Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany. The different level of influence of parliaments.

ISSN 2192-6921 Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence Volume No 13

Edition 2/2012

Main TopicForces development in the EU and NATO

For a more dynamic and safer EuropeVilly Søvndal, Foreign Minister, Kopenhagen

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Croatia – the 28th

EU-Member StateDr Vesna Pusic, Minister for Foreignand European Affairs, Zagreb

Global Player in Security

Is Europe powerful enough tomaster armed conflicts?

ImpressumThe European − Security and Defence UnionProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

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Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, BrusselsDeputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: [email protected] House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbHPresident ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe ProllLayout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbHPrint: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch GladbachThe European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPressPublishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress onEuropean Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congressand the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.comSuscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription)

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Under pressure from the EU to engage in reforms as a condi-

tion for its accession to the Union, Turkey has made consider-

able progress in the fields of democracy and human rights.

Indeed, over the last decade it has developed its democratic

system. That is an achievement on the part of its young and

dynamic population, but also on the part of the EU, which

must continue to insist on reform: for unfortunately there is

still room for improvement.

Although Prime Minister Erdogan was able during his second

term of office to peacefully break the Turkish military’s hold on

the country, since his sweeping election victory last year he no

longer appears unduly concerned about the conditions laid

down by the EU. His party is extending its influence to a

growing number of areas and increasingly this ultra-successful

prime minister himself is showing a propensity for more

authoritarian forms of action: criticism is no longer welcome. Is

Turkey distancing itself from the EU criteria?

Turkey was recognised as a candidate country in Helsinki in

1999 and the accession talks began in 2005, although thus far

they have delivered little in the way of results. There can be no

doubt that the Cyprus issue weighs heavily on the negotia-

tions, but what worries me is that Europe’s dealings with

Turkey continue to follow the same old pattern, as though

nothing in the world had changed.

Yet in the meantime Turkey has become a success story in its

own right, with a flourishing economy, and Mr Erdogan is

seeking and finding a new geopolitical and geostrategic role

for Turkey in this region fraught with

conflict. Moreover he has NATO’s numeri-

cally strongest armed forces to rely on for

that purpose. The fact alone that last

April’s talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions

took place in Istanbul, where Turkey

played host not only to the EU, but also

to China, Russia and the US, speaks

volumes about the country’s new politi-

cal role in the region. This positioning by Turkey shows that it

has developed into Iran’s main competitor in the striving to

become the leading regional power. So does it really need to

continue down the road towards Europe, where attitudes to it

anyway blow hot and cold with the vagaries of national poli-

tics?

The answer is that Turkey needs Europe, even if with its high

growth rates it is economically better off than many EU mem-

ber states. Europe is its biggest partner in the fields of trade

and technology. But Europe too needs Turkey, and not just to

provide it with geostrategic backing vis-à-vis the Arab world.

If Europe wishes to keep exerting “pressure” for still more

democratic change in Turkey, then it must take account of the

country’s new positioning and the accession talks must pro-

duce some tangible interim results at least that give indica-

tions where additional progress is indispensable. The opportu-

nity must be grasped now: the EU should not wait so long that

it will one day have to beg Turkey to join the Union, only then

it will be on terms that are no longer defined by the EU.

3

EDITORIAL

Hartmut Bühl

Turkey – still waiting in Europe’s anteroom

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

3 Editorial Hartmut Bühl

The European Union

7 Villy Søvndal, Kopenhagen The EU's conflict prevention and crisis response Plead for a dynamic and safe Europe

8 Dr Vesna Pusic, Zagreb 28th Member State of the European Union Croatia –a veritable engagement for Europe

The European External Action Service (EEAS) one year on10 Maciej Popowski, Brussels A view from the inside On the way to an authentic European diplomatic service

13 Documentation A view from the European Parliament 14 Christoph Raab, Brussels Between a rock and a hard place? How to run a complicated organisation

European Security and Defence Policy16 Robert Walter MP, London European Defence Policy on a post-Sarkozy continent A certain inconsistency is to be observe

18 Delphine Deschaux-Beaume, Grenoble Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany The different level of influence of parliaments

Defence and Security20 Dr Klaus Wittmann, Berlin “Pooling and Sharing” must be pragmatic and conceptual The decisive factor is common requirements

22 Christoph Nick, Brussels The lack of will to be a greater power The unconcern of the population

23 Geoffrey Van Orden MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg The EU’s CSDP is a misguided irrelevance The transatlantic element is decisive for Europe

NATO

25 Gábor Iklódy, Brussels Crisis management – coping with asymmetric threats NATO is in first place a military alliance

29 General (ret) Harald Kujat, Berlin The credibility of NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan’s future A transition strategy is needed

31 Dr Merle Missoweit, Euskirchen Long-term strategic partnerships in defence National sovereignty will lose its importance

4

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

POLICY and POLITICS

Maciej PopowskiDeputy Secretary General, EEAS, Brussels

Gábor IklódyNATO’s Assistant Secretary General forEmerging Security Challenges, Brussels

50 Gerd Hexels, Erkrath Police forces: personal protection during crisis- management operations The human factor is essential

52 Arnaud de Péchy, Kreuzlingen The future of versatile platforms The real driver is reducing the life cycle cost

54 Hartmut Bühl, Brussels CBRN – The stockpiling of antidotes Anticipating needs following the release of toxic chemicals

Maritime security

56 Maria Eleni Koppa MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg “Yes” to a robust EU counter-piracy strategy Some fear of militarisation

57 Dr Michael Stehr, Bonn Piracy off the Horn of Africa – 2012 Pirates continue going strong

Institutions

60 Organisation chart – EEAS-Organisation

Conferences Report 32 ESRT-Cyber-conference in Washington

33 AFCEA – special aspect of Cyber Defence Prague

34 Michael Eberhardt, Böblingen IT- Security is more than technology The human factor is part of the system

37 Stefan Dopp, Ralf Otten und Christina Janzen-Wolf, Bonn Serco goes green and mobile Reduce the dependency of fossil fuel need

39 Martin Stoussavljewitsch, Brussels Renewable energy and military More than avision

Crisis management forces

Forces development41 Jürgen Bornemann / Ton van Osch, Brussels Forces Development – synergy in EU and NATO Creating synergies

44 Janusz Zakrecki, Warsaw Helicopters in Crisis Management Manage the flight

Protection47 General Fulgencio Coll Bucher, Madrid Protection in operations – an integrative approach Sound personal protection is a prerequisite

5

CONTENT

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Michael EberhardtVice President and General Manager, Enterprise Services Germany, Hewlett-Packard, Böblingen

General Fulgencio Coll BucherChief of the General Staff of the Spanish Army,Madrid

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Crisis around Europe make it nessesary for the EU to be a comprehensive crisis-management player

The EU's conflict prevention and crisis responseby Villy Søvndal, Foreign Minister of Denmark, Copenhagen

The trends in new crises underline the need for the EU to act

as a comprehensive crisis management player. We simply

cannot afford the risk of using limited resources on uncoordi-

nated activities. We must do better with less. The Horn of

Africa, the Sahel region and South Sudan are all conflict ridden

areas where the EU is making use of its wide range of instru-

ments in coordination with local and international stakehold-

ers. Three new possible CSDP missions are among the many

EU tools in these regions. They cannot function in isolation

from political and development efforts of other EU agencies or

cooperation with international partners. A very important

development in the EU’s approach is the formulation of over-

all, regional political strategies acting as a unifying framework

for the efforts.

We have come some of the way but there is still a lot of work

to be done. We must continue to improve our efforts to be-

come even better at applying the comprehensive approach.

Giving power to the EEASOne of the main goals of the Danish Presidency of the Council

of the European Union has been to support the implementa-

tion of the Lisbon Treaty and with it the establishment of a

strong and resourceful EEAS. The economic crisis highlights

the need to improve the EU’s efficiency. We need to be better

at acting as “One” EU, across institutions and instruments,

and must always adapt our response to the actual situation at

hand. The strength of the EU lies in the variety of tools in our

tool box. But we must improve the ways in which we use them,

making them complement each other to create a sum that is

greater than the parts. That is what the comprehensive ap-

proach is all about.

The EU has possibilities that individual states – and most

other international organisations – do not have on a similar

scale. The EU has great diplomatic capacity spearheaded by

the EEAS, a significant economic size, strong multilateral

contacts by the Commission, the possibility of deploying both

military and civilian capabilities, just as the EU is the world’s

largest donor of development assistance.

To apply the comprehensive approachIn February, I hosted a conference in Brussels on the Compre-

hensive EU Approach to Crises. The purpose was not only to

7

Villy Søvndal speaking in the EP Source: European Parliament

The European UnionThe European Union has demonstrated that it has the political, civil- and with certain limitations- the mili-tary capabilities to contribute to the settlement of conflicts, and that it is co-operable with internationalorganisations such as the UNO and NATO as a solid partner for peace keeping, crisis prevention, crisis andhumanitarian aid management.

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The Croatian citizens voted “yes” for Croatian EU membership

on the referendum held on January 22nd this year. Following

the ratification of the Accession Treaty in all Member States,

Croatia will become the 28th Member State on July 1st 2013.

The Commission’s Monitoring Report, issued on April 24th,

confirms that Croatia is maintaining a steady course towards EU

membership, and will hopefully serve as an additional impetus

for the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Croatian

Accession Treaty in a timely manner.

A long and challenging processSpanning a decade, the process of Croatia’s EU accession was

long and, at times, challenging; we had negotiated in more

chapters than any previous EU candidate country and according

to criteria stricter than ever. However, the resulting benefits for

our society are invaluable. The perspective of membership was

a strong driving force which accelerated adoption and imple-

mentation of numerous reforms in Croatia in the past years.

The reforms implemented as a part of the harmonisation with

the acquis communautaire have led to the better functioning

institutions, guaranteeing Croatian citizens higher standards of

living. Croatia’s EU membership is, therefore, the logical follow-

up to the overall political, institutional and economic transfor-

mation of the country. The EU integration was for Croatia, in

fact, a process of state building. The process of reforms in line

with high international standards is an unprecedented experi-

ence that Croatia is ready to share with all the countries which

have a perspective of joining the EU, as well as with all the

others countries which may benefit from similar reforms or are

witnessing substantial changes in their societies.

identify areas where the EU could improve coordination of our

efforts, but also to focus on an intensified dialogue with other

international organisations. During the conference, the High

Representative Catherine Ashton outlined the important steps

taken in the EEAS towards achieving this common goal, but

also highlighted that the EU needs to be more comprehensive

in the use of its instruments as well as in its approach to

international partnerships.

The need is clear: The demand for civilian CSDP missions in

particular is on the rise, but resources to staff and funds for

them are becoming scarcer across Member States. At the same

time, our political visions for integrating CSDP missions with

other strategic efforts of the EU have become more ambitious.

The synergies between our EU tools are many. We simply

cannot afford the risk of using limited resources on uncoordi-

nated activities. We must do better with less. Building on com -

prehensive regional strategies, the EEAS and Member States

are preparing for three new possible CSDP missions; counter-

ing piracy through maritime capacity building in the Horn of

Africa, improving security in the Sahel region through capacity-

building of the security sector in Niger, and strengthening

border control in South Sudan through support to the Juba

Airport. The missions will have to have a comprehensive

approach, coordinating all the tools of the EU.

The EU needs strategic partnershipsThe aspect of coordination with international partners is vital

to fully achieve the ambitions of a comprehensive EU ap-

proach. In responding to crises, the EU will be one among

several international partners. We need to work strategically

alongside the UN, NATO, OSCE, African Union, Arab League,

and other strategic partners – in better defining our respective

comparative advantages and homing in on the most optimal

division of labour between us in the crisis cycle. We also need

to coordinate amongst ourselves. Since the ratification of the

Lisbon Treaty, we have systematically strengthened the coop-

eration between our national embassies and the EU delega-

tions, just as the cooperation between the different EU institu-

tions have improved. This increases our political weight and

possibilities for action considerably.

The way aheadIn the near future, with continued developments of new

threats and security challenges, we must deliver on our high

ambitions to further fulfil the potential of the EU as a compre-

hensive crisis-management player. This is a shared responsi-

bility between the EEAS, the Commission and not least the 28

Member States. Denmark looks forward to continuing the

good cooperation to achieve our common goals.

Croatia is bringing added values to the European Union

28th Member State of the by Dr. Vesna Pusic, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Zagr

8


Dr Vesna Pusic Vesna Pusic is Minister of Foreign and EuropeanAffairs of Croatia. She is also Vice-president ofCroatian People’s Party Liberal Democrats andserved twice as its President. She graduatedfrom the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Philoso-phy, where she also earned her doctorate inSociology. From 1976 till 1978 she worked on a

research project on industrial democracy in 12 countries at the Institutefor Sociology in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Since 1978 she has been employed at the Department for Sociology ofthe Faculty of Philosophy, where she became full professor in 1988.Elected to the Croatian Parliament in 2000, Vesna Pusic was DeputySpeaker from 2003-2007 and Chairperson of the National Committee forMonitoring EU Accession Negotiations (2008-2011).

9

The European Union

European Unionreb

Stabilising the region of South-Eastern Europe (SEE)Croatia’s role in stabilising the region of SEE through the

transfer of EU reforms’ know-how is its main added value in the

EU institutions. Preparing for the European Union membership

is in fact a process of stabilization and state building for the

entire region of SEE. By assuming a crucial role in stabilising

South-Eastern Europe, Croatia will perform an important, both

regional and European task. This position makes the region an

added value for Croatia in the EU and vice versa. However, the

know-how from European reforms is suitable for institution

building in any country, holding particular benefits for post

conflict societies. Therefore, this know-how could prove to be a

valuable tool for institution building in the countries of South-

ern Mediterranean. Croatia can make a significant contribution

to EU Foreign and Security Policy by developing partnerships

with those countries, aimed at the transfer of its EU know-how.

Having this goal in mind, the Croatian Government decided to

entitle the 2012 Croatia Summit “EU Experience and the State

Building”. Leaders and think-tanks from across Europe and

beyond will discuss the potential benefits of EU reforms’ know-

how for peace-building and institution building in the countries

of South-Eastern Europe and Southern Mediterranean.

Knowledge of conflict resolution and managementThe knowledge of conflict resolution and management ac-

quired as a consequence of the Homeland war is our added

value for sharing the responsibility in maintaining international

security, with our current contribution to 13 UN, NATO and EU

missions on four continents. Since our active engagement

within the CSDP in 2007, Croatia is participating in the EU led

missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and off the coast of Somalia,

and supporting the development of EU Battle Groups.

In all these efforts, Croatia is establishing itself as a credible

partner and stability anchor, whether in its endeavours in

South East Europe, Southern Mediterranean, or elsewhere in

the world. Through various facets of its foreign policy, geopolit-

ical context and willingness to actively partake in international

efforts, Croatia will add to a stronger voice of Europe in the

global arena. Throughout the process of EU accession we were

guided by common EU values – freedom, solidarity, justice and

the rule of law, tolerance, the right to equal chance for success

and happiness, to name just a few. This set of values induces

an on-going progress, constantly pushing the institutional

development forward, both in new and old EU Member States.

In the face of current challenges in Europe, it is more important

than ever to safeguard these values and Croatia is dedicated to

actively fulfilling and strengthening them.

Any evaluation of the European External Action Service, one

and a half years after it was set up, should start by recalling

the aims of those who framed the EEAS in the Lisbon Treaty.

Their aim was to build a service, under the leadership of the

High Representative, to pursue Europe’s interests in the world,

to help make EU foreign policy more coherent, to provide

continuity in external representation.

While the Lisbon Treaty provides for the legal basis, many of

the basic parameters of the EEAS required further work when it

came to effectively creating the service. Teams had to be

merged, new staff recruited, a budget prepared.

Beyond that, 2011 was a challenging year in many ways. The

political and economic conditions were hardly the ideal back-

drop for launching a new service: 2011 was marked by the

eruption of the Arab spring and the euro zone crisis.

Yet, as Catherine Ashton has set out in her December 2011

report on the EEAS, much has been achieved already.

The new Service is ensuring coherence First, on coherence: the High Representative has taken over

the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Council from the

rotating Presidency; she represents the European Union

externally and is also the Vice President of the Commission.

The EEAS supports her in all these tasks. As part of this, the

service chairs the Political and Security Committee and more

than 20 other working groups.

The EEAS also prepares and conducts political dialogue meet-

ings with third states at all levels. EU Heads of Delegations

chair meetings of Member States’ Embassies and represent

the EU locally. At the same time the EEAS ensures coherence

with the activities of the Commission through the program-

ming of EU assistance as well as in the inter-service consulta-

tions that precede of the commission decisions.

Ensuring coherence was always the key rationale behind the

creation of the EEAS: the revamped European Neighbourhood

Policy, the creation of a Crisis Management Board and ad hoc

Crisis Platforms to function as coordinating platforms in times

of crisis are examples.

Integration of CSDP structures into the EEASThe integration of the Common Security and Defence Policy

(CSDP) structures into the EEAS serves this goal of coherence.

The EU is currently deploying over 5000 personnel in twelve

missions and operations across the globe. European women

and men are supporting the rule of law (Kosovo), training and

mentoring police and judiciary (Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestinian

Territories), monitoring a peace plan (Georgia), supporting

security sector reform (Democratic Republic of Congo), training

armed forces (Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and fighting

piracy in the Horn of Africa.

We are starting to help improve the security situation in the

Sahel and South Sudan: by this summer the EU will be running

a total of fifteen missions and operations. These missions and

operations are a tool in the overall EU toolbox, and need to be

part of a global strategy. The EU’s action in the Horn of Africa

is emerging as a good example of such a comprehensive

approach. To further reinforce the comprehensive approach

within the EEAS, the departments dealing with security policy,

conflict prevention and non-proliferation have been function-

ally linked with the CSDP structures.

More continuity for CFSPSecond, the EEAS has brought more continuity to Common

Foreign and Security Policy. It is worth highlighting two quali-

tative changes relative to the rotating Presidency system:

continuity within the EU, with High Representative Ashton as

the permanent Chair of the FAC. And external continuity, when

it comes to dealing with third countries and most importantly

with the strategic partners.

Internally, six-monthly presidencies priorities are now replaced

The EEAS is organized to ensure the coherence of the EU external action

The European External Action Service – a view from the insideby Maciej Popowski, Deputy Secretary General, EEAS, Brussels

10

Maciej PopowskiMaciej Popowski is Deputy Secretary General ofthe External Action Service (EAS). He was born in1964. He studied German and Dutch languageand literature at the University of Wroclaw andparticipated in the Postgraduate Foreign ServiceTraining at the Polish Institute for InternationalAffairs in Warsaw (March-June 1991) and at the

Auswärtigen Amt in Bonn 1991/1992. Maciej Popowski joined the Polish diplomatic service in 1991. Hisprevious posts include: Director of the Department of the EuropeanUnion, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw (2000-2001), Ambassador,Representative of Poland to the Political and Security Committee of theEU, Deputy Head of Mission (2003-2008) and Director, DG Development,European Commission (2008-2009). Before taking up his current post,he was Head of Cabinet for the President of the European Parliament,Jerzy Buzek.


by long-term actions translating European overall objectives.

The EEAS can focus on the Southern (response to Arab Spring)

and Eastern neighbourhood (Eastern Partnership Summit) at

the same time. Externally, we have now the capacity to build

relationships with interlocutors on the long-term.

Continuity, predictability and effectiveness are a fundamental

pre-condition for achieving results in our strategic partner-

ships. The EEAS is becoming a more reliable interlocutor

towards third countries precisely by ensuring continuity of

interlocutors and policies. For instance, the High Representa-

tive has developed a close working relationship with Secretary

of State Hilary Clinton, allowing the EU and the US to increas-

ingly work hand in hand on a number of important dossiers –

the Western Balkans, the Iran nuclear issue, Belarus, the Horn

of Africa, the Middle East peace process.

Finally, the EEAS is a service provider. We are working hard to

ensure that Member States feel ownership of the EEAS, and

that the European Parliament and Commissioners are properly

and timely briefed. Fiscal austerity is providing an opportunity

to work with Member States to further enhance the role of EU

Delegations. We have established an ongoing dialogue with

Member States through the Secretaries-General of the Foreign

Ministries, focused on how to better implement cooperation.

As an example, Luxembourg is opening an Embassy in Addis

Abeba, to be co-located with the EU Delegation.

The creation of the EEAS – a long-term challengeSo while we can look back with a certain satisfaction to the

first year, many challenges remain. We need to work on im-

proving communication, quick response, the sense of owner-

ship by Member States, developing an esprit de corps. The

EEAS still faces some working conditions constraints, some of

a very operational nature such as the absence of a protocol

service or conference organisation team and a continuing

structural deficit of staff and other resources.

The creation of the EEAS is a long-term challenge that will take

several years to reach maturity. It is obviously too soon to

make definitive judgements. Among the priority areas for

future work, Catherine Ashton has identified consolidating the

capacity to deliver policy substance; an enhanced emphasis

on the work of the EU delegations as the front-line presence of

the EU’s external action, and progress in building a shared

organisation culture. The breath and geographical spread of

the activities of the EEAS is very wide. Many go beyond the

boundaries of traditional diplomacy, drawing more and more

on policies managed at EU level with an important external

dimension, including global financial regulation, climate

change and energy security, migration and poverty reduction,

non-proliferation and disarmament, the fight against terrorism,

the promotion of human rights and democracy. These are all

areas where the EEAS can promote the potential for the EU to

add value through the coherent use of national and EU policy

instruments, working closely with the Commission services

and the Member States.

