 IS )

0150¿0-..

q 0 I5 0 , S ligh tly damaged

2

PLAN

40° 30'

C.B.H. 22724

6°30'E.

6°30'E. 7°E. 8°E. 9°E. IO°E. I l°E.

PLAN 101320 / Y 3rd Div. Cruisers

f *

1140 "Eastern" Group 1st Div.Pola Fiume Gorizzia 9th Flot.

1140 'W estern " Group 3rd Div.Trieste Trento •Bolzano 12th Flot.

1320 Battleships

000°

A

1140. Manchester

Sheffield Southampton

1140 Faulknor *

Firedrake S ' 1150 Forester

Fury encounter

.<71320 Ark Royal

Force D

BerwickRamilliesNewcastleGreyhoundDefenderHerewardDiamondGallant

1000 \

ACTION OFF CAPE SPARTIVENTO, SARDINIA 27th NOVEMBER 1940

Times, Zone minus 2: Movements are approximate

Note .— British movements (Red) are based on plan in M 0 2 4 148/40 Italian movements (Blue) from plan in Italian Official History

Key

Ship symbols closed 0 ^ . shew positions at 1220 (open fire)

Ship symbols open f~^> shew positions at 1320

Track of H.M.S. R e n o w n ......................

Ram illies....... ............... * * —

Ark R o y a l ....... ..................... •••••

M anchester_________________________

Force "D ” (before junction)---- ----------------------

Italian Battleships _______________

Cruisers, 1st D iv ._________ ____________

3rd Div. _________ ____________

D e stro ye rs_______________ ____________

•1220Renown 1140.

<v

wW ind S.E.,Tjt Force 3 - 4

10 15 20 25

.... r— r i i i r i i iScale: Sea miles

.-•r

C.B.H. 22724

ÄSsWk

-t « fe s ,

S^MIIÉ i

Hs® - , . *:

I .t v «s»<- , «s|w |g*%y:

Sf";

RESTRICTED