11

The European Union

Documentation

One year after the creation of the European External ActionService (EEAS), High Representative Catherine Ashton issued aReport in December 2011 assessing the record of the service overthe past 12 months and identifying the challenges it might face inthe future. Ashton identified four priorities for the future of herservice. She expects to consolidate the “capacity to deliver policysubstance,” increase “the emphasis on the work of the EUdelegations,” work on “building a shared organisational culture”and resolve “the outstanding issues in the relationship with theCommission”.> The Report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/7wq9cbl

Report from the High Representative on the EEAS

High Representative Catherine Ashton in Baghdad, meeting with Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi Prime Minister, before the Iran talks (23/05/2012).Source:European Commission, Audiovisual service

13

The European Union

Documentation

The European Parliament “(…) Calls for the further development ofan appropriate mechanism in the EEAS,with the participation of the relevantCommission services, where geographicand thematic expertise are integratedand drive a comprehensive approach topolicy planning, formulation and imple-mentation;

Recognises the essential role of theEEAS (including its Delegations and EUSpecial Representatives) in assisting theHR/VP in pursuing a more strategic,coherent and consistent political approach to the Union’s externalaction; affirms its intention to continue monitoring the geographicand gender balance of staff in the EEAS, including in senior positions,and to assess whether the appointment of Member State diplomatsas Heads of Delegation is in the interests of the Union, not of Mem-ber States; stresses the importance of strengthening relationsbetween the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States with aview to achieving synergies in the effective implementation ofexternal action and in delivering a single EU message on key politicalissues;

(…) Calls on the HR/VP to come forward with proposals to furtherencourage Member State cooperation under the CFSP, specifically bysetting out a process that will lead to European Council conclusionson Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of security anddefence and guidelines for more systematic use of coalitions of thewilling, such as in the ‘core group’ concept for CSDP missions andoperations, as a means of overcoming the limits of the ‘battlegroup’concept;

(…) Stresses the importance of ensuring coherence between policyplanning, formulation and implementation through an appropriatemix of external financial instruments in the area of foreign affairs;calls among other things for continued complementary between theCFSP and the Instrument for Stability in the areas of mediation,conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace-build-ing, as well as for further work towards complementarity with thegeographical instruments for long-term engagement with a country

or region; welcomes the innovativeintroduction of a new PartnershipsInstrument which brings importantadded value to the EU’s CFSP byproviding a financial framework forcooperation with the EU’s StrategicPartners and in the follow-up to impor-tant international summits;

(…) Reiterates its call for the HR/VP, theCouncil and the Member States toovercome the imbalance betweencivilian and military planning capabili-ties in the EEAS and the generaldifficulty in achieving staffing require-

ments for CSDP missions and operations, in particular for staff in thefields of justice, civilian administration, customs and mediation, soas to ensure that adequate and sufficient expertise can be providedfor CSDP missions; calls for the HR/VP to come forward with specificproposals for making up these staffing shortages, in particular in thearea of civilian crisis management and the sectors described above;

Calls for the HR/VP to put forward proposals for boosting the capaci-ties of the EEAS on conflict prevention and peace-building, withparticular reference to the Gothenburg Programme, and to furtherexpand the EU’s capacity to prevent conflict and provide mediationcapacities alongside its better-resourced crisis management capaci-ties; calls as a matter of priority for stock to be taken of EU policies inthe area of conflict prevention and peace-building with a view to theHR/VP reporting back to Parliament on proposals for strengtheningthe Union’s external capacity and responsiveness in this area; (…)

(Excerpts) Draft Report on the Annual Report from the Council to theEuropean Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy,29 May 2012, Rapporteur: Elmar Brok MEP

> The full version of Elmar Brok’s draft report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/csjfsnh

The EEAS – a view from the European Parliament(Edit/nc) In May 2012, the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) issued a draft report assessing the 2010 Council AnnualReport on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Rapporteur for the Parliament’s draft report, AFET Committee Chairman, Elmar Brok, critizised in his draft report that the Council’sAnnual Report is not giving a sense of priorities or strategic guidelines for the CFSP and is avoiding important questions on the role of theEEAS and the Delegations in ensuring that the Union’s resources (personnel, financial and diplomatic) are aligned with its foreign affairspriorities. The draft report recognises the essential role of the EEAS (including its Delegations and EU Special Representatives) in assistingthe HR/VP in pursuing a more strategic, coherent and consistent political approach to the Union’s external action. It stresses the importanceof strengthening relations between the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States with a view to achieving synergies in the effectiveimplementation of external action and in delivering a single EU message on key political issues.

Mr Brok’s Report will be voted in the AFET Committee on 2 July and in Plenary Session in September 2012.

Rapporteur Elmar Brok MEP Source: European Parliament

How to run a complicated organisation

The European External Actiby Christoph Raab, Chairman of the European Security Round Table

Congress on European Security and Defence

Berlin Security ConferenceBSC

Europe and its neighbours –

common responsibilityfor a stable continent

27 – 28 November 2012

andel’s Hotel & Convention CenterLandsberger Allee 106

D - 10369 Berlin, Germany

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The Lisbon Treaty brought with it the historic task of creating

the European External Action Service (EEAS), a new institution

separate from the Commission and the Council designed to

make EU foreign policy action more efficient and effective. That

in itself would have represented a formidable undertaking even

under the best circumstances. However, the circumstances were

not exactly the best and so the newly established institutions

became overloaded with expectations and have so far under-

performed, leading to very negative press about the Service and

its management. A lot of criticism can be put down to the

excitement of the early days. However, there are a number of

issues that reflect more structural underlying failures and which

merit closer analysis.

The right idea - but complicated implementationThe proposal of those who drafted the text of the Lisbon Treaty,

and before that the European Convention, to merge Commission

services, Council staff and national diplomats into one service

was daring, but they certainly had the right idea. At the same

time, it is absolutely clear that bringing at least three different (if

not two plus 27) cultures together necessarily creates friction

and requires periods of adjustment before the full potential of

such a new organisation can unfold.

But to make the task even more complicated, the EEAS and the

conditions that would govern it became, even before its exis-

tence, the subject of a bitter power struggle between the Euro-

pean Parliament and the Member States. It took months of arm-

wrestling before the Parliament negotiators forged a solution

accepted by all sides in a showdown night two years ago in

Madrid. So rather than conceiving the Service from scratch as

would have been most useful and functional, it had to be

established on the basis of constraints imposed by the Parlia-

ment and Member States and serving their interests but not

necessarily those of the EEAS. In the end, the Parliament played

its hand to the full and managed to secure more oversight and

influence over the EEAS than had originally been foreseen;

Elmar Brok, one of the key European Parliament figures in those

negotiations, played a crucial role in that.

The structure There is another factor that made for a less than optimal out-

come when it comes to the structure of the EEAS. The task of

setting up the EEAS was put into hands of people who arguably

may not have been the most qualified in terms of their career

records to fulfil that job. More worrying still as it looks now, is

that this was not a one-time event but rather is an ongoing

14


ion Service – between a rock and a hard place?e (ESRT), Brussels

pattern. It is a pity that while there is a substantial number of

highly qualified people who are trying to do their best every

day, the lack of an efficient structure renders such efforts less

valuable than they could be, which is a major source of frustra-

tion. The frequent changes in the EEAS organisation chart also

indicate a certain lack of a chartered path in the establishment

of the EEAS. A closer look shows that, when it comes down to it,

the EEAS consists of the Council’s old crisis-management

structures and something that bears a lot of resemblance to the

old DG Relex. This seems to be a missed opportunity for creat-

ing genuinely new structures in order to generate synergies and

avoid duplication and friction. One may also wonder whether it

would not make more sense in terms of efficiency, for Agostino

Miozzo, for example, who is responsible for crisis response, to

be part of the crisis-management structures. All in all, taking the

analyses of the organisation chart and performance together,

one gets the strong feeling that the whole EEAS structure is too

people-oriented and too little oriented to issue areas.

It must also be stressed that the EEAS does not have an opera-

tional budget at its disposal. The money sits with the Foreign

Policy Instrument Service, which has been placed under the

High Representative but is part of the European Commission,

which is certainly an odd structure that is difficult to understand

to say the least. More importantly, it puts it under pressure from

several sides that would rather see the financial services inte-

grated into their own structures.

A chanceAll of the abovementioned matters may or may not be ad-

dressed over time, but they are probably manageable. Even if

they are not properly addressed they do not make the EEAS

dysfunctional. We are now entering a period when more and

more studies and assessments of the first phase of the EEAS will

be published. An internal assessment of the Service’s perform-

ance is also coming up on the agenda. This will be an opportuni-

ty to correct some of the glitches of the beginning.

There is, however, one other aspect that raises deeper issues:

National foreign services have certain security cultures that give

them the wherewithal to stand up for the interests of their

respective countries. The European Union is not a state, but

this does not mean that it does not have interests that need to

be formulated and defended in the international arena. Current-

ly, it seems that the Member States are somewhat uneasy about

the character of the EEAS in this regard. Between national

security cultures and the culture of the European Commission,

there is probably no easy answer as to what kind of culture the

EEAS should acquire over time. It would seem that this question

has to be answered in the wider context of the debate on where

the European Union is headed for.

15

The European Union

Christoph RaabChristoph Raab was born on 18 April 1974 inKarlsruhe.He obtained his degree in Economics at theUniversity of Trier. He holds a Master’s degreefrom the College of Europe (Natolin) and is atrained journalist. From 2002-2005, Mr Raab wasPersonal Assistant to Karl von Wogau MEP in the

European Parliament. In November 2005, he founded COPURA, an eventmanagement, consulting and communications company that specialisesin European affairs with a focus on issues of security, defence andresearch policy. In 2009, he transformed the European Security RoundTable (ESRT) into a full-fledged, neutral event platform on EU securityand defence issues. Since then, it has established itself as a key Brusselsdiscussion forum for current and future topics in the field of Europeansecurity and defence policies. He is a regular contributor on EU-Institu-tions issues for “The European − Security and Defence Union”.

Further Information about the magazine: www.magazine-the-european.com

The magazine for European SecurityNovember edition No 14 /3 – 2012

• The EU and Russia• The EU Security and Research Policy• The EU Common Security and Defence Market• Naval power and crisis management

ISSN 2192-6921Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 13

Edition 2/2012

Main TopicForces development in the EU and NATO

For a more dynamic

and safer Europe

Villy Søvndal, Foreign Minister,

Kopenhagen

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Croatia – the 28th

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Dr Vesna Pusic, Minister for Foreign

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Global Player in Security

Is Europe powerful enough to

master armed conflicts?

Release date:November 10th 2012

Deadline for advertisements: October 15th 2012

Doubts about the reliability of allies and plea for deeper cooperation

EU Defence Policy on a post-Sarkozy continentby Robert Walter MP, London

France’s rejoining of NATO’s military structures in 2009 under

Nicolas Sarkozy was in my view a step in the right direction for

European Defence and Security co-operation. However, now

that he has been replaced by the Socialist François Hollande,

will this practice continue?

President Sarkozy’s decision to opt back in to the NATO

military structures after France’s withdrawal in 1966 under

General Charles de Gaulle was ultimately vindicated following

the war in Libya. France and Britain assumed the role of

leadership with America playing more of a supporting role.

With President Obama’s foreign policy appearing to be more

and more wary of global leadership, it is likely in future to fall

to Europe to lead and defend itself.

As Philip Hammond, the British Defence Secretary pointed out

in his speech to the British Embassy in Berlin, the United

States has shifted its strategic posture to meet the challenges

posed by the emergence of China as a world power. In Ham-

mond’s words, this now means that “we, the nations of Eu-

rope, must take on more responsibility for our own back yard.”

However, with British defence capabilities lessened by the cuts

outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, Ger-

many’s leadership left in question after abstaining over Libya

and now with the French President’s promise at the NATO

summit in Chicago this week to withdraw all troops from

Afghanistan by the end of 2012, are the three biggest military

powers in Europe still up to the job? Whether they are or not,

they are going to have to be.

Cooperation to answer transnational threatsThe threats posed to European and global security are increas-

ingly transnational in nature. Since the collapse of the Soviet

Union over 20 years ago there is no great state with which we

sit at the edge of the abyss that is state vs. state war. Conflicts

in the near future are likely to be so-called ‘low-intensity’

16


conflicts involving protracted counterinsurgency, active assis-

tance in state-building and cross-border cooperation. The

enemies of Europe do not stop at frontiers and there is no

reason that the efforts to thwart them should do so either.

The Anglo-French Security and Defence Co-Operation Treaty,

signed on 2nd November 2010 was, at first, an encouraging sign

of defence co-operation. However it may now already be in

jeopardy. The first problem with the operation of the treaty is

political will, something that there was much more of between

Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy

than there is now between Prime Minister Cameron and Presi-

dent Hollande.

Mr. Hollande has outlined his plans to back an “EU army” on

the one hand, whilst also establishing an aggressive position

in his relationship with the United Kingdom, the nation with

the fourth highest defence budget in the world. The second

problem is a technological one. With the British Ministry of

Defence’s recent announcement that it will now be purchasing

the F-35B Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of

the Joint Strike Fighter and will no longer be fitting catapults

and arrestors to its new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier,

it will no longer be possible for France to operate its aircraft

off British carriers.

45% of the defence budget and 50% of the military capacity of

the entire EU is provided by France and the United Kingdom. If

military co-operation between these great nations cannot be

achieved and maintained effectively then what hope is there

for a common European defence effort at all?

French-British co-operation must become realitySo, what must be done to improve co-operation? Firstly, the

political will must be restored to continue co-operation be-

tween France and the United Kingdom, to ensure that the

terms and the intentions behind the Treaty signed in 2010 are

upheld. The politics within and between these countries must

not be allowed to jeopardise or hamper co-operative defence.

Both the President and the Prime Minister need to maintain

the good relations Britain and France had previously on

defence co-operation, even when they were on different sides

of a political debate.

Secondly, the technological issue must be addressed. It is

necessary for both the United Kingdom and France to be able

to operate aircraft off each other’s aircraft carriers. Whilst we

must look at this issue through the far from rose-tinted lens of

our current economic situation, without security economic

growth is a hollow objective. The decision to abandon the

installation of catapults and arrestors on the new Queen

Elizabeth class aircraft carriers was taken partly in light of the

fact that they could not be delivered until 2023 at the earliest,

leaving the United Kingdom without a carrier-strike capability

for an unacceptable length of time. One solution would be to

build one aircraft carrier without catapults and arrestors, likely

to be delivered by 2018 and to build another with them, to be

delivered later. This ensures the long-term possibility of co-

operation without jeopardising the short-term defencibility of

the United Kingdom.

President Hollande – a less cooperative approach?We do not want to create a Fortress Europe and implement a

new isolationism which shuns our allies beyond the continent.

This, if anything, would undermine European security goals.

Nicolas Sarkozy understood this, which is presumably why he

chose to re-engage with the NATO military structures, at the

same time pushing for greater unity of policy within the Euro-

pean Union. Germany has a key role to play here. With one of

the best equipped and best trained militaries, she should be

fully engaged in this project.

Unfortunately, at this critical time, President Hollande appears

to be signalling a neo-Gaullist approach to foreign affairs. He

has adopted an adversarial posture towards the United King-

dom, France’s erstwhile closest military partner; his intention

to withdraw from Afghanistan early would seem to indicate a

less co-operative approach with NATO and his call for a Euro-

pean army would suggest that he does not take Sarkozy’s

position on defence affairs.

Europe has to champion its values abroadTo conclude, with America more concentrated on Asia and less

focused on world leadership, it is time for Europe to come into

its own and champion its values abroad, particularly on its

own door-step in the Middle East and North Africa. The shape

that this will take depends on the approaches taken by Presi-

dent Hollande as the new leader of the militarily crucial France.

We have proven ourselves more than capable of operating

effectively within the NATO structure in Libya. President

Hollande should maintain the healthy military co-operation

between France and the United Kingdom established under

President Sarkozy, and also capitalise on the nascient Weimar

Triangle of France, Germany and Poland. Recent experiences in

Libya show us that multi-lateral co-operation works very well

and presents a real milestone on the road to structured coop-

eration in Europe.

17

The European Union

Robert Walter MPRobert Walter MP has been British Member ofParliament since 1997. He also serves as Chair-man of the European Democrat Group and VicePresident, Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe. Born in 1948, he graduated in1971 from the University of Aston in Birmingham.Before he entered the House of Commons, he

was an international banker and farmer. Mr Walter was President of theEuropean Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU in Paris fromDecember 2003 until June 2011. In 2011 he was elected President of theEuropean Security and Defence Association (EASD).

The use of armed force and its political legitimation are han-

dled differently in each EU Member State. So far the Common

Security and Defence Policy has been unable to bring about

greater convergence among parliamentary practices. The

ideological and practical differences among the national parlia-

ments when it comes to conferring legitimacy on military

operations remain substantial. Yet those missions have be-

come crucial for the credibility of the Common Security and

Defence Policy. That being the case, a comparison of the

respective roles of the German and French Parliaments in the

field of European defence policy should allow a better under-

standing of the challenges confronting this policy area in the

field of democratic scrutiny.

Parliamentary scrutiny of defence in Germany...There is a traditional relationship between the State and the

armed forces in France, while in Germany the approach is more

pragmatic; there, in accordance with ideological principles, the

army is placed under the highest democratic authority, the

Bundestag. Since 1945 Germany has acquired contradictory

constitutional provisions that restrict the deployment of the

Bundeswehr outside NATO territory.

Contradictory constitutional provisions

Indeed, Article 87a of the German Constitution requires consti-

tutional authorisation for the deployment of Germany’s armed

forces outside the national territory, while Article 24 asserts

Germany’s responsibility in the area of collective security,

including in the case of external interventions.

Those conflicting articles are put to the test when it comes to

the resolution of regional conflicts: military operations con-

ducted within the framework of European defence policy clearly

extend beyond the borders of NATO territory. Against the

backdrop of intensive debate in the German Parliament be-

tween the Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats,

the German Federal Constitutional Court finally ruled in 1994

that the participation of German soldiers in out-of-area military

missions conducted under a UN mandate is consistent with

Germany’s 1949 Basic Law, even when those missions entail

the use of force.

A binding instrument for parliamentary scrutiny

Every deployment of German armed forces in an external

operation, be it military or civilian, must be approved by the

Bundestag by a simple majority (Article 87a). Through the

organisation of parliamentary debates on defence matters as

well as by making use of its right to establish at any time a

committee of inquiry in order to question the Chief of Staff of

the armed forces, the Standing Committee on Defence exercis-

es effective scrutiny over the government in this area. Further-

more, the Bundestag elects a Parliamentary Commissioner for

the Armed Forces (Wehrbeauftragter), whose task is to assist

the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary oversight. Moreover

the Wehrbeauftragter represents the German armed forces in

the Bundestag, giving them a direct link with Parliament. In

France no such system exists. In addition, as in all European

democracies, the Bundestag must approve the defence budget

as part of the Federal budget.

… and FranceIn France the army holds a special position within the state

through its link with the supreme political authority: the Presi-

dent of the Republic (while in Germany the Commander in Chief

of the Armed Forces is the Federal Minister of Defence).

A minimum of parliamentary scrutiny

In the event of recourse to the use of armed force, parliamen-

tary scrutiny in France is in no way comparable to that which

exists under the German system. Only the Chairman of the

Assemblée nationale’s Defence Committee and a few members

of his office are entitled to more substantive information. It is

true that Parliament votes the financial acts that determine in

particular the defence budget and the five-year military pro-

gramming law. Thus, until the constitutional reform of July

Deficient parliamentary scrutiny at European Level

Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germanyby Dr Delphine Deschaux-Beaume*, Associated research fellow at PACTE, Grenoble

18


French President François Hollande is the new Chief of the FrenchArmed Forces. Source: Council of the European Union

2008, the only military act requiring authorisation by Parlia-

ment was a declaration of war. New Article 35 of the Constitu-

tion, however, aims at making a vote by Parliament on military

operations the normal procedure. The first historic vote took

place on 21 September 2008 on the occasion of the decision to

extend the French armed forces’ mandate in Afghanistan.

National parliamentary practices and the CSDPThe reason for the problems posed by the democratic scrutiny

of the Common Security and Defence Policy is the lack of a

European security identity. This shortcoming is reflected in the

diversity of procedures for the parliamentary scrutiny of de-

fence questions at national level, scrutiny that ideally should

be backed by a system of oversight at European level, which for

the moment remains largely to be developed.

The Bundestag – an important actor in CSDP

The German Government tends to be strict in its compliance

with the procedures foreseen by the Basic Law for the parlia-

mentary scrutiny of external operations, whether these are

conducted in the framework of the CSDP, the UN or NATO. For a

long time Germany’s politico-military players contented them-

selves with the image that Germany had established for itself

as a civilian power, in particular as of 1998, when Chancellor

Gerhard Schröder defined security in terms of peace policy

(Friedenspolitik). While Germany has understood the impor-

tance of gaining visibility and power at international level,

which European defence policy enables it to do, it must consid-

er one major factor that barely exists in France: the pressure of

public opinion. Much more than in France, the cooperative

federal system facilitates a direct link between the Bundestag

and German citizens, with the result that parliamentary scrutiny

over the government is much more stringent than it is in

France’s semi-presidential system. Moreover, German public

opinion remains relatively wary about the participation of

German troops in combat missions2: in 2005, 43% of respon-

dents took the view that Germany should focus on its own

problems and refrain from intervening in other nations’ crises,

while 34% were in favour of active engagement by Germany in

resolving crises in third countries.

Since the Bundestag must approve all Bundeswehr deploy-

ments and determine the operational mandates in detail, its

decisions are a crucial factor in European military operations.

The intensive parliamentary debate that preceded the launch of

the EUFOR mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in

spring 2006 clearly showed that it takes a long learning process

in order to establish the link between the Common Security and

Defence Policy and parliamentary oversight. On 17 May 2006,

440 Members of the Bundestag approved the deployment of

780 German soldiers in Kinshasa; there were 135 votes against

and six abstentions, predominantly among the members of the

Green Party, the Liberals and the SPD. Notwithstanding the

importance of intensive debate on such a subject, this consti-

tutes a major caveat with regard to the immediate response,

often necessary in the context of the CSDP. The question is how

the requirement for democratic scrutiny of the CSDP can be

reconciled with an effective rapid response.

A tenuous role for the French Parliament in the area of CSDP

Although Article 88.3 gives the National Assembly the right to

examine questions pertaining to the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP), in practice, for each military operation,

the Government has made a case for the need to use urgent

procedures in order to be able to deploy troops rapidly without

any parliamentary debate. The pre-eminent role of the French

President in military affairs makes this possible. Parliament’s

role is made even more tenuous by the broad consensus that

exists on defence questions in France, in contrast to Germany

where the Greens have been particularly active in keeping the

debate on that topic alive. In France, since the 1980’s and

19

The European Union

The sober plenary chamber of the Bundestag (rebuilt in the 1990’s) and the splendid Assemblée Nationale (used as such since the 1830). Thesetwo chambers with their different traditions and practices exert a different degree of influence on national and on European security and defencepolicy. Source: © Deutscher Bundestag, Marc-Steffen Unger, cc Richard Ying/LePost.frt

The principle of pooling and sharing is not new – but it is

“Pooling and Sharing” musby Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.), Berlin

In Europe, for many years defence budgets have been sapped

by the avid cashing-in of the post-Cold War “peace dividend”,

by the priority of social spending and by the absence of a threat

perception – until the next ugly surprise? Now, because of the

financial and economic crisis, NATO and EU member states

drastically shrink their expenditure and forces for the sake of

debt reduction (which a former German Defence Minister even

elevated to “the highest strategic parameter”).

Not a panacea, but urgentIs “pooling and sharing” of military capabilities a panacea for

dwindling resources? The European Union, in the framework of

its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is pushing this

concept, and NATO, in the same vein, has proclaimed “smart

defence” - following the Defence Capabilities Initiative (Wash-

ington 1999) and similar efforts at Prague 2002, Istanbul 2004

and Lisbon 2010.

“More bang for the buck” is the motto – putting scarce re-

sources to better use, setting priorities, avoiding duplication

and pursuing multinational solutions. “Pooling” means the

common use of national capabilities (like in the European Air

Transport Command), while “sharing” refers to using the

capabilities of allies (example: the integrated air defence of

Europe during the Cold War). Even more integrated are “com-

mon assets” such as NATO’s AWACS fleet. “Specialization”, i.e.

the concentration of smaller nations on “niche capabilities”,

also belongs in this context.

As the examples show, the principle of “pooling and sharing”

(P&S) is not new. But it is becoming more urgent with the

money-driven reductions of the armed forces of many European

countries, which threatens to erode NATO’s “European Pillar”

and the EU’s capacity to act militarily. Yet, “burden-sharing”

appears ever more imperative with the U.S.’ turn to the Pacific

and European nations having to shoulder greater responsibility

for the security of their continent and its periphery. The Libya

operation demonstrated significant shortfalls.

DifficultiesPolitical momentum for the EU’s effort was generated by the

2010 “Ghent Initiative”. The survey among member nations

about which capabilities might be eligible for pooling and

sharing and subsequent discussions had, however, a non-spec-

tacular outcome. This reveals the difficulties: Larger nations

want to retain the full spectrum of military capabilities (land, air,

sea), and with defence the sovereignty issue comes up quickly.

Also, there is not general trust in the assured availability of

pooled or shared assets in case an ally differs with others about

20


François Mitterrand’s support for a foreign policy in line with the

Gaullist, defence in France has been the subject of a national

consensus based on several fundamental principles: nuclear

deterrence, building a European defence, participation in

international military operations, strategic autonomy. National

defence remains the preserve of the French President: it is he

who decides, on the advice of the Chief of Staff of the French

Armed Forces in the framework of a restricted council on de-

fence, on the deployment of troops abroad.

Deficient parliamentary scrutiny at European levelThe role of the European Parliament, EP which could provide a

bridge with the national parliaments in the field of European

defence policy, is reduced to a minimum. No significant role in

the field of CSDP has been assigned to it de jure: the Treaty on

European Union (TEU) makes provision solely for the EP to be

consulted and informed about defence in the framework of the

Common Foreign and Security Policy in connection with matters

pertaining to the common budget (Article J7.V). In addition the

EP may put questions to the Council and present opinions on

developments within the CSDP (Article 21 TEU). However, the EP

has no means of influencing the decision-making process in the

run-up to a new European military mission – it is neither re-

quired to give its prior approval nor has it the right to be con-

sulted – given the intergovernmental (as opposed to suprana-

tional) character of European defence policy. A further major

shortcoming of the EP is its lack of powers of scrutiny over

member states’ military expenditure for CSDP missions and over

the common costs arising as a result of intergovernmental

arrangements: here again. The EP merely has the right to be

informed by the Council about the expenditure incurred as a

result of such common costs. Basically, the difficulty of reconcil-

ing the need for parliamentary scrutiny at national and Euro-

pean level over defence issues with the existence of the CSDP is

due mainly to the strictly intergovernmental nature of this policy

area. This question of parliamentary oversight over the CSDP is

starting to arise in connection with the traditional debate

between the advocates of federalism, on the one hand, and

those who favour an intergovernmental approach to European

integration, on the other. For the moment, the European Parlia-

ment – the very symbol of democracy at supranational level – is

only a minor player in the Common Security and Defence Policy.

But reading between the lines, it is obvious that the fundamen-

tal problem facing European security and defence policy is that

it involves nations with very different relationships between

Parliament and the armed forces. In truth, the crux of the prob-

lem is one of national sovereignty and the need for nations to

delegate portions of that sovereignty for the purpose of a

common European defence.

* Delphine Deschaux-Beaume is a Doctor of Political Sciences. She is Associate

Research Fellow at PACTE (IEP – Institute of Political Studies – Grenoble), and

teaches at the IEP in Grenoble. She is also in charge of research within the NGO

Ecole de la Paix (School for Peace).

s becoming urgent

st be pragmatic and conceptual

a planned mission. (The withdrawal of German personnel from

the AWACS fleet in the Libyan context was ominous.) Further

difficulties arise from armaments industrial competition, differ-

ent national views about whether the P&S effort should be

preferably pursued in the EU or in NATO, the lack of concerta-

tion between the two, and the diminution, by many, of the

European Defence Agency (EDA) to an “armaments agency”.

Pragmatic and conceptualMoreover, is pragmatic development of individual initiatives

(“bottom up”) or a conceptual approach (“top down”) prefer-

able? The answer is: both! Individual projects such as air-to-air

refueling capabilities on which EU Defence Ministers recently

made a “political declaration” (March 2012) can encourage the

process and increase the thrust; and other fields identified so

far include helicopter training, maritime surveillance network-

ing, military satellite communications, medical field hospitals,

pilot training, smart munitions, naval logistics and training. It

will be essential to move to increasingly important areas and to

have more key member states participate.

But in the longer termn only a concept of capability develop-

ment on a European scale will yield the desired results. Al-

though in the EU “communitarization” of defence is still far

away, jointly developing a model of future European armed

forces could provide orientation. The way in which the UK,

Germany and France went about their recent resp. current

defence reform is an example of missed opportunities for

coordination.

What needs to be doneWhat is required? To develop promising initiatives in non-con-

troversial areas; at the same time to think about future Euro-

pean armed forces in a very concrete fashion regarding task

and role sharing; to conduct capability development from such

a conceptual vantage point and not merely motivate P&S with

financial constraints; to develop trust among Member States

about assured availability of capabilities; to think more about

“common assets”; and to harmonize the parallel efforts of

NATO and EU.

21

The European Union

Klaus WittmannDr Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.) wasborn in Lübecki in 1946 is Senior Fellow at theAspen Institute Germany.In 2008 his 42 year career in the German Bun-deswehr came to an end. It included troopcommand, academic phases (university studiesin history and political science as well as a year

at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), political-mili-tary work in the German Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headquarters,and positions in higher military education. His last assignment was that ofDirector of Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defence College,Rome). In September 2009 Dr Klaus Wittmann published “Towards a newStrategic Concept for NATO” (Forum Paper 10, Rome) and in September2010 he presented “NATO’s new Strategic Concept. An Illustrative Draft”(http://www.natowatch. org/node/400).

At the Strasbourg/Kehl summit in2009, the Heads of States andGovernments asked the Secre-tary General to elaborate withthe member nations a newstrategic concept and to besubmitted at the Lisbon summit2010.The review at the 2011 Chicagoended in a convincing plea for asubstantial EU-NATO-Coopera-tion.

Photo: www.nato.int

Since 2008 at the latest, crisis has become the most familiar

word in politics: financial crisis, economic crisis, Greek debt

crisis, euro crisis, NATO in crisis, etc. Nowhere in the western

world in general and in Europe in particular are politicians

and people talking first and foremost about solutions, chal-

lenges and opportunities. It is significant that name coined

for the fundamental political crisis in the Arab states, which

runs much deeper than Europe’s various crises, is one that

expresses hope: the Arab spring. It is too easy to say that in

the Arab countries the young generation is standing up

against old dictatorships and that an ageing European popu-

lation is not ready to cope with future challenges. What really

makes the difference is the fact that the Arabs have a vision of

the future, be it modern democracy or Islamist fundamental-

ism, and that the Europeans only have a vision of the past.

Europe needs more common sense2012 is the fourth year of the most severe economic crisis

since 1929. Compare 2012 to 1933 and you know that we are

doing not too badly. But, we are not doing well either. The

very diverse problems facing the Europeans have one thing in

common: the best solution lies in more supranational cooper-

ation and in giving up more of one’s national sovereignty.

What is true for the economy is also true for the European

Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. European

integration has reached a crucial point. Either nations or

people go further towards the long proposed ever closer

union – a United States of Europe – or the European Union

will fall back on more intergovernmentalism, a proven means

for not solving the existing problems.

The trouble is that nobody apart from enthusiasts wants a

United States of Europe. Timothy Garton Ash, the renowned

British historian, stated in 2011 in an interview with the

German weekly Der Spiegel that Europeans are still doing too

well to be ready for more radical steps. Almost a year ago

outgoing US Defense Secretary Robert Gates deplored Eu-

rope’s demilitarisation and Europeans’ unwillingness and

incapacity to defend themselves.

The recent threat, in Soviet style, of Russia’s Chief of the

General Staff Nikolai Makarov to, maybe, attack NATO missile

defence installations in the European Union once put in place

went largely unnoticed or was not taken seriously. The Russ-

ian criticism of NATO missile defence boils down to the fact

that Russia wants to be completely unhindered in her capacity

to eradicate Europe with her strategic missiles. Europeans do

not even dare to discuss this in public. George Friedman,

founder and CEO of STRATFOR, predicts in his book “The Next

100 Years”, published in 2009, that Russia will try to expand

westwards again and that the Baltic States will be the first

victims.

The dilemma faced by the French and British in 1939 –

whether or not die for Poland – and their negative answer

before they themselves were attacked a year later might have

inspired Friedman.

Time for Europeans to decide their futureThe Second World War was the aftermath of an economic

crisis. Politics gave the wrong answers after 1929, and not

only in Germany. The Europeans might miss their chance this

time as well. In 1950, Robert Schuman was ready to give up

France’s sovereignty over her coal and steel resources in

order to prevent Germany from regaining hers. In the fifties

coal and steel were seen as decisive for winning wars. Today,

pooling economic sovereignty would be a smart answer to the

European debt crisis and creating a truly European army

would lead to a smart defence that can practise what it

preaches. Strong national interests are working against these

two obvious solutions. The British are not willing to give up

what they already lost decades ago, the French believe that

they are being truly European when fighting for their own

interests and the Germans have delved so much into the 12

dark years that they are not willing to give up Parliament’s

right of say over the use of German soldiers to an institution

that they cannot control entirely.

The European Union is not ready to cope with the multiple

crises it faces. No head of state or foreign minister is painting

a bright European future for the Europeans by proposing to

create political union and a common army now. When they

are ready to go for it, it may be too late. Europe is lacking the

will to decide its own destiny.

The European Population is relatively unconcerned about security

The lack of will to be a greater power by Christoph Nick, Journalist, Brussels

22

Christoph NickChristoph Nick, born 1958 in Duisburg is afreelance journalist in Brussels, Belgium. Hestudied History and English and French literatureat Heidelberg University and has been workingfor over two decades for Germany’s Green Party,in the Bundestag in Berlin and the EuropeanParliament in Brussels. In the 1980s he was

Director of a development project in Chad.


European forces would bring no added value to security and defence

The EU’s CSDP is a misguided irrelevance A commentary by Geoffrey van Orden MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

You cannot get closer to the bone of national sovereignty than

defence, and the European Union has regarded fulfilment of its

ambitions in this field as a major political objective. As part of

an increasingly federal union where the EU acquires more and

more of the attributes of an integrated state called ‘Europe’,

then of course it would want it to have its own currency, fiscal

policy, diplomatic service and, ultimately, military capability.

The aspiration for the creation of a ‘European army’ is rarely

expressed in such blunt form. Yet if this is not the goal, why

does the EU want an operational planning HQ and a commit-

ment to “deploy 60,000 men in 60 days”? Why is it so keen to

stick the EU badge on a succession of military operations?

What justification is there for the panoply of EU structures to

control these operations? Why is there a European Defence

Agency and such an effort to create an EU defence industry

and an EU defence procurement market? And why do we have

a virtual European Defence College to promote an EU defence

culture?

Duplication of staff and structuresInstitutionally there have been a plethora of initiatives over

the years that have gradually built up the EU’s desired military

identity. The UK brake on EU involvement in defence was

removed by Mr Blair at St Malo in 1998 when it was formally

agreed with France that the EU should develop an

autonomous military capability. Since then, while contributing

no additional military capabilities or adding any practical

value, the EU has placed its institutional footprint on an

increasing range of defence-related activities, and wastefully

duplicated staff and decision-making structures that are all

already very well established at NATO.

EU battlegroups – just a retitling of existing unitsClearly, the ability to recruit, train and deploy personnel is the

most critical of requirements of an autonomous military force,

and with this in mind the 1999 European Council in Helsinki

gave birth to the idea of a 15-brigade EU force of 60,000

troops, sustainable in the field for a year. Of course, these

were not additional troops, but the same ones that nations

had for national, NATO, UN or other opera-

tions. This ridiculous idea didn’t get far at the

time - but, as in other sensitive areas of

policy, the EU proceeds by small steps, and

decided instead to create so-called “EU

battlegroups” that have never been deployed

on operations and are really just a retitling of

already existing units.

EU headquarters vetoed by the UKIn the years that followed, the Nice Treaty

saw the creation of an EU Military Committee

(replicating the similar body long-established

at NATO) that would be served by an EU

Military Staff, and the intention of having an

operational headquarters (OHQ) with all the

associated command and communications

capabilities (again duplicating structures at

NATO in its SHAPE HQ). The idea of a perma-

23

The European Union

Geoffrey Van Orden MEPGeoffrey Van Orden has been Conservative MEPfor the East of England since 1999. His lastmilitary appointment, as a Brigadier (Brigadier-General), was at NATO HQ. He spent many yearsin Germany, including five in Berlin where in1989 he was Chief of Staff and Chief G2 of theBritish Sector. He attended the Indian Defence-

Services Staff College and was a member of the Directing Staff at theGerman GeneralStaff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr). He isConservative Spokesman on Defence & Security Policy, and long-stand-ing member of the Foreign Affairs committee of the European Parliament,and of its Defence & Security sub-committee. He is also a Member of theParliament’s Delegation to India, to Turkey, and to the NATO Parliamen-tary Assembly. He has led opposition to EU involvement in defence.

British army between traditions and modern warfare Source: flickr.com/cc by 2.0

nent EU OHQ was the ‘logical’ next step for Eurocrats, but

when it was finally presented to the Foreign Affairs Council in

July 2011, the UK Government took a tough line, insisting the

EU focuses on more constructive areas of work – and effectively

vetoed the proposal. It has since re-emerged in different

clothing.

No EU will for a comprehensive approach EU efforts have been both institutional and conceptual. Adept

at identifying fresh justifications for its ambitions, the EU now

claims some unique amalgam of civil and military capabilities

through its ‘comprehensive approach’. This is what generations

of soldiers have known as CIMIC or ‘hearts and minds’. Unfortu-

nately, while NATO’s budget is being pared, the EU seems to

have largesse to throw around. The reality is that the EU is

incapable of getting both parts of the civil-military equation

right. Apart from the fact that most of those that inhabit the EU

civil sphere, including NGOs, have little understanding of, or

taste for, the military, the EU has difficulty coordinating its own

activities. At one stage, for example, its civil delegation in

Kampala had nothing to do with its Uganda-based military

training mission for Somali recruits. In Afghanistan EU person-

nel sat in offices in different parts of Kabul, rarely communicat-

ed with one another and had little coordination with the main

effort which was being run by NATO.

In European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso’s so-

called ‘State of the Union Address’ in September 2010, he

declared “[The EU] will not have the weight we need in the

world without a common defence policy. I believe now is the

moment to address this challenge.” His words confirmed the

real purpose of CSDP - not to do anything militarily useful but

to enhance EU ambitions.

The EU brings no additional military capabilitiesIn Britain, the Coalition Government’s 2010 Strategic Defence

and Security Review reluctantly set out the biggest defence

cuts since the Cold War. Budget sacrifices included an 8% cut in

defence spending by 2014.This bleak picture has been replicat-

ed across Europe: most European nations have inflicted major

cuts in their defence budgets since 2008. Some naively imagine

that the EU will provide a more comprehensive solution – this

misses the point about the essential purpose of a nation’s

armed forces. It would also entrust the same people that

created the Euro with responsibility for our defence.

The fact is, the EU brings no additional military capabilities to

the table and takes on no additional European share of the

transatlantic defence burden. Instead, European defence

ambitions are yet another call on the same diminishing pool of

national armed forces, and are a very serious distraction from

NATO – the long-established institution which should be the

clear and natural focus of international military commitment for

Western democracies. The defence and security challenges that

confront us today – Afghanistan, international terrorism,

piracy – and as yet unknown for the future, are too serious to

be playthings for the EU’s political ambitions. CSDP has not

added one more bullet, one more gun or aircraft to our military

capabilities, nor will it. The whole logic of CSDP – essentially

French driven – was removed when France rejoined the inte-

grated military structure of NATO. Libya proved its irrelevance.

The military efforts of the European nations should be concen-

trated on reinvigorating NATO.

24


British forces in Basra during the 2nd Iraq-War. Source: www.defenceimagedatabase.mod.uk © Crown Copyright

NATO needs a new business model

Crisis management – coping with asymmetric threatsby Ambassador Gábor Iklódy, Assistant Secretary General, NATO, Brussels

The Cold War in Europe was an unnatural state of affairs, but it

was an excellent compass. Two alliances faced each other,

with roughly similar military potentials. Both sides knew a lot

about one another, be it military technology or combat tactics.

And both sides assumed that the other was acting rationally,

i.e. that its cost-benefit calculus would lead it to conclude that

initiating a major war for the sake of conquering territory was

simply not a feasible option. In short, despite different politi-

cal systems, the military situation between both opponents

was largely symmetrical. It were these very symmetries that

made deterrence work – to buy time until the social forces did

their job and dismantled the unnatural Soviet empire from

within.

Traditional notions of defence are meaninglessBut that was then. Today, with the threats to NATO’s nations

more likely to come through a fibre optics cable than through

the “Fulda gap”, and with Improvised Explosive Devices

having become the main cause of death of our soldiers in

Afghanistan, the situation has fundamentally changed. To-

day’s conflicts, whether they are fought in the real world or in

cyberspace, are fought with asymmetrical means – from the

small pirate ships that attack an oil tanker to a cyber attack on

a nation’s electricity grid, or a terrorist’s “dirty bomb” that

causes the radioactive contamination of large areas. Against

such threats, traditional notions of defence are meaningless –

and, consequently, so is deterrence.

NATO must effect change in five key areasIf NATO is to provide security in these circumstances, it must

effect change in five key areas.

A broader understanding of solidarity

First, Allies need to develop a broader understanding of

solidarity. In the symmetrical situation of the Cold War, an

attack against one Ally would have triggered a collective self-

defence mechanism that would have made it next to impossi-

ble for any Ally to stand aside. Through NATO’s defence

25

NATOToday’s conflicts are fought with asymmetric means. Against such threats, traditional notions of defence are meaningless. Thus NATO needs to invest in prevention and resilience as well as to bolsterits analytical capabilities.

Pho

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NATO leaders concluded a decisive summit inChicago on 21 May, taking key decisions onthe Alliance’s future engagement inAfghanistan, military capabilities and world-wide partnerships.NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Ras-mussen said after the two-day summit: “We

came to Chicago with three goals. And wehave met them. We have focused on thefuture of Afghanistan. We have decided toinvest smartly in our defence even in times ofausterity. And we have engaged with ourpartners around the world to address thechallenges we all face in the 21st century”. He

added that the decision taken in Chicago“will reinforce the vital bond between NorthAmerica and Europe and strengthen NATO forthe years ahead. “> All official NATO summit declarations are

available at: http://tinyurl.com/bnjrdtg

News: NATO leaders took key decisions in Chicago

planning and force deployment solidarity was institution-

alised. By contrast, many new security challenges affect Allies

differently. Countries that suffer a terrorist attack or an energy

cut-off will be more alarmed than their more fortunate neigh-

bours, who may think that these problems are not really

theirs. However, if the transatlantic community were to fail to

understand the new security challenges as collective chal-

lenges, the very notion of Alliance would quickly fade away.

NATO would not survive a compartmentalisation of solidarity.

In our interconnected world, a major national vulnerability

becomes almost by definition a collective NATO vulnerability.

Invest in prevention and resilience

Second, NATO must invest more in prevention and resilience.

If asymmetric threats cannot be deterred by the threat of a

military response, protection has to be achieved on a differ-

ent level. For example, new technologies to detect explosives

or to trace their origin will gain in importance. The same

applies for measures to enhance the resilience of cyber

systems or critical energy infrastructure: the key to security

lies in the resilience of the infrastructure itself. Redundancies

make it possible to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil and

gas, the rapid repair of the damaged pipelines can keep the

losses within acceptable limits, and the electronic systems in

a control centre must be designed in such a way as to ride out

even a sophisticated cyber attack. The integration of such

measures into NATO’s defence planning process will ensure

that prevention and resilience become firmly ingrained in the

Alliance’s approach to security.

Connection between NATO and other security stakeholders

Third, NATO needs to be better connected with other security

stakeholders of the international community. The nature of

today’s security challenges makes NATO’s success increasing-

ly dependent on how well it cooperates with others, whether

the issue is cyber defence, non-proliferation, counter-terror-

ism or energy security. Accordingly, NATO needs to further

enhance its ties not only with international actors, above all

the European Union, but also with the academic and scientific

communities and the private sector. For example, an effective

cyber defence without the expertise of major IT companies

will remain as elusive as reducing energy vulnerabilities

without the advice of the private sector. To put it bluntly:

when it comes to meeting asymmetric security challenges,

NATO will have to be a team player, or it will be no player at

all.

NATO as a forum for political debate

Fourth, NATO Allies must rediscover NATO as a forum for

political debate about long-term security developments. At

present, many NATO members approach discussions on such

security issues only hesitantly, worrying that NATO’s image as

a solely military, operations-driven alliance may create the

impression among partner countries or the wider public that

any such debate was only the precursor to military engage-

ment. However, the true risk for NATO lies in the opposite

direction: by refusing to look ahead Allies would condemn

themselves to an entirely reactive approach. They would

simply miss the opportunity to address the issues in time, to

put greater emphasis on prevention and on a pro-active

rather than a reactive approach.

NATO needs to bolster its analytical capabilities

Fifth and finally, if NATO wants to become a more effective

platform for forward-looking political debate it needs to

bolster its own analytical capabilities. Improving NATO’s

intelligence sharing mechanisms is one part of such an effort,

but it will be equally important to produce analyses that dig

deeper into how certain developments affect NATO, and what

the Alliance could do to prevent or at least mitigate such

developments or their adverse effects. NATO has taken

several bold steps in this direction, including by establishing

a unique civil-military team that performs such complex

strategic assessments. Ultimately, however, this analytical

effort will only pay off if Allies muster the political will to use

it to improve their collective strategic awareness.

NATO needs a new business modelCoping with asymmetric threats requires NATO to adopt a new

“business model”. Rather than relying on military power

alone, NATO will need to develop a holistic approach to

security with a greater emphasis on strategic awareness,

prevention, enhanced resilience, cooperation with other

countries and organisations, and forward-looking political

debate. This is a tall order. However, in the years ahead

NATO’s relevance will be ever more closely tied to its success

in tackling asymmetric challenges. If NATO wants to remain an

effective crisis manager, it must continue to adapt.

26

Ambassador Gábor IklódyAmbassador Gábor Iklódy is NATO’s AssistantSecretary General for Emerging Security Chal-lenges. He joined the Hungarian Foreign Servicein 1983 and has devoted a large part of hisdiplomatic career to Euro-Atlantic integration.Before taking up his new position at NATO, heworked as Political Director and State Secretary

in charge of multilateral issues (2009), with the main focus being onHungary’s upcoming EU Presidency in the first half of 2011. In the periodbetween 1999 and 2009 he served two four-year terms in Scandinavia asAmbassador, first in Norway (accredited also in Iceland) and later inSweden. In between the two (2003-2005) he filled the position ofDirector General for European Political Cooperation in Budapest. In 1996he headed the Foreign Ministry’s Security Policy and Arms ControlDepartment and later, from 1997 through 1999 its NATO and WEUDepartment.


NATO

Documentation

Issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan andNations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assis-tance Force (ISAF) Declaration (excerpts)“We, the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of theIslamic Republic of Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew ourfirm commitment to a sovereign, secure and democratic Afghanistan.In line with the strategy which we agreed at the Lisbon Summit,ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafterAfghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close partner-ship will continue beyond the end of the transition period. In Lisbon, in November 2010, we decided on the phased transition ofsecurity responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National SecurityForces (ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibilityfor their own security. (…)The third wave of provinces to enter the transition process wasannounced by President Karzai on 13 May 2012. This means that 75%of Afghanistan’s population will soon be living in areas where theANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid-2013, all parts ofAfghanistan will have begun transition and the Afghan forces will be

in the lead for security nation-wide. This will mark an importantmilestone in the Lisbonroadmap. ISAF is gradually andresponsibly drawing down itsforces to complete its mission by31 December 2014. (…)

The completion of transition,however, will not mean the end of the International Community’scommitment to Afghanistan’s stability and development. Afghanistanand NATO reaffirm their commitment to further develop the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed at Lisbon in 2010 in all itsdimensions, up to 2014 and beyond, including through joint pro-grammes to build capacity such as the Building Integrity Initiative. (…)NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a newtraining, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a differentnature to the current ISAF mission. We agree to work towards estab-lishing such a new NATO-led mission. We will ensure that the newmission has a sound legal basis, such as a United Nations SecurityCouncil Resolution. (…)”

Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan

NATO finds itself in the precarious situation of having to justify the firm withdrawal date

The credibility of NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan’s futureby General (ret) Harald Kujat*, Berlin

At the summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Govern-

ment on 20 and 21 May in Chicago, Afghanistan was at the top

of the agenda. It was important to show unity. The end 2014

date for the withdrawal of the ISAF contingent was confirmed,

although some Alliance partners have already started drawing

down their troops and newly-elected French President François

Hollande was not willing to forgo his election promise and to

stick it out together with his allies until the joint withdrawal.

Indeed it is questionable whether the security situation at the

end of 2014 will look very different from that which prevails

today. In military terms, thanks to its regional successes and

the wait-and-see attitude adopted by the Taliban, NATO has

achieved an uneasy stalemate. This is why it is necessary to

keep training the Afghan security forces beyond 2014. And this

is also why the NATO Secretary General made every effort at

the Chicago summit to secure the necessary funding – an

annual sum of US$ 4.1 billion – from NATO member states and

other sponsors. At the same time the member states were

asked to undertake to supply the staff for the NATO training

mission. But whether the provision of training and funding for

the Afghan security forces will be enough in order to lead

Afghanistan towards a secure future is doubtful, especially

when one considers that it is not the numbers of security

forces that are decisive, but rather their professionalism and

reliability.

NATO finds itself in the precarious situation of having to justify

the firm withdrawal date by pointing to constant improvements

in the security situation. Yet it is a sign of the Taliban’s

strength that it is they who decide whether, when and with

whom to negotiate. The spectacular action with which they

draw attention to themselves from time to time is first and

foremost a signal to the Afghan population, among which they

evidently still find support for their attacks. The negotiations

with the Taliban, notwithstanding their importance, also show

that NATO is now going to have to allow the Taliban to play an

influential part in shaping the country’s future.

What the future holds in store for Afghanistan will depend

above all on progress in the civilian sector. So far the efforts to

establish a stable and democratic system of government, a

viable economy freed from drugs production and rampant

corruption, a countrywide legal and judicial system and a

reliable and law-abiding police have not succeeded. Thus for

the moment one cannot rule out the possibility that the Taliban

will again seize power once NATO has left.

But after spending 10 years in Afghanistan engaged in what

has been its most difficult operation, one that has cost dearly

in civilian and soldiers’ lives, NATO cannot simply buy its way

out of its responsibility for the country by offering a training

mission and funding for the Afghan security forces. What is

needed is a transition strategy that defines the means and

objectives for ensuring that the country can enjoy a secure

future in a region of lasting stability. Should it really prove to

be possible to negotiate a modus vivendi with the Taliban,

such a transition strategy would also be a confidence-building

tool. Unfortunately the Heads of State and Government were

unable to come up with even the beginnings of such a strategy.

The United States will in any case, if only in order to protect its

geostrategic interests, continue to show a strong military

presence in Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan is at the

heart of a key geostrategic region in which the regional and

global powers have overlapping security and economic inter-

ests. Therefore lasting sovereignty and stability for Afghanistan

would only be possible if the neighbouring states and regional

powers, including Iran and India, were to come together within

a system of regional security and stability, for Afghanistan’s

stability is threatened not only from within, but also from

without. This should form the core of a transition strategy that

must also be supported by Russia, for it is in the security

interests of both: Russia is worried that after NATO’s withdraw-

al the Taliban could infiltrate the central Asian countries and

might even threaten Russia’s security. This is why it also

important from the Russian point of view that NATO should

avoid making the same mistake as in 1989, when the US

withdrew from the region following the Soviet defeat in

Afghanistan.

The Heads of State and Government would therefore have

been well advised to leave the haggling about staff and fund-

ing for the training mission to their ministers and to concen-

trate on the more fitting task for a summit of demonstrating

their far-sightedness in the field of security policy and their

geostrategic skills by adopting a forward-looking and realistic

transition strategy for Afghanistan.

*Harald Kujat, is a former Chief of Defence (CHOD), Federal Armed Forces, Berlin

and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Brussels

29

NATO

08:30 – 10:30 Plenary sessions / 10:30 Coffee break / 13:00 Luncheon

Welcome and openingMr. Jiri Sedivy, First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic (invited)

NATO Smart Defence: Options for industrial cooperationMr. Ernest J. Herold, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment

Europe’s role in NATO Smart Defence – cooperation between NATO and EUMr. Krzysztof Lisek, European Parliament – Vice chairman subcommittee on Defence & Security (SEDE)

Security and Defence Industry: Meeting Future ChallengesDr. Paul Weissenberg, Deputy Director General – EU Directorate General Enterprise and Industry

Conference reception, Posters at exhibition

30


European Defence Conference9 and 10 October 2012, Dorint Hotel Don Giovanni, Prague (CZ)

09:00 – 10:30 Plenary sessions / 10:30 Coffee break / 12:45 Luncheon

Economic aspects and financing of defence technology and capability developmentMr. Rudolf Sharping (invited)

Challenges of SMART Defence and P&S to industry and industry policyIndustry speakers

11:00 – 13:00 Track 1: Strategies for CooperationPanel discussion: Long-term defence cooperationBenefits and challenges of interdependency: Weimar Triangle,Visegrad 4, Smart R&T cooperation, Strategic Airlift Command,Major OCCAR projectsChairman: Mr. Hartmut Bühl, editor in chief of “The European“Speakers: Mr. Ivan Dvorák, MoD CZ, Visegrad 4Ir. Jelle Keuning - NL MoD, Smart R&T cooperationMaj.Gen Jochen Both, EATC (inv.), Strategic AirliftMr. Eric Huybrechts, OCCAR-EA, Major projects

Track 2: technologies for the futureSnap-shot and poster session: R&T project resultsMultiple projects in 10 minute presentations followed by poster presenta-tions and discussion at exhibitionChairman: Mr. Pavel Cerny, CZ MoD Deputy NADSeveral speakers: Register your abstract on-line atwww.defenceconference.eu

10:45 – 12:45 Track 1: Strategies for CooperationDebate session: Human aspects of cooperationHuman behaviour, friendships, mutual trust, inter cultural recog-nition and other informal elements are critical to the success ofcooperation.Introduction: Dr. Peter Essens, TNO-NLDebate coordination: Dr. Sadhbh McCarthy and moderator team

Track 2: technologies for the futureSnap-shot and poster session: Cooperative project proposalsMultiple projects in short presentations followed by poster presentationsand discussion at exhibition. Promoting ideas for R&D in the style ofEurofinder.Chairman: Mr. Jelle Keuning, NL MoD Director R&TSeveral speakers: Register your abstract on-line atwww.defenceconference.eu

15:00 – 17:00 Track 1: Strategies for CooperationDebate session: Regional cooperationRegional cooperation could help solve European challenges.Industries and governments to foster regional initiatives. Examples Benelux, NORDIC, Bulgarian

Track 2: technologies for the futurePanel discussion: Major technological challengesCapability shortfalls in the Military (EDA), Space (ESA) and Security (EC)domain that need technological breakthroughs or advanced research

14:00 – 14:45 Plenary sessionsDependencies in Europe on technology and capabilitiesMr. Christian Bréant, Director R&T of the European Defence Agency (EDA)

13:45 – 15:45 Track 1: Strategies for CooperationDebate session: PPP options for SMART defenceAlternate financing options to resolve capability shortfalls. Basedon concrete list derived from the Continued Capability WatchStudyIntroduction: Mr. Maarten Stikkelorum and SWPDebate coordination: Dr. Sadhbh McCarthy and moderator team

Track 2: technologies for the futureLecture session: Cooperation in actionEDA – JIP programmes; EC demonstration programmes NATO capabilitychallenges

Tuesday 9 October 2012

Wednesday 10 October 2012

Closing session and Wrap-Up

16:00 – 16:30: Plenary session

For up-to-date information on speakers, registration and exhibition please visit www.defenceconference.eu.

31

NATO

The European defence community has witnessed a number of

attempts to share the financial burden through cooperative

development and use of military capabilities. Recent initia-

tives, namely NATO Smart Defence and its EU counterpart

Pooling & Sharing (P&S), were born in light of shrinking

national defence budgets within the last decade and gained

further importance through the ongoing financial crisis.

Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing – a necessityThe lack of political will to accept mutual dependencies often

consigned previous long-term strategic cooperation attempts

to failure. This time, restriction of Smart Defence and P&S to

“political window dressing” or failure, may not be an option.

Without the appropriate commitment to the aforementioned

co-operation, Europe’s defence industries could shift their

focus to markets abroad thus replacing national European

defence investments. Such a development would not only lead

to an EU technological dependence on foreign suppliers, but

furthermore, eventually to an EU which is lacking a defence

based strategic significance on a global scale. Moreover, a loss

of technological superiority, caused by the growing gap be-

tween Europe’s, on the one side, and emerging economies’

R&D investments, on the other side, can be anticipated1. Thus,

as already stated by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh

Rasmussen, it has to be concluded that “our choice is between

Smart Defence and Less Defence. […] if you think that security

is money, remember that it is cheaper than insecurity”.

The difficulty to implement those approachesBesides the underwhelming political will to understand that

national industry protectionism and putative maintenance of

national sovereignty and freedom of decision (that potentially

prevents Smart Defence and P&S from becoming effective) will

lead to the contrary, i.e. to a loss of both, there is a further

constraint to a successful implementation of the two ap-

proaches. This is namely a reasonable definition of promising

military capability areas for long-term cooperation (acknowl-

edging national and industrial interests and capacities) com-

bined with the development and implementation of an organi-

sational evaluation process of lessons learned in long-term

cooperation within, and between, NATO, and the EU/CSDP.

Lessons to learn To that end, it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at:

1. military capability areas that are promising with regard to

the formulation of common requirements and to the degree of

national protectionism; 2. existing long-term defence partner-

ships in order to derive best and less successful practices as

well as lessons identified from those. There are a couple of

existing use cases to be analysed: including the Weimar

Triangle between France, Germany and Poland, and its ambi-

tion to set up a common Battle Group2; the Visegrad 4 Group

consisting of Hungary, Check Republic, Slovakia and Poland;

but also the joint efforts in the transport aircraft case, the

A400M, or in multinational logistics. This analysis should be

further complemented by studying some of the unsuccessful

long-term cooperation attempts that took place in the R&D

area. Analysis of the latter will lead to a better understanding

of national industry policy constraints that prevent the imple-

mentation of more cost-effective long-term partnerships.

By initiating and supporting the evaluation process outlined

above, NATO and the EU (in this case the European Defence

Agency, EDA, being best positioned to coordinate the P&S

activities), ideally in coordination with OCCAR (Organisation

Conjointe de Coopération en matiére d`Armement), could

contribute to national ambitions to develop long-term partner-

ships and at the same time bridge the traditional gap between

the three organisations, national armaments policies and

armaments production.

Following a good start in Warsaw 2011 the EDC 2012 in Prague

will continue to foster this coordination and cooperation

process among the various national and multinational organi-

sations to achieve smarter cooperation in Europe.

1 Cf. Europe without Defence (November 2011), Chrisian Mölling, German

Institute for International and Security Affairs

2 Cf. Weimar Defence Cooperation – Projects to Respond to the European

Imperative (November 2011), Marcel Dickow et al., German Institute for Interna-

tional and Security Affairs

It is the lack of political will that consignes long-term strategic cooperation attempts to failure

Long-term strategic partnerships in defenceby Dr Merle Missoweit, Fraunhofer Institute for Technological Trend Analysis (INT), Euskirchen

Dr Merle Missoweit Senior researcher fellow at the Fraunhofer INTsince 2007. She graduated with a PhD in Biologyat the Faculty of Science of Bonn University(Germany). In her current work she focuses onanalyses and scientific support regardingstrategic aspects of long-term oriented defenceresearch planning, especially in the field of

international cooperation projects for the German Federal Ministry ofDefence. At EU level she was, in cooperation with the German Govern-ment, involved in a number of recent EDA initiatives (Capability Develop-ment Plan, European Defence R&T Strategy, and European R&T QualityImpact Assessment) and, on the security side, she is active in the field ofresearch planning for EU level crisis management.


(Edit/nc) On 1 and 2 May the ESRT organised jointly with the

CSIS a major Transatlantic Cyber Security Conference in Wash-

ington. Keynote speakers were Commissioner Cecilia Malm-

ström, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute and German Interi-

or Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich. Malmström and Lute under-

lined the increasingly intens nature of transatlantic cooperation

in cyber security. Lute described the difference in the approach

to privacy between Europe and the US as: “Americans want to

limit the access of government to their data. Europeans want to

control what happens to their data in general once it is out

there.” A topic that was intensively discussed was the new

European Cyber Crime Centre at Europol, its functioning, the

interaction with the FBI and perceived and real differences

between Europe and the US with regard to privacy and data

protection. In addition, there were many comments and ques-

tions on the obstacles and necessary agreements for develop-

ing an internationally common understanding of cyber security.

Friedrich proposed for Germany and the US to develop interna-

tional cyber soft law including the right

for states to find out who attacked

them. Transatlantic cooperation is

achieved by a multitude of Transat-

lantic Working Groups, which are

focusing on different aspects of cyber security and cyber crime.

Speakers from the EU and US underlined the importance of

public private partnership for developing a sound protection of

individuals but also nations against cyber attacks. The panel-

lists expressed clear ideas of what needs to be done and

agreed on regarding cyber security. The conference was very

successful in hightlighting the commonalities and differences

between the US and EU approaches to

cyber security. The ESRT will continue

its Cyber Security series with a Global

Cyber Security Conference in Brussels

in early 2013.

ESRT ChairmanChristoph Raab withCommissionerCecilia Malmströmat the Washingtoncyber securityconference.

Photo: ESRT

Transatlantic Dimensions of Cyber Security, Washington

Conferences Reports

Conferences Reports

(Edit/hb) On 30 and 31 May, the AFCEA TechNet Europe 2012

was held in conjunction with the AFCEA Czech Chapter’s ITTE

2012 in Prague. Conference Chairman Major General (ret)

Klaus-Peter Treche welcomed cyber and ITT professionals from

18 countries all over the world, including representatives of

the major European and NATO institutions, think tanks and

industries.

Under the Cyber Defence Umbrella, four major topics were

discussed: Cyber Active Defence, Cyber Defence in Mobile

Computing, Recovering from Cyber Attack and SMART procure-

ment. Addressing an audience of more than 200 persons, the

keynote speakers agreed on the growing importance for civil

society of the cyber issue and the resulting asymmetric

threats.

Jiri Sedivy, the Czech 1st Deputy Minister of Defence, under-

lined national responsibilities but also the need for well-coor-

dinated cooperation with the EU and NATO.

Ioan Pascu, MEP and Vice-Chairman of the European Parlia-

ment’s Foreign Affairs Committee, stressed that the EP sup-

ported the efforts to respond effectively to needs, but that

procedures within the EU were fragmented. The new EU Cyber

Centre at Europol might be conducive to the development of a

more centralised EU concept.

Lt General Kurt Herrmann of NATO CIS Services Agency (NCSA)

addressed the need for secured information sharing during

NATO- led coalition operations. To meet threats, NATO aimed

for the highest level of security in network-enabled operations,

an approach that had very successfully proven itself during the

ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

General Vlastimil Picek, Head of the Czech Armed Forces,

speaking in the presence of AFCEA President Kent Schneider,

Fairfax/Virginia, underlined the importance attached by the

Czech Government to cyber defence and the formidable work

done by the Czech AFCEA Chapter.

1st Deputy MinisterJ. Sedivy and K.P.Treche, GeneralManager AFCEAEurope at TechNet2012 in Prague.Photo: Pavel Pelikan,

Prague

Special aspects of cyber defence, Prague

TThe European: What is Hewlett Packard’s assessment of IT-

security over the last 12 months?

Michael Eberhardt: Based on the observations and analysis of

our own Labs and research departments 2011 saw a slight

decrease of detected vulnerabilities, but also an ongoing

increase of attacks.

The European: Does this mean that existing and known vulner-

abilities are still offering enough opportunities for cyber based

attacks?

Michael Eberhardt: Yes indeed. The Internet is the easiest

way to do business, but this opportunity also brings risks

with it. In the UK, for example, cybercrime is the third in the

top ten list of economic crimes. Cyber threats are non-discrim-

inatory; they affect all businesses from Small and Medium

Enterprises (SMEs) to large multinational organizations.

The European: Do you see the rising number risks as related to

business and Internet commerce?

Michael Eberhardt: Not only, the public sector, defense and

military organizations and industries that form part of the

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) are all high-profile targets

of cyber attack. The motivation and goals of the intruders

might be different, but we see a lot of similarities in the

strategies and tactics in targeting both private and public

sector organizations.

The European: Can you give us an example?

Michael Eberhardt: In April last year the SONY PlayStationTM

Network was infiltrated, compromising millions of users, it

was one of the largest attacks last year. Similarly, a public

water utility in Illinois was hacked stealing customer user-

names and passwords, but the attack also caused substantial

damage to a water pump as it was powered on and off,

burning it out.

The European: How can organizations prevent and stop these

attacks?

Michael Eberhardt: Organisations need to change the way

they approach vulnerabilities and how they view and manage

security on a day-to-day basis. As we all know, there is no 100

per cent security, so we cannot avoid all these attacks, but

can transform how we tackle them. Security should not be

seen solely as a technology issue; it can have an impact right

across the mission of the organization affecting everything

from productivity to brand reputation. It’s crucial organiza-

tions balance risk migitation with responding to cyber attacks

in a multi-layered approach.

The European: How has HP enhanced its portfolio by acquiring

security companies such as ArcSight, Fortify and TippingPoint?

Michael Eberhardt: Cyber threats have become more sophisti-

cated, persistent and unpredictable. Organizations can no

longer just rely on building and defending security perimeters,

they need to apply security to all layers of their infrastructure

and applications’ environments. By combining market-leading

capabilities from ArcSight, Fortify and TippingPoint, HP has

established a foundation for the unified approach to security

and continues to invest in security innovation In addition, we

offer security experts across the globe in HP Enterprise Security

Services (HP ESS). HP has vast experience in counselling

businesses from varying industry sectors and geographies with

innovative methods and procedures to manage current and

future business challenges. To be a global security leader you

need to be global also in daily operations. Nearly all of our

clients operate in a multinational, 24/7 environment. We have

built one of the most comprehensive information security

operations in the world today. Our 3,000 staff and 5 GSOCs

(Global Operation Centres) are integrated onto a common

threat and intelligence platform giving us unparalleled insight

into the global security landscape. Last but not least we are

continuing to invest and expand our SOCs and specific regional

Cyber-Centres to offer greater span and control for our clients

(government, finance, insurance) with the need for dedicated

and regional delivered managed security services.

The European: What exactly is the new approach of your security

teams?

To protect Information and Intellectual Properties a business oriented approach is needed

IT-Security is more than technologyInterview with Michael Eberhardt, Vice President and General Manager, Enterprise Services Germany, HP, Böblingen

34


Global footsteps of HP Enterprise Security Services

35

NATO

Michael Eberhardt: Globalization, cloud, hacktivism — all add

to the changing landscape of modern business, but the oppor-

tunities, threats and associated risks are personal to individ-

ual organizations. Our approach is holistic, active, and busi-

ness-ready. We’ve developed a far more efficient way to

reduce risk. We take a consistent and strategic approach,

based on our Information Assurance Platform – a methodology

and integration platform that not only identifies present

security challenges, but proactively works to avoid security

issues that might keep organizations from achieving their

objectives.

For example, it’s important to determine the real risks to your

organization and the costs associated in reducing the risk are

reasonable in proportion to the potential loss. Also it

shouldn’t be about restricting access to information, but make

it securely available. Information security is about making the

correct information available to authenticated and authorized

people and not as a barrier to getting on with business.

TThe European: So risk management is the solution for cyber

threats.

Michael Eberhardt: Risk is part of life. Every time we make a

decision, however mundane, we make a risk assessment

whether consciously or not. Risk and business cannot be

separated. Where a CEO may take calculated risks on market

conditions and sales predictions, the risk decisions a CISO or

CIO make can lead to an unnecessary impact on the whole

business. IT or technology is often central to the whole opera-

tion of a business.

You have to take a holistic approach to security and consider

the whole business. Security cannot operate in a silo running

box ticking exercises, with no real understanding or evidence

of the risks and potential vulnerabilities. You only have to look

at media headlines from last year to see the conse quences of

failing to do so.

The European: So how do technology and the human factor fit in

this business risk related approach?

Michael Eberhardt: Good point, human error can and should

never be ignored. Technology is vital in helping business

comply with many regulations and legal requirements, and

critical in tackling the huge number of threats posed. For

example AntiVirus software vendors are receiving about

30.000 potential malware probes each day. The data captured

from every attempted attack is important in helping us im-

prove the effectiveness of countermeasures, but educating

employees about cyber threats is essential as a first line of

defence.

EMC’s well known security division RSA was the subject of a

social engineering attack in 2011. Social engineering cyber

attacks deceive people into revealing information by unknow-

ingly giving access to a computer system. The attack started

with two different spear phishing emails with the subject

“2011 Recruitment Plan” sent to two small groups of employ-

ees. One employees clicked on the spreadsheet attached to

the email, which contained a zero-day exploit; attackers then

were able to infiltrate RSA and steal information related to its

SecurID products, which had an impact related to the protec-

tion level of RSA´s customers, including military, government

and others with a higher need of secure access to their sensi-

tive information . Experts were stating the network disruption

of defense contractor Lockheed was a result of “RSA’s SecurID

Hack”.

The European: How could individuals be integrated into an

overall cyber scenario concept?

Michael Eberhardt: With the internet and social networks it is

much easier today to research and access information needed

to prepare and start a dedicated attack against organizations

via individuals. Organisations need to evaluate all social

networks and communication channels. Users need to be

careful about the level of detail they publish in a private life

and business environment, and aware of the sensitivity of

information in communications such as emails from colleagues

and friends. Educating and making employees aware of their

role and responsibility in security is a key success factor.

But also new ways to find and educate young talents are

important. HP is partner of the so called Cyber Security Chal-

lenge (www.cybersecuritychallenge.or.uk) a series of online

games and competitions, e.g. the Digital Forensic Challenge of

the US Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)

designed to test the cyber security abilities of individuals and

young teams from every walk of life. The Master class grand

final was held in Bristol and HP labs staff were on hand to

design and run the competition. HP supports this initiative to

continually develop our capability and understanding of cyber

threats.

Another important approach is the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) by

our mentioned security research organizations DVLabs.

Micheal EberhardtMichael Eberhardt has been Managing Directorof Hewlett-Packard GmbH and Vice PresidentGeneral Manager Enterprise Services Germanysince November 2009. He was born in 1963 inGermany. Mr Eberhardt studied mechanicalengineering at the University of Applied Sci-ences in Konstanz, and started his professional

career in 1989 at IMB Germany. He became later Business Executive,integrated Technology Services IBM USA, Somers, NY (1999-2000). From2000-2005 he worked for TDS Informationstechnologie GmbH where hasbeen Head of Sales TDS IT-Outsourcing and Chief Executive Officer(2001-2007). Before his current position he was Director OutsourcingGermany at Hewlett Pachard GmbH (2007-2008) and Vice President CEEEDS (2008-2009).

36


The European: What does it mean and how does it work ?

Michael Eberhardt: While there clearly are skilled malicious

hackers out there, this remains a very small minority of the

total number of people who actually discover new software

flaws. In reality, the number of benevolent researchers with

the expertise required to discover a software vulnerability is a

sizeable, and fast growing group. The dissemination of pub-

licly available vulnerability analysis and discovery tools has

helped foster this group of security enthusiasts. It made

perfect sense however to augment DVLabs with the additional

zero day research of this growing network of “extended re-

searchers”. Interested researchers provide DVLabs with exclu-

sive information about previously un-patched vulnerabilities

they have discovered. DVLabs collects background informa-

tion in order to validate the identity of the researcher for

ethical and financial oversight. DVLabs validates the issue in

its security labs and makes a monetary offer to the researcher.

If the researcher accepts the offer, he/she will be paid prompt-

ly. As a researcher discovers and provides additional vulnera-

bility research, bonuses and rewards can increase through a

loyalty program similar to a frequent flier miles program.

After an agreement has been reached for the acquisition of a

researcher’s vulnerability, DVLabs simultaneously develops

IPS protection filters for HP Tippingpoint software and notifies

the affected vendor so the they can develop a vulnerability

patch before it will be published and misused by the “bad

guys”.

The European: What are your predications for cyber security in

2012?

Michael Eberhardt: We continue to witness unpredictable

economic and political events across the economies of US,

Europe and Asia. This might result in sustained high levels of

unemployment, further social unrest and as in the past reces-

sions have increased crime, which of course includes cyber

based attacks. We may witness more cyber attacks against the

CNI, either as “probes” against defence procedures or full-

scale attacks as part of geopolitical disputes. But, with the

mentioned methods, tools and well trained and aware people

we are able to fight these cyber battles. For our own organisa-

tion and also for our clients.

The European: Mr. Eberhardt, yesterday evening I received a

phone call from a friend of mine who informed me, that HP is

cutting up to 40.000 jobs in Europe. Could you comment?

Michael Eberhardt: As you know, when published its quarterly

results on 23 May, it announced a restructuring programme

aimed at optimising its cost structure, simplifying business

processes and reducing complexity. The restructuring process

is to take place over several years and comprises structural

measures concerning its supply chain and portfolio. It also

entails a reduction of 27 000 jobs worldwide by the end of

financial year 2014.

The European: Ok this is a little less but which are the countries

in Europe the most affected?

Michael Eberhardt: For the moment there are no concrete

plans regarding the detailed implementation of those cuts in

the different countries and regions.

However, we attach great importance to cooperation and

coordination with the responsible bodies and to transparent

communications with our staff.

The European: Mr. Eberhardt, thank you for the interview.

Michael Eberhardt during the interview with Hartmut Bühl at the HP-Germany Headquarter in Böblingen. Source: Tobias Bahlinger, Bad Nauheim

37

NATO

It is a MUST that the strategic dependency of fossil fuel needs

to be reduced in order to guarantee energy security. Thus,

today’s energy production requires a high degree of techno-

logical innovation – as per linear technology. At the same time

when Europe demands that European Forces go green, Serco

is fielding first products.

EDA pilots the B-Project GO GREENThe European Defence Agencys (EDA) just recently launched

the “GO GREEN” category B project. This initiative is aiming at

meeting the energy requirements of European armed forces by

evaluating new ways of deploying alternative energy sources

faster, cheaper, cleaner and environmentally sound. This

innovative and cost-effective cooperation initiative will be

implemented by six EDA members: Austria, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg.

One example for the renewable energy potential of the Euro-

pean armed forces are the collectively managed numerous

buildings and structures with a total surface of about 200

million square meters. There solar panels could be installed to

form additional investment for CSDP capabilities and to

release national defence budgets from pressure.

Serco is aheadSerco delivers an efficient solution in the field of renewable

energy supply by innovative solar thermal energy technology –

designed for military deployments, exercises and in facilities -

ideal for WATER HEATING in accommodations as well as for

the production of process heat.

Since February 2012, the first LinearMirror System has been in

operation for a long-term field test, on site at the Habtoor Staff

Village near Dubai. Although the field test will end by June

2012, the expectations concerning the energy efficiency are

already today highly exceeded. As a result of this field test,

this product with its high energy efficiency proofs to be the

convincing solution for an autarkic hot water supply.

Innovative approach on field campsAt the Eurosatory 2012, Serco will present a solution for a

mobile military camp that is autarkic with respect to communi-

cations and energy. The Mobile Field Camp solution provides

An innovative step forward – less dependence on fossil fuels is needed

Serco goes green and mobileby Stefan Dopp, Ralf Otten und Christina Janzen-Wolf*, Bonn

LinearMirror Technology Source: Serco Gmbh

38


MOTS and COTS standards. Live demonstrations of Serco’s

LinearMirror as well as of Serco’s mobile communication

systems MUP (Mobile Unified Platform) and DN (Deployable

Network) will convince users about Serco´s innovative ap-

proach for mobile solutions.

Deployable Network SolutionThe Deployable Network Solution is a robust system for voice

and data communication. It fully complies with the require-

ments for extreme environmental conditions. Thus, it can be

utilized for a rapid generation of communication networks of

various standards as required by FOBs (Forward Operation

Bases) and UORs (Urgent Operational Requirements).

Mobile Unified Platform (MUP)The MUP Solution is a highly mobile system providing a data

communication infrastructure based on IP within a very short

time slot. The basis of MUP is the consequent development of

the idea of a mobile Ad hoc Networking towards the mobile Ad

hoc information system carrier. The system has been designed

for an open field operation. Up to 20 wireless network devices

in an obstacle-free zone can be connected for voice and data

communications. Additional applications can be customized

on request.

The highly mobile network is mounted in a robust backpack,

which is both suitable for one-handed transport or for the back

supported by a backpack device. It can also be mounted into

vehicles. Together with a high rate of availability, this product

is the appropriate solution for autarkic communications.

*Stefan Dopp, Serco Sales and Product Manager LinearMirror

*Ralf Otten, Serco Sales and Product Manager

*Christina Janzen-Wolf, Serco Sales and Marketing Manager

Serco GmbH

Serco GmbH is an independent manufactur-ing service company, which is among one ofthe largest technical service providers inGermany, with more than 800 employees.Headquarter is located in Bonn. We offer clients premium quality, low-cost,innovative and requirement-orientedsolutions in the sector for products andservices, and provide the services in closecooperation with our clients from the

industry, science, public and military sector. As a long-term partner of NATO, of nationaland international armed forces around theworld, we support our clients working acrossland, sea, air, nuclear and space. Ourservices and products comprise technicalsupport, engineering, facilities management,training and IT support.Our mission is to deliver affordable solutionsthat are “mobile – modular – ruggedized -

innovative and green”!Serco solutions are aimed at providingEffectivity, Reactivity, Flexibility.through- Minimizing dependency- Securing availability - Controlling cost- Reducing risks

DP – Deployable Network Solution Source: Serco Gmbh

MUP Mobile Unified Platform Source: Serco Gmbh

Eurosatory 2012, (11th – 15th JUNE, 2012) in Paris, Serco Stand No. B230 - Outside Area

Renewable energy production and armed forces are not neces-

sarily an obvious combination. Yet no one doubts that energy

is essential to military operations. Without energy, the Armed

Forc es stand still and silent. Over the past decades, energy

dependency has steadily increased, and although operations

consume the greatest share of fuel, electric energy use at home

is also an important factor. Multiple national initiatives current-

ly encourage energy efficiency in the military to reduce depend-

ency and cost.

But do armed forces have other options to reduce energy

dependency and, more broadly, to contribute to Europe’s 2020

Energy Policy targets? The European Defence Agency (EDA) has

been looking for innovative solutions.

A simple ideaIn defence, there are few “Eureka!” moments. Progress is made

step-by-step, one incremental innovation at a time. Those

advances usually require extensive military-industrial research

and development, at a considerable cost. Energy is an impor-

tant exception; the ultimate dual-use technology, nearly all the

work has already been done by the civilian sector. Combining

these already extant technologies with the unique needs and

advantages of the military, we were able to create a win-win

situation. GO GREEN is a simple idea allowing substantial

progress by producing renewable energy.

The basic idea within the GO GREEN demonstration project is to

install solar panels on buildings and free land of armed forces

in Europe, enabling them to produce the electricity they need

from renewable sources and even to generate additional

revenues for defence budgets by feeding surplus electricity into

the general electricity network. The GO GREEN initiative was

officially launched at the EDA Steering Board in March 2012,

with the participation of six EDA Member States: Austria,

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany (Lead Nation), Greece and

Luxembourg.

The broader contextThe Energy Policy for Europe, agreed by the European Council

in March 2007, establishes the Union’s core energy policy

objectives of competitiveness, sustainability and security of

supply. By 2020, renewable sources have to contribute 20% to

Europe’s total energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions

have to fall to 20% below 1990 levels and energy efficiency

gains have to deliver 20% savings in energy consumption. The

military are not exempt, and GO GREEN is one effort towards

this goal.

Why Armed Forces and renewable energy?A single European armed force consumes the electric energy of

a large city, while the militaries of the EDA Member States1

combined need energy equivalent to a small EU country.

Besides making the Armed Forces dependent on fossil fuels

(with their carbon emissions and uncertain supply), this ac-

counts for a substantial chunk of the defence budget. It is

estimated that the 26 EDA pMS spend roughly 1 billion € on

electric energy for their military every year. At the same time,

EU Armed Forces own huge amounts of land, with a total

estimated infrastructure surface of about 200 million square

metres and an estimated total land surface of 1% of Europe.

This combination means they are ideal contributors to renew-

able energy efforts; they need to reduce energy dependence,

and they have the means to do so.

FinanceAt a time of increased pressure on budgets and defence spend-

ing, this project’s innovative approach will not cost any taxpay-

ers’ money. The project funding shall be generated as privately

organized investment.

The strategy of GO GREEN is to collect infrastructure and free

land user rights, pool them and bring them to the market as an

attractive package for energy development. The payoff of the

land and free roofs used by industry to generate electricity is

39

NATO

European Armed Forces should conribute to the EU’s energy objectives

Renewable energy and the military by Martin Stoussavljewitsch, Principal Officer, European Defence Agency, Brussels

Martin StoussavljewitschMr Martin Stoussavljewitsch is a Principal Officerin the Armaments Directorate of the EuropeanDefence Agency (EDA). His main task is thepromotion and enhancement of Europeanarmaments cooperation, in particular by promot-ing and proposing new multilateral cooperativeprojects. Among his current activities are the

EDA support measures in the field of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and theEuropean Armed Forces GO GREEN initiative. Mr Stoussavljewitsch received his MSc in Mechanical Engineering fromthe University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich and his MBA inInternational Sales- and Marketing- Management from the University ofApplied Science in Deggendorf. He served in the German Air force ascommissioned officer for the TORNADO and PHANTOM Jet EngineMaintenance facility and as System Engineer in the In-Service SupportCentre of the EUROFIGHTER Typhoon Weapon System. He joined theEuropean Defence Agency as Seconded National Expert in 2006 and wassubsequently contracted in 2008 as Principal Armaments Officer.

40


the spread between the financial value of the energy produc-

tion of the completed projects and the cost of pre-financing,

constructing and implementing the project.

Growth and jobsThere is consensus that low carbon policies can bolster the EU

economy, as stressed in the Commission’s 2012 Annual Growth

Survey. Studies have shown that the public sector, including

defence, can create new markets for energy efficient technolo-

gies, services and business models. Incentives like that set out

in GO GREEN, allowing Armed Forces to reach their targets cost-

effectively and safeguard financial benefits when producing

renewable energy, are one measure to facilitate growth and job

creation.

Financing for renewable energy in the defence sector should be

recognised as a growth-enhancing incentive that will provide

greater returns in the future, for defence budgets by saving

energy and gaining independence from fossil fuels, but also for

the society at large in supporting the 2020 targets.

Because of their size, the considerable amount of energy they

consume and their extensive experience in technological

innovation, the Armed Forces are uniquely positioned to

stimulate renewable energy innovation. The GO GREEN initia-

tive will address the opportunities that will result from the

transition to renewable energy-supported armed forces and the

key role that they can play to advance innovation and commer-

cialization of clean, low carbon energy without additional

investment from public budgets. They can thereby contribute

directly to Europe’s future economic competitiveness and

energy efficiency targets and at the same time reinforce Eu-

rope’s security with new investments in capabilities for CSDP.

European cooperation, not national fragmentationSeveral EDA Member States are already investing in renewable

energy production and reduced energy consumption. However,

a purely national business base in the solar energy domain has

significant disadvantages resulting in limited financial return. In

some EU countries, a good solar exposure with many sunshine

hours per day allows a high level production of energy. Howev-

er, more often than not, investment conditions of the govern-

ment and/or private industry in those countries do not allow a

project to be realized that can exploit that potential. Some EU

countries have greater financial resources, larger armed forces

and the investment level, technological know-how and govern-

ment incentives in place to set-up solar projects, but lack the

intense sun exposure, so can only produce limited electrical

power output. Scaling factors, knowledge transfer and best

practice solutions are additional factors which are generated by

multinational approaches.

A necessary combinationIn a recent speech of José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of

the European Commission, energy was identified as a strategic

enabler for Europe, shaping the environment of the future. His

argument is worth quoting at length.

“With our European 20-20-20 commitment we have launched a

highly ambitious European energy policy. And we are delivering

on it! These actions are cornerstones of our Europe 2020 agenda

for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth: Because you simply

cannot have sustainable growth without sustainable energy

production and use. But unleashing the potential of this new

energy revolution is also creating huge job opportunities. … The

EU is thus leading what some call the third industrial revolution;

we are showing not only that our 2020 objectives can and will be

met, but can positively benefit our citizens and provide answers

to the issue of climate change, and support our drive for long

term sustainable growth.”

The European Defence Agency’s innovative GO GREEN project

will demonstrate the deployment of new alternative energy

sources for faster, cleaner, more sustainable and cheaper ways

to meet Armed Forces’ growing energy needs. It will demon-

strate that Armed Forces and renewable energy are a necessary

combination. Through the GO GREEN project, participating

European Armed Forces will develop and demonstrate a gener-

ic renewable energy exploitation model that could be used later

on for European-wide implementation, moving Europe forward

in the renewable energy revolution.

1 27 EU Member States participate in EDA - all EU members except Denmark.

EDA GO GREEN leaflets Source: EDA

41

The EU and NATO can play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles for peace and security

Forces Development – EU/NATO SynergyInterview with Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann, DG IMS, and Lieutenant General Ton Van Osch, DG EUMS, Brussels

TThe European: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

and the European Union (EU) cooperate on issues of common

interest and are working shoulder-to-shoulder in crisis manage-

ment. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010 the Allies underlined their

determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

General Bornemann in which fields are these objectives these to

be realised?

General Bornemann: First of all, let me thank you for the

possibility to engage with you together with my EU counter-

part, General Van Osch.

You’re absolutely right. The New Strategic Concept recognizes

that an active and effective EU contributes to the overall

security of the Euro-Atlantic area. We share common values

and strategic interests, therefore the EU is a unique and

essential partner for NATO and we reaffirmed this at the

Chicago Summit in May. I strongly believe that we can and

should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in

supporting international peace and security. Having said that,

these objectives can be realised through practical cooperation

in operations. Of course, all this requires broad political

commitment so that we may share assessments and perspec-

tives, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the

field. Operations-wise, there is a lot we are already doing. In

Kosovo for example, we experience very good cooperation

between KFOR and EULEX in support of the Kosovo authori-

ties. In Afghanistan, the NATO training mission works closely

with the EU police mission to build a safe and secure environ-

ment. And off the coast of Somalia, NATO and the EU forces

deploy side-by-side to prevent and combat piracy.

These are all concrete examples of military synergy between

our two organisations, and where it matters most – in opera-

tions. But we cannot rest on our laurels. NATO nations are

determined to continue the strategic partnership with the EU,

in a spirit of mutual transparency and openness.

The European: General Van Osch, among these objectives,

which is the most important for the European Union Military

Staff? Is it more the practical cooperation throughout the crises

spectrum from coordinated planning to mutual support on the

ground or is it capability development?

General Van Osch: The aim is to further improve our coopera-

tion in both crisis management and capability development.

Though there are still some political difficulties to overcome,

we military will try to find the most pragmatic solutions within

the political framework which is given to us. We have limita-

tions with regard to formal exchange of information, but we

are permitted to have informal staff-to-staff coordination. In

this way, we can avoid duplication in both planning and

capability development. We make use of each other’s

strengths and look for complementary solutions.

General Bornemann: If I may, let me add one additional remark

to what General Van Osch just said. I fully share his view that

the staff-to-staff cooperation is the most important tool we

have at the moment to coordinate between NATO and EU. We

are doing this on a permanent basis at all levels between our

two staffs. There is still room for improvement but at the same

time there are also limitations, taking into account the political

difficulties with regard to the participation of Cyprus in NATO-

EU business. Only a political solution to this problem will allow

us to develop a real strategic partnership between NATO and

EU.

The European: As I understand you both well, you are convinced

that NATO and EU should play complimentary and reinforcing

roles. In the field of operations there is a certain understanding

and mutual assistance, e.g. in the Balkans or in Afghanistan.

General Bornemann, let me ask you on the topic of Afghanistan,

how does cooperation work there. Is NATO’s role is a more

Crisis management forcesThe New Strategic Concept of NATO recognises that an active and effective European Union contributes tothe overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area, sharing common values and geostrategic interests.

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military one? How does the contribution of the EU fit in your stra -

tegy?

General Bornemann: Indeed, both the Balkans and Afgha -

nistan are good examples to explain how cooperation between

NATO and EU works within the current political framework. In

Kosovo, KFOR and EULEX liaise closely every day in the execu-

tion of their respective mandates to ensure a safe and secure

environment. And during the election weeks, this dialogue

proved to be very effective, intervening when needed, avoid-

ing incidents and escalation of violence. KFOR and EULEX have

their respective mandate and it is vital that both sides have

the necessary means and capabilities to execute their missions

as a prerequisite for common success.

“The strength of the partnership lies

in its complementarity”. Jürgen Bornemann

In Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) helps create a secure environment in which the

Afghan government, as well as other international actors, can

work to reconstruct the country. At the same time, the EU Rule

of Law mission strengthens civilian policing, focusing on

security sector and justice reforms. Needless to say, we all

recognize the importance of the EU’s strong contribution to

Afghan security, as well as sustainable economic develop-

ment. And I can tell you that at the Chicago Summit, the Allies

welcomed the EU’s affirmation of its continuing long-term

commitment in support of Afghanistan.

I believe NATO and the EU jointly play key roles in bringing

peace and stability to Afghanistan, within the international

community’s broader efforts, to implement a comprehensive

approach. But the strength of the partnership lies in its com-

plementarity.

TThe European: General Van Osch, the EU will remain in

Afghanistan after the redeployment of NATO forces in 2014. Are

you giving already thought to real strategic coordination with

NATO as is apparently the case in the field of the naval mission

EU NAVFOR Atalanta?

General Van Osch: Firstly, I’d like to stress that the EU current-

ly does not have a military involvement in Afghanistan, though

most EU Member States contribute to NATO’s Operation ISAF.

Secondly, the EU as an organisation does give high priority to

the stabilization and development of Afghanistan. Since 2002,

the European Commission (EC) has contributed some 1.8

billion EUR to Afghanistan. The thrust of EC assistance has

gradually shifted from humanitarian assistance and support

for reconstruction towards development cooperation aimed at

supporting priorities set out in the Afghanistan National

Development Strategy. Furthermore, the civilian EU police

training mission in Afghanistan was launched in 2007 and

supports the Afghanistan government to move towards a

civilian police system grounded on the rule of law.

The European: And after 2014 where the focus will shift to?

General van Osch: Diplomacy, security, defence and develop-

ment are clearly common efforts of both organisations togeth-

er with many other partners. After 2014, the focus of what is

necessary will shift, but to what extent, will depend on the

concrete development of the security situation. I expect that

the further development of Afghanistan will remain a common

effort for all who are part of this endeavour from the begin-

ning.

The European: Let me turn to other areas of cooperation. NATO

and EU have created in 2003 the NATO-EU capability group to

ensure mutual reinforcement, and in 2004 the EU has built up

the European Defence Agency (EDA) whose aim. This organisa-

tion is to coordinate work on development of defence capabili-

ties and arms cooperation among others things. Is there any

real progress and are there any upcoming “products”?

General Van Osch: The NATO-EU capability group is a good

tool for coordinating our efforts to improve the military capa-

bilities of our Member States. The informal staff-to-staff

coordination between the EU and NATO is also very useful. On

the EU side you can see that the work of the EU Military Staff

and the European Defence Agency (EDA) mirrors the work of

the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in NATO. An addi-

tional benefit for EU Member States is that EDA also has a

responsibility for Research and Technology and the improve-

ment of the European Industrial Base. I agree that for some

specific projects it can also be very beneficial for Member

States to have ACT take these forward. Both NATO and EU

have their specific strengths and Member States can choose

which suits them best.

The European: It seems that there is a master plan?

42


Lieutenant General Jürgen BornemannLieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann has beenDirector General of the NATO InternationalMilitary Staff since 2010. He was born in 1950 inBad Wildungen, Germany. He joined the GermanFederal Armed Forces in 1968, and studiedeconomics from 1976-1980. Before taking up his

current post, he was German Military Representative to the NATO and EUMilitary Committees (2008-2010). Previous posts include that of: Assis-tant Director Plans and Policy Division, NATO International Military Staff(2005-2008), Deputy Head of Politico-Military Affairs and Arms ControlDivision, Federal Ministry of Defence Berlin (2000-2005), and Head ofPolitico-Military Affairs, Federal Ministry of Defence, Bonn (1996-2000).

General Van Osch: The positive aspect is, that EU and NATO

are well coordinated. We have a good overview of who does

what. I would also like to stress that we facilitate Member

States in their creation of better capabilities. Member States

continue to own these capabilities and can decide themselves

how to use them. This can be done under EU, NATO or other

coalitions. So, if we strengthen the capabilities of Member

States within the EU, we directly also strengthen the capabili-

ties of NATO, since most are members of both organisations.

TThe European: General Bornemann, you would certainly like to

comment on that.

General Bornemann: General van Osch hits the point when he

says that strengthening European capabilities directly rein-

forces NATO. And the Chicago Summit Declaration recognises

the importance of a stronger and more capable European

defence in underlining NATO-EU cooperation. Concretely,

NATO’s Smart Defence approach and the EU’s Pooling and

Sharing initiatives are two faces of the same coin. Smart De-

fence means spending wisely on essential requirements, while

avoiding duplication. That is why we welcome the EU’s efforts

to address the European shortfalls in air-to-air refuelling,

medical support, maritime surveillance, and training.

“Reality is that no Member State can take

care of its security in isolation” Ton Van Osch

The European: Is this the right track or only a trend?

General Bornemann: I believe we are on the right track. This

requires working step-by-step to strengthen EU-NATO cooper-

ation, specifically in the important area of military capabilities

development.

However, there is always room for improvement. I am con-

vinced that the NATO-EU Capability Group has not yet made

full use of the potential of coordination in the area of capabili-

ty building. We can and we should do more in this area.

The European: General Bornemann, could the financial crisis

have “positive” effects on this cooperation or are national cuts

in defence budgets to work not yet so deep that nations are

forced to cooperate further and in a more coordinated fashion?

Until now, as Secretary Rasmussen stated some weeks ago at

the Folketing in Copenhagen, “not much progress has been

made”. Is NATO´s new mind-set of the Smart Defence initiative a

remedy?

General Bornemann: Of course the financial crisis has acceler-

ated the need for greater cooperation between NATO and the

EU. I mean, we share the majority of member nations, so the

benefit is clear in terms of saving money and better utilisation

of resources. At NATO, we have already made progress in this

regard. Our Smart Defence initiative is a new mindset that

seeks to better align our collective requirements with national

priorities. It means deciding on selective cuts and specialised

areas. So Smart Defence is a vital principle for us. And in

Chicago we approved a robust package of more than 20

multinational projects, to provide the capabilities we need, at

a price we can afford.

But let’s be clear, Smart Defence is not the only answer to the

current security challenges. Making progress requires the

political will of all nations and in this regard, the EU plays a

key role. Certainly at the staffing level contacts are increasing,

and we shall continue to work towards regular discussions at

all levels across the widest spectrum of common security

threats.

The European: General Van Osch, in parallel to that Smart

Defence initiative the EU has developed the concept of Pooling

and Sharing. Are my doubts justified that an outcome will not be

achieved easily since nations are not yet forced by budgetary

constraints to follow this concept or should I rather believe in

the CEO of EDA, Ms Claude-France Arnould, when she under-

lined at a Foreign Affairs committee meeting in the European

Parliament that the EDA is successfully preparing the ground for

a long-term Pooling and Sharing initiative on “save and rein-

vest”?

General Van Osch: I am quite clear on the coordination be-

tween NATO and EU on who does what. Both facilitate Member

States to identify and then take forward new initiatives. It is in

the interests of both organisations that we do not duplicate. I

also believe that there is the political will to become more

efficient by pooling and sharing capabilities. That said, we also

have to acknowledge, that it is not easy. Let me mention two

key issues. Firstly, the question of sovereignty: In the field of

defence, most Member States do not like to be dependent on

others. But the reality is that no Member State can take care of

43


Lieutenant General Ton Van OschLieutenant General Ton Van Osch has beenDirector General of the EU Military Staff sinceMay 2010. He was born in 1955. In 1974, hejoined the Royal Netherlands Military Academy.After various appointments, he attended the USArmy Command and General Staff College, and

studied at Leiden University for a Masters degree in Public Administra-tion. In 1999, during the Kosovo conflict, Van Osch became Chief Ops(Land) at HQ SFOR. Directly after 9/11 he was sent to US Central Com-mand, Tampa, as an operational planner for the conflict in Afghanistan.In June 2002 Van Osch was promoted to Brigadier General and took overthe post of Director of Operations in the Netherlands. Before taking uphis current post, he was Military Representative of The Netherlands tothe EU and NATO in Brussels.

its security in isolation. Therefore, there is no choice. Sover-

eignty is not only the freedom to decide, but also the ability to

act. If for your security ambition you need certain capabilities

and you cannot afford to have those by yourself, it is better to

create those capabilities with others than not having them at

all. Secondly, the question of reinvestments: Here, I fully

agree with Claude-France Arnould, the Chief Executive of EDA.

If we want to stimulate Chiefs of Defence ( CHODs) to come

with initiatives for pooling and sharing, it is important that

they have a certain guarantee that they can reinvest the

money they save. If, as a matter of principle, the Minister of

Finance with each initiative cuts the budget with the level of

expected savings, the Chiefs of Defence will only have the

disadvantages and not the benefits. In the domain of military

capabilities, Europe is clearly below the level of the formal

political ambition. This is another reason we should reinvest

the money we save.

TThe European: General Bornemann, one of the issues General

Van Osch mentioned is air-to-air refuelling. EU defence minis-

ters declared that this initiative should serve the EU but also

NATO and other nations. What is about the NATO Prague

summit capability package in which air to air refuelling was

stated to be essential for NATO? Are you working in parallel and

can the EU’s albei restricted volume of air-to-air refuelling

capabilities bring an added value for NATO?

General Bornemann: The Prague Capabilities Commitment was

part of a three-pronged approach to improving defence capa-

bilities. The other two were the creation of the NATO Response

Force and the streamlining of NATO’s military command

structure. With this package, Allies made firm political commit-

ments to improve capabilities in 76 specific areas, one of

which is air-to-air refuelling. Last year, NATO’s operation in

Libya demonstrated significant shortfalls in a range of Euro-

pean capabilities – including precision-guided munitions, air-

to-air refuelling, and intelligence surveillance and reconnais-

sance.

The European: That shows that Europe alone is not yet powerful

enough to master these forms of conflict?

General Bornemann: Although European nations clearly

showed their willingness to lead a NATO operation, it is also

true to say that, without significant American contributions,

the operation in Libya would have been more difficult to

conduct. For Europeans to provide these assets requires

politi cal commitment just as much as financial resources.

However, if we go for multinational solutions, then we can

afford the capabilities we need in order to face new security

challenges. This is the essence of our Smart Defence initiative.

And, as I said before, a crucial part of Smart Defence involves

closer coordination between NATO and the EU. This is the

reason why we welcome the EU pooling and sharing initiative,

and in particular the current project on air-to-air refuelling. We

all have much to gain from a more capable European defence.

The European: Generals, which are the fields of cooperation

that will bring tangible success in the near future, when you

intend to bring together Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing?

General Bornemann: I won’t single out any one field. What is

important is that we ensure that these two initiatives are

mutually reinforcing. We cannot deny that we are facing a

difficult time of financial restrictions in a scenario which con-

tinues to present complex security challenges. The economical

crisis is putting tremendous pressure on our populations and

our public finances. At the same time, there remains great

uncertainty in the world, and we are facing new threats like

cyber attacks and global terrorism. It is plain that no single

nation can address these challenges on its own. This is a time

when, more than ever, we depend on each other to ensure our

shared security and preserve our shared values. So we need

to keep investing in the security relationships that matter, and

face these new threats from a global perspective.

General Van Osch: Because for political reasons sharing of

classified information is still difficult, it is easier to coordinate

“who does what” based on each other’s strengths, rather than

doing projects together. But this kind of coordination is

already very beneficial to both organisations. It avoids dupli-

cation, and most Member States benefit from the projects on

both sides. It helps us to use our defence budgets as efficient-

ly as possible.

The European: Thank you, Generals, for your attitude to bring

those initiatives forward. How do you think that the NATO-EU

cooperation will develop in the future?

General Van Osch: Political problems should be solved by

politicians, therefore we welcome the political will in both

NATO and EU to further improve our cooperation. Within the

political framework given, we military will try pragmatically to

find the most optimal solutions.

General Bornemann: I agree with General Van Osch. Of

course, NATO and the EU can work together to facilitate

solving any political impasse. In this regard, the “two-way

street” approach suggested by the Secretary General could

really make the difference. All EU members should be able to

participate in NATO-EU cooperation. At the same time, it

would certainly be beneficial for the EU to reinforce its politi-

cal and military rela tions with those NATO Allies who are not

members of the EU. We know what we need to do. If we work

together, then both our institutions can emerge stronger from

these times of eco nomic difficulty, supporting international

peace and security.

The European: Generals, thank you for this joint interview that

illustrates so well the potential synergy of NATO and EU cooper-

ation.

44


The need to save lives and ensure battle supremacy is influencing helicopter’s mode of operation

Helicopters in Crisis Management by Janusz Zakrecki, CEO, PZL Mielec, Warsaw

In 1938, when Igor Sikorsky was perfecting the design of a

vertical lift aircraft, a design that would launch the rotorcraft

industry, he said: “The helicopter will prove to be a unique

instrument for the saving of human lives.”

His words have proved to be prophetic and since the first

recorded helicopter rescue in 1944 in a Sikorsky R4, helicop-

ters of all types and makes have rescued an estimated three

million people.

Manage the flight The need to save lives and ensure battle supremacy is pro-

foundly influencing how the military operates helicopters.

The U.S. Marine Corps is experimenting in Afghanistan with a

version of the K-MAX aerial truck that resupplies troops with-

out a pilot. Adapted for the unmanned mission by Lockheed

Martin and Kaman, the aircraft is freeing more valuable

manned helicopters for troop transport roles, and keeping

trucks away from roadside bombs.

Similarly, with an eye on making BLACK HAWK helicopters

useful when their crews are resting, Sikorsky is developing

flight control technology that will enable the same aircraft to

be flown in an optionally piloted mode.

Sikorsky’s vision will enable an operator, who may not be a

pilot, to manage the helicopter, not fly it. A medic, for exam-

ple, could summon an aircraft to extract wounded troops,

relying solely on the aircraft to return to base with minimal

human oversight.

Eventually, remotely piloted or autonomous helicopters will

migrate to civil search and rescue and other humanitarian aid

(HA)/disaster relief (DR) missions, demonstrating again the

connection between military and civil technology and how

both sides still maintain Igor Sikorsky’s initial vision.

Transatlantic cooperationAcross the European Union, fiscal belt tightening is forcing

Member States to think “smart” about their defence expendi-

tures by pooling and sharing resources.

Cooperative national defence planning could compel the EU to

look to the United States for heavy lift transport helicopters,

even as the European Defence Agency (EDA) proposes forma-

45


Janusz ZakreckiSince 2005 Janusz Zakrecki has been GeneralManager of PZL Mielec, a position established in2005, when Sikorsky Aircraft acquired the Polishaviation company. In 1992 Mr. Zakrecki graduat-ed from Cracow University of Technology andjoined Zaklad Lotniczy “PZL Mielec” Sp. z o. o. In1999, he transferred to Pinacle Consulting’s

economic department and in 2002 he became department manager atWSK “PZL-Rzeszów” S.A. Mr Zakrecki is a member of the boards of theAviation Valley Association in Rzeszow and of the Polish IndustryAssociation (SPPL).

S-70i Black Hawk – a Polish Product of PZL, Mielec Source: Mielec

tion of a Multinational Helicopter Wing with separate

squadrons for heavy lift, utility and attack. Today, Sikorsky

and the U.S. Navy are well into a $3 billion system develop-

ment and demonstration contract to design and build the CH-

53K heavy lift helicopter for the U.S. Marine Corps.

A breakthrough in technologyWhile the CH-53K aircraft will have an identical footprint to its

D and E predecessors, the aircraft is all-new in every other

way. Titanium rotor components, 7,500 shaft horsepower

engines (twice the power of the CH-53E), fourth generation

blades, composite structures and fly-by-wire controls will

render the K aircraft more survivable, more maintainable and

easier to fly — while tripling external payload to 27,000

pounds (12,247 kilograms) over 110 nautical miles in “high

hot” ambient conditions. First flight of the K aircraft is expect-

ed in 2014, with initial operational capability in 2019. The

program of record is for 200 aircraft.

Given the maturity of the CH-53K program, and the longstand-

ing transatlantic relationship, the EU could explore coopera-

tive opportunities in the areas of production, sustainment and

spiral development to meet mutual capabilities enhancements

and country-specific modifications.

This approach has precedence. In the early 1970s, Sikorsky

teamed with German industry to bring production of 112 CH-

53G aircraft to Germany. Forty years later, those heavy lift

aircraft are still operational.

Low risk acquisitionA truism of today’s acquisition process is that mature, proven

aircraft — often defined as “military off the shelf” — provide

governments the lowest risk procurement choice.

Sweden is taking the low risk path with the purchase of 15 UH-

60M BLACK HAWK helicopters for deployment to Afghanistan

in 2013. The Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV)

cited its desire to buy a proven aircraft and support system

rather than update their existing aircraft for the ISAF mission.

To answer an immediate crisis response requirement, Sikorsky

is accelerating production and delivery of all 15 aircraft via the

U.S. Army in just 18 months and Sweden will deploy its BLACK

HAWK helicopters with trained personnel, logistics services,

spares and the knowhow to ensure operational success.

Likewise, because of an aversion to high risk, Australia last

year selected 24 MH-60R SEAHAWK aircraft for the Royal

Australian Nav and this summer, the U.S. Army is expected to

sign a five-year contract with Sikorsky for 500 more BLACK

HAWK helicopters. Alternatively, governments can now buy

Polish-built S-70i™ BLACK HAWK helicopters direct from

Sikorsky. Built at PZL Mielec, Sikorsky’s $100 million facility in

Poland. S-70i aircraft are identical in power and performance

handling to U.S. Army UH-60M helicopters.

Go smartTo keep costs low, customers can order airframes with option-

al equipment, including sensors and armament, while keeping

an eye on harmonization, standardization and interoperability.

Both the new CH-53K and the Polish manufactured S-70i

BLACK HAWK helicopters can give the European Multinational

Helicopter Wing an important edge in military and HR/DR crisis

response situations.

Attachment of a “Battle Hawk” module to the utility BLACK

HAWK helicopter will thereby fulfill the attack mission, and

thus drastically reducing logistic footprint and increasing

responsiveness and flexibility.

These airframes can offer a solution along the lines of the

European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) and the C-17 Strategic

Airlift Capability (SAC) in Hungary, where the longstanding

stable and cultivated transatlantic relationship guarantees the

required security of supply.

Staying competitiveWhile governments are devising new ways to affordably

acquire and operate military helicopter fleets, Eurocopter and

Sikorsky are each developing rotorcraft designs that could

achieve high speed flight in the 200 to 300 knot range — twice

the speed of conventional helicopters.

The speed advantage can be crucial for the “Golden Hour” in

Helicopter Emergency Management Services (HEMS) opera-

tions, or can extend the reach of helicopters in HEMS and

HA/DR missions.

Eurocopter’s X3 design features two turbo shaft engines to

power a main rotor and two propellers installed on short-span

fixed wings. Sikorsky’s X2 design uses co-axial counter-rotat-

ing blades and a pusher propeller. Both companies have

proved the effectiveness of their designs to deliver efficient

high speed flight and vertical lift performance with the poten-

tial for low operating and ownership costs.

Design innovationDesign innovation is the approach Igor Sikorsky took more

than 70 years ago with his VS-300 helicopter. Dismissing a

claim he had invented the helicopter, he said he and his team

of engineers had “merely” kept abreast of existing technolo-

gies, which they had combined with the successful design and

construction of an aircraft capable of controlled vertical flight.

Igor Sikorsky would applaud today’s efforts to build better

helicopters, which often make the difference in the success or

failure of crisis management missions.

Being the humanitarian that he was, he would urge industry

and governments to collaborate fully to establish a strong EU

defence equipment market and technological and industrial

base.

46


Protection is a system bringing together the human factor and state of art technology

Integrative Protection for and in operationsInterview with General Fulgencio Coll Bucher, Madrid

TThe European: General, you are the head of the Spanish land

forces and to reach that position you have participated as Force

Commander in all the Spanish forces’ out-of-area missions of

the last 20 years: Mozambique, Iraq, Afghanistan are just three

examples. What was the biggest problem you faced in preparing

your servicemen and women for those operations?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: The key element in my view is the

preparation of the squads, fire teams, team leaders and even

drivers. Each soldier must realise the importance of his/her

individual contribution for the success of the mission. Soldiers

must learn to respond automatically to the different incidents

with which they are likely to be confronted in any operation, in

a way that is consistent with the commander´s intent and, of

course, with the rules of engagement and all other applicable

procedures. In this way, soldiers are trained to be self-confi-

dent and to understand the culture of the people around them

and the history of the place they are working in. This enables

them to use their initiative and common sense, to avoid taking

unnecessary risks and to help keep the local population in

their AO safe.

The European: I can understand that there is nothing worse for

the troops’ morale than not being able to have confidence in the

safety and functionality of the equipment – personal protection

gear in particular – on which their survival and sustainability

often depend. How do you see the issue of protecting your

forces today, and what avenues are you exploring for the future?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: Our soldiers know that there is no such

thing as zero risk and that force protection is achieved by

means of thorough training as well as by equipping the de-

ployed contingents with the best available materiel and

weapons in accordance with the risk level of each operation.

Also, UAVs are used to locate any insurgent presence in the

areas of operation of our patrols in advance. The soldiers’

personal equipment is being improved, as are night vision

devices, camp security and all other means that can contribute

to minimising the risk.

The European: What you are saying, General, is that yours is an

integrated approach that takes account not only of direct

threats but also the risks associated with a highly technological

environment. What does this mean in terms of the technical

requirements of soldiers’ personal protection equipment, on

the one hand, and the compatibility of that equipment with their

environment – in other words the transport and combat vehicles

made available to them – on the other?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: One must not forget that this compre-

hensive approach also encompasses the welfare of the ser-

vicemen and women deployed on operations as well as that of

their families back home. That is an integral part of protection.

But now to come to your question: we can state that the

quality of the equipment carried by our deployed soldiers

meets our allies’ standards. Our uniforms, personal protection

elements, weapons and radio sets are completely reliable even

in the harsh conditions of modern operations and can be

employed in any feasible theatre, regardless of the specific

environmental conditions. Furthermore, before any materiel is

fielded a complete procedure is followed to determine the

requirements that the materiel must cover and what its specifi-

cations must be. During reception the equipment specifica-

47


General Fulgencio Coll BucherGeneral Fulgencio Coll Bucher has been head ofthe Spanish Landforces since 2008. He was born1948 in Palma de Mallorce and received hiseducation there and in Menorca.He graduated as an infantry lieutenant in 1970and was promoted to brigadear general in 2001.Fulgencio Coll was the first Spanish liaison

officer to the Eurocorps in Strasbourg and commanded then a brigade inSpain. After his command of a mechanized division he created the mostmodern Military Emergency Unit in Europe to be engaged in natural orman made desasters.During his career he has become a specialist in special forces operationsexperienced in UN missions in Angola and Mozambique and under Natocommand in Bosnia-Herzogewina and he commanded the 2nd Multin-tional Brigade in Iraq.

Spanish infantry platoon with the Spanish transport vehicle RG-31 MK 5E.Source: MOD, Spain, Madrid

tions and requirements are conscientiously verified for compli-

ance with army standards, so that the equipment can be

deployed from that very moment.

TThe European: You are conducting the COMFUT programme

with Spanish industry using the technologies developed by that

industry, or those developed elsewhere in Europe. Are there any

common approaches in the EU that you are following?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: I’m happy to answer that, but then I

would also like to address the question of compatibility

between personal protection equipment and vehicles.

The Future Warrior programme has two components: one is

national in scope, with all the industrial developments made

by Spanish companies, while the other – known as Combat

Equipment for Dismounted Soldiers – is multinational. The

latter is supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA),

which strives for convergence among the projects of several

European countries – up to 9 projects – including the Spanish

Army one.

The European: Allow me to ask you a few

questions on the issue of CBRNE threats and

protection. Where do you see the biggest

threat for armed forces coming from?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: Despite the efforts

made in weapons control and CBRNE technol-

ogy, we cannot disregard the risk posed by

failed states and terrorist elements interested

in using weapons of mass destruction in the

form of limited-effect artifacts and devices.

This threat assessment has led to a change in

the CBRNE protection perspective, making it

more proactive, with the focus on improve-

ments in the field of intelligence rather than

relying mainly on protection as has been the

case up until now.

The European: How do you assess the devel-

opment of protection against IEDs, including

with regard to the situation post-Afghanistan?

Will they continue to represent a threat for

future operations?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: Great advances have been made in

implementing TTPs to face and minimise the C-IED war risks

that are so relevant in what we call asymmetric warfare. I think

that these kinds of attacks can be expected to continue in the

near future and we must therefore persevere in our protection

efforts in this area. The preparation of our personnel and the

excellence of our materiel will be of great help, although we

know that there is no such thing as total security. Spain has

taken a huge qualitative step forward in that direction by

including, among other things, MRAP vehicles and the use of

jammers in its range of protection measures. We also have the

C-IED Centre of Excellence where experts work to update and

standardise the procedures for facing this threat within NATO.

The European: Could I ask you to come back to the issue of the

“human system” and the social integration of the men and

women that make up your forces: do you have a strategy here?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: The human element is our main asset.

Our personnel – men and women – work conscientiously day

48


General Coll and the Editor in Chief during the interview at the Army Headquarter in Madrid.Source: Luiz Rico, Madrid

From 4 to 15 June 2012, the Spanish AirForce is hosting a European Air TransportTraining event (EATT2012) involving sixEuropean Defence Agency (EDA) memberstates in Zaragoza. Member States involvedare: Belgium (one C-130 with two crews); theCzech Republic (one CASA-295 with two

crews); France (one C-130 with two crews);Germany (two C-160s with two crews); theNetherlands (one C-130 with two crews);and Spain (one C-130 and one CASA-295with four crews). The course has beenorganized by the EDA with the support ofEuropean Air Transport Command and is

part of the EDA’s ongoing pooling andsharing initiative. A second EEAT will beorganised in 2013 with the perspective toestablish a permanent European AdvancedAirlift Tactics Training Course (EAATTC) in2014, modeled on the U.S. course that hasoperated with success since 1984.

News: Spain is hosting European Air Transport Training event

by day to enhance the Army’s capabilities, giving their best to

the task. In that regard we are making a big effort as regards

further training courses for both commissioned and non-com-

missioned officers in our military academies. Regarding enlist-

ed personnel and junior NCOs, we have consolidated the

professionalisation process a little more than ten years after

the abandonment of conscription. Satisfactory results are

being achieved at all levels; indeed I am very proud to com-

mand this extraordinary group of people.

TThe European: General, you founded the Military Emergency

Unit in 2006. What is the MEU?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: The Military Emergency Unit (MEU) is an

Armed Forces unit that is especially constituted, organised,

trained and equipped to preserve the security and welfare of

citizens in the event of grave risks, catastrophes, calamities or

other cases of public necessity. It is composed of 4 000 staff

from the Army, Air Force and Navy and is deployed all over

Spanish territory for the purpose of providing a faster inter-

vention capability. It is the medium provided by the State to

assist in cases of emergency.

The European: How does it fit into the Civil Protection System?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: In Spain civil protection responsibilities

are structured into different levels of assistance according to

the seriousness of the emergency. The most elemental level is

the responsibility of the municipality. The second level is the

responsibility of the Autonomous Community. The third level

is the responsibility of the State through the Ministry of the

Interior. In the case of an emergency that exceeds the capabili-

ties of the Autonomous Community, the Autonomous Commu-

nity requests the help of the State through the Ministry of

Interior (Civil Protection and Emergency Directorate). In this

case the Ministry of Interior asks the Ministry of Defence to

authorise the intervention of the Military Emergency Unit. Once

authorised, the MEU is at the disposal of the Autonomous

Community.

In the event of a level-three emergency the MEU General

Commander assumes the sole operational command, taking

his orders directly from the Minister of the Interior.

The European: Is this the only unit of this kind in Europe?

Fulgencio Coll Bucher: No. The MEU is based on other models,

in particular the French and Swiss ones, but clearly, being

more recent it has been able to take advantage of the know-

how of its French and Swiss predecessors which were very

generous in providing assistance for its creation. This Unit

improves upon certain aspects of the French and Swiss mod-

els, principally in that it is bigger in size and has a more pow-

erful communication systems.

The European: General, thank you for the discussion. I wish you

all the best in bringing your troops safely home from

Afghanistan in 2014.

49


Spanish Forces training Afghan soldiers in patrolling Source: MOD, Spain, Madrid

TThe European: Herr Hexels, you are the CEO of Blücher Systems

GmbH, whose name is associated with the SARATOGA brand

name, known in more than 40 countries, including the US and

Germany, as the synonym for CBRN protective clothing for the

armed forces. Your company was also the development partner

for the clothing system for the Infantryman of the Future En-

hanced System (IdZ-2) of Germany’s armed forces.

Gerd Hexels: After some initial research and development work

for Germany’s civil protection forces Blücher evolved into a

company concerned predominantly with developing protection

technologies for military forces. But time has moved on, our

systems have proven their worth, and just as the 2009 Lisbon

Treaty calls for a comprehensive approach to threats, deploy-

ment scenarios and operational concepts, so do we too now

perceive the need to make the technologies initially developed

for military operations available to civilian forces as well.

The European: That is indeed an interesting development, but

before we discuss police forces in more detail, could I ask you to

briefly explain all the things that the brand name SARATOGA

stands for?

Gerd Hexels: With pleasure. In the 1990s the SARATOGA®

brand name was still synonymous with an adsorptive air

permeable fabric liner for protective suits, designed to keep the

soldier safe from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

(CBRN) threats. But as the company grew, it extended its area

of expertise to the whole supply chain, which for some product

areas now ranges from the raw material through to the com-

plete integrated protection system. Over the last ten years the

company has developed into a systems supplier.

The European: With the development of the IdZ-2 for the Bun-

deswehr you have extended your technological leadership to

areas other than CBRN protection.

Gerd Hexels: Yes indeed, through successful partnerships we

are now also particularly active in such areas as ballistic protec-

tion, human factors, camouflage technologies and the integra-

tion of electronic components.

The European: Then it comes as no surprise that you are now

also applying those technologies to the protection of police

forces but – let me try to phrase this carefully – is this something

that the police actually want? And if there is a real need, how do

you intend to set about satisfying it?

Gerd Hexels: There can be no doubt that the need exists: we

see this not only for our German and European forces, but in

our activities all over the world. However one must be clear

about the fact that police and military forces often do not

have exactly the same approach, which means that the

requirements of the protection systems will be different,

although for the user the physiological burden is much the

same.

The European: What is your approach?

Gerd Hexels: As a general rule the first step is to try and

understand the threat and operational scenarios. On that

basis we can then define the equipment requirements, before

finally developing solutions that also take on board the

specific needs and wishes of the users.

The European: Herr Hexels, to get down to the business at

hand: on what kind of scenarios are your development activi-

ties in the area of protection systems for police based?

Gerd Hexels: Given the multinational nature of operations

there is a need for interoperability, common standards and

equipment components that are at least mutually compati-

ble, if not, even, totally interchangeable. And the European

Union considers itself a global player.

There is a need in multinational police operations for common standards and equipment components

Police forces: personal protection during crisis-management operationsby Gerd Hexels, CEO Blücher Systems, Erkrath

50

Gerd Hexels Gerd Hexels has been CEO of Blücher Systems,formerly Texplorer since 1998.1960 born in Lobberich he joined after gradua-tion the German Armed Forces for a two-yearservice in 1980. Then he started working in thetextile industry in the fields of R&D, produc -tion and sales. From 1982 to 1990 he has been

technical director and later production manager at Thomassen GmbH, asmall business unit in Nettetal. From 1990 to 1995 he has beentechnical director at Voss Biermann Lawaczeck Krefeld. From 1995 to1998 he has been Managing Director at Rawe Nordhorn. In 1998 hefounded Texplorer® GmbH, a company specialized in the developmentof high quality functional systems for civilian as well as for militaryforces. In 2010 Blücher GmbH, Erkrath, became the main shareholder ofTexplorer® GmbH and the company was renamed Blücher SystemsGmbH. In the last couple of years Gerd Hexels main focus laid on humanfactors in textile systems to improving the soldier’s survivability andsustainability.


TThe European: What do you mean

by that?

Gerd Hexels: That police opera-

tions these days are not neces-

sarily confined to peaceful

areas with temperate climates.

During international police

missions, special forces and

training staff may face asymmet-

ric threats such as terrorism and

at the same time have to oper-

ate in climatic zones for which

their normal equipment was not

originally designed. The challenges

for police forces and hence for every

single police officer are therefore be-

coming greater. On top of that there is the

problem of the unpredictability of events, both

in terms of the location and timing.

The European: And what are the requirements that you deduce

from that?

Gerd Hexels: The diversity of threats leads to increasingly

complex protection systems, both for law enforcement person-

nel and for the special and police units engaged in internation-

al missions. We fully agree with the police authorities on the

need to attach equal importance to protection and to opera-

tional effectiveness. This is why we have developed systems

that, thanks to the integration of ballistic protection, human

factors and load-carrying systems make for weight savings and

an ergonomic weight distribution, thereby enhancing the

operating efficiency of the wearer.

The European: So far so good. However, I see another issue,

namely that of the need to adapt the protection to actual opera-

tional requirements in a given situation. In other words, some

situations require less protection, but others, more. How do you

tackle that problem?

Gerd Hexels: In our discussions with our clients we see time

and again, after a careful analysis of the current scenarios and

operating concepts, the need to develop modular protective

clothing to allow the equipment to be adapted to specific

situations in the way you just suggested. Among other things,

for example, we propose a modular design for ballistic protec-

tion systems as well as components adapted to specific clima-

tic conditions that enhance the operational efficiency of forces,

in that, for example, they allow the weight of the equipment to

be reduced without increasing the risk for the wearer. This has

become a recognised principle that we adhere to.

The European: A moment ago you mentioned the Lisbon Treaty.

I note that political circles deliberately no longer make a clear

distinction between civilian and military scenarios. In your

discussions with your cus-

tomers do you find that they

too are working on the basis of

converging scenarios for

military and civilian crisis-man-

agement operations?

Gerd Hexels: Civil-military

cooperation is getting closer.

The fact that military and

civilian forces find themselves

confronted, increasingly, with

similar scenarios is reflected in

the growing convergence

between the requirements that

the two types of forces put forward for

their protection equipment. In my view, however, it is not a

matter of treating the two cases without distinction.

The European: What then?

Gerd Hexels: We need a clear analysis of where and under what

circumstances joint action is called for. And this is precisely

why our system components and products incorporate tech-

nologies and research findings that were originally developed

for use in the military area and can now be used for civilian

purposes.

The European: Allow me, finally, to ask once again about the role

of human beings in your development activities: just now you

referred to “human factors”. What does this mean exactly?

Gerd Hexels: “Human factors” generally speaking is a very

wide-ranging concept. It is of special importance for the field of

personal protection equipment, where it refers in particular to

ergonomic and physiological considerations as well as to

issues of compatibility with weapons systems and transport

platforms/vehicle systems. Since all these criteria have an

equally important influence on the effectiveness and success of

missions, human factors now carry as much weight with users

and in our development work as the protection performance of

each system itself.

51


Example of a new clothing systemincluding load bearing vest.

Source: Blücher Systems

From 14 to 16 May 2012, experts from 32 countries met in Copen-hagen for a conference on Explosives & CBRN. The conference washeld under the umbrella of the EU-based network EEODN (EuropeanExplosive Ordnance Disposal Network), which was created byEuropol in 2008 with the aim to strengthen knowledge sharing andexchange of best practices between the countries of the EuropeanUnion on CBRNE issues.

News: CBRNE conference

Recent conflicts have created a growing demand for highly

protected vehicles. This could easily be realised with the range

of strongly armed Infantry Fighting Vehicles, but it was more

challenging to improve the protection of medium wheeled

platforms. The last decade has seen the creation of a new type

of system able to resist the highest level of mine or IED (Im-

provised Explosive Device) threats, but which has the draw-

back of increasing weight, with the negative consequences

that this entails for operational and strategic mobility. The by

now well-known Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)

category of vehicle was a natural and fast response to the

need to carry soldiers whilst providing satisfactory protection

against the worst threats. It has been the golden age of the “V-

shape hull”, reputedly the best technological compromise for

saving lives, but at the cost of downgrading other operational

assets, such as internal volume, low centre of gravity, payload

capability. These drawbacks have finally created additional

hazards in the battlefield, cancelling out the gain in protection

originally expected from the V-hull.

The need to reconcile requirementsIn actual fact this technological choice simply contradicts basic

military tactical principles according to which the best protec-

tion stems from mobility, the capacity to take initiatives,

reversibility and quick manoeuvres. On top of that, the limita-

tions of MRAPs have led to a hyper-specialisation of medium-

sized platforms, leading to a deep lack of versatility. This has

resulted in the multiplication of intermediate categories of

vehicles, several different medium-sized platforms now being

required to cover the full range of missions in the operational

spectrum, from low to medium intensity. Consequently, the

bulk of today’s medium wheeled vehicle fleets are afflicted

both by a loss of operational capability and by the increasing

organisational complexity of logistic support. Hence today, in

order to reconcile protection, operational needs and logistic

efficiency, versatility appears to be the key, by giving more

room for manoeuvre and streamlining fleet management.

Multi-role chassis platformGeneral Dynamics European Land Systems, with its long

tradition of the well-known PIRANHA family of vehicles, has

now developed the EAGLE family of vehicles based on a

common versatile and multi-role chassis platform, available

either in 4x4 or 6x6, and offering as much protection as the

heavier MRAP vehicles. High and secure mobility on and off

the road is achieved by means of De Dion axles using a patent-

ed roll stabilizer system. The De Dion suspension system

combines the advantages of independent wheel suspension

with those of rigid axles. By means of the patented roll stabi-

lizer, maximum off-road traction and thrust are achieved even

in the toughest conditions and body roll in curves is eliminat-

ed. This state-of-the-art chassis technology can be combined

with an innovative double V floor.

The versatile EAGLE-PlatformThanks to the combination of the two technologies, and

contrary to the majority of MRAPs, the EAGLE vehicle does not

need to give up any of its mobility or payload capabilities in

order to achieve the highest protection. This innovative versa-

tile platform ranges from a 10 tonne two-men cab support

vehicle to a 15 tonne armoured personal carrier suitable for a

crew of up to 12 soldiers. Hence, whereas in the past more

than five different types of vehicle were sometimes required,

today a single family of vehicles can cover the full range of

missions while allowing the use of all four tactical methods:

offensive and defensive action, security and assistance.

The EAGLE family of vehicles has been developed in order to

offer customers the possibility of standardising their entire

fleet of light tactical vehicles. By using a single platform to

cover all requirements, the EAGLE family reduces the

through-life support cost of the entire customer fleet. Indeed,

each variant within the EAGLE family has more than 85% of

parts in common with the other members. This high degree of

commonality is an important factor that is highly in demand

for the mobility chain of a military vehicle. Moreover, it facili-

tates the potential outsourcing of maintenance support at

home or on operations abroad, thereby reducing logistic

52


Reduce the budget burden of the life-cycle cost through standardisation

The future of versatile platforms by Arnaud de Pechy, Regional Sales Director GDELS, Kreuzlingen

Arnaud de Péchy Regional Sales Director, General DynamicsEuropean Land SystemsBorn in 1973 in France. He spent 14 years in theFrench Army and had the opportunity to serve asan infantry officer within the French ForeignLegion. He is graduated with Master degrees inoperational management and in Internationl

Business. Formerly Key Account Manager in a French Defence company,he has been working for GDELS since 2010, as Regional Sales Directorworking mainly in Europe. He is currently one of the participant of theSERA24-IHEDN European course.

support management costs. More than 5 000 EAGLE vehicles

are already in service worldwide. We offer our customers

various pooling and sharing opportunities in the field of

common training or common logistic support during opera-

tions.

With all defence budgets facing drastic cuts, it is urgently

necessary to implement new fleet management methods and

rationalisation concepts. This can be achieved with the help of

this off-the-shelf military product. Fleet standardisation also

makes for optimised human resources management. Indeed,

the rationalisation of spare parts implies the rationalisation of

training for maintenance staff. Training can now focus on a

single type of vehicle, using one kind of documentation and

repair kit, in similar workshops set up in every regiment or

maintenance unit. On the user side, the driver can be trained

on the same real driver post or simulator. The driver of a recce

platoon equipped with a 4x4 vehicle will, for instance, be able

to drive a 6x6 APC. Thus he can reinforce another unit for

specific missions or replace the driver of another vehicle who

may be injured or sick, not to mention the ease with which he

can switch from driving a training fleet vehicle to an alert fleet

vehicle.

Meeting operational requirements…The EAGLE family of vehicles has been designed to improve

the allocation of budgetary resources to operational require-

ments. By providing the opportunity to progressively move

from a heterogeneous to a homogeneous fleet, it reduces the

budget burden of the fleet, to the benefit of the soldier on the

ground. In addition, by offering soldiers the highest level of

protection and mobility, EAGLE helps increase the margin for

manoeuvre of the tactical chief on the battlefield.

… and reducing the financial burden over the life-cycleThe trend towards modern military equipment with the in-

creasing integration of various cutting-edge technologies will

require the allocation of more and more budget resources to

the maintenance and use of equipment. Meanwhile, procure-

ment batches are being dramatically reduced, leading to in-

creased procurement costs. The EAGLE family of vehicles is the

solution proposed by GDELS for tackling these constraints.

This platform covers the broadest range of needs and hence

enables optimised procurement and a better operational use

of the vehicle fleets. This ideal solution that now exists is the

key to achieving budget savings by simplifying procurement

management, rationalising maintenance and optimising

training. All these savings can be converted into potential new

budget allocations to operational training, urgent procure-

ments and/or other direct investments for meeting operational

requirements.

53


EAGLE FoV within the Spectrum of Operations Chart: GDELS, Kreutzlingen

CBRN response is a cornerstone of the European Union’s

internal security strategy. In June 2009 the European Commis-

sion issued its Communication on an EU CBRN Action Plan,

which was adopted by the EU Council in November 2009. The

aim of this Communication was to ensure efficient interaction

between EU and national initiatives in addressing CBRN risks

and preparing appropriate responses. This represents a

veritable challenge for the EU and the member states and the

efforts thus far have fallen short of those objectives.

The EP - one of the main players in securityDuring the vote in the European Parliament (EP) in December

2011 on MEP Ana Gomes’ report on the EU CBRN Action Plan,

the EP recognised that “the current CBRN Action Plan is weak,

lacks coherence and is not being implemented by all Member

States” and that “the changes introduced by the European

Council to this action plan dilute the binding level of the

measures foreseen and weaken the monitoring and control of

their implementation”.1

The EP finally voted for the establishment of a special Euro-

pean Crisis Reaction Mechanism for helping nations to cope

with CBRN disasters.

An important aspect of Ana Gomes’ report is that the EP calls

for regional or EU-wide stockpiles of response sources. In its

its opinion on the EU CBRN Action Plan, the Committee on

Foreign Affairs called for a special focus on defining the EU’s

needs in terms of CBRN preparedness and response capability,

including medical counter-measures.

Hans H. Kühl, one of the world’s recognised authorities on

CBRN, suggests that the European Union could “provide

nations and interested parties [with] the platform for identify-

ing threats and risks, coordinating research and development,

harmonizing capabilities, and increasing civil-military coopera-

tion”,2 given that the responsibility for such primary opera-

tional-level domains as protection, response and recovery lies

with the member states.

Regional conflicts – accidents – disastersThe European Security Strategy of December 2003 identifies

the most probable threat scenarios and concludes that the

most likely scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire

weapons of mass destruction, but CBRN threats to Europe do

not stem only from international terrorism. Natural accidents

or industrial disasters can also create mass casualties. The “EU

Threat Programme” has shown that, generally speaking,

neither hospitals nor medical staff are prepared to deal with

mass casualties.

Chemical hazards and threats In general, chemical hazards or threats stem from the deliber-

ate release of substances (e.g. by terrorists) or from their

production, storage and transport. Chemical disasters such as

the accidental leakage of methyl isocyanate gas at Bhopal in

India in 1984 or the deliberate release of sarin in the Tokyo

subway in 1995, which killed 12 people and poisoned and

more than 5.000, prove that a real danger exists all over the

world. So far the European Union has been spared such a

major chemical catastrophe, but the deliberate or accidental

release of chemical substances remains a realistic possibility,

notwithstanding the EU’s higher security standards. In such

incidents as the Toulouse disaster in 2001, when 300 tonnes

of stored nitrate ammonium exploded,3 or the spill of toxic red

chemical sludge in Hungary in 2010, the population narrowly

escaped a major catastrophe.

Nations strive for EU-wide cooperation in the field of “C”

EU MASH WP 5 (2007–2009),4 which was set up to gather

information from nations with a view to the management of

mass chemical casualties, clearly identified deficiencies in the

management of chemical disasters. It noted that only a minori-

ty of member states were capable of a quick and timely re-

sponse to chemical incidents involving mass casualties and

that less than half of nations had hospital facilities specialised

in the treatment of chemical casualties. One reason for those

shortcomings in the provision of emergency care would seem

to be that some chemical agents are persistent and require

decontamination measures, while others are not. Depending

on the mechanism of their impact on the human body, the

effect of some toxic chemicals can be mitigated by administer-

ing antidotes to the victims.

According to the MASH Report, more than half of member

states made provision for early life-support care in the event of

chemical incidents, but only half of the nations had an emer-

gency plan for the administration of antidotes. One positive

finding, however, was that there is unanimous interest in an

EU cooperation programme for chemical casualty management

as recommended by the report. One aspect of this programme

is the stockpiling of chemical antidotes.5

The way ahead

Apparently there is no shortage of ideas and good will within

the European Union in order to master the problem of re-

sponse to chemical incidents.

Regarding stockpiling, it seems that among the EU countries

France at least has a consolidated and implemented national

54


Anticipating needs following the release of toxic chemicals

CBRN – The stockpiling of antidotes by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels

response strategy; indeed, France recently set up an official

organisation for that purpose called EPRUS, to which the

legislature has given two main tasks: to ensure the acquisition

and inventory management of public health stockpiles to deal

with emergency situations and to organise the mobilisation of

health workers in the event of a massive medical emergency.

The EU needs a stockpiling strategyThe European Union needs a stockpiling strategy that must

lead to the creation of a central European stockpile as well as

decentralised stockpiles of antidotes. This strategy must

provide an answer to the question of how strategic and local

stockpiling with cross-border effect could create added value.

The strategic work should therefore start with common guide-

lines about what, how much and how to stockpile for each

specific risk.

The stockpiling of antidotes is an integral part of overall

protection. For the moment is not obvious that everyone will

rally behind this proposal, but it is vital to launch a process of

reflection within the EU and at national level.

1 Ana Gomes MEP: “Member States must enact an enhanced EU CBRN Action

Plan” in The European – Security and Defence Union Berlin/Brussels ed. 1-2011,

pp. 21ff.

2 Hans H.Kühl, “The CBRN threat and resulting challenges for the European Union

in The European-Security and Defence Union, Berlin/Brussels ed. 2/2011 p. 44.3 Xavier Montauban: “Les risques NRBC-E, savoir pour agir”, Paris, 2010, 2nd

edition, pp. 135 ff.4 MASH = Mass Casualties and Health care following the release of toxic

chemicals or radioactive material. 5 The results of MASH WP 5 are resumed in: MASH WP 9 by David Baker and

others under the Health Protection Agency, Oxfordshire, UK.

55


Documentation

(…) A large scale incident, although rare, may stretch the re-sources of a single country so that expert help may be requestedfrom neighbouring nations, or if it may affect several countries. Ifthere is at least some procedures in common between nations,an international response can be carried out more easily and willbe more effective. The ultimat goal for mass casualty manage-ment in Europe is the ability to respond effectively and efficientlyto a major incident in a variety of situations, providing a coordi-nated compatible response (…).Source: Heath Protection Agency, HPA: Mash-Work-Package 9, Oxfordshire 2011, page V

MASH EU Project 2007-2009 WP 9-Final Report

Actions to be implemented with caution

“Yes” to a robust EU counter-piracy strategyby Maria Eleni Koppa MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels*

56

Maritime securityLeaving aside maritime terrorism for the moment, pirates’s degree of organisation can greatly vary.Depending on the latitude, a different modus operandi is used and the attack radius and objectivesdiverge.

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A major development field has been the first offensive action of

EU naval force EU NAVFOR Somalia-Operation Atalanta in

Somali territorial waters and on Somali soil on 15 May 2012.

Extension of the missionThis action was mandated by a European Union Council (EUC)

decision adopted on 23 March 2012 authorising an extension of

the force’s range of operations to include Somali coastal

territory (up to 2000 metres from the shore), as well as its

territorial and internal waters. The European Parliament (EP), in

a resolution adopted on 10 May, welcomed – albeit with some

scepticism – this decision of the EUC, realising that without

more resolute action it is not possible to ensure safe navigation

off the coast of Somalia and to protect humanitarian aid ship-

ments to Somalia. Indeed, pirates have extended their area of

operations to encompass over a quarter of the Indian Ocean.

As a consequence, effective policing and escorting has become

almost a mission impossible.

Scepticism This scepticism has to do with the Parliament’s conviction that

piracy cannot be eliminated through military means alone, as

its root causes are related to the conditions of extreme poverty

in which the Somalis live and to the region’s persistent instabil-

ity. But there are also fears that the intervention could exacer-

bate violence, increasing the risk of unintentionally targeting

civilians and fishing equipment. Clearly, piracy in Somalia is a

multifaceted problem that re quires a comprehensive response

by the international community. As a matter of fact, the EU is

now adopting a more comprehensive approach. Early this year

a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn

of Africa was appointed, with a special focus on Somalia, and a

strategic framework was elaborated with the emphasis on the

root causes and drivers of conflict, the rule of law and socio-

economic development in the region. In other words, the EU

has upgraded its political presence in the Horn of Africa, view-

ing Somalia and its problems from a broader perspective.

It would therefore be erroneous to claim that there has been a

militarisation of the EU engagement. The new robust action by

Operation Atalanta on the Somali coast is in line with UNSC

resolution 1851 and is being conducted with the agreement of

the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. It is a re-

sponse to the situation when it comes to piracy at sea, as is the

planned CSDP mission EUCAP NESTOR, a regional training

mission for strengthening the maritime capacities of eight

countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean.

The EU has to avoid entering a circle of violenceIt is precisely such “militarisation fears”, however, which are

being echoed by certain Members of the European Parliament.

Are these fears groundless? Certainly not. The EU should be

very careful to avoid getting involved in a vicious circle of

violence that could endanger the lives of civilians on the

ground. Any action beyond the authorised 2 000 metres should

be excluded from rules of engagement (ROEs) and the scope of

European action should be defensive in nature and thoroughly

planned. It is important that the EU mission should be provided

with adequate intelligence, analysis, early warning capabilities

and clear ROEs. The EU mission, finally, has to be seen and to

act as a sincere ally of the Somali people. The EU needs to

communicate more clearly the contribution it makes to protect-

ing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to take more

pronounced action against illegal fishing and the dumping of

toxic and radioactive waste off the coast of Somalia. These

illegal activities, affecting the livelihoods of thousands of

Somalis, are also the root causes of piracy.

* Maria Eleni Koppa MEP, Advocat, Athens, has been MEP since 2007

Pirates are still active in the first half of 2012 – with a major economic impact

Piracy off the Horn of Africa in 2012by Dr Michael Stehr, German Maritime Institute, Bonn

57

Maritime security

About 60 incidents resulting in 12 hijacks were reported to the

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in the period until the end

of May 2012. The numbers show a decline in comparison to

2011 as an effect of naval operations and of civil shipping

relying more and more on private armed security teams

(PAST). The heavy weather season contributed to this result.

Pirates: tactical developmentsIn February pirate gangs began to extend their sweeps for

booty to the “Malacca-Cape Route” – with three attempted

attacks south of 5° South and east of 60° East. Pirates contin-

ue their mother ship operations preferring to use captured

dhows. To counter the navy’s effective sea surveillance and

information-sharing pirates have begun a new game: dhow-

hopping – which means using a dhow for a limited time or

number of strikes and then capturing a new one in exchange,

without sailing back to their home beaches. Pirates also

continue their business with “low cost-high profit”, but some-

times escalation is indicated by the heavy use of weapons or

by “mass attacks” involving up to eight attack-craft. Uncon-

firmed reports since 2011 have accused some pirate gangs of

intentionally killing hostages in order to push the ransom

negotiations.

Civil shipping: BMP4, PAST and insuranceMore ship-owners than before are relying on Private Armed

Security Teams (PAST). Up until now no ship with armed

guards has been hijacked. In recognition of that fact, a Lon-

don-based insurance company is offering a piracy policy for

transiting the high-risk area off the Horn of Africa with reduced

rates (up to a 75% reduction). The MT SMIRNY (Aframax crude

oil tanker) hijacking incident illustrated the importance of

effective self-protection. Technical protection measures in

accordance with the Best Management Practices (BMP4) of the

International Maritime Organisation (IMO) may help in the Gulf

of Aden with warships in the vicinity, but are not likely to

succeed in the vast ocean areas if there is no naval ship to

assist.

EU NAVFOR Atalanta – mandates and tacticsThe European Union has prolonged the mandate of EU

NAVFOR Atalanta until the end of 2014 and extended the naval

forces’ operational area from the sea to a land corridor stretch-

ing from Somalia’s coastline to 2 000 metres further inland.

The EU’s naval forces are now allowed to destroy boats and

equipment while gangs are preparing their raids. This does not

constitute a major change of mandate but closes a practical

gap. In May, nine naval vessels and five Maritime Patrol

Aircraft were operating under the EU mandate and flag. They

conducted a first raid on pirates’ land-based assets in May.

Yemen: next failing state in at the Gulf of AdenIn Yemen developments resemble the Somali agony that

began 25 years ago. In southern parts around Aden and in

northern regions, clans, militias and Islamic terror organisa-

tions are taking control. The election of Al-Hadi as the succes-

sor of President Salih in February 2012 has not changed

anything.

The economy is in dire straits, oil revenues are declining and

there is a dramatic water shortage in parts of the country due

to the intensified cultivation of quat. There has been no

complete collapse of law and order in the period up until mid-

2012 thanks to the tribal structures that have provided a

degree of stability for some 3 000 years. Will the elder clans-

men be able to maintain stability in the 21st century, and in

particular to counter the Islamists’ dream of a new safe haven

after Afghanistan and southern parts of Somalia? Islamists are

trying to establish a maritime link with Somalia and to build up

maritime assets and abilities in order to gain a kind of “con-

trol” over the sea lanes around the Arabian Peninsula enabling

them to carry out terrorist attacks in the maritime environment

and perhaps also to engage in piracy in order to fund their

war. Regarding the objective of conducting a new close-

in/blockade along the Yemeni coastline like that put in place

to keep Somali pirates ashore, new mandates and more naval

assets would be required.

Economic burden of Somali piracyThe One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) has published a

detailed study in which it estimates the economic costs of

Somali piracy at some US$ 7 billion in 2011. Military opera-

tions (about 20 nations operating some 30 ships to fight

piracy) account for a share of only 19% (US$ 1.4 billion); it is

the shipping industry that carries the main burden. Ransoms

account for a tiny share (2%) of that sum, insurance 10%,

security equipment 17%, additional labour costs 3%,

increased speed and fuel consumption in high-risk areas 40%

and re-routing 9%. Increased fuel consumption alone amounts

to nearly US$ 3.5 billion. To this sum of US$ 7 billion one must

add the economic drawbacks for Somalia, Yemen, Kenya and

Tanzania, which all suffer from higher prices for imported

commodities.

Study and Executive Summary: www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org

58


New EADS Top ManagementOn 31 May 2012, EADS confirmed changes inits top management. The Annual GeneralMeeting appointed a new Board of Directorswith Arnaud Lagardère as Chairman and DrThomas Enders as Chief Executive Officer ofEADS. At their meeting, the Board of Direc-tors also appointed Harald Wilhelm as ChiefFinancial Officer of EADS N.V. and of AirbusS.A.S, succeeding Hans Peter Ring. ThierryBaril was appointed Chief Human ResourcesOfficer of EADS N.V. and of Airbus S.A.S. Hereplaces Jussi Itävuori. The Airbus Share-holder Committee has appointed FabriceBrégier as new Chief Executive Officer Airbustaking over the post from Tom Enders. Based on a proposal by FabriceBrégier, approved by the Board of Directors of EADS, the Airbus Share-holder Committee has also appointed Günter Butschek as Chief Operat-ing Officer of Airbus. The CEO of EADS will announce the composition ofthe EADS Executive Committee in September, following the conclusionsof his review of the state and strategy of the company.

NATO AGS takes off in ChicagoNATO nations took an important step towards the delivery of a NATO-owned and operated ground surveillance and reconnaissance capabil-

ity. A procurement contract for the AGS system was signed with theUS industrial group Northrop Grumman on 20 May 2012 in themargins of the NATO Summit in Chicago, paving the way for thedelivery of a vital capability that will be made available to all NATOmember nations. Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) will be a NATO-owned and operated system and will be fully operational in 2017.

Dassault 2011 ResultsEnd of March, Charles Edelstenne, CEO of Dassault Aviation,

presented the Results of is Group for 2011. Net sales (3,305

million) went down by 21% in 2011. This decrease results from

a noticeably lower number of business jets deliveries com-

pared to 2010, which was the Falcon historical delivery record.

The CEO commented: “However, 2011 net income is improv-

ing, thanks to Thales contribution. Thales 2011 good results

are in line with their forecast. Regarding the prospects, the

Group is pleased with the Indian Government decision to

select the RAFALE in the frame of the MMRCA program, in

order to equip the Indian Air Force with 126 aircraft. Our

teams keep mobilized into obtaining the signature of the

contract.”

> An interactive version of the Annual results report is

available here: http://tinyurl.com/ck62d6j

News: from Industry

Dr Thomas Enders,new CEO of EADS

Source: EADS

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)16 February 2012

Source: EEAS/Graphic: The European

60


SG 5Strategic Communication

Mann

MD IASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Isticioaia-Budura

MD IIAFRICA

Westcott

MD IIIEUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Lajcák

MDR Administration& Finance

Child ff

GPSC CHAIR

SkoogDirect link toWG chairs

FAudit, Inspection& ex-post control

O’Sullivan f.f.

MDR AFinance and Corporate SupportGuerend

MDR.A.1BudgetO’Neill

MDR.A.2Contracts

Perez Jimenez

MDR.A.3IT

Ruys

MDR .B.1Field Security

Croll

MDR.B.2HQ Security

Lajos

MDR.B.3Secure

CommunicationsKeymolen

MDR.C.1Human resources

HQRuiz Serrano

I.A.1India, Nepal,

BhutanRemond

I.B.1China, HK,

Macao, Taiwan,Mongolia

Cunningham f.f.

III.A.1Western Europe

Grippa

III.B.1E. Partnership,

reg.coop. & OSCE

Tibbels

III.B.2Eastern Partners-

hip bilateralKjaer

III.B.3RussiaPulch

III.B.4Central Asia

AndresMaldonado

III.A.2Western Balkans

Jonsson

Turkey AdvisorPortman

I.B.2Japan, Korea,Australia, New

ZealandHatwell

I.B.3Pacific

Sabatucci

I. 1Horizontal affairs

Molnar

I.A.2Pakistan,

Afghanistan,Bangladesh, SriLanka, Maldives

Tirr

I.A.3South East Asia

Gillespie

MDR.C.2Staff in

DelegationsMandler

MDR.C.3Rights &

AllowancesDemassieux

MDR.C.4Local Agents in

DelegationNotarangelo

MDR.C.5Partnerships with

MS (ENDs)Theodorou-Kalogirou

MDR.C.6Resources &

planningKlaar

MDR.C.7Training

Ruiz Serrano f.f.

MDR.A.4Infrastructure

Christiane

MDR BSecurity Officer

Potuyt

MDR CHuman Resources

Child

I.ASouth and South

East Asia

Serrano

I.BNorth East Asiaand the Pacific

Sabathil

III.AWestern Europe,Western Balkans

and TurkeyGentilini

III.BRussia, E. Part-nership; C. AsiaR. Coop. & OSCE

Wiegand

CIVCOM Leinonen,PMG Versmessen

COASI MajewskiCOEST Vuorimaki,COWEB Everard,COSCE Bechet

Mediator.Allegra

F.1Internal Audit

Lopparelli f.f.

F.2.Inspection ofdelegations

Graham

F.3.Ex-post control

Cavendish

II.A.1Horn of Africa,East Africa &Indian Ocean

Lester

II.B.1West Africa

Doyle

II.B.2Central Africa

Tison

II.1Pan-African

affairsCosta Pereira

II.A.2Southern AfricaWiedey-Nippold

II.AHorn of Africa,

East Africa, IndianOcean

Vervaeke

II.BWest &

Central Africa

Lopez Blanco

COAFR Lunny

61

Organisation chart

Crisis management structures

CounsellorCooper

Chair EUMCSyren

EUSRs

MD VIICRISIS RESPONSE &

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

A. MiozzoDSG 2

DEPUTY SECRETARYGeneral Schmid

DSG 1DEPUTY SECRETARYGeneral Popowski

MD IVNORTH AFRICA, MIDDLE

EAST, ARABIAN PENINSULA,IRAN AND IRAQ

Mingarelli

MD VAMERICAS

Leffler

MD VIGLOBAL AND

MULTILATERAL ISSUES

Marinaki

SG.1Policy

coordinationCampbell

SG.2StrategicplanningConte

SG.3CB secretariat

Onestini

HEP and national

parliamentsMatthiessen

SG.4Legal affairs

Van Hegelsom

IV. 1. ENPStrategy andInstrumentsO’Rourke

III.1. ENP SectorCoordinationMajorenko

IV.A.1Middle East I –Egypt, Syria,

Lebanon, JordanUusitalo

V.A.1US, CanadaAndresenGuimaraes

VI.B.1Human Rights

policy guidelinesKionka

VI.C.1Peacebuilding,

conflict prevention, mediation

Jenny

VI.D.1WMDs,

conventional weapons, space

Ganslandt

VI.C.2Security policy

Roy

VI.B.2Human Rights

policy instrumentsTimans

VI.B.3Democracy,Electoral

observationWasilewska

VI.A.1Multilateralrelations

De Peyron

VI.A.2Global issues

Guyader

VI.A.3Dev Coop

coordinationFernandez Shaw

V.A.2Mexico and

Central AmericaMavromichalis

V.A.3Andean Countries

MartinezCarbonell

V.A.4Mercosur Countries

Carro Castrillo

V.A.5CaribbeanKalogirou

IV.A.2Middle East II –Israel, occupiedterritories and

MEPPGabrici

IV.A.3Regional policiesfor the SouthernMediterranean

Bergamini

IV.A.4Maghreb

Fanti

IV.A.5Arabian Penin-sula, Iran, Iraq

Llombart Cussac

PrincipaladvisorGrela

IV.AN. Africa, MiddleEast, Ar. Peninsu-la, Iran and Iraq

Berger

V.AAmericas

Dupla del Moral

VI.A.Multilateral rela-tions & globalgovernance

Grela ff

VI.BHuman Rightsand Democracy

Arnault

VI.CConflict

prevention, & security policyMarinaki f.f.

VI.DNon-Proliferation& Disarmament

Marinaki ff

Foreign PolicyInstruments

Service (FPI –Commission

service)Margue

Budget,finance, inter -institutionalrelationsMiller

Stabilityinstrumentoperations

Ruiz-Calavera

CFSPoperationsAuvinen

Publicdiplomacy;

electionobservation

Nette f.f.

SITCENSalmi

MAMA Bozovic,MOG Kisling

COMEP Di Michele

CONUNDe Peyron

COHOMTheuermann

COARM Della Piazza,CONOP Rudischhauser,

CODUN Ganslandt

EUMSVan Osch

CMPDStevens

CPCCHaber

EU SatelliteCentre

EDA EU ISS

Chief OperatingOfficer O’Sullivan

Executive SecretaryGeneral Vimont

KEY:

reporting directly to the HRVP ASHTON

Corporate and Policy Boards

Working Group Chairs

CFSP Agencies

Crisis management structures

Commission Service reporting directly to HRVP ASHTON

COTRA ZajcFreudenstein,

COLAT Gelabert

V.1Regional affairsGelabert Rotger

HRVPAshton

Corporate board EUSRs

Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany. The different level of influence of parliaments.

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Transcript of Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany. The different level of influence of parliaments